



Universiteit  
Leiden  
The Netherlands

# **Impact of Economic Performance on the Secessionism of Ethnic Elites in Authoritarian Ethnofederal Systems: The Case of Sakha Republic and Chuvash Republic**

Šváb, Josef

## **Citation**

Šváb, J. (2023). *Impact of Economic Performance on the Secessionism of Ethnic Elites in Authoritarian Ethnofederal Systems: The Case of Sakha Republic and Chuvash Republic.*

Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown)

License: [License to inclusion and publication of a Bachelor or Master Thesis, 2023](#)

Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3641912>

**Note:** To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

Leiden University

Faculty of Social Sciences

Institute of Political Science



**Master Thesis**

Impact of Economic Performance on the Secessionism of Ethnic Elites in Authoritarian  
Ethnofederal Systems: The Case of Sakha Republic and Chuvash Republic

Josef Svab (s2524120)

Supervisor: Dr. Maria Spirova

Second reader: Dr. Christoph Niessen

July 21, 2023

Word Count: 9626

## **Abstract**

This research focused on analysing the behaviour of ethnic leaders in autocratic ethnofederal regimes during changing economic situations of economic growth and contraction and in changing political landscape of democratization and autocratization. More specifically, the focus was on the Russian Federation and its two ethnic republics: Republic Sakha and the Republic of Chuvashia. The cases were picked to represent a wealthy and a poor region of Russia. The analysis was conducted through qualitative content analysis of primary sourced speeches and secondary sourced interpretations of speeches given by ethnic elites such as heads of the republic, other political figures, or important business elites. The analysis was organized into two periods of democratization 1997-2000 and autocratization 2008-2011, and 4 sub-periods: 1997-1998 and 2008-2009 (economic contraction periods), and 1999-2000 and 2010-2011 (economic growth periods). The results found that Sakha as the wealthier republic is generally more secessionist during periods of economic contraction during both democratization and autocratization. Support was also found for the expectation that ethnic elites will prove more secessionist during democratization periods.

## Contents

Abstract .....	2
Contents .....	3
Acknowledgments.....	5
Introduction.....	6
Theory .....	8
Ethnofederations: What are they, and how do they survive?.....	8
Ethnofederations, democratization, and disintegration .....	9
Ethnofederations and performance of the economy.....	11
Research expectations .....	12
Methodology.....	13
Data .....	17
Russia and the ethnic republics.....	20
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia).....	23
Republic of Chuvashia .....	25
Analysis.....	29
Expectation 1: Sakha will display more secessionist themes than Chuvashia.....	30
Expectation 2: Periods of economic contraction will encourage more secessionism in Sakha than in Chuvashia.....	32
Expectation 3: Democratizing period will contain more secessionist themes than autocratizing .....	33
Expectation 4: The percentage increase in unionist themes between democratizing period and the autocratic period will be more visible in Sakha than in Chuvashia .....	34
Conclusion .....	38
Findings summary .....	38
Relevance, constraints, and recommendations.....	39
Bibliography: .....	42
Appendix A – Themes/Republic.....	45
Appendix B – Federation Council Analyzed Material .....	46
Appendix C – Newspaper .....	47
Appendix D – Federation Council Press Release .....	50
Appendix E – Personal sites .....	51



## **Acknowledgments**

I would like to express my gratitude to all who helped me in the completion of this thesis. Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Maria Spirova for constructive feedback and patience. I would also like to thank to all my friends who helped me when I needed it the most.

My sincerest gratitude goes to those who directly equipped me with knowledge and contacts to make my work possible. Firstly, my teacher Vitalii Zinchenko who taught me the necessary language skills and to whom I could vent my sorrows. Next, to Dr. Frank de Zwart thanks to whom I became interested in the topic and many other topics that will surely form my future interest.

Lastly, I would like to express my deepest thanks to Dmitrii who familiarized me with the struggle of the Sakha people and provided me with connections that truly made it all possible. I hope your dreams will come true.

## Introduction

The fall of the Soviet Union created a surge of interest in political systems based on ethnic lines. A term that emerged for these systems was ethnic federations or ethnofederalism. Studies on ethnofederalism were largely published in the 1990s and early 2000s. Unsurprisingly, the focus stayed on the Soviet Union and its successors and aimed to evaluate the feasibility of ethnofederalism as an approach to diversity and its compatibility with democracy. It was largely concluded that such a system is an unsuitable solution (Roeder 1991, 196; Roeder 2009, 213; Hale 2004, 165). However, the studies were often reliant on the perception of the world that was democratizing and for which autocracies were the relic of the past. It is the goal here to revisit these debates and consider ethnofederalism in the current viewpoint; a world where democratic backsliding is on the rise and numerous countries, including the Russian Federation (RF), revert to autocracy.

This research will be conducted by applying the ethnofederal theories and shall evaluate whether they remain relevant for autocratic regimes. The main claims focused on the role of economy and democratization, and their impact on ethnic elites (actors) of the autonomous ethnic regions (republics). Therefore, the research question to be answered is:

*What is the impact of economic contraction and growth on the rhetorical behaviour of ethnic elites in wealthy and poor republics during periods of democratization and autocratization?*

To answer the question, 226 themes were coded, analysing primary sourced speeches and secondary interpretations from news outlets made by actors in periods of economic growth (1999-2000, 2010-2011) and periods of economic contraction (1997-1998, 2008-2009) while

simultaneously considering them in the periods of democratization (1997-2000) and autocratization (2008-2011). This approach was adopted on actors from two republics: Republic Sakha and the Republic of Chuvashia.

The results support that actors in wealthier republics display a higher degree of secessionism than poorer ones during economic contraction. It was also found that the democratization period in Russia was associated with a higher degree of secessionism in both republics than in the period of autocratization. On the contrary, no difference was found in the ratio by which secessionism decreased between the two republics transitioning from democratization to autocratization period. Lastly, Sakha (wealthy republic) maintained a comparable degree of secessionism during economic growth as Chuvashia (poor republic).

## Theory

Ethnofederalism is a contested concept, including varying definitions. While it is agreed the system was adopted at many places worldwide (Ethiopia, Nigeria, Czechoslovakia, USSR, Russia, Belgium) at different times and in political contexts, scholars seem to disagree on how they function. Some of the most important arguments are outlined below.

### *Ethnofederations: What are they, and how do they survive?*

Firstly, there are competing definitions of ethnofederalism as such. While there is an agreement the term signifies a federal system constructed following ethnic lines, there is disagreement on whether it should signify that every ethnicity is represented through its ‘homeland’ republic or whether more than one is enough. Anderson argues the original understanding focused primarily on Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR which provided a ‘homeland’ for all ethnicities of the federal state (Anderson 2014, 171). Alternatively, focusing on the USSR, Hale used a definition that defined an ethnofederal system as “a federal state in which at least one constituent territorial governance unit is intentionally associated with a specific ethnic category” (Hale 2004, 167). Lastly, Roeder employed definitions that included all ethnic groups (Roeder 1991, 197). While the criticism is relevant, it is problematic to draw a clear line. Within the USSR, Mordvins only possessed their republic inside the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. This is despite being similarly numerous as the Estonians in 1989 (Vishnevsky Institute of Demography, n.d.). Diversity inside the sub-units was treated differently from the federation level and generally swayed towards attempts to assimilate and sometimes denial of acknowledgment (Balzer and Vinokurova 1996, 104). This can be observed on the treatment of Crimean Tatars, who despite the establishment of the Crimean Republic, were denied the ability

to relocate to Crimea after the deportation of the population in 1950, and their indigenous status remained unacknowledged. Thus, some of the “fully ethnofederal system[s]” (Anderson 2013, 171) are not ‘full’ after all.

### ***Ethnofederations, democratization, and disintegration***

Ethnofederalism and democratization are generally associated with the risk of state breakup. There are two arguments for why this is the case. First, there is the ethnicization of politics (Ishiyama 2022, 8; Roeder 1991, 213). The second is the creation of “socializing institutions that promote the transmission of the values of ethnic particularism across generations” (Ishiyama 2022, 8). This relates to the way the education system transmits ethnic values (Wagaw 1999, 78-79).

In the ethnicization of politics, the risk is attributed to material incentives created within authoritarian regimes. Ethnic elites in authoritarianism are created to pursue *instrumental* gains (Roeder 1991, 213). The ethnic elites are dependent on the centre for their resources (Roeder 1991, 213). The elite, while pursuing its own goals, is dependent on the centre for its position. The centre’s collapse would likely mean a loss of position by the ethnic elites as well. However, elites in autocratic regimes are generally dependent on the centre (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018, 66). The difference is that ethnicity and ethnic consciousness play a role in the system. It was noted “that ethnofederalism creates socializing institutions that promote the transmission of the values of ethnic particularism across generations” (Ishiyama 2022, 8). Specifically, educational systems are constructed to promote an “exclusivist sense of solidarity within them” (Girma 2012, p. 119).

Furthermore, while Roeder stresses that ethnicity was mostly instrumental and ethnic elites were monitored to build their ethnic identity around loyalty to the Kremlin, it is stressed this also led to the creation of national movements as ethnic groups take on a new life and “both federal

institutions and indigenous cadres shape ethnic agendas” (Roeder 1991, 199-203). The local leaders can establish regional hegemony over the people and provide positions for aspiring compatriots (Roeder 2009, 210). The agenda is generally formed in opposition to the dominant ethnicity as the minorities feel increasingly threatened by it (Hale 2004, 174-175; Hale 2005, 58). This means there is pressure on the actors in charge of ethnic regions to appease ethnic demands. This means opposing the central rule. This in turn generates additional ethnic demands. Evidence from democratic ethnofederal states such as Belgium or Canada, as provided by Turton and Kymlicka, shows that their existence is possible due to the de-securitization of ethnicity, and thus neither side feels threatened by the presence of the other (Samatar 2007, 365; Ishiyama 2022, 7).

