Examining the Multifaceted Korean Wave: Assessing Korean Soft Power through the Lens of Japanese and Chinese Youth Sentiment

Mochizuki, Rika

Examining the Multifaceted Korean Wave: Assessing Korean Soft Power through the Lens of Japanese and Chinese Youth Sentiment

MA Thesis International Relations, Culture and Politics

Rika Mochizuki
S3488535

June 3rd, 2023

Supervisor: Dr. E. Veldkamp

Universiteit Leiden

Contents

Introduction

Initially, East Asia served as a hub for the dissemination of Western popular culture, but in the past three decades, it has undergone a "cultural renaissance" and emerged as a cultural powerhouse (Hong and Jin 2021, 218). The Korean Wave, a phenomenon of immense influence originating from South Korea in the 1990s, has played a pivotal role in this transformation. It not only challenges the cultural dominance long held by the United States but also shapes the trajectory of Asia's future (Valeriano and Nissen, 2022). The global expansion of the Korean Wave is often described as soft power because it exerts an "attractive power" that brings economic benefits and molds Korea's image among its audience (Kim and Nye 2019, 41). While the Korean Wave initially emerged from private actors, the government's involvement provided the impetus for its growth (Kim and Nye 2019, 4). The Korean government now recognizes the Korean Wave as a crucial "soft power asset" and conducts various statistical studies to assess its impact. One significant survey conducted by the Culture and Information Service (KOCIS) under the Ministry of Culture and Information is the 'National Image' survey. Since 2018, the KOCIS has conducted an online survey involving over eight thousand respondents from sixteen countries, including Korea. The most recent data reveals that over 80% of foreigners hold a positive perception of Korea (KOCIS, 2022). Notably, "modern culture" (22.9%), encompassing K-pop and Korean movies, emerged as the primary reason for this favorable opinion among foreigners (KOCIS, 2022).

Hallyu, the Korean Wave, has become a cultural phenomenon extending its reach to Southeast Asia, Europe, and North America. However, when considering historical and economic factors, the neighboring countries of Japan and China stand out as the most significant recipients of Korean culture. Both countries have not only been influenced by Hallyu since the 1990s, but also account for the biggest importers of Korean contents. In 2022, Japan and Greater China (including Taiwan and Hong Kong) accounted for more than half of

the total K-contents exports and are expected to maintain their importance as recipients of Hallyu (Yonhap News, 2023b). Having lived in both countries for over ten years, I witnessed the immense popularity of Korean culture. When the K-pop idol group EXO debuted, featuring several Chinese members, it created a significant buzz both online and offline. Although some members have since left the group, they remain actively involved in China as judges on dance shows and as brand ambassadors for luxury companies. In Japanese cities, Korean restaurants can be found in abundance, and it is a frequent sight to see teenagers and young adults enthusiastically shopping for Korean cosmetics. Additionally, Korean idols often appear on the covers of numerous magazines available in bookstores. Yet, the result from the same 'National Image' survey demonstrates that Japan and China are among the top two countries that have the most negative views about Korea. Japan stands out as an extreme case, with only 30% of its population holding a positive opinion, contrasting sharply with the global average of 80%.

<Figure 1> Overall Image Rating of South Korea (Positive views)



Source: 'National Image Survey 2021', Korean Culture and Information Service (2022).

Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge the emergence of positive attitudes and interests towards Korean "modern culture", particularly among young females aged 20 to 30

in China and Japan. When asked about their levels of favorability towards various fields, including modern culture, cultural heritage, economics, safety, politics/diplomacy, society, and sports, “modern culture” received the highest level of favorability in both China and Japan (KOCIS, 2022). These findings indicate that reactions to the Korean Wave are multifaceted and require further investigation to gain a comprehensive understanding of the impact of soft power. While the overall public opinion may highlight the limitations of soft power, the results can vary significantly when viewed through different lenses, such as generational and gender perspectives, even within the same country.

There have already been various discussions on how soft power works and its effectiveness, many of which are based on public opinion polls and other quantified methods. While these data provide general trends and reflect the voices of the masses, they do not reflect the voices of individuals, such as how popular culture influences their images toward Korea in specific ways. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to examine the effectiveness of Korea’s soft power by focusing on the individual voices of youths in Japan and China, which do not readily appear on data. Based on existing data and the original interview, this paper aims to understand the non-monolithic effect of Korea’s soft power through the following research question: How does the Hallyu affect the sentiments towards Korea among Japanese and Chinese youth? Sub-questions include: Do young people who are interested in these cultures have a deeper understanding of Korea, which is one of the goals of Korea’s public policy? What are the differences in the acceptance of Hallyu between Japanese and Chinese youths?

Chapter 1: Literature review on ‘soft power’

This literature review first clarifies the definition of the ‘soft power’, which is the theoretical framework of this paper. This paper will focus on two major lines of criticism that are relevant today and crucial to understanding the effect of the Korean Wave: its necessity and

effectiveness. Two sections will explore the existing rivalries and describe how this paper will challenge these premises through a constructivist approach. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the significant points of debates surrounding the efficacy of soft power and illustrates why examining the effect of the Korean wave in Japan and China will contribute to these lines of debate.

Over three decades ago, Nye coined the term "soft power" to describe an "ability to shape the preferences of others" through the usage of "attraction", as opposed to the traditional "hard power" such as military and economic force (Nye 2008, 95). Soft power arises from utilizing three resources: culture, political values, and foreign policies. Nye demonstrated that the "soft power" was the driving force for the U.S. to play a leading role in the international community, as the country needed an alternative way to affect others notably after the end of the cold war. Since then, the concept has become widespread in both academia and politics. One of the most significant impacts is on public policy formulation. Nye argues that public policy and soft power are closely related as government utilizes soft power resources such as culture to "communicate with and attract the publics of the countries, rather than merely their governments" (Nye 2008, 95). The influence of the soft power concept in public policy is evident in the case of Korea. According to Jang and Paik, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Trade and the Presidential Council on Nation Branding have been putting efforts to utilize the soft power of the Korean Wave for the purpose of promoting their national images and brands since 2010 (Jang and Paik 2012, 196). In 2017, the Moon Jae-In administration defined Hallyu as "a key policy driver" and established a culture powerhouse to enhance more cultural activities (Kim Y, 2021). The administration has also called for efforts in export promotion measures linked to Hallyu. The scale of Hallyu exports continues to increase, doubling between 2016 and 2021 to a record high of $11.5 billion (Hosokawa and Satō, 2022). It is not only the value of exports that has increased year after year but also Korea's image in other countries has generally been on the rise in the eyes of foreigners. According to the

"National Image Survey 2021" of the Korean Culture and Information Service of 16 countries (including Japan and China), 76% of non-Koreans had a positive impression of Korea in 2019, while the latest results show more than 80% have favorable views (KOCIS, 2022). This data indicates that the Korean government has partially achieved one of its goals of enhancing its national image among the "international community" by incorporating Hallyu into public policy (MOFA of Republic of Korea, n.d.). However, this alone is not enough to determine neither the significance of soft power nor how the employment of soft resources may affect the creation of different perceptions among the recipients. It is important to delve into various criticisms and questions surrounding soft power and its utilization in the realm of public diplomacy. These criticisms can be broadly divided into those regarding its 'necessity' and 'effectiveness'.

The necessity of soft power has come under increasing scrutiny when compared to hard power. According to Gallarotti, a realist perspective on power has traditionally dominated the academic field of international politics (Gallarotti 2011, 25). This realist view asserts that nations can exert influence through tangible and coercive means of power (Gallarotti 2011, 27). Gray is among those who support this realist stance, contending that hard power should remain "an indispensable instrument of policy", rather than soft power (Gray 2011, 9). Examining the current landscape of international relations involving Korea, with assertive neighbors such as North Korea and China, the significance of hard power should not be underestimated. Given these international circumstances, it is not surprising to encounter the perspective that soft power is no longer necessary, having "given way to the age of hard power" (Li, 2018). These arguments may suggest an incompatibility between soft power and hard power, but Nye never stated that soft power can replace hard power. Soft power is used in conjunction with hard power to attain diplomatic and other objectives. In Nye's most recent article, he responds to the argument that soft power is no longer meaningful by emphasizing again that "soft power is not the only or even the most important source of power" (Nye, 2022). Especially for a country

like Korea, which is establishing its position as a “middle power” that holds considerable influence across various critical global domains and actively promotes the principles of a liberal international order, it is crucial to further build a positive image internationally by successfully using soft power in junction with hard power (Mo, 2016). In addition, when addressing the ‘necessity’ of employing soft power, it is significant to consider its audience and objectives. From this standpoint, it is advantageous for Korea to persist in utilizing its soft power approach towards Japan. Both nations not only share democratic values but also hold alliances with the United States, making it crucial from a security standpoint to foster a cooperative relationship. Hence, the recent assertion that soft power is dispensable when compared to hard power does not hold true in Korea’s case, especially when Japan is the target. Concerning China, the situation is more complex. As the next chapter will delve into in greater detail, the Chinese government imposed restrictions on the influx of the Korean Wave due to geopolitical tensions.

Another significant critique directed at soft power is on its ‘effectiveness’. Numerous scholars question its validity due to the difficulty in measuring its impact empirically. Hall, for instance, takes issue with Nye’s placement of “attraction” as the primary mechanism driving the effects of soft power (Hall 2010, 190). Hall argues that since “attractiveness” is not a causal mechanism, there is a need to disaggregate different forms of soft power into separate mechanisms with distinct causal logics, such as institutional power (Hall 2010, 207-208). In short, Hall’s criticism lies upon the ambiguity of “attractiveness” as a flawed indicator and thus not suitable as an “analytic tool” (Hall 2010, 190). Similar concerns are echoed by other scholars, as Blanchard and Lu highlight the deficiency in the operationalization of soft power (Blanchard and Lu 2012, 570). The authors illustrate this point by referring to the challenges of consolidating various indicators into a unified measure when evaluating China’s soft power (Blanchard and Lu 2012, 570). Undoubtedly, these assertions deserve careful consideration. However, there have been numerous efforts to measure the effectiveness of soft power in practice. Some use indicators such as the “National Brand Index” to quantify the effectiveness

of soft power (Anholt, 2014). Others advocate the use of "reputation" as a reliable source. One notable development is the Soft Power 30 project, which combines objective data and polls to create an index that serves as an analytical tool for soft power (Passow et al., 2005). Furthermore, the University of Edinburgh's first statistical report on soft power across political, cultural, and economic domains in 2017 revealed significant statistical impacts of soft power. According to the report, the soft power of a country has a statistical impact on areas including "foreign direct investment, overseas student recruitment, tourism, and international influence, such as UN General Assembly" (Singh and MacDonald, 2017).

