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**INDIAN SOUTH SOUTH COOPERATION CHALLENGING THE
TRADITIONAL NORTH SOUTH DEVELOPMENT APPROACH:
Comparative analysis of the development practices by the government
of India and the government of the Netherlands in Africa.**

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INDIAN SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION CHALLENGING THE TRADITIONAL NORTH- SOUTH DEVELOPMENT APPROACH

Comparative analysis of the development practices by the government of India and the government of the Netherlands in Africa.

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Abstract

This thesis looks at India as a development partner compared to Dutch development cooperation. This thesis aims to find out if the South-South cooperation approach to development is differing from a traditional donor approach to development cooperation. The comparative framework used is based on assumed differences between SSC and NSC derived from the literature review and claims made by SSC emerging partners like India. The factors are terminology, the rejection of conditionality, horizontal partnerships, agency of partner/recipient, and capacity building. This study contributes to the academic debate on the changing global power dynamics in the liberal world order, with emerging powers like India challenging the traditional development approach. They are claiming a more visible and active role in the field of international development. Through comparative analyses, the following research question will be answered: In what ways is the development partnership between India and Africa different from the traditional development cooperation approach of the Netherlands in Africa?

Table of contents

Abstract	2
Abbreviations	4
Chapter 1: Introduction	5
1.2 Methodology	7
Limitations	9
Chapter 2: Literature review	10
2.1 History of SSC	10
2.2 History of traditional development assistance	11
2.2 Defining SSC.....	12
2.3 Academic debate on NSC and SSC.....	13
Chapter 3: Background Chapter	16
3.1 Indian development cooperation	16
History	16
Main actors in development partnerships.....	17
Development partnerships in Africa	17
3.2 Dutch development cooperation.....	19
History.....	19
Main actors in development cooperation	20
Development cooperation in Africa	20
Chapter 4: Analytical framework.....	21
4.1 Terminology	21
4.2 The rejection of conditionality	22
4.3 Horizontal partnership or vertical cooperation.....	24
4.4 Agency of partner/recipient.....	25
4.5 Capacity building	26
Chapter 5: Comparative analysis.....	28
5.1 Terminology	28
5.2 The rejection of conditionality	31
5.3 Horizontal partnership or vertical cooperation.....	32
5.4 Agency of partner/recipient.....	34
5.5 Capacity Building.....	36
5.6 Conclusions of comparative analysis	38
Chapter 6: Conclusion.....	40
6.1 Discussion	41
Bibliography.....	43

Abbreviations

AU: African Union

CSO: Civil Society organizations

DAC: Development assistance committee

GNI: Gross national income

GOI: Government of India

HIPCs: Heavily indebted poor countries

IDEAS: Indian Development and Economic Assistance Scheme

IOB: Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en beleidsevaluatie (Inspection Development Cooperation and Policy Evaluation)

ITEC: Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation

LICs: Low Income Countries

LOCs: Lines of credit

MEA: Ministry of External Affairs

MFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

NAM: Non-aligned movement

NGO: Non-governmental organizations

NSC: North-South Cooperation

ODA: official development assistance

OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

TVET: Technical and vocational education and training

SCAAP: Special Commonwealth African Assistance Programme

SDGs: Sustainable Development Goals

SSC: South-South Cooperation

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

Chapter 1: Introduction

The growing emergence of South-South cooperation (SSC) has been described by some as a breath of fresh air whilst others regard it as old wine in new bottles (T. De Bruyn 2020, 179). Partnerships within the Global South are growing in importance, especially in the last few decades have emerging ‘donors’ become more visible. They distinctly distance themselves from the traditional development cooperation rhetoric. This thesis is contributing to the academic debate regarding the possible ways in which SSC is changing the field of development cooperation that is still dominated by the Global North.

In 1960 the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was established, as it took over the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OECE) that was set up to manage the aid from the United States under the Marshall Plan after World War II. A year later the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) was launched and in 1969 the members adopt the concept of Official Development Assistance (ODA), distinguishing aid flows from ‘other official flows’ (OECD 2006). The OECD-DAC has positioned itself as the ‘moral book-keeper’ of the foreign aid world, whilst most members of the OECD-DAC are countries from the Global North (Mawdsley 2011, 261). Furthermore, Mawdsley (2011) argues that the dominance of the Global North within the DAC is one of the reasons that foreign aid is mostly understood as something that can only be given by ‘the richer industrialised countries of the North to the poor, needy, backward countries of the South’ (ibid.).

As Esteves and Assunção (2014) argue two effects are distinguished in the process of development assistance from the Marshall Plan to traditional development aid. The first as described above is the founding of a definition of what is and what is not understood as development, an international development *doxa* is created (See Chapter 2). Secondly, it has led to a new hierarchy in which countries were divided into developed and underdeveloped. In that way, the Global North has also acclaimed a sort of legitimacy for their power to lead the underdeveloped along the ‘path’ they have already taken (2014: 1777). One way for the so-called ‘underdeveloped’ countries, or rather the Global South countries, to gain back autonomy and set their own goals after a long battle for independence, was to cooperate with other Global South countries. For instance, through the Afro-Asian Bandung Conference in 1955 or the creation of the Group of 77 developing countries. Through SSC the *doxa* of traditional development assistance as the only legitimate form of development assistance is being tested, leading to what Esteves and Assunção have called ‘the international development battlefield’ (2014: 1786).

India is one of the non-DAC actors of the Global South that has not followed these norms and the agenda set by the Global North, their cooperation with other developing countries claims to be focused on mutually beneficial outcomes and their own experiences as a recipient of aid. India is an avid advocate of SSC and an important partner for other Global South countries. The development landscape is diversifying and changing with these Global South actors becoming more visible and influential. Global South actors set different goals and challenge what has traditionally been understood by ‘development’ (Gore 2013, 772). Former Permanent Representative of India to the UN, Ambassador Syed Akbaruddin, states: “India’s development cooperation is rooted in our social ethos, defined variously, but encompassed by the philosophy of Sarvodaya, meaning ‘development and progress of all.’ Our working with fellow developing countries translates this philosophy into reality.”¹ This ethos of win-win partnerships is often repeated in speeches by prime ministers and ambassadors of India. This thesis will focus on understanding and analyzing the kind of ‘development and progress for all’ the Government of India is promoting, by comparing it with ‘traditional aid cooperation’ also known as North-South cooperation (NSC).

In the Global North these emerging economies challenging the arena of development assistance are widely perceived as a threat (Chaturvedi, Fues and Sidripoulos 2012, 14). Although many of the low-income countries (LICs) are still dependent on ODA through NSC, they fear that SSC practices are supporting rogue states and jeopardize the position of traditional aid structures (Naím 2009). The Netherlands has been a member of the DAC since its inception in 1961. The Government is a strong advocate of human rights based development cooperation. Their goals for ODA, like the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), have been set and monitored internationally. As a traditional donor of development assistance most of their ODA is channeled through bilateral aid and they ranked 9th in 2021 in the list of total development spending from DAC donor countries (SEEK Development 2023). However their approach and rhetoric has changed since the 60s as has the whole field of development assistance. This study is investigating a question posed by Chaturvedi et al. (2012) about how SSC development practices are differing from NSC practices (2012, 13). One of the hypotheses is that NSC is changing due to Southern actors challenging the liberal world order specifically regarding traditional development cooperation, this would be in line with the argument of Mawdsley (2019) that the traditional development community is “in a period of dynamic

¹ During the celebration of the second anniversary of the India-UN Development Partnership Fund, organized by the Permanent Mission of India to the UN together with the UNOSSC (The Hindu 2019).

change'' in part due to the 'rise of the South' (2019, 260). On the other hand, Kragelund (2015) discusses the convergence of SSC towards a more traditional aid approach, specifically reviewing the changes in development financing from China in Africa.

The overarching question driving this study is; the extent to which South-South development differs from North-South development cooperation? To answer this question a comparative analysis of Indian SSC partnerships compared to Dutch development cooperation in Africa will be done, leading to the following research question:

In what ways is the development partnership between India and Africa different from the traditional development cooperation approach of the Netherlands in Africa?

With the following sub-questions:

1. Is SSC changing the way development cooperation has been practiced by the North?
2. Is India along with the other 'emerging' donors changing the 'rules of the game'?

In broad terms, this thesis aims to find out if the assumed differences, retrieved from academic literature, between the partnership and cooperation of India and the Netherlands can be confirmed in practice. These assumed differences are based on the secondary literature and claims that India and the Netherlands make about their development approach (see Chapter 2).

1.2 Methodology

This thesis will assume a qualitative research method to look at two approaches of development practices. It is a comparative analysis of two cases. The method of comparative analysis is used to analyze two or more entities (cases, individuals, themes, etc.) to isolate their similarities and differences (Mills 2008). The first case will be India's approach of SSC in Africa and the second case is the traditional approach of development cooperation of the Netherlands in Africa. The two case studies will be compared through five factors: terminology, conditionality, capacity building, horizontal or vertical partnerships and agency of partner/recipient. These are explained and justified in the analytical framework. These factors provide a framework for analyzing the different types of development assistance.