Roeder claims ethnofederalism allowed the Kremlin to control ethnic nationalism by being able to promote specific people to serve the interest of the Kremlin (Roeder 1991, 199). Kremlin was able to maintain their loyalty by allocating resources that otherwise would be inaccessible to the broader public. These resources were also the means of mobilization, such as media outlets and raw materials such as paper (Roeder 1991, 205-206). The motivation for this approach was to encourage ethnic elites to pursue the *instrumental* strategy of ethnic mobilization over *primordial*. *Primordial* focus Roeder explains as the focus on ethnic revival and ethnic mobilization, therefore, focuses on the centrality of ethnic identity, which is what the USSR officials believed to lead to demands for sovereignty (Roeder 1991, 203). Instead, *instrumental* strategy articulates ethnic identity with the primary goal of gaining resources for the respective individuals and the community as a whole (Roeder 1991, 203). The success of this strategy was highly dependent on the constant provision and expansion of material and status benefits.

### *Ethnofederations and performance of the economy*

Economy and resources are a focal point for much of ethnofederal scholarship, including understanding the behaviour of ethnic leaders (Roeder 1991, 213; Brubaker 1994, 54; Hale 2004, 174-175). The focus on economy and resource distribution likely stems from the rational choice theory, a concept that remains contested in economic theory. For this reason, it is reasonable to re-evaluate the position.

Some of the primary perceived threats to ethnic groups are the fear of losing their resources to another, more dominant group (Hale 2004, 174-175). When the USSR's economic growth slowed, the ethnic elites would be incentivized to pressure the Kremlin to provide more resources to their republic (Roeder 1991, 213). Thus, creating a twofold competition 1) between the federal government and the ethnic republic and 2) among the ethnic republics themselves as redistribution of resources meant that richer republics would subsidize poorer republics (Roeder 1991, 214-217). Suddenly the encouragement of *primordial* strategies became appealing to the ethnic elites as a means of pressuring the Kremlin to provide the resources to stop it (Roeder 1991, 214). For example, there were quotas on ethnic composition across the USSR, making migration and diversity in large cities a common occurrence. However, migration fuelled resentment among the ethnicities. All ethnicities of the USSR perceived the immigrants as leaching on their resources (Brubaker 1994, 59). The elites supported these divisions and used the argument of instability to avoid federal taxes. Roeder suggests that richer areas, such as the Baltic republics, were particularly damaged by the redistribution, and therefore their elites were the first to push for sovereignty. In comparison, the poor regions remain dependent on the redistribution of federal resources (Roeder 1991, 224-225). It is the eventual inability of the ethnic elites to control the

ethnic demands that leads to independence rather than the selfish interest of the elites themselves (Roeder 1991, 214).

### ***Research expectations***

The expectations focus on two points: Democratization and periods of economic growth and contraction. The rich republics should particularly reflect higher secessionist ideas when economic contraction forces the centre to take away additional funds from the rich republics. Secessionism should be overall higher even during GDP growth as the rich will always be losing on the redistribution. In contrast, poor regions might experience an increase in loyalty (throughout the article, loyalty is used interchangeably with unionism and secessionism for the opposite) since being independent means even fewer resources. It should be expected that during periods of looser grip on power, such as democratization, the elites will seize the opportunity and voice significantly more secessionism than during periods of autocratization. Lastly, autocrats while regaining power are likely to target rich regions first as those can easily challenge the centre power. For this reason, gaining control over these regions should be the priority.

## Methodology

The application of the theory here is reliant on qualitative content analysis. The data focused on specific individuals in positions of power.<sup>1</sup> For all analysed segments, 226 pieces of data were analysed (1998-1999 [48], 2000-2001 [41], 2008-2009 [84], and 2010-2011 [53]). This data was extracted from local and federal governmental websites, websites directly relating to key actors and media outlets. The coding frame is a deductive-based approach with prior general theoretical assumptions about ethnic mobilizations combined with the interpretation of academic texts on Sakha and Chuvashia. These were at least partially confirmed through online held interviews with native-born individuals holding nationalistic beliefs in support of their republics. The resulting framework composes of 7 themes for unionist narratives and 7 themes for secessionist narratives.

The qualitative method is useful for studying contexts where quantitative data is untrustworthy or unavailable. Censorship and surveillance in Russia create an illusion of conformity. The loosening of restrictions during democratization allowed for studying the phenomena but created the difficulty of distinguishing between the influence of democratization and ethnofederalism since elections and internal voting are unrepresentative, especially in autocracies. Understanding requires focusing on meanings, intentions, and their consequences (Kyngas, 2008, 109). Focusing on smaller databases helps to overcome data scarcity and uncover evidence that would be difficult to capture for a quantitative approach. QCA is also effective for

---

<sup>1</sup> Usually this resulted in mostly focusing on presidents in the respective periods. The most represented actors that were not presidents during the period are usually former and the first presidents of the republic as in both cases the first presidents have somewhat of a special status in the republic which is a common occurrence in the post-soviet countries. These individuals usually not only hold a special status de facto from maintaining popular support, but also de-jure by codifying their status as the first president into the constitution or other laws.

theory building and testing. Since no research proposed concrete theory, the framework used here is flexible to include related research into ethnofederalism and individual republics.

Additionally, several interviews with representatives of the nationalist movements were conducted. I utilized semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews are the most appropriate as they allow for generally guiding the interviewee to learn about specifically the actors of interest and, at the same time, allow for space to ask follow-ups in fields that were not clear. Their input was used to verify the perceived grievances and create the coding framework. As previously stated, the initial grievances and contention points were located through an analysis of prior works (Balzer and Vinokurova 1996, 104; Cruikshank, and Argounova 2000, 101-102). Nevertheless, this research was often based on studying the 90s and early 2000s, and it was required to verify these themes continued to resonate through society in all analysed periods. The interviews confirmed the continuity of the resentment towards Russians, especially regarding culture. There is a significant fear that Russian influence will lead to the destruction of the indigenous language. On the contrary, the pro-Russian ethnic members emphasize the role Russia plays in protecting their cultures against other influences. For Sakha, there is the fear of Chinese influence, whereas in Chuvashia some fear the influence of Tatarstan. The argument presented by the unionist side is the Russian state provides better protection for indigenous culture than the alternative as independence or union with another state, such as Tatarstan would mean complete destruction. Similarly, in Sakha there is a perception of economical exploitation. The diamonds mined in Sakha are to benefit the Russians more than the Sakha. Importantly, it is also the employment positions which are disproportionately more allocated to Russians. As previously, there is a fear among pro-Russian Sakha, independence would mean exploitation from the side of China instead.

The coding framework was designed through the implied assumptions about the nature of ethnofederal economic mobilization theories. First, the evidence in Roeder suggests that budget cuts to the republican budget and investment are justified by the need to take care of its people first. Therefore, the first theme focuses on *Budget increase X Budget cuts*. This code is used when an actor refers to the (in)ability to provide service (start a construction, increase welfare, etc.) paid through the republican budget while referring to what the federal government did to allow for it. For example, the actor praised the FG for increasing the budget to build a hospital. The *Investment by Federal government X Lack of investment by the federal government* was possible to include in the Budget cut/increase themes, but it is beneficial to separate these for future reference in deeper focus into the separate categories. Therefore, the coding is similar but differing in whether the actor emphasized the money injection to be an investment. To continue, the theme focusing on decentralization and centralization (*Decentralization desires X Centralization desires*) is based on the assumption that the ethnic elites need to generate positions for aspiring elites. Therefore, if an actor (president) wants to create space for a new position, they express a desire for funding to combat ethnic tensions to the FG and appeal to the nationalists by the same means (Roeder 1991, 225-226). This includes criticisms of inefficient distribution of federal funds or highlighting successes of the regional government in providing for the needs of the citizens for *Decentralization desires* and requests to the FG to subsidize welfare or salaries for *Centralization desires* code. Next, *Criminal behaviour by Russians X Inspiration for Russia*; is based on the former criminal behaviour. Especially in Sakha, there is hostility towards Russians for alleged sexual violence and kidnappings (Balzer 1996, 109). *Criminal behavior* requires mention of the ethnicity of the perpetrator by the ethnic actor. The opposite *Inspiration for Russia* requires recognitions given by Russians (President of Russia) given to and highlighted by an actor. The themes *Culture*

*destruction X Culture protection* relate to indigenous culture and language. In Sakha and Chuvashia, the maintenance of language was one of the primary interests of the first presidents (Orttung, Lussier, and Paretskaya 2000, 104,472). The interviewees also cited fears of their language disappearing and the worrying levels of people who cannot speak their native language. This was largely supported by the research focusing on national movements (Balzer and Vinokurova 1996, 104). Once again, the actor had to refer to destruction or protection, such as the federal government supporting/limiting the teaching of indigenous languages at schools. Lastly, there are two pairs *Resource exploitation X Resource protection/Ecology* and *Population exploitation X Civilizing impact of Russia*. *Resource exploitation* and *Resource protection* relate to extractive industry activities. For this theme, actors invoked language relating to exhausting resources (diamonds for Sakha) or protecting resources from foreign influences such as China. *Population exploitation X Civilizing impact* is related as it is connected to indigenous people being exposed to harsh jobs (*exploitation*), whereas *civilizing effects* were cases where indigenous people received new opportunities (education, lucrative jobs) from the centre.

