Which Opinions about the EU Led to Voting against Ukraine? Voting Behaviour during the 2016 Ukraine Referendum in the Netherlands Explained Based on more Explanatory Models of Euroscepticism

Berg, Brigitte van den

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Master Thesis by

Brigitte van den Berg S1206958

Supervisor: Dr. Brian Shaev

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Author: Brigitte van den Berg

Student Number: S1206958

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Preface

This thesis has taken me almost seven years to write, and it is such a relief to finally close this chapter of my life. Crazy enough, next to endless fear, in the end it did give a lot of joy to write this thesis. It had a lot of different elements in it, with the survey, the statistics, the various theories on Euroscepticism, the political aspects, the relationship with populism, Brexit, Russia and now even the war in Ukraine. I look at it as a relevant research, that has taught me a lot. I am proud and relieved that it is done.

I have experienced a lot of support while writing this thesis. At the beginning already from a dozen of friends who helped me voluntarily to carry out the surveys at the polling stations. But also in the many years after, I received support from my girlfriends, brothers, boyfriend, coach and parents. They nurtured me while working on it, helped me overcome my fears for failure and gave me the space to ventilate and brainstorm. I know that some people who supported me did not believe I would ever finish it, I myself at some point thought I would never, but here it is (Thank you Corona!).

A great thank you goes out to Dr. Shaev for his endless patience, advice through the process and the fast feedback on the first version of this thesis. This helped me a lot. I experienced his support and 'no pressure' as very helpful. His positive response on the first concept of this thesis, helped me to keep believing in it at hard times.

I have worked on this thesis at different kitchen tables in Beverwijk, in the middle of a grapevine in Italy, in snowy Canada and I am now finishing it on the couch of my own home. Just to be safe, in the cellar of this home, I will keep hold of the boxes with the stacks of filled out surveys for at least another 7 years.

Abstract

The outcome in the Netherlands of the 2016 Ukraine referendum was influenced by Eurosceptic voting. Both this thesis and The National Referendum Research show that a lack of trust in the European Union corresponds with a 'No' vote. This thesis takes the analysis of the role of Eurosceptic voting a step further by using more explanatory models of Euroscepticism, giving insight on not only the relationship with Euroscepticism as a linear factor, but also as a multi-dimensional concept and a benchmark concept. With these models, this thesis shows that perceived utility of the EU - separate from trust in the EU - is an important factor that influenced the outcome of this Ukraine referendum. Beyond this, it shows that the referendum voters' average trust in the EU's policy and regime is lower than their trust in the national policy and regime. This leads to the conclusion that the Dutch voters have sent a message to The Hague and Brussels that they must put more effort in showing the Netherlands' benefits through EU membership, for lack of confidence in the EU's utility has been a key element in not accepting this international association agreement. On a methodological level, this thesis aims to contribute to a new research method predicated on the idea of 'average towns' because its data is collected based on the comparability of the municipality of Heemskerk with the Netherlands as a whole, in both demographics and voting outcomes.

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Introduction

April 7, 2016, one day after the Ukraine referendum in the Netherlands, European newspaper headlines showed their interpretation of the Dutch 'No' vote on the question about ratification of EU's association agreement with Ukraine. The *Daily Telegraph* wrote "Victory for Eurosceptics" and "Dutch 'No' beginning of the end for the EU" (Boztas, 2016). *"Referendum in den Niederlanden: Doppelte Ohrfeige für die EU" ("Referendum in the Netherlands, double hit on the head for EU") headlined the German *Der Spiegel* (Becker, 2016). *Die Welt* stated "den Wählern geht es gar nicht um die Ukraine" ("For the voters it is totally not about Ukraine") and "Eine bittere Pille für die schwer angeschlagene Europäische Union" ("A bitter pill for devastated European Union") (Brech, 2016). In France, *Le Figaro* wrote: "Aux Pays-Bas, un vote sur l'accord UE-Ukraine mobilise les eurosceptiques" ("In the Netherlands, a vote for the EU-Ukraine agreement, mobilised Eurosceptics") (Mevel, 2016). UK's *BBC* added the perspective of the Brexit referendum - at that time still two months away - and predicted that the Brexiteers would use this outcome to argue "this result proves public concern over sovereignty and accountability is shared beyond Britain" (Forsyth, 2016). At first glance, it could be said that the international media drew a logical conclusion, because the initiators of the referendum, and the 'No' camp during the campaign, publicly declared that their goal was to make the referendum one about the EU. However, the Dutch Prime Minister, most Dutch politicians, and the leaders in Brussels did not mention the dimension of Euroscepticism after the referendum was held; they concentrated on the arguments specific for the referendum and how to take into account the outcome while also still ratifying the association agreement.

During the campaign, the question was already often raised in the public debate what this referendum was actually about, and if the voter should stick to the topic or base their vote on other factors. After the referendum, the question was, does the outcome of the referendum really reflect public opinion on the association agreement with Ukraine or did people cast their vote based on their opinion of the government, or the EU? Six months thereafter, the National Referendum Research by Jacobs et al (2016) provided an answer. This research drew a nuanced conclusion; voting against the EU was only the third mentioned voting motivation from the 'No' voter, and EU support was not at the top of the list for the 'Yes' voter. Support for the EU (and also the national government) did have a strong correlation with a 'Yes' vote, but the correlation with trust in Ukraine and distrust in Russia was stronger. The researchers concluded that it goes too far to interpret the outcome of the referendum as an act of distrust against the EU, although it had an important role.