The comparative method used will focus on the government, leaving out important actors in the field like Civil Society organizations (CSOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), although it would be useful to incorporate these actors in future research. This thesis focuses on official development cooperation and for that purpose this method is most useful

when comparing two actors at the same level. Both primary sources (speeches, government documents, data on development projects) and secondary sources are used.

The choice to focus on India as an SSC actor is because of their visibility in the SSC community since its inception. India has been an avid advocate for SSC before, but especially since its independence (Chaturvedi, Fues and Sidripoulos 2012, 171). The Government of India has always reiterated the principles of SSC as an important cornerstone of their foreign policy. They are overshadowed in many academic works on SSC because of the great interest in China. Another reason to focus on the Indian partnership with Africa is because it shows the growing interest India is expressing in partnerships outside of Southeast Asia. Although it should be mentioned that this is still their focal point for development practices. India has strong connections with the African continent as well as a strong bilateral partnership African nations.

The choice to take the Netherlands as a country to represent a traditional donor, is because their foreign policy on development cooperation has been formed by international regulations as well as by their history of colonialism. After the Second World War and the decades of decolonization the Netherlands focused more on development cooperation. They have ties with many former colonies and some of them still receive more aid than other countries in the South (Tilman 2018). The Netherlands likewise has a strong bond with many African countries, and it is one of their focus areas for their development cooperation. Although the Netherlands has in the last few years not reached the target of 0.7% of their gross national income for ODA, they are still among the top donors of bilateral development aid in the Global North (OECD 2022). Another argument for myself as a Dutch researcher is that it is intriguing to look at the Dutch policies on development cooperation and critically compare the type of bilateral relation the Netherlands has with Africa as opposed to a country that is not a DAC member. It also allows me to be able to use sources in my native language.

Lastly, this thesis focuses on the partnership and cooperation with the African continent. This study looks at the approach from the perspective of India and the Netherlands, unfortunately this leaves neither time nor space to concentrate on the recipient/partner perspective. This is nevertheless definitely an interesting perspective for future studies, including the question of which development approach is favored by African countries. Because it is not about one specific view of the recipient/partner using the African continent allows me to look at more examples and use more studies to compare both the Dutch and Indian approaches to development.

Limitations

One impediment that does arise when looking at foreign aid of India is related to the data of the partnerships India has with other developing countries. The data of the foreign aid is not separately collected and specified as much as the Dutch government's development aid. Foreign aid is not done according to the DAC regulations; thus, it is not measured by an international organization. Therefore, the data is not for instance, as easily retraceable as the amounts the Dutch government spends on aid each year. Nevertheless, the amount of loans and grants is not crucial information for the comparison in this thesis, since it is not a quantitative comparison.

As a researcher it is important to be critically aware of your positionality, this point becomes much clearer after reading and studying the scholars arguing for a decolonization of universities. Therefore, it is important to state that I am writing from a so-called 'Northern perspective'. As a Dutch student living in the Netherlands, I am aware that my background in some ways hinders my work. Firstly, because it in many ways shapes my point of view even whilst I am trying to be as open, and objective as can be. Secondly, the only languages I am fluent in are Dutch and English which does create a language barrier. To limit these obstacles, I will focus on the Netherlands as an example of a traditional DAC donor and will try to be self-reflexive and try to ensure that my perspective is influencing this study as little as possible.

Chapter 2: Literature review

Although South-South Cooperation (SSC) is still a relatively young concept the literature on this subject has grown extensively in the past decades, especially from the 2000s onwards. This literature review outlines the history of SSC and NSC to better understand the principles of SSC and shows that it is not a new concept but has been a system of cooperation for decades. The next section defines what SSC entails in this study and the critiques that both development practices receive.

Firstly, it is important to recognize that the ‘Third World’ or the ‘Global South’ is not a homogenous group. In this thesis, the terms Global North and Global South are used, important to note is that although most countries referred to as Global South are “located in the southern hemisphere, the term refers to their conceptualization as developing or middle-income countries rather than their geographical location” (Besada, Tok and Polonenko 2019, 2). The term ‘Third World’ like the term ‘underdeveloped’ have a negative connotation as well as a Eurocentric and paternalistic background. The Global South is a term used by many Southern actors, like India, themselves and it avoids the implying of inferiority. The Global South in this thesis includes “all nations classified by the World Bank as low- and middle-income that are in Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean” (Mitlin en Satterthwaite 2013, 13).

2.1 History of SSC

Although there is no complete consensus amongst scholars on when SSC started, one of the most crucial points in SSC history is the Bandung conference. In 1955 this first Asian-African conference in Bandung took place. Twenty-nine governments of these two continents were represented, the aim was to discuss peace and the role of the Third World in times of the growing tensions due to the Cold War. Furthermore, economic development and decolonization of the South were the main topics. It was a core issue at that time for most countries of the ‘Global South’ to not get involved in the tensions of the Cold War and the only way to stand strong against these global powers was to stand together. This is what inspired the establishment of the Non-Aligned movement (NAM) in 1961.

Pasha (2012) describes this conference as a birth of a new space in international relations for the left out nations that didn’t want to be involved in this power struggle between the USA and the Soviet Union (2012, 148). They were more focused on the decolonization process and the racial inequality struggles these newly independent nations were facing (2012). As Prashad (2007) and Eslava, Fakhri & Nesiah (2017) argue this ‘Bandung spirit’ could be seen as hope

and solidarity for the people and leaders of these Global Southern states (2017, 6). The spirit was this sort of feeling that these nations coming together were achieving something for themselves as opposed to directly or indirectly being controlled by their former colonizers or other states.

The Bandung spirit is still recognizable in organizations and institutions, however, these cooperations have changed. One of the main features of this change is the institutionalization of SSC. An example of institutionalized SSC is the way the BRICS countries work together. Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South-Africa have been coming together mainly to strengthen their position in the global order that is still in many ways dominated by the West (Júnior en Rinaldi 2020). In most regards, the BRICS agreement is about economic advantages, and it is not to say that these countries have similar ideologies. Other examples of institutionalized SSC are the many summits and conferences between different actors of the South. An example is the India-Africa Forum Summit which is held every three years since 2008 or the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) fund.

The effectiveness of SSC institutions and organizations seems to be greatly influenced by how they are able to set practical goals and find systemic approaches (UNDP 2016, 20). One of the more contemporary issues is the growing divide between the countries all described as belonging to this so-called Global South. The heterogeneity of these Southern countries sometimes makes researchers question if SSC is not just a different type of traditional cooperation between a ‘‘donor and recipient’’. As De Bruyn (2020) eloquently put it, is SSC actually changing the field of International Development or is it rather a way of putting ‘‘old wine in new bottles’’ (2020, 179). This argument is strengthened by the fact that countries like China, seen as one of the Global Powers of today, are also part of this Global South and forge partnerships in the name of SSC.

2.2 History of traditional development assistance

Traditional development assistance can be traced back to after the Second World War, the United States played an important role in this period due to the Marshall Plan. In the 1960s and 1970s newly independent states needed aid for their economic development, organizations like the United Nations Development Platform (UNDP) and the World Bank became key players. As well as the OECD installing the DAC that created the definition for ODA that has been upheld as a way to measure and define what the Global North identifies as development assistance. In the 1980s and 1990s structural adjustment programs were implemented to address

economic imbalances, while the 2000s focused on the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals through increased funding for education, healthcare, and poverty reduction. The current era is characterized by the Sustainable Development Goals, which expanded the development agenda to include broader issues such as climate change and gender equality.

Traditional development assistance has a history rooted in post-war reconstruction and supporting the economic and social development of developing countries. It has gone through different phases, from rebuilding war-torn nations to addressing debt crises and advancing specific development goals. Despite ongoing debates about its effectiveness, development assistance continues to play a crucial role in supporting countries in their pursuit of sustainable development.

2.2 Defining SSC

Besides the numerous examples of SSC, defining what concretely entails it proves to be harder (Fues 2016). The definition of SSC which is provided by United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation is: “A broad framework of collaboration among countries of the South in the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental, and technical domains. Involving two or more development countries” (UNOSSC 2016). This definition is broad but aligns with another definition offered by Mawdsley (2019), who gives the definition based upon multiple academic works: “[SSC] refers to the transfer and exchange of resources, technology and knowledge, set within claims to shared colonial and post-colonial experiences and identities, and anchored within a wider framework of promoting the collective strength and development of the global South” (2019, 259). Both these definitions align with the outcome document of the 2009 High-Level United Nations Conference on South-South Cooperation, that stated:

“... South-South cooperation is a common endeavour of peoples and countries of the South, born out of shared experiences and sympathies, based on their common objectives and solidarity, and guided by, inter alia, the principles of respect for national sovereignty and ownership, free from any conditionalities. South-South cooperation should not be seen as official development assistance. It is a partnership among equals based on solidarity...”

(United Nations 2010).

