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Ἄνδρες, νῦν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα νομίζετε ἀμιλλᾶσθαι: An Investigation and Evaluation of Xenophon's Situated and Invented Ethos in his Anabasis

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
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Ἄνδρες, νῦν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα νομίζετε ἀμιλλᾶσθαι

An Investigation and Evaluation of Xenophon's Situated and Invented Ethos in his *Anabasis*



Master Thesis Classics and Ancient Civilisations: Classics

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Introduction

Influencing your reputation is often not only dependent of what image people have of you, but more strongly even by how you present yourself to other people in certain situations. This subjective perception of reality in specific moments is more easily altered than the fixed image of a person itself, making this self-made or 'invented' *ethos* a crucial part of rhetoric.¹ Mastering the art of forming a positive *ethos* is thus important for anyone concerned with their public image. This is not a modern insight, as Greek philosophical heavyweights like Aristotle and Isocrates teach us when writing about *ethos* in their respective works *Ars Rhetorica* 1356a and *Antidosis* 270ff. This *ethos*, or "Character", as one could translate it, can be subdivided into two forms: a "situated *ethos*", meaning the character or image of a speaker that an audience has in their mind based on his background, history and reputation, and an "invented *ethos*", this being the image a speaker forms of himself in his speech or text.² Both Aristotle and Isocrates acknowledge the importance of the two kinds of *ethos* in their works.³ For a speaker trying to persuade his audience, positively changing his *ethos* as a whole through his invented *ethos* is rather difficult when his situated *ethos* is damaged. We will elaborate on the topic of *ethos* further on in this introduction.

Enter the subject of this thesis, the Athenian general and writer Xenophon. Born around 430 B.C., Xenophon was an eyewitness of a part of one of the most turbulent periods of ancient Greek history. As a leading figure of an army participating in a Persian "usurpation-war", he has serious problems with his situated *ethos* in the eyes of an Athenian-Greek audience. Not only had the Greek world as a whole fought out two wars with the Persians just 80 years ago, but his hometown Athens had also suffered a defeat in the Peloponnesian war against the Spartans, backed by the Persians, as short ago as three years prior to Xenophon's Persian adventure. Thus it was not all that strange that there lay at least a little suspicion of anti-Athenian sympathies on his shoulders after his trip to Persia.⁴

Luckily for him, Xenophon was not only a general and an adventure-seeker, he was also a gifted writer, publishing among other works a history of the Greek world, which started in the middle of the dramatic Peloponnesian war from the point where the famous writer Thucydides had abruptly ended his telling of the war in 411 B.C., and continued up to the year 362 B.C. After his Persian expedition and his banishment from Athens following this journey,⁵ he also wrote an "history" of this experience, thus writing the first memoirs in the history of western literature in the eyes of many scholars: the *Anabasis* or "March of the ten thousand (soldiers)". This report of his own deeds and actions gave him an enormous opportunity to repair his damaged *ethos* in the eyes of later Athenians and

¹ See Crowley & Hawhee (2004: 167ff.) for the importance and practical effects of this aspect of *ethos*.

² See Crowley & Hawhee (2004: 167ff.).

³ Aristotle *Ars Rhetorica* 1356a1-a14 & Isocrates *Antidosis* 278-280.

⁴ Something which is also mentioned by Xenophon himself through the words of his 'teacher' Socrates in *An.* 3.1.5. These suspicions were most likely decisive when the decision on Xenophon's exile was made, cf. Brennan (2022:165), who states: "betrayal of homeland being the most likely official cause of his exile from Athens."

⁵ See *Xen. An.* 7.7.57.

Greeks: by presenting himself in particular ways, it would be possible for him to paint a more positive picture of himself for his (Athenian) audience, thus saving his image as a honourable Athenian. The question of the identity of Xenophon's possible audience will be addressed below.

It is here that we arrive at the research question of this thesis: How does Xenophon use the depiction of his own person (his invented ethos) in his *Anabasis* to give his situated ethos a more positive form in the eyes of his Greek audience?

Status quaestionis

Naturally, there is already written a rather copious amount of literature on Xenophon and his ethical problems. I will describe the more relevant studies below. A most important study with respect to this thesis is the dissertation of Patrick Bradley titled *Apologia Xenophontos: A study of author and audience in Xenophon's exilic rhetoric*.⁶ Bradley also focuses strongly on Xenophon's self-presentation with respect to the Athenian audience, but he concentrates his research around the aspect of a *nostos*, or journey home, in the style of the *Odyssey*, which is also an important aspect in Xenophon's work. By pointing out that in the *Anabasis*, Xenophon is constantly busy with his way home and the misery of his 'exile', Bradley states convincingly that Xenophon uses the narrative of the *nostos* to win the Athenian sympathy, for, as Bradley puts it, "If Xenophon were not to return to his native city, this would confirm the doubts about his devotion to his homeland."⁷ The motive of the *nostos* thus has an apologetical function, according to Bradley. With this approach however, he leaves room for a different angle of approach, focusing on the characterisation of Xenophon in the text apart from the usage of the literary archetype of the homesick Odysseus, a powerful motive in the Greek world.⁸ Another angle of approach left open by Bradley which I hope to fill in this thesis is the contrast between the commander Odysseus and the commander Xenophon when it comes to the aspect of saving their men. I intent to argue that Xenophon strengthens his own ethos by exploiting the clear similarity between himself and Odysseus when it comes to their intentions to return back home and subsequently pointing out his will and capability to save the soldiers returning under his leadership, as opposed to Odysseus, who, as is known both now and in Xenophon's time, loses all his men on the way home.

The study of Jonas Grethlein titled *Xenophon's Anabasis from Character to Narrator* offers a worthwhile reading into the way Xenophon uses his double-function as an author of and a character in his work to present a positive image of himself.⁹ However, Grethlein concludes that: "The narrator's tendency to adopt Xenophon's perspective endows him with authority, his echoes of narratorial statements underscore his reliability and his evaluations illustrate his superior judgement."¹⁰ Thus, according to Grethlein, Xenophon

⁶ Bradley (1994).

⁷ Bradley (1994: 123).

⁸ A motive of which Xenophon constructs with his *Anabasis* a cunning form of *aemulatio*: after all, he will be succeeding in bringing his men home from his *nostos*.

⁹ Grethlein (2012).

¹⁰ Grethlein (2012:38).

uses this double-function to emphasize his reliability and superiority as an author in general, not as a more trustworthy sympathizer of the Athenians, their society or democracy. This leaves some room to analyse this aspect further, whereby Grethlein's approach may be useful. Vivienne Gray has written a small but interesting study, in which she discusses the use of *Interventions and Citations in Xenophon*.¹¹ According to the author, Xenophon uses these literary methods to authorize his narrative in his voice and those of others. In my thesis, I will take note of this approach and will discuss if these methods are also used explicitly to establish a positive ethos for Xenophon. Tim Rood and Robin Seager have written studies on political thought and ideology in Xenophon's works.¹² Rood concludes that "The *Anabasis* can be read not as a text concerned with teaching an elite the tools of leadership but as an analysis of the creation and collapse of social harmony"¹³ whereas Seager finishes his paper by describing Xenophon as a "Laconophile and military man".¹⁴ Although these angles of approach are not fully relevant for the subject of this thesis, I will make use of their political and ideological findings when I deem this to be clarifying. Lastly, the 2011 thesis by Shane Brennan and his 2022 book based on this thesis are worth mentioning here. Through the analysis of a multitude of passages involving themes as leadership, Laconism and a defence of Socrates, Brennan concludes that the *Anabasis* is a strongly apologetical work in a broad manner, defending not only the person Xenophon himself but also his philosophical teacher Socrates and his philosophy.¹⁵ The scope of his thesis is too broad to be applied on my current thesis and the use of ethos as a literary-persuasive means, which is an important factor in my research, has no (prominent) place in his work, but the detailed and inventive approach to Xenophon's own *apologia* is nevertheless of value for our current study; I will therefore refer back to Brennan's work when I find this to be useful.

Thus, with a look into the status quaestionis above, the relevance of our current research question becomes quite clear. Although Xenophon himself and his work the *Anabasis* have been subject to various (rhetorical, political, narratological) studies, an in-depth study of his use of invented ethos as a way to alter his negatively affected situated ethos in the *Anabasis* still has worth on his own. It can help to analyse the methods that Xenophon used to repair his ethos and subsequently answer the question to why he wanted to present himself in such a way. This enables us to paint a more detailed picture of Xenophon as a persuasive narrator as well as of the complex social-political world in which he operates.

Research methods

For this study I will combine a limited though diverse number of research methods. Close reading will be the starting point of each chapter. Which specific Greek passages are

¹¹ Gray (2003).

¹² Rood (2015) & Seager (2001).

¹³ Rood (2015: 163-164). The notion which this statement carries, that the army in the *Anabasis* is a metaphor for a Greek πόλις and that Xenophon is thus keen on preventing στάσις both in his army and in Greek πόλεις (Athens!) will be worked out later.

¹⁴ Seager (2001: 397).

¹⁵ Brennan (2011:245).

subject to extensive study will be discussed below in the paragraph on the corpus. Furthermore the appliance of classical and modern rhetorical strategies and analyses on these Greek passages will be most important for this thesis to analyse the exact rhetorical purpose of Xenophon's work.¹⁶ Lastly, theories on sociolinguistics will also be applied to determine the relationship between Xenophon and his target audience, giving us, after the "how" of his rhetorical manoeuvres, also an attempt to answer the "why" of these passages.¹⁷

Target Audience of the *Anabasis*

Before we dive into the study to this work, it is worthwhile to shortly take into consideration the context and target audience of this work. Xenophon wrote this work later on in his life, most probably after he was banished by the Athenians (likely because of his friendly relations with Cyrus and prominent Spartans), and while living a peaceful life on his estate at Scillus near Olympia. It is thus an account of him looking back at the events earlier on in his life, making it, as told before, one of the first more or less non-fictional memoirs in Greek and western literature. In another prominent work of his, the *Hellenica*, he refers to the *Anabasis* as being written by someone named Themistogenes of Syracuse.¹⁸ According to Plutarch, he published the work under this pseudonym to make his account more credible by writing in the third person.¹⁹

This focus on credibility also gives us insight in the audience Xenophon had in mind while writing the *Anabasis*; it is obviously far more than an entertaining bedtime story of a man in the late years of his life. An *apologia* of his deeds while under contract in Persia belongs to the possible functions of the work, for he was banished by the Athenians once he arrived back in Greece.²⁰ This implies that his target audience will have been predominantly Athenians and other Greeks that lived in the generations after him: because he published the work relatively late in his life, it is improbable that he had the Athenians of his own time in mind when writing the *Anabasis*.²¹ Another option for a possible audience can also quickly be put aside: Xenophon writing for a select group of aristocrats who preferred an oligarchy above the democracy as it was installed in Athens. Although Xenophon's aristocratic sympathies are generally acknowledged,²² it seems unlikely that Xenophon would write an all too obvious aristocratic work for the Athenian/Greek society of around 390-370 B.C: by then the Athenian democracy had been a stable form of government for at least 15 years, making harsh critical comments on this

¹⁶ Already mentioned are Aristoteles' *Rhetorica* and the *Antidosis* of Isocrates, but other modern studies will also be used, such as *Ancient rhetorics for contemporary students* by Crowley & Hawhee (2004).

¹⁷ A key study to be used will be *Studies in the Way of Words* by Grice (1991).

¹⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.2. It could be possible that he refers to another work about the same topic by another author, but this is not very likely. See for the discussion and further literature also Huitink & Rood (2019:16).

¹⁹ Plut. *De glor. Ath.* 1. See also Grethlein (2012:24).

²⁰ See Xen. *An.* 7.7.57. We know that, luckily for Xenophon, the banishment was recalled near the end of his life: his sons would serve in the Athenian cavalry. OLD; *Xenophon*: Cary, Denniston et al. (1968).