This Master thesis states that, even though the National Referendum Research gave useful insights on voting motivations during this referendum, it does not paint the full picture when it comes to the role of Eurosceptic voting motivations, because Jacobs et al. used a rather narrow definition of Euroscepticism, which does not provide information on what the voter means with its signal of distrust to the EU. Since the mid-1990s, the academic community has been in a lively and still developing debate on what Eurosceptic voting actually means

and what the message of the voter is. There has been thorough critique on the linear definition (scores on the statement "I trust the EU") that Jacobs et al. use, because it does not provide much information. This has lead scholars to the development of multiple definitions, for example based on models that include matrixes distinguishing diffuse and direct trust or distinguishing trust in EU government and in EU policy. Also, multi-dimensional approaches have shown which different factors, like perceived utility, loss of identity or support for further integration, are underlying in Eurosceptic voting.

In this thesis, I researched the role of Euroscepticism in this referendum on the basis of the most far-reaching models to distinguish EU-related motivations for voting, using two datasets. Firstly, data from my own survey, held on the day of the referendum in the municipality of Heemskerk, including multiple EU-related questions based on a multi-dimensional approach of Euroscepticism. Furthermore I processed the data from the National Referendum research to fit a new, so-called "benchmark" model to measure Euroscepticism that was developed after the Brexit referendum. With this I answer the research question of this thesis: Which aspects of Euroscepticism had a significant role in the voting behaviour during the Ukraine referendum?

More in-depth knowledge on the EU-related voting motivations in this referendum is academically relevant, to be able to learn about how voters handle referenda and to give insight on the EU's future when it comes to referenda concerning the EU. Furthermore, this research can give a new insight on which feelings about Europe influence choices during elections and referenda that are not (solely) about the EU. Also, this research adds to the debate on relevant factors to measure when researching Euroscepticism. Additionally, this research has political relevance. The answer to the question of which Eurosceptical message the voters have sent to the Dutch government and to Brussels also gives a perspective of to what extent The Hague and Brussels have formulated a sufficient answer.

In this Master Thesis I show that the partly Eurosceptic message of the referendum can be better understood when applying more distinguished models of researching Euroscepticism. According to my dataset, in this referendum perceived utility is the most dominant factor correlating with the voting behaviour. The remodelling of the data from the National Referendum research shows that on average, Dutch voters show a higher trust in their national government than in the EU. This suggests that it is extra important for the Dutch government and the EU to keep making clear how the Dutch citizens directly profit from being part of the EU.

In the first chapter I describe the relevant events and arguments before, during, and after the referendum and discuss the existing research on voting motivations during the Ukraine referendum. In the second chapter I give a disquisition of multiple approaches to defining and measuring Euroscepticism and justify the model choices I made in this thesis. In the third chapter I present my research question and hypotheses. In the fourth chapter I describe and critically evaluate my method of collecting data directly at a number of polling stations in the

most representative municipality of the Netherlands. In the fifth chapter I analyse my data and remodel the data of Jacobs et al. In the sixth chapter I draw conclusions, discuss flaws and present leads for further research. Two appendixes are included to show in more depth the calibration of my method (A) and analysis (B).

This research is everything but flawless. The method is experimental and should be tested in more depth. The research has an explorative character and does not aim to overthrow the conclusions of the National Referendum Research, but to deepen them. It confirms that Euroscepticism is a multi-layered phenomenon and that focussing on its different aspects makes it possible to better distinguish the message that the Dutch voter gave about the EU during the Ukraine referendum.

Chapter 1. - The Ukraine Referendum

1.1 The Course of Events and the Arguments in the Campaign

On April 6, 2016, an advisory referendum was held in the Netherlands on the question: "Are you in favour or against the act of parliament approving the association agreement between the European Union and Ukraine?" (Electoral Council, 2015b). This referendum was the first held on the basis of the new referendum law (published in the Official Gazette of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, volume 122, 2015). The initiative came from *GeenPeil*, a cooperation between *GeenStijl*, *Burgercomité EU* and *Forum voor Democratie*[1]. They collected 427.939 signatures from Dutch citizens to request the referendum, more than sufficient for the 300.000 needed to make the request valid (Electoral Council, 2015a). According to their own website, *GeenPeil* is a broad initiative for more participation in our national and European democracy. Their mission statement is to have greater grip and influence on developments in the Netherlands and the EU, and through the referendum to give a signal to The Hague and Brussels (Geenpeil.nl, 2015b).

In the weeks before the referendum, there was an active campaign, both by opponents and proponents, each using different arguments. The campaigners for a 'No' vote pointed out that Ukraine is one of the most corrupt countries in the world (Ukraine was ranked at 130 out of 189 on the Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency International, 2015). Peter van Ham, expert from Clingendael Institute, stated that the association agreement would not help to fight corruption, but would give corrupt politicians access to money from the EU. Next to this, Van Ham predicted that Russia could not accept a Ukrainian move towards Europe, considering their economic and military interest in Ukraine. With the association agreement, Russian leader Vladimir Putin would be provoked and this "may cause unrest and dangerous situations", according to Van Ham. He stated that "the EU has very little geostrategic experience and therefore would not be able to handle this well" (Cafe Weltschmerz, 2016).

Beyond this, 'No' campaigners feared that this association agreement would be the first step to EU membership for Ukraine. "This association agreement is made to involve Ukraine with the EU. This way Brussels tries to build out the European System. Expansionist, conceited and naïve" said Thierry Baudet, from Forum voor Democratie (NOS Nieuws., 2015). Van Dixhoorn, president of *Burgercomité EU*, was quoted saying, "We do not care about Ukraine". He confessed that for the initiators of the referendum, it's not about the association agreement, but the goal is to break the EU or to exorcise The Netherlands from the EU. "A Nexit-referendum is not an option yet, so we take every opportunity to put tension on the relationship between the Netherlands and the EU" (Heck, 2016).