However, referring to the heterogeneity of the Global South countries mentioned above, the last part of the definition given during the UN Conference begs the question whether SSC is always amongst equals. As the focus is on comparing development practices, this is important to keep in mind since the definitions in this chapter highlights how widely the term SSC could be interpreted. The definition of Mawdsley will be adopted as the broad definition of what SSC entails in this thesis, because it encompasses specifically this ‘Bandung spirit’ as well as reflecting the current want for economic growth and political recognition of the partners within the Global South. It also defines the actors as a group with a common identity because of their claims to colonial and post-colonial experiences instead of categorizing it by whether or not the UN defines the countries as ‘development countries’. This study is mostly focused on the SSC partnerships that are forged to promote ‘development of the Global South’.

2.3 Academic debate on NSC and SSC

The potential of SSC is recognized by many scholars who Cheru (2016) called the cheerleaders of SSC², those that see the opportunities and positive alternatives that SSC offers compared to the mostly conditional aid provided by the Global North. Nevertheless, there are sceptics and critics as well (Cheru 2016, 593-594). The latter group can be split up in those that believe SSC to be destabilizing the institutions that have been set up by the North, the conservative critics.³ And the critics who believe SSC to be a new form of imperialism, especially the partnerships in Africa. They claim that these partnerships are solely established out of self-interest, for either international or national goals by countries of the Global South. According to these scholars the self-interests of these countries are leading to a new form of land grabbing in Africa. A sort of renaissance of the ‘scramble for Africa’, and not just for land but also for resources.⁴

It is Duarte (2019) that argues that although there are similarities between Northern countries’ development cooperation and Southern countries’ partnerships, their differences stay significant. The main reason for the significance is the way government and media of both sides keep underscoring these differences between the Northern and Southern approach. It is thus the actors themselves that stress their divergences and even express these differences as a threat to their own forms of development cooperation. As Muhr (2023) argues this dichotomy created by the dominant Global North is nothing new, it has historically been used to justify the role of

² For instance: (Chure en Obi 2010); (Bräutigam 2009).

³ For instance: (Pillsbury 2015)

⁴ For instance: (Moyo 2012); (Southall en Melber 2009)

the North. Institutions like the NATO justify excluding partners from the South and keep setting the global agenda even when it affects global issues like development (2023, 348). The Global North justifies this by dichotomizing, for instance by using us versus them terminology, and mystifying the South as rogue nations and failed states (2023).

To name just one example after a multi-billion-dollar worth contract was signed between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and China, an article in the *Financial Times* (2007) stated that “Beijing has thrown down its most direct challenge to the West’s architecture for aiding Africa’s development yet” (Financial Times 2007). Thus, claiming that African countries partnering with non-DAC members should be seen as a challenge to the traditional development aid architecture. Instead of challenging their own traditional views of development cooperation, western media are portraying the dangers and threats these non-traditional development partnerships supposedly pose for their institutions. This is problematic since it leaves no space for a debate on the opportunities these other partnerships and flows of money and knowledge can offer. Also, it closes the doors for options like trilateral development cooperation.

Nevertheless, some believe that SSC has already changed the ways of development cooperation. Mulakala and Waglé (2016) state that SSC and the rise of the South, in general, has already changed the norms of the international field of development cooperation (2016, 33). The recognition of the importance of agency of formerly oppressed countries is growing, which leads to a more diverse set of agendas within development cooperation. For this reason, the agency of the recipient/partner is used as one of the categories for comparing SSC and NSC practices. Besides, depending on definitions, UNDP in 2013 estimated that non-DAC aid flows have increased in the late 90s from 5% of the global ODA to around 15-20% in 2013 (Mawdsley 2017).

Furthermore, Woods (2008) contends that the current development assistance regime is going through a silent revolution. She claims that it is silent because these actors are not actively trying to overthrow the current system. The emerging donors are however offering an alternative to the established donors and in some ways these partnerships can even complement the already established development cooperations. Hackenesch (2013) shows this argument in her comparison of China’s relationship with Ethiopia and the pressure this puts on the development policy regime of the EU in Ethiopia. One of the conclusions she puts forward is

that too often the Chinese bilateral partnerships with other countries in the South are portrayed as a challenge while these cooperations should be regarded as opportunities (2013, 31).

The critiques voiced on SSC are in line with what Hackenesch (2013) argued. Firstly, the way the North as well as the institutions created by Northern donors are too often viewing other forms of development that take place outside of the OECD ODA approach as a challenge or an active resistance to the current development assistance landscape. Woods (2008) names four other prominent critiques on the way emerging donors practice development and change the current aid landscape for better or worse. The critiques on these practices voiced mainly by western donors are that emerging donors support rogue states, ignore the established economic model and endanger the Washington consensus, renew the indebtedness of already heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) and risk the bypassing of good governance and environmental standards which are key aspects of ODA approaches (Woods 2008).

This study will delve into the claims SSC partners make that makes their approach to development partnerships different from traditional donors. By focusing on two cases that represent a Global South partner and a Global North donor. It is contributing to the debate on the changing development landscape by proving or denying the claimed differences. The literature review above shows that the opportunities and threats on both approaches are recognized and the claims that are made from SSC partners. These claims are further elaborated and justified in chapter 4.

Chapter 3: Background Chapter

This chapter is incorporated to give a short overview of the development practices of the Dutch and Indian Governments. It provides some background information necessary for a better comprehension of the upcoming comparative analysis.

3.1 Indian development cooperation

History

The first Prime Minister of India since its independence in 1947 was Jawaharlal Nehru, he was a strong advocate for the Gandhian and Nehruvian philosophies, namely “*swaraj* (self-rule), *ahimsa* (non-violence) and *panchsheel* (the five principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, non-alignment with power blocs during the Cold War period, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, and peaceful coexistence/cooperation for mutual benefit).” (Shahi 2014, 2). These principles align with the principles of SSC. Even before India’s independence, nationalists supported anti-colonial liberation movements in Africa and after independence this support was “solidified into various forms of development cooperation” (Mawdsley 2012, 71). This shows the way India is not a new partner for other developing countries and has long adhered to the principles of SSC.

Nehru had set ambitious goals for the state. “In 1946, Nehru stated: *In Asia it seems inevitable that two or three huge federations will develop... India is going to be the centre of a very big federation (...)* From the point of view of all these possible developments of the future, it is very desirable for us to gain contacts with countries all over Asia.” (Shahi 2014, 3). India wanted to be the center point of Asia, and their ambitions for cooperation with other countries of the Global South plus their competition with China stimulated them to claim pivotal role in the field of SSC. Although India was dependent on international trade and aid before it became self-sufficient. The Green Revolution, when the agriculture sector evolved into a modern industrial system, made it possible for India to shift the focus from being an aid recipient to being a partner in development. This shift towards cooperation and partnership is especially seen after 1991 when the GOI concentrated on economic liberalization. In 2018 the Indian economy in GDP had grown nearly nine times, from \$266billion GDP in 1991 to \$2,3trillion in 2018 (Mudgill 2018). The income per capita has grown substantially as well since 1991, however India is still classified as a Lower-Middle-Income Economy (Javaid 2020).

Since 2003 India has strongly steered away from dependency on aid and it was at this time that Minister Singh announced that India had reached a “new ‘stage’ of development

which entailed reviewing its dependence on external donors” (King en Venkatachalam 2021, 123). India decided to no longer accept bilateral aid, with the exception from five specific countries, and no longer accept any form of tied aid. India also relieved a considerable sum of their debt. Minister Singh at the time also announced the proposed discontinuation of loans to fellow developing countries (Ministry of Finance 2003). In the same period the Indian Development Initiative (IDI), presently known as the Indian Development and Economic Assistance Scheme (IDEAS), was established by the Government of India (GOI). It formed an umbrella for the distribution of Loans, grants and Lines of Credit (LOCs).

Main actors in development partnerships

The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) is the main actor in development assistance by the GOI. Another actor which is supervised by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) is the EXIM Bank of India. The EXIM Bank focuses on commercial interests of India as one of their main goals, but is also the largest entity in granting (concessional) loans, grants and LOCs. Some of the Government supported LOCs are concessional⁵ when directed towards HIPCs that are categorized as countries for which IMF has prescribed minimum binding concessional requirements (Ministry of Finance 2015). These concessional LOCs are prioritized by the objectives of IDEAS and LOCs are approved through the Development Partnership Division (DPD), established in 2012 and falls under the MEA. The objective is “sharing India’s development experience through: a. capacity building and skills transfer, b. trade, and c. infrastructure development” (EXIM Bank sd).

Development partnerships in Africa


India has since its independence mostly focused on their partnerships with neighboring or regional countries. However, especially since the last two decades India is re-strengthening the partnership with the African continent and overall focusing more on partnerships outside of Asia (Naidu 2010, 35). The cooperation with Africa is both through bilateral partnerships with African countries as well as through multilateral and regional institutions, such as the African Union (AU) and Economic Community of West African States (Mawdsley 2015, 147). India’s success regarding development is something they claim to want to share with other Global South countries, mostly LICs. India is a big investor in land but focuses their bilateral partnerships mainly on technical assistance and capacity building. The direct competition for influence as an Asian power with China has forged India in a way to start already in the 60s

⁵ “Typically, a loan is considered to be concessional if its grant element is at least equal to 35 percent.” (IMF 2021).

with enforcing the partnerships with African countries. Mainly to ensure that China is not the only Asian SSC partner in the continent (Kragelund 2010, 9).