The purpose of this thesis is not to engage in the debate surrounding the empirical measurement or the best index to gauge the effectiveness of soft power. Instead, the aim is to provide a better understanding of the nuanced and non-monolithic effectiveness of soft power by focusing on individual voices that often go unnoticed in data and public polls alone. To emphasize the significance of individual experiences in shaping perceptions, Iwabuchi's research highlights the long-term influence of popular culture, even if its immediate political impact may not be recognizable. For instance, the popularity of the television drama *Winter Sonata* among avid fans in Japan has fostered an interest in learning about the history of Japanese aggression and contributed to a deeper understanding about Korea (Iwabuchi and Huat 2008, 252). Similarly, just as Korean dramas served as a means for middle-aged female fans to acquire historical knowledge two decades ago, there is now a growing movement among young people, particularly K-pop fans in Japan and China, to deepen their understanding of Korean society. In 2021, Japanese university students who are fans of K-pop took up the issue of Korean and Japanese history, published the book "My Discomfort with 'Japan-Korea' Relations and Me as a University Student" (*Nikkan nō Moyamoya tō Watashi)*, which received significant attention. Shortly after its release, the book reached the top position in the "Korean Peninsula Area Studies" category on Amazon Japan, a section that typically features works by historical revisionists (Yonhap News, 2021a). These subtle shifts in perceptions among the

culture recipients require time and are not usually evident in the data. Nevertheless, gradual transformations are occurring, and as Iwabuchi argues, these ordinary citizens' everyday practices form the "foundation of society", and they are the potential "active political actors" who shape public opinion about other countries. Therefore, this paper focuses on Japanese and Chinese youths who are potential active political actors in the future and examines through interviews how the Korean Wave influences these youths' feelings toward Korea, and how it functions as a soft power.

Chapter 2: The impacts of Hallyu in Japan and China

Japan and China have been exposed to the influence of the Korean Wave for approximately three decades. The term 'Hallyu' emerged in China during the 1990s, denoting the sudden and remarkable surge in popularity of Korean television, music, and other forms of popular culture within that country (Kim Y 2021, 55). The Hallyu phenomenon in China was triggered by the broadcast of a Korean TV series called *What is Love* on state-controlled television in 1997 (Jang 2012, 98). Over time, the impact of the Korean Wave extended beyond national borders, eventually reaching Japan in 2003. This chapter aims to explore the diverse and multifaceted effects of the Korean Wave as a form of soft power by examining the responses to Hallyu in Japan and China from the early 2000s to the present.

2.1 The impacts of Hallyu in Japan: Polarization of avid fans and the bottom-up 'Kenkan' movement

Similar to the case of China, the Hallyu boom in Japan was also triggered by a TV drama series: *Winter Sonata*. The popularity of the lead actor especially among middle-aged and older women attracted much attention in Japanese society, leading to many academic articles discussing the reasons for this phenomenon and its implications for cultural reception

and the effect of soft power. Before the Korean boom triggered by *Winter Sonata*, Korea was a country with which most Japanese middle-aged and older women had little contact (Kim H 2000, 5). However, the survey by NHK Broadcasting Research Institute on the Winter Sonata phenomenon reveals an increasing number of Japanese women became "interested in Korea" as a result of the drama series and answered that their "image of Korea has changed" (Sanya 2004, 17-18). The most prominent criticism of fans who consume Korean dramas is their "perception of Korea" and their "unwillingness to learn about the real Korea and Japan-Korea relations" (Kim H 2000, 4). However, according to Iwabuchi, a prominent scholar on the impact of the Korean Wave in Japan, *Winter Sonata* provided Japanese audiences with an opportunity to think critically about "the state of their lives, society, and history" rather than simply consuming culture (Iwabuchi and Huat 2008, 244). Mōri further proved this small yet long-lasting impact of the TV series especially among the middle-aged Japanese women fans, who started to learn about the history of Japanese colonialism to Korea and visit the shooting locations of the drama in Korea (Mōri 2008, 155). Although some scholars (e.g. Arai 2004, Son 2004) predicted that the Hallyu boom in Japan is a temporary movement and thus not likely to lead to an advanced understanding of Korea, the second wave of Hallyu characterized by the rise of K-pop idols began in the early 2000s. The popularity of these second-generation K-pop idols, represented by KARA, Girl's Generation, and TVXQ, was so great in Japan that they became the first three foreign acts to appear on a national TV broadcaster's New Year's program.

The widespread popularity of K-pop, particularly among women, was robust, but it also coincided with a growing sense of nationalism. A notable representation of this was the term "*kenkan"*, which translates to 'anti-Korea'. It was first introduced by the Asahi Shimbun, a prominent Japanese newspaper, in 1992 (Lee H 2021, 54). During the late 1990s, hate books (*heitōbōn)*, defined as "books that mock other nations and incite ethnic discrimination and chauvinism" started to appear with the topic of anti-Korea (Ōizumi et al., 2015). These hate

books on the topic of anti-Korea did not attract much attention at the time because Korea-Japan relations were relatively amicable due to the success of the 2002 FIFA World Cup co-hosting and the second Korean wave boom (Lee 2021, 63). However, that trend changed in September 2002 when North Korea admitted to former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi that they had abducted Japanese citizens in the past. This incident led to a marked increase in anti-Korean and anti-China expressions in cyberspace (Mie, 2013). Furthermore, in 2005, the publication of *Hating the Korean Wave Comic (Manga Kenkanryū)* triggered an anti-Korean movement not only in the cyber space but also in the public space. These books, which spread false and discriminatory messages such as Koreans are 'liars', sold more than several million copies during the late 2000s. Over the course of a decade, the term "*kenkan"*, once relatively obscure, became widely known within Japanese society.

In the year following the surge of Anti-Korea books, an extremist right-wing group known as "*zaitokukai*" became active. This group holds that the ethnic Korean population living in Japan (*zainichi)* are benefiting from privileges that cause suffering among the Japanese population. They disseminated discriminatory messages and engaged in various activities to promote this agenda. One notable incident happened in 2009 when members of the extremist group stormed into Kyoto Korean First Elementary School and rallied hate speech for nearly an hour. As a result, four members were found guilty in connection with the incident. Additionally, the group played a prominent role in organizing two anti-Hallyu demonstrations targeting the Japanese TV station Fuji TV in 2011. These demonstrations attracted over 3500 participants who held message cards with slogans such as "Stop over-selling Hallyu!" (Yoshino, 2016). During this period, Fuji TV had a channel dedicated to Korean dramas known as *Hallyu α*, as well as a music channel *Music Fair* that featured several K-pop groups such as KARA and TVXQ. However, a former producer from Fuji TV clarified that these broadcasts were far from "over-selling Hallyu", as claimed by the right-wing group. The content of these programs neither excessively elevated Korean celebrities or content, nor displayed antagonistic attitudes

towards Japanese society, culture, or history (Yoshino, 2016). Lee suggests Japan's chauvinistic attitudes and the term *kenkan* become widely known and normalized in the Japanese society in 2012 with further increase of "hate speech rallies" (Lee H 2021, 54). This was followed by territorial disputes and the resurgence of issues surrounding Comfort Women, which further strained tensions between Korea and Japan.

The series of negative reactions towards Korea cannot be solely attributed to the Korean Wave, as there are other potential factors at play, such as the increase in "social unrest" since the 2000s (Tanabe 2018, 67). However, it can be asserted with certainty that the introduction of new Korean culture in Japan has elicited diverse reactions, demonstrating that it is an example of non-monolithic soft power. In some instances, the utilization of soft resources like popular culture can yield unintended consequences. This contradictory phenomenon towards Korea in Japan was initially highlighted by Iwabuchi during the first Hallyu boom in the early 2000s. In his interviews with Korean residents in Japan, many respondents expressed frustration with how Japanese people embraced Korean popular culture while the underlying "structure of social discrimination" remained unchanged (Iwabuchi and Huat 2008, 255).

2.2 The impacts of Hallyu in China: From Top-down Endorsement to Sanctions

While the Hallyu boom and the rise of anti-Korean sentiment in Japan occurred naturally among the people, in the case of China, government intervention controls the larger trend. The widespread popularity of Hallyu during the early 2000s in China was only possible due to the Chinese government's endorsement as the industry was brought into a country with "strict censorship and changeable cultural policies" (Chen 2016, 386). In China, the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) has detailed and precise control over the content and quantity of dramas imported into China, and such strict control applies to K-

pop music as well (Chen 2016, 377). When the government was endorsing the influx of Korean music in the late 1990s, idol groups from SM Entertainment such as H.O.T and BoA, and Sechs Kies from current YG Entertainment successfully gained a considerable number of fans (Jun 2017, 155). In 2000, K-pop group H.O.T established the new record with over 100,000 fans attending their concerts in Beijing (Wang, 2023). The Korean wave was gaining momentum, as evidenced by President Hu's remark to a South Korean journalist in 2005 that he enjoyed watching the popular historical drama, *Jewel in the Palace* (*Dae Jang Geum)*. However, just as hit Korean TV shows began to gain popularity among the public, there was also a movement to express aversions of Hallyu in the closed space of the Internet, as in Japan. According to Chen, the anti-Hallyu sentiment among Chinese netizens attributes to how they perceive the bilateral relations as "empire-tributary" from historical perspective (Chen 2016, 384). The Chinese netizens used this "empire-tributary" discourse to justify how China should be "the center of East Asian cultures" and claimed that some of the Korean drama contents have plagiarized the traditional Chinese culture. Since 2007, there has been a series of anti-Korean movements in public spaces. This was triggered by a pet store in South Korea that replaced the portrait of Mao Zedong on top of Tiananmen Square with a picture of a dog, which became an international issue involving the Chinese Foreign Ministry.

As these examples show, negative reactions to the Korean Wave have gradually appeared among the public, but the strongest rejection of the Korean Wave has come from the government. In 2016, China decided to impose sanctions on Hallyu content as a reaction towards South Korea's decision on implementing Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system (Cho, 2017). According to Wang, China's "de facto ban" on Hallyu include prohibition of "new investment from Korean entertainment companies", "new cooperation projects for Korean related dramas", and idol groups performing for more than 10,000 audience (Wang, 2023).