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[1] GeenStijl is an opinionated news website (GeenStijl.nl, 2023), Burgercomité EU is a citizens initiative stating to be in favour of Europe but against the EU (burgercomite-eu.nl, 2023). Forum voor Democratie was an citizens initiative that developed into a political party after the referendum (fvd.nl, 2023)

Lastly, 'No' campaigners feared that the association agreement would be financially unfavourable for EU citizens. Harry van Bommel, from political party SP (socialist party) stated that "With this agreement, at least 11 billion Euro will go to Ukraine in the coming 5 years. That is partly Dutch taxpayers' money. But because Ukraine is bankrupt, no Ukrainian money will come to the Netherlands in the coming years" (NOS, 2016b).

The 'Yes' campaigners mainly pointed out the economic benefits of the association agreement. It would make trade easier with a country of 45 million potential consumers, which could increase jobs in the Netherlands. Vice versa, Ukraine would also benefit from access to the EU market (NOS, 2016b) The association agreement would help the human rights situation in Ukraine, the 'Yes' campaign advocated. Lastly, the pro campaigners stated that this agreement would help in the battle against corruption in Ukraine. According to Michiel van Hulten, initiator of *Stem voor Nederland[2]*, the agreement would stimulate companies to work according to European measures and cause Ukraine to apply anti-corruption measures. "The Ukrainian people chose a democratic government that wants to embrace the European values, we can help them with that" (NOS, 2016a). Lastly Jan Gruiters, director of the Dutch Peace organisation PAX stated that every vote against this agreement would be a cynical reward for Russian leader Putin's perjury and land grab.(Gruiters, 2016)

During the referendum on the 6th of April, 32,38% of the Dutch citizens eligible to vote did so, meeting the turnout threshold of 30%. 61% voted against the approval of the association agreement, 38,21% in favour, and 0,79% cast a blank vote. Above this, 0,92% of votes were invalidated. Consequently, the government had to reconsider the act and take into account this advisory opinion rejecting the agreement.

Right after the result of the referendum was announced, Prime Minister of the Netherlands Mark Rutte declared that the ratification of the treaty couldn't go on immediately. After lobby work by the Dutch government, the European Council decided on December 2016 to add a legally binding annex to the association agreement, containing the clarifications and restrictions that the Netherlands wanted to add (European Council, 2016). After long and intense debates in the Dutch parliament, in both chambers small majorities voted in favour of the law ratifying the association agreement (Parliamentary Document, 2017). For further insights on this process, see Lambie & Koole, 2016.

1.2 Existing Literature on the Referendum
There are two main publications on this referendum the first is the National Referendum Research, of which I discuss three separate articles in this chapter. The second is a panel study by Van der Brug *et al* (2018), that also uses the data collected in the National Referendum Research. Note that all these articles are based on the linear approach of Euroscepticism. These researches provide information about the arguments used by the voters and about the relationship between institutional trust and the voting behaviour. For

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[2] Initiative campaigning in favour of the association agreement

these insights and to be able compare their results with my own survey, I briefly summarize the conclusions most relevant for my thesis in this subsection. In the rest of my thesis I refer to these researchers as 'The National Referendum Researchers' or 'NRR'.

The main conclusions from Jacobs *et al* (2016) on the voting motives of the participants in this referendum are that the most important reason for the 'yes' voters to vote in favour was to support the population of Ukraine (37,7%), and the second was that this agreement would be good for the economy (21,0%). Other less common reasons given were 'using the right to vote'(7,9%), 'against Putin and Russia'(7,2%), 'in favour of the EU' (6,7%), and 'against the initiators of the referendum' (1,5%).
The most important reasons for the 'no' voters to vote against the association agreement, according to Jacobs *et al* (2016), were the corruption in Ukraine (34,1%), the fear of Ukraine becoming an EU member (16,6%), and vote against the EU (7,5%). Reasons less commonly mentioned were 'not to provoke Russia and Putin'(4,5%), 'vote against the government'(3,2%) and 'using the right to vote'(2,3%).

Van der Meer (2016) looks into the correlation between the trust of the voters in the national and international actors and their vote. The strongest relation is found with the trust in Ukraine. In the group that distrusts the Ukraine the most, the amount of 'Yes' voters was the lowest. In the group that has diffuse trust in Ukraine (there was no group that has significant trust in the Ukraine) the majority voted in favour of the association agreement. Trust in Russia has a strong negative correlation with a 'Yes' vote. A more ambivalent view on Russia seems to be a base for a 'No' vote. Also, a correlation between trust in the EU and trust in the Dutch government is seen: people with a high trust in these institutions were more likely to vote yes. An important notion in the analysis of Van der Meer (2016) is that these correlations are less strong than the ones with Ukraine and Russia. He therefore concludes that, first of all, there is overall little trust in both Ukraine and Russia. Trust in the EU, the national government, and the national parliament is significantly higher. Secondly, interpreting a 'No' vote primarily as a signal of distrust in the EU or the Dutch government goes too far. That distrust had an important role in the voting, but was less determinative than that of trust in successively Ukraine and Russia.

Research by Steenvoorden *et al* (2016) focuses specifically on the role of social dissatisfaction in the Ukraine referendum. She concludes that the people who voted during the Ukraine referendum were the most optimistic and the most pessimistic voters; the less outspoken middle group stayed home. Steenvoorden (2016) shows that a large part of the voting behaviour could also be explained by three general attitudes, namely society pessimism, political trust and opinion on migration. Because of this, Steenvoorden states that the larger social dissatisfaction was projected on the specific opinion over this referendum. She concludes that the referendum-specific opinions were the most important, but they were inspired by larger social dissatisfaction.