“India’s development cooperation with Africa follows on from and contributes to New Delhi’s efforts to move from a former aid recipient to a more active development actor with a wider international voice” (Large 2013, 34). The ambition for a reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the cooperation between India and the African continent has changed the past decades, for varying reasons. Firstly, the economic ascent of the emerging Asian powers. Secondly, the common ideological grounds on which the relationship between India and the African continent was based, namely the struggle against colonialism as well as the Non-Aligned stance during the Cold War period have become redundant in the post-Cold War era (Shrivastava 2009, 117). Nevertheless, the cultural and historic ties India shares with African nations is often repeated in their speeches. India has intensified their relation with the African continent particularly in the early 2000s. An example of the more visible intensification of their political engagement is the India Africa Forum Summits (IAFS), firstly held in 2008 and two more summits have followed since. The summit served to strengthen other older initiatives like the Indian Technical Economic Cooperation (ITEC), set up in 1964 and the Pan Africa E-network Project, initiated in 2009.

To conclude, it is not easy to find concrete and specified data on the money flows from India in the name of SSC specifically primary data. One of the main critiques emerging donors



like India and China get is their lack of monitoring, transparency and evaluation of their own development practices. To give a short overview of the main receivers of concessional loans from India see figure 1.

Figure 1: Top ten recipient of loans 2003-2017 (Dixit, Gill en Kumar 2018).

3.2 Dutch development cooperation

History

The Netherlands was a colonial power until the Second World War. The first period after the war saw a foreign policy focused on decolonization, mainly in ensuring knowledge transfers to former colonies and the processing of the post-colonial trauma (WRR 2010). Dutch development aid officially began after the call of President Harry Truman of the United States in his ‘Point Four’ program in 1949. During the 1950s the motivation for providing development aid changed, goals like poverty and inequality reduction, sustainability, preventing conflict and instability were now key drivers of development cooperation. Two categories of motifs can be distinguished in the development policies, self-interested motifs such as stability in newly independent states will benefit the Netherlands in the long run, and moral motives of helping out the ‘underdeveloped nations’ (WRR 2010, 36).

The goals of the Dutch Government for development cooperation are mainly set internationally and monitored by the OECD. Currently, the seventeen SDGs are the international guidelines for Dutch development cooperation. The funds that the Foreign Affairs department spends are set out in the Homogeneous Budget for International Cooperation (HGIS). These expenses can be separated in two groups: the expenditures that meet the ODA criteria and the expenditures that do not meet these criteria. The Dutch Government is also in agreement with the UN norm of 0.7% of the GNP to be allocated to aid for developing countries. This target is however not always reached, as will be shown in the analysis chapter as well (Spitz, Muskens en Ewijk E. 2013, 32).




Figure 2: Source, MFA, 2013: 28.

For the Dutch government their aid relationships are divided into three categories. Partnerships that are broadly based on the achievement of the SDGs, relations that are based on achieving specific objectives (such as reconstruction or food security), and relations that are part of broader foreign policy (mainly focused on ensuring political stability) (Government of the Netherlands 2020). In 2013 the MFA provided a ‘new agenda for aid, trade and investment’ making more space for transitional relationships with former aid recipients (see figure 2) (MFA 2013).

Main actors in development cooperation

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the executive practice of development cooperation. There is a Minister of Foreign Affairs and a Minister of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation. The primary goals according to the government of development cooperation of the Netherlands are preventing conflict and instability, minimizing societal inequality and poverty, promoting sustainable growth and actions to diminish climate change (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 2018). There is also a growing dedication towards more synergy across government, private sector and civil society, this is carried out by the Netherlands Enterprise Agency (RVO), Netherlands Development Finance Company (FMO) and, embassies in partner countries (OECD 2016, 4).

Development cooperation in Africa




Figure 3 Top 10 recipients of ODA by the Netherlands Source: OECD, 2020

The Dutch government focuses most of their ODA flows and other initiatives for development cooperation in Africa. To illustrate out of the top ten recipients of ODA in 2020, six were African countries. Furthermore, the Dutch government has since 2013 increased their regional approach in the African Great Lakes region and the Horn of

Africa (MFA 2013). In the annual report of the HGIS of 2019, five regions in Africa are named as the main receivers of ODA (MFA 2019).

Chapter 4: Analytical framework

The following subsections outline the factors that will be used to compare the development practices of India and the Netherlands. Although these factors will be analyzed separately, they are of course interrelated to each other which will become clear in the subsequent chapters. As Chaturvedi (2012) puts it NSC emerges from the conception of philanthropy and SSC from mutual growth (2012, 23). The factors are based on the argued differences between these development practices derived from the literature on NSC and SSC as well as being based on the claims of SSC partners about the distinguishing features of their development approach.

4.1 Terminology

The first starting point should be on the difference in terminology, since it already unveils this fundamental difference in the way both forms of development cooperation are framed through their separate discourses. This factor is chosen because Global South actors actively use their terminology to differentiate from NSC, these actors are challenging the traditional discourse (Alonso 2019, 1). On the other hand, the Global North has traditionally been defining what development entails and how development assistance should internationally be defined according to the DAC members. Both sides actively use their discourse to exercise their power and pursue their ambitions within the global landscape of development cooperation.

For Global South partners to use SSC rhetoric is a way to identify as a different type of partner for other developing countries. SSC actors construct a different discourse than is commonly seen in the traditional development field, by using terms like ‘partner’, ‘friendship’, ‘win-win’ and focusing on shared experiences and history. Furthermore, terms like ‘donor’ and ‘recipient’ are linked to colonial pasts and for both political as well as diplomatic reasons emerging economies try to distance themselves from these terms (Chaturvedi, Fues and Sidripoulos 2012, 22). The different terminology of SSC also shows the ambition for more equality between the cooperating countries, the focus is shifted towards horizontal relations instead of vertical hierarchy (Mawdsley 2011, 257).

On the other side, the discourse of traditional international development through NSC has also serviced an agenda of reinforcing and normalizing the hierarchic structures in place (Dogra 2014). Within the hegemonic world order that is dominated by the West, the ‘normative projection’ as Mawdsley (2017) calls it has also played its part in framing the roles of the North and the South. By persistently claiming the ‘South’ as a ‘disciplinary subject and the ‘North’

as active and benevolent provider of knowledge and material assistance” (Mawdsley 2017, 108). Although it is the Northern donors that still wield most power in the current world stage of development cooperation the axes of power are being tested by the Global South. The domestic motivations of these Southern powers are according to Mawdsley (2017) in some ways similar in the ‘pursuit of geo-economic interests and soft power’, however the starting point of these states as former colonies has changed their agendas. They have different motivations that have also changed over the last decades.

Terminology of the actors, in this thesis focusing on state-level actors, shows not just the motivations and agenda of their development practices but also their social cultural past. It is part of the answer to the ‘why provide aid/partnership’, the national and international goals and motivations for these states to be a partner/provider in development.

4.2 The rejection of conditionality

Conditionality is often used as a means to promote policy changes or specific actions by a recipient country that align with the priorities or interests of the donor country. It is using financial leverage to stimulate donor objectives (Killick 1997, 487). Conditionality, according to the OECD is the other side of the coin from ownership, the less conditions applied to a loan, the more ownership for the lender (Mold 2009). The debate on conditionality based aid has resurfaced during the financial crisis of 2008 and questions of ownership were raised in the changed course of traditional development policy established in the Paris Declaration 2005 (Mold, 2009: 12). The focus in the Paris Declaration shifted from aid towards cooperation and even partnership, whilst still focusing on rights-based issues embedded in the Sustainable Development Goals.

Conditionality has been a controversial aspect of traditional development cooperation, with both supporters and critics arguing about its impact on recipient countries. While it can help to ensure the effectiveness of development assistance, it can also lead to negative social outcomes and undermine the sovereignty of recipient countries. Conditionality can be done *ex ante* and *ex post*; meaning certain conditions must be met before aid is given or during the project the conditions must be met (Shah 2017, 7). The IMF defines ‘the degree of freedom the recipient government will be given to spend the aid funds at its own discretion’ as ‘the modality’ and thus more modality means, at least in the decision-making process, more agency for the receiving country.

In the last twenty years the ask for more ownership of the recipient and less conditionality in development cooperation has grown (Sims 2022, 277). However, conditionality in some form can hardly be avoided completely and as Hackenesch (2019) concludes the conditions to force authoritarian governments to adopt democratic policy changes has had some positive effects (2019, 12). She does however caution for the current changes in the liberal world order, especially the role China is playing in Africa. This truly questions whether condition-based aid from the Global North could still be effective if an alternative route for development partnership without conditions is available. As Kanbur (2000) suggests, the Global North might have to adopt a more ‘‘arms-length relationship’’ to ensure the space for ownership of policy changes and implementation instead of forcing change in the recipient government (2000, 422).