The Chinese government's campaign against South Korean culture extended beyond

just the entertainment industry and involved controlling the movement of people. In the aftermath of the THAAD incident, China placed restrictions on the travel of Chinese citizens to South Korea. Prior to this incident, the number of Chinese tourists visiting South Korea had reached a historic high of 6.9 million. However, the number has significantly declined since then, and the COVID-19 has further reduced the figure to fewer than 70,000 visitors in 2022. Additionally, the Chinese government's anti-Korean sentiment led to a boycott of Korean products, which resulted in reduced profits for Korean automobile manufacturers and the closure of 23 Korean-owned department stores in China (Jun 2017, 163).

Therefore, the response to the Korean Wave in China differs from that in Japan. In Japan, anti-Korean sentiment is a discriminatory and chauvinistic reaction from the bottom-up, whereas in China, it is predominantly a top-down reaction from the government that has spread to the public. This has resulted in enforced travel restrictions and boycotts of Korean products. The anti-Hallyu movements in China have caused economic damage to South Korea, which indicates the limits of soft power. However, this chapter has presented the complex reactions to the Korean Wave in both Japan and China over the past few decades, which does not adequately capture the small but positive changes that are occurring among the youth. Again, the purpose of this thesis is to explore non-monolithic soft power by focusing on the younger generation, who are not typically the primary focus in this context. While acknowledging that anti-Korean sentiment remains prevalent in both Japan and China, the next chapter will target and examine the response of Japanese and Chinese youth to the Korean Wave.

Chapter 3: The impacts of Hallyu among the youth of Japan and China

As stated in the preceding chapter, there has been a surge in anti-Korean movements in Japan and China during the 2010s. Nevertheless, the Hallyu impact has persisted and remains a dominant cultural force in both nations, particularly among the younger generation.

Specifically, the phenomenon has resulted in both bringing economic advantages for Korea via tourism and education, and shaping the images of Korea, highlighting the diverse impacts of soft power. This chapter endeavors to comprehend the intricate nature of soft power influences through an analysis of the impact of the Hallyu on the tourism patterns of Japanese youth and the study abroad experiences of Chinese youth.

3.1 Generational Dynamics: Shifting Affinity Towards Korea Among Japanese Youth

In Japan, a noticeable intergenerational disparity has emerged in relation to the level of affinity towards Korea as represented in Figure 2. As indicated by the "Public Opinion Poll on Diplomacy" conducted by the Japanese Cabinet Office, the sense of affinity towards Korea, which had been steadily increasing, experienced a sudden decline subsequent to President Lee Myung-bak' s visit to the Dokdo/Takeshima islands in 2012, accompanied by his remark suggesting that "if the emperor wanted to visit Korea, he should do so only if he sincerely apologized" (Hakoda, 2012). This decline was particularly evident among individuals in their sixties, with the percentage of those reporting affinity towards Korea dropping from over 61.7% in 2011 to 37.5% in the following year. Subsequently, this figure has remained relatively stable in the range of 30% over the past decade. Conversely, young adults in their twenties displayed a contrasting pattern. Their affinity towards Korea decreased to approximately 40% in 2015, coinciding with the emergence of the comfort women agreement issue, and once again in 2019 during the COVID-19 outbreak. However, during other periods, more than half of this demographic reported feeling familiar with Korea. In fact, the most recent data indicates that their familiarity level reached an unprecedented peak of 64.7%.

<Figure 2> Japanese people's affinity towards South Korea (2007 – 2022)



Source: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, "Public Opinion Poll on Diplomacy".

Similarly, the recent "10th Japan-Korea public poll" conducted by the Genron NPO, a Japanese think tank, indicates a positive shift in the perception of Korea, particularly among the younger generation. This change in attitude can be attributed to the influential role of 'culture' and 'media', which have played a significant part in fostering more favorable sentiments among Japanese youth towards their Korean counterparts. According to the joint-poll conducted by the Genron NPO, the top two reasons cited by Japanese respondents for their "good impression" of Korea were their interest in Korean pop culture, such as K-pop and TV dramas (44.7%), and the appeal of Korean culture, particularly food and shopping (43.4%) (Genron NPO, 2022). The influence of Korean culture on Japanese youth is also noticeable in the realm of tourism. Initially, during the first Hallyu boom in 2003, it was predominantly middle-aged and elderly women who were drawn to Korea, resulting in a significant increase in Japanese tourists visiting the country, reaching over three million in 2009. However, various factors, including contentious remarks regarding Dokdo/Takeshima, contributed to a decline in the number of Japanese visitors until 2015. Nevertheless, a resurgence of interest among

younger generations in Japan, particularly in Korean idol groups like TWICE and BTS, marked the onset of a third wave of Hallyu influence from 2016 onwards (Parc 2021, 31). Despite the strained bilateral relations, the number of Japanese tourists visiting Korea reached an all-time high of approximately 375,000 in March 2019, primarily consisting of individuals in their teens to twenties who were enticed by "Korean fashion and food culture through social media" (Takeda, 2019). Although the COVID-19 pandemic and ensuing travel restrictions led to a significant decrease in tourism from 2019 to 2020, the popularity of Korean culture continued to gain momentum among Japanese youth.

In 2020, a Netflix show *Crash Landing on You* and Korean literature such as *I decided to live as I am* becoming a best-seller in Japan, fueling the fourth Hallyu boom. During the time of travel restrictions to Korea, the Japanese MZ demographic (generations born between 1980s to 2010s) developed a new trend called a Mock-travel experience to Korea (*Tōkan-gokkō*). According to Chosun Online, this trend involved replicating the experience of traveling to Korea within the confines of one's home or hotels, by partaking in Korean cuisine, consuming Korean media, and sharing related images and videos on social media platforms (Chosun Online, 2023). The strong Hallyu influence among the Japanese youth is more pronounced after the lift of travel restrictions. Following the Korean government's announcement to issue short-term visas to Japanese people, the number of Japanese tourists surged to 85,693 tourists (15.4% of total foreign visitors) in December 2022, a 62-fold increase from the same month the previous year (Yonhap News, 2023a).

According to Nye, three pillars of soft power resources are political values, culture, and foreign policy, of which 'tourism' belongs to the culture category (Nye 2004, 25). The increasing number of Japanese youths traveling to Korea through their interests in attractive Korean popular culture, exemplifies the effective deployment and impact of soft resources as soft power. Since these visitors not only generate economic advantages for Korea via indulging in cosmetic shopping and dining, but also acquire a fresh perception of Korea from their travel

experiences. The next chapter will scrutinize how such travel experiences transform the perception of Korea and serve as a form of soft power.

3.2 The Soft Power Paradox: Examining China's Youth and their Affinity for Korean Culture

China does not officially release surveys akin to those conducted by the MOFA of Japan or reputable think tanks regarding the perception of Korea among the Chinese population. Consequently, this study relies on empirical data and surveys conducted by the United States and Korea to examine the sentiments of the Chinese people towards Korea. In China, the overall trajectory reveals a decline in favorable sentiment towards Korea from 2007 to the present, as illustrated in Figure 3. The public opinion survey conducted by the Northeast Asian History Foundation indicates that China's positive perception of Korea decreased by more than 30% between 2007 and 2010, signifying the emergence of an anti-Korean movement. Kim and Chung argue that although the two countries still maintain a relatively positive outlook on each other, there has been an escalation in hostile online behaviors between them as well (Kim and Chung, 2013, p. 293).

<Figure 3> Positive Views of South Korean and Chinese Mutual Perceptions



Source: Northeast Asian History Foundation, Northeast Asian History Foundation,
"A Report on South Korea, China, and Japan's Perceptions of History 2010", October 2010, p8.

The findings of a comprehensive "Global Attitudes Survey" conducted by the Pew Research Center reveal similar patterns. This extensive survey has been undertaken across 69 countries since 2002, encompassing participants who were asked to rate their favorability towards a range of subjects on a four-point scale, ranging from "very favorable" to "very unfavorable". Figure 4 illustrates the outcomes of this survey specifically regarding Chinese participants' favorability towards South Korea in the years 2006, 2008, and 2016. It should be acknowledged that the sample utilized in the 2006 and 2008 surveys did not adequately represent the entire Chinese population, while the 2016 survey results were based on a representative sample. However, due to the scarcity of alternative reputable sources for public opinion data during the late 2000s, this paper relies on the survey data from the Pew Research Center. According to these findings, from 2006 to 2008, China's positive sentiment towards Korea exhibited a gradual decline, decreasing from 77.8% to 65.9%. Moreover, the 2016 survey results indicated a further decrease in favorability, with a decline of over 20% over the course of the decade. Conversely, the proportion of the population expressing unfavorable sentiment experienced a moderate increase, approaching nearly 40% as indicated by the results.

<Figure 4> China's View of Korea



Source: Pew Research Center, Pew Global Attitudes & Trends Question Database, 2006, 2008, 2016.

The potential repercussions of the THAAD dispute since 2016 on China's deteriorating perception of Korea cannot be disregarded. However, the central question remains to the impact on the younger generation. A study conducted in 2021 by the Institute for Foreign Economic Policy Research shed light on the attitudes of Chinese youth aged between 15 to early 20s, revealing relatively positive sentiments towards South Korea in comparison to Japan and the United States. The research employed a 10-point scale to measure favorability towards the four nations, and the findings indicated that Chinese youth held less favorable views towards Japan (3.15) and the United States (3.55), while demonstrating more positive attitudes towards South Korea (4.53) (Bae et al., 2021). Particularly intriguing is the observation that among Chinese individuals in their twenties, favorable attitudes towards South Korea (4.55) surpassed those among teenagers (4.47). The report concludes that this result "also overlaps with the main target group that consumed Korean cultural content five years ago, when the Korean Wave was active before the Korean ban policy was enforced with the deployment of the THAAD, suggesting that Korea's soft power can influence the country's image" (Bae et al., 2021).

<Figure 5> Chinese youth's favorability by country (average score out of 10 for each of the four countries)



Source: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), "A Comparative Study of Korean and Chinese Youth Living Conditions and Values in the Post-Corona Era", China Research 21-84-02, p.127.

Therefore, the fact that Chinese youth keeping a relatively positive view towards Korea despite the continuing deterioration in bilateral relations suggests that the influence of soft power is not uniform. Moreover, the positive impact of soft resources, particularly 'culture' is evident in the field of education. Prior to the emergence of COVID-19, China constituted the largest source of foreign students in Korea, accounting for over 40% of the total international student population. Even during the period of worsening relations between the two countries in 2016-2017, the number of Chinese students in Korea increased from 60,136 to 68,184 (Lee and Yoo 2022, 180). According to Lee, there are multiple factors that attract Chinese students to study in Korea, with Hallyu being one of the primary "pull factors" that significantly influence their decision-making process (Lee S 2017, 181).