The second research published on voters' opinion in the Ukraine referendum is the panel study by Van der Brug *et al* (2018). They show that existing literature finds three sorts of voter motivations in EU-related referenda, which are often combined in different ways to explain referendum outcomes. The three are: 1. Voters base their vote on domestic politics: both on advice from parties they trust and as a way to express their opinion on the government. 2. Voters base their opinion in any EU-related referendum on their general opinion about the EU. 3. Voters actually base their vote on referendum-specific characteristics. Van der Brug cites Hobolt and Brouard (2011) when stating that influence of each of the three motivations strongly depends on the issues raised during the campaign.

The theoretical framework behind this is that, especially with complicated topics, voters use shortcuts (so named 'cues') to decide what to vote. In this case, existing literature calls for two logical shortcuts: The first is that the general opinion on the EU decides the vote, the second is that the voting advice of the preferred political party is followed by the voter. An alternative for using cues, would be that voters base their opinion on referendum-specific information. Van der Brug *et al* expect that over the course of the campaign, when more information is available, more voters will base their opinion more often on campaign-specific arguments. Van der Burg et al (2018) find strong support for their hypothesis that the more one is supportive of the EU, the more likely one is to vote 'Yes'. Using the different surveys held (two during the campaign and one right after the referendum) they analyse how the predictable value of the three voter motivations increases or decreases over time. They find support for their hypothesis that, as the campaign proceeds, the direct effect of EU attitudes on vote intentions decreases in strength.

Chapter 2. - A Theoretical Framework on Euroscepticism
From a linear question to a multidimensional approach and a benchmark conceptualization of EU attitudes

2.1 The Academic Debate on Euroscepticism

The academic discussion on Euroscepticism started in the mid-nineties, and has grown into a broad and well-studied sub-field of European Studies. For this theoretical framework I focus on discussing the key research on Eurosceptic voting and the role of Euroscepticism in referenda. Throughout the development of theory on public opinion on Euroscepticism, certain categories can be distinguished. In this subsection I discuss those categories, I show where the research of the National Referendum Researchers (NRR) fits in, and I give arguments as to why I look at the Ukraine referendum with the theories of Van Spanje and de Vreese (2011) and De Vries (2018) in hand. This chapter ends with summaries of the elements of the theories by Van Spanje and De Vreese(subsection 2.3) and De Vries (subsection 2.4) that I use to analyse my data.

In the development of literature about Euroscepticism, a few categories of theories can be distinguished. First of all there are the scholars that look at Euroscepticism as the range of answers to a question like "Do you trust/like the EU?" or "Do you think your country's membership in the EU is a good thing?". These studies focus on the general approval or disapproval of the European project (See Gabel 1998; Hooghe & Marks 2004, 2005; McLaren 2006). Note that the National Referendum Researches (NRR) are based on such a definition on Euroscepticism. The NRR use the question: "To what degree do you personally trust the EU?" and analyse how these answers are related to voting behaviour, and if these relations are stronger than relations to the same statement about other (international) institutions. In this approach Euroscepticism is considered as a one-dimensional issue, that does not provide us information on what the voter finds wrong with the EU. Or as Van Spanje and De Vreese (2011) put it: "We know quite a lot about to what degree and in which circumstances, voters' party choice results from concerns about the EU, but little is known about what these concerns exactly are".

Why is it important to look at Euroscepticism through a layered approach? For a good explanation I summarize De Vries (2018): Firstly, the different types of sceptics display distinctive sets of issue positions, priorities, and reform preferences. Second, not all types of scepticism have the ability to threaten the EU's existence, because only certain types of scepticism lead to support for hard Eurosceptic parties (political parties that actively advocate to leave the EU). Third, believing that opinions are simply Eurosceptic or not leads to a one-size-fits-all approach, which is then bound to be unsuccessful.

So the first category of theories on Euroscepticism with a layered approach, are theories that use a two-dimensional approach. These two dimensions are based on the distinction between diffuse and specific support, introduced in political science by David Easton (1965,1975). This concept is used by Taggart (1998) and Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002) to

form theory on Euroscepticism that distinguishes hard Euroscepticism and soft Euroscepticism, in which hard Euroscepticism is 'principled opposition to European integration and the EU', and soft Euroscepticism is a "'qualified opposition' to the EU, reflecting dissatisfaction with 'core' EU policies or with the current EU trajectory". Taking this idea a step further, Mudde (2007) combined the two dimensions into a quadrant that creates four categories of Eurosceptic political parties. He states that one can support or not support the general idea of a collective Europe and one can support or not support the policies of the EU. This makes four types of attitudes possible with respect to Europe and the EU. Krouwel and Kutiyski (2017) state about Muddes' theory that "Although this two-by-two matrix refers to party positions on European integration, it can also be applied to voters." This way of modelling is relevant for my research because the theory by De Vries (2018) uses a two-dimensional approach (See subsection 2.4).

The second category of layered approaches to Euroscepticism are those with a multidimensional approach. This approach is used by scholars who believe that citizens have different opinions on different aspects of the EU. Common 'sub-issues' mentioned are economic or utility aspects, and aspects of identity or sovereignty. Two examples of significant research in this category are: First, McLaren(2007), who tested four factors that Euroscepticism could be driven by, namely 1. Feelings about national institutions, 2. Distrust of supra-national institutions, 3. Fears about the loss of national identity, and 4. Personal interest-based utilitarianism. She finds that sub-issue 4 is significantly influential and that factor 2 is more influential than factor 1. Startin and Krouwel (2013) show that Eurosceptics differ in intensity and in arguments on their Euroscepticism, as they take into account political, institutional, and economic aspects of Europeanization. The second, and most extensive research diving into the multiple dimensions of Euroscepticism is the studies by Boomgaarden, Van Spanje and de Vreese (2011a,2011b etc.). They differentiate five dimensions; performance, identity, affection, utilitarianism, and strengthening. They have derived these dimensions from factor analysis and they show that all these elements enhance anti-EU voting (Van Spanje and De Vreese 2011). As this research is one of the key models in this thesis, I will discuss it more thoroughly in subsection 2.3.