Nevertheless, Quadir (2013) poses the question whether the conditionally driven framework of development cooperation is to be redefined by the more horizontally focused (mostly bilateral) development cooperation that is prominently practiced by these ‘emerging donors’. Although his short answer is no, Quadir (2013) does explain that this is due to the amount of money spend on development aid by traditional donors. The agenda of NSC is mostly based on promoting good governance through conditional and top-down aid. This form of development cooperation might not yet or, as António Guterres put it once, can never be replaced by SSC.⁶ Although some of these ‘‘traditional foreign aid’’ trends have changed over the years, non-conditionality is still one of the distinguishable features of SSC. That is not to say that there are never any conditions to the partnerships between developing countries. The emphasis, however, is on horizontal relationships with a win-win outcome.

Non-conditionality encompasses the fundamental element of SSC that is non-interference. Global South actors adhere to non-interference especially since most of them have been through a long struggle for independence. The eagerness for Global South actors to partner with an African country lies within this shared history and the shared principles of non-interference and mutual respect (Cheru 2016). It is quite the opposite, as Cheru describes, as the ‘‘paternalistic and ‘conditionality’-based partnership practiced by Western donors’’ (2016, 593).

⁶ As the UN Secretary-General, António Guterres stated in his message during the UN day for SSC on the 12th of September 2020: ‘‘[SSC] can never replace official development assistance, or the responsibilities of the global North set out in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the Paris Agreement. But we will need the full contributions and cooperation of the Global South to build more resilient economies and societies, and implement the Sustainable Development Goals.’’ (United Nations 2020).

As opposed to Southern actors like China and India, the EU enforces the *ex post* condition of giving bilateral aid to a recipient that is an electoral democracy that acknowledges human rights. Del Biondo (2011) explains the inconsistency in EU sanctions practices towards African Caribbean Pacific countries. This dilemma of sanctioning recipients is multifaceted, but one of the main conclusions is that the EU favors security interests above the promotion of democratization. Many Global South actors see conditionality driven cooperation ‘as interference in domestic affairs and as a way to advance donors’ interests instead of fostering recipients’ development.’ (Esteves en Assunção 2014, 1781). Conditionality affects the principles of sovereign equality and non-interference. Development actors practicing SSC thus distance themselves from conditionality. For instance, through focusing on demand-driven development cooperation. In this thesis is neither time nor space to analyze what the effects of conditionality are in the field of development cooperation over time, but it is an important factor that could prove to be a significant differing factor for distinguishing NSC development versus SSC.

4.3 Horizontal partnership or vertical cooperation

This factor relates to the horizontal partnerships Global South actors focus on as well as being an importantly claimed difference compared to NSC. The insistence mutual beneficial partnerships amongst equals leading to win-win outcomes is an important claim made by Southern actors in their SSC partnerships (Mawdsley 2011). This is a significant but also criticized feature of SSC. Mawdsley (2011) illustrates in her analysis of SSC through the lens of the gift theory, first introduced by Mauss (1966), that the reciprocity in a partnership between Southern partners is an integral part of their relationship (2011, 263). Unlike traditional foreign aid that still has the persistent image of being a moral objective that is about helping the less fortunate (Rowlands 2008). Even though the opposite has been proven that development cooperation also from the Global North is dominated by political and strategic interests (Rowlands 2008, 8).

SSC claims to reject the creation of new dependencies, rather it focuses on interdependencies (Muhr 2016). That is to say that countries are supporting each other and ‘rather than (re)producing dependency, Southern *interdependences* drive global structural transformations’ (2016, 637). These new actors and practices that divert from the traditional OECD/DAC defined standards of providing aid call for a new perspective, a ‘Beyond Aid’ perspective, according to Janus et al. (2015). In line with the arguments made by Muhr (2016), Janus et al. (2015) claim that SSC focuses more on horizontal cooperation while traditional

cooperation is using a vertical model of development cooperation (2015, 159). The horizontal versus vertical cooperation is not just a change in discourse but in the approach towards development assistance. Nevertheless, “the economic ‘gaps’ growing most dramatically in the past decade have not been between the North and the South, but rather within the South itself” (Hansen 1980, 1105). This widening gap and blurring lines of what a developing country is, is even more visible nowadays. Some even distinguish a trend towards a “South within the South”, because of this growing gap within the “group” of countries categorized as the South (Ladd 2010). The solidarity, specifically between Asia and Africa, might be put to the test as Asian countries experience more rapid economic growth (Dargin 2013, 101). It is also one of the main arguments critics of SSC cite that this widening gap causes new dependencies that in a sense are a repetition of the traditional NSC and will lead to more indebtedness of the already HIPC.

As the chairman of the Group of 77 put it (2007): “South-South cooperation cannot mirror North-South cooperation”, the terminology is not just semantics but is significant for the way development cooperation between developing countries is practiced. As Chaturvedi et al. (2012) put it, SSC “encompasses trade, political and economic cooperation through various regional and global forums, and finally capacity creation” (2012, 31). Providing aid is not the sole focus, it is about building partnerships that both partners benefit from. The factor of horizontal relations is one of the most debated features of SSC, however as the literature review has proven this factor should hypothetically be a significant difference between Dutch and Indian development approach.

4.4 Agency of partner/recipient

An important claim of SSC is that partnerships are amongst equals and as mentioned before that this is only possible through reciprocity. In other words, to create a win-win outcome the ability of the development partner to reciprocate is an integral part of their horizontal partnership, as Mawdsley (2011) argues this establishes a certain status of the “receiver” (2011, 264). It enables or at the very least claims to enable a more active partnership where the focus lies on mutual benefit. This is solely achievable through the exercise of agency of both actors. Feldhoff (2018) argues that the only way Africa can successfully benefit from this power struggle for influence on the African continent is if it uses this struggle between global powers in “ways that enable African ownership of the development process” (Feldhoff 2018, 440).

In line with the arguments of Feldhoff (2018), Cheru (2016) also contends that a successful win-win partnership ultimately depends on African Agency (2016, 594). A definition of African Agency is given by Dye (2022) as “the ability of states in Africa to ‘advance [their] chosen development agenda and gain optimum deals’” (2022, 223). Dye (2022) clarifies the two sides of this debate by stating that some are seeing the potential of SSC for leaving more space for African agency whilst others view SSC as a form of “masking exploitation and imperialist intention” (ibid.). Even though in financial flows the capabilities of these emerging partners may be modest, their partnerships do challenge the current hierarchic global power structure by challenging the very foundation and framework NSC is built upon (Alonso 2019, 15). The role of agency for the partner recipient might be difficult to quantify, however it is a relevant factor for that should distinguish the type of development practices the Global South actors are trying to establish. This discussion enlightens the importance of this factor, namely to see how both the Indian and Dutch government approach leave policy space for African countries to ensure their own development ambitions.

4.5 Capacity building

This factor is chosen because when researching SSC partnerships most literature mentions or even claims capacity building to be a crucial part of SSC (Huysse, et al. 2012, 130). As Ladd (2010) argued SSC has “a distinctly different flavor” than “the conditionality-based project, programme or budget support” that he identifies as traits of traditional donors. Although there is not necessarily one internationally agreed upon definition of capacity building, the practice is in fact used by both traditional and emerging providers. As Gerspacher (2022) defines it “Capacity building is a process by which people, institutions, and societies can develop, strengthen, and expand their ability to meet their goals or fulfill their mandate” (2022, 9). Which aligns with the definition the OECD-DAC use for capacity, that is “understood as the ability of people, organizations and society as a whole to successfully manage their affairs” (Baser 2011, 7). Both development donors and partners proclaim to use capacity building in their development strategy, however there seems to be a lack of transparency on what this strategy entails and how effective the capacity building element is (Huysse, et al. 2012). Furthermore, De Bruyn (2019) argues that even within the group of Global South actors the way these actors actually incorporate capacity building practices in their projects varies a lot. Showing both the heterogeneity of the actors practicing SSC as well as the difficulty in trying to generalize the conclusions of a case study.

De Bruyn (2019) compares different ways of incorporating capacity building in SSC projects. His analytical framework distinguishes five qualities of capacity building: implicit versus explicit, downstream versus upstream, the type of objective capacity building is used for, hands-on versus hands-off and the interaction with the partner. He concludes that in most SSC projects the peer-to-peer and domestic experiences played a crucial role in capacity building strategies, nevertheless seldom are the local organizations of the partner involved (T. De Bruyn 2019, 270). This shows the overlap with the aforementioned factor agency, which even within the transfer of skills and knowledge the practice can be dominated by one of the actors not just within traditional development practices. The comparative analysis compares the government led initiatives on capacity building in Africa in terms of sector, objectives and ambitions. Specifically looking at the place capacity building has within the development policies of the Dutch and Indian government.

Chapter 5: Comparative analysis

The development practices of India and the Netherlands in Africa will be compared through five factors: terminology, the rejection of conditionality, horizontal partnership, agency, and capacity building. The main reason for these factors is that these are based on the hypothesized differences based on the literature review between SSC and traditional development cooperation and the claims made by SSC actors.

5.1 Terminology

The concepts used by the Government of India are different from the concepts the Dutch Government uses in their foreign policy on development cooperation, thus posing the question what entails development practices. For instance concepts such as donor-recipient versus partnership, ODA or mutual beneficial relationship. This section will compare the differing terminology and discourses of the Netherlands and India.