Table 1 - Themes Code Book

Themes	
Secessionist	Unionist
Resource exploitation	Resource protection/Ecology
Budget cuts	Budget increase
Lack of investment by the Federal Government	Investment by Federal Government
Criminal behavior by Russians	Inspiration for Russia
Population exploitation	Civilizing impact of Russia
Culture destruction	Culture protection
Decentralization desires	Centralization desires

Themes could occur multiple times in one piece of data, provided that the themes would be related to a different section of the text from the data entry. This was done to reflect the predominance of some themes in longer speeches found in the primary data published by the actors themselves. In contrast, the themes in news articles were usually inconspicuous, as the articles were shorter than the declarations made by the actor himself. Commonly, speeches contain both unionist and secessionist themes; in such cases both were coded.

### *Data*

Qualitative content analysis allows the analysis of speeches and official declarations made by ethnic officials (actors). While the focus is on specific actors, it is assumed that their behaviour and actions are directly related to the actions the republic as such will take. The paper adopts Roeder's position that actors' incentivization of primordial nationalism leads to eventual secession (Roeder 1991, 214). Therefore, while there is a focus on actors when all actors are added together in the analysis, it is assumed the position of the aggregated actors is reflective of the republic as such.

Data for qualitative content analysis were accessed at the official website of the Russian government and governmental websites and from newspaper archives. Firstly, there is the archive of the Federation Council (Совет Федерации, FC), which is the upper chamber of the Russian parliament and that consists of two representatives for each of the 89 (including the occupied Ukrainian territories - the so-called Republic of Crimea, City of Sevastopol, Donetsk People's Republic, Kherson Region, Lugansk People's Republic, Zaporozhye Region). The archive of the FC contains transcripts of all meetings since its establishment in 1993 as well as a section with press releases. Thus, the keyword search focused largely on individual representatives of

Chuvashia and Sakha. As a result, certain individuals are more represented than others such as the first president of Sakha Mikhail Nikolaev due to his position as a deputy Chairman of the FC and Nikolay Fedorov as an active member of the Committee on International Affairs.

The transcripts became the most important primary documents. While the presidents of republics were for all analysed periods the representatives of their republics, it was often the case that the presidents themselves were not the most vocal. Either they simply did not participate (Fedorov) or were in the position of the chairman, which hampered the possibility of participating on divisive issues (such as the case of Nikolaev). Nevertheless, the other representatives usually the heads of the legislative branch of republics, were often reasonably active and are well represented in the data (Schurchanov, Matveev, Kurakov)

Lastly, much of the data originates from news outlets and personal sites for one of the actors (Vyacheslav Shtyrov). Several outlets were employed and are represented in the database. First of all, there is data extracted from Kommersant (Коммерсантъ – [kommersant.ru](http://kommersant.ru)). This outlet contains data up to 1989 and is largely believed to even today be relatively free (Eurotopics n.d.). Kommersant turned out to be the most represented news outlet. Other represented outlets include: Argumenty i Fakty (Аргументы и Факты – [aif.ru](http://aif.ru)), regnum (регнум – [regnum.ru](http://regnum.ru)), Sovetskaya Chuvashia (Советская Чувашия – [sovch.chuvashia.com](http://sovch.chuvashia.com)), Na-svyazi.ru (НА-СВЯЗИ.ru), and Cheb.ru (ЧЕБ.RU – [cheb.ru/cheb.ws](http://cheb.ru/cheb.ws)).<sup>2</sup> The news outlets (together with FC press releases) largely served as a means of matching the difference between data sets as primary actors displayed different activity through analyzed channels. For example, some actors were very active in the FC, whereas others largely abstained, especially in later analyzed periods, for example, actors from Chuvashia. However, some articles are considered primary for both cases and periods that are

---

<sup>2</sup> For the exact distribution refer to appendix C.

considered primary (from the studied actors themselves or press releases from the regional government). News articles were thus used to make up the difference and gain more materials for the analysis.

## **Russia and the ethnic republics**

Russia displays a considerable variation across its regions. The RF is more homogenous than the USSR. First, there are 196 recognized ethnicities and 22 ethnic republics. There are cases of ethnic republics where the titular ethnicity is in the minority, such as Bashkortostan (31.5%) or Mordovia (37%.1), and cases where the titular nationality is almost homogenous such as Chechnya (96.4%) or Ingushetia (96.4%) (Rosstat 2020, 98-99). Similarly, some republics are majority Muslim and thus different from the ethnic Russian Orthodox Christianity such as Tatarstan. Also, Russia greatly varies in GDP. Yakutia is among the highest in GDP per capita across all regions of the RF. On the other hand, Chuvashia's GDP per capita is close to five times lower than that of Yakutia (Knoema, n.d). Both cases are similar in the representation of the titular nationality, which at all analysed periods composed the dominant group in their republics.

Since the end of the Soviet Union, as the newly born RF plunged into an economic and political crisis, the ethnic leaders and governors of the regions quickly seized the initiative and gained significant autonomy on the FG (Remington 2016, 73). What followed was adoption of constitutions with sovereignty clauses among the ethnic republics. The ethnic republics were in the best position to claim their sovereignty as they quickly started to ethnicize the politics of the republics and bring about ethnic consciousness, which some have claimed to be aided by the governors themselves through appeals to ethnic demands. Therefore, republics were gradually beginning to threaten the territorial integrity of Russia. The scales started to shift the other way once the federal government consolidated. This was achieved mostly by two means. First of all, President Yeltsin in 1993 managed to adopt the new constitution giving the president powers that were eventually used by Vladimir Putin after becoming president in 1999. Secondly, the reason

Putin was motivated to strip the regions of autonomy can be explained by the rise of fear of separatist movements, which strengthened especially after the Chechen war.

The birth of an independent RF was plagued by numerous issues. The governmental institutions were suddenly receiving powers that were before only on paper. It was unclear which body would inherit the governmental responsibilities as there were the Soviet institutions and the republican, which was “hardly more than an empty shell” (Bezrukov 1993, 82-83). At the same time, these institutions were being designed to reflect liberal democratic systems with which few had any experience (Sakwa 2019, 8). Simultaneously, it was necessary to proceed with the market reforms to transition from the Soviet centrally planned economy according to Yeltsin’s wish. This approach faced backlash in the regions where the governors often refused to follow or otherwise circumvented the federal directions.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, the combination of the spirit of the time in which the ideas of separatism spread and the weak institution that struggled to distribute responsibilities led to the governors claiming significant freedom, which they were encouraged to seize to limit the far-reaching austerity measures adopted by the federal government (Hanson 2019, 133)

Autonomy was quickly enhanced with the ethnic nationalistic characteristic. This can be seen on the sovereignty declarations that many republics adopted between 1990 and 1992 (Gorenburg 2003, 201). The republics of Russia were inspired by the declarations of sovereignty by the former countries of the USSR (Graney 2009, 17). The RF quickly started to negotiate the retraction or rewording of the declarations in exchange for benefits, including increasing the republics’ budget through redirection of tax money from local businesses and oil sales as in the

---

<sup>3</sup> The governors and heads of production often refused to limit production and risk loss of jobs. For this reason, they usually decided to buy the extra produce from companies from the regional budget. This to a certain extent limited the implementation of market reforms and their possible effects.

case of Tatarstan (Graney 2009, 46) to avoid the disintegration of the USSR spreading further. Most visibly, there was the Chechen war following the declaration of the Republic of Ichkeria that de facto ruled itself as an independent country from 1996 until 2000. Another popular example is Tatarstan representing the second-largest minority group in Russia. Despite a worse position in comparison to the republics of the USSR, Tatarstan displayed significant ethnic tensions before and after the declaration of the independent RF. Similarly to USSR republics, from 1987 Tatarstan intellectual elites debated about the language, history, and ethnography (Gubadullin 1995, 32). The debates developed into open demonstrations with tens of thousands of participants, and even attempted to capture the parliament in Kazan (Gorenburg 2003, 1). Eventually, these protests dissipated in part due to bargains struck between the governor and the FG under Yeltsin and secondly due to the economic recession that Russia faced until 1999.

During the Soviet period, the constituents of at the time Russian Socialist Federative Republic (RSFR), such as the Tatar, Chechen, or Yakut, operated under tighter control in relation to ethnic identity. All republics in USSR were even encouraged to promote ethnic identity as long as it was in support of the USSR as a unitary state and the one-party rule (Roeder 1991, 203-206). Joseph Roucek named it “Federalist nationalism” which was specific by utilizing the local sources of nationalism to harness support for the USSR (Roucek 1961, 19). On the other hand, the ethnicities of RSFR were discouraged from pursuing such endeavours. Despite this, Tatarstan enjoyed a better position and maintained more privileges than some other constituents of RSFR (Graney 2009, 18). While it is clear that indigenous people of the RF are nowadays far from an equal and let alone privileged position, Russian leadership still often utilizes ethnicities to improve relations with their neighbours. For example, the president of Tatarstan is commonly chosen as the diplomatic envoy to Kazakhstan.

The two cases that are used here have several factors in common. These characteristics are common occurrences among the republics. Both republics contain a majority of the titular ethnicity. Except for Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia, the ethnic Russians are well represented and usually form at least a third of the population concentrated around the major cities. This is also the case for Sakha (32.6%) and Chuvashia (30.7%). Importantly, in 1989 Sakha was still in the minority, accounting for 33.4%, and Russians maintained a clear majority of 50.3% (Orttung, Lussier, and Paretskaya 2000, 470). The titular nationalities maintain their specific language and religion. Since the 90s, the Sakha have been working successfully on rebuilding traditional shamanism and more. For Chuvashia, it is more complicated. While there are attempts to establish their distinct religion, there seems to be a disagreement about what religion is the native religion of the Chuvash (Vovina 2000, 695-700).