Next to these categories, many scholars note that national circumstances and opinions on the national government have an influence on Eurosceptic voting (see also mentioned above McLaren 2007). When it comes to national circumstances, this not a distinguishing factor in my research as this is a solely Dutch referendum, but of course the opinions of the Dutch voters on their own government vary. This aspect has a distinctive role in the different models I use in my research. Therefore I will here summarize a few findings from earlier studies about the influence of the perceived quality of the nation state. I find support for two approaches in the literature. On one side research on EU opinions by Anderson (1998) and Kritzinger (2003). They find that due to a lack of knowledge about the EU, the performance of national governments serves as a proxy or cue (see Van der Brug *et al* 2018, subsection 1.2). This idea is in line with the approach of the NRR. In contrast, Loveless (2010)

shows that citizens use their opinion on the national economic and democratic performance as a yardstick to compare the EU's economic and democratic performance with. Sanchez-Cueanca (2000) and Rohrschneider (2002) even found that people who are dissatisfied with the performance at national level are more willing to transfer power to the EU, and citizens from countries that are perceived to perform well on the national level display lower levels of EU support. This is an ingredient of the model by De Vries (2018) as further explained in subsection 2.4.

2.2 Justification of the Theory on Euroscepticism Used in my Research

In the previous subsection I discussed the field of research in popular opinion on the EU and showed linear approaches, approaches that distinguish support for 'the general idea' and support for 'specific policies' modelled into a two-by-two matrix, and multi-dimensional approaches. Above this I have shown that scholars agree that opinions on the national state influence EU opinions, but they do not agree how.

Taking into account that Jacobs *et al* used a linear approach of Euroscepticism to measure the influence on this referendum, I want to see if a two-by-two matrix approach and a multidimensional approach can provide extra information on the role of Euroscepticism in this referendum. I also want to analyse Euroscepticism in relation to opinions on the national government, as this was a 'hot' topic in the debate around this referendum. I recognize that social dissatisfaction has a role in Euroscepticism and in this referendum, but as this has been thoroughly discussed by Steenvoorden (2016) (see subsection 1.4), I do not focus on these factors in this research.

I have chosen to use the theory and models by both Van Spanje and De Vreese (2011) and De Vries (2018). Van Spanje and De Vreese use the most thorough multidimensional approach, so if different dimensions of Euroscepticism have had a role in this referendum, I have the most chance of finding this with Van Spanje and De Vreese's approach. In the model developed by De Vries, the opinion on the national government and national policy performance is used as a benchmark for the opinion on the EU, and she uses two dimensions to create a two-by-two matrix. So, not only are these two theories both on different aspects complementary to the model used by the NRR, they are also the most far-reaching within their category. Therefore I think they are the most suitable for my explorative approach on finding which aspects of Euroscepticism had a role in the Ukraine referendum. In the next subsections I will discuss both theories more thoroughly and present their models of Euroscepticism that I use for my analysis.

2.3 The Multi-Dimensional Approach

Van Spanje and De Vreese note that "we know quite a lot about to what degree and in which circumstances voters' party choices result from concerns about the EU, little is known about what these concerns actually are". Van Spanje and De Vreese mention Lubbers and Scheepers (2005,2010), Wessels (2007), Krouwel and Abts (2007) and Boomgaarden *et al* (2011) as scholars going beyond the one-dimensionality of EU attitudes. He follows the

conceptualization of Boomgaarden *et al*, because it is "the most comprehensive and inclusive set of items tapping EU attitudes in the literature". It distinguishes five dimensions, each measured by the scores on multiple questions/statements on a 1-7 scale. In my survey held during the Ukraine referendum, I used the same questions/statements, which are:

Dimension 1: Democratic performance

1. How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in the European Union?
2. The European Union functions well as it is
3. The European Union functions according to democratic principles
4. The decision-making process in the European Union is transparent

 Dimension 2: Utilitarianism

5. The Netherlands' membership of the European Union is a good thing
6. The Netherlands has on balance benefited from being a member of the European Union
7. The European Union fosters peace and stability

Dimension 3: Negative affection

8. I am angry about the European Union
9. I feel threatened by the European Union
10. I am disgusted by the European Union
11. I am afraid of the European Union

Dimension 4: Strengthening

12. The European Union should become one country
13. In general, are you against or in favour of efforts being made to unify Europe?
14. What speed of building Europe would you like?

Dimension 5: Identity

15. I am proud to be a European citizen
16. Being a citizen of the European Union means a lot to me
17. The European flag means a lot to me

With this survey, put out the day after the European Parliament elections of 2009, Van Spanje and De Vreese found that all these attitudes and issue positions had a (reversed)

correlation with Eurosceptic voting. In particular dimension 4 (strengthening integration) and 2 (the EU's utility) stand out as key predictors of Eurosceptic voting. Van Spanje and De Vreese also find a significant separate influence of the dimensions tapping into democratic performance and negative affection. The fifth dimension, EU identity, loses its power when dimensions 1, 2, and 4 are also modelled, due to high correlations with these three. Van Spanje and De Vreese also find that the impact of the five EU attitudes varies across countries according to their degree of party dispersion with regard to EU issues, saying, "The greater the party dispersion, the stronger the effect of each dimension". Van Spanje and De Vreese conclude on the basis of this finding, that some attitudes are more important in some contexts than others, because "when contestation over the EU becomes more salient, the EU itself becomes an important yardstick in the act of voting".