Furthermore, Kwon's (2021) survey on the perceptions of Korean culture among more than 80 Chinese students studying in Korea reveals the evident impact of popular culture. The survey results indicate that these Chinese students held a favorable view of Korean culture,

rating it at 4.5 out of 5. This rating suggests that they perceive Korean culture to be more "modern" (4.42) rather than "traditional" (4.18) (Kwon 2021, 252). The study also found that when asked about their associations with "Korea", the top three responses from the students were "idols (12)", "kimchi (8)", and "TV dramas (6)", highlighting the significant influence of popular culture on the perception of Korea among Chinese youth (Kwon 2021, 252). This positive attitude of Chinese youth towards "popular culture", including K-pop and TV dramas, is further evident in the "favorable ratings" results of Korea's "National Image Survey", particularly among individuals in their twenties. Figure 6 illustrates the "favorability ratings" of "popular culture" among youth in their twenties compared to those in the age group over fifties, spanning from 2018 to 2021. Notably, the favorability of Chinese youth towards Korean popular culture has consistently increased each year, surpassing 80% in the latest results, despite the backdrop of worsening bilateral relations since 2016.

<Figure 6> China's Favorability ratings on Korea by field ("popular culture")



Source: Korean Culture and Information Service, "Korea's National Image Survey", 2018-2021.

Thus, when considering Chinese youth, as well as Japanese youth, it becomes apparent that

"popular culture" may contribute to the formation of a positive image of Korea as a potent soft resource, thereby exerting its influence as a form of soft power. The next chapter will delve into this aspect further by conducting interviews with Chinese youth.

Chapter 4: Understanding The impacts of Hallyu among the youth of Japan and China through interviews

The preceding chapter provided evidence of the rising appeal of the Korean Wave among the youth of China and Japan, despite the existing tensions in their bilateral relations. This chapter explores this phenomenon further through interviews conducted with twelve Chinese and Japanese women in their twenties. The interviews will primarily investigate the efficacy of Hallyu as a form of soft power, with a specific emphasis on Korea's cultural diplomacy and knowledge-oriented diplomacy objectives, and their implementation.

As highlighted in the literature review, the Korean government has embraced the concept of soft power within the domain of public diplomacy. In 2010, public diplomacy was identified as one of the fundamental pillars of the Korean governmen's foreign policy strategy, alongside national diplomacy and economic diplomacy. The objective of Korean public diplomacy is defined as the promotion of diplomatic relations by sharing the nation's history, traditions, culture, arts, values, policies, and vision through direct communication with foreign nationals. By doing so, the intention is to strengthen diplomatic relations, enhance the "national image, gain the trust of the international community, and augment the country's global influence" (MOFA of Korea, n.d.). This paper specifically focuses on two aspects: cultural diplomacy and knowledge-oriented public diplomacy, which possess more tangible goals. Cultural diplomacy, according to Cull, refers to the endeavors of an actor to manage the international environment by making its cultural resources and achievements known abroad or facilitating cultural transmission in foreign countries (Cull 2008, 33). In Korea, the goals of cultural diplomacy align closely with this definition and encompass promoting cultural

attractions, enhancing the national image through cultural assets, and facilitating two-way communication via cultural exchange (MOFA of Korea, n.d.). Similarly, knowledge-oriented diplomacy centers around education and pursues the promotion of knowledge and awareness about Korea, support for Korean studies and the teaching of the Korean language abroad, and fostering educational and academic cooperation (MOFA of Korea, n.d.). Furthermore, the MOFA of Korea recognizes the cultural assets of Hallyu as a crucial tool in achieving these public diplomacy goals. In other words, while the private sector may primarily drive the Hallyu phenomenon, if it can be demonstrated that Hallyu indeed contributes to the formation of cultural attraction, positive national images abroad, and enhanced knowledge and awareness through language learning, it substantiates the effectiveness of Hallyu as a form of soft power. Therefore, to examine whether the three aims of cultural diplomacy and knowledge-oriented diplomacy are achieved and function as soft power through the influence of Hallyu, this paper employed a one-on-one, in-depth, semi-structured interview technique to examine how Korean popular culture affects the formation of perceptions and attitudes toward Korea at the individual level.

This paper used purposive sampling to select participants who would provide insights that do not readily appear on the public polls. While public polls clarify overall trends, they are inadequate to capture the recent changes in the specific media consumed by young people and how it shapes their perceptions of Korea. Additionally, it is challenging to understand how those people adapt the K-contents into their lifestyles which fosters the positive images of Korea. Finally, the usage of interview allows a comprehensive understanding of how studying experience in Korea functions as a strong sign of soft power.

4.1 Methodology

This paper uses sampling groups consisting of Japanese and Chinese females in the age range of 20-29 years who possess either prior experience studying in Korea or a particular

affinity towards K-pop. The selection of female participants in their 20s is based on the rationale presented in the introduction. According to the "National Image Survey 2021", Japan and China exhibit the lowest levels of positive impressions toward Korea among the 23 countries surveyed. However, the survey also reveals that Chinese females (80.4%) and Japanese females (61.5%) hold a more favorable perception of Korea's "modern culture" compared to the average responses (KOCIS, 2022). Additionally, "K-pop" emerged as the most captivating content for respondents in both countries, with females displaying a higher level of interest than males (KOCIS, 2022). Consequently, engaging with these specific sample groups offers valuable data for understanding the multifaceted impact of non-uniform soft power, aligning with this paper's objective. The demographic details of the twelve participants are presented in Table 1.

<Table 1> List of respondents

Name	Nationality	Age	Occupation	Studied in Korea
Mina	Japanese	28	Music Industry	No
Erika	Japanese	27	Manufacturing Industry	No
Hana	Japanese	21	Student	No
Neina	Japanese	27	Creative Industry	Yes
Momo	Japanese	29	Service Industry	Yes
Chisa	Japanese	29	Education Industry	Yes
Ling	Chinese	29	Game industry	No
Yun	Chinese	28	Student	No
Suyin	Chinese	28	Service Industry	Yes

Fang	Chinese	23	Student	Yes
Jiayi	Chinese	22	Student	Yes
Zhuqi	Chinese	26	Student	Yes

Through 30-to-60-minute Zoom interviews, this study aimed to explore the efficacy of Hallyu as a form of soft power by investigating participants' media consumption patterns, sentiments toward Korea, and behavioral changes. Specifically, the interviews sought to elucidate how Hallyu influences the media usage patterns of young individuals in Japan and China, thereby contributing to the cultivation of "cultural attractiveness". Furthermore, the interviews examined the extent to which Hallyu alters participants' lifestyles and fosters an inclination to visit Korea, thereby promoting the formation of a positive "national image" of Korea. Lastly, the interviews sought to assess the impact of Hallyu on individuals' motivation to learn languages and their intentions to pursue studies in Korea, ultimately enhancing their "knowledge and awareness" of Korea. The interviews were conducted in either Japanese or Chinese, and all participants were duly informed about the interview process in advance and provided their informed consent, as shown in Appendix 1.

4.2 Beyond K-pop: Hallyu's Influence on Fostering 'cultural appeal' through media diversification

Based on interviews conducted with six Japanese females and six Chinese females in their twenties, it was revealed that Korean popular culture has exerted an influence on their usage of social media platforms and consumption of news on bilateral relations. This transformation in media consumption patterns holds significance in terms of bolstering the "cultural attractiveness" of Korea. Notably, all participants reported actively following news related to bilateral relations, although Japanese respondents' sources of information varied depending on whether they lived with their parents or independently. Among Japanese

respondents living with their parents, traditional media outlets such as television and radio were favored, while those living alone in Tokyo relied on smartphones and social media platforms for accessing Korean-related information. Chinese respondents exhibited an even stronger inclination towards smartphones and social media as their preferred sources. Furthermore, in contrast to Japan's strict regulations on illegal videos, Chinese respondents tended to enjoy Korean programs with Chinese subtitles, uploaded in real time to Chinese video sites. These findings imply that Hallyu has contributed to increased viewership of Korean popular culture and news among the respondents, thereby enhancing the cultural appeal of Korea.

Mina, a 28-year-old from Osaka working in the Japanese music industry and living in Tokyo, experienced a significant shift in her cultural interests following her discovery of BTS during the height of COVID-19 restrictions in 2020. Prior to this encounter with Hallyu, Mina had displayed no prior inclination towards Korean culture. However, she gradually expanded her media consumption patterns and developed a growing interest in foreign news subsequent to her exposure to BTS. Mina explains, "To learn more about BTS, I downloaded the live streaming application called Vlive and Weverse". Weverse, a mobile application and web platform developed by the Korean entertainment company which produced BTS, encompasses a diverse range of content, including interviews with artists, and live streaming sessions featuring the artists. In 2022, Mina made the decision to visit Korea for the first time in order to attend a K-pop concert. She elaborates, "I actively pay attention to Korea-Japan relations news now. I care about it because I often go to see my idols in concerts. When relations go bad, it simply makes it harder for me to go." Evidently, Mina's regular exposure to idols and Korean cultural information through these platforms gradually fostered a strong desire to visit Korea while simultaneously cultivating a habit of closely monitoring related news updates.

Erika, a 27-year-old respondent originally from Hokkaido and currently residing in Tokyo, offers another compelling example illustrating the influence of Hallyu on her media consumption patterns. In her case, the diversification of media usage emerges as a means to

acquire a deeper understanding of Korean society and nurture a sense of "cultural attraction". Erika's interest in Korean popular culture begun during the second wave of Hallyu in the 2010s, sparked by a DVD loaned to her by a high school friend featuring Hyun Bin, a prominent Korean actor. Her fascination further intensified when she encountered BIGBANG's music during a car ride with a friend's mother. Erika describes the transformation in her media consumption: "Before I became interested in Korean idols, I had no interest in Korean news at all. But now I use app like Smart News (Japanese news media) to stay updated on Korean news." During the interview, Erika also shared insights into her Instagram feed, explaining how it provides summaries on Japan-Korea relations in the "Explore" section. The personalized nature of Instagram's algorithmic content delivery, based on users' previous interactions, underscores Erika's consistent engagement with Korean-related topics on a daily basis (Jillian, 2022). Additionally, Erika follows "Japanese -Korean (*Nikkan*) YouTubers", a popular genre featuring international couples and Koreans residing in Japan who share their experiences and highlight the differences between life in Japan and Korea, some amassing as many as 400,000 subscribers. Erika finds it intriguing to learn about nuanced pronunciation distinctions that only native speakers can discern through these YouTube videos or short clips on TikTok.