²¹ It is possible that Xenophon wrote the work while being in exile, thus indeed having his own contemporaries in mind as an audience. I refer to footnote 24 for possible objections.

²² See OLD; *Xenophon*: Cary, Denniston et al. (1968).

system nothing more than a political anachronism.²³ This redirects us to the first audience-option: the generations after Xenophon. While Xenophon had, with his *Hellenica*, followed the footsteps of Thucydides, who had in his turn been indebted to Herodotus, the “father of historiography”, it is not all too implausible to think that Xenophon wrote (the majority of) his works with future generations in mind.²⁴ Taking this approach, Xenophon seemed not all too interested in changing his image in the eyes of his contemporaries, but rather in working on his *ethos* for the sake of positive evaluation from generations to come: the *Anabasis* as an apologetic text for later Greek readers.²⁵ Keeping this in mind, it is time to take a closer look into the meaning of *ethos* with which I will be working in this thesis.

Definitions of *ethos*

Aristotle, writing about persuasive means in his *Ars Rhetorica*, goes as far as to describe *ethos*, or ‘persuasion through character’, as “so to say, the most powerful means of persuasion”, because the public is more likely to believe decent speakers than those who they believe do not qualify as such.²⁶ Building on what Aristotle has said some lines earlier in his work, that some persuasive means can be altered and used by a speaker for his own advantage and some cannot, Crowley and Hawhee make a distinction between situated *ethos*, or given, non-customizable *ethos*, the character which a speaker has in the eyes of his audience before his speech, and invented *ethos*, or adjustable *ethos*, the character which a speaker ‘makes up’ for himself during his plea.²⁷ Xenophon most likely had a predominantly negative situated *ethos* in the eyes of a (democratic) Athenian public, so it is his use of invented *ethos* that will be object of study here. Turning back to Aristotle, he elaborates further on the topic of *ethos* by dividing it in three parts. He writes:

τοῦ μὲν οὖν αὐτοῦς εἶναι πιστοῦς τοὺς λέγοντας τρία ἐστὶ τὰ αἷτια· τοσαῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶ δι’ ἃ πιστεύομεν ἔξω τῶν ἀποδείξεων. ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ εὖνοια· διαψεύδονται γὰρ περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν ἢ συμβουλεύουσιν ἢ δι’ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ἢ διὰ τούτων τι· ἢ γὰρ δι’ ἀφροσύνην οὐκ ὀρθῶς δοξάζουσιν, ἢ δοξάζοντες ὀρθῶς διὰ μοχθηρίαν οὐ τὰ δοκοῦντα λέγουσιν, ἢ φρόνιμοι μὲν καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς εἰσιν ἀλλ’ οὐκ εὖνοι,

²³ Xenophon’s aristocratic image even made the Greek literary tradition attribute a work named “*The constitution of the Athenians*” to him, which contained sharp condemnation of the democratic system. Xenophon, however, was probably too young to have written it: the anonymous author is nowadays named “The old oligarch”. The link with Xenophon’s aristocratic views is quickly made.

²⁴ I do not follow the suggestion of my supervisor Dr. Rademaker, although appreciated, that Xenophon wanted to write for a contemporary audience but had more success with later generations: if he had his own generation in mind when writing, he would not have had to make the effort of explaining all the political and military backgrounds in his work (e.g. the internal affairs of the Persian empire, the dominance of the Spartans at the Hellespont or the troubles with the Thracians in the north, respectively Xen. *An.* 1.1, 6.6.9 and book 7 *passim*) for these things will have been known by the literate public of his time.

²⁵ See Bradley (1994:92ff), Brennan (2022:136ff) and Lendle (1995:150) for the apologetic character of the work, and Huitink & Rood (2019:17-18) for the notorious difficulty of identifying the audience and publication date of the work.

²⁶ Arist. *Rh.* 1.2.4.

²⁷ Arist. *Rh.* 1.2.2. & Crowley & Hawhee (2004: 167).

διόπερ ἐνδέχεται μὴ τὰ βέλτιστα συμβουλεύειν γινώσκοντας, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν.
ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸν ἅπαντα δοκοῦντα ταῦτ' ἔχειν εἶναι τοῖς ἀκρωμένοις πιστόν.²⁸

A good and evincive character is thus based on 1) φρόνησις or expertise, 2) ἀρετὴ or virtue and 3) εὖνοια or goodwill. This means that a persuading speaker must show his audience that he knows what he is talking about, that he is morally virtuous and that he wants the best for his audience or for the topic of his speech. I will use this tripartition to subdivide Xenophon's use of ethos in this paper.

One other aspect of the *Anabasis* makes the analysis of ethos a rather obscure task: the 'triple roll' that Xenophon plays in this work, being the author and the narrator of this work, as well as a character.²⁹ The tension between these rolls may result in obscurity when it comes to the question who is speaking in certain scenes: Xenophon the character, Xenophon the omniscient narrator, or is it a case of author's commentary? For each passage that will be part of the case studies in this thesis, this question is relevant and it will be investigated when we come across these passages.

Selection of corpus

Looking ahead to the main body of this thesis, it is fitting to establish which parts of the *Anabasis* will be thoroughly studied. For a balanced picture of Xenophon's narrative, I have chosen one 'scene' from the beginning of the work, one from the middle and one from the end, which seem promising when searching for Xenophon's ethos in this work. These three scenes will each be investigated in one chapter of this thesis. The first passage is situated in the beginning of book 3, when Xenophon takes on the lead in the Greek army, deprived of its generals, and will consist of parts of *An.* 3.1.4-3.1.25. The second passage, situated in the middle of his work, revolves around the army trekking through the mountains in the winter. The relevant passages here are *An.* 3.4.46-49 and 4.6.14-17. The last part subject to study here will include *An.* 5.6.15-16, 5.7.32-35 and 6.1.26-28 and describes the internal struggles of the army when it has arrived at the Black Sea coast and its search for a supreme commander in their final approach to the Greek world.

I have chosen these exact passages because they have a strong focus on Xenophon's person and give him as a writer a tremendous opportunity to paint a favourable picture of himself in the work: the passages often consist of Xenophon giving a speech, sharing his thoughts and motives with the readers or setting up a certain image of himself as opposed to other leaders/soldiers in the army. Through these literary manoeuvres he is able to

²⁸ "For the orator to produce conviction three qualities are necessary; for, independently of demonstrations, the things which induce belief are three in number. These qualities are good sense, virtue, and goodwill; for speakers are wrong both in what they say and in the advice they give, because they lack either all three or one of them. For either through want of sense they form incorrect opinions, or, if their opinions are correct, through viciousness they do not say what they think, or, if they are sensible and good, they lack goodwill; wherefore it may happen that they do not give the best advice, although they know what it is. These qualities are all that are necessary, so that the speaker who appears to possess all three will necessarily convince his hearers." (Arist. *Rh.* 2.1.5.) Translation by J.H. Freese (1926).

²⁹ On this aspect the article of Grethlein is specifically relevant, especially the introduction of the problem and his conclusion (Grethlein 2012: 24 & 37-38).

contradict the suspicions Athenian readers could hold against him and which affected his ethos negatively. In short, the suspicion of him lacking ἀρετή and εὐνοία with regard to the Athenian/Greek interests in particular could be parried by presenting himself as someone loyal to Athens.

In the first chapter, Xenophon's decision to take the lead in the army will be analysed. An Athenian reader could suspect him of being hungry for power: how can Xenophon defend himself? In chapter two, his leadership under harsh conditions is examined. How does Xenophon present his actions as a general in such a way that a Greek reader can accept or even applaud them? In the last chapter, Xenophon's ethical capacities are under a magnifying glass when he has to avoid στάσις (mutiny) in the army and subsequently has to decide if he takes up the supreme command or not. These are all key decisions in his journey with which he is able to patch up his *ethos* when presenting them in the right way to convince his soldiers and his readers. If and how he manages to do so will be investigated in the following chapters, beginning with the introduction of his character and his assumption of the leadership in chapter one.

Chapter 1: Taking the Lead *Nolens Volens*

In this first chapter, I will investigate Xenophon's self-presentation in the exact moment when the focus of his tale shifts from the more global, impersonal introduction of his story to his own person in book 3. Introducing himself to the readers here, he will have been keen to establish a positive *ethos* for himself on all three aspects of *ethos* which have been named above. I will highlight the different ways in which Xenophon constructs this image in the crucial first encounter with the main character of the *Anabasis*. But first, I will provide a short overview of the two preceding, introducing books.

The Greeks deceived twice

The story of Xenophon's way home does not cover the whole work of the *Anabasis*, as the title already suggests.³⁰ In the first two books of his narrative, Xenophon introduces the why, how and when of his expedition to Persia and explains how he and thousands of other Greeks got lost hundreds of miles away from home in a leaderless army of mercenaries. He begins with introducing Cyrus, the Persian pretender to the throne. After explaining the quarrel with Cyrus' brother Artaxerxes, the legitimate Persian king, Xenophon describes how Cyrus gathers an army of mercenaries in Ionia by lying about the real objective of the mission and sets off for his expedition to Sousa in the Persian heartland. At first this all goes well, but when the mercenaries find out Cyrus wants to march against the Persian king, a mutiny breaks out.³¹ After lying about the true cause of the campaign again, Cyrus manages to persuade the Greeks to follow him once more, and when he finally reveals the true goal, they are already deep inside Persian territory and far from home.³² Grumbling, and only through the promise of extra payment if the expedition is successful, the Greeks continue. After many days and hundreds of kilometres of marching, Cyrus' army finally meets the Persians at Cunaxa in Babylonia.³³ The battle is fairly balanced, but when Cyrus himself gets hit and perishes, his army of 'Asian' soldiers crumbles and only the Greeks hold. Unknowing of his death, they wait in their camp until the next morning, when they finally hear the news.³⁴

Deprived of their commander and thus of their reason of being in Persian territory, the Greeks open negotiations with Artaxerxes. They agree on a truce and the Greeks begin on their long way back home under the command of the Spartan Clearchus. The Persians follow them, however, under the leadership of the satrap Tissaphernes. This permanent threat raises

³⁰ *Anabasis* meaning "Expedition up from the coast" (LSJ entry 2). The title thus refers to the journey into Persia under Cyrus' command, although by far the largest part of the work (five out of seven books) describes the way back from Persia to Greece, the *Katabasis* so to say. Xenophon could have chosen this title to redirect the attention of the reader away from his person to that of Cyrus, or maybe it was the initial title for the first two books and it was not altered afterwards, but it is impossible to know for sure if the work already bore this title when Xenophon published it. See also the discussion in Thomas et al. (2021:xiv-xv).

³¹ Cyrus had told various untrue stories about the goal of his expedition: he had told some Greeks that he wanted to attack his rival-satrap Tissaphernes, others that his expedition was aimed against the rebellious tribe of the Pisidians. (Xen. *An.* 1.1.6-11). The Greeks (including Xenophon!) have thus been tricked into a far more dangerous adventure than was thought beforehand.

³² Respectively Xen. *An.* 1.3.20. & 1.4.11-13.

³³ Xen. *An.* 1.8ff.