The Dutch Government uses a specific definition given by the OECD for their development practices and the conditions that come with it. They consider ODA as development aid and differentiate these aid flows from other flows when looking at development cooperation. The international agreement defines ‘ODA as funds, goods and services that promote economic development and prosperity in developing countries’ (Government of the Netherlands 2018). As Esteves and Assunção (2014) argue this definition is showing what development cooperation entails according to DAC members, as well as showing what the Global North excludes from what development practices are. The definition




Figure 4 Data Source: OECD DAC Table1 - Total official and private flows: ODA on flows and grant equivalent measures by members of OECD (DAC) as percent of gross national income (GNI). (OECD 2022)

has a political significance that underscores this agenda of the Global North as described in the literature review. Financial flows like trade, investment and military aid are excluded from what ODA should be according to ‘traditional’ donors (2014, 1777).

The Netherlands defines three goals for their development cooperation as a donor, preventing conflicts and instability, reduce poverty and social inequality, and promote sustainable growth and climate action worldwide. Besides these broad goals they emphasize the SDGs as targets and aim to allocate 0.7% of their gross national income (GNI) to foreign

aid. This target however has not been reached since 2013, with the exception of 2015 (see figure 1).

Like other Global South partners, New Delhi strongly opposes the Western terminology used and rather refers to their development practices as partnerships with other developing countries (Júnior en Rinaldi 2020, 12). The name is not just a coincidental distinction from development aid but there is a significant normative value shift. The Indian model of development cooperation declares to be comprehensive and involves multiple instruments mainly (concessional) loans and grants, lines of credit (LOCs), bilateral grant assistance projects, capacity building and technical assistance. India states that “the most fundamental principle in cooperation is respecting development partners and be guided by their development priorities” (Ministry of External Affairs 2022). Thus, their development partnership prioritizes the need of the partner. The lines between what is and what is not development assistance are less clear cut, which is a general trend of SSC actors (Mawdsley 2011, 258). Most speeches by Indian officials concerning partnerships with African countries have a similar structure, starting with trade ties over the Indian ocean, shared colonial history, how Gandhi initiated in political and social activism in South Africa and then move to the struggle for independence and the commitment given by Nehru towards this goal (Mawdsley 2015, 151) . For example, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the second Africa-India Forum Summit⁷:

“The India-Africa partnership is unique and owes its origins to history and our common struggle against colonialism, apartheid, poverty, disease, illiteracy and hunger. India will never forget Africa’s role in inspiring our own struggle for national liberation. It was here that Mahatma Gandhi developed his political philosophy and developed the concepts of non-violence and peaceful resistance.”

India emphasizes their shared history, specifically the colonial past and struggles for independence. As Berger and Eickhoff (2022) have shown these cultural and historic ties are also reiterated by actors outside of the government, this remembrance of the struggles in the past can strengthen partnerships. India continuously mobilizes the ‘South’ as a discursive category within the organization of this e-Network set up by the MEA. Claiming India as a ‘Sister continent’ and distancing themselves from the Western terminology and the Chinese

⁷ Address by the Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh at the Plenary Session of the 2nd Africa-India Forum Summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (2011).

discourse by repeating their solidarity and their focus on ‘inclusive’ growth instead of self-interested, exploitative or paternalistic development (2021, 126).

It is not just the definition of what development cooperation entails that differs. As Gore (2013) shows there is also the difference in goalsetting of development practices which influences the way development cooperation is practiced. NSC is rights-based focused, and SSC emphasizes economic convergence between countries (2013, 772). The Netherlands focuses in their speeches mostly on what has to still change in African states and how development cooperation should be about human rights, sustainability and good governance. To give just one example of a speech of the Netherlands given during the UN conference in 2008 on Africa’s development needs, by then Prime Minister Balkenende of the Netherlands:

‘Real progress on human rights, good governance and the fight against corruption is essential. This includes democratisation, free press, and transparent power and wealth-sharing arrangements within African states and societies. They are a precondition for building stable African states in which economic progress is possible. [...] It is an extra incentive for traditional donors, non-traditional donors like China and India, and African states themselves to give high priority to these good governance issues, alongside sustainable economic development.’⁸

Some argue that the definitions of what cooperation and partnerships should look like is being challenged by the Global South, but that SSC partners like India are also still moving within a *doxa*. *Doxa* is a term coined by Bourdieu and entails in this case in the international field of development the assumption of common practices, language and social purpose. In this case upheld by donors from the Global North, like the Netherlands. Esteves and Assunção (2014) argue that the promotion of SSC was part of a strategy to gain back some agency regarding the dominant donors whilst still playing within the rules on the field. They state that traditional aid was set up according to the agenda of the Global North and by setting clear rules and positioning themselves as leaders they have created a common set of practices and social purpose. These are then portrayed as the common standard for what international development is supposed to look like. Moreira (2020) argues for the importance of acknowledging this created *doxa* by the donor-recipient relations, because it has created certain expectations even within SSC projects especially in the receiver country. One of the most important expectations is the economic resources and other resources will all be provided by the partner/donor. This

⁸ Speech by the Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende at the UN Conference on ‘Africa’s Development Needs’ in New York (2008).

tension of expectations and reality is what makes it even more important to understand that SSC is not always able to change the rules of the game.

The game, whether the rules are being contested or not, is still the same. The terminology mostly differs in what both states define as development cooperation/partnership and what they exclude. Nevertheless, the exclusion of trade from traditional development practices seems to change in the Netherlands focusing their policy in Africa more on the combination of aid and trade (Kingdom of the Netherlands 2017). Besides defining in speeches and literature what development cooperation or partnership entails it is in practice that we can identify what kind of relation has been established between states both through NSC and SSC. This change in terminology of the Dutch government regarding the move to more trade-based partnerships rather than aid recipients will be elaborated in section three of this chapter on horizontal or vertical partnerships.

5.2 The rejection of conditionality

As mentioned, the effectiveness of the traditional aid structure has been questioned notably because of the strings that are attached to their conditional aid. ‘‘The realm of ‘donors and recipients,’ unilateral transfers of concessional funds frequently under conditionality, and rather vertical decision-making structures (all traditional characteristics of ODA) is increasingly challenged.’’ (Alonso 2019, 1). Since the fall of the Berlin Wall a trend of European, including Dutch, development policies is seen. There is a shift in focus from providing aid and focusing on economic growth as the main ambition, to providing aid towards the promotion of human rights and good governance (Hoebink 2006, 132).

Dutch development policy since the 1990s often involves the use of conditionality to ensure a more rights-based approach. These conditions may be related to governance, human rights, environmental sustainability, and other areas such as gender equality and sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR). The Dutch government may require recipient countries to meet certain benchmarks in terms of a democratic governance, transparency, and accountability in order to receive development assistance or have more modality with the funds if certain conditions are met by the recipient. Conditionality is often used as a way to promote good governance, foster policy reforms, and ensure that funds are used effectively and transparently. In 1998 the Dutch Government limited the number of recipients of aid following the World Bank report *Assessing Aid* and used various methods to promote or enforce good governance (2006, 134), from a Western democratic perspective.

Conditionality is strongly correlated with the agency of the partner country; this is also based on the priorities and goals set by the (emerging) donor. In the case of the Netherlands the focus lies as on good governance as well as goals that are set internationally, like the SDGs. Condition based aid by the Netherlands has been ambivalent, many questions have been raised over the years about the policy on using development to promote good governance and human rights. Hoebink (1990) identified the different motivations for Dutch development policies within the elements of internationalist idealism and maritime commercialism, coining it the policies of ‘merchants and ministers’, also further explained by Spitz et al. (2013, 10). Since the motivations lie in a combination of ‘political/strategic and ethical/humanitarian reasons on the one hand and the economic/commercial on the other’ (Arens 2003, 458). The ambivalence then lies in choosing states that are most dependent on ODA and avoiding the support of rogue states where the priority for the Netherlands lies on political stability and democratization instead of economic growth and independence.

India is actively opposing conditional aid, because of the importance of independence and sovereignty. ‘India’s development assistance’ according to Kragelund (2010) is ‘linked to India’s own capabilities and its interests in Africa. It is a combination of tied project aid and scholarships and it mainly targets African countries rich in resource or rich in Indian diasporas.’ (2010, 13). This form of tied aid is not uncommon especially for SSC actors, a lot of development cooperation is tied to the purchase of their own goods and services (Zimmerman en Smith 2011, 727). This could be considered a more national self-interested condition to their development cooperation, which aligns with the focus on a partnership that is mutually beneficial. Through the EXIM Bank of India lines of credit (LOCs) are provided. The projects receiving these soft loans are selected by the receiving country, according to Viswanathan & Mishra ‘this entire process is non-conditional and aims to enhance the developmental process in the host country’ (2019, 6).

