



Universiteit
Leiden
The Netherlands

Greece, Ireland, and populism in the context of the Eurozone crisis
Zbucki, Thomas

Citation

Zbucki, T. (2023). *Greece, Ireland, and populism in the context of the Eurozone crisis*.

Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown)

License: [License to inclusion and publication of a Bachelor or Master Thesis, 2023](#)

Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3633890>

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

Greece, Ireland, and populism in the context of the Eurozone Crisis

Research Question – Despite having similar economic consequences in both countries, why did the Eurozone Crisis contribute to the rise of populism in Greece (and not in Ireland)?

Supervisor - Bart van Riel

Second Reader – Dennie Oude Nijhuis

Student Number – S3004333

Word Count – 15,000

Leiden

May 2023

Contents Page

Introduction	3
Literature Review	15
Methodology	22
Case Analysis.....	27
Results	35
Final Conclusions.....	49
Appendices	52
Bibliography	57

Introduction

The Eurozone debt crisis

With the introduction of the Eurozone in 1999, many thought that closer economic integration would be accompanied by greater economic stability in Europe. Steps were taken to mitigate the dangers of effectively removing sovereignty over monetary policy in eurozone member states – namely through the Growth and Stability Pact (GSP), which was meant to set clear fiscal rules for member states to abide by in order to avoid large fiscal imbalances emerging between Eurozone members.¹

However, the GSP would ultimately fail in its objective of ensuring fiscal stability. The emergence of significant asymmetries between the economies of the Northern and Southern member states would mean that it was profitable for creditors and financial institutions in the North to lend money to the Southern states, who were naturally keen to take advantage of this new access to cheap credit. This process would fuel consumption - driven economic growth in the South, that would be unsustainably financed through issuing more debt (something that also led to the emergence of significant bubbles in property markets, particularly in Ireland).²

The first signs of trouble began to emerge with the onset of the global recession that began in 2007. In the Eurozone, this economic downturn meant that the Northern states were suddenly unable to lend money to the South, leaving the Southern member states with exorbitant levels of debts and facing an inevitable economic disaster.³

Problems were exacerbated even further when, in 2009, Greece admitted that its budget deficit was much larger than previously disclosed. This process caused investors to entirely lose confidence in Greece's ability to repay its debts, damaging Greece's credit

¹ de Haan, J., Berger, H. and Jansen, D.-J. (2004). Why has the stability and Growth Pact failed? *International Finance*, 7(2), pp. 235–260.

² Frieden, J. and Walter, S. (2017). Understanding the political economy of the eurozone crisis. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 20(1), p.373.

³ *ibid*, p.376.

rating, to such an extent that Greece was no longer able to borrow money on international financial markets and had to request assistance from the EU and the IMF.⁴

With investors losing faith in Greece, attention soon turned to the remaining peripheral Eurozone member states, such as Ireland, with credit ratings and investor confidence plummeting.⁵ Despite the best efforts of the EU and the IMF to restore confidence, the Eurozone crisis had begun.

Greece

Greece was admitted to the Eurozone in 2001.⁶ However, prior to joining the Eurozone, the Greek economy had been suffering from deeply entrenched structural problems, something that can be traced back to the way that the PASOK government reformed the public sector during the early 1980s. Academics such as Anderson identify these structural problems as consisting of ‘deep-seated corruption’, ‘weak institutions’, ‘sustained tax evasion, overgenerous pensions, high public salaries, and excessive state spending’⁷. Whilst Greece managed to satisfy the conditions necessary for joining the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), these problems inherent in the Greek economy would still remain.

With EMU membership achieved, the Greek government had access to cheap credit and European funds that it used to finance an unsustainable growth model consisting of consumption driven economic growth. It did this at the expense of targeting the structural problems plaguing the economy.⁸ Doing so contributed to growing macroeconomic imbalances that the government tried to address through even more borrowing.⁹ This

⁴ *ibid*

⁵ Copelovitch, M., Frieden, J. and Walter, S. (2016). The political economy of the Euro Crisis. *Comparative Political Studies*, 49(7), p.815.

⁶ Kotios, A., Pavlidis, G., & Galanos, G. (2011). Greece and the Euro: The chronicle of an expected collapse. *Intereconomics*, 46(5), p.263.

⁷ Anderson, B. (2020). The Crisis in Greece: missteps and miscalculations. *European Stability Mechanism, Discussion Paper series no.9*, p.5.

⁸ *ibid*

⁹ *ibid*, pp.5-6.

process would continue, with the Greek government consistently accruing ever increasing budget deficits. The true extent of the problem was only realised when the Greek government revised its budget on the 5th of November 2009, which showed that the government deficit was at 12.7% of domestic GDP, which was double what had been previously estimated.¹⁰

As was previously mentioned, this revelation caused investors to lose confidence in Greece, with the remaining states on the periphery soon following suit. The subsequent intervention by The Troika – the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission (EC), and the European Central Bank (ECB) - would ultimately force the Greek government to embark on a policy of extreme austerity, involving cuts to public expenditure that would lead to the country experiencing the worst recession of the post-war period.¹¹ By 2012, unemployment had reached 24% and it was estimated that national output had fallen to levels not experienced since Greece joined the Eurozone in 2001.¹²

As well as this, the spending cuts had drastic consequences for living standards, especially for those at the lower end of the income distribution that were more reliant on the state, causing significant increases in income inequality and poverty.¹³

Political consequences – Greece

With the Eurozone crisis having such far reaching consequences for the Greek population, it comes as no surprise that the political ramifications of the crisis were also severe. In the political arena, support for the two major parties, PASOK and New Democracy, collapsed in the 2012 elections. Both parties regularly shared the majority of the vote, receiving on average 83.8% of the total vote share in elections between 1981-

¹⁰ De Santis, R. (2012). The euro area sovereign debt crisis: safe haven, credit rating agencies and the spread of the fever From Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. *ECB Working Paper Series 1419*, Frankfurt: European Central Bank, p.2.

¹¹ Ellinas, A. (2013). The Rise of Golden Dawn: The New Face of the Far Right in Greece. *South European Society And Politics*, 18(4), p.544

¹² Anderson, B. (2020). The Crisis in Greece, p.7.

¹³ *ibid*

2009.¹⁴ In the 2012 election, the vote shared by both PASOK and New Democracy had fallen to just 32%.¹⁵ Whereas support declined for the two major parties, Golden Dawn (GD), a far right populist party¹⁶ that had only received 19,640 votes in 2009, gained 425,990 votes and 18 seats in the June 2012 elections.¹⁷ Furthermore, SYRIZA – a radical left-wing populist party¹⁸ - has since been considered by some as a ‘big winner’ of the crisis, with its vote share rising from 4.6% in 2009 to 36.3% in 2015.¹⁹

Ireland

Whilst the Eurozone crisis contributed to the rise of populist parties in Greece, the same cannot be said for Ireland. Ireland, being a member of the European Economic Community before Greece, reaped the benefits of EEC membership, namely funding that would help the development of the country.²⁰ This, combined with a currency devaluation and reduced corporation tax rates in the early 1990s, led to significant economic growth in Ireland, a period now known as the Celtic Tiger years.²¹

Although the financial crisis materialised for different reasons, the consequences were just as severe in Ireland as they were in Greece. Several years of poor financial regulation contributed to a loosening of the fractional reserve system, whereby banks were given greater freedom to determine how much they could loan versus how much they would have

¹⁴ Ellinas, A. (2013). *The Rise of Golden Dawn*, p.544.

¹⁵ *ibid*

¹⁶ Guriev, S. and Papaioannou, E. (2022). The political economy of Populism. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 60(3), p.763.

¹⁷ *ibid*

¹⁸ Guriev, S. and Papaioannou, E. (2022). The political economy of Populism, p.754.

¹⁹ Ladi, S. and Tsagkroni, V. (2019). Analysing crisis parliamentary discourse in Greece: Whom should we blame? *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 57(4), p.734.

²⁰ Fitzgerald, C. (2012). The debt crisis in Ireland. *The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance*, 53(4), p.353.

²¹ *ibid*

to keep in reserve. This development contributed to considerable asset bubbles that were particularly significant in the housing market.

Once the asset bubble burst in the housing market, many banks became insolvent. In order to avoid a total collapse of the banking sector in Ireland, the EU and IMF intervened, granting Ireland a bailout package in November 2010.²² As was the case with Greece, the bailout package was conditional on the Irish government tightening its fiscal policy, namely through reducing government spending and increasing tax revenue by lowering income tax bands, as well as reforming the financial sector.²³

Predictably, the economic cost of these policies was also drastic. Unemployment rose sharply from 4.5% in 2007 - before the outbreak of the crisis - to 14.5% in 2011 prior to the general election.²⁴ In addition to this, economic activity declined in the same way as it had in Greece, with GDP falling by an estimated 21% between 2007 and 2010.²⁵

Political consequences – Ireland

With both countries experiencing equally damaging economic fortunes, one may imagine that Ireland also experienced an increase in electoral support for populist parties. However, this was not the case. The 2011 election in Ireland was the first to be held in the country after the crisis. Fianna Fáil (FF) had been the dominant party in Ireland since the 1930s, with FF's share of the total vote never falling below a threshold of 39% in all elections prior to 2011.²⁶ After the 2011 election, the party's dominance over Irish politics was lost, with the party receiving just 17.4% of the vote. This presents a dramatic change of fortunes

²² Magalhães, P. (2014). Introduction – Financial Crisis, Austerity, and Electoral Politics. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 24(2), p.126.

²³ Kinsella, S. (2012). Is Ireland really the role model for austerity? *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 36(1), p.228.

²⁴ Marsh, M. and Mikhaylov, S. (2014). A Conservative Revolution: The Electoral Response to Economic Crisis in Ireland. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 24(2), p.160.

²⁵ Kinsella, S. (2012). Is Ireland really the role model for austerity, p.244.

²⁶ Marsh, M. and Mikhaylov, S. (2012). Economic voting in a crisis: The Irish election of 2011. *Electoral Studies*, 31(3), p.478.

for the party, especially when considering the fact that FF's received 41.6% of the vote share in the previous election in 2007.²⁷ Also, the Green Party that had been in a coalition with FF lost every one of its seats.²⁸

The heavy losses of FF during the election meant that the main opposition party, Fine Gael (FG) won enough votes to secure its position as the largest party in Ireland for the first time in its history. The Labour Party that would enter a coalition with FG saw its share of the vote almost double.²⁹

Whereas some scholars have used the Pedersen index to show that the turnaround in electoral fortunes in Ireland were some of the most dramatic in post-war Europe, Marsh and Mikhaylov argue that the 2011 election in Ireland was "merely one where one centre right party replaced another"³⁰. This would suggest that the net result of the election was far less dramatic than what was experienced in Greece. More importantly, the crisis in Ireland did not lead to the emergence of populist challenger parties. Sinn Fein – being the only one of the long standing political parties that could be considered to be populist – experienced some gains in the 2011 election, winning 9 seats and 9.9% of the popular vote, which took the party's total number of seats to 14.³¹

So, whilst it is true that the election in Ireland was also dramatic, the political consequences were entirely different, since no significant populist challenger party emerged (as was the case in Greece). This presents an interesting research puzzle, especially given the similar economic consequences of the crisis in both countries.

Relevance and Scope

²⁷*ibid*

²⁸ Marsh, M. and Mikhaylov, S. (2014). *A Conservative Revolution*, p.161.

²⁹ *ibid*

³⁰*ibid*

³¹ Cline, R. and Wolff, G. (2012). *Special Report 21: Resolving the European Debt Crisis*. Illinois: Versa Press, p.39.