### ***Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)***

Sakha is one of the richest parts of the RF. It is ranked 7<sup>th</sup> among all Russian regions, and its GDP per capita ranks higher than the average of the RF, only falling short of Moscow and St. Petersburg. Sakha mainly owes its economy to natural resources. Specifically, Sakha contains oil, gas, coal, silver, gold, tungsten, and diamonds. For diamonds, Sakha makes up 20% of the total world production and the entire production of diamonds in Russia. Despite its richness in natural resources, the inhabitants live in relatively low standards of living. This is in part due to the challenging environment where arctic temperatures last for most of the year and thus drastically increase the price of common goods such as housing and energy deliveries. This is also the reason why Sakha is sparsely populated, with most people being concentrated around industrial centres

such as Yakutsk. In total, the population of the Sakha numbers only around half a million in a territory that by itself is similar in size to India.

In Sakha, the nationalists mainly perceive grievances related to the exploitation of natural resources, racism, and lack of investment. Lack of investment and exploitation of resources are connected as they are usually addressed in comparison. The exploitation of natural resources, mainly diamonds, is criticized in line with where the revenue later continues and its non-reflection in either the republican budget or the levels of federal investments. Racism, on the other hand, is presented as disrespectful treatment of the ethnicity by ethnic Russians as such rather than as institutionalized racism. For example, Sakha would cite cases of sexual assaults by Russians on Sakha women. Many of the Sakha have an aversion toward the Russians as they believe that Russians are taking advantage of the Sakha women while the men are absent (Balzer 1996, 109).<sup>4</sup> Lastly, there is a feeling of ongoing russification. This is mostly visible on the importance of language. While the majority of Sakha speak the Sakha language, there is widespread suspicion among Sakha that their language is under attack. This is partially driven by the pushback of the FG against the ethnicization of the republics. For example, the FG outlawed mandatory teaching of the ethnic language to ethnic Russians inside the republics. Especially in the more homogenous and those where the titular ethnicity has a majority, there is a focus on the proficiency of officials in the indigenous language. This is especially important if the official belongs to the said ethnicity (Balzer, and Vinokurova 1996, 110). However, most Sakha are proficient in their language. It seems that this fear is largely paranoia rather than based on evidence.

---

<sup>4</sup> Balzer cites a case that sparked outrage where a Sakha woman was raped by a man of Ukrainian nationality. However, it seems that the origin of the person did not matter as it was largely connected to the anti-russian sentiments who compose majority of immigrants in the region.

The 1990s, when the elections were perceived as competitive across the Russian regions, saw the rise of the highly popular Mikhail Nikolayev. Nikolayev oversaw the changes including the change of the name from the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic to the Republic of Sakha. The name of the republic and the new parliament named Il Tumen (In Russian: Государственное собрание [Ил Тумэн] Республики Саха [Якутия]; In Sakha: Саха Өрөспүүбүлүкэтин Ил Түмэнэ) is interesting because it is uncommon for a non-Russian name to be adopted. Putting the name of the native people into the official name while taking out the largely Russian-used Yakut was thus clearly declared that the direction Sakha wanted to take was to focus inward and strengthen the Sakha identity among its people. Sakha was particularly fast to proceed with this move, adopting the sovereignty clause already in October of 1990 (Cruikshank, and Argounova 2000, 98). Despite the sovereignty clauses not leading to any tangible result and were all retracted following the adoption of a federal constitution that deemed these declarations illegal (Graney 2009, xx), this is evidence that the unity and ethnic consciousness were better prepared and able to organize quicker than in republics where the identity was harder to turn into political gains.

### ***Republic of Chuvashia***

Chuvashia is considered one of the poorest regions in all of Russia, with the GDP per capita being far below the federal average. However, Chuvashia, as was the spirit of the time in the region, was heavily active in the ethnic protests that were common in the neighbouring Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Khakassia (Gorenburg 2003, 201-202).

As the Russian economy is heavily based on natural resources and extractive enterprise, it is important to note that Chuvashia is the poorest among the Russian regions in these regards

(Shutlakan 2001). Chuvashia is an agricultural region with some industrial enterprises such as the Promtractor JSC. In this sense, while Sakha and regions such as Tatarstan would regularly clash with the FG over mining revenues, in Chuvashia this could never be the point of contention.

Yet, possibly partially caused by the lack of natural resources in comparison to the rest of the regions, the Chuvash ethnic identity seems to be well established. One of the popular Chuvash phrases is “People are our main wealth” (“Люди — главное наше богатство”) (Shutlakan 2001). While praise of cultural heritage is common among ethno-nationalistic movements, it is possible that Chuvash, in this regard unique position, might be mixed into their identity. Similarly to Sakha, almost all Chuvash people speak their native language. The protection of the language was in the 90s and early 2000s one of the most important focus points of the regional government and was heavily emphasized by the first president Nikolay Fedorov. The focus of the Chuvash intelligentsia can be separated into two periods: The pre-Soviet and Soviet periods. The Pre-Soviet Chuvash intelligentsia and, specifically historians focused on delineating a separation between Chuvash and Russian history.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, as it was common for Soviet ethnic elites, the main objective of the closely followed and centrally picked intelligentsia was to emphasize the co-habitation of the Chuvash and Russian ethnic groups and the belonging of the Chuvash to the Russian Socialist Republic and thus USSR. Currently, the intelligentsia is largely split between embracing unionist pro-Russian ideology and secessionist anti-Russian line of identity building (Kyrchanov 2017, 134). From the 80s to the early 2000s, the two streams largely focused on the revision of Soviet-era historiography. The Pro-Russian continued to emphasize the Soviet anti-Tatar view that

---

<sup>5</sup> It should also be mentioned that while the Chuvash national movement formed in its opposition to imperial Russia and early Soviet Union, it was also profiling itself as anti-Tatar. Tatars and Russians were perceived to jointly oppress the Chuvash as a part of their conflict tracing back to the struggle between Muscovy and the Kazan khanate (Kyrchanov 2017, 138).

considered the Russians to liberate the Chuvash from the oppression of the Kazan Khanate. In contrast, the anti-Russian line dismissed the ‘liberation’ as a violent Russian takeover (Kyrchanov 2017, 139-141).

Therefore, clearly identity development is continuing. The development should be understood as motivated by the need to distinguish and delineate where the Russians end and the Chuvash start. This can be seen in the debates among the Chuvash on what religion should be considered traditional. Parts of the Chuvash community, especially from the intelligentsia, are attempting to revive the traditional Chuvash pagan religion *Sardash*. While there are internal disagreements about institutions and practices in *Sardash* religion, there are voices that consider the idea of a pagan religion as completely outrageous (Vovina 2000, 695-700). Scholars are unable to agree whether the official political discourse since the establishment of independent Russia is in line with pro-Kremlin voices or covertly encouraging nationalist voices. The special focus is aimed at the first president of Chuvashia Nikolay Fedorov (Николай Васильевич Фёдоров – president 1994-2010). For example, Orttung perceived Fedorov’s early presidency as anti-Russian highlighting Fedorov’s disagreements with Yeltsin and Putin in the early 2000s (Orttung, Lussier, and Parentskaya 2000, 104). On the contrary, Kyrchanov classifies Fedorov as continuing the Soviet tradition of national historiography that continues to portray Russians as the saviours from Tatar oppression (Kyrchanov 2017, 145).

Nevertheless, Chuvashia as a region and the political elite received trust from the federal government. Fedorov received several influential appointments since the 90s. Fedorov served as the minister of justice during Yeltsin’s era from 1990 to 1993, after which becoming the first president of Chuvashia and served until 2010. Controversially, Fedorov was granted a third term,

unlike some presidents, including the first president of Sakha Nikolaev. The approval from the constitutional court to become a president for a third term came as a surprise to many as Fedorov publicly criticized Putin's early presidency and even openly called his tendencies dictatorial (Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation 2000, 37-39). In contrast, Fedorov's successor in the presidency, Mikhail Ignatiev (Михаил Васильевич Игнатьев - president 2010-12, head of state 2012-2020) was dismissed from the position as the head of Chuvashia and Putin's United Russia party for a mixture of criticism of the Kremlin and personal affairs. Fedorov, on the other hand, was appointed as a senator for Chuvashia in the Federation Council in 2010, subsequently named minister of agriculture from 2012-2015, and once again named a senator from 2015 to 2020 in the position of the First Deputy Chairman.

## Analysis

The theory sections outlined four expectations of how wealthy and poor regions and the actors should behave. Therefore, similarly the four expectations are analysed in order:

1. *Sakha will display more secessionist themes than Chuvashia.*
2. *Periods of economic contraction will encourage more secessionism in Sakha than in Chuvashia.*
3. *The democratizing period will contain more secessionist themes than autocratizing.*
4. *The percentage increase in unionist themes between democratizing period and the autocratization period will be more visible in Sakha than in Chuvashia.*

The analysis found support for expectations 2 and 3. Across the four periods, Sakha displays a majority of secessionist themes during the first analysed period. Paired with the results of the second economic contraction period of 2008-2009, it is visible that expectation 2 found support in the analysis. Conversely, expectation 1 does not find support in the analysis as the Sakha did not register resolutely more secessionist themes than Chuvashia. Most clearly, Sakha and Chuvashia registered an increase in unionist themes in the 2008-2009 period when compared to 1997-1998. Surprisingly this increase is almost even for the two republics. Lastly, expectation 3 found support reaffirming democratization as a crucial period for secessionist ideas.