The finding that the importance of the five attitudes can vary depending on contexts is an important notion for my research. When formulating the hypotheses (subsection 3.2) I translate this finding to a prediction in the importance of the attitudes in this referendum.

2.4 The Benchmark Matrix
De Vries (2018) launches the 'benchmark' concept as a crucial piece of the puzzle in understanding Euroscepticism: the idea that the ranking of citizens' support for the EU is less significant on its own, because it is relative ranking when compared to support for their own national government. De Vries reasons this by making a comparison between Spain and the United Kingdom. In a survey in both countries asking respondents' degree of approval of the policies and the regime of both the EU and their national government, the UK showed a higher approval on all questions than Spanish participants did. However, UK participants approved more of their national government, both on policy and on regime, than of the EU. By contrast, Spanish participants' comparative approval of the EU and their national government was the reverse, with approval of their national government ranking lower than of the EU. Despite their overall rankings for both bodies being lower than rankings given by UK participants, in Spain the call for leaving the EU is far less apparent than in the UK. Thus, De Vries concludes that relative approval is more essential for measuring EU support than absolute approval. Her benchmark theory builds on a large amount of literature that has drawn attention to the importance of national conditions in shaping preferences for the integration of Europe. (See subsection 2.1). De Vries also shows that this benchmark theory approach goes against theories that suggest that perceived performance of the national government predicts attitudes against the EU (either in a positive correlation, as suggested by Anderson (1998) or in a negative correlation, suggested by Sanchez-Cuenca (2000)).

The benchmark theory is built on a behavioural economic theory by Tversky and Kahneman (1979 and 1992), namely 'prospect theory'. This theory posits that people choose between two choices that involve risk by evaluating the potential gains and losses, not the absolute values. De Vries theorizes that citizens look at their countries' membership in the EU in the same way. That is, they evaluate their countries' prospects being outside of the EU. If they

think that the status quo is better or the same as being outside the EU, they will want to stay in. (De Vries argues that if the evaluation of the future inside and outside the EU is the same, people will choose a certain situation above an uncertain one.) To sum up, according to De Vries, EU support or Euroscepticism should be conceptualized as the expected difference between being in and out of the EU. For this difference, De Vries introduces the term: the EU differential. The EU differential is the support for the Status Quo (SQ) being part of the EU, minus the support for the Alternative State being outside of the EU (AS). Given the fact that when a country functions outside of the EU, they are for their governing solely dependent on their own national government, De Vries reasons that we can measure her concept of Euroscepticism by measuring the difference between the approval of the national government and the approval of the EU. So if the EU differential is positive, the support for the EU is higher than the support for the nation, and if the EU differential is negative, it is vice versa.

De Vries distinguishes two differentials, one showing evaluations of policies and one showing evaluations on how the regime operates. She calls these dimensions the EU policy differential and the EU regime differential. Placing each differential on an axis, forms a quadrant (Figure 1). De Vries sees this quadrant as suitable to model the positions of countries, parties, regions, groups, and individuals. De Vries makes a two-by-two matrix of the two dimensions she distinguishes, which leads to four types of support/scepticism. Loyal supporters favour the EU over their nation state both on regime and policy, so both their differentials are positive. Opposite them are exit sceptics, whose differentials are both negative. Thirdly, regime sceptics, who have only a positive policy EU differential, and lastly policy sceptics, that only show a positive regime differential. De Vries states, "Exit sceptics can be viewed as unified Eurosceptics who oppose EU membership as a whole, while policy and regime sceptics are more ambivalent Eurosceptics who dislike certain aspects, but do not reject the EU altogether." I will use this model to analyse my data.

Figure 1. The two-by-two matrix of EU differentials. (figure 0.1 from De Vries (2018))

A relevant conclusion from De Vries is that a distinguishing difference between the four groups is not so much their different opinions on certain 'hot' EU-related topics, but their difference in prioritizing these topics. De Vries demonstrates that exit sceptics care most about migration, and loyal supporters care mainly about unemployment. Policy and regime sceptics care both about unemployment and migration. De Vries also shows that these priorities strongly influence their party choice. Furthermore, she shows that issue priorities correlate strongly with voting behaviour on Brexit. "... for those respondents who view migration as one of the most important issues, the intention to vote 'remain' is lower no matter which type of support or scepticism they belong to. The reverse is true for those who view the economy as the most important." (De Vries, 7.1). Interesting to add in this context is that immigration and the economy were also the core concerns listed by Brexit voters when asked about their reasons to vote (Hobolt 2016; Clarke et al. 2017).

Last, I want to show how De Vries plotted the EU countries in her model (Figure 2). Because it shows that in 2014, the Netherlands is on average sceptic on the policy side, and neutral on the regime side. So on average, the Dutch have equal trust in the EU regime and their national regime and less trust in the EU policy compared to the national policy.

Figure 2. Plotting countries on the basis of their average EU differential means in 2014 (figure 4.2 from De Vries (2018))

Chapter 3. – Research Question and Hypotheses

3.1 Research Question

As shown in subsection 1.3, the existing research on this referendum is based on a linear approach of Euroscepticism. As shown in Chapter 2, a lively academic debate on Euroscepticism has led to multiple more layered definitions, that give more information about the underlying factors of Eurosceptic voting. With this research question I want to fill this gap.

This leads to the following research question for this thesis: "Which aspects of Euroscepticism had a significant role in the voting behaviour during the Ukraine referendum?".