³⁴ Xen. *An.* 2.1.3.

tensions in the Greek army and Clearchus opens new negotiations with Tissaphernes. After gaining each other's trust, Clearchus departs out of the Greek camp with five generals and twenty captains to talk with the Persians. In the Persian camp, all Greek commanders are taken captive and killed. The Greek army is now leaderless, hopeless and in disarray.³⁵

A certain Xenophon

It is here that the narrator Xenophon introduces the character Xenophon.³⁶ After describing the desperation among the troops and the depressed mood in which the soldiers pass the night, Xenophon writes:

Ἦν δέ τις ἐν τῇ στρατιᾷ Ξενοφῶν Ἀθηναῖος, ὃς οὔτε στρατηγὸς οὔτε λοχαγὸς οὔτε στρατιώτης ὦν συνηκολούθει, ἀλλὰ Πρόξενος αὐτὸν μετεπέμψατο οἴκοθεν ξένος ὦν ἀρχαῖος· ὑπισχνεῖτο δὲ αὐτῷ, εἰ ἔλθοι, φίλον αὐτὸν Κύρῳ ποιήσειν, ὃν αὐτὸς ἔφη κρείττω ἑαυτῷ νομίζειν τῆς πατρίδος.³⁷

A very modest introduction, telling the reader through various ways that Xenophon is until this point a character of no importance in the army.³⁸ Using the adjective *τις*, Xenophon emphasizes that he has not been a person worth mentioning before, and that he thus did not play a (big) role in the events so far.³⁹ His unimportance until this point is further elaborated by not telling the reader what Xenophon was actually exactly doing in the army: his role is not specified.⁴⁰ Furthermore, the reason that he was present there at all was not because he was a mercenary of Cyrus, but because a friend invited him to come,⁴¹ as Huitink & Rood also state: "triple οὔτε, followed by military ranks of decreasing importance, emphasizes that Xenophon joined the expedition not in a paid military capacity, as readers might expect, but through an aristocratic link of *φιλία*."⁴² Thus, Xenophon constructs three lines of defence against Athenian/Greek critics in the first sentence introducing himself. Hereafter his reasoning takes a surprising turn: he informs the reader that his friend Proxenos thought joining Cyrus would be more profitable than staying in his *πόλις*. This statement could very well have been met with disapproval by an Athenian public, but Xenophon manages to soften the possible criticism to his own address. He very explicitly puts these words in the mouth of his (now dead) friend

³⁵ This paragraph is a short summary of book two of the *Anabasis*.

³⁶ The introduction of the character so relatively late in the story helps Xenophon the narrator to disassociate the character with the failed mercenary march.

³⁷ "In the army was a certain Xenophon, an Athenian, who did not come along as a general, nor as a captain or a soldier, but (because) an old friend, Proxenos, had invited him away from home: he promised him, if he would come, to make him befriended with Cyrus, of whom he himself said that he regarded him as more useful for himself than his hometown." (Xen. *An.* 3.1.4). (All the translations in this thesis are of my own hand, unless explicitly stated otherwise (Cf. the translation of Aristotle's *Ethics* by Freese in the introduction).

³⁸ "The story (of Xenophon's participation in the expedition), which could have been included at any of Xenophon's earlier appearances, is delayed until his decisive intervention." (Huitink & Rood 2019:73). This boosts the importance his character has in the story from this point onwards.

³⁹ Xenophon was mentioned already seven times in total in book 1 & 2, but only in minor roles. See Huitink & Rood (2019:11).

⁴⁰ His role was probably also still unclear for him on arrival in Ionia, cf. Brennan (2022:166) and from there Buzzetti (2014:144).

⁴¹ For the importance of this *ξενία/φιλία* or 'friendship' with regard to Xenophon's decision, see Brennan (2022:167).

⁴² Huitink & Rood (2019:74).

by using the pronouns αὐτὸς and ἑαυτῷ: it is Proxenus *himself* who said these things, thus shifting the blame for this train of thought to Proxenus, clearing himself of suspicion regarding *προδοσία*, betrayal of his homeland, for it was *ξενία* which made him follow his friend to the east.⁴³

For an non-contemporary public, however, this last remark could have sparked more understanding reactions. Just two years prior to the events described by Xenophon (401), the Athenian people had overthrown an aristocratic government installed by Sparta after Athens lost the Peloponnesian war in 404. Xenophon had served in a minor role under this anti-democratic government, making his wish to leave Athens for a period of time and try his luck elsewhere while his πόλις was so fidgety quite understandable,⁴⁴ even more so for later generations of readers;⁴⁵ they did not witness these events themselves but were nonetheless familiar with civil and political unrest.⁴⁶ Furthermore, Athens' internal struggles around 400 will still have been part of the collective memory of the πόλις 30 years later.⁴⁷

Xenophon's mistake, Cyrus' deceit

Subsequently, Xenophon describes his own course of action: after getting the letter from Proxenus, he asks his 'teacher' and friend Socrates what he should do next:

καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ὑποπεύσας μὴ τι πρὸς τῆς πόλεως ὑπαίτιον εἶη Κύρῳ φίλον γενέσθαι, ὅτι ἐδόκει ὁ Κύρος προθύμως τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐπὶ τὰς Ἀθήνας συμπολεμῆσαι, συμβουλευεῖ τῷ Ξενοφῶντι ἐλθόντα εἰς Δελφοὺς ἀνακοινῶσαι τῷ θεῷ περὶ τῆς πορείας.⁴⁸

Using Socrates to voice the general opinion at the time,⁴⁹ Xenophon lets the reader know that he was well aware of the objections the Athenians had against his journey beforehand and that his decision to go was not one-sided: the deity of Delphi would advise him. He then writes how he went to Delphi and asked Apollo to which gods he needs to sacrifice to for his voyage to be successful and to return home safely.⁵⁰ Content with the answer, he returns to Athens and tells the outcome to Socrates:

⁴³ See Brennan (2022:167). See Bradley (1994:200-202) for other literary manoeuvres of Xenophon to distance himself from Proxenus.

⁴⁴ Cf. Huitink & Rood (2019:10-11) and Waterfield in Thomas et al. (2021:275), who even speaks of signs of a purge of Xenophon's aristocratic class just before he leaves Athens.

⁴⁵ I follow Lendle (1995:148) in this analysis.

⁴⁶ See Koolschijn & Matsier (2001:225). The *Anabasis* being published around 370, the majority of Xenophon's audience will most likely not have actively taken part in the events of 403, but they almost certainly witnessed major political and military unrest such as arose with the battle of Leuctra in 371.

⁴⁷ See Assmann (2011:36,41,196), who describes the "time-limit" for a collective memory to be roughly 40 years.

⁴⁸ "And Socrates, because he feared that the πόλις would condemn Xenophon having friendly relations with Cyrus, who (in the opinion of the Athenians) had all too diligently helped the Spartans wage war against the Athenians, advised Xenophon to go to Delphi and share his doubts about the journey with the god." (Xen. *An.* 3.1.5.).

⁴⁹ This being an attempt to clear the accusations about Socrates' societal tone deafness along the way (cf. Huitink & Rood 2019:74). Socrates almost functions as an oracle himself here, giving Xenophon a rather vague instruction.

⁵⁰ Cf. Huitink & Rood (2019:10) who remark that it was thus Xenophon's wish to return to Athens after the expedition and not leave for good.

ὁ δ' ἀκούσας ἤτιᾶτο αὐτὸν ὅτι οὐ τοῦτο πρῶτον ἠρώτα πότερον λῶον εἶη αὐτῷ πορεύεσθαι ἢ μένειν (...) ἐπεὶ μέντοι οὕτως ἦρου, ταῦτ', ἔφη, χρὴ ποιεῖν ὅσα ὁ θεὸς ἐκέλευσεν.⁵¹

Xenophon admits he made a mistake:⁵² had he thought out his approach more thoroughly, then he would have been able to stay at home, but now he is more or less obliged by the deity to travel to the east. For the (religious) Greeks, this will have been an acceptable excuse to join Cyrus' army: if the most respected oracle of Greece had condemned Xenophon, through him posing the wrong question, to set out for Lydia, then he would do so.⁵³ A salient implication here is that he took off on this journey *precisely because* he was not deaf for the *communis opinio*: his attempt to take it in account had brought him to this point and obliged him to go. Xenophon thus makes clear that he understood and lived up to Greek (political) values: when in doubt, ask the gods for advice; when the gods tell you what to do, you ought to do exactly that. Xenophon made the error of posing the wrong question, but not of following the wrong chain of actions.

Having followed the orders of the god, Xenophon sails eastward and meets Proxenus and Cyrus. About their first encounter and the following period he recalls:

ἐλέγετο δὲ ὁ στόλος εἶναι εἰς Πισίδας. ἐστρατεύετο μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐξαπατηθεῖς (...) ἐπεὶ μέντοι εἰς Κιλικίαν ἦλθον, σαφὲς πᾶσιν ἤδη ἐδόκει εἶναι ὅτι ὁ στόλος εἶη ἐπὶ βασιλέα. Φοβούμενοι δὲ τὴν ὁδὸν καὶ ἄκοντες ὁμῶς οἱ πολλοὶ δι' αἰσχύνην καὶ ἀλλήλων καὶ Κύρου συνηκολούθησαν· ὧν εἷς καὶ Ξενοφῶν ἦν.⁵⁴

Lendle says about this passage: "Hier wird die apologetische Tendenz der *Anabasis* deutlich."⁵⁵ Xenophon has been cheated on by Cyrus (ἐξαπατηθεῖς) together with the rest of the army,⁵⁶ but because of peer pressure he continues the journey with the other Greeks until the point where we have met him somewhat earlier in book 3, with the army in a state of desperation.

Summarizing Xenophon's introduction of his own character, it is clear to see that he got caught up in this situation not on his own initiative, but through the invitation of a friend, that he set out for this journey because of a mistake from his side which placed him under divine coercion and that he got this far tangled up in the misfortunate events not because of his own actions,

⁵¹ "And he, having heard this, reprimanded him because he had not first asked what was more desirable for him, to set out or to stay... but because he had asked the question in this way, he said, it was necessary to do these things as the deity had commanded" (Xen. *An.* 3.1.7).

⁵² Identified also by Grethlein (2012:25), who remarks that "the one-page flashback adds weight to the new character": it thus had a double-function of both introduction and apologia of Xenophon at once.

⁵³ On Greeks and the roll of oracles in decision-making in general, and Xenophon and oracles in the *Anabasis* in particular, see Eidinow (2007), Ch. 3.

⁵⁴ "Xenophon was told the expedition was against the Pisidians. Completely deceived in this manner, he took part in the army (...) when they arrived in Cilicia, it seemed clear to everyone that the expedition was aimed against the king. Fearing the journey and unwillingly, many came along nonetheless, because of shame before each other and before Cyrus: Xenophon was one of them." (Xen. *An.* 3.1.9-3.1.11).

⁵⁵ Lendl (1995:150). For a selection of possible charges a Greek reader could hold against Xenophon, See Brennan (2022:137 & 165). Most of these possible charges will also be discussed in this thesis.

⁵⁶ Cf. Huitink & Rood (2019:75) who suggest that Xenophon was not aware of the goal of the expedition when arriving in Sardis, somewhat further stating: "Cyrus' promise distances Xenophon from those of his followers who were seeking a position with him in the Persian empire." (p.78). Cf. footnote 50.

but through Cyrus' lies and social pressure. Above all, the reader needs to know that Xenophon is very little to blame for this series of events, according to himself: he carefully constructs an *ethos* of an innocent man, who just happened to be there due to proceedings out of his control: thus any accusing of withering εὐνοια towards Athens is out of place here. Had he displayed initiative and enthusiasm in this first part of the march, then such an accusation would have made sense. With the absence of a suchlike attitude, the accusation becomes nonsensical. Now that this image is made clear, it is worthwhile to investigate how Xenophon describes and motivates his own actions in this disorderly setting.