Some of the interesting observations unrelated to specific expectations include the presence and absence of specific themes. The dominant theme for Chuvashia and Sakha was the unionist *Centralization desires* and its secessionist counterpart *Decentralization desires*. Much of the analysed data focused on pension payments from federal/republican budgets. Surprisingly, the governors rarely criticized or praised the FG for *Budget cuts* (secessionist) or *budget increase*

(unionist), even when addressing the good or bad federal practice. Interestingly, the interviews showed republican budget and specifically income from natural resources in the case of Sakha was a pivotal point for the nationalists. Similarly, a theme that greatly resonates throughout society, especially in Sakha, is *population exploitation* (secessionist), as it is apparent from research and interviews. Some of these allegations against Russians are quite severe, including kidnapping and raping women. However, the theme has appeared only three times in Sakha and only once in Chuvashia across all analysed periods (Appendix A). Another theme represented among the unionist themes was *Culture protection* and *Civilizing impact of Russia*. If we pair this theme with *population exploitation* and other themes aimed mainly at the society and culture, the actors emphasized the positive impact of RF on Sakha and Chuvash ethnic groups and their cultures and possibly downplayed the negative impacts that are at least perceived by the more nationalistically parts of their communities.

***Expectation 1: Sakha will display more secessionist themes than Chuvashia.***

As it is clear from tables 1 and 2, Sakha indeed showcases more secessionist tendencies than Chuvashia for the periods of economic contraction in both democratization and autocratization periods (1997-1998 and 2008-2009). For the remaining two periods (1999-2000 and 2010-2011), the results are more varied. Interestingly, not only Chuvashia contained more secessionist themes in 1999-2000 and 2010-2011 than Sakha, but it also showcased more secessionist themes than in the period before. However, the ratio of secessionist and unionist themes per period is almost equal, and no side displayed overall more secession than the other. Therefore, the first expectation does not hold as Sakha did not display more secessionism across all analysed periods as was expected.

Table 2 - Chuvashia

<b>Chuvashia</b>					
	Democratization Period		Autocratization Period		
	1997-1998	1999-2000	2008-2009	2010-2011	Totals
<b>Secessionist</b>	11	12	9	9	41
<b>Unionist</b>	16	9	24	21	70
<b>Totals</b>	27	21	33	30	111

Table 3 - Sakha

<b>Sakha</b>					
	Democratization Period		Autocratization Period		
	1997-1998	1999-2000	2008-2009	2010-2011	Totals
<b>Secessionist</b>	13	7	19	5	44
<b>Unionist</b>	8	13	32	18	71
<b>Totals</b>	21	20	51	23	115

There might be several reasons for such outcome. In theory, poor regions are more dependent on funding from the federal government and, by extension, the redistribution of resources, while the richer regions should lean the opposite way due to bearing most of the costs. According to the expectations, it was believed that Sakha would be more secessionist in all periods as it always possesses more leverage. However, tables 1 and 2 clearly show that Sakha leaders were more satisfied with their situation during both periods of economic growth.

The overall expectation does not confirm. Nevertheless, the original Roeder's assumption does prove to be correct, that is richer regions will display more secessionism during the period of economic contraction. However, this by itself does not address why Chuvashia would be more secessionist during economic growth. The high degree of secessionist themes in Chuvashia during 1999-2000 and 2010-2011 shows that periods of growth have a similar effect as periods of economic growth have for rich regions. In other words, poor regions might in general, threaten territorial integrity if they are not gaining additional unallocated resources. However, it is possible to be merely a result of individual actors such as Fedorov.

***Expectation 2: Periods of economic contraction will encourage more secessionism in Sakha than in Chuvashia.***

Indeed, this expectation found support in the analysis supporting Roeder's observation of the USSR (Roeder 1991, 214). In both periods of economic contraction, Sakha registered more secessionist themes than Chuvashia. In both cases, Sakha contained around 10% more secessionist themes than Chuvashia. Therefore, periods of economic contraction could indeed prove critical for ethnofederal regimes, democratic or autocratic. If economic contraction was one of the causes of the USSR breakup, Russia could face the same problem in the future. It is possible that autocracies

like democracies could face the danger of breakup if the economic contraction is severe enough. In this light, it is still unknown what levels of secessionist ideas bring about the breakup and whether at all economic conditions alone can trigger it. To study this, the case of Russia is not ideal and would require other cases where this was the case.

During both periods in Sakha, the actors mostly emphasized the good practice of the republic (Appendix A). However, the competences of the regions were decreased since 1998. Economic contraction arguably incentivizes showcasing governmental work to maintain support. However, it fails to explain why the actors emphasize republican work as much or more than the work of the FG. Actors could emphasize the work of the FG while highlighting their impact. The choice to prioritize own work is significant as it downplays the benefits of being part of the federation. In 2008 much of the spending came from FG rather than the republic. This means the actors likely actively downplayed the role of the FG.

***Expectation 3: Democratizing period will contain more secessionist themes than autocratizing***


The support is visible in tables 1 and 2 and figures 1 to 4. In both, secessionist themes were more represented in the democratizing period. In Chuvashia, this was around 15% more, and in Sakha 12%. Democracies or democratizing regimes provide more space for scrutiny of all actors, including the central government. First, the freedom allows to voice secessionism by itself. More importantly, democracy is associated with the capture of the political debate between two perils of centralization of decentralization. In this sense, Russia is following the pattern of the USSR.

Previously, researchers identified democratization as a danger to territorial integrity. Nevertheless, there were concerns that the cases utilized to create the assumption were predestined to failure. Specifically for Russia, Hale claimed that there are fundamental differences in the ethnic


composition ratio and the lack of a core region for the dominant ethnic group. There is insufficient evidence to claim Russia would have disintegrated if democratization continued. However, autocratization can be perceived as a response to the threat of disintegration. Interestingly, the increase in loyalty manifestation from 1997-1998 and 2008-2009 period is more visible for Sakha than for Chuvashia. Therefore, while economic resources might play some role loyalty of ethnic leaders, democratization seems to be much more impactful in these regards. In other words, democratization is more likely to bring about the collapse of autocratic ethnofederal states rather than a severe economic contraction period.

***Expectation 4: The percentage increase in unionist themes between democratizing period and the autocratic period will be more visible in Sakha than in Chuvashia***


The overall change percentage change in unionist themes was 19% for Chuvashia and 17% for Sakha (See Figures 1 through 4). Therefore, this expectation did not find support. The change is greater for Chuvashia by 2%. However, there is little reason to believe that this number could have any relevance. The idea behind this expectation was to evaluate whether the center focuses on solidifying its position over the more strategic territories first rather than the regions that provide them with fewer resources. Rich republics, while enjoying the privileged position and greater space to manoeuvre to leverage their position, were also expected to be the first target of the autocrats in times of strength to guarantee themselves a stronger grip on power by securing economic and other resources to award their inner circles. However, what we see here is that Chuvashia strongly manifested unionism with 24 out of 33 (72.86%) themes in the period of economic contraction, opposing the expectation.




*Figure 1 - Sakha democratization*



*Figure 2 - Sakha Autocratization*



*Figure 3 - Chuvashia democratization*



*Figure 4 - Chuvashia autocratization*

There might be several reasons for this result. It could be that the consolidation of power over Sakha happened earlier than during the analysed period. For example, there was a controversy in Russia over banning President Nikolaev from pursuing a third term (Shutlakan 2001). Some in Sakha believe the reason to be that Nikolaev was prohibited from running precisely because of the

authority he possessed in Sakha and the difficulty of controlling him. On the contrary, the president of Chuvashia was heavily critical of Putin in the early years and yet was allowed to run for a third term.<sup>6</sup> So firstly, Chuvashia represented a high degree of secessionist themes due to Fedorov as an individual. Therefore, this could be an overall anomaly, and another figure would be more loyal. Alternatively, it is possible that secessionist talk is more tolerated in regions that are considered weak. However, this question is not possible to answer here, and a more comprehensive analysis of more ethnic republics is required for that.

---

<sup>6</sup> From the data it seems that Fedorov became much less active at least in the FC. Fedorov did not have a single speech in the FC in 2010-2011 while relatively actively during the 2000-2001 period.

## Conclusion

The phenomenon of democratic backsliding and autocratization brought the need to revisit the old approaches to diversity. One of these solutions includes ethnofederal regimes. The goal was to consider an autocratic ethnofederal regime and analyse it while utilizing theoretical concepts developed during the democratization period of the 1990s and early 2000s. The aim was to analyse some of the main points addressed in previous research. This is the role of democratization and the influence of the state of the economy on ethnic elites inside the sub-national units. While these forces were often highlighted as reasons behind centrifugal forces, they were rarely analysed in relation to the ethnic elites they were supposed to influence. Therefore, the objective was to answer the following: *What is the impact of economic contraction and growth on the rhetorical behaviour of ethnic elites in wealthy and poor republics during periods of democratization and autocratization?*

### ***Findings summary***

The analysis focused on Republic Sakha and the Republic of Chuvashia, both subjects of the Russian Federation. A review of prior research led to the development of four expectations: (1) *Sakha will display more secessionist themes than Chuvashia.* (2) *Periods of economic contraction will encourage more secessionism in Sakha than in Chuvashia.* (3) *Democratizing period will contain more secessionist themes than autocratizing.* (4) *The percentage increase in unionist themes between democratizing period and the autocratic period will be more visible in Sakha than in Chuvashia.*

Expectations were evaluated using the QCA of speeches of ethnic elites from each republic. The emphasis was on speeches from primary sources. However, as the volume was insufficient,

especially for the earlier periods, the difference would be topped with the use of news articles citing (often less known) actors. In the end, 226 codes were applied using a framework composed of 7 secessionist and 7 unionist themes (See Table 1).