Similarly, Chinese respondents demonstrated a shift in their media usage as a result of their interest in K-Pop and Korean dramas. Notably, they employed both Korean media platforms, such as Naver (comparable to Google), and domestic Chinese platforms like Weibo (similar to Twitter) and Instagram. Due to censorship regulations, the respondents use VPNs to access foreign-owned platforms like Naver and Instagram. Suyin, a 28-year-old from northeastern China who spent four years studying in Korea and is fluent in Korean, emphasized her continued use of Naver for "real-time Korean news" beyond K-Pop-related content. She found Naver valuable as it provided news coverage that might not be available in China, leading her to rely on the platform frequently. Additionally, Yun, a 28-year-old devoted K-Pop fan since the 2010s, mentioned her regular use of both Naver and Weibo, even without any experience

of studying in Korea. She explained: “Weibo is convenient because I receive notifications about Korea-related topics that I follow, but if I’m particularly interested, I prefer reading the original text.” The influence of K-pop is evident as other Chinese respondents indicate how it serves a catalyst for their engagement with broader Korean news.

In comparison to Japanese respondents, Chinese respondents demonstrate a distinctive reliance on smartphones and social media platforms for obtaining information about Korea. Notably, television is not mentioned as a prominent source of information among the respondents. Instead, several respondents mentioned using the video sharing platform Bilibili. Bilibili, a Chinese website encompassing diverse content such as anime, gaming videos, and Korean-related programs, offers a notable feature: numerous Korean programs on the platform are equipped with Chinese subtitles contributed by fan groups, allowing viewers to access them without delays. According to Wakebe, an expert in intellectual property protection laws in the Chinese content industry, Chinese youth watch less television compared to Japanese youth primarily due to the prevalence of the Internet as the primary medium for video consumption (Wakebe, 2018). Furthermore, Wakebe emphasizes that state censorship poses restrictions on the television broadcasting of foreign content in China, further contributing to the reduced reliance on television among Chinese youth (Wakebe, 2018). In contrast, Japan’s strict copyright and broadcasting rights regulations often result in limited availability or delayed access to such content until it is officially broadcast on authorized channels. It is notable that some respondents’ exposure to Korean content since the 2010s has contributed to their broader understanding of Korean society. For example, Yun enjoys watching a Korean variety show, such as *Running Man*, of which she had watched more than five seasons. The show is extremely popular in China, as evidenced by Zhejiang Satellite TV acquiring the format rights in 2014 and has begun producing a Chinese version of the show. Yun actively engages with the latest Korean shows on Bilibili, such as *Steel Troops*, a military survival show, to gain insights into Korean society. This firsthand exposure allows her to discover previously unknown aspects: “I

did not know that there is special unit force against North Korea exists in South Korea until I watch this show. It's fun and you can also learn at the same time."

The influence of Hallyu on the media consumption habits of respondents in Japan and China is apparent. Ignited by their passions for K-pop groups, some Japanese respondents have become active in keeping up with Korean news and society. Instead of relying solely on traditional media like television, they use various social media platforms such as Twitter, Weverse, YouTube, and TikTok to gather information on Korea. As respondents naturally become more familiar with Korean content and news on a daily basis, the cultural appeal is further strengthened. This finding supports Genron NPO's assertion that different media usage patterns may contribute to the positive impressions younger generations in Japan and Korea hold of each other (Genron NPO, 2022). However, it is important to note that television remains a significant source of information for Japanese youth regarding Korea. According to the "National Image Survey 2021", the top two sources of information on Korea for Japanese in their 20s is "Broadcast (72%)", followed by "Online (70%)" (KOCIS, 2022). During the interviews, three respondents living with their parents mentioned television as their main source of information on Korea, in addition to social media platforms like Twitter. One respondent, Hana, currently attending university in Tokyo, explained that her parents prefer watching television, particularly NHK and other news outlets, to stay informed about Japan and Korea.

Chinese respondents, on the other hand, exhibit a higher inclination than their Japanese counterparts to use smartphones to access real-time trends and information on Korea, often by watching on platforms like Bilibili. Several respondents have been exposed to Korean variety channels with subtitles since their teenage years, indicating regular consumption of Korean media and the subconscious absorption of cultural knowledge that fosters attraction. Additionally, five Chinese respondents mentioned using Naver, a major Korean search media outlet, to stay updated on local news, demonstrating an active effort to deepen their

understanding of the country. Overall, the respondents in both countries actively employ a wider range of social media platforms to access Korean news and content due to the impact of Hallyu. These platforms continue to play a crucial role in enhancing cultural attraction.

4.3 From a 'foreign' country to a 'familiar' country: change in lifestyle and formation of nuanced 'national image'

To gain further insight into the influence of Hallyu on the construction of a "national image", participants were asked to provide three nouns and adjectives that come to mind when they hear the term 'Korea'. The responses revealed how contemporary culture, particularly popular culture, plays a significant role in shaping the national image of Korea among young individuals in Japan and China. Many of these associations are positive, suggesting that the impact of K-pop and the integration of Korean lifestyle elements like cuisine and fashion have fostered a sense of "familiarity" among respondents who previously had limited exposure to or impressions of Korea. Consequently, this familiarity instilled a heightened inclination to travel to Korea and reinforced their perceptions of the nation's image. However, it is worth noting that some respondents also held negative impressions of Korea, perceiving a disparity between their preconceived notions and their actual experiences after visiting the country. This tendency was more prevalent among Chinese respondents. Therefore, these nuanced responses suggest a multi-layered influence of Hallyu as soft power, where the formation of "national image" does not necessarily yield a uniformly positive perception.

First, all Japanese respondents answered "K-pop" as the first word that comes to mind when thinking of Korea. The second most common answer was "Korean cuisine", with five of the six respondents saying a word associated with a specific Korean food such as *samgyeopsal*, or Korean food in general. The third most associated word was "beauty", cited by half of the respondents.

<Figure 7> Top 10 Most Interested Korean Cultural Contents among Japanese



Source: Korean Culture and Information Service, "Korea's National Image Survey", 2021.

The findings align closely with the outcomes from the "National Image Survey 2021" concerning the Top 10 Korean cultural contents of respondent's interest (KOCIS, 2022). In the same survey, "K-pop" was the most interested content among those Japanese in their twenties with 44%, followed by "Food and drink" (16%) (KOCIS, 2022). Given the selective sampling approach, which targeted mostly individuals with pre-existing interests in K-pop, it is unsurprising that this group associates the image of Korea with K-pop. What is noteworthy, however, is that Hallyu has inspired them to incorporate Korean lifestyle daily, including consuming Korean food, cosmetics, and fashion. Furthermore, the fact that the daily adoption of this Korean lifestyle increases the desire to travel and study in Korea, and that these local experiences ultimately lead to a favorable impression of Korea, is important in understanding the multifaceted impact of soft power.

Several interviewees' answers imply that Hallyu had an impact on their preference for Korean food. Specifically, Neina, a 27-year-old who studied in Seoul as part of a university exchange program, attributed her increased interest in Korean cuisine due to her fondness for K-pop. Neina became aware of Korean culture when K-pop artists such Girls' Generation

began entering in the Japanese market during the second Hallyu boom. Although she was not initially interested in K-pop, a friend lent her a DVD of a Girls' Generation concert, and after watching it, she found "Koreans to be surprisingly cute". From there, she quickly fell in love with the group and began to try the Korean cuisine. Prior to discovering K-pop, she was "unable to eat spicy food, but now I always stock kimchi in my fridge." Similarly, Erika also cited her admiration for Korean idols as a catalyst for her shift in dietary habits. She used to avoid Kimchi due to its spiciness: "Even when my mom was eating Kimchi in front of me back when I was in high school, I could not eat them. But after seeing on variety channels how idols enjoy it so much, I decided to give it a try." She is now fond of Korean cuisine in general and often goes to Shin-Okubo, the biggest Korean town in Tokyo, to indulge in the experience of Korean cuisine with her friends.

It is crucial to highlight that the consumption of Korean cuisine by the interviewees alone does not prove the efficacy of Hallyu as a form of soft power. Nonetheless, the key finding is that being acquainted with Korean popular culture does have a significant impact on the inclination towards Korean cuisines, and subsequently on the intention to engage in tourism activities, which further contributes to shaping the perception of Korea. Several of the Japanese respondents used positive words such as "energetic", "warm", and "lively" to describe their image of Korea. When asked about the reasons for these impressions, several episodes related to food during sightseeing and study abroad were introduced. Erika had decided that her first stop would be Seoul after the travel ban due to COVID-19 was lifted. She explained her reasoning, "I already went to Shin-Okubo many times while I couldn't actually go to Korea, but I wanted to taste Korean food in the real place." Erika recounts the positive image acquired through visiting a food market in Seoul: "It's hard to see such a lively and energetic scene in Japan, I liked how everyone was so cheerful." Hana, a current college student who has not yet traveled to Korea, indicates that Korean cuisine is one of the main attractions. For Hana, Korean food is more "familiar" to her than other foreign cuisines: "To celebrate the end of the club

activities in high school, we went out to eat *samgyeopsal*. I want to go to Korea for my graduation trip and try many restaurants". Again, it is difficult to prove the influence of soft power if Japanese participants merely likes to eat Korean cuisines. Nevertheless, what sets apart these participants who have been influenced by Korean popular culture is their adoption of Korean food as a regular part of their daily lives, thereby facilitating the transition of what was once considered foreign cuisine into something more "familiar". Moreover, the interest in Korean food has prompted some of their intentions to engage in tourism, and the local experiences have contributed towards creating a positive image of Korea.

Similarly, the Chinese respondents acknowledged the influence of Hallyu on the increased adoption of Korean lifestyle, which led to the development of positive associations with "admiration" and a connection to "modern culture". Ling, a dedicated 29-year-old K-pop fan who has traveled to Korea more than 20 times, also associated "trendy" with her images of Korea. Initially, Ling had reservations about Korean idols due to negative portrayals by Chinese media, which often criticized K-pop fans as "idiotic fans (nǎo cán fěn)". In recent years, there has been an increase in scrutiny faced by fans of K-pop idols and idols in general, prompting Chinese authorities to ban certain idol-related reality shows, such as the Chinese adaptation of Korea's *Produce 101*. Since 2021, China's broadcast regulator, the National Radio and Television Administration has been ordering local stations not to promote "sissy (*niáng pào)*" image of men, as part of the country's attempt to reshape its entertainment industry and young audiences (Ni, 2021). Nevertheless, Ling's perception of Korea underwent a significant transformation during her college years while studying abroad in Japan, when a friend invited her to an EXO concert. Ling remarked, "I was blown away. I thought, 'Wow, Korea must be a really cool place if they can create such an impressive stage". After visiting Korea, Yun confirmed that "popular culture thrived even on the streets of Seoul". As these responses indicate, some Chinese respondents displayed a higher tendency to construct a "refined" images of Korea based on depictions of Korean dramas and K-pop. Moreover, this positive

perception was reinforced by tangible validation through firsthand experiences of tourism or studying in Korea.