5.3 Horizontal partnership or vertical cooperation

India insists that ‘unlike western donors India does not impose its own agendas or policy conditionalities’ (Mawdsley 2015, 148). India’s partnerships with other developing countries are based on mutual beneficial relations with an emphasis on the sovereign independence of Global South actors. Since their independence, the foreign policy has been subscribed to the objective of strategic autonomy (Andersen 2011, 264). New Delhi doesn’t focus on the conditions attached to partnerships and instead focuses on the economic or sustainable benefits from this cooperation. Furthermore, India claims to base their development

practice on the needs and priorities of the partner. The Netherlands does not make this claim, their development cooperation is attentive to democratization and ensuring that the SDGs are reached by 2030, whilst prioritizing prevention of conflicts and instability, reducing poverty and inequality, promoting health rights and sustainable growth (Government of the Netherlands 2018).

New Delhi also enables a space for dialogue with Southern actors to establish a platform, not dominated by the Global North, to share experiences and pursue dialogue on development cooperation among the South (Mulakala, 2015: 26). This ‘‘Delhi Process’’ is still quite new but shows the eagerness of India to create a different space for SSC and take a leadership role in future SSC and prioritizing the needs of the South (ibid.). Another space for dialogue between India and African countries is the India-Africa Forum Summit. The Forum Summit has embraced a collaborative structure that defines the key domains of future collaboration, including capacity building, the development of agricultural infrastructure, the assurance of health, food and energy security, and cooperation in the technological sector (Beri 2011, 6).

The alignment of priorities and principles provides a strong foundation for the partnership between India and Africa, enabling them to work together towards common goals, these common goals are thus not set by an international agenda that is prioritized by the Global North. The former Deputy managing director, Debasish Mallick, of the EXIM Bank of India stated during a conference of India-Africa partnership: ‘‘India’s partnership with Africa has been driven by the aim of empowerment, capacity building, human resource development, access to Indian market, and support for Indian investments in Africa.’’⁹ According to Mallick the relationship between India and Africa is based upon historic, cultural, economic and political exchanges and cooperation. This rhetoric on historic and cultural ties is reiterated by leaders and other figureheads of the Government of India in most speeches regarding the partnership with the African continent. As Miller (2014) argued the memories of colonialism strengthen the common desires for more independence and sovereign equality, she proved the theoretical connection between historical memory and status-seeking behavior. These arguments are echoed in one of the flagship projects of India, the Pan-African e-Network.

The official aid flows that are provided by India for development projects in Africa are mainly in the form of concessional loans or tied aid. As Krageland (2010, 11) shows, much of

⁹ Quote from Mr. Debasish Mallick’s speech at the 12th CII- EXIM BANK Conclave on India Africa Project Partnership, New Delhi (2017).

the lines of credits are tied to purchases, goods and services from India ensuring this win-win partnership in the long term. As was also touched upon in the previous factor, tied aid is another form of conditionality that doesn't interfere with the governance and thus the sovereignty African countries, but it does impose a more mutual beneficial partnership where India also benefits directly from the partnership.

For the Dutch government African countries are mostly seen as a recipient since their partnerships with development countries are divided into three categories. Partnerships that are broadly based on the achievement of the SDGs, relations that are based on achieving specific objectives (such as reconstruction or food security), and relations that are part of broader foreign policy (mainly focused on ensuring political stability) (Government of the Netherlands 2020). Besides these categories there are countries with which the Dutch government has a phasing out relation, meaning that the relationship is moving from a traditional development cooperation towards a more trade-based partnership (ibid.). Especially this last category shows the division between trade and development policies and the different approach to their practices in Africa compared to the Indian government.

5.4 Agency of partner/recipient

As shown in both the literature review and chapter 4, agency is part of a much broader academic debate in development studies. Some scholars urge that in order for development projects to have any sustainable effects in African countries there is a specific need for African agency (Feldhoff 2018) (Dye 2022). The claim of SSC is to ensure the agency of Global South actors to define their own development priorities and projects. This factor correlates with the previous factor that a SSC partnership is mutually beneficial and not meant to create a new dependent relation. According to Cheru (2016) the African agency is central for "establishing a mutually beneficial partnership" (2016, 594). As is stated on the website of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs: "Our development partnership will be guided by your priorities" (Ministry of External Affairs 2022). They greatly advocate for this SSC principle in their partnership with Africa, this is also reiterated in the ten guiding principles of India's development partnership with Africa¹⁰.

There is some optimism that the growing importance of Global South actors in international development may lead to "a new global aid regime that aims to provide greater

¹⁰ Address of Prime Minister Narendra Modi at Parliament of Uganda during his State Visit to Uganda, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India (2018).

democratic space for autonomous development” (Quadir 2013, 334). This new narrative is in progress, however with a few bottlenecks as well. Taylor (2012) argues that one of the hold ups, which is also seen in India, is that the development cooperation is not centrally organized. Because of tensions between different ministries of the Indian government the practicing of SSC is not the responsibility of one ministry rather it falls under multiple ministries, mainly the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). Unlike the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in the Netherlands that even has a separate minister of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation.

Another difference in development policies, is the focus on evaluating the effectiveness of their policies. In addition to having their development cooperation centrally organized, the Dutch government has set up their own evaluation service, set up by MFA, named the *Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en beleidsevaluatie (IOB)* (Inspection Development Cooperation and Policy Evaluation). In quite some instances have the outcomes of their reports been negative, as Janssen (2009) argues the effects of the Dutch development cooperation are modest at best. The management by the Ministry is poor according to Janssen (2009) and it is because of the lack of accurately assessing the specific needs and issues of the recipient countries. He also agrees with the assessment of Bräutigam and Knack (2004) that aid allocation has to be somewhat competitive and maybe even reward based in some cases. At least to ensure that there is some kind of incentive for structural changes for the recipient countries. Besides the IOB the development policy of the Dutch government is also reviewed by the OECD-DAC, which has also been critical of the Dutch approach especially regarding the agency of the recipient. In 2017 the OECD-DAC peer review stated “the context and preferences of partner countries are not identified as the point of departure” and budgets are increasingly managed from the Netherlands, with limited opportunities for national governments to input into decisions” (2017, 16).

On the other hand Dye (2022) recognizes an important flip side to India’s approach in Africa driven by the agency of African nations. He is critical of SSC, mainly on the renunciation of responsibility. Exemplified by his case study on the Nyabarongo Dam in Rwanda financed by India following the principles of SSC. Thus, with little conditionality and with focus on the demands of the Rwandan government. Dye finds that the lack of experience from both states and the way this project should present a win-win outcome whilst actually privileging the recipient elites showcases this problem of responsibility (2022, 248). The people of Rwanda will not benefit from this “win-win” project that is supposedly set up for the development of the region. Nevertheless, besides the question of responsibility and outcome, agency is also

about allowing the partner/recipient to prioritize and address its own needs. In this sense SSC could prove to change the development cooperation policy as we know it from traditional donors. Agency for fragile and especially for small African countries with less resources and sometimes a lack of capacity, does require the recipient/partner to take responsibility for ensuring for instance feasibility studies or capacity training (Viswanathan en Mishra 2019, 6).

5.5 Capacity Building

The attitude of the European Union (EU) towards capacity building aims at “ the interdependence of economic development and social progress” (Gerspacher 2022, 9). The Netherlands is an advocate for capacity building projects, one of the largest and more recent initiatives is the Orange Knowledge Collaboration. In the beginning one of the biggest projects of this collaboration was started in Ethiopia, strengthening agricultural TVETs¹¹ in dairy and horticulture (Nuffic 2019). The Dutch government has also engaged in capacity building projects in the water management sector the Sustainable Water Fund has supported the construction of water infrastructure and the training of local communities in water conservation practices, leading to improved access to clean water and sanitation. Comparable to India their capacity building projects have focused on fields in which the Netherlands is known to excel in, such as water management and agriculture. An agricultural project is the Integrated Seed Sector Development program that has helped smallholder farmers, extension workers, and seed producers improve seed quality and accessibility, leading to improved crop yields and incomes (Wageningen University and Research).

The partnerships between African partnerships and India are multifaceted, it is “enshrined in a series of bilateral agreements in the field of trade, double taxation, education, cultural cooperation, agricultural research and capacity building in a wide range of fields” (Cheru 2016, 602). Most of the development assistance from India to Africa is channeled through capacity building in various sectors, the main projects are enabled under Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) or its sister programme Special Commonwealth African Assistance Programme (SCAAP). The focus of capacity building from India lies on technology and human resources, but also in the educational, agricultural and medical fields capacity building projects or exchanges are set up (Zewide 2011, 45). India distinguishes itself as a development partner

¹¹ Technical and vocational education and training (TVET) “is understood as comprising education, training and skills development relating to a wide range of occupational fields, production, services and livelihoods” (UNESCO 2015).

through their own experiences and learning curve as a country that during the mid-90's was the biggest receiver of ODA (OECD 2012).

According to Modi and Cheru (2013) India's green revolution should also be seen as a comparative advantage of taking India as a Global South partner, because of its expertise in the agriculture field and their eagerness for educating other partners in this field (2013, 16). Mawdsley and McCann (2011) regard the technical assistance and capacity building by India as their strongest value as a development partner (2011, 60). One of the key drivers for Indian SSC is to transfer skills through capacity building especially in LDCs. An example of this ambition is a quote by Gurjit Singh, an Indian Ambassador and former representative of India to the African Union, who stated "that India was 'committed to build over 100 capacity building institutions in Africa'" (Taylor 2012). Another example of the role capacity building plays in development practices in Africa is the Pan African e-Network project, created by the Indian President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam in 2005. This network was set up in collaboration with the African Union and Ethiopia was the first recipient (Zewide 2011, 48). However, there is a downside to the capacity building through for instance an e-Network set up by India.