The results showed support for expectations 2 and 3. As is visible from tables 2 and 3, during the period of democratization both republics displayed more secessionism than during the period of autocratization. This thus contributes reaffirms that democratization truly does encourage secessionism. However, this does not necessarily mean that actual secession will occur, as there are other tools to address it. Expectation 3 showed that wealthier Sakha did manifest more secessionist themes than Chuvashia during both periods of economic contraction. This thus finds a positive correlation between secessionism and periods of economic contraction.

However, no support was found for the remaining themes 1 and 4. For the first expectation, there cannot be a specific explanation as to why Sakha should not always be in a better position to express secessionist attitudes than a region whose elites, without a doubt benefit from redistributing resources from the centre. Expectation 4 failed as well. It was expected that autocrats would be interested in guaranteeing loyalty primarily from actors who could credibly challenge the integrity of the state or otherwise directly challenge the autocratic leader. However, the increase of unionism between democratization and autocratization for both Sakha and Chuvashia was almost interchangeable.

### ***Relevance, constraints, and recommendations***

Unsurprisingly, there is much left unaddressed that could provide different results. First, the case selection itself. While the economy, ethnic composition, population, and other aspects perfectly fit the choice of Sakha and Chuvashia, the distance from the centre could be a factor.

Also, the concentration of population is much higher in Chuvashia, which could impact how nationalist but also unionist movements organize. This could be addressed by broader research focusing on more or, ideally all ethnic republics at once.

On a similar matter, as was alluded to in the analysis, the individual actors both from the centre and in the republics matter. Their charisma and ambitions will surely impact the development of national consciousness. Yeltsin had a very different approach from Putin towards the republics. Fedorov seemed to be trusted dearly by Putin despite being critical of Putin's actions. Furthermore, the influence that foreign actors have over the republics is barely covered here. China is portrayed as a potential danger but is viewed as an ally by some in Sakha. Chuvashia can be associated with Turkic nations of central Asia, but Tatarstan also plays a role. Lastly, Russia is not the only autocratic ethnofederal state, and it would be a mistake to assume that the dynamics will be the same across all. Russia today is still heavily impacted by its Soviet past. Specifically, the disintegration period likely fuelled the secessionist movements to some degree.

However, the analysis supports prior remarks on the influence of economy and democratization in ethnofederal regimes. While economic resources were generally understood to allow regions to manifest autonomy and desires for independence, there was little empirical evidence to support the claim. The analysis showed that rich regions do voice more concerns during economic contraction rather than during economic expansion. Similarly, democratization proved to be a good environment for secessionist ideas. Therefore, economic contraction and democratization might be a dangerous mixture, as it was thought.

Of course, there is much left uncovered with this research, possibly bringing new research questions and points of interest. Greater attention should be paid to different actors and cases not

limited to Russia, Sakha, and Chuvashia. Nevertheless, this paper can be viewed as a starting point from which new theories and further studies can be conducted on ethnofederal regimes and elites in autocracies as such. Considering the ethnic tensions in many parts of the world, including in Russia, connected to the ethnic backlash toward its invasion of Ukraine, the question of ethnofederal systems, how they operate, and how to arrange them could become an important question in years to come.

## Bibliography:

- Anderson, Liam. 2014. "Ethnofederalism the Worst Form of Institutional Arrangement...?" *International Security* 39, no. 1 (Summer): 165-204.
- Balzer, Marjorie M. and Uliana A. Vinokurova. 1996. "Nationalism, Interethnic Relations and Federalism: The Case of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia)." *Europe-Asia Studies* 48, no. 1: 101-120.
- Bezrukov, Mikhail E. 1993. "The Creation of a Russian Foreign Policy." In *The Limited Partnership: Building a Russian-US Security Community* edited by James E. Goodby and Benoit Morel, 81-93. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cruikshank, Julie, and Tatiana Argounova. 2000. "Memory and Indigenous Identity in Sakha Republics (Yakutia)." *Arctic Anthropology* 37, no. 1: 96-110.
- Eurotopics. N.d. "Kommersant – Daily Newspaper." Accessed June 17, 2023. [.https://www.eurotopics.net/en/164376/kommersant#](https://www.eurotopics.net/en/164376/kommersant#).
- Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. 2000. "ctenogramma sestdesyat tretevo zasediniya Soveta Federacii" (Transcript – 63<sup>rd</sup> Meeting of the Federation Council)." *Federation Council*. Accessed July 18, 2023. <http://council.gov.ru/media/files/KcIRKcHunawSPZKohOwpvRWIAEtUC9sh.pdf>.
- Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2018. *How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalizaion, and Collapse*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Girma, Mohammed. 2012. "Cultural Politics and Education in Ethiopia: A Search for a Viable Indigenous Legend." *Journal of Politics and Law* 5, no. 1 (March): 117-125.

- Gorenburg, Dmitry P. 2003. *Minority Ethnic Mobilization in the Russian Federation*.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gubadullin, Rustam M. 1995. *Tatarskoye National'noye Dvizheniye v Reshenii Problemy Gosudastvennogo Vozrozhdeniya Tatarstana (The Tatar National Movement in the Resolution of the Rebirth of the State of Tatarstan)*. Candidate dissertation in the Department of History, Kazan State University, Kazan, Russia.
- Hale, Henry E. 2004. "Divided We Stand: Institutional Sources of Ethnofederal State Survival and Collapse." *World Politics* 56 (January): 165-193.
- Hale, Henry E. 2005. "The Makeup and Breakup of Ethnofederal States: Why Russia Survives Where the USSR Fell." *Perspectives on Politics* 3, no. 1 (March): 55-70.
- Hanson, Philip. 2019. "Managing the Economy." In *Developments in Russian Politics 9* edited by Richard Sakwa, Henry E. Hale, and Stephen White, 133-150. London: Red Globe Press.
- Ishiyama, John. 2022. "Does Ethnic Federalism Lead to Greater Ethnic Identity? The Case of Ethiopia." *The Journal of Federalism* 53, no. 1 (Winter): 1-24.
- Knoema. n.d. "Sakha, Republic of (Yakutia): Compare Chuvashia, Moscow Region, GRP."  
Accessed March 19, 2023. [https://knoema.com/atlas/Russian-Federation/Sakha-Republic-of-Yakutia?compareTo=RU\\_CU,RU\\_MOS](https://knoema.com/atlas/Russian-Federation/Sakha-Republic-of-Yakutia?compareTo=RU_CU,RU_MOS).
- Kyngas, Elo S. 2008. "The Qualitative Content Analysis Process." *Journal of Advanced Nursing* 62, no. 1 (March): 107-115.

- Kyrchanoff, Maksym. 2017. "Imagining Chuvash Historical Time: Historical Continuities and Intellectual Failures." *Tractus Aevorum* 4, no. 2 (Fall): 134-155.  
[http://dspace.bsu.edu.ru/bitstream/123456789/38952/1/Kyrchanoff\\_Imagining.pdf](http://dspace.bsu.edu.ru/bitstream/123456789/38952/1/Kyrchanoff_Imagining.pdf).
- Roeder, Phillip G. 1991. "Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization." *World Politics* 43 (January): 196-232.
- Roeder, Phillip G. 2009. "Ethnofederalism and the Mismanagement of Conflicting Nationalisms." *Regional & Federal Studies* 19, no. 2 (May): 203-219.
- Rosstat. 2020. *Russian Statistical Yearbook 2020*. Moscow: Rosstat.
- Roucek, Joseph S. 1961. "The Soviet Treatment of Minorities." *Phylon (1960-)* 22, no. 1:15-23.  
<https://doi.org/10.2307/273752>.
- Sakwa, Richard. 2019. "Politics in Russia." In *Developments in Russian Politics 9* edited by Richard Sakwa, Henry E. Hale, and Stephen White, 1-17. London: Red Globe Press.
- Shutlakan, Arina. 2001. "Республика Чувашия" [Chuvash Republic]. *Коммерсантъ [Kommersant]*, December 12, 2001. <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/301246>.
- Orttung, Robert W., Danielle N. Lussier, and Anna Paretskaya. 2000. *The Republics and Regions of the Russian Federation: A Guide to Politics, Policies, and Leaders*, edited by Robert W. Orttung. New York: M.E. Sharpe.
- Vishnevsky Institute of Demography. n.d. "All-Union Population Census of 1989." Accessed March 19, 2023. [http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng\\_nac\\_89.php](http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_89.php).
- Vovina, Olessia P. 2000. "Building the Road to the Temple: Religion and National Revival in the Chuvash Republic." *Nationalities Papers: Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 28, no. 4 (December):695-706. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905990020009683>.