3.2 Hypotheses

To work towards an answer to this question, I formulated three categories of underlying hypotheses. The first category of hypotheses are formulated on basis of the outcomes of the research by the NRR, to show my data is in line with their findings. The second category of hypotheses are formulated on the basis of the theory by van Spanje and De Vreese (2011) and the hypotheses in the third category are based on the theory by De Vries (2018).

For the first category of hypotheses, I use four statements that cover the correlation of the voting behaviour with believing the agreement is positive for Ukraine, fear for tensions with Russia, being positive about the EU, and having faith in politics. I use these statements because they cover the same topics as the statements in the research by Van der Meer (from the NRR) and they showed that these have a large explanatory value of the voting behaviour.

My analysis is based on the following topics, measured by the following statements:

- Positive for Ukraine
  Statement in survey: "This association agreement is positive for the future of Ukraine"
- Negative feelings towards Russia
  Statement in survey: "I'm afraid of tensions with Russia because of this association agreement"
- Positive about the EU
  Statement in survey: "I am positive about the European Union"

- Faith in politics
  Statement in survey: "Generally speaking, I have faith in politics"

These statements are comparable to those used by the NRR, but not the exact same. I will therefore not directly compare my data with theirs. But I do cover the same topics and can

compare the relationships between the statements within my dataset. Taking the findings of the NRR into account, this leads to the following hypotheses:

A.1. Respondents who agree that this agreement is positive for Ukraine are more likely to vote 'Yes'.

A.2. Respondents who fear tensions with Russia are more likely to vote 'No'.

A.3. Respondents who are positive about the European Union are more likely to vote 'Yes'.

A.4. Respondents who have faith in politics in general are more likely to vote 'Yes'.

A.5. Opinions on Ukraine and Russia will have a stronger correlation with the voting behaviour than opinions on politics in general and the EU.

As shown in the theoretical outline, theory about Euroscepticism shows that Euroscepticism is more than the degree of trust that a voter has in the EU. The multi-dimensional approach gives more insight into the message behind Eurosceptic voting. In the research by Van Spanje and De Vreese (2011), the dimensions 'strengthening integration' and 'utilitarianism' stand out as the key predictors of Eurosceptic voting. Considering the topic of this referendum and the fact that the 'no' camp in the campaign stressed that this association agreement could be the first step to Ukrainian membership of the EU, I expect the position of the voter on strengthening integration to correlate the strongest with the voting outcome. Considering the findings of Van Spanje and De Vreese, this brings me to the following hypotheses:

B.1. The dimension of being positive or negative about further integration will have the strongest correlation with voting behaviour.

B.2. The dimension of utilitarianism will also have strong correlation with the voting behaviour.

Following the theory by De Vries (2018), we assume that it is not so much about direct EU support, but relative EU support, in relation to the support for the national government. This leads to the following hypotheses:

C.1. 'Yes' voters will on average have a positive EU differential in regime and policy.

C.2. 'No' voters will on average have a negative EU differential in regime and policy.

C.3. The differential for 'No' voters will be more negative than the differential for 'Yes' voters.

C.4. 'Yes' voters will belong to the group of 'loyal supporters' more often than 'No' voters.

C.5. 'No' voters will more often belong to the group of 'exit sceptics' than 'Yes' voters.

Chapter 4. - Research Method

4.1 Introduction of the Method

To answer my research questions I use the data of a survey I conducted directly outside three polling stations in the municipality of Heemskerk in the Netherlands. I have chosen to stand directly at the polling stations, because a survey prior to the referendum could be less reliable, due to people changing their minds or the questionnaire influencing voting behaviour. Risk for a survey after the referendum results are known is that voters are influenced by the outcome and by the reactions of politicians in the media. I have chosen the municipality of Heemskerk because it is a famous local maxim for journalists in the Netherlands to keep a close eye on election results in the municipality of Heemskerk (North of Holland, 40.000 citizens), because they often turn out to be very similar to the national results (see BNR, 2012; NH Nieuws, 2017; De Voogd, 2017 and Schmale & Boeschoten, 2017). As I have not seen any other research based in Heemskerk, this thesis introduces a new way of organising a representative research group in the Netherlands.

The survey consisted of two parts. The first contained a series of eleven questions, tapping into reasons why the participants voted in favour or against. The second part of the survey consisted of Van Spanje and De Vreese's questions about the EU (see subsection 2.3). At the time of the referendum, the theory by De Vries was yet to be written. Therefore I did not involve these insights when making my survey. Unfortunately, I did not ask the correct questions to use her theory. Therefore, for this part of my analysis I have used data from the 'Election Survey Ukraine Referendum', by CentERdata provided through the data archive of LISS data. I used their survey conducted on the 7th of April, the day after the election. Data from this survey is also used by the NRR. Using two different datasets has limitations. In my analysis I clearly state for each part which data is used and I do not draw comparisons between the different sets of data.

In this method section I discuss the strengths and limitations of the survey conducted in Heemskerk. First I show the representativeness of Heemskerk and the three polling stations for the Netherlands. Second I show how representative the results of the survey were for the national outcome and I discuss the limitations of the survey. This chapter contains an overview of the most notable parts of the method; for a more thorough evaluation of the comparability of my Survey, Heemskerk and the Netherlands as a whole, see Appendix A.

4.2   The Representativeness of the Polling Stations in Heemskerk

To analyse if Heemskerk is a kind of 'average town', that could be considered representative for the Netherlands, I first compared some statistics about the composition of the population. I compared statistics about, first: gender, age, and origin; second: education, employment, housing, and households. For this analysis I used data from CBS, the Central Bureau for Statistics of the Netherlands.