The dream: divine intervention and a self-conscious debate

Xenophon continues the story with a remarkable event: after falling asleep, he has a dream in which a bolt of lightning strikes his parental house, illuminating it. Fearful, he awakens and deliberates with himself what this dream may mean: is it a positive or a negative sign?⁵⁷ He is not sure, but with another argument he convinces himself to take action:

τί κατάκειμαι; ἢ δὲ νύξ προβαίνει· ἅμα δὲ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ εἰκὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἦξειν. (...) ὅπως δ' ἀμυνόμεθα οὐδεὶς παρασκευάζεται οὐδὲ ἐπιμελεῖται, ἀλλὰ κατακείμεθα ὡσπερ ἐξὸν ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν. ἐγὼ οὖν τὸν ἐκ ποίας πόλεως στρατηγὸν προσδοκῶ ταῦτα πράξειν; ποίαν δ' ἡλικίαν ἐμαυτῷ ἐλθεῖν ἀναμείνω; οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγ' ἔτι πρεσβύτερος ἔσομαι, ἐὰν τήμερον προδῶ ἐμαυτὸν τοῖς πολεμίσις.⁵⁸

This is a cunning way of explaining his vigour to his readers: a religious Greek audience will have been well acquainted with divine signs appearing in dreams, so this anecdote probably sparked little scepticism.⁵⁹ But even more so, by giving insight in his train of thought, Xenophon makes his actions more understandable and him taking the initiative more acceptable. Moreover, the question he asks himself about the πόλις whence a leading general should come, would evoke one most probable answer from the Athenian public: Athens.⁶⁰ Although having lost the Peloponnesian war and playing a more modest role in Greece around 370, the Athenians still had their pride.⁶¹ Now, one of the remaining Athenian participants of the expedition who has at least some leadership qualities, is Xenophon.⁶² the reader can almost make the decision himself. The fact that Xenophon hesitates to take the lead, strengthens his εὐνοια towards Greece and φρόνησις: he is not eager to lead the mercenary army, but he knows how to do so when necessary. Had he not hesitated to take the lead, an accusation of lust for power would be easily made, damaging his ethos in the eyes of Greek

⁵⁷ Grethlein (2012:25) writes: "...the ancient belief that dreams were signs from the gods mark Xenophon as a special character". His readers will also have noticed this, strengthening the focus of the story on Xenophon's persona.

⁵⁸ "Why am I laying here? The night goes by: it is likely that the enemy will come at sunrise. Yet, no one is preparing to defend ourselves nor is anyone working on it, but we lay here as if it is possible to lounge around. From which πόλις then do I expect a general who will do these things? What age do I await myself to reach? For I will not grow any older if I hand myself in to the enemies today." (Xen. An. 3.1.13-14).

⁵⁹ The practise of gods or "Fate" giving signs and instructions through dreams was as old as the epics of Homer and a generally accepted way of motivating actions. See Lipka (2021) and Petridou (2016: especially Ch. 1 & 2).

⁶⁰ Cleverly initiated by Xenophon, thus strengthening his Athenian 'profile'. Cf. Huitink & Rood (2019:83).

⁶¹ For Athens after the disastrous Peloponnesian war, see Strauss (1986).

⁶² He originated from an aristocratic family, after all, and had had a minor function under the rule of the 30 in Athens.

readers. Had he not taken the lead at all, then he could have been accused of evading responsibility, damaging his ethos in front of the soldiers. This is an extension of the tactics used by Xenophon in the paragraphs above: he would rather keep a low profile to avoid association with the whole, rather problematic, situation (which he shows by stressing that he is not eager to become the commander), but takes on the required responsibility when it is needed.

But why did Xenophon put in this effort to defend his initiative? This stands most likely in relation with the experience the Athenians had with another young commander of whom the democratic sympathy was disputed during the Peloponnesian war: Alcibiades. This aristocratic general had been immensely popular with the Athenian people, but had switched sides between Athens, Sparta and Persia multiple times, always calculating his chances. Xenophon, who had almost certainly met his contemporary in Athens, will have known about Alcibiades' reputation and wanted to avoid being accused of disloyalty to Athens or evoking στάσις or discord, himself, for he was of course leading an army of mercenaries into Persian territory.⁶³

Xenophon is thus trying to improve all three aspects of his ethos at once in this passage: he knows what is the right thing to do at this point (taking action), but he stresses that he only takes initiative because the circumstances force him to, not because he is hungry for power or has dubious plans with the army. His rather lengthy explanation of how he got involved also fits this tactic, for he cannot truly be keen to rule the army of ten thousand men if he was not planning on joining the army at all. There is also an implicit reference to the shared "Greekness" of the army and Xenophon: it is almost his moral duty to get these Greeks out of foreign territory back to their homelands: there were no other options for him at this point. The aspects of ἀρετή and εὐνοία overlap in a double meaning here, for he shows compassion with the Greek army wanting to go home on the one hand (which is shown by his deliberation above) and with the Greeks at home who might be scared of the army on the other hand (which becomes clear through his hesitant introducing of his character). Having all these different considerations in his mind, Xenophon still has the φρόνησις to take the most logical decision at that point: urging the army to set off for Greece.

To complement the analysis of this passage, let us turn to Xenophon's self-presentation in the assembly of the remaining army leaders.

Xenophon in the assemblage: an *a fortiori* reasoning

Xenophon summons the captains that had served under Proxenos and calls for action: when the truce was valid, the Greeks were bound to oaths that prohibited them to plunder, leaving the army in an idle state. Now the Persians have broken the truce by killing the Greek generals, the Greeks are free to move again, make use of the fertile lands and take their own initiative, so he states.⁶⁴ Reaching the problem of replacing the dead high command, he makes the following remarks:

⁶³ Xenophon writes about Alcibiades' return to Athens in 407 in his *Hellenika*, an event he most likely witnessed himself (Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.12). See also McBayer (2017) for a study of Xenophon's evaluation of Alcibiades.

⁶⁴ Xen. *An.* 3.1.20-21. Cf. Huitink & Rood (2019:87).

ἀλλ' ἴσως γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοι ταῦτ' ἐνθυμοῦνται, πρὸς τῶν θεῶν μὴ ἀναμένωμεν ἄλλους ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ἐλθεῖν παρακαλοῦντας ἐπὶ τὰ κάλλιστα ἔργα, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ἄρξωμεν τοῦ ἐξορμῆσαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν· φάνητε τῶν λοχαγῶν ἄριστοι καὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἀξιοστρατηγότεροι. κἀγὼ δέ, εἰ μὲν ὑμεῖς ἐθέλετε ἐξορμᾶν ἐπὶ ταῦτα, ἔπεσθαι ὑμῖν βούλομαι, εἰ δ' ὑμεῖς τάττετ' ἐμὲ ἡγεῖσθαι, οὐδὲν προφασίζομαι τὴν ἡλικίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκμάζειν ἡγοῦμαι ἐρύκειν ἀπ' ἐμαυτοῦ τὰ κακά.⁶⁵

Xenophon plays this rhetorical game quite smartly and with a strong “pathetic” component, thus relying on *pathos* (appealing to the emotions of the captains) in his speech: Firstly he evokes a sense of pride within the hearts of the captains: they can be the first commanders to take the soldiers by the hand and lead the way, showing that they are worthy of commanding a vast army. After having incited them, he presents himself in a humble way: he will follow them, and will only accept the leadership himself if they really want it and because he does not want to be accused of cowardice.⁶⁶ Following this speech, Xenophon is elected as leader.⁶⁷

Within the whole narrative of the *Anabasis* as we have seen it so far, this passage fits seamlessly into Xenophon’s strategy to present himself to the reader as not power hungry or eagerly taking control, thus being aware of the suspicions and fears of Greek readers, but nonetheless capable of doing so when it is absolutely necessary. He has the opportunity to try and cease power himself, but ostentatiously chooses not to: only when the other generals vote for him to take the lead does he come forward.⁶⁸ Using an *a fortiori* reasoning: if Xenophon is not all too eager to take command of a vast army when the opportunity is offered to him, it is ruled out that he had plans to use his presence in the army for bad purposes, or pose a threat to others, in the first place.

Drawing conclusions until this point, the *ethos* that Xenophon ‘invents’ in this first introduction of his character in the *Anabasis* becomes quite clear: Xenophon appears to be hardly to blame for the situation he is in and he becomes leader of the army *nolens volens*. Invited to the expedition by others, forced to go because of his piety to Apollo, Socrates and thus ultimately the Athenian *communis opinio* itself, deceived by Cyrus about the goals of the journey, divinely instilled to come into action and ultimately democratically chosen to take the lead, Xenophon ends up where he is now because at every crossroad he encounters he chooses to do what is in his eyes the right and just thing to do. This boosts his *ethos* on all fronts: Firstly his ἀρετή, because he shows the necessary respect and obedience to the Greek religion and the gods when making decisions, even if they urge him to do things he does not

⁶⁵ “But, because others too probably have these things in mind, let us not wait, by the gods, for others to come to us while encouraging the most virtuous deeds, but let us begin with exciting the others to virtue: Show that you are the best of the captains and more worthy of being a general than the generals. As for me then, if you want to set out for this, I wish to follow you, but if you appoint me to be the leader, I do not use my age as an excuse, but I believe to be strong enough to keep the dangers away from myself.” (Xen. An. 3.1.24-25).

⁶⁶ Huitink & Rood furthermore remark that “the self-centred ending (...) underscores Xenophon’s point that the good of the whole will come from tending to the good of the individual.” (2019:90). A remarkably democratic message hidden under Xenophon’s speech.

⁶⁷ Xen. An.3.1.26.

⁶⁸ This process of deciding by voting is not only seen here, but also in other assembly-passages, cf. 3.2.9 & 3.2.33. This democratic way of decision-making, which Xenophon even implements when speaking with the common troops, will have been met with approval by a democratic readership.

want to do himself. Secondly, his εὐνοια, since he makes clear that he does not feel indifference for the worries of the soldiers in army, nor for the worries of the Greeks back home. Lastly his φρόνησις, due to the showing of his capability to lead the army and make crucial and wise decisions. But most importantly he cannot be blamed of being unfaithful to Athens, at least not willingly unfaithful, when the events until this point unfolded as he describes them: the assumption of command was after all the best decision he could have made in these circumstances, not only for himself, but for the army and the Greeks at home too. His εὐνοια towards home and the Greek army remains intact, his ἀρετη is not questioned and his φρόνησις is even improved, for he has shown himself a capable and democratic leader until this point.

The question rises if the positive image of his leadership constructed so far remains untouched during the march to Greece. In the following chapter, we will focus on Xenophon's self-presentation and brand-new leadership in a completely different setting: when the army encounters harsh winter-conditions in the mountains of Armenia.

Chapter 2: Pro-Athenian in Word and Deed

Now that has become clear how Xenophon frames his assumption of power over the army in chapter 1, it is worthwhile for the research of his *ethos* to subject the presentation of his leadership “in action” to a closer inspection. What does Xenophon tell the reader about his actions as a commander in the army, and which characteristics of the literary character Xenophon predominate in his description? This will be the main question of the following chapter.

As it would be far too ambitious to investigate all of Xenophon’s actions as a general in the *Anabasis*, only a selection of notable passages will be analysed in depth. The *capita* that will be subject to study are *An.* 3.4.46-49 and 4.6.14-17. After a brief introduction, the passages will be examined on the use of *ethos* on two different layers: with regard to the soldiers in the army on the one hand, whom he needs to show that he is a capable leader despite his relatively young age and that he wants what is best for them (thus defending his φρόνησις and his εὐνοια), and Xenophon’s intended audience on the other hand, whom he needs to convince of the fact that he has not forgotten the Athenian worries and interests and is in fact still a good Athenian citizen (again defending his εὐνοια, but now in front of his readers). This will then hopefully result in a clear image of Xenophon’s *ethos* as a leader of the army.