**Appendix A – Themes/Republic**

<b>Sakha Unionist Themes</b>					
	Democratization Period		Autocratization Period		Totals
	1997-1998	1999-2000	2008-2009	2010-2011	
Resource protection/Ecology	1	2	1	2	6
Budget increase	0	0	0	0	0
Investment by FG	2	0	11	1	14
Inspiration for Russia	1	1	1	1	4
Civilizing impact of Russia	1	5	14	0	20
Culture protection	0	2	2	6	10
Centralization desires	3	3	3	8	17
<b>Total</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>71</b>
<b>Sakha Secessionist Themes</b>					
	Democratization Pe- riod		Autocratization Period		Totals
	1997- 1998	1999- 2000	2008- 2009	2010- 2011	
Resource exploitation	3	1	2	0	6
Budget cuts	2	0	2	1	5
Lack of investment by FG	0	1	3	1	5
Criminal Russian behaviour	0	0	0	1	1
Population exploitation	2	0	1	0	3
Culture destruction	0	1	3	1	5
Decentralization desires	6	4	8	1	19
<b>Total</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>44</b>
<b>Chuvashia Unionist Themes</b>					
	Democratization Period		Autocratization Period		Totals
	1997-1998	1999-2000	2008-2009	2010-2011	
Resource protection/Ecology	2	0	0	0	2
Budget increase	0	0	1	0	1
Investment by FG	1	2	5	4	12
Inspiration for the Russia	2	0	5	3	10
Civilizing impact of Russia	1	0	3	7	11
Culture protection	0	3	6	0	9
Centralization desires	10	4	5	7	26
<b>Total</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>71</b>
<b>Chuvashia Secessionist Themes</b>					

	Democratization Period		Autocratization Period		Totals
	1997-1998	1999-2000	2008-2009	2010-2011	
Resource exploitation	1	0	0	1	2
Budget cuts	1	1	0	0	2
Lack of investment by FG	0	0	0	1	1
Criminal Russian behaviour	1	1	1	0	3
Population exploitation	1	0	0	0	1
Culture destruction	0	0	1	2	3
Decentralization desires	7	10	7	5	29
<b>Total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>41</b>

### Appendix B – Federation Council Analyzed Material

Speaker	Date	Meeting Number
Valentin S. Schurchanov	22-23.01.1997	16
Valentin S. Schurchanov	16-17.04.1997	19
Valentin S. Schurchanov	14-15.05.1997	20
Valentin S. Schurchanov	10-11.06.1997	21
Valentin S. Schurchanov	15.10.1997	24
Valentin S. Schurchanov	03.12.1997	26
Valentin S. Schurchanov	10.06.1998	34
Valentin S. Schurchanov	17.07.1998	36
Lev P. Kurakov, Nikolay V. Fedorov	22-23.12.1999	54
Nikolay V. Fedorov	07.06.2000	60
Nikolay V. Fedorov	28.06.2000	61
Nikolay V. Fedorov	26.07.2000	62
Alexander S. Matveev	14.07.2010	275

Vyacheslav A. Shtyrov	27.10.2010	280
Vyacheslav A. Shtyrov	24.11.2010	282
Alexander S. Matveev, Vyacheslav A. Shtyrov	24.12.2010	285
Alexander S. Matveev	16.02.2011	289
Alexander S. Matveev	30.03.2011	293
Alexander S. Matveev	08.06.2011	297
Vyacheslav A. Shtyrov	22.06.2011	298
Alexander S. Matveev	06.07.2011	299
Alexander S. Matveev, Vyacheslav Shtyrov	13.07.2011	300
Alexander S. Matveev	12.10.2011	303
Vyacheslav A. Shtyrov	29.11.2011	307

### Appendix C – Newspaper

Outlet	Date	Link
Argumenty i Fakty	01.08.2000	<a href="https://archive.aif.ru/archive/1725174">https://archive.aif.ru/archive/1725174</a>
Cheb.ru	24.01.1998	<a href="https://cheb.ru/news/?shownews=218357">https://cheb.ru/news/?shownews=218357</a>
Cheb.ru	19.02.1998	<a href="https://cheb.ru/news/?shownews=218364">https://cheb.ru/news/?shownews=218364</a>
Cheb.ru	03.12.1999	<a href="https://cheb.ru/news/?shownews=217535">https://cheb.ru/news/?shownews=217535</a>
Cheb.ru	29.09.1999	<a href="https://cheb.ru/news/?shownews=217529">https://cheb.ru/news/?shownews=217529</a>
Cheb.ws	15.09.1999	<a href="https://cheb.ws/news.htm?shownews=281959">https://cheb.ws/news.htm?shownews=281959</a>
Kommer-sant	24.01.2009	<a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1108327">https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1108327</a>
Kommer-sant	15.02.2008	<a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/853177">https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/853177</a>

Kommer-sant	06.06.2009	<a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1184569">https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1184569</a>
Kommer-sant	26.09.2009	<a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1244713">https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1244713</a>
Kommer-sant	13.03.2009	<a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1137286">https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1137286</a>
Kommer-sant	24.3.2008	<a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/870481">https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/870481</a>
Kommer-sant	15.05.1997	<a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/177642">https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/177642</a>
Kommer-sant	15.05.1997	<a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/177600">https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/177600</a>
Kommer-sant	06.11.2000	<a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/290148">https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/290148</a>
Kommer-sant	11.12.2000	<a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/301246">https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/301246</a>
Kommer-sant	14.11.2000	<a href="https://shorturl.at/ptvxy">https://shorturl.at/ptvxy</a>
Kommer-sant	06.06.1998	<a href="https://shorturl.at/ayMQ2">https://shorturl.at/ayMQ2</a>
Kommer-sant	23.12.1997	<a href="https://shorturl.at/tyBO7">https://shorturl.at/tyBO7</a>
Kommer-sant	06.06.1998	<a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/199788">https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/199788</a>
Kommer-sant	18.02.1997	<a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/13298">https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/13298</a>
Kommer-sant	25.04.1997	<a href="https://shorturl.at/eA178">https://shorturl.at/eA178</a>
Kommer-sant	17.09.1998	<a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/205275">https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/205275</a>
Kommer-sant	21.01.1998	<a href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/190673">https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/190673</a>
Kommer-sant	08.08.2000	<a href="https://shorturl.at/gjqOT">https://shorturl.at/gjqOT</a>
Kommer-sant	24.10.2000	<a href="https://shorturl.at/eqtP2">https://shorturl.at/eqtP2</a>
Kommer-sant	28.01.2000	<a href="https://shorturl.at/jFGO3">https://shorturl.at/jFGO3</a>
Kommer-sant	19.10.2000	<a href="https://shorturl.at/fOSZ6">https://shorturl.at/fOSZ6</a>
Kommer-sant	23.08.2000	<a href="https://shorturl.at/ALT79">https://shorturl.at/ALT79</a>
Na-svyazi.ru	25.01.1998	<a href="https://na-svyazi.ru/news/?shownews=103748">https://na-svyazi.ru/news/?shownews=103748</a>

Na-svyazi.ru	09-14.02.1998	<a href="https://na-svyazi.ru/public/19980209.htm">https://na-svyazi.ru/public/19980209.htm</a>
Regnum	21.6.2011	<a href="https://regnum.ru/news/1417285">https://regnum.ru/news/1417285</a>
Sovetskaya Chuvashia	19.01.2008	<a href="http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=136">http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=136</a>
Sovetskaya Chuvashia	19.01.2008	<a href="http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=138">http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=138</a>
Sovetskaya Chuvashia	22.01.2008	<a href="http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=156">http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=156</a>
Sovetskaya Chuvashia	22.1.2008	<a href="http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=162">http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=162</a>
Sovetskaya Chuvashia	23.01.2008	<a href="http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=203">http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=203</a>
Sovetskaya Chuvashia	24.2008	<a href="http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=230">http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=230</a>
Sovetskaya Chuvashia	25.01.2008	<a href="http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=322">http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=322</a>
Sovetskaya Chuvashia	01.02.2008	<a href="http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=607">http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=607</a>
Sovetskaya Chuvashia	31.01.2008	<a href="http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=551">http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=551</a>
Sovetskaya Chuvashia	31.01.2008	<a href="http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=595">http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=595</a>
Sovetskaya Chuvashia	30.01.2008	<a href="http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=512">http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=512</a>
Sovetskaya Chuvashia	10.01.2008	<a href="http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=11">http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=11</a>
Sovetskaya Chuvashia	12.01.2008	<a href="http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=51">http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=51</a>
Sovetskaya Chuvashia	12.01.2008	<a href="http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=55">http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=55</a>
Sovetskaya Chuvashia	15.01.2008	<a href="http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=73">http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=73</a>
Sovetskaya Chuvashia	15.01.2008	<a href="http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=76">http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=76</a>
Sovetskaya Chuvashia	16.01.2008	<a href="http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=332">http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=332</a>
Sovetskaya Chuvashia	16.01.2008	<a href="http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=339">http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=339</a>
Sovetskaya Chuvashia	17.01.2008	<a href="http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=102">http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=102</a>
Sovetskaya Chuvashia	31.01.2008	<a href="http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=577">http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=577</a>

Sovetskaya Chuvashia	31.01.2008	<a href="http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=581">http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=581</a>
Sovetskaya Chuvashia	31.01.2008	<a href="http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=578">http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=578</a>
Sovetskaya Chuvashia	31.01.2008	<a href="http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=587">http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=587</a>
Sovetskaya Chuvashia	29.01.2010	<a href="http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=73870">http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=73870</a>
Sovetskaya Chuvashia	30.01.2010	<a href="http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=21397">http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=21397</a>
Sovetskaya Chuvashia	30.01.2010	<a href="http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=21403">http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=21403</a>
Sovetskaya Chuvashia	30.01.2010	<a href="http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=21421">http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=21421</a>
Sovetskaya Chuvashia	30.01.2010	<a href="http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=21441">http://sovch.chuvashia.com/?p=21441</a>