However, in some instances, the strong sentiments of "admiration" reversely resulted in the formation of a negative image of Korea, potentially due to disparities between the respondents' expectations and the reality they met upon visiting the country. For example, Suyin, who studied in a four-year university in Seoul described her images of Korea as more "traditional" than "modern". She revealed that her exposure to Korean culture initially occurred through her mother's fondness for Korean dramas broadcasted on Chinese television. The series *Dae Jang Geum*, depicting the life of a Korean female court cook and doctor, while introducing delectable Korean cuisines and traditional cultures, gained popularity in both China and Japan in early 2000s. As Ling became engrossed in the "beautiful images" of Korean dramas and K-pop, she developed an impression of Korea as being highly "modern". However, she was surprised to discover strict seniority structure during her study experience. Ling commented:

> "When Korean girls go out, they dress up and live good lives, like in America. But in school, even people from the same grade make you do more work just because they were born a little earlier. It seemed the hierarchical relationship was clear especially among Koreans, giving me the impression that Korea values traditions more."

Furthermore, Ling described her images of Korea as "creative" and "contentious", illustrating the complex image she has of the country. "Korea is very creative because they set the whole new trend through K-pop. But I believe that their countries, from the past to even to the present, they have expressed to foreign countries that they want to protect their domestic culture by clearly delineating what belongs to them and not to foreigners." Similarly, Yun explained that she highly appreciates the creative aspects of Korea. However, when describing the image of

Korea, Yun cited the phrase “narrow-minded (xiǎo qì)”. Yun thinks of countries and cultures separately and explained why her image of Korea itself is not positive: “Korea tends to often bring up historical issues. I remember there was a time when a claim emerged from Korea stating that Confucius was of Korean nationality.” According to Guex, these rumors began to circulate on the Chinese cyberspace since early 2010s following a territorial dispute over the Mountain Baekdu (Guex, 2019). China’s development plans for the area surrounding the Mountain Baekdu, considered the birthplace of the Korean people, and their attempt to register it as a World Heritage site sparked outrage among Koreans. The situation further deteriorated when Korean athletes claimed the mountain as their own territory, resulting in increased Chinese hostility and accusations of cultural theft. Rumors alleging Koreans’ appropriation of Chinese medicine and claiming Chinese inventions added to the tensions (Guex, 2019). Although these claims are mere rumors, it is noteworthy that some Chinese respondents, like Yun, suggested that such rumors have a negative impact on Korea’s image. It was notable some Chinese respondents displayed a tendency to appreciate Korean culture while being critical of the nation, which indicates the image of Korea is not exclusively composed of positive sentiments. The influence of Hallyu appears to have partially succeeded in creating “creative” and “advanced” perceptions of Korea among the respondents. However, for it to function as soft power, the establishment of a positive “national image” must precede the gaining of understanding of Korea’s policies by other countries. Therefore, regardless of one’s enthusiasm as a fan who appreciates the cultural aspects of Hallyu, the existence of individuals who evaluate it harshly and separate it from the country itself highlights the limitations of Hallyu as a soft power tool.

4.4 The Long-lasting Impact: Hallyu as a Catalyst for Language Learning and Study Abroad

Finally, to examine respondents’ knowledge and awareness of Korea, the interviews

explored the impact of Hallyu on their intentions to learn Korean and study abroad. All respondents, regardless of nationality, admitted that exposure to K-pop and drama motivated them to learn the Korean language. As explained in the introduction, public diplomacy is one of the three pillars of Korea's foreign policy, and its purpose "is to attract foreign audiences by means of art, knowledge transmission, media, language and foreign aid" (MOFA of Korea, n.d.). Among these, the promotion of the Korean language is an important strategy. Hisada and Ogata highlight the development of the "Korean language overseas promotion policy" in the 1980s, following the Seoul Olympics, which led to the international community embracing the language as a representation of Korean culture (Hisada and Ogata 20, 72). Furthermore, according to Hill, the potential of language learning as soft power lies in its ability to change attitudes toward a particular community (Hill 2016, 365). Therefore, both Japanese and Chinese respondents exhibited a strong motivation to learn Korean, and their experiences in Korea provided them with a deeper understanding of the society, indicating another enduring impact of Hallyu as a form of soft power.

First, two of the Japanese respondents attended a language institute (*eohakdang*) affiliated with universities in Korea. Momo started working after graduating from high school, saved up enough money to attend a language institute in Seoul from 2021 to 2022. Momo recalls her first exposure to the Korean language was when her mother hosted Korean families at her house in Kyushu region. More than a decade after her first exposure to the Korean language, she became captivated by the Korean idol group called Mamamoo, and decided to study abroad to improve her Korean ability. Momo shared her anxious feeling before departure: "There are always negative news (about Korea) in Japan, like there was a protest or boycott movement against Japan, or Japanese tourists had a bad experience... I saw so much of that kind of news. I knew that not all people are like that, but I wondered what would happen if I went there." Despite feeling anxious before leaving for Korea due to the influence of the Japanese media, she eventually found the language institution and her life in Korea to be

welcoming and supportive. She described images of Korea has changed into “cold” to “warm” due to her interaction with local people. Momo now hopes to use a working holiday next year to work in Korea and improve her Korean language skills. This shows how the initial interest in Korean language sparked by K-pop inspired her to experience Korea at deeper level, and eventually altered her image of Korea into positive one permanently. Chisa, who currently works at an educational institution in Japan, decided to study at the language institution in the suburb of Seoul in 2016. Similar to Momo, Chisa also had some concerns before going to Korea despite the eagerness to learn Korean.

> “I genuinely believed if Korean people found out I was Japanese, they would throw stones at me. So I tried to hide it, but they eventually found out that I am not Korean. Their reactions surprised me: ‘We have the same face, so we can’t even tell unless we talk!’ They were just smiling and being nice, and I realized how prejudice I was against Korea.”

Through her one-year time at the language institution, Chisa not only obtained the second highest level of Korean language exam, but also gained deeper understanding and positive feelings towards Korea. She continued studying Korean even after returning to Japan, regularly using a Korean search portal and listening to MBC radio. These new routines seem to foster her deeper understanding about Korean society: “Whenever I see something on Naver like, “Today is *Gwangbokjeol* (National Liberation Day of Korea), I always try to click and look it up.” Furthermore, Chisa shared that even on the Japanese version of Twitter, she follows the accounts of Korean newspapers and watches news videos in Korean. It is also noteworthy that she often visits Korea to enjoy activities that further enhances the deeper understanding of the society, from watching musicals, meeting her old Korean friends, to buying Korean books. Their experiences show that although their interest in Korean language learning initially grew due to Hallyu, their images of Korea changed dramatically when they learned the language and

stayed in Korea for a long period of time. It is significant to note that their change in behavior is not temporary, such as continuing to learn Korean after returning home and using Korean media daily, which are important factors in shaping their images of Korea and thereby suggesting the long-lasting impact of Hallyu as soft power.

Among some Chinese respondents who decided to pursue higher education in Korea, it was clear that their interests in popular culture was the main factor that triggered their decision. This confirms the results of the study mentioned in the earlier chapter that Hallyu serves as a "pull factor" for Chinese students when deciding where to study abroad (Lee 2017, 181). Additionally, their studying abroad experiences foster a heightened comprehension of Korean society, thereby suggesting a form of soft power. Jiayi, a 22-year-old senior student at a Korean university majoring in practical music, has been a fan of BTS since her junior high school days and is an avid lover of Korean dramas. Before enrolling in the music college, she spent a year in the language school of Kookmin University. Jiayi remarked her fondness of Korea increased after coming to the country: "When I was in China, I heard Korean people are xenophobic, but I don't feel that way. I also admire how Korea excels in setting new trends, not only in K-pop but also in fashion. The hip-hop culture here is very diverse too". It is clear Jiayi's enduring attraction towards Korea persists, as she prepares to apply for an internship upon her college graduation, with the aim of further enriching her knowledge of the Korean music industry.

Additionally, Zhuqi, a 26-years-old who specialized in Korean language during her undergraduate years in Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, often referred to as "the other Korea" in northeastern China, shared that her interest in the Korean language was sparked by Korean dramas. She said, "When I was in high school in Hunan, dramas like *Love Under The Sun* and *My Love from the Star* were popular, and my classmates would discuss them every week. I was captivated by the beautiful visuals and the elegance of the language, which inspired me to study Korean in college." The region where she studied Korean, Yanbian Korean

Autonomous Prefecture, is home to approximately 800,000 ethnic Koreans, and the city's signage is displayed in both Hangul and Chinese characters. Spending four years there allowed Zhuqi to deepen her understanding not only of the cultural aspects but also of history and literature. She explained, "As a Korean language major, I needed to learn about Korea's historical development up to the present. The history of the Korean peninsula also has some connection to China, so I studied that as well. Studying Korean literature enabled me to delve deeper into the modern and contemporary realism of certain literary works." After obtaining her bachelor's degree in Korean language, she decided to enter a graduate school in Korea in 2022 to further specialize in the study of literature. When asked if her impression of Korea had changed since she had moved to Seoul, she noted that she found the country has a "well-organized system". Zhuqi explained: "I have the impression that many of the infrastructure systems in Korea are very well organized. And the fact that everyone has equal access to them is proof that Korean society is advanced." In this way, Zhuqi's interest in the Korean language was sparked by the drama series, which also deepened her understanding of Korean history and society. What is even more noteworthy is the fact that Jiayi has not only improved her language skills and become more deeply immersed in the local society, but also continues to have a high opinion of the country after living in Korea. This demonstrates how learning a language can change one's impression of a community in diverse ways and function as a soft power.