Skirmishes in the mountains

After the formation of a new Greek high command, as described in chapter one, the Greek army sets off on the difficult journey home through hostile territory. They subdivide the army into a vanguard, led by the commander Cheirisophos, and a rear-guard under the command of Xenophon. After the rear-guard has been battered by the Persian cavalry and infantry armed with slings and bows, Xenophon suggests a reform in the army: he organises a cavalry division and places Rhodian slingers, who used smaller projectiles than the Persians and thus had a greater range, at the rear.⁶⁹ After this, Xenophon and his half of the army are quite successful in keeping the Persian pursuers at a distance. The Greeks continue their march through the hills until they reach a ridge behind which lays a plain the Greeks need to cross. Unfortunately, the ridge is held by the Persian army. After a short consultation with Cheirisophos, Xenophon volunteers to lead a division in storming the top of the ridge. When the Persians find out about the Greek intentions, they at their turn begin storming the top from the other side. Xenophon describes his exhortation in this moment in detail:

Ξενοφῶν δὲ παρελαύνων ἐπὶ τοῦ ἵππου παρεκελεύετο· Ἄνδρες, νῦν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα νομίζετε ἀμιλλᾶσθαι, νῦν πρὸς τοὺς παῖδας καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, νῦν ὀλίγον πονήσαντες ἀμαχεῖ τὴν λοιπὴν πορευσόμεθα.⁷⁰

His incitement makes a strong impression on the reader, foremost because of the form: the tricolon νῦν... νῦν... νῦν, constructing at the same time an anaphor and an asyndeton, conveys

⁶⁹ Xen. *An.* 3.3.16-20.

⁷⁰ “Xenophon, driving by on his horse, encouraged (them): “Men, believe that you contend for Greece now, that you contend for your children and wives now. If we suffer a little now, we will march without struggle for the rest of our journey.” (Xen. *An.* 3.4.46).

a powerful message:⁷¹ the soldiers just need to give it their all now, to be freed of future attacks. Although this cannot be anything more than an empty promise of Xenophon for he does not know what dangers the remainder of the journey will include, it is not difficult to imagine the positive effect this had on the moral of the troops, especially when Xenophon uses the first-person form πορευσόμεθα, creating an emphasis on their joint effort.⁷²

More interesting, however, is the appeal to a feeling of “home” which Xenophon makes here.⁷³ Although the army consists of mercenaries who willingly got on a march away from Greece into unknown land, they now have lost the will to fight and want to return to their native land.⁷⁴ The fact that, with the death of Cyrus, they had also lost the economic stimulus for this campaign, is smartly concealed by Xenophon when talking about the army, avoiding putting the army in a negative light in the eyes of his readers.⁷⁵ This change of heart could nevertheless have been met with some scepticism in Greece, but the famous case of Alcibiades shows that accepting soldiers who had fought for an enemy back into Greek/Athenian ranks was not an uncommon practise.⁷⁶ Now Xenophon has shown he wants the best for the soldiers and can relate with them, he is left with tackling the suspicion of wanting to cause στάσις in the army at some point in their journey or when arriving back home in Greece: how do his readers know he was not planning on usurping parts of Greece or joining in new battles between πόλεις with his army, in short posing a threat to Athens?⁷⁷ In this aspect, the naming of “children and wives” is a remarkable and clever detail. Xenophon had not mentioned having a wife or children himself earlier in his work,⁷⁸ so his encouragement here seems to be mainly aimed at the soldiers serving under him, demonstrating that he did have an idea of the importance the soldiers saw in completing the νοστος, while at the same time reassuring his readers by suppressing the idea that a violent revolt will be at hand: the soldiers just want to see their wives and children again. With regard to *ethos*, this is a strong case of εὐνοια and φρόνησις combined on two levels, for Xenophon not only, as a general, acknowledges the fears of his soldiers, but also knows precisely how to motivate them (thus improving his *ethos* as a character in front of the soldiers), while at the same time carefully avoiding any suspicion on using the loyal soldiers for subversive means. In this way he

⁷¹ As Huitink & Rood put it: “The anaphora and asyndeton produce a forceful staccato effect (...) the shift of construction in the final limb makes for an impressive climax” (2019:175). See Vatri (2019) for a study on the role of the asyndeton in ancient Greek rhetoric.

⁷² See Huitink & Rood (2019:175), also for a reference to theories on military exhortations: Albertus (1908:67-68).

⁷³ I agree with Huitink & Rood stating: “Xenophon adapts the common trope that wars abroad are fought in defence of the homeland (...) to fit the *nostos*-theme.” (2019:175). See also Bradley, writing: “It is the repeated use of “home”, “homeland” and “homeward” that creates the feeling that the Cyreans are intent upon reaching the loved ones they left behind.” (1994:24).

⁷⁴ See Xen. *An.* 3.1.3 for a clear image of the desperation and homesickness in the army.

⁷⁵ For the economic situation and considerations of Xenophon and the army, see Bradley (1994:22 & 139ff).

⁷⁶ For studies on the case of Alcibiades, see Stuttard (2019: especially 279-299), Bloedow (1973) and Ellis (1989).

⁷⁷ This suspicion being most probably one of the factors that resulted in him being banished from Athens, see Brennan (2022:172) for a discussion of this topic.

⁷⁸ Later sources tell us that he had a wife and two sons, but the dates of his marriage or the birth of his children are unknown. Both sons grew up in Sparta (cf. Plut. *Ages.* 20), meaning that they were born before 394, but this does not rule out that they were still to be born when Xenophon was in Persia. Cf. Huitink & Rood (2019:17) and Cawkwell in Lane Fox (2004:47-48).

reassures his readers of his sympathy for Greece and of his capability to command the roaming army, consequently improving his *ethos* as a narrator in front of his readers.

His commitment to the common soldiers is even more apparent from the following passage:

Σωτηρίδας δὲ ὁ Σικυώνιος εἶπεν· Οὐκ ἐξ ἴσου, ὦ Ξενοφῶν, ἐσμέν· σὺ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ἵππου ὀχῆ, ἐγὼ δὲ χαλεπῶς κάμνω τὴν ἀσπίδα φέρων. καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας ταῦτα καταπηδήσας ἀπὸ τοῦ ἵππου ὠθεῖται αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς τάξεως καὶ τὴν ἀσπίδα ἀφελόμενος ὡς ἐδύνατο τάχιστα ἔχων ἐπορεύετο· ἐτύγγανε δὲ καὶ θώρακα ἔχων τὸν ἱππικόν· ὥστ' ἐπιέζετο. καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἔμπροσθεν ὑπάγειν παρεκελεύετο, τοῖς δὲ ὀπισθεν παριέναι μόλις ἐπόμενος.⁷⁹

The passage invokes a powerful image: Xenophon the commander is willing to jump of his high horse and suffer the same harsh conditions as the soldiers he is commanding. This is not only another strong example of his εὐνοια towards the common soldiers, but also of his willingness to sacrifice himself and thus even maybe of his egalitarian views on the army: everyone will suffer the same fate. Apart from this, the passage is also a clear case of “lead by example”, showing the reader that Xenophon has the φρόνησις to lead the army in this difficult situation.⁸⁰ This would have been a well-known motive for a Greek public, accustomed as they were with generals joining their soldiers in battle:⁸¹ one can think of the mythical Greek warrior-leaders in the *Iliad* who joined battles with common soldiers, but more historically also Greek leaders and Persian nobles who participated actively in the naval battle at Salamis in the second Greek-Persian war in 480.⁸²

That Xenophon's actions were indeed a fruitful tactic is something that can be read in the following part of his anecdote:

οἱ δ' ἄλλοι στρατιῶται παίουσι καὶ βάλλουσι καὶ λοιδοροῦσι τὸν Σωτηρίδαν, ἔστε ἠνάγκασαν λαβόντα τὴν ἀσπίδα πορεύεσθαι. ὁ δὲ ἀναβάς, ἕως μὲν βάσιμα ἦν, ἐπὶ τοῦ ἵππου ἦγεν, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἄβατα ἦν, καταλιπὼν τὸν ἵππον ἔσπευδε πεζῆ. καὶ φθάνουσιν ἐπὶ τῷ ἄκρῳ γενόμενοι τοὺς πολεμίους.⁸³

His deeds turn out to be successful in two aspects: not only has he captured the goodwill of the common soldiers, who recognize the good example he gives them and force Soteridas

⁷⁹ “Soteridas the Sicyonian said: “We are not equal, Xenophon: you are being carried on a horse, but I toil in difficult conditions, carrying my shield.” And he, after having heard these words and having jumped of his horse, pushed him out of the battleline and, after taking the shield from him, marched on as fast as he could carrying the shield. He so happened to be wearing his cavalry armour: thus he was hindered. The soldiers in front of him he encouraged to move forward, the ones behind him (he encouraged) to overtake him, for he was barely keeping up.” (Xen. An. 3.4.47-48).

⁸⁰ Cf. Huitink & Rood: “After Xenophon has proved himself a more insightful tactician than Cheirisophos, there follows a vignette which casts him as an effective leader of the rank and file.” (2019:175).

⁸¹ Besides that, bravery and the willingness to undergo the same challenges as the common soldiers was a requirement for a good commander, at least according to Plato. See Rockwell (2022:52).

⁸² See Herodotus 8.92 (for the participation of the Greek admiral Themistocles) and 8.89 (for various Persian nobles dying in battle).

⁸³ “The other soldiers struck Soteridas and hit him and rebuked him, until they forced him to continue the march, after having taken back his shield. After he (Xenophon) had remounted, he led the way on his horse as long as there was a passable path, and when it became impassable, he hastened forth on foot after having left behind his horse; and they arrived first on the summit before the enemies.” (Xen. An. 3.4.49).

back in line as a sign of loyalty to Xenophon,⁸⁴ but his tireless urging of the troops also results in the successful capturing of the ridgetop. Here, Xenophon's unwearied motivation and leadership are once again emphasized: when he can no longer lead the army on horseback, he demounts and continues on foot, despite the aforementioned awkwardness that the marching on foot gives him, wearing both his cavalry armour and the hoplite-shield.⁸⁵

Concluding the analysis of this passage, it is striking to see that Xenophon cleverly intertwines two aspects of *ethos* in his account of the attack on the ridge. Firstly, his successful reform of the army shows that he has clever insights in how to defend the rear-guard properly (φρόνησις), and that he is capable of working these ideas out and leading the rear-guard himself. Secondly, his speech before the soldiers not only underscores the importance Greece still has for himself and his soldiers (comforting his readers), but is also a clear example of εὐνοια from his character towards the soldiers and φρόνησις with regard to the persuasion of his division. Simultaneously, he clears any possible impression of wanting στάσις, reassuring his readers of the εὐνοια of Xenophon the narrator. Lastly, his leading-by-example also works on two levels of *ethos* at the same time: εὐνοια from his character with respect to the common infantrymen, and through which the narrator communicates to his readers that the lives of his fellow Greeks are important to him. Φρόνησις, for he knows how to take the army by the hand in storming their goal and because he succeeds in his intent to secure the top of the ridge.

Xenophon thus manages to create a firm and positive *ethos* for himself in this combat situation. To complete the image which he wants to paint of his leadership under difficult circumstances, let us now investigate a passage with a less military connotation.

A stereotypical discussion

After crossing the plain, more mountains and the river Centrites, the Greeks arrive in the Armenian mountains. At some point in their journey, a pass through the mountains is blocked by hostile, local tribes. The generals arrange a meeting, in which Xenophon proposes to secretly search for a way through the mountains where there are no enemies, so they can occupy a part of the hills before the enemy can act. After his proposal, the discussion takes a surprising turn when Xenophon argues the following:

ἀτὰρ τί ἐγὼ περὶ κλοπῆς συμβάλλομαι; ὑμᾶς γὰρ ἔγωγε, ὦ Χειρίσοφε, ἀκούω τοῦς Λακεδαιμονίουσ ὅσοι ἐστὲ τῶν ὁμοίων εὐθύς ἐκ παιδῶν κλέπτειν μελετᾶν, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι ἀλλὰ καλὸν κλέπτειν ὅσα μὴ κωλύει νόμος. ὅπως δὲ ὡς κράτιστα κλέπτητε καὶ πειρᾶσθε λανθάνειν, νόμιμον ἄρα ὑμῖν ἐστίν, ἐὰν ληφθῆτε κλέπτοντες, μαστιγοῦσθαι. νῦν οὖν μάλα σοι καιρὸς ἐστίν ἐπιδείξασθαι τὴν παιδείαν, καὶ φυλάξασθαι μὴ ληφθῶμεν κλέπτοντες τοῦ ὄρους, ὡς μὴ πληγὰς λάβωμεν.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ Cf. Huitink & Rood (2019:176-177).