Whereas several studies already exist in the literature that consider either the political economy of the Eurozone crisis in Greece/Ireland, or the reasons for diverging levels of economic recovery across the most affected Eurozone states, very little attention has been devoted to investigating why the political consequences of the crisis were so much more extreme in Greece than they were in Ireland.

Thus, it was decided that the following approach would be the most appropriate for plugging this gap in the literature:

1. A number of enabling factors contributing to the success of populist parties were identified and classified (see Fig 1).
2. Whilst it would be possible to also look at all 3 types of enabling factors, it was ultimately decided for the purposes of this project to focus on demand side factors. This was done chiefly because it is easier to gain access to primary sources related to demand side factors (such as the ESS dataset), therefore making it easier to carry out a quantitative analysis.
3. A number of demand side frameworks were investigated and compared using the following criteria:
 - Best fit/coverage of the demand side factors.
 - Best fit for the data available (the ESS datasets).

Frameworks

Eatwell and Goodwin, two prominent figures in the contemporary study of populism, suggest that there are 4 'deep rooted societal changes' that have occurred in recent times, the presence of which increases the likelihood of populism to thrive.³² In their book titled *National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy*, these are called the 4 Ds: *Destruction, Deprivation, De-Alignment, and Distrust* (see Fig 1).

³² Eatwell, R. and Goodwin, M. (2018). *National populism – the revolt against liberal democracy*. 1st ed. London: Pelican, pp.11-13.

Although it was eventually decided to use the 4Ds framework for the purposes of this project, it should be taken into consideration that other academics have devised similar frameworks. Whilst it would not be possible to list all of approaches given the spatial constraints of this project, a couple of examples will be considered in this section, but these are by no means exhaustive.

For example, a similar set of contributing factors was devised by Pappas et al, this time consisting of 4 ‘guiding hypotheses’³³ (or 4 Hs – see Fig 1). It should be apparent that there are certain parallels between the framework developed by Eatwell and Goodwin and Pappas et al, particularly between H1 and *Deprivation* and H2 and *De-Alignment*.

In a largely similar vein to Goodwin et al and Pappas et al, Aiginger also proposes that the recent success of populist parties can be attributed to 4 root causes: ‘economic problems’, ‘cultural causes’, ‘the speed of change generated by globalisation and digitalisation’, and ‘the failure of policy to manage a transition to higher welfare, globally and locally’³⁴.

A somewhat different approach to understanding why populist parties emerge is offered by Berman, who divides the causes of populism into ‘demand side’ and ‘supply side’ explanations. Demand side explanations focus on the demands of the electorate for populist parties and the origins of this demand; namely economic and socio-cultural grievances that motivate people to vote for populist parties, whilst supply side explanations focus on the deficiencies present within modern democracies that empower populist parties – i.e. “the failures of governments, politicians, policy makers, parties, and other actors”³⁵.

Justification for using the 4 Ds framework

³³ Pappas, T. and Kriesi, H. (2015). *European populism in the shadow of the great recession*, 1st ed. Colchester : ECPR Press, pp.11-14.

³⁴ Aiginger, K. (2020). Populism: Root causes, power grabbing and counter strategy. *Intereconomics*, 55(1), p.38.

³⁵ Berman, S. (2021). The causes of populism in the West. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 24(1), p.73.

It was ultimately decided to use Eatwell and Goodwin's 4 Ds framework to determine why the Eurozone crisis caused populist challenger parties to emerge in Greece but not in Ireland. This was done chiefly for two reasons.

Firstly, it was deemed that Eatwell and Goodwin's 4 Ds framework best fits the theory surrounding populism. Other frameworks, for example, overlook the role played by immigration, which, as is explained in the literature review, is something that populist parties frequently use when forming an out-group.

Secondly, after checking the variables available in the ESS dataset, it became clear that there were multiple variables available in the dataset that would be relevant for each D. In this way, it was determined that the 4 Ds framework provided the best fit for the data available; on these grounds, Eatwell and Goodwin's framework was selected over the alternatives.

In using the 4 Ds framework, I make the prediction that the reasons for the differing fortunes of both countries lies in the fact that Ireland only satisfies a few of Eatwell and Goodwin's contributing factors, and where it does satisfy a factor, it'll always be to a lesser extent than Greece.

In this way, not only would this research actually test the robustness of Eatwell and Goodwin's theory of the 4 Ds— it may also broaden our understanding of the conditions contributing to the rise of populism, as well as providing more detailed insights as to why Ireland and Greece experienced such different political fates from the same economic shock. This is something that could act as a springboard for fellow academics to take advantage of in order to further our understanding of the rise of populism.

Overview of structure

This thesis will be structured as follows. In the subsequent chapter, the existing literature on populism, Greece, and Ireland in the context of the Eurozone Crisis will be analysed.

Following on from the literature review, the methodology will provide a justification for the case selection, a brief summary of the approach used to tackle the research question, as

well as a discussion of the methods of data gathering and why it was decided to conduct a quantitative study over a qualitative study.


In the next chapter, titled Case Analysis, it is shown how the value of each D (i.e. the extent to which each D applies to each case study) was calculated. This involves the process of allocating observable variables from the ESS dataset to each one of the 4 Ds. Furthermore, since it was frequently the case that the observable variables from the ESS survey had different measuring scales (see tables in Appendix 1), it was necessary to 'standardise' the variables, such that each variable would have the same scale. The formulas that were used to do this, as well as the formulas used to calculate each D, are also included in this section.

The results chapter firstly provides a discussion of any trends that were noticed when processing the data, followed by a more detailed discussion of the results, where the findings of this project are then linked back to the literature.

In the final chapter, some general conclusions will be made, as well as a brief discussion of the limitations of this project.

Fig 1

Taxonomy of populist enabling factors



Frameworks

4 Ds

D1: 'Destruction of the National Group's Identity' (*Destruction*) .

D2: 'Deprivation as a result of rising inequalities of income and wealth in the West' (*Deprivation*).

D3: political 'De-Alignment' (*De-Alignment*).

D4: 'Distrust of Politicians' (*Distrust*).

4 Hs

H1: A 'deep economic crisis enhances the antagonism between 'the people' and some political or economic elites, which serves to intensify populism-qua-discourse'.

H2: 'Political crises create anti-elitist sentiments on which populists feed. In other words, we expect more intense populism in countries characterized by a political crisis'.

H3: 'Indeed, when the economic crisis leads to a political crisis, we expect the combined effect of the two crises to be particularly conducive to populism'.

H4: 'When in power, populists tend to tone down their populist discourse/ behave more like mainstream parties'.

Demand side factors

Deal with the electorate and their choice to vote for populist parties. This need can be explained using frameworks such as the 4 Ds and the 4 Hs.

Supply side factors

Deal with what enables populist parties to emerge in the first place, such as 'the deficiencies present in modern democracies that empower populist parties – i.e. "the failures of governments, politicians, policy makers, parties, and other actors

Important note

Populism is more likely to thrive when demand side factors are met by supply side factors (and possibly also when some of the other factors are present, such as historical or cultural factors).

In other words, demand side factors, supply side factors, or other factors in isolation cannot be seen as necessary for populist parties to emerge, as they are a subset of all enabling factors.

Literature Review

Literature on populism

One of the first things that becomes apparent in the literature on populism is the difficulty associated with deriving a definition for the term *populism*. Cases can be made for a wide array of different movements, systems, or regimes - from the Peron regime in Argentina, George Wallace in Alabama, to the Solidarity movement in Poland – to be labelled as populist.³⁶ The problem here lies in the fact that all of the aforementioned political movements/political phenomena had very little in common with each other from an ideological perspective. Yet, the word *populist* can be used in every single example mentioned.³⁷

In this way, academics cannot reach a consensus when it comes to defining populism. This is something that is encapsulated by Laclau, a prominent scholar in the field of populism, who said that “Few terms have been so widely used in contemporary political analysis, although few have been defined with less precision”³⁸.

As well as proving notoriously difficult to define by academics,, usage of the word populist itself is often used as a political slur by the political parties, most often the opposition, in an attempt to discredit the policy initiatives of rivals.³⁹

Furthermore, unlike other political movements - where it has been generally agreed upon by the members of each movement what the movement stands for - the same is not true for populism. As Canovan notes, there was never any international conference where populists from across the globe met to agree upon what “their movement stood for”⁴⁰.

³⁶ Taggart, P.A. (1996). *The new populism and the new politics: New protest parties in Sweden in a comparative perspective*. 1st ed. Basingstoke: Macmillan, p.32.

³⁷ Allcock, J. (1971). *Populism*, p.372.

³⁸ Laclau, E. (2005) *On populist reason*. 1st ed. London: Verso, p.143.

³⁹ Albertazzi, D. and McDonnell, D. (2008). *Twenty-first century populism*. 1st ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p.2.

⁴⁰ Canovan, M. (1981) *Populism*, pp.5-6.

As such, it should become fairly clear already that it would not be possible to come up a single definition for every instance of populism that would hold true for every single case. Because of this, some have considered whether to stop using the word altogether due to its confusing nature.⁴¹

Nonetheless, whilst efforts to formally define the word *populism* will undoubtedly continue, academics are more able to reach a consensus regarding the key features of populism. At its core and in its most simplest form, each populist movement consists of an effort to unify *the people* against some sort of enemy of the people.⁴² In this way, populists form a type of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ rhetoric, whereby the ‘us’ refers to *the people* (sometimes called the in-group) and ‘them’ refers to the enemy of the people (sometimes also called the out-group in the literature).⁴³

What is exactly meant by *the people* will vary in each case of populism. Canovan, for example, identifies 3 main different interpretations, whereby the people can entail the ‘*united people*’, ‘*common people*’, or ‘*our people*’⁴⁴. However, as Taggart argues – sometimes the notion of the people is not always clear in every instance, as it is often the case that “they may not know who they are, but they know who they are not”⁴⁵.

In this way, sometimes it is easier to identify who the populists are discriminating against rather than who belongs to the movement. Generally speaking, those that belong to the out-group – i.e. those that the populists will attempt to discriminate against - will often consist of (but is by no means limited to) “liberal elites, the establishment, and minorities and/or immigrants”⁴⁶.

That being said, it is not the purpose of this project to derive a new definition of populism. Therefore, the definition proposed by Albertazzi and McDonnell will be used in this project. They define populism as follows:

⁴¹ *ibid.*, pp.6-7.

⁴² Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy. *Political Studies*, 47(1), p.3.

⁴³ Berman, S. (2021). The causes of populism in the West, pp. 72-73.

⁴⁴ Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the People, p.5.

⁴⁵ Taggart, P.A. (1996). *The new populism*, p.33.

⁴⁶ Berman, S. (2021). The causes of populism in the West, pp.72-73.

“An ideology which pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice”⁴⁷

Literature on Greece and Ireland

Furthermore, whilst a significant amount academic attention has been devoted to defining populism or understanding the causes of populism, it should be noted that a surprisingly small volume of academic research has been directed towards investigating why populism thrives in some European countries and not in others. In particular, the interesting case of Greece and Ireland - two seemingly similar Eurozone member states that have had entirely differing experiences with populism - has largely gone unnoticed.

The existing literature in this field can be divided into three general categories. The first two types are studies that either deal with populism in Greece *or* Ireland. The third type consists of comparative studies that compare multiple EU member states (in which sometimes Greece and Ireland are included) with the attempt of explaining why populist parties have enjoyed greater success in certain parts of Europe. Whenever Greece is the focus of an academic study, the emphasis is very much placed on understanding the rise of populism in Greece, whilst whenever Ireland is the sole focus of an academic study, the objective is to investigate the apparent lack of a populist challenger party in Ireland.