Chapter.5: Conclusion

The purpose of this paper was to investigate the diverse impacts of Korea's soft power, with a specific focus on the formation of sentiment toward Korea among youth of Japan and China. Although these two countries have been heavily affected by the Korean Wave from both a historical and economic perspective, they are also the countries with the most negative opinions of Korea. However, a closer look at survey results reveals that young women hold a

favorable view of Korea, contrary to the average sentiment. Therefore, this paper examined the role of Hallyu in shaping individual perceptions and sheds light on its function as a form of soft power that goes beyond traditional methodologies. Since Joseph Nye introduced the concept of soft power in 1992, it has had significant impact in academic and political realms, while also facing various criticisms. This paper addressed two academic criticisms: (1) that diminishing necessity of soft power in an era of rising hard power, and (2) the difficulty in measuring effectiveness of soft power. This paper argued that soft power remains essential, especially for middle power countries like Korea, and emphasizes the need to use cultural assets effectively. This paper also emphasized the significance of employing a combination of quantitative and qualitative tools to measure effectiveness, while also considering individual voices that are often difficult to capture through public polls.

To examine the multi-layered effects of Hallyu on the youth of Japan and China, this paper used the form of in-depth interviews. Firstly, this paper explored how Hallyu influences the media consumption habits of young women in Japan and China and contributes to the development of “cultural appeal”. Respondents in both countries were not only exposed to K-pop content through the diverse usage of social media and video sharing platforms, but also to Korean news and Korean variety shows. In particular, Chinese respondents have habitually familiarized themselves with Korean content through sites such as BiliBili since middle school, suggesting that they have unconsciously taken their understanding of Korea one step further, thereby further strengthening Korea’s “cultural appeal”. Secondly, this paper examined the impact of Hallyu on individuals’ lifestyles, their inclination to visit Korea, and its role in shaping the “national image”. Several Japanese participants expressed that their first interest in Korea was sparked by the K-pop or Korean dramas, leading them to incorporate broader Korean lifestyle elements such as cuisines and fashions. As a result, they developed a sense of “familiarity” with Korea, which heightened their desire to visit the country and solidified an overall positive image of Korea itself. While Chinese participants particularly appreciated the

"creativity" of K-content, their perceptions of the nation were more nuanced. Some Chinese respondents revealed that although they had initially held an aspirational image of Korea as tourists or students, they also saw a "narrow-minded" attitude due to the seniority culture, or the strong inclination to delineate "clear boundaries between domestic and foreign cultures". It suggests that even if individuals highly value cultural aspects and the economic benefits they bring to Korea through tourism and other forms of consumption, the overall "national image" may not necessarily improve, and thus the limitation of Hallyu functioning as a soft power. Lastly, this paper investigated how Hallyu influences their motivations to learn Korean and pursue studies in Korea, which ultimately fosters the "promotion of knowledge and awareness of Korea". For participants in both countries, it was observed that their biased images changed to positive ones mainly through actual interaction with local people in Korea, and that they continued to try to deepen their understanding of Korean society after returning to their home countries. Therefore, by focusing on the individual level, this paper validated the enduring influence of Hallyu as a form of soft power.

The transmission of culture is a complex and dynamic process, and understanding the perceptions of cultural recipients can be particularly challenging. However, interviews suggest that Hallyu has the ability to generate significant interest in a country and shape a positive image. For Korea, effectively harnessing these cultural assets is essential in shaping its national image. An example of a recent initiative aimed at fostering cultural exchange between China and Korea is the Korean film festival organized in Shanghai by the Korean Film Committee, which holds the potential to facilitate the removal of restrictions and revitalize cultural interactions between the two countries. Noteworthy developments have also occurred in the realm of Japan-Korea relations, underscoring the significance of cultural assets in this context. Specifically, South Korea announced on March 6th a potential resolution to the longstanding issue of forced labor, followed by a summit meeting held in Japan on March 16th. Furthermore, on May 7th, Prime Minister Kishida visited South Korea, marking the resumption of reciprocal

visits between the leaders of the two nations after a hiatus of 12 years. The significance of public opinion in supporting the advancement of bilateral relations is evident in this concentrated period of diplomatic activity. Mr. Kang, the Deputy Director of the Tokyo Branch of the Korea Tourism Organization, emphasized the pivotal role of "entertainment" and its influence in Japan as a means to improve the relationship between the two countries (Kodama 2023).

> "We believe that the key to building a relationship of trust between countries lies in communication between people. We believe that the key to this is for people to visit the country. Since the "Winter Sonata" boom, the number of repeat visitors to Korea has been steadily increasing. The power of entertainment has definitely provided a strong impetus for action to build good relations between Japan and Korea. (Kodama 2023)"

While entertainment and culture possess substantial potential, they should not be solely relied upon to enhance bilateral relations. However, the often underestimated influence of culture as a form of soft power, and its capacity to mobilize individuals as political actors, should not be disregarded. The noteworthy expansion of Korean culture, which has evolved from limited popularity among middle-aged and older women two decades ago to now capturing a wider audience and fostering a positive image, particularly among the younger generation, calls for careful consideration. Although the precise impact of Hallyu as a form of soft power is not fully understood, but the increasing interaction and cultural exchange among people should continue to thrive. It is imperative to consider their influence on Sino-Korean relations, Japan-Korea relations, and the broader political landscape.

Appendix 1: Interview Consent Form

This study will focus on Korea's soft power, culture, and examine how Korean contemporary culture is accepted by young people in Japan and China. This research will be presented as a master's thesis, and its main objective is to examine the effects of Korea's soft power.

If you wish, all of your talk will be published anonymously. On rare occasions, we may need to discuss sensitive topics. In such cases, you do not have to respond. All interviews will be recorded via Zoom. Data will be stored until the end of August 2023.

I agree to participate in the survey as a respondent.
Signature:

Bibliography

Anholt, Simon. 2007. *Competitive Identity : The New Brand Management for Nations, Cities and Regions*. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bae, Sang-Ryul, Shuai Zhang, Sooyoung Kim, and Jihye Moon. 2021. "포스트코로나 시대의 한중 청소년 생활 실태 및 가치관 비교연구 (a Comparative Study of Korean and Chinese Youth Living Conditions and Values in the Post-Corona Era)." 대외경제정책연구원(KIEP) 중국종합연구, (Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) China Research) 84 (02).

Blanchard, Jean-Marc F., and Fujia Lu. 2012. "Thinking Hard about Soft Power: A Review and Critique of the Literature on China and Soft Power." Asian Perspective 36 (4): 565–89. https://www.jstor.org/stable/42704806.

Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. n.d. "List of Public Opinion Polls and Diplomacy Polls - Cabinet Office." Survey.gov-Online.go.jp. https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/index-gai.html.

Chen, Lu. 2016. "The Emergence of the Anti-Hallyu Movement in China." *Media, Culture & Society* 39 (3): 374–90. https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443716646176.

Cho, Jennifer. 2017. "Turning out the Lights?: The Impact of THAAD on Hallyu Exports to China." Korea Economic Institute of America. April 12, 2017. https://keia.org/the-peninsula/turning-out-the-lights-the-impact-of-thaad-on-hallyu-exports-to-china/.

Chosun online. 2023. "Japan's Generation Z Women 'No. 1 Overseas Travel Destination' Is South Korea...Favorability of South Koreans toward Japan Is Also the Highest since the Survey Began in 2015." Www.chosunonline.com. March 11, 2023. https://www.chosunonline.com/site/data/html_dir/2023/03/10/2023031080092.html.

Cull, Nicholas J. 2008. "Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616: 31–54. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/25097993.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aa804ee459c0124ab3bc931889ddcb04c&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1.

Dirir, Kadir. 2022. "Japan and South Korea's Implication of Soft Power: Cultural Aspects, Education, and Foreign Aid Diplomacy." *Humanities and Social Sciences* 10 (4): 271–80. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.hss.20221004.20.

Enomoto, Yasuko, and Satoko Yasuno. 2020. "China's Soft Power and Its Limitations in Japan: A Comparison with Korea's Soft Power" *Bulletin of the School of Letters, Arts and Sciences, Sociology and Social Informatics of Chuo University of University* 30 (February): 125–47. https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1050571239978449920.

https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1050571239978449920.

Farhi, Paul. 2020. "'Parasite' Makes Oscars History as the First Foreign-Language Film to Win Best Picture." *Washington Post*, February 12, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/parasite-makes-oscars-history-as-the-first-foreign-language-film-to-win-best-picture/2020/02/10/93b7e5f8-49fa-11ea-9164-d3154ad8a5cd_story.html.

Gallarotti, Giulio M. 2011. "Soft Power: What It Is, Why It's Important, and the Conditions for Its Effective Use." *Journal of Political Power* 4 (1): 25–47. https://doi.org/10.1080/2158379x.2011.557886.

Genron NPO. 2022. "10th Japan-Korea Joint Public Opinion Poll Results Released." Genron NPO. September 1, 2022. https://www.genron-npo.net/world/archives/13326-2.html.

Gray, Colin, and Colin S Gray. 2012. *Hard Power and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st Century*. CreateSpace.

Guex, Samuel. 2019. "Was Confucius Korean? : Sources of Chinese-Korean Contention." Edited by Jean-François Sabouret. OpenEdition Books. Paris: CNRS Éditions. August 20, 2019. https://books.openedition.org/editionscnrs/13026.

Hakoda, Tesuya. 2012. "President Lee's Comment on the 'Emperor's Visit to Korea' and What He Really Meant... President Lee Spoke Out)." Asahi Shimbun Digital. September 9, 2012. https://www.asahi.com/special/t_right/TKY201209090069.html.

Hall, T. 2010. "An Unclear Attraction: A Critical Examination of Soft Power as an Analytical Category." The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3 (2): 189–211. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poq005.

Hasegawa, Noriko, and Hokuseigakuen University. 2006. "A Quantitative Analysis of Japanese Images of Korea: Perceptual Changes Brought about by TV Drama Viewing." *Intercultural Communication Studies XV* 1. https://www-s3-live.kent.edu/s3fs-root/s3fs-public/file/08-Noriko-Hasegawa.pdf.

Hill, David T. 2014. "Language as 'Soft Power' in Bilateral Relations: The Case of Indonesian Language in Australia." Asia Pacific Journal of Education 36 (3): 364–78. https://doi.org/10.1080/02188791.2014.940033.

Hisada, Kazutaka, and Yoshihiro Ogata. 2014. "The Republic of Korea's Policy to Spread the Korean Language as Public Diplomacy －Focusing on the Korea Education Institution and the King Sejong Institute in Japan－." The Institute for Humanities Research, Kanagawa University, Departmental Bulletin Paper 51 (51): 67–90.

https://kanagawa-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=repository_uri&item_id=6012.

Hong, Seok-Kyeong, and Dal Yong Jin. 2021. *Transnational Convergence of East Asian Pop Culture*. Routledge.