⁸⁵ For the infamous unwieldiness of the hoplite shield and the cavalry armour, see Xen. *An.* 3.3.20, 5.8.23 & Huitink & Rood (2019:176). See Mather & Hewitt (1962:39-42) for an elaborate discussion of the equipment carried by different divisions in the army.

⁸⁶ ""But why do I converse about secret acts? Because I for one heard that you Spartans, Cheirisophos, at least those who are of the same aristocratic rank, practise stealing already in childhood, and that it is not a disgraceful, but a good thing to steal what the law does not prohibit to steal. And in order that you steal as well

The passage contains a rather remarkable argument made by Xenophon. Although stories of the peculiar upbringing of the Spartan upper classes were well known in Greece,⁸⁷ it does not seem appropriate to bring it up in this way in the discussion, unless there was a clear sarcastic undertone in Xenophon's utterance. A clue that suggests that he is serious about his insult is that Xenophon himself writes some sections earlier in the same chapter that he and Cheirisophos had a row about a local guide who was beaten by Cheirisophos and subsequently escaped the following night.⁸⁸ This assemblage took place not long after that argument, so they could have very well still be a little displeased with each other.⁸⁹ Nonetheless, I follow Bradley in interpreting this passage as a more or less friendly teasing blow by Xenophon, who writes down this anecdote to portray their amicable relationship.⁹⁰

But friendly relations or not, by writing down this conversation Xenophon nonetheless also creates a distance necessary for his *ethos* between himself, the Athenian, and Cheirisophos, the Spartan. He explicitly makes clear that he is not to be associated with Sparta and that he does not hesitate to mock them or their way of living. For an Athenian public, his remarks will have been met with tacit agreement, thus making it easier for them to identify Xenophon more as 'one of them' in this discussion. To make the distinction between the two generals even larger, Xenophon continues his account:

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη ὁ Χειρίσοφος, κἀγὼ ὑμᾶς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀκούω δεινοὺς εἶναι κλέπτειν τὰ δημόσια, καὶ μάλα ὄντος δεινοῦ κινδύνου τῷ κλέπτοντι, καὶ τοὺς κρατίστους μέντοι μάλιστα, εἶπερ ὑμῖν οἱ κράτιστοι ἄρχειν ἀξιῶνται· ὥστε ὦρα καὶ σοὶ ἐπιδείκνυσθαι τὴν παιδείαν. Ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν, ἔφη ὁ Ξενοφῶν, ἔτοιμός εἰμι τοὺς ὀπισθοφύλακας ἔχων, ἐπειδὴν δειπνήσωμεν, ἰέναι καταληψόμενος τὸ ὄρος.⁹¹

Here Xenophon's report becomes even more interesting. It is not at all surprising that Cheirisophos chooses to attack Xenophon and the Athenians here after the latter's affront, but the question is why Xenophon would show Cheirisophos' political criticism so openly in this work. While it will have been difficult to provide a truthful display of Cheirisophos' words after circa 30 years, Xenophon might have tried to at least fill in the conversation as veracious as possible. A plausible interpretation is that Xenophon himself, being of aristocratic descent, was not all too satisfied with the κράτιστοι himself: he interprets them not as the "best" in a political or philosophical sense, but rather as the best in practising democracy, in other words

as possible and try to go unnoticed, it is your custom that, if you are caught stealing, you are whipped. Thus, now is the right time for you to display your education and to watch out that we are not caught stealing a part of the mountain, in order that we do not receive beatings.''' (Xen. An. 4.6.14-15).

⁸⁷ See for instance the *Life of Lycurgus* by Plutarch and the *Lacedaemonian Politeia* by Xenophon himself, and Thomas et al. (2021:136) for a modern commentary on this.

⁸⁸ Xen. An. 4.6.3. Thomas et al. (2021:134) suggest that the army became confused and followed the river Phasis by mistake due to having lost their guide: a understandable reason for Xenophon to be angry at Cheirisophos.

⁸⁹ Between their initial quarrel and this gathering were approximately nine days.

⁹⁰ Bradley (1994:221).

⁹¹ ''''But í in turn however'', said Cheirisophos, ''heard that you Athenians are proficient in stealing the public funds, even although there is a terrible danger for the thief, the ''best'' ones most of all, if with you the best are deemed worthy to rule, that is: therefore it is time for you also to show your training.'' ''Well, í'', said Xenophon, ''am willing, having the rear-guard with me, to proceed to occupy the mountain, after we have had a meal.''' (Xen. An. 4.6.16-17).

they are demagogues.⁹² This is nonetheless not a statement the writer Xenophon wants to connect to his own character, as that would paint a negative picture of him as an “aristocratic snob” in the eyes of Athenian readers. Their discussion is therefore useful for him to lay his ‘social criticism’ in the mouth of another character, while taking the Athenian side himself in this quarrel and pretending that he is a supporter of democracy.⁹³ This Athenian identification is given even more effect with Xenophon’s direct response to the mockery of the Spartan: “Ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν (...) ἔτοιμός εἰμι...”: Xenophon, being an Athenian, is at least without hesitation ready to take control of the mountain, in contrast with the resisting Spartan. Albeit part of the jolly atmosphere, he certainly will have scored points in the minds of an Athenian reader here: he as an Athenian is willing to take the initiative when needed, opposed to others who flinch in such a situation, consequently showing that Athenians are braver or have more initiative than other Greeks.⁹⁴ This is in line with the most positive attitude Xenophon displays towards Athenian characters in the *Anabasis*: the study by Bradley shows how Xenophon has a positive stance towards all the Athenians he encounters during the journey, while he is significantly more critical of most of the non-Athenian Greeks.⁹⁵ For this implicit but consistent and sincere pro-Athenian position, this discussion is an example which is not too serious, but striking nonetheless.⁹⁶

Concluding what has become clear in this chapter, Xenophon’s efforts to construct a positive *ethos* during his actions as a general break up into two parts: during the ‘action-scene’ on the ridge, he shows to be a good leader, clever in his ways of persuasion, empathic for the soldiers, not afraid to give the good example, Hellenophile almost, and not keen on evoking στάσις. The dialogue with Cheirisophos, secondly, is maybe even more significant. Here Xenophon shows his Athenian background as opposed to his Spartan counterpart and frames his Athenian descent as something positive when it comes to taking the initiative, while formulating criticism through Cheirisophos’ words, thus not harming his own *ethos*. His pro-Athenian approach is also made clear by his evaluation of other important Greek soldiers and commanders, sending a strong but implicit message of loyalty to Athens and the readers of his work. Xenophon, through a literary tactic of ‘show, don’t tell’, turns out to be an implicit but firm ‘mascot’ of Athens, its values and inhabitants.

In the next and final chapter, the construction of Xenophon’s image during a another difficult stage of the *Anabasis* will be looked into in more detail: when tremendous internal issues rise in the army on the coast of the Black Sea.

⁹² I follow Vollbrecht (1912: 102) in this reasoning. Athens was a democracy at this point, in contrast with Sparta.

⁹³ I do not agree with Vollbrecht (1912:101) stating that Cheirosophos becomes inappropriately rude in his answer to Xenophon: it holds the same meaning as the latter’s remarks, albeit somewhat more political.

⁹⁴ Note the parallel with the situation in chapter 1, with Xenophon also taking the lead.

⁹⁵ See Bradley (1994: 213-228).

⁹⁶ See for more examples of Xenophon’s pro-Athenian stance when in contact with other Greeks: Bradley (1994: 195, 197, 208, 213ff).

Chapter 3: Using and Losing Influence for the Greater Good

After the investigation of Xenophon's presentation of his 'seizing' of power over the army in chapter 1 and his behaviour on the battlefield and in the assembly of generals in chapter 2, this final chapter will have as subject of study the presenting of his person and actions in a turbulent period of the march on the coast of the Black Sea. How does Xenophon display his character in an environment where tensions are rising and the interests within the army diverge further and further, and how does he react to his person becoming more unpopular with the common soldiers?

The portion of the *Anabasis* discussing the struggle of the army on the Black Sea-coast is rather large, covering the whole of books 5 and 6. Therefore a strict selection of case studies is needed with the scope of this thesis in mind. I have chosen three passages that are especially relevant for this study, because they give a clear indication as to how Xenophon presents both himself as a literary character as well as his relation to Greece/other Greeks. The passages that will be more closely investigated in this chapter are *An.* 5.6.15-16, 5.7.32-33 and 6.1.26-28, because these parts of the text give a clear description of Xenophon's deliberations, ambitions and actions as a commander. After introducing the context of these passages, I will analyse them on the usage of the aspects of Xenophon's *ethos* which are mainly threatened in this part of the work (which are, as we will see, his εὐνοια and his ἀρετη). This will hopefully paint a clear picture of the way(s) Xenophon constructs his own persona in difficult times with regard to both the soldiers in the army and the readers of his work.

Augmenting Greece

The first relevant passage to be analysed here is found already fairly far into the fifth book: After the Greek army has reached the coast, the soldiers decide that they have marched enough and that they want to travel the remaining part of the journey by boat. Not having enough boats at their disposal at that moment, they send out Cheirisophos to fetch boats from the Spartan admiral Anaxibios. Because he takes a disappointingly large amount of time to return, the Greeks decide to move westwards on foot along the coast. When they reach the region of Paphlagonia, Xenophon has the following thoughts:

Ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ Ξενοφῶντι, ὀρῶντι μὲν ὀπλίτας πολλοὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ὀρῶντι δὲ πελταστὰς πολλοὺς καὶ τοξότας καὶ σφενδονήτας καὶ ἰππέας δὲ καὶ μάλα ἤδη διὰ τὴν τριβὴν ἱκανοὺς, ὄντας δ' ἐν τῷ Πόντῳ, ἔνθα οὐκ ἂν ἀπ' ὀλίγων χρημάτων τοσαύτη δύναμις παρεσκευάσθη, καλὸν αὐτῷ ἐδόκει εἶναι χώραν καὶ δύναμιν τῇ Ἑλλάδι προσκτήσασθαι πόλιν κατοικίσαντας. καὶ γενέσθαι ἂν αὐτῷ ἐδόκει μεγάλη, καταλογιζομένῳ τό τε αὐτῶν πλῆθος καὶ τοὺς περιοικοῦντας τὸν Πόντον. καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐθύετο πρὶν τι εἰπεῖν τῶν στρατιωτῶν(...)⁹⁷

⁹⁷ "In that time it seemed like a good idea to Xenophon to add land and power to Greece by establishing a city, when he saw many Greek hoplites, many peltasts also and archers and slingers and horsemen, by this time very competent through their experience, and because they were in the Black Sea-region, where a force of such size could not be prepared with little means. And it seemed to him that it would be a big (city), considering their

Instead of bringing the army to Greece, Xenophon plays with the thought of bringing Greece to the army and building a colony according to good Greek custom.⁹⁸ This idea, although quickly rejected by others in the army,⁹⁹ will probably have invoked relieved reactions with Greek readers: not only was this a very ‘Greek’ thing to think, it also showed that Xenophon had no intentions of using the army to cause Greek states harm, but that he was in fact planning the opposite.¹⁰⁰ He explicitly states he wanted to do this τῆ Ἑλλάδι, for Greece, displaying his loyalty to his place of birth.¹⁰¹ This view is strengthened when Xenophon tells of the considerations of his opponents in the general assembly: one of them, the Boeotian Thorax, says to the soldiers:

γελοῖον δὲ εἶναι ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι οὐσης χώρας πολλῆς καὶ ἀφθόνου ἐν τῇ βαρβάρων
μαστεύειν.¹⁰²

Thus, other commanders wanted explicitly to go to Greece and seize land for the veterans there.¹⁰³ This contrast may have worked to Xenophon’s advantage in the eyes of Greek readers (relieved that he army would stay far away), but it did not do so with regard to the soldiers, of whom the majority wanted to go home. As a result, he takes a step back and tells the soldiers in the assembly he designed this plan with their interests in mind, but that he now abandons it and suggests they stay together on the way home,¹⁰⁴ because of the following reason:

διασπασθέντες δ’ ἂν καὶ κατὰ μικρὰ γενομένης τῆς δυνάμεως οὐτ’ ἂν τροφήν δύναισθε
λαμβάνειν οὔτε χαίροντες ἂν ἀπαλλάξαίτε.¹⁰⁵

These concerns and Xenophon’s following conclusion that they should stick together are met with general approval, saving his *ethos* of εὖνοια in front of the soldiers, for they now know he wishes the best for the army on their way home and is willing to accompany them. At the same time, he has had the opportunity to prove his best intentions with Greece to his readers,

number and the inhabitants of the Black Sea-region. And regarding these deliberations he sacrificed before telling anyone of the soldiers” (Xen. *An.* 5.6.15-16).