Out of all the three types, the first type - i.e. studies that focus specifically on Greek populism - are the most numerous, to such an extent that it would be difficult to list all of them (see the citation below for a few examples, but this list is by no means exhaustive).⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Albertazzi, D. and McDonnell, D. (2008). *Twenty-first century populism*. 1st ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p.3.

⁴⁸ Vasilopoulou, S., Halikiopoulou, D. and Exadaktylos, T. (2013). Greece in Crisis: Austerity, Populism and the Politics of Blame. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 52(2), pp.388-402; Lamprianou, I. and Ellinas, A. (2016). Institutional Grievances and Right-Wing Extremism: Voting for Golden Dawn in Greece. *South European Society and Politics*, 22(1), pp.43-60; Mavrogordatos, G. (1997). From Traditional Clientelism to Machine Politics: the Impact of PASOK Populism in Greece. *South European Society And Politics*, 2(3), pp.1-26; Stavrakakis, Y. (2014). The Return of “the People”: Populism and Anti-Populism in the Shadow of the European Crisis. *Constellations*, 21(4), pp.505-517.

Without overtly generalising, the bulk of this research has provided five key arguments for the historical and current salience of populist parties in Greece. These are: the legacy of the Ottoman occupation of Greece (also sometimes referred to as ‘Greek underdog culture’⁴⁹ in the literature), the role that immigration has played⁵⁰, the role of clientelism and corruption⁵¹, and the impact of the Eurozone crisis itself.⁵²

Whilst Greece has become somewhat of a focal point for scholars of populism, Ireland has not received the same attention. This is particularly interesting, especially when considering that Ireland satisfies many of the conditions required for a populist parties to emerge.⁵³

Nonetheless, even though Ireland has attracted less attention from scholars, some research on the topic of Irish populism has already been carried out. For example, McDonnell argues that Ireland presents the ideal conditions for the emergence of a populist challenger party, something which he calls “opportunity structures for populism in Ireland”⁵⁴. These conditions are: Irish political culture, the political system in Ireland, the Irish economy, Immigration, European Integration, and Corruption.⁵⁵

⁴⁹ Diamandouros, N. (1994). Cultural Dualism and Political Change in Post-authoritarian Greece. Working paper, 50, Madrid: *Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales* 50, p.40; Papathanassopoulos, S. (2018). Greece: Populism Between Left and Right. *Populist Political Communication In Europe*, pp.205-216; Ellinas, A. (2013). The Rise of Golden Dawn: The New Face of the Far Right in Greece. *South European Society And Politics*, 18(4), pp.543-565.

⁵⁰ Lamprianou, I. and Ellinas, A. (2016). Institutional Grievances and Right-Wing Extremism: Voting for Golden Dawn in Greece. *South European Society and Politics*, 22(1), pp.46-47; Bistis, G., 2013. Golden Dawn or Democratic Sunset: The Rise of the Far Right in Greece. *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 24(3), pp.35-55

⁵¹ Lamprianou, I. and Ellinas, A. (2016). Institutional Grievances and Right-Wing Extremism: Voting for Golden Dawn in Greece. *South European Society and Politics*, 22(1), p.47; Mavrogordatos, G. (1997). From Traditional Clientelism to Machine Politics: the Impact of PASOK Populism in Greece. *South European Society And Politics*, 2(3), p.19.

⁵² Ellinas, A. (2013). The Rise of Golden Dawn: The New Face of the Far Right in Greece. *South European Society And Politics*, 18(4), p.544; Lamprianou, I. and Ellinas, A. (2016). Institutional Grievances and Right-Wing Extremism: Voting for Golden Dawn in Greece. *South European Society and Politics*, 22(1), p.46.

⁵³ Guildea, A. (2021) *Ireland presents all the conditions for the emergence of a radical right populist party – except there isn't one, The Loop*. Available at: <https://theloop.ecpr.eu/ireland-presents-all-the-conditions-for-the-emergence-of-a-radical-right-populist-party-except-there-isnt-one/> (Accessed: October 20, 2022).

⁵⁴ McDonnell, D. (2008) The Republic of Ireland: the dog that hasn't barked in the night?, in: D. Albertazzi & D. McDonnell (Eds). *Twenty-First Century Populism. The Spectre of Western European Democracy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, p.199.

⁵⁵ *ibid*, pp.199-208.

Written in exactly the same year, O'Malley also looks into why Ireland has been able to resist the rise of what he calls "radical right parties"⁵⁶. In a similar vein to McDonnell, he too acknowledges that Ireland satisfies many of the necessary conditions for such a party to emerge and analyses more or less the same conditions as McDonnell, just phrased differently. These are: increased immigration, the party system in Ireland, the presence of clientelism and corruption in Irish politics, and the presence of a post-industrial society.⁵⁷

This is not the only contribution that O'Malley has made to this field of research. A joint effort with Fitzgibbon in 2014 was also written in a similar style, wherein the puzzling case of Ireland's reaction to the Eurozone crisis is considered, given that the majority of other Eurozone member states experienced a rise in support for right-wing populist parties whilst Ireland did not.⁵⁸

One final contribution to the topic of Irish populism that should be acknowledged is the work of McGuigan, who also attempts to explain why Ireland managed to resist the trend of rising support for populist-parties in the immediate aftermath of the Eurozone crisis.⁵⁹ However, whilst it is implied by the others that the rise of populism should be treated negatively, McGuigan differs somewhat in his approach, in the sense that he attempts to justify populism as "a constructive style of politics, which articulates social demands for segments of society who lack a voice"⁶⁰.

The third type of study, as mentioned earlier, relates to comparative studies that compare the rise of populism across multiple EU member states. As was the case with the rise of populism in Greece, these studies are numerous. However, a comparative study conducted by Pappas and Kriesi presents a fantastic example of these types of study. By systematically dividing Europe into several geographical regions, they compare the fortunes

⁵⁶ O'Malley, E. (2008). Why is there no radical right party in Ireland? *West European Politics*, 31(5), p.960.

⁵⁷ *ibid*, pp.965-966.

⁵⁸ O'Malley, E. and FitzGibbon, J. (2014). Everywhere and nowhere. Populism and the puzzling non-reaction to Ireland's Crises. In Pappas, T. and Kriesi, H. (2015). *European populism in the shadow of the great recession*. 1st ed. Colchester: ECPR Press, pp.281-282.

⁵⁹ McGuigan, P. (2014). An Examination of the 'far right' and 'populist politics' in contemporary Ireland. In *Rising Populism and European Elections Collection of selected contributions*, 55(4), pp.153-177.

⁶⁰ *ibid*, p.153.

of parties that they consider to be populist by aggregating changes in electoral support for these parties both before and after the Eurozone crisis began.⁶¹ Naturally, since the study involved the entire EU, this means that both Greece and Ireland are included in the study. Nonetheless, since Greece and Ireland belong to different geographical regions - with Ireland belonging to what Pappas and Kriesi call the 'Anglo-Celtic countries'⁶² - and Greece belonging to the 'Southern group'⁶³, no in depth comparisons between the two are made.

A more recent comparative study was conducted by Salgado et al that considered the representation of populist parties and political figures across several European countries (of which Greece and Ireland are also included). However, whilst the sample size is far smaller than the study conducted by Pappas and Kriesi, it should be noted that the emphasis is very much placed on how populist and non-populist parties were represented in the media and investigating whether there exists a link between media representation and the success of populist parties.⁶⁴

It should also be noted that several other comparative studies related to populism that also use ESS data already exist. Many examples of these can be found in a study conducted by Guriev and Papaioannou.⁶⁵

The only comparative study that could be found that directly compares the fortunes of only Greece and Ireland in the context of the Eurozone Crisis just so happens to have been conducted by Pappas and O'Malley. Pappas and O'Malley solely compare Greece and Ireland and investigate why the same level of civil unrest in Greece following the economic crisis was not witnessed in Ireland. As well as considering cultural differences, their argument is chiefly based on the strength of both states – i.e. the ability of the state 'to

⁶¹ Pappas, T. and Kriesi, H. (2015). Populism and Crisis: A Fuzzy Relationship, in: Pappas, T. and Kriesi, H. (2015). *European populism in the shadow of the great recession*. 1st ed. Colchester: ECPR Press, pp.303-304.

⁶² *ibid*, p.320.

⁶³ *ibid*, p.312.

⁶⁴ Salgado, S. *et al.* (2021). Crisis and populism: A comparative study of populist and non-populist candidates and rhetoric in the news media coverage of election campaigns. *European Politics and Society*, pp. 1–16.

⁶⁵ Guriev, S. and Papaioannou, E. (2022). The political economy of Populism. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 60(3), pp.782-783,794.

continue providing 'basic public goods and other state-related services'⁶⁶ - being different in both countries.⁶⁷ They argue that the ability of the Greek government to continue to provide to the people was severely hampered by the crisis, where the PASOK government had to drastically cut public expenditure and the provision of public goods/services.⁶⁸ This was not the case in Ireland, where despite support for Fianna Fail drastically falling, the Irish state was still able to provide these services.⁶⁹

However, as was the case with the research conducted by Salgado et al, the focus of the study differs somewhat to what is being proposed in the previous chapter. Whereas Pappas and O'Malley focus on the varying strength of both states, this constitutes a slightly different approach to what is being proposed in this project, since this project is attempting to explain the different political outcomes in both countries in terms of demand side causes of populism (see Fig 1).

Thus, taking all of this into consideration, it would appear to be the case that a gap exists in the academic literature, since - to the best of my knowledge – no direct comparative study exists that compares Greece and Ireland and attempts to explain the different political outcomes in both countries using demand side explanations. Given the absence of a such a study, I believe that this is likely to be one of the first studies in this field to directly tackle this research puzzle from this perspective.

As such, insights gained from this research would achieve two things. Firstly, the gap that has been identified in the literature would be filled, something that is likely to improve our understanding of populism in general and the factors that can contribute to the spread of populism. Secondly, by approaching this research puzzle from a unique perspective that has not been attempted before, it is likely that this research will contribute something new to the existing debates about the rise of populism.

⁶⁶ Pappas, T. and O'Malley, E. (2014). Civil Compliance and 'political luddism'. *American Behavioural Scientist*, 58(12), p.1592.

⁶⁷ *ibid*, pp.1603-1607.

⁶⁸ *ibid*

⁶⁹ *ibid*, p.1604.

Methodology

Case selection

As mentioned in the previous two chapters, the case of Ireland and Greece in the context of the Eurozone Crisis offers an interesting research puzzle. Both countries were exposed an economic shock of similar proportions, yet the political consequences that can be observed in both nations are entirely different.⁷⁰ Moreover, what makes the case of Greece and Ireland even more interesting is how much the two countries have in common with each other. For example, Pappas and O'Malley go so far as to say that Greece and Ireland also share a similar "cultural background, social composition, ideological profiling, and party system dynamics, among other factors"⁷¹.

With such striking similarities, the case selection is justified for two reasons. Firstly, the cases in question present a natural experiment. We have an example of two cases with similar inputs (i.e. the similarities that both states shared before the crisis began that have already been identified by Pappas and O'Malley) but with differing outcomes. Secondly, given the spatial constraints of this project, it is unlikely that studies a la Pappas and Kriesi or Salgado et al that were considered in the previous chapter would be feasible, since it would be difficult to devote enough attention to each case whilst also simultaneously remaining within the word limit. Bearing this in mind, the cases of Greece and Ireland provided an ideal situation for a two country comparative study to be conducted that would explain the differing fortunes of both countries in the context of the Eurozone crisis.