As Duclos (2021) reveals in his decade of research on the medical education and telecommunication between hospitals of India and the African continent is that there is a frustrating side to the at first glance seemingly "established South-South referral pathways" (2021, 127). Because the hospitals and other sites connected through the e-Network are not equal and in some cases "PAN may sometimes have aggravated existing inequalities in the global distribution of biomedicine" (2021, 128). This argument is in line with the growing trend of a South within the South (Ladd 2010) and reiterates the importance of acknowledging inequality also within the Global South. Such projects may fail to address the root causes of poverty and inequality, such as unequal power dynamics and limited access to resources, leading to limited impact. Therefore, it is important to consider the broader context and involve local communities in the design and implementation of capacity building projects to ensure their long-term sustainability. Development approaches both from North and South actors can involve outsiders providing technical training and resources to local communities, without considering the social, political, and economic contexts in which they operate. This can result in the creation of dependency or the frustration of inequality as shown in the example of the Pan African e-Network.

5.6 Conclusions of comparative analysis

From the literature and primary sources used to compare the Dutch and Indian approach to development cooperation/partnership it appears that the differences between these approaches are shrinking. Dutch development cooperation is focusing their efforts to transition their aid recipients towards trade partners and India has grown in to the role of being a frontrunner for SSC and has claimed their seat at the international negotiation table (MFA of the Netherlands, 2013: 5). The shift in policy of the Netherlands towards a partnership approach where the lines between aid and trade are less stark and the focus lies on a partnership that is based on both development cooperation and trade (Government of the Netherlands 2020), like other Global North donors, could be seen as a traditional donor moving more towards the development approach of SSC partners, this trend is also seen with other NSC donors (Mawdsley 2015, 149).

The rejection of conditionality however is a significant difference between the two countries. The Netherlands has utilized conditionality in its aid programs, aiming to promote good governance, human rights, and other specific policy reforms. Whilst in recent years the trend in the Netherlands, in line with other Global North actors, is to lessen conditional aid and shift more towards ownership of the recipient. In contrast, India has always opposed conditional aid and instead focuses on providing tied aid and concessional loans that align with its own capabilities and interests in Africa. A big difference also remains within their discourse, the Netherlands uses a more measurable definition of development assistance and their development assistance is assessed both domestically and internationally by institutions like the OECD, in line with the findings of the literature review (see chapter 2). This is a big difference with India's approach in Africa, their approach to development cooperation is not strictly separated from trade and geopolitics. It proves harder to find concrete data of their financial or other flows that are used for development purposes in and with African countries.

The factors show that the main differences remain in the terminology and the conditionality of development assistance. Surprisingly their approach to capacity building projects in Africa is in some ways similar, especially with both governments focusing on their own strengths and both the Netherlands and India focus on regional and bilateral projects in Africa. Beri (2011) argues that ‘‘The trade trends, the diverse investment profile and various initiatives to augment technical assistance, training and capacity building in Africa suggests a strategy that has married components of the earlier idealistic policy with strands of pragmatism.’’ (2011, 13).

The concept of horizontal partnership, emphasizing mutual benefit and the sovereignty of Global South actors, is central to India's development cooperation approach. India prioritizes the needs and priorities of its partner countries and seeks to establish dialogue platforms that are not dominated by the Global North. On the other hand, the Netherlands places importance on achieving specific development goals, preventing conflicts and instability, and reducing poverty and inequality. Agency remains a central theme in the development discourse, with scholars and practitioners emphasizing the need for African agency and the importance of empowering Global South actors in development projects. While challenges and criticisms exist, SSC presents an opportunity for a more equitable and mutually beneficial approach to development cooperation, provided that responsibility and the specific needs of recipient countries are adequately addressed and the space for open dialogue to discuss the common goals and priorities in the changing development agenda is provided.

Overall, the comparative analysis reveals distinct approaches to development cooperation between India and the Netherlands. While the Netherlands adheres to traditional donor practices and emphasizes specific development goals and conditionality, India seeks to establish partnerships based on mutual benefit, shared history, and respect for partner priorities. There are significant differences between both approaches, but I argue that the difference have converged over the years. As for instance stated by the MFA of the Netherlands, “The new global power relations obviously affect how international institutions and bodies operate, and how the Netherlands operates within them.” (MFA 2013). This convergence as I argue is in part due to emerging powers like India becoming more influential and visible SSC partners. This argument is in line with the conclusion of Mawdsley (2019) and contests the idea that SSC is a threat to the international field of development cooperation. This study rather shows that India is challenging the ‘rules of the game’.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

This thesis has provided a comparative analysis, mostly based on secondary literature, of development practices of SSC compared to traditional development cooperation. The findings in this thesis contribute to the academic debate regarding the changing power dynamics within the field of development assistance and further rejects the perception of the Global South states being passive actors in this hegemonic world order. As Silk (2004) situates it, caring at a distance presumes “the construction of Northern actors as carers who are active and generous and of Southern actors as cared for, passive and grateful” (2004, 230). This view is in each factor of this study disproven, the Global South has an ever-growing influence on the world stage. However, the field of traditional aid has also changed to NSC. In the Netherlands this shift is moving even more towards trade relations and the phasing out of traditional donor-recipient relations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2022).

Although not being emerging or new in any regard, India is an important actor the global order, challenging the traditional NSC approach that is still dominating and setting the development agenda. The guiding principles set in the Bandung Conference are guiding the foreign policy of India’s strategic partnerships till this day, however the terminology and capacity building projects should not make us overlook the inequality within the South; the danger of assuming a homogenic group when talking about the Global South is a common pitfall. Further research should include the question whether new dependencies are actually being created between Global South countries or if their partnerships are lessening the indebtedness and dependencies of LICs.

Besides SSC being able to provide an alternative as well as a supplement for development assistance for LICs, the question of the effectiveness of the different approaches of cooperation has mostly been left out of this thesis. The ineffectiveness of aid has been shown to at least in part be due to dependency on aid, aid fragmentation because of the many different providers and a lack of coordination especially in the LICs, these are mostly fragile states with inadequate governance (Alonso 2019, 10). This sober conclusion is stressed by for instance the Ministry of Finance of Ethiopia “more must be done to improve donor coordination to ensure the effectiveness of development financing and projects.” (2022, 14).

To answer the research question posed in the introduction: *In what ways is the development partnership between India and Africa different from the traditional development cooperation approach of the Netherlands in Africa?* While India focuses on South-South cooperation,

innovation, and entrepreneurship, the Dutch government emphasizes traditional development cooperation practices with a particular emphasis on ‘good governance’, human rights, and social protection. However, both countries share a common goal of fostering sustainable and inclusive development outcomes in Africa, and their respective approaches contribute to addressing the country's development challenges in different ways. The five factors show the significant differences between these two approaches adhering to very different terminology and creating not just different narratives but also different goals and ambitions to strive for. Both approaches are not without pitfalls and in either form of development practice the agency of African countries to steer the development projects and ensure the local context and resources are considered beforehand is crucial for any project. Especially, to ensure that development practices are not about creating new dependencies or enable exploitative relations between states.

To conclude with the answers to the sub-questions:

1. Is SSC changing the way development cooperation has been practiced by the North?
2. Is India along with the other ‘emerging’ donors changing the ‘rules of the game’?

According to my study the answer to both these questions is yes, India along with the other SSC partners is challenging the traditional hegemonic system of development cooperation. Leading them to slowly change the rules of the game even though the role of the Global North in development cooperation is still preceding that of the Global South. It is not yet clear what the influence on crises like the global COVID-pandemic will have on SSC and the field of development assistance, but both NSC and SSC are not static approaches performed in a vacuum. They are constantly challenged and changing. It is hard to specifically quantify the role of the Global South actors in these changes, but according to this analysis SSC partnerships becoming more visible and important has forced Global North actors to question their role and approach as donors even more.

6.1 Discussion

It has become clear whilst writing this thesis that there is so much more to research and not enough time and space to fit in this thesis. Further research could include more actors, such as NGOs or other non-state actors like CSOs and focus more on the local impact of projects ‘on the ground’. Building on this analysis other research on development practices could focus more on the effectiveness of approaches to development and look into quantitative data as well or solely focus on the sustainable outcomes of capacity building through qualitative research.

Besides, future research could and should focus also more on the complementarity of these approaches to sustainable development and not just be compared and analyzed as if they are mutually exclusive. Besides, the African perspective has been left out of this thesis to leave more space for the Indian and Dutch approach. The viewpoint of African states towards both NSC and SSC and how best to utilize both forms of development assistance is for sure an interesting research question. Such a study could also analyze more in-depth which approach of development cooperation is better received and leaves more space for agency. In short, this thesis contributes to the academic debate on differences between traditional and non-traditional approaches of development cooperation but there is a lot to build future research upon.

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