⁹⁸ The coasts of the Mediterranean and Black sea were colonized by Greek seafarers as early as the 8th century. In fact, all the cities Xenophon and his army passed on the trip along the coast were Greek colonies (Koolschijn & Matsier (2001: 244-245). Athens, although not the first Greek city-state to settle and develop colonies, was no exception when it came to expanding Greek power in other parts of the world. See Levi et al. (1984: 94, 141) on Athenian colonies in the Black Sea area.

⁹⁹ Led by the seer Silanus, who had his own motives to want to return to Greece as soon as possible: see Xen. *An.* 5.6.18, Grethlein (2012:26-27) and Flower in Thomas et al. (2021:322).

¹⁰⁰ For an elaboration on Xenophon’s good intentions with founding a Pan-Hellenic colony in a Greek historical context, see Lendle (1995:344).

¹⁰¹ He may also have had some “panhellenic” intentions with the founding of a city, trying to improve the unity among the soldiers in the army, cf. Gray in Thomas et al. (2021:307 and 310-311).

¹⁰² “That it is absurd to search for land in the territory of barbarians, while in Greece there is much and plentiful land.” (Xen. *An.* 5.6.25).

¹⁰³ That Thorax’ plan was doomed to fail is pointed out by Thomas et al. (2021:174), who mention that the area Thorax is targeting, the Chersonese, was already occupied by the Spartan military.

¹⁰⁴ A suggestion which would prove to be very wise, cf. Xen. *An.* 6.2.9-6.3.26. After the army does fall apart eventually, one of the divisions finds itself in great trouble, only to be rescued by Xenophon and his men. This of course boosts his φρόνησις along the way. See Gray in Thomas et al. (2021:311).

¹⁰⁵ “Would you be separated and would the power (of the army) be spread among small factions, you would not be able to acquire food nor would you get away safely.” (Xen. *An.* 5.6.32).

reassuring them of his loyalty to home. In this way Xenophon manages to change a situation of potential loss of face into one in which he assures himself of the approval of the soldiers: a smart staging of events revolving around the colony-passage.

Xenophon touches on the aspect of piety in the last part of the passage above, when he makes clear that he first sacrificed to the gods before telling the soldiers of his plan, with the intent of consulting the gods about the chance of succeeding.¹⁰⁶ This adds to the reputation of a pious man that Xenophon was constructing in chapter one when consulting the oracle of Delphi on his journey and interpreting his dream in Persia. Here again, he asks the gods what to do, making his decisions more legitimate for the soldiers of his army and for his readers, repairing his ἀρετή as he also did in chapter 1.¹⁰⁷ The passage thus shows that Xenophon made his decisions with Greece, his soldiers and the gods in mind: truly a prudent general indeed.

A moralistic speech

Another aspect of Xenophon's leadership is illuminated a little further on in book 5. The situation is as follows: Xenophon calls for another assembly, because the soldiers are under the impression that the commanders want to bring the army back to the river Phasis in the east. After having eloquently convinced them of the nonsense of this suspicion,¹⁰⁸ Xenophon addresses another development which worries him, which began some time earlier: following an incident in which some of the Greek soldiers of the army had unsuccessfully raided a village near Cerasus, spokesmen of the village had come to Cerasus to discuss the burial of the dead Greeks. They were lapidated in the city by Greeks who had participated in the raid. Afterwards, messengers from Cerasus came to the Greek army which had already moved westwards to tell about the situation. During the deliberation between them and the Greek army leaders, the messengers were scared by violent shouting from the army, thinking they would be targeted by the soldiers. They subsequently ran to their ships and sailed away, while also some Greek attendees fled to the coast. This was all sparked by Greek soldiers being angry at market masters. Understandably, Xenophon strongly disapproved of this behaviour, with the army lacking any discipline. Having firstly explained the dangers their behaviour poses to the discipline and their interests, cynically stating that they maybe are happy with these events,¹⁰⁹ he changes the course of his speech:

εἰ μέντοι ὑμῖν δοκεῖ θηρίων ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀνθρώπων εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔργα, σκοπεῖτε παῦλάν τινα αὐτῶν· εἰ δὲ μή, πρὸς Διὸς πῶς ἢ θεοῖς θύσομεν ἠδέως ποιοῦντες ἔργα ἀσεβῆ, ἢ πολεμίοις πῶς μαχοῦμεθα, ἢν ἀλλήλους κατακαίνωμεν; πόλις δὲ φιλία τίς ἡμᾶς δέξεται, ἢ τις ἂν ὀρᾷ τοσαύτην ἀνομίαν ἐν ἡμῖν; ἀγορὰν δὲ τίς ἄξει θαρρῶν, ἢν περὶ τὰ μέγιστα τοιαῦτα ἐξαμαρτάνοντες φαινώμεθα; οὗ δὲ δὴ πάντων οἰόμεθα τεύξεσθαι ἐπαίνου, τίς ἂν

¹⁰⁶ Understandable is it may seem from the perspective of Xenophon, some objections about this course of events may have risen both from Silanus and from the soldiers, for they could have felt "left out" of the procedure. See Thomas et al. (2021:172) and Lendle (1995:345-346).

¹⁰⁷ That his sacrifices to the gods are in everyone's best interest is again emphasized by him in Xen. An. 5.6.28.

¹⁰⁸ It was not total nonsense to be exact, but it was an idea of the other generals and not of Xenophon (Xen. An. 5.6.36-37). See also Lendle (1995:349) and Thomas et al. (2021:175-176).

¹⁰⁹ Xen. An. 5.7.31.

ἡμᾶς τοιούτους ὄντας ἐπαινέσειεν; ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτι πονηροὺς ἂν φαίημεν εἶναι τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιοῦντας.¹¹⁰

Xenophon's rhetoric is cleverly multi-layered. Having shown his own contempt, he points out why the conduct in the army needs to come to a halt: if the soldiers want to be pious men, if they want to stand a change in battle and save their lives, if they want to have the opportunity to rest and forage in (Greek) cities, they will have to show more lawful and disciplined manners. He ends with the strongest appeal: an appeal to home (thus again using *pathos* as a persuasive means, cf. the passage on the mountain ridge in chapter 2). Xenophon speaks out the expectation that they will be met with praise (τεύξεσθαι ἐπαίνου) when they arrive in their own πόλεις. This implies that Xenophon himself thinks that the Persian expedition was nothing to be ashamed, and maybe even something to be proud of, if they behave themselves on the way home. That also sheds a different light on the thoughts of the writer Xenophon which he might have had when arriving in Greece:¹¹¹ if he held hope that he would be warmly received in his hometown Athens after the expedition, as seems to be made clear in this passage, his readers would have a better understanding of the disappointment or anger Xenophon might have had after his banishment *in absentia*, especially if he himself was responsible for an orderly and well-behaved return of the army to Greece.

The "pathetic" appeal to home has another implicit meaning: this appeal can only work if the soldiers have a sense of honour themselves. If they are sensitive to this argument, which they are, as becomes clear after this passage, it means they have an untouched ἀρετή and are not "out of touch" with Greek norms and values. This would then also apply to Xenophon, as the instigator of this moral consideration.

The last sentence is another statement worth noting, for he states that they would think of such people as rogues, meaning they themselves are ultimately better than that and should behave in a better way, despite their current behaviour. The fact that the soldiers agree with his speech,¹¹² suggests that they have a proper functioning moral compass and will thereby not form a threat for the Greek world when they arrive there eventually.

The whole passage, therefore, leans very much on the notion that the participants of this army are not rogues or bandits or barbarians, but Greeks who know the νόμοι that need to be followed and the ways they should behave, thus essentially not posing a threat to the Greek world but being a part of it, lost but now on the way home. This radiates on the person of Xenophon directly, for whom of course all the implications above are also true, but who as a clever commander moreover knows how to bring the "Greek" spirit back into a currently undisciplined army. (Greek) readers of his work will have noticed this strong rhetorical passage

¹¹⁰ "If however these deeds seem to you to be of beasts rather than of humans, you should look for some means of stopping them. Otherwise, by Zeus, how will we sacrifice to the gods in an pleasing manner while practising wicked deeds, or how will we fight enemies, if we kill each other? Which befriended city will accept us, when it sees a lawlessness of such proportion among us? Who will confidently provide us with a marketplace, if we show ourselves doing such things wrong regarding the most important matters? And there then were we think we shall be met with everyone's praise, who could possibly praise us if we are of such behaviour? Because I know that we would say that men who do such things are rogues." (Xen. An. 5.7.32-33).

¹¹¹ See Grethlein (2012:28-30) for an elaboration on the separation and overlap between writer and character.

¹¹² As is told directly after this passage (Xen. An. 5.7.34).

and agreed with Xenophon's words, resulting in a better understanding and maybe even admiration of the writer and his rhetorical- and leadership qualities.

In this light, the last two lines of chapter 5.7 seem to be working on different levels, when Xenophon writes:

παραινοῦντος δὲ Ξενοφῶντος καὶ τῶν μάντεων συμβουλευόντων ἔδοξε καθῆραι τὸ στράτευμα. καὶ ἐγένετο καθαρμός.¹¹³

Not only is the army cleansed of their sins in the eyes of the gods, there seems also to be a form of cleansing of the expedition and of Xenophon in the eyes of the readers through this passage, making it easier for a Greek public to identify themselves with the characters, to see them as righteous Greeks and ultimately to see the role of the commander Xenophon in a positive light.