⁷⁰ Pappas, T. and O'Malley, E. (2014). Civil Compliance and 'political luddism'. *American Behavioural Scientist*, 58(12), p.1602.

⁷¹ *ibid*, p.1592.

Originally proposed by Mill, this type of case selection has become known as the most similar method, or the most similar case study design and the logic behind this type of case selection is as follows:

“If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance save one in common, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon”⁷²

As such, the case selection is fairly self explanatory. Provided that is possible to prove the effects of the economic crisis were similar in both countries, whilst also simultaneously showing that some of the Ds do not fully or only partially apply to the Irish case, then it is highly probable that this will offer the reason as to why no significant populist challenger party emerged in Ireland.

Research Goals

Taking into consideration what has already been written about Greece and Ireland in the previous sections, I propose the following research question:

Despite having similar economic consequences in both countries, why did the Eurozone Crisis contribute to the rise of populism in Greece (and not in Ireland)?

In order to answer the research question, the following research goals have been proposed:

1. Show that both Greece and Ireland experienced an economic crisis of similar proportions.
2. Prove that whilst Greece satisfies all 4 Ds, Ireland only satisfies some (and where it does, it is always to a lesser extent than Greece).

⁷² Mill, J.S. (1869). *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation*. New York: Harper and Brothers, p.225.

3. Link the different political outcomes of the crisis in Ireland – i.e. the apparent lack of an Irish populist challenger party emerging – to the fact that Ireland satisfies these enabling factors to a lesser extent than Greece, or even not at all.
4. Link the success of the Greek populist parties to the fact that Greece satisfies all 4 of Eatwell and Goodwin’s enabling factors.
5. Compare the results of this research project to the existing literature on populism in order to test whether the findings synthesise the literature.

Satisfying the research goals

To satisfy these research goals, the following approach will be taken. Firstly, in order to satisfy the first research goal, the existing literature on Greece and Ireland will be analysed. From this, it will be shown that both nations suffered an economic shock of similar proportions.

Secondly, in order to answer the remaining research goals, European Social Survey (ESS) data will be used to determine whether or not Eatwell and Goodwin’s 4 Ds apply to both cases, and – should these enabling factors apply – the magnitude with which each case satisfies each factor.

The survey is conducted biannually from 2002 to present in every single EU member state. In the survey, respondents in each member state are asked to answer questions about a wide variety of aspects relating to social life within the EU, ranging from attitudes towards immigration and political preferences, to trust in political institutions, both at the national and EU level. As such, the survey data provides an ideal dataset from which it is possible to analyse the significance of the 4 Ds in each case study.

From the survey data, ‘variables’ have been selected in order to measure the extent to which each individual D applies in each national context. In this way, each of the 4 Ds is treated as a complex variable that would be incredibly difficult to measure given how broadly each D can be interpreted. Given this, it becomes apparent that a logical approach would be to break down each D into smaller variables or ‘sub-variables’ that can be more easily measured. As such, each D is to be broken down into a set of corresponding sub-variables that can be measured directly using the ESS data. This process of measuring the

complex variables using sub-variables (which can be directly measured) can be generalised and is summarised in the following section.

Measuring complex variables

This section gives a brief summary of the main steps that were followed in order to measure/calculate the complex variables which can not be measured directly.

1. Breaking down complex variables into simpler (and measurable) sub-variables. This step involves the following sub-steps:

- Identifying the sub-variables. Any variables that had the potential to contribute to a complex variable (i.e. the 4 Ds) was listed in order to help with the next step.
- Allocating sub-variables to complex variables (for each complex variable). In this process, each of the variables that made the shortlist was then allocated as a sub-variable to measure the complex variable (in our case, the 4 Ds - *Deprivation, Destruction, De-Alignment, and Distrust*).
- Formal validation of allocation using statistical tools and techniques (optional).

2. Metrics design. This step involves developing functions e.g. formulae to calculate the complex variables using the corresponding sub-variables. These functions (or formulae) can vary, from trivial averages to quite complicated functions – this depends on the nature of data.

3. Calculations. This step involves calculations using functions (e.g. formulae) developed in the previous step. In this way, the complex variables can be quantified, allowing for easier comparisons to be made in the analysis.

Qualitative vs Quantitative

As has been already mentioned, data from the ESS dataset will be used to measure the extent to which each case satisfies the conditions identified by Eatwell and Goodwin. This

means that this work qualifies as a quantitative study. The justification for choosing a quantitative study – rather than a qualitative study – is as follows.

Firstly, there is a lack of empirical studies in this field of research. The limited empirical studies that have already been carried out have been identified in the literature review, where it was established that there is a lack of academic interest in this field of research in general, let alone research backed up by arguments supported by empirical evidence (see previous section).

Secondly, as Libarkin and Kurdziel note, the main strength of qualitative research – i.e. that the research is based upon interpretations and not raw data - is also its weakness. This is because “the training and beliefs of the qualitative researcher may themselves shape the research structure and findings”⁷³. As such, through basing the research and analysis in this thesis on empirical data, we can eliminate any interpretation bias that is inherent in qualitative research.

Lastly, the availability of data played a significant role in influencing the decision to undertake a quantitative study over a qualitative study. Not only is the ESS dataset reliable, it is also free to access and can be easily summarised, manipulated, and presented, which is incredibly convenient for the purposes of this research. Given all these considerations and the accessibility of the data, it was decided that a quantitative study would be more appropriate to tackle the task of answering the research question.

⁷³ Libarkin, J. and Kurdziel, J. (2002). Research methodologies in science education. Qualitative Data, *Journal of Geoscience Education*, 50(1), p.79.

Case Analysis

Introduction

This chapter will be structured as follows. Firstly, the selection process that was used to select the sub-variables from the ESS dataset (which would be used to measure each D) will be explained. This will be followed by a short justification as to why these specific sub-variables were chosen for each relevant D.

Next, a more formal approach that determined the allocation of these sub-variables to the corresponding Ds will be discussed. A table that neatly summarises all of the sub-variables (including the codes for each variable) can be found in Appendix 1. From the table it will become clear that the sub-variables used to measure each D tend to have different scoring systems, both in terms of the numerical scoring scale available to respondents and in terms of the interpretation of the scores (for some variables a score of 10 implies stronger populist tendencies, whereas for other variables this is denoted with a 0). This is all summarised and explained in the table.

The next section explains how the metrics were designed for measuring the Ds - i.e. the process and formulae that were used to calculate each one of the Ds. The results of these calculations are presented in the last section, along with the relevant discussion of the results.

Selection and allocation of sub-variables

As was already mentioned in the previous chapter, each complex variable (i.e. each one of the 4 Ds) has to be broken down into a group of smaller sub-variables that would be easier/simpler to measure. In other words, the selected sub-variables have to be allocated to appropriate Ds. This selection and allocation process is presented in this section.

Destruction

In order to better gauge the extent to which respondents felt that immigration threatened the identity of their national group (*Destruction*), the following variables were chosen:

Allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority (*imsmetn*)

Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority (*imdfetn*)

Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe (*impcntr*)

Immigration bad or good for country's economy (*imbgeco*)

Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants (*imueclt*)

Immigrants make country worse or better place to live (*imwbcnt*)

The selection of all variables from *imsmetn* to *imwbcnt* is fairly self explanatory. All offer an insight into public attitudes towards immigration in both countries and, in being selected, will make it possible to determine the role that immigration plays in the spread of populism.

Deprivation

To understand the role that economic considerations could have played in both cases, Deprivation was also broken down into a series of sub-variables:

How satisfied with present state of economy in country (*stfeco*)

Government should reduce differences in income levels (*gincdif*)

Feeling about household's income nowadays (*hincfel*)

As was the case with *Destruction*, the variables selected here to measure the magnitude of *Deprivation* (the role that rising income inequality played in the growth of populism) are also mostly self explanatory. Given that incomes tend to be related to and closely follow macroeconomic performance, *gincdif* was selected on the basis that respondents would be more in favour of government intervention should income inequality be high. *Stfecov* was included as it will give an insight into the attitudes of respondents towards national macroeconomic performance.

Hincfel was selected to gauge the attitudes of respondents in both cases towards household income. Again, should attitudes towards household income be negative, then it is more likely that income inequality is prevalent.

Several variables related to unemployment (namely *uemp12m*, *uemp3m*, and *uemp5yr*) were considered for selection on the basis that long periods of unemployment are likely to contribute to greater income inequality among respondents. According to Eatwell and Goodwin's theory, this should contribute to more pro-populist responses from survey respondents, thus making the inclusion of these variables in the calculations particularly interesting.

However, these variables are dummy variables – i.e. they are scored with 0s and 1s, which makes the inclusion of these variables problematic when having to take averages. As such, the selection of these variables was considered but ultimately it was decided that they would not be selected.

De-Alignment

The next complex variable to be broken down was *De-Alignment*. These are the sub-variables that were selected to measure the magnitude of this variable:

European Union: European unification go further or gone too far (*euftf*)

How satisfied with the national government (*stfgov*)

Euftf was included in the selection so that it would be possible to observe whether the distrust of respondents was solely directed at national governments, or whether this distrust was also prevalent at the supranational level.

Stfgov was a necessary inclusion for the calculations. Through this variable it was possible to gauge the attitudes of respondents towards the respective national governments, with the assumption being that higher levels of dissatisfaction with domestic governments would contribute to respondents seeking political alternatives, some of which could be on the more extreme end of the political spectrum.

Distrust

The last of the 4 complex variables that needed to be broken down was *Distrust*. The sub-variables chosen to measure the magnitude of this D are as follows:

Trust in politicians (<i>trstplt</i>)
Trust in country's parliament (<i>trstprl</i>)
Trust in political parties (<i>trstprt</i>)
Trust in the European Parliament (<i>trstep</i>)
How satisfied with the way democracy works in country (<i>stfdem</i>)

As was the case with *Destruction*, the vast majority of the chosen sub-variables here are mostly self explanatory. *Trstplt*, *trstprl*, and *trstprt* all reveal the level of trust that respondents have in the various aspects of the political apparatus in both national contexts. *Trstep* was included since it would be interesting to see if there is a relationship between distrust at the national and supranational levels – in other words, whether respondents also distrusted the European Parliament if they distrusted their own country's parliament.

To further investigate the distinction between higher levels of distrust and the demand for more extreme political alternatives, *stfdem* was included. Should respondents be dissatisfied with the way that democracy works in their country, then it stands to reason

that they should be more willing to vote for a populist party. With higher levels of distrust in these, it will be assumed that respondents are more willing to turn to political alternatives that may be more extreme (such as populist parties).

Validation of informal selection and allocation of sub-variables

In this section, a more formal approach is used for grouping the sub-variables or, in other words, allocating the sub-variables to each appropriate D. A few statistical techniques were considered, such as Factor Analysis (FA) and Principal Component Analysis (PCA). However, it was decided not to use these techniques for the following reasons.

FA is typically used to reduce variability among observed, correlated variables (in this case, sub-variables) in terms of a larger number of unobserved factors (i.e. complex variables). The observed variables are then modelled as linear combinations of factors. In my research, I am more interested in modelling factors/complex variables as linear combinations of observable variables/sub-variables. For this reason, it was decided not to use FA.

PCA seems to be a suitable technique for my research, but possibly too elaborate for the purpose of validating the allocation of observable sub-variables to each relevant D. For this reason, it was decided not to conduct a PCA.

In the end, it was decided that a far simpler approach to validate the allocation would be to use a correlation matrix (see Appendix 2). The matrix was calculated on a substantial section (around 20%) of the ESS datasets. It clearly shows two highly cohesive groupings of observable variables, corresponding to *Destruction* and *Distrust*.