Hosokawa, Kōtarō, and Hiromi Satō. 2022. "Rapid Expansion of Hallyu Entertainment Exports Doubled in 5 Years to 1.3 Trillion Yen in 2009." Nikkei Shimbun. January 3, 2022. https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOGM300J60Q1A231C2000000/.

Iwabuchi, Koichi, and Chua Huat. 2008. *East Asian Pop Culture : Analysing the Korean Wave*. Hong Kong University Press -02-01. http://hongkong.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.5790/hongkong/9789622098923.001.0001/upso-9789622098923-chapter-2.

Jang, Gunjoo, and Won K. Paik. 2012. "Korean Wave as Tool for Korea's New Cultural Diplomacy." *Advances in Applied Sociology* 02 (03): 196–202. https://doi.org/10.4236/aasoci.2012.23026.

Jeong, Yeong-Hyo. 2022. "Seoul Reclaims Spot as Japanese Tourists' Top Destination after 11 Yrs: HIS." KED Global. November 28, 2022. https://www.kedglobal.com/travel-leisure/newsView/ked202211280009.

Jun, Hannah. 2017. "Hallyu at a Crossroads: The Clash of Korea's Soft Power Success and China's Hard Power Threat in Light of Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) System Deployment." *International Studies Review* 18 (1): 153–69. https://doi.org/10.1163/2667078x-01801008.

Khaimina, Alena, Nikita Ivanov, and Irina Gnedash. n.d. "The Korean Wave as a Tool of South Korea's Soft Power in 1990-2020." *Theories and Problems of Political Studies* 10 (2A): 2. Accessed 2021. https://doi.org/10.34670/AR.2021.60.99.005.

Kim, Hyeweon . 2010. "Middle and Advanced Aged Women's Cultural Practice and Social Participation." Archives of Yamaguchi Prefectural University 3 (March): 1–10. https://ypir.lib.yamaguchi-u.ac.jp/yp/998.

Kim, Yeikyoung, and Jongpil Chung. 2013. "Mutual Perceptions in South Korea-China Relations: The Need for Creative Arguing." Asian Perspective 37 (2): 281–304. https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2013.0011.

Kim, Youna. 2021. *Soft Power of the Korean Wave : Parasite, BTS and Drama*. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge.

Kim, Youna, and Joseph Nye. 2019. *South Korean Popular Culture and North Korea*. Routledge.

Kim, Yunhee. 2021. “The K-Wave: South Korea’s Soft Power Bliss.” Italian Institute for International Political Studies. September 5, 2021. https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/k-wave-south-koreas-soft-power-bliss-33969.

Kodama, Sumiko. 2023. “20 Years after ‘Winter Sonata,’ Korean Culture Has Permeated Japan. Cultural Exchange Has Helped Build Good Japan-Korea Relations.” ORICON NEWS. May 15, 2023. https://www.oricon.co.jp/special/63259/.

Korean Culture and Information Service. 2022. “2021년 국가이미지 (2021 National Image).” Www.kocis.go.kr. January 24, 2022. https://www.kocis.go.kr/ebook/ecatalog5.jsp?Dir=396.

Kwon, Migyoung. 2021. “The Perception of Culture and Korean Culture Learning of Chinese International Students in South Korea.” The Korean Association of General Education 15 (1): 247–58. https://doi.org/10.46392/kjge.2021.15.1.247.

Lee, Andrea , and Hak-Soo Yoo. 2022. “Trends and Challenges: Chinese Students Studying at South Korean Universities.” Asian Journal of University Education 18 (1): 179. https://doi.org/10.24191/ajue.v18i1.17185.

Lee, Hongchun. 2021. “Analyzing ‘Anti-Korean’ Hate Books in Japan1.” *Japanese Public Sentiment on South Korea*, November, 53–68. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003143536-4.

Lee, Se Woong. 2017. “Circulating East to East.” Journal of Studies in International Education 21 (2): 170–90. https://doi.org/10.1177/1028315317697540.

Li, Eric. 2018. “The Rise and Fall of Soft Power.” Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy. August 20, 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/20/the-rise-and-fall-of-soft-power/.

Mie, Ayako. 2013. “Xenophobia Finds Fertile Soil in Web Anonymity.” The Japan Times. January 8, 2013. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/01/08/reference/xenophobia-finds-fertile-soil-in-web-anonymity/.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Korea. n.d. “Introduction of the Public DiplomacyMinistry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea.” Www.mofa.go.kr. https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/wpge/m_22841/contents.do.

Mo, Jongryn. 2016. “South Korea’s Middle Power Diplomacy: A Case of Growing Compatibility between Regional and Global Roles.” International Journal 71 (4): 587–607. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26414059.

Mōri, Yoshitaka. 2008. “ 6. Winter Sonata and Cultural Practices of Active Fans in Japan:

Considering Middle-Aged Women as Cultural Agents." In East Asian Pop Culture : Analysing the Korean Wave, 127–40. Hong Kong University Press -02-01. http://hongkong.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.5790/hongkong/9789622098923.001.0001/upso-9789622098923-chapter-2.

Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai. 2023. "'Korea's Idea? Impressive.' behind the Scenes of the Japan-Korea Summit on 'Forced Labours.'" NHK Politics Magazine. March 15, 2023. https://www.nhk.or.jp/politics/articles/feature/96832.html.

Nomura Research Institute Singapor. 2022. "FY2021 Commissioned Project for Strengthening Local Structures in Countries/Regions of Export Destination (Compilation of Information on Local Issues and Measures to Be Considered When Expanding Overseas and Provision of Information to Business Operators) 2nd Trend Report." https://www.maff.go.jp/j/kokusai/kokkyo/attach/pdf/platform-78.pdf

Northeast Asian History Foundation. 2010. A Report on South Korea, China, and Japan's Perceptions of History 2010 (in Chinese). Northeast Asian History Foundation.

Nye, Joseph. 2022. "Whatever Happened to Soft Power? | by Joseph S. Nye, Jr." Project Syndicate. January 11, 2022. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/whatever-happened-to-soft-power-by-joseph-s-nye-2022-01.

Nye, Joseph S. 2008. "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616 (March): 94–109. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25097996.

Ōizumi, Mitsunari, Yukihiko Kimura, and KatōNaoki. 2015. *さらば, ヘイト本！: 嫌韓反中本ブームの裏側 (Good-bye Hate books!: Bekind the Anti-Korea and Anti-China books)*. Tokyo: Korokara.

Parc, Jimmyn. 2021. "Measuring the Impact of Hallyu on Korea's Economy: Setting off on the Wrong Foot." Korea Economic Institute of America. October 20, 2021. https://keia.org/publication/measuring-the-impact-of-hallyu-on-koreas-economy-setting-off-on-the-wrong-foot/.

Passow, Tanja, Rolf Fehlmann, and Heike Grahlow. 2005. "Country Reputation — from Measurement to Management: The Case of Liechtenstein." Corporate Reputation Review 7 (4): 309–26. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.crr.1540229.

Pew Research Center. n.d. "Pew Global Attitudes & Trends Question Database." Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project. Accessed April 17, 2023.

https://www.pewresearch.org/global/question-search/.

Saitou, Shinichi, Akie Arima, Teruhiko Hiyoshi, Jinah Lee, and Kumiko Mukaida. 2010. "The Hanryu (Korean wave) boom and Japanese perceptions of South Korea" *Bulletin of the Institute for Comparative Studies of Culture of Tokyo Woman's Christian University.* 71 (71): 1–32. https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1050282812635211136.

Sanya, Keiko. 2004. "The 'Winter Sonata Phenomenon' from the Viewpoint of Public Opinion Polls , from the Results of a Public Opinion Poll on 'Winter Sonata.'" NHK Bunken Broadcasting Culture Research Institute. 2004. https://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/summary/yoron/broadcast/004.html.

Singh, J.P., and Stuart MacDonald. 2017. "Soft Power Today Measuring the Influences and Effects." https://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/3418_bc_edinburgh_university_soft_power_report_03b.pdf.

Sneider, Daniel. 2022. "Different Wartime Memories Keep Japan and South Korea Apart." United States Institute of Peace. August 24, 2022. https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/08/different-wartime-memories-keep-japan-and-south-korea-apart.

Tanabe, Shunsuke. 2018. "A Statistical Investigation on Anti-Korean Sentiments in Japan: Comparative Analysis of 2009 and 2013 Data." *Bulletin of the Graduate School of Letters, Arts and Sciences of Waseda University* 63 (March): 67–82. https://cir.nii.ac.jp/crid/1050282677499727104.

Toma, Masaaki. 2022. "Where 'K-Food Strategy' Is Now, Not Just Ramen and Nori (South Korea) | Regional and Analytical Report - Foreign Business Information." Japan External Trade Organization. June 20, 2022. https://www.jetro.go.jp/biz/areareports/2022/ea4d7a1122623424.html.

Valeriano, Brandon, and Aleydis Nissen. 2022. "This Is South Korea's K-Pop Soft Power Moment." Thediplomat.com. February 16, 2022. https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/this-is-south-koreas-k-pop-soft-power-moment/.

Wakebe, Yusuke. 2018. "New Insights into the Chinese Content Industry That Japanese Do Not Know." Visual Industry Promotion Organization. 2018. https://www.vipo.or.jp/interview/list/detail/?i=984.

Wang, Linbin. 2023. "The Korean Wave's Rocky Road in China." Thediplomat.com. January

28, 2023. https://thediplomat.com/2023/01/the-korean-waves-rocky-road-in-china/.

Yonhap News. 2021a. “Japanese University Students Who Are Fans of Hallyu: "Pleases Don’t Just Consume Culture, but Face Its History.” Yonhap News. July 25, 2021. https://jp.yna.co.kr/view/AJP20210725000500882.

———. 2021b. “‘Squid Game’ Becomes Most-Watched Netflix Show with Record 1.65b Hours.” The Korea Herald. November 17, 2021. https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20211117000693.

———. 2023a. “The Number of Japanese Visited Korea in December Last Year Was the Highest at 85,000.” Yonhap News. January 22, 2023. https://jp.yna.co.kr/view/AJP20230120001800882.

———. 2023b. “Korean Government Announces Strategy to Double Content Exports, Strengthening Strategy in Middle Eastern, European, and U.S. Markets = Korean Government).” YONHAP NEWS AGENCY. February 23, 2023. https://jp.yna.co.kr/view/AJP20230223002200882.

Yoshino, Yoshitaka. 2016. “Why Does Fuji TV Become a Target of Internet ‘Blew Up.’” Toyo Keizai Online. September 6, 2016. https://toyokeizai.net/articles/-/134071.