#### Appendix D – Federation Council Press Release

Speaker	Date	Link
Mikhail V. Fedorov	14.05.2009	<a href="https://shorturl.at/zABIN">https://shorturl.at/zABIN</a>
Mikhail V. Fedorov	15.04.2009	<a href="https://shorturl.at/klsL4">https://shorturl.at/klsL4</a>
Mikhail V. Fedorov	18.12.2009	<a href="https://rb.gy/j6elj">https://rb.gy/j6elj</a>
Mikhail V. Fedorov	30.11.2008	<a href="https://rb.gy/hbxou">https://rb.gy/hbxou</a>
Mikhail V. Fedorov	20.1.2009	<a href="https://rb.gy/0js3z">https://rb.gy/0js3z</a>
Mikhail V. Fedorov	12.01.2009	<a href="https://rb.gy/qy612">https://rb.gy/qy612</a>
Mikhail V. Fedorov	26.01.2009	<a href="https://shorturl.at/kpCQU">https://shorturl.at/kpCQU</a>
Mikhail V. Fedorov	26.11.2009	<a href="https://shorturl.at/buxC2">https://shorturl.at/buxC2</a>
Mikhail V. Fedorov	30.09.2009	<a href="https://tinyurl.com/5eumkxex">https://tinyurl.com/5eumkxex</a>
Mikhail V. Fedorov	25.11.2009	<a href="https://tinyurl.com/47vcdxy2">https://tinyurl.com/47vcdxy2</a>
Mikhail V. Fedorov	30.09.2009	<a href="http://council.gov.ru/events/news/20323/">http://council.gov.ru/events/news/20323/</a>
Mikhail V. Fedorov	24.11.2009	<a href="http://council.gov.ru/events/news/20051/">http://council.gov.ru/events/news/20051/</a>
Mikhail V. Fedorov	27.3.2009	<a href="https://tinyurl.com/2xppe768">https://tinyurl.com/2xppe768</a>
Mikhail V. Fedorov	29.10.2009	<a href="https://tinyurl.com/2re4kr9n">https://tinyurl.com/2re4kr9n</a>
Mikhail V. Ignatiev, Nikolay V. Fedorov	16.11.2011	<a href="http://council.gov.ru/events/news/16285/?hl=чувашия">council.gov.ru/events/news/16285/?hl=чувашия</a>
Leonid L. Lebedev	19.11.2010	<a href="http://council.gov.ru/events/news/18027/?hl=лебедев">council.gov.ru/events/news/18027/?hl=лебедев</a>
Nikolay V. Fedorov	28.10.2011	<a href="http://council.gov.ru/events/news/16373/?hl=Николаи Федоров">coun- cil.gov.ru/events/news/16373/?hl=Николаи Федоров</a>
Leonid L. Lebedev	27.12.2011	<a href="http://council.gov.ru/events/news/16108/?hl=чувашия">council.gov.ru/events/news/16108/?hl=чувашия</a>

Leonid L. Lebedev	29.7.2011	<a href="http://council.gov.ru/events/news/16794/?hl=лебедев">council.gov.ru/events/news/16794/?hl=лебедев</a>
Leonid L. Lebedev	25.11.2011	<a href="http://council.gov.ru/events/news/20046/?hl=лебедев">council.gov.ru/events/news/20046/?hl=лебедев</a>
Nikolay V. Fedorov	10.8.2011	<a href="http://council.gov.ru/events/news/16773/?hl=Николаи Федоров">council.gov.ru/events/news/16773/?hl=Николаи Федоров</a>
Leonid L. Lebedev	18.10.2010	<a href="http://council.gov.ru/events/news/27181/?hl=чувашия">council.gov.ru/events/news/27181/?hl=чувашия</a>
Leonid L. Lebedev	22.02.2011	<a href="http://council.gov.ru/events/news/27309/?hl=чувашия">council.gov.ru/events/news/27309/?hl=чувашия</a>
Leonid L. Lebedev	18.10.2010	<a href="http://council.gov.ru/events/news/18244/?hl=чуваши">council.gov.ru/events/news/18244/?hl=чуваши</a>
Alexander Goncharov	28.10.2010	<a href="http://council.gov.ru/events/news/18174/?hl=чувашия">council.gov.ru/events/news/18174/?hl=чувашия</a>

### Appendix E – Personal sites

Actor	Date	Link
Vyacheslav A. Shtyrov	23.01.2008	<a href="https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/yakutskaya-vahta/">https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/yakutskaya-vahta/</a>
Vyacheslav A. Shtyrov	01.02.2008	<a href="https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/vzaimodejstvie-obrazovaniya-nauki-i-biznesa-osnova-innovacionnoj-ekonomiki/">https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/vzaimodejstvie-obrazovaniya-nauki-i-biznesa-osnova-innovacionnoj-ekonomiki/</a>
Vyacheslav A. Shtyrov	09.01.2009	<a href="https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/yakutiya-strategiya-i-taktika-razvitiya/">https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/yakutiya-strategiya-i-taktika-razvitiya/</a>
Vyacheslav A. Shtyrov	11.04.2009	<a href="https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/vyjti-iz-krizisa-mirovym-liderom/">https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/vyjti-iz-krizisa-mirovym-liderom/</a>
Vyacheslav A. Shtyrov	12.08.2009	<a href="https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/dlya-dalnego-vostoka-nuzhny-dolgovremennye-gorizonty-planirovaniya/">https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/dlya-dalnego-vostoka-nuzhny-dolgovremennye-gorizonty-planirovaniya/</a>
Vyacheslav A. Shtyrov	21.08.2009	<a href="https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/yakutiya-klyuchevoj-region-sibiri-i-dalnego-vostoka/">https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/yakutiya-klyuchevoj-region-sibiri-i-dalnego-vostoka/</a>
Vyacheslav A. Shtyrov	20.08.2009	<a href="https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/yakutiya-yakutsk-i-staryj-gorod/">https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/yakutiya-yakutsk-i-staryj-gorod/</a>
Vyacheslav A. Shtyrov	2009	<a href="https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/lokomotiv-yakutskoj-ekonomiki/">https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/lokomotiv-yakutskoj-ekonomiki/</a>
Vyacheslav A. Shtyrov	2009	<a href="https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/transportnaya-dostupnost-ne-mechta-a-realnost/">https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/transportnaya-dostupnost-ne-mechta-a-realnost/</a>

Vyacheslav A. Shtyrov	12.02.2010	<a href="https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/zhemchuzhina-dalnego-vostoka/">https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/zhemchuzhina-dalnego-vostoka/</a>
Vyacheslav A. Shtyrov	22.06.2010	<a href="https://va-shtyrov.ru/news/publikaczii/kak-nam-stroit-almaznuyu-strategiyu-strany/">https://va-shtyrov.ru/news/publikaczii/kak-nam-stroit-almaznuyu-strategiyu-strany/</a>
Vyacheslav A. Shtyrov	1997	<a href="https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/k-voprosu-o-formirovanii-czen-na-neobrabotannye-almazny/">https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/k-voprosu-o-formirovanii-czen-na-neobrabotannye-almazny/</a>
Vyacheslav A. Shtyrov	08.04.1998	<a href="https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/nemozhet-byt-de-birs-hozyainom-severalmaza/">https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/nemozhet-byt-de-birs-hozyainom-severalmaza/</a>
Vyacheslav A. Shtyrov	15.01.1997	<a href="https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/o-sbytovoj-politike-kompanii-almazny-rossii-saha-v-rabote-na-vnutrennem-rynke-rossijskoj-federaczii/">https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/o-sbytovoj-politike-kompanii-almazny-rossii-saha-v-rabote-na-vnutrennem-rynke-rossijskoj-federaczii/</a>
Vyacheslav A. Shtyrov	10.02.1998	<a href="https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/gorizonty-kompanii-2/">https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/gorizonty-kompanii-2/</a>
Vyacheslav A. Shtyrov	24.12.1998	<a href="https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/vyacheslav-shtyrov-xxi-vek-uvlichit-sprosa-brillianty-2/">https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/vyacheslav-shtyrov-xxi-vek-uvlichit-sprosa-brillianty-2/</a>
Vyacheslav A. Shtyrov	05.04.1997	<a href="https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/v-kompanii-almazny-rossii-saha-glavnoe-trudovoj-kollektiv/">https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/v-kompanii-almazny-rossii-saha-glavnoe-trudovoj-kollektiv/</a>
Vyacheslav A. Shtyrov	04.06.1998	<a href="https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/almazny-rossii-kto-bogateet-na-nih/">https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/almazny-rossii-kto-bogateet-na-nih/</a>
Vyacheslav A. Shtyrov	04.03.2000	<a href="https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/vyacheslav-shtyrov-prezident-almazodobyvayushhej-kompanii-alrosazachem-almaznik-granit-brilliant/">https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/vyacheslav-shtyrov-prezident-almazodobyvayushhej-kompanii-alrosazachem-almaznik-granit-brilliant/</a>
Vyacheslav A. Shtyrov	18.07.2000	<a href="https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/almaz-v-nalogovom-kapkane/">https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/almaz-v-nalogovom-kapkane/</a>
Vyacheslav A. Shtyrov	1999	<a href="https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/ak-alrosa-sostoyanie-strategiya-i-osnovnye-napravleniya-razvitiya-almazodobychi-i-soputstvuyushhih-proizvodstv/">https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/ak-alrosa-sostoyanie-strategiya-i-osnovnye-napravleniya-razvitiya-almazodobychi-i-soputstvuyushhih-proizvodstv/</a>

Vyacheslav A. Shtyrov	2000	<a href="https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/u-menya-est-svoya-rodina-rossiya-i-dengi-kotorye-nam-prinadlezhat-budut-na-moej-rodine/">https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/u-menya-est-svoya-rodina-rossiya-i-dengi-kotorye-nam-prinadlezhat-budut-na-moej-rodine/</a>
Vyacheslav A. Shtyrov	2000	<a href="https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/my-rodilis-na-etoj-zemle-i-verno-sluzhim-eyo-narodu/">https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/my-rodilis-na-etoj-zemle-i-verno-sluzhim-eyo-narodu/</a>
Vyacheslav A. Shtyrov	12.01.1999	<a href="https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/alrosa-strategiya-i-perspektivy-2/">https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/alrosa-strategiya-i-perspektivy-2/</a>
Vyacheslav A. Shtyrov	15.05.1999	<a href="https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/alrosa-menyaet-kurs-2/">https://va-shtyrov.ru/actual/alrosa-menyaet-kurs-2/</a>