However, the same cannot be said about *Deprivation* and *De-Alignment*. It seems that *Destruction* and *Distrust* are rather one-dimensional vis-à-vis the ESS dataset, while *Deprivation* and *De-Alignment* are multi-dimensional, i.e. less cohesive. This may explain the difference. So, a more sophisticated approach might be suitable.

Metrics design for Ds

In this section, the process of designing the metrics for the Ds is explained. Each D consists of the 'sub-variables' identified in the previous section. The main assumption here is as follows:

The higher the value of each D, the better the conditions for a populist challenger party to emerge.

In other words, should such a case arise where the value of one D for Country 1 is greater than the value of D for Country 2, then it can be inferred that the likelihood of populist parties succeeding in Country 1 will be greater.

When selecting and allocating sub-variables to the Ds, it soon became apparent that the way in which the ESS survey was conducted means that certain sub-variables have different measuring scales. Broadly speaking, each of the sub-variables used in this project from the ESS survey can be placed into 4 main categories:

Type 1 sub-variable, or a '*standard*' sub-variable. These are measured on a scale that uses a scoring system from 0-10, where survey responses with higher values indicate preferences that are more 'pro-populist'.

Type 2 sub-variable, or an '*inverted*' sub-variable. These variables are exactly the same as above, with the key difference being that the measuring scale is inverted, such that in this case, *lower* value survey responses indicate pro-populist response (instead of higher values).

Type 3 sub-variable. These variables use a smaller measuring scale in terms of range. With these variables, the smaller range is between $N_1:N_2$ (where $0 \leq N_1 < N_2 < 10$ or $0 < N_1 < N_2 \leq 10$). Here, higher values also indicate more pro-populist attitudes, but survey respondents have a much more limited range of possible responses.

Type 4 sub-variable. The final type of sub variable is the exact same as above but, once again, lower values indicate more pro-populist preferences rather than higher values.

Since sub-variables with the range 0-10 are the most numerous in the dataset, the range 0-10 encompasses all other ranges, and, given that it seems more logical that higher survey response values should correspond to more pro-populist political preferences, it was decided that Type 1 sub-variables would be used as a template and all the other types of sub-variables identified above would be adjusted accordingly to maintain a consistent approach.

Metrics for Ds

It was decided to base the metrics for the Ds on averages, or the mean of the corresponding sub-variables. If some of the constituent sub-variables are not standard sub-variables, their averages/means must be adjusted accordingly.

In general the formula for each D will be as follows:

$$D = \frac{AVG_{Standard\ 1} + AVG_{Standard\ 2} + \dots + AVG_{Standard\ K}}{K}$$

Where K is the number of sub variables that have been allocated for the particular D in question.

The process of adjusting the averages/means of non-standard sub-variables (as well as the formulas used) in order to fit the standard set by the Type 1 variable scoring system is as follows:

Type 2 variables. In order to adjust the averages of type 2 sub-variables, the following formula was used:

$$AVG_{standard} = 10 - AVG_{Type\ 2}$$

Type 3 variables. In order to adjust the averages of type 3 sub-variables, the following formula was used, where the value of Type 3 is from the range $N_1:N_2$:

$$AVG_{\text{standard}} = (AVG_{\text{Type 3}} - N1) \times \frac{10}{N2 - N1}$$

Type 4 variables. To adjust the averages of type 4 sub-variables, the following formula was used. As was the case in the previous formula, the value of Type 4 is from the range $N_1:N_2$:

$$AVG_{\text{standard}} = 10 - (AVG_{\text{Type 4}} - N1) \times \frac{10}{N2 - N1}$$

Results

In this section, the results of the calculations performed are summarised. The second column of each table shows the number of sub-variables allocated to each D and the third provides the value of each D as calculated by the formulas (see previous section).

ESS1 – 2002*

Greece

Type of D	Number of sub variables	Value of D
DESTRUCTION	6	6.51
DEPRIVATION	3	5.70
DE-ALIGNMENT	1	5.94
DISTRUST	4	5.08

Ireland

Type of D	Number of sub variables	Value of D
DESTRUCTION	6	4.37
DEPRIVATION	3	4.41
DE-ALIGNMENT	0	
DISTRUST	4	5.43

*For *De-Alignment*, data entries for the variable *eufth* were missing for both countries. For Ireland, data entries were also missing for *stfgov*. For this reason, it was not possible to calculate a value for *De-Alignment* in ESS1 for Ireland.

ESS2 - 2004

Greece

Type of D	Number of sub variables	Value of D
DESTRUCTION	6	6.34
DEPRIVATION	3	5.75
DE-ALIGNMENT	2	4.54
DISTRUST	5	5.29

Ireland

Type of D	Number of sub variables	Value of D
DESTRUCTION	6	4.15
DEPRIVATION	3	4.21
DE-ALIGNMENT	2	4.56
DISTRUST	5	5.22

ESS3 - 2006

Whilst data for Ireland is available for the third ESS round, unfortunately Greece did not participate in ESS3. As a result of this, it would not be possible to make any comparisons between the two countries for this round and, as such, it was decided to not include ESS3 in the calculations.

ESS4 - 2008

Greece

Type of D	Number of sub variables	Value of D
DESTRUCTION	6	6.55
DEPRIVATION	3	5.76
DE-ALIGNMENT	2	5.97
DISTRUST	5	6.54

Ireland

Type of D	Number of sub variables	Value of D
DESTRUCTION	6	4.52
DEPRIVATION	3	4.55
DE-ALIGNMENT	2	6.13
DISTRUST	5	6.10

ESS5 - 2010

Greece

Type of D	Number of sub variables	Value of D
DESTRUCTION	6	6.76
DEPRIVATION	3	5.91
DE-ALIGNMENT	1	8.16
DISTRUST	5	7.94

Ireland

Type of D	Number of sub variables	Value of D
DESTRUCTION	6	5.07
DEPRIVATION	3	5.04
DE-ALIGNMENT	1	6.47
DISTRUST	5	6.28

ESS6 – 2012*

Ireland


Type of D	Number of sub variables	Value of D
DESTRUCTION	6	4.79
DEPRIVATION	3	4.99
DE-ALIGNMENT	2	6.11
DISTRUST	5	6.13

*As was the case with ESS3, Greece did not participate in ESS6. Therefore, data is only available for Ireland for this round.


Data trends – each D by ESS round

In this section, the results from each table have been represented graphically. There are 4 graphs and each represents the value of that particular D across all 4 ESS survey rounds in both countries (as well as ESS6 for Ireland). This means that changes in attitudes relating to each D can be more easily tracked over time.


Destruction




Deprivation



De-Alignment



Distrust



Discussion of the results

Trends

Considering the above graphs, it becomes clear that the first two Ds (*Destruction* and *Deprivation*) share a similar pattern, and the remaining two Ds (*De-Alignment* and *Distrust*) share a different pattern. **However, all 4 Ds in ESS round 5 (i.e. in 2010, immediately after the crisis) clearly show a significant difference between Greece and Ireland.** As well as this, it is important to note that the value of each D fell between ESS5 and ESS6 for Ireland, which is significant because the data for these rounds would have been collected at the same time as the 2011 general election in Ireland.

In addition to this, it becomes clear that overall survey responses from both countries across each D increased over time (i.e. it can be said that political preferences became more populist over time).

Other significant points of comparison include the fact that the value of each D in many cases actually fell between ESS1 and ESS2. This is true for *Destruction* (where it can clearly be seen that the values for both countries fell), *Deprivation* (where only Ireland experienced

a marginal decrease and Greece experienced a marginal increase), *De-Alignment* (where Greece experienced a significant decrease) and *Distrust* (where Greece once again experienced a marginal increase and Ireland a marginal decrease).

Furthermore, there are only two points across all the datasets where survey responses in the Irish ESS survey responses actually outscored the survey responses from Greece. These are: *De-Alignment* between ESS Rounds 2 and 4 and *Distrust* between ESS Rounds 1 and 2. However, in both cases, the following survey round saw a return to the expected result of Greek survey responses being more populist, meaning that the values of both Ds taken from Irish survey responses outscoring Greece only occurred across one ESS round.

Destruction

In the case of *Destruction*, Greek survey respondents consistently gave higher scores in their survey responses than their Irish counterparts, which can be seen from the noticeable distance between the points on the scatter graph. This is something that is true across all ESS rounds, which is shown by the analogy between the two lines across the entire timeframe.

This would strongly suggest that attitudes towards immigration in Ireland, whilst gradually becoming more pro-populist over time, are far less extreme than is the case in Greece, which could offer an explanation for the apparent lack of a populist challenger party in Ireland. Since populist parties often seek to exploit anti-immigrant sentiments across the electorate⁷⁴, the significantly more tolerant attitudes towards immigration in Ireland suggest that part of the explanation could be related to differences between preferences for immigration.

⁷⁴ Yilmaz, F. (2012). Right-wing hegemony and immigration: How the populist far-right achieved hegemony through the immigration debate in Europe,” *Current Sociology*, 60(3), pp. 368–369, Vieten, U.M. and Poynting, S. (2016). Contemporary far-right racist populism in Europe. *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, 37(6), pp. 533–540.

This would be consistent with what has already been found in the existing literature on populism in Greece and Ireland. Ireland experienced high levels of immigration from central and Eastern Europe⁷⁵, which should theoretically satisfy one of the enabling factors identified by Eatwell and Goodwin (*Destruction*). Nonetheless, the data from the ESS survey for immigration clearly shows that Irish respondents have more tolerant attitudes towards immigration. O'Malley suggests that this is down to Ireland's history, namely Ireland's problematic past within the United Kingdom.⁷⁶ He argues that this historical context contributes to more tolerant attitudes in a few ways. Firstly, the Irish were an oppressed ethnic minority within the United Kingdom, something which has contributed to "the rights of small nations and minorities" being "important to Irish politics"⁷⁷. Secondly, Ireland was always traditionally an emigration country, which has also led to the Irish being more open towards immigration.⁷⁸ Thirdly, he suggests that Sinn Fein were wise enough to realise that migrants would form an important voting bloc, and as such actively took strides to represent the rights and welfare of migrants in their policies to gain electoral support.⁷⁹

However, the case of Greece challenges O'Malley's second argument – that Ireland, being an emigration country, contributed to more tolerant attitudes towards immigration. This is due to the fact that Greece, just like Ireland, has also historically been considered an emigration country.⁸⁰ Yet the data clearly shows that attitudes towards migrants are significantly different. Taking this into consideration, there must therefore be another explanation for the differing attitudes towards immigration in the two countries.

In an empirical study, Karyotis and Patrikios pin this more hostile attitude towards migrants in Greece down to the role played by the Greek government and the Greek Orthodox church. Faced with overwhelming migration flows following the collapse of the

⁷⁵ O'Malley, E. (2008). Why is there no radical right party in Ireland? *West European Politics*, 31(5), p.961.

⁷⁶ O'Malley, E. and FitzGibbon, J. (2014). *Everywhere and nowhere*, p.283.

⁷⁷ *ibid*

⁷⁸ *ibid*

⁷⁹ *ibid*

⁸⁰ Karyotis, G. and Patrikios, S. (2010) "Religion, securitization and anti-immigration attitudes: The case of Greece," *Journal of Peace Research*, 47(1), p.45.