Refusal of the supreme command

After a while, the Greeks receive enough ships from the town of Heraclea to be able to transport the whole army by boat. They sail west to Sinope, where they meet up with Cheirisophos. Now the army is complete and on the brink of entering the Greek world, the desire rises to strengthen the efficiency and stability of the army by choosing one supreme commander. Not surprisingly, the captains approach Xenophon to take the lead. Following good Xenophonian practise, he does not know what to do and decides to sacrifice to Zeus the King. Zeus makes clear to him that he should refuse the supreme command if offered to him. When it becomes clear in the general assembly that the soldiers want to appoint him, Xenophon opens his speech with the following words:

Ἐγώ, ὧ ἄνδρες, ἡδομαι μὲν ὑφ' ὑμῶν τιμώμενος, εἴπερ ἄνθρωπός εἰμι, καὶ χάριν ἔχω καὶ εὐχομαι δοῦναί μοι τοὺς θεοὺς αἰτίον τινος ὑμῖν ἀγαθοῦ γενέσθαι· τὸ μέντοι ἐμὲ προκριθῆναι ὑφ' ὑμῶν ἄρχοντα Λακεδαιμονίου ἀνδρὸς παρόντος οὔτε ὑμῖν μοι δοκεῖ συμφέρον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἦττον ἂν διὰ τοῦτο τυγχάνειν, εἴ τι δέοισθε παρ' αὐτῶν· ἐμοί τε αὖ οὐ πάνυ τι νομίζω ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι τοῦτο. ὁρῶ γὰρ ὅτι καὶ τῇ πατρίδι μου οὐ πρόσθεν ἐπαύσαντο πολεμοῦντες πρὶν ἐποίησαν πᾶσαν τὴν πόλιν ὁμολογεῖν Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ αὐτῶν ἡγεμόνας εἶναι. ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτο ὠμολόγησαν, εὐθύς ἐπαύσαντο πολεμοῦντες καὶ οὐκέτι πέρα ἐπολιόρκησαν τὴν πόλιν. εἰ οὖν ταῦτα ὁρῶν ἐγὼ δοκοίην ὅπου δυναίμην ἐνταῦθ' ἄκυρον ποιεῖν τὸ ἐκείνων ἀξίωμα, ἐκεῖνο ἐννοῶ μὴ λίαν ἂν ταχὺ σωφρονισθεῖην.¹¹⁴

¹¹³ "On advise of Xenophon and with the agreement of the seers, it was decreet to cleanse the army. And a cleansing took place." (Xen. An.5.7.35. See also Thomas et al. (2021:181) for the possible execution of the cleansing).

¹¹⁴ "I, men, am happy to be honoured by you, since I am a human, and I am thankful and I pray that the gods give me a cause to achieve something good for you. However, the fact that I am preferred by you as a commander while a Spartan man is present does not seem to be profitable for you to me, for it will be less likely to be successful because of this, when you would need something from them. And for me in turn I deem this not safe at all. Because I see that the Spartans did not stop waging war against my hometown before they had made the whole city agree that the Spartans were also their leaders. When they agreed with this, the Spartans immediately stopped waging war and did not besiege the city any further. If I would thus, seeing these things, create the impression of undermining their reputation wherever I can, I understand that regarding this I would be chastened very quickly." (Xen. An. 6.1.26-28).

A remarkable opening of the oration of a man who had spoken with much authority not so long ago. Nevertheless, this way of presenting himself fits the character Xenophon in the *Anabasis* very well: his modesty is something we have already encountered in chapter 1, when he eventually took the lead.¹¹⁵ The most contrasting part between the two scenes is the form of divine intervention: whereas Xenophon had interpreted his dream in chapter 1 as a call for action, here he is explicitly told by Zeus through his offerings that he has to back away. A parallel is also easily seen: on both occasions, Xenophon has the faith of the common soldiers in mind. In the first chapter, the army was in ἀπορία, they did not know what to do, making Xenophon's seizure of the command an action in their best interests: as he stated himself, they would die otherwise.¹¹⁶ Now, with the army almost reaching Greek territory that is at that moment under the control of the Spartans, it is, as Xenophon points out, for the best that the soldiers chose a Spartan general and do not upset them, for they will be needing Spartan favours in the future.¹¹⁷ Xenophon therefore makes way for a Spartan to seize the command: a logical course of events.

What remains is Xenophon's own striking relation to the Spartans. Although his relationship with most Spartan commanders like Klearchos and Cheirosophos had been mostly friendly during the campaign, Xenophon now decides to openly distance himself from them (although not in a negative way per se) and to identify himself with his hometown, Athens. I analyse this as having three functions: firstly, it is an 'easy' way for Xenophon to lay down the command and thus follow the advice of Zeus (evoking his 'pious' image, strengthening his ἀρετή). Secondly, his comparison between himself at this point and the city of Athens after the Peloponnesian war will have evoked recognition and sympathy with an Athenian public (bettering the writers' εὐνοια with regard to his readers). Lastly, it repairs his position in the army: the common soldiers as well as the (soon to be) Spartan commanders now know that Xenophon wishes the best for them and does not form a threat for the ambitions of any Spartan nor does he want the rule of the army for himself, making his modesty a form of defence and strengthening the character's εὐνοια with regard to the soldiers.

Summarizing the analysis of this part of the *Anabasis*, the image of Xenophon that really stands out here is that of a respected commander who uses his influence on the army for the greater good of his soldiers and of Greece, but who is also not hesitant to lose that influence once losing power benefits that same greater good. When he suggests the plan of founding a colony, a panhellenistic project for the benefit of Greece (winning the sympathy of readers), he is not afraid to back down once it is made clear that the soldiers oppose this plan, saving his *ethos* in front of the troops. This saved face later comes in handy when he needs to convince the soldiers to stay together and to behave themselves, with a return to their Greek πόλεις in prospect. That his advice is followed by the soldiers (for now) is not only an indication that his *ethos* before the soldiers is unharmed and that he is still regarded as a leader with authority (based on his *ethos* in general and on his φρόνησις and εὐνοια in particular), but

¹¹⁵ Modesty and perhaps also a good sense of reality: Xenophon knows the Spartans have the upper hand. Cf. Grethlein (2012:28) and Lendle (1995:370).

¹¹⁶ Xen. An. 3.1.13-14.

¹¹⁷ As Waterfield in Thomas et al. (2021:274) puts it: "Accepting the offer (of becoming a sole ruler) would endanger the men, and a good leader eliminates risk as much as possible."

also of the fact that the mercenary army knows how to behave when they want to return to Greece, implicitly communicating that they will not pose a threat to Greece (at least not under Xenophon's leadership). This is then symbolised by the ritually cleansing of the army on the instigation of Xenophon, cleansing both the army and himself of the suspicion of wanting to harm Greece. The positive picture Xenophon constructs of his leadership is completed with the explicit focus of his relation to the Spartan commanders and his decision to lay down the supreme command. Explicitly, he argues that Zeus has told him to do so and that this decision is best for the army regarding the Spartan supremacy in the territories they are about to enter. This strengthens his ἀρετή and his εὐνοία not only before the soldiers but before the readers as well: Xenophon appears as a pious man who places the interests of the army above his personal ambitions and who does not want to form a threat of any kind to the *status quo* in Greece. Implicitly, he identifies himself with his hometown Athens as opposed to Sparta, informing his readers that he has not lost his heart to another πόλις and that they do not need to be afraid of him or his ambitions. In the end, Xenophon the character always does what needs to be done, because he and the writer Xenophon know what needs to be done. He does this with indifference regarding his own status, but always with the greater good and with Athens in his mind.

Conclusion

What can now be concluded about the invented *ethos* of Xenophon in his *Anabasis* on the basis of the research displayed above? If the evaluation shows one aspect of Xenophon in particular, it is his excellence as an entertaining and gifted writer. His passages, of both the rhetorical and the descriptive kind, are vivid, informative and fascinating. But, to refer back to my introduction, Xenophon did not write this work simply as an enjoyable bed time story, but as a work with a high historical and rhetorical value, both in general and for himself in particular. In this rhetorical aspect, which was the precise topic of this thesis, Xenophon is as outstanding in his authorship as he is in the historical and entertaining aspect. There are good reasons to hang on to the assumption that he had a negative *ethos* in the eyes of his audience when they started reading the work, as I have made clear in the introduction, but he managed to change this image of himself in a positive way in numerous passages throughout the work, both in explicit and implicit ways.

When the focus of the story falls on him for the first time, Xenophon stresses his hesitance to firstly join the mercenary army and secondly lead it when the opportunity and necessity came to him, rebuking the possible heavy reproach that he joined the army because of a lust for power. This same refuting of the power-hungry image he might have suffered before the publication of the work is found in various other places, as the backing away of his initial, panhellenic plan to found a colony and his insistence to leave the supreme command over the army to the Spartans show his readers. This aspect of his *ethos* is each time cleverly intertwined with another important feature: his devoutness to the gods. Whenever he has to make a decision during his journey, be it a hugely important one like his decision to join the expedition or one with which is dealt in a relatively small passage like his contemplation on the founding of the colony, he consults the gods through oracles, offerings or divine messages in his dreams. Through this literary tactic he does not only establish an image of himself as a remarkable pious man, but he also makes the gods implicitly almost complicit to his actions and their consequences: how can one criticize actions encouraged or even instilled by the gods? Because the answer to this rhetorical question is that one simply cannot, Xenophon forces the reader to agree that his ἀρετή need not be subject to criticism.

That Xenophon is also capable of boosting the ἀρετή of other literary characters besides himself is shown when he reprimands the soldiers in the army because of their behaviour. Since a literary character with as much self-awareness as Xenophon in his *Anabasis* is ought to practise what he preaches, his ἀρετή is definitively defended from possible criticism through this passage. In addition, this same passage touched on the core of Xenophon's tactic to save his εὐνοία, for he shows that he has a clear and thorough understanding of the fears and suspicions of προδοσία of his audience back home and that he does everything that lies within his power to disprove these fears. He starts with this strategy of refuting any suspicions already when he lays the exact possible accusation in the mouth of his mentor Socrates, but he maintains this tactic when he gives the readers insight in his own thoughts, when he gives Greece the notion of home while encouraging the soldiers and again in the colony-passage, where he explicitly states to have the interests of Greece in mind.

The defence of his εὐνοία towards Greek readers goes surprisingly well together with the defence of that same aspect of his *ethos* with regard to the soldiers of the army. After his democratic rise to power within the army, he makes sure to keep an eye on the feelings, worries and wishes of the common soldiers, encouraging them when needed and even joining their ranks during the attack on the ridge. Through his acknowledgment of the worries of his readers and of his soldiers at the same time and because he stresses that the men are fighting for Greece and towards home, Xenophon successfully frames the army as an exponent of the Greek world under his command, coinciding the interests of both reader and soldier and presenting himself as an almost heroic leader fighting for Greeks and Greece in general. The only passage in which this concurring of interests does not occur is, again, the passage about the colony. Although Xenophon underestimates the desire of the soldiers to return home, he succeeds through his eloquence and by backing away from his plan to reconvince the soldiers of his εὐνοία and of his φρόνησις (which he had established through his successful actions on the battlefield and during the march), while strengthening his εὐνοία with regard to his readers by simply telling them of his deliberations.

His complicated relationship with Athens and Sparta has now also become more clear: Through implicit (his positive stance towards other Athenians in contrast to other Greeks, his preference for democratic decision-making) and explicit (his twofold identification with Athens when conversing with Cheirisophos and when refusing the command) hints, Xenophon makes it very clear to his readers that, wherever the army may go, there is only one πόλις which has his true predilection: Athens.

To conclude one could say that, by depicting himself struggling with most unfortunate events, Xenophon has the chance to prove to his readers that he is not the traitorous, opportunistic, loose-headed, power-hungry mercenary some might have seen in him before reading his report, but that in fact the opposite is true. Xenophon's *ethos* as invented by him paints the picture of a humble, intelligent, pious and decisive man who gets himself in trouble by accident, but responds to this situation as any free, skilled (and maybe *democratic*) Greek would want to respond in similar circumstances. Xenophon skillfully transforms his character from someone with whom no one in the entirety of Greece would have wanted to trade places to an example of excellent leadership, good moral conduct and sincere loyalty to home. The product of a proficient writer describing a proficient leader.

Follow-up research could concentrate on other persuasive means used by Xenophon in his work: what exact role and effect does the use of *pathos* or *logos* have in his description of the expedition? Are they as cleverly deployed as a means to convince readers of Xenophon's excellence as *ethos* turns out to be? A broader investigation of *ethos* is another option, for the number of passages that could be investigated were perforce limited due to the length of this thesis: there is surely more interesting material to be found in other, now unresearched parts of this work. Future possible research options into Xenophon and his *Anabasis* are as numerous as the men he helped get back home.

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