Eastern Bloc⁸¹, they find that political discourse on migrants became highly securitised by the Greek government during the 1990s. They find that offensive language was often directed towards migrants in this discourse in order to gain support for more restrictive migration policies. Moreover, migrants were frequently scapegoated and blamed for any social problems affecting the country, with the participation of migrants in criminal activities being frequently overexaggerated, as well as the burden of immigrants on the state - something which has since been disproven consistently by criminologists.⁸² Naturally, the media echoed this sentiment, as the media would also present migrants in a negative light.⁸³

According to Karyotis and Patrikios, the Greek Orthodox church also contributed to forming these negative attitudes for two reasons. Firstly, whereas the Church and state are in theory separated by the Greek constitution, the Greek Orthodox church still has a significant influence over politics.⁸⁴ The second reason is that the Greek Orthodox religion has strong ties to Greek nationalism; the notion here also being that Greek national identity historically is strongly linked to the orthodox church. In this way, the Church did not directly target migrants in its discourse in the same way that political actors did, but it was naturally opposed to immigration since the migrants did not belong to the Greek Orthodox church.⁸⁵ In this way, as was mentioned in the literature review chapter, it was easy to identify an in-group (members of the Greek Orthodox church) and an out-group (migrants that had different religions), something which fed into the populist rhetoric at the time.⁸⁶

Deprivation

⁸¹ Tsatsanis, E., Andreadis, I. and Teperoglou, E. (2018). Populism from below: Socio-economic and ideological correlates of mass attitudes in Greece. *South European Society and Politics*, 23(4), p.434; Cholezas, I. and Tsakoglou, P. (2009). The economic impact of immigration in Greece: Taking stock of the existing evidence. *IZA Discussion Papers, No. 3754*, p.3.

⁸² Karyotis, G. and Patrikios, S. (2010). Religion, securitization and anti-immigration, p.46.

⁸³ *ibid*

⁸⁴ Karyotis, G. and Patrikios, S. (2010). Religion, securitization and anti-immigration, pp.47-48.

⁸⁵ *ibid*, p.47.

⁸⁶ *ibid*

The results for *Deprivation* are not as clear cut as is the case with *Destruction*. For example, survey responses from Greek respondents remained fairly consistent over the ESS rounds, whilst Irish responses actually increased in magnitude over the ESS rounds, indicating a more significant shift towards populist attitudes across the time period than in Greece.

However, whilst not as clear cut as the results from *Destruction*, *Deprivation* can also offer an explanation for the apparent lack of populism in Ireland. As has already been established in the previous chapters, populist parties attempt to appeal to inequalities in the distribution of income to gain support. Since the survey responses suggest that the extent of *Deprivation* in Ireland (i.e. inequalities in the distribution of income) are far less significant than they are in Greece, then it is likely that a populist challenger party in Ireland would not be able to take advantage of this in order to gain electoral support.

This is something that would be consistent with the existing literature. For example, Tsatsanis et al conducted an empirical study in which they found that personal income ‘demonstrates the strongest effect on populist attitudes’, such that lower household income and greater inequality in the distribution of income indicated more pro-populist attitudes among voters.⁸⁷ Taking this into consideration, it would appear that the data from the ESS rounds supports the findings made by Tsatsanis et al. Barring the gradual convergence towards the final ESS rounds, the estimate for *Deprivation* in Greece was consistently higher than in Ireland which, according to the populist theory, would suggest that there should be more populism in Greece than in Ireland.

The work of academics such as Stankov can account for these differences in survey responses for *Deprivation*. Stankov acknowledges that, whilst the crisis hit both Greece and Ireland similarly hard, the reaction and recovery of the crisis was entirely different in both nations. According to Stankov, this is largely due to ‘economic freedom’. Stankov argues that Ireland responded to the crisis by introducing economic reforms that guaranteed greater ‘economic freedom’, which protected flexibility in ‘product, labour, and financial markets’. Greece, on the other hand, ‘continued to fall in the economic freedom rankings

⁸⁷ Tsatsanis, E., Andreadis, I. and Teperoglou, E. (2018). Populism from below: Socio-economic and ideological correlates of mass attitudes in Greece. *South European Society and Politics*, 23(4), pp. 429–450

ever since'⁸⁸. As such, this meant that unemployment in Greece would eventually rocket to 26%, whilst the Irish were able to slow down the rate of growth of unemployment and eventually unemployment after the crisis began to fall.⁸⁹

This is also backed up by the growth statistics in both countries following the crisis: by 2015, Ireland's GDP level was almost at 150% of the level that it was in 2000, whilst at the same time, 'Greece was still struggling to regain its 2000-level of per capita GDP'⁹⁰.

In addition to this, it is highly likely that exports can account for the different levels of economic recovery in both countries. As Gros notes, many of the crisis affected Eurozone member states were able to at least partially make up for the fall in domestic demand caused by the crisis and subsequent austerity measures by increasing their exports.⁹¹ Ireland, being an open and export orientated economy, benefitted greatly from this, something that is shown by the subsequent recovery from the crisis in Ireland. This was not the case in Greece, which has a more closed economy. According to Gros, export growth in Greece following the crisis was far lower in comparison to the other states on the periphery, which is likely to account for the slower economic recovery in Greece.⁹²

Thus, whilst the initial economic shock was of similar proportions, the reaction and subsequent recoveries in both cases was vastly different. In this way, it would appear that the stronger recovery in Ireland could also offer an explanation for the apparent lack of a populist challenger party emerging.

De-Alignment

⁸⁸ Stankov, P. (2017). *Economic Freedom and Welfare Before and After the Crisis*. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, pp.153-154.

⁸⁹ *ibid*, pp.153-154.

⁹⁰ *ibid*, pp.152-153.

⁹¹ Gros, D. (2015). *Why Greece is different*, Daniel Gros, *New Vision*. Available at: https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1326589/greece-daniel-gros (Accessed: 12th May 2023).

⁹² *ibid*

With *De-Alignment*, there is no real significant difference between responses made by survey respondents in both countries in the early rounds. However, in the final ESS rounds (2010), a clear difference between the two countries does emerge. This would suggest that the relationship between *De-Alignment* and the growth of populism is clear in this particular instance.

As such, the results from the ESS survey for *De-Alignment* fit the main narrative found in the literature. In the case of Ireland, academics have argued that the elections held immediately after the outbreak of the crisis were dramatic, but that the net change was minimal, since in essence the result was ‘merely one where one centre right party replaced another’⁹³. The Greek case is far more significant, with the elections held immediately after the outbreak of the crisis leading to a collapse in support for PASOK and New Democracy, the two dominant parties in Greek politics.⁹⁴

The different electoral outcomes can be attributed towards the different responses to the crisis in both countries. The case of Ireland presents a typical case of what is known in the literature as economic voting – i.e. where voters attribute the negative consequences of the economic crisis with the incumbent party. Thus, the incumbent party is punished during the election by voters for mismanaging the economy and voters end up voting for a political alternative.⁹⁵ This is what happened in Ireland. Voters associated the negative consequences of the crisis with Fianna Fail.⁹⁶ FG and Labour, having spent many years as the opposition, avoided any association with the crisis since they had no input over policy decisions.⁹⁷ In this way, no extreme political alternatives arose in Ireland.

⁹³ Marsh, M. and Mikhaylov, S. (2012). Economic voting in a crisis, p.161; O’Malley, E. and FitzGibbon, J. (2014). Everywhere and nowhere, p.287.

⁹⁴ Ellinas, A. (2013). The Rise of Golden Dawn: The New Face of the Far Right in Greece. *South European Society And Politics*, 18(4), p.544.

⁹⁵ Nezi, R. (2012). Economic voting under the Economic Crisis: Evidence from Greece. *Electoral Studies*, 31(3), p.499.

⁹⁶ Marsh, M. and Mikhaylov, S. (2012). Economic voting in a crisis: The Irish election of 2011. *Electoral Studies*, 31(3), p.478.

⁹⁷ Marsh, M. and Mikhaylov, S. (2014). A conservative revolution: The electoral response to economic crisis in Ireland. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 24(2), pp. 161–162;

Greece presents an entirely different case. It is true that the incumbent party (PASOK) was punished by voters during the election, making PASOK's demise at first glance another typical case of economic voting (much in the same way as FF in Ireland).⁹⁸ However, the role that blame shifting played during the Greek elections must also be considered.⁹⁹ For example, Ladi et al argue that the case of Greece is not a typical case of economic voting due to the presence of blame shifting. Not only were PASOK blamed for the ensuing economic chaos, they were also seen by many as part of the 'old establishment' that colluded with foreign actors (such as the EU).¹⁰⁰ Ladi et al claim that this is a necessary condition for protest parties to emerge, which naturally led to new and more extreme parties (such as SYRIZA) emerging and enjoying so much electoral support.¹⁰¹

This would offer an explanation as to why the scores for *De-Alignment* were so different in both countries. Simply put, in Ireland, voters engaged in classical economic voting behaviour, seeking to punish the incumbent party and vote for the traditional opposition parties, whilst in Greece voters wanted to seek a more extreme alternative whilst also punishing the incumbent party, something that is reflected in the findings of this project

Distrust

Distrust follows a similar pattern, whereby there is no significant difference between the two nations and only in the final 2 ESS rounds does a significant difference emerge. This pattern observed in the data would once again be consistent with the empirical research conducted by others. Melios, for example, looks at levels of trust in national governments in EU member states and finds that Ireland qualifies as a 'mid/high' trust country in his

⁹⁸ Nezi, R. (2012). Economic voting under the Economic Crisis, pp.498-505.

⁹⁹ Sommer, M. (2019). Blame-shifting in times of permanent austerity: Evidence from Spain and Greece in the eurozone crisis. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 58(3), pp. 562–579.

¹⁰⁰ Ladi, S. and Tsagkroni, V. (2019). Analysing crisis parliamentary discourse in Greece: Whom should we blame? *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 57(4), p.732.

¹⁰¹ *ibid*

research, whilst Greece qualifies as a 'low trust' country.¹⁰² The same is also true for corruption.¹⁰³

This would be consistent with other academic studies, especially with the work made by O'Malley, where he also notices that trust in political institutions in Ireland was incredibly low from ESS data in subsequent ESS rounds.¹⁰⁴

A possible explanation for these differences is offered by Halikiopoulou et al. By comparing Greece with other peripheral Eurozone members, their key argument is that it was not the economic crisis per se that enabled the rise of multiple populist parties in Greece, but rather the fact that the economic crisis caused what they call 'an overall crisis of democratic representation'¹⁰⁵. In other words, the Greek people effectively lost faith in the ability of the government to deal with the economic crisis. This is something that Halikiopoulou attributes to Greece's historically weak democratic institutions and clientelist networks that emerged following the democratisation of the country during the 1970s.¹⁰⁶ Given this, the loss of faith in the established parties then opens up the space for other parties to emerge that offer the electorate an alternative. In the Greek case, this resulted in the rise of more extreme protest parties, many of which were populist.¹⁰⁷

This sentiment is also echoed by Pappas et al, who argue that the economic crisis in Greece contributed to a political crisis, whereas the crisis in Ireland did not lead to a political crisis.¹⁰⁸

Whilst weak democratic institutions led to the Greek electorate losing faith in all of the traditionally established political parties, the same is not true for Ireland. O'Malley et al

¹⁰² Melios, G. (2021). Europe in crisis: Political Distrust, corruption and austerity. *SSRN Electronic Journal*, p.6.

¹⁰³ *ibid*, p.6.

¹⁰⁴ O'Malley, E. and FitzGibbon, J. (2014). Everywhere and nowhere, p.281.

¹⁰⁵ Halikiopoulou, D. and Vasilopoulou, S. (2016). Breaching the social contract: Crises of Democratic representation and patterns of extreme right party support. *Government and Opposition*, 53(1), p.26.

¹⁰⁶ Halikiopoulou, D. (2020). Economic crisis, poor governance and the rise of populism: The case of Greece. *Intereconomics*, 55(1), p.37.

¹⁰⁷ Halikiopoulou, D. and Vasilopoulou, S. (2016). Breaching the social contract, p.45.

¹⁰⁸ Pappas, T. and Kriesi, H. (2015). European populism in the shadow of the great recession, 1st ed. Colchester : ECPR Press, p.32.

attribute these differences to the fact that, as was the case with *De-Alignment*, the political opposition in Ireland had been out of power for so long that the electorate attributed the blame of the crisis on the incumbent party (FF) and were willing to give the opposition a chance. As such, there was no opportunity for more extreme alternatives to emerge.¹⁰⁹

This would explain why the values for *De-Alignment* diverged so significantly in the last two ESS rounds. In Greece, the electorate lost its faith in the mainstream parties and sought more extreme alternatives, whilst in Ireland the electorate still had faith in opposition parties.

Brief summary

The fact that we can see clear differences between survey responses for all 4 Ds would strongly support the hypothesis established in the research objectives/goals, whereby it was stated that the emergence of populism in Greece, but the lack thereof in Ireland was most likely going to be due to Ireland only satisfying some of Eatwell and Goodwin's enabling factors. As the data suggests, this assumption is valid in this context, since the results for Ireland strongly indicate that Ireland does not satisfy all 4 factors identified by Eatwell and Goodwin, thus leading to differing political outcomes from the crisis, despite the apparently similar economic shock and the many other similarities shared between the two nations.

Conclusion

Limitations

When considering the methodology, it is worth highlighting a few of the limitations that exist in this project that arose as a result of spatial constraints. For example, given more

¹⁰⁹ O'Malley, E. and FitzGibbon, J. (2014). Everywhere and nowhere, p.288.

time and space, it would have been beneficial to analyse the manifestos of the political parties in question, using various analysis techniques (such as content analysis).

However, election manifestos, especially from the 2012 elections in Greece, are not easily accessible. One of the very few manifestos that could be found was SYRIZA's Thessaloniki Programme from the 2015 elections. The manifesto is incredibly condensed and uncharacteristically short, mainly containing policies aimed at tackling the humanitarian effects of the economic crisis in Greece.

That being said, some preliminary research was carried out on manifesto analysis techniques, such as key word count/analysis and populist statements count in the main body of the manifestos. Also, some investigation was carried out on the Manifesto Corpus – a substantial database of election manifestos. The summary of this preliminary research can be found in Appendix 3.

Furthermore, due to the previously mentioned constraints, there was not enough space to provide a justification for labelling the political parties in this project as populist. Nevertheless, a glance at the Chapel Hill Survey – an online dataset that tracks the position of political parties on key policy issues - will quickly reveal that the parties in question undoubtedly have strong populist tendencies.

The analysis of other factors, such as news/media coverage of election campaigns, as in Salgado et al, was also considered, but it was not possible to do this whilst remaining within the word limit. As well as this, it would be possible to use a more formal approach to the allocation of observed sub-variables from the ESS dataset to the complex variables – i.e. Ds (such as principal component analysis).

As well as there being methodological limitations, there exists the possibility to apply the formulas developed in the methodology to even more ESS rounds (2012 and onwards) to better understand trends a few years after the crisis. However, in this particular context, this was not possible because Greece stopped participating in the ESS survey rounds after 2010 and only re-appears in the 10th survey round (in 2020).

It seems however that the results from ESS5 (2010) for both countries - as well as ESS6 results for Ireland only – can account for the different political outcomes that can be observed in the general elections that were held immediately after the crisis. This is because:

1. Both elections took place not long after ESS5 (2010) was published. In Greece, data for ESS5 was collected between the 6th of May and the 5th of July 2011. In Ireland, data was collected from the 20th of September 2011 until the 31st of January 2012.
2. According to Eatwell and Goodwin, all Ds can be viewed as long term trends.
 - Both *Destruction* and *Deprivation* look stable for both countries between 2002-2010, with a clear gap between both cases. This trend continues in Ireland after 2010 and into the subsequent ESS round (ESS6).
 - *De-Alignment* and *Distrust* diverged substantially between 2008 and 2010 in both countries. Both Irish Ds flattened out between 2010 and 2012.

So, given how turbulent the 2012 election was in Greece, it seems unlikely that all 4 Ds for Greece would decrease rapidly in this time period. In other words, it is very likely that the gap between Greece and Ireland was preserved in 2010-2012.

Regarding the metrics design for each one of the Ds, it should be considered that more sophisticated statistical tools/techniques could be used when designing metrics for Ds.

Considering the sub-variables used to measure each D, for *De-Alignment*, only 2 sub-variables were used (*euftf* and *stfgov*). This was due to the fact that many of the variables that could have been used for this D were rotational variables – i.e. they appear on a few ESS Rounds, but not necessarily in every round, meaning that they could not be used. That being said, electoral turnout for the elections (and the data for this) can easily be included in order to supplement the list of sub-variables.

In a similar vein, it should also be noted that in some places, data was missing for certain sub-variables in certain ESS rounds. This can be seen in ESS 1 for *De-Alignment*, where *euftf* was missing for both Greece and Ireland. The other sub-variable for *De-Alignment*, *stfgov*, was also missing for Ireland in this round, meaning that, out of a total of 2 sub-variables used, both were missing in the Irish survey responses. This problem partially repeats itself in the 5th round, where *euftf* is missing in ESS 5 for both Greece and Ireland.

Conclusion

By comparing the puzzling case of Greece and Ireland in the context of the Eurozone Crisis, it has been shown that, on the surface, both countries suffered an economic shock of similar proportions. By using Eatwell and Goodwin's 4 Ds framework, as well as the ESS data, it has been shown in this project that the differing political outcomes of the crisis can be attributed to the fact that Greece outscores Ireland in ESS 5 (the last round before general elections were held in both countries) across all 4 Ds. The differences between *Distrust* and *De-Alignment* in particular seem to be significant.

Possible explanations for these differences were discussed in the results section, whereby for *Destruction*, it was shown the Greek government and the Greek Orthodox church played a significant role in shaping negative attitudes towards immigrants, whilst this did not occur in Ireland. For *Deprivation*, it was shown that whilst the immediate economic impact of the crisis was of a similar magnitude, the Irish government handled the economic crisis significantly better than the Greek government.

For the final 2 Ds, *De-Alignment* and *Distrust*, it was shown that Ireland only satisfies these Ds to some extent, and always to a lesser extent than Greece. It was determined that this was largely due to the differing nature of the crisis that emerged in both countries. In Greece, the economic crisis rapidly became a political crisis, causing dramatic changes in Greek politics and the emergence of several populist protest parties (such as SYRIZA). On the other hand, in Ireland, the crisis was mainly an economic crisis, with the electorate deciding to punish the incumbent party by electing the opposition. In this way, it was not possible for a populist challenger party to emerge in Ireland.

Appendix 1

Table with summarised variables

Destruction

Variable	Scoring system	Scoring scale
lmsmetn Allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority	1-4 and 7-9	1 = Allow many 4 = Allow none 7 = Refusal 8 = Don't know 9 = No answer
imdfetn Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority	1-4 and 7-9	1 = Allow many 4 = Allow none 7 = Refusal 8 = Don't know 9 = No answer
impcntr Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe	1-4 and 7-9	1 = Allow many 4 = Allow none 7 = Refusal 8 = Don't know 9 = No answer
imbgeco Immigration bad or good for country's economy	0-10 and 77,88,99	0 = Bad for economy 10 = Good for economy 77 = Refusal 88 = Don't know 99 = No answer
imuect Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants	0-10 and 77,88,99	0 = Undermined 10 = Enriched 77 = Refusal 88 = Don't know 99 = No answer
imwbcnt Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	0-10 and 77,88,99	0 = Worse 10 = Better 77 = Refusal 88 = Don't know 99 = No answer

Deprivation

Variable	Scoring system	Scoring scale
stfeco How satisfied with present state of economy in country	0-10 and 77,88,99	0 = Dissatisfied 10 = Satisfied 77 = Refusal 88 = Don't know 99 = No answer
gincdif Government should reduce differences in income levels	1-5 and 7-9	1 = Agree strongly 5 = Disagree Strongly 7 = Refusal 8 = Don't know 9 = No answer
hincfel Feeling about household's income nowadays	1-4 and 7-9	1 = Living comfortably on present income 2 = Coping on present income 3 = Difficult on present income 4 = Very difficult on present income 7 = Refusal 8 = Don't know 9 = No answer

De-Alignment

Variable	Scoring system	Scoring scale
eufff European Union: European unification go further or gone too far	0-10 and 77,88,99	0 = Unification already gone too far 10 = Unification go further 77 = Refusal 88 = Don't know 99 = No answer
stfgov How satisfied with the national government	0-10 and 77,88,99	0 = Extremely dissatisfied 10 = Extremely satisfied 77 = Refusal 88 = Don't know 99 = No answer

Distrust

Variable	Scoring system	Scoring scale
trstplt Trust in politicians	0-10 and 77, 88, 99	0 = No trust at all 10 = Complete trust 77 = Refusal 88 = Don't know 99 = No answer
trstpri Trust in country's parliament	0-10 and 77, 88, 99	0 = No trust at all 10 = Complete trust 77 = Refusal 88 = Don't know 99 = No answer
trstprt Trust in political parties	0-10 and 77, 88, 99	0 = No trust at all 10 = Complete trust 77 = Refusal 88 = Don't know 99 = No answer
trstep Trust in the European Parliament	0-10 and 77, 88, 99	0 = No trust at all 10 = Complete trust 77 = Refusal 88 = Don't know 99 = No answer
stfdem How satisfied with the way democracy works in country	0-10 and 77, 88, 99	0 = Extremely dissatisfied 10 = Extremely satisfied 77 = Refusal 88 = Don't know 99 = No answer

Appendix 2

Correlation Matrix

Variable	imsmetr	imdfetr	impcntr	imbgeco	imueclt	imwbcnt	stfeco	gincdif	hincfel	eufft	stfgov	prtlbgr	trstplt	trstpri	trstprt	trstep	stfdem
imsmetr	1																
imdfetr	0.5131605	1															
impcntr	0.4270565	0.754065	1														
imbgeco	-0.208559	-0.303491	-0.332475	1													
imueclt	-0.407222	-0.472879	-0.561153	0.4222596	1												
imwbcnt	-0.284796	-0.427658	-0.504731	0.368978	0.758474	1											
stfeco	0.0111595	-0.066203	-0.077297	0.1500965	0.058521	0.0557727	1										
gincdif	-0.138688	-0.010061	-0.061841	-0.022172	0.060583	-0.021822	0.196121	1									
hincfel	-0.058076	0.018286	0.087177	-0.046145	-0.04226	-0.005044	-0.15	-0.05803	1								
eufft	-0.199223	-0.216009	-0.238577	0.162444	0.253687	0.2158505	0.26998	0.037616	-0.03399	1							
stfgov	0.0690918	0.003895	-0.013608	0.0896472	-0.05227	-0.031715	0.775006	0.184043	-0.08022	0.22029	1						
prtlbgr	0.014236	-0.01329	-0.022734	0.0261606	-0.08219	-0.057457	-0.03921	0.025513	0.000886	-0.04354	0.033517	1					
trstplt	-0.061546	-0.146994	-0.149446	0.1236554	0.200495	0.2459857	0.513725	0.16327	0.099867	0.135591	0.525311	-0.088186	1				
trstpri	-0.032127	-0.083848	-0.074645	0.1477849	0.114615	0.1688585	0.43507	0.1166	0.079099	0.121767	0.417804	-0.112244	0.655473	1			
trstprt	-0.098474	-0.158679	-0.157945	0.1904317	0.1967	0.2441195	0.464695	0.198789	0.041911	0.171592	0.448915	-0.167646	0.831332	0.560887	1		
trstep	-0.113913	-0.167282	-0.187467	0.2119347	0.276716	0.3029641	0.396288	0.084494	0.097204	0.270585	0.369523	-0.106725	0.535436	0.622648	0.550848	1	
stfdem	-0.067735	-0.097409	-0.079581	0.1502782	0.114135	0.1241055	0.541411	0.107117	-0.01273	0.18712	0.569332	-0.04934	0.534147	0.557506	0.423187	0.453744	1

Appendix 3

Manifesto Analysis

1. Approach used

Retrieve all required manifestos (e.g. from the Manifesto Corpus database or other sources)

[optional] Translate manifestos (if necessary) to English, which is treated as a 'common denominator' language.

Apply selected content analysis techniques to the manifestos (e.g. populist statements count, populist keywords count, etc)

Compare the results of the content analysis and draw relevant conclusions

2. Sample of manifestos used

It was decided to carry out manifesto analysis on two manifestos: SYRIZA 2012 and Sinn Fein 2011. Both manifestos were produced for the corresponding general elections, which resulted in big gains for both parties. Due to spatial, time, and technical constraints, only a limited analysis was carried out on the introductory sections in both manifestos. However, it is important to stress that usually these sections tend to be more 'populist oriented' than other sections, which focus more on concrete political, economic, and social programmes.

3. Content analysis and results

The technique used here is similar (although simplified) to the technique used by DaSilva et al (2022) – populist statements count (see below):

1) Statements. A sentence is coded as a statement in case the political party author of the manifesto either takes a position about a certain topic or expresses an evaluation about another political or economic actor, either national or international.

2) Populist Rhetoric. A statement is coded as populist when the party positively mentions the people in opposition to cultural, economic, or political elites. To qualify as populist, the group or class (a part of "the people": virtuous people, etc.) is portrayed as suffering undeservedly because of another group or the "system" that is controlled by that group (the elite, etc.). The mentioning of the first group takes the form of a generalising claim, whereby the part is taken for the whole: for instance, the "working class" is taken for "the people". This means that we look for specific symbolic and material struggles between parts of the people, not references to "the people" per se, in order to distinguish between a populist and a nationalistic rhetoric.

Applying this technique (simplified) to the introductions of both manifestos obtained the following results:

Sinn Fein – 10/44 (where 10 is the populist statements count; 44 – total number of sentences)

Syriza – 10/22 (where 10 is the populist statements count; 22 – total number of sentences)

Conclusion: There is a substantial difference between the 'intensity' of populist rhetoric in both manifestos, but even if a margin of error is taken into account, it seems that Sinn Fein's Introduction is substantially less populist than Syriza's.

N.B. Some very long sentences with clear 'parts' were treated as multiple sentences.

Bibliography

- Aiginger, K. (2020). Populism: Root causes, power grabbing and counter strategy. *Intereconomics*, 55(1), pp. 38–42. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10272-020-0867-3>.
- Anderson, B. (2020). The Crisis in Greece: missteps and miscalculations. *European Stability Mechanism, Discussion Paper series no.9*, pp.4-40. Available at: <https://www.esm.europa.eu/publications/crisis-greece-missteps-and-miscalculations> (accessed 18/3/2021)
- Albertazzi, D. and McDonnell, D. (2008). *Twenty-first century populism*. 1st ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.1-251.
- Allcock, J. (1971). Populism: A Brief Biography. *Sociology*, 5(3), pp.371-387.
- Berman, S. (2021). The causes of populism in the West. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 24(1), pp. 71–88.
- Bistis, G. (2013). Golden Dawn or Democratic Sunset: The Rise of the Far Right in Greece. *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 24(3), pp.35-55
- Canovan, M. (1981). *Populism*. 1st ed. New York: Jovanovich, pp.1-351.
- Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy. *Political Studies*, 47(1), pp.2-16.
- Cholezas, I. and Tsakloglou, P. (2009). The economic impact of immigration in Greece: Taking stock of the existing evidence. *IZA Discussion Papers, No. 3754*, pp. 1-35.
- Cline, R. and Wolff, G. (2012). *Special Report 21: Resolving the European Debt Crisis*. Illinois: Versa Press, pp.1-294.

Copelovitch, M., Frieden, J. and Walter, S. (2016) “The political economy of the Euro Crisis,” *Comparative Political Studies*, 49(7), pp. 811–840. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414016633227>.

Diamandouros, N. (1994). Cultural Dualism and Political Change in Post-authoritarian Greece. Working paper, 50, Madrid: *Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales 50*, pp.1-70.

Eatwell, R. and Goodwin, M. (2018). *National populism – the revolt against liberal democracy*. 1st ed. London: Pelican, pp.1-344.

Ellinas, A. (2013). The Rise of Golden Dawn: The New Face of the Far Right in Greece. *South European Society And Politics*, 18(4), pp.543-565.

Fitzgerald, C. (2012). The debt crisis in Ireland. *The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance*, 53(4), pp.353-363.

Gros, D. (2015). *Why Greece is different*, Daniel Gros, *New Vision*. Available at: https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1326589/greece-daniel-gros (Accessed: 12th May 2023).

Guildea, A. (2021). *Ireland presents all the conditions for the emergence of a radical right populist party – except there isn't one*, *The Loop*. Available at: <https://theloop.ecpr.eu/ireland-presents-all-the-conditions-for-the-emergence-of-a-radical-right-populist-party-except-there-isnt-one/> (Accessed: October 20, 2022).

Guriev, S. and Papaioannou, E. (2022). The political economy of Populism. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 60(3), pp. 753–832.

de Haan, J., Berger, H. and Jansen, D.-J. (2004). Why has the stability and Growth Pact failed? *International Finance*, 7(2), pp. 235–260.

Halikiopoulou, D. and Vasilopoulou, S. (2016). Breaching the social contract: Crises of Democratic representation and patterns of extreme right party support. *Government and Opposition*, 53(1), pp. 26–50.

Halikiopoulou, D. (2020). Economic crisis, poor governance and the rise of populism: The case of Greece. *Intereconomics*, 55(1), pp. 34–37.

Karyotis, G. and Patrikios, S. (2010). Religion, securitization and anti-immigration attitudes: The case of Greece. *Journal of Peace Research*, 47(1), pp.43-57.

Kinsella, S.(2012). Is Ireland really the role model for austerity? *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 36(1), pp.223-235.

Kotios, A., Pavlidis, G., & Galanos, G. (2011). Greece and the Euro: The chronicle of an expected collapse. *Intereconomics*, 46(5), pp.263-269.

Laclau, E. (2005). *On populist reason*. 1st ed. London: Verso, pp.1-288.

Ladi, S. and Tsagkroni, V. (2019). Analysing crisis parliamentary discourse in Greece: Whom should we blame? *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 57(4), pp. 729–748.

Lamprianou, I. and Ellinas, A. (2016). Institutional Grievances and Right-Wing Extremism: Voting for Golden Dawn in Greece. *South European Society and Politics*, 22(1), pp.43-60.

Libarkin, J. and Kurdziel, J. (2002). Research methodologies in science education: Qualitative Data. *Journal of Geoscience Education*, 50(2), pp. 195–200.

Magalhães, P. (2014). Introduction – Financial Crisis, Austerity, and Electoral Politics. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 24(2), pp.125-133.

Mavrogordatos, G. (1997). From Traditional Clientelism to Machine Politics: the Impact of PASOK Populism in Greece. *South European Society And Politics*, 2(3), pp.1-26

Marsh, M. and Mikhaylov, S. (2012). Economic voting in a crisis: The Irish election of 2011. *Electoral Studies*, 31(3), pp. 478–484.

Marsh, M. and Mikhaylov, S. (2014). A conservative revolution: The electoral response to economic crisis in Ireland. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 24(2), pp. 160–179.

McDonnell, D. (2008). The Republic of Ireland: the dog that hasn't barked in the night? in: Albertazzi, D. and McDonnell, D. (Eds). *Twenty-First Century Populism. The Spectre of Western European Democracy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 198–210.

Melios, G. (2021). Europe in crisis: Political Distrust, corruption and austerity. *SSRN Electronic Journal* [Preprint]. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3847633>.

Mill, J.S. (1869). *A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation*. New York: Harper and Brothers, pp.2-1157.

Nezi, R. (2012). Economic voting under the Economic Crisis: Evidence from Greece. *Electoral Studies*, 31(3), pp. 498–505.

O'Malley, E. (2008). Why is there no radical right party in Ireland? *West European Politics*, 31(5), pp. 960–977.

O'Malley, E. and FitzGibbon, J. (2015). Everywhere and nowhere. Populism and the puzzling non-reaction to Ireland's Crises. In Pappas, T. and Kriesi, H. *European populism in the shadow of the great recession*. 1st ed. Colchester: ECPR Press, pp.281-294.

Pappas, T.S. and O'Malley, E. (2014). Civil Compliance and 'political luddism'. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 58(12), pp. 1592–1613.

Pappas, T. and Kriesi, H. (2015). Populism and Crisis: A Fuzzy Relationship, in: Pappas, T. and Kriesi, H. (2015). *European populism in the shadow of the great recession*. 1st ed. Colchester: ECPR Press, pp.303-324.

Pappas, T. and Kriesi, H. (2015). *European populism in the shadow of the great recession*, 1st ed. Colchester : ECPR Press, pp. 1-394.

Papathanassopoulos, S. (2018). Greece: Populism Between Left and Right. *Populist Political Communication In Europe*, pp.205-216.

Salgado, S. *et al.* (2021). Crisis and populism: A comparative study of populist and non-populist candidates and rhetoric in the news media coverage of election campaigns. *European Politics and Society*, pp. 1–16.

de Santis, R. (2012). The euro area sovereign debt crisis: safe haven, credit rating agencies and the spread of the fever From Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. ECB Working Paper Series 1419, Frankfurt: European Central Bank, pp.1-59.

Sommer, M. (2019). Blame-shifting in times of permanent austerity: Evidence from Spain and Greece in the eurozone crisis. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 58(3), pp. 562–579.

Stankov, P. (2017). *Economic Freedom and Welfare Before and After the Crisis*. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, pp.1-168.

Stavrakakis, Y. (2014). The Return of “the People”: Populism and Anti-Populism in the Shadow of the European Crisis. *Constellations*, 21(4), pp.505-517.

Taggart, P.A. (1996). *The new populism and the new politics: New protest parties in Sweden in a comparative perspective*. 1st ed. Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp.1-99.

Tsatsanis, E., Andreadis, I. and Teperoglou, E. (2018) “Populism from below: Socio-economic and ideological correlates of mass attitudes in Greece,” *South European Society and Politics*, 23(4), pp.429-450.

Vasilopoulou, S., Halikiopoulou, D. and Exadaktylos, T. (2013). Greece in Crisis: Austerity, Populism and the Politics of Blame. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 52(2), pp.388-402.

Vieten, U.M. and Poynting, S. (2016). Contemporary far-right racist populism in Europe. *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, 37(6), pp. 533–540.

Yilmaz, F. (2012). Right-wing hegemony and immigration: How the populist far-right achieved hegemony through the immigration debate in Europe. *Current Sociology*, 60(3), pp. 368–381.