The composition of the Heemskerk population and the composition population of the Netherlands as a whole, differs 0,5 percentage point when it comes to gender, less than 2 years when it comes to mean age and less than 2 percentage points when it comes to age groups. What can be seen is that the population in Heemskerk is older, because age groups up to 44 are underrepresented and age groups from 45 are overrepresented. Heemskerk

has slightly more immigrants of non-western origin than the Netherlands as a whole (2,5 percentage points more). The only significant difference is population density: Heemskerk is three times more densely populated than the Netherlands as a whole. I have no reason to assume that a difference in population density will influence the opinion, when other factors are alike.

Also on the factors of employment and education, Heemskerk and the Netherlands are highly similar. Net employment was 65.80% in the Netherlands in 2016, in Heemskerk this was 67.50%. Heemskerk has a slightly larger working population (84% vs. 80.5% in the Netherlands) and the unemployment rate in Heemskerk is slightly lower (5.6% vs. 6.1% in the Netherlands). Also looking at the working population in certain degrees of education, the Netherlands and Heemskerk are highly comparable. The largest difference is the percentage of secondary educated working population between 15-65, as a percentage of the total population, which is 22.1% in the Netherlands and 25.4% in Heemskerk. Lastly, when comparing housing and households – such as percentages of social rent, families with children, etc. - Heemskerk is also highly representative for the Netherlands as a whole. The largest differences are that in the Netherlands there are more people living alone (37.6% vs. 33.4% in Heemskerk) and there is slightly more homeownership (56.2% in the Netherlands vs. 53.6% in Heemskerk). For a more detailed comparison on all factors mentioned above, see appendix A.

To analyse the representativeness of the voting behaviour in Heemskerk, I compared the results of the four elections that took place closest to the referendum date, to the results of the Netherlands as a whole. I compared the results from elections for the national parliament of 2010, 2012, and 2017, and the EU election of 2014. The comparison showed that the voting behaviour of Heemskerk is very similar to the national voting behaviour. Apart from two exceptions, for parties scoring over 5% of the votes, the differences in voting behaviour are never higher than 2 percentage points (see appendix A for more detail). Due to a limited capacity of my research, I conducted the survey at three polling stations. Appendix A shows that the three polling stations chosen together had election results that are even more alike to the national outcome than the voting results of Heemskerk as a whole. For the three polling stations together, all results are within the range of 2 percentage points, except for one small Christian party during one election.

4.3. The Representativeness and Limitations of the Survey

In total, my N is 541. Out of all surveys, 431 are filled in completely. 110 have missing values. Most of these missing values are the ages of the participants. Due to the layout of the survey, this question was easily overlooked. When this was noticed during the execution of the research, the assisting volunteers pointed out to the participants to fill in this question. In total, 59 surveys have a missing value on the age question. A different reason for the missing values can be that the survey was quite long and contained several pages. Several surveys are stopped halfway, so this could be an indication that participants thought the survey was too long. This conclusion is also based on spontaneous feedback given by participants during the execution of the survey. Also, some participants seem to have missed a page. Lastly, some participants might have left questions open because they did not know what to answer and there was no 'I do not know' option in the survey. All these notes mean limitations to the interpretation of my results.

The gender representation of this survey is highly similar to the national turnout. See table 1.

Sex	National turnout (NTO)	Survey	Difference
% Men	54,2%	54,5%	-0,3 pp
% Women	45,8%	45,5%	-0,3 pp

Table 1. Participating sexes compared between turnout and survey.

When it comes to age, this survey has an underrepresentation between 0,8 and 2,0 percentage points for ages up to 54 and an overrepresentation between 1,7 and 2,6 percentage points for people over 54 years old. Graph 1 shows that the differences in age groups between the Netherlands and Heemskerk are also seen in the difference between the national turnout and the participants of the survey.

Graph 1. Age groups compared for the Netherlands, Heemskerk, the national turnout and the survey.

For education, due to differences in categorizing between CBS and the national referendum research, it cannot be said if the survey is comparable to the national turn out. The analysis in appendix A gives an indication that low-educated people are underrepresented in this survey.

There are two possible reasons why the survey is not completely representative for the national turnout. First of all, I do not have information on the composition of the turnout in Heemskerk nor at the three polling stations where the survey was held. Secondly, the group

that filled in the survey could be different from the group that turned out to vote at the three polling stations. In total, 2.312 people voted at the three investigated polling stations. 541 filled in the survey. Therefore, 23,4% of my potential research group participated. The ambition was to ask every voter leaving the polling station to participate in the survey. During the busiest moments the capacity of volunteers was insufficient to do this, so a random selection of voters was asked to participate. The researchers did not collect any data from the people who were not willing to participate. Therefore the following information about this group is purely based on the observation of the researchers: Noticeable was that during the morning (pre-work hours) and during dinnertime (post-working hours), the willingness to fill in the survey was lower than during daytime and in the evening (frequently heard comment: "Dinner/work is waiting"). This can be explained by the fact that during these times, people with the busiest lives came to vote. This could be an explanation for the overrepresentation of the age category of 65+. Also, the survey required quite some reading and was experienced as 'long' and 'difficult' by some participants. This could possibly explain the low participation of lower educated people.

Overall the conclusion on the basis of the available information and the available research capacity is that this survey can be considered reasonably representative. The method used could have further potential when researched and executed more precisely. The results presented in this thesis should be read with the critical remarks on its limitations from this subsection in mind.

Chapter 5. - Results and Analysis

In this chapter I present my main results in frequency tables, after presenting the necessary statistic tests. Next I analyse the results of my survey according to the multi-dimensional approach by Van Spanje and De Vreese (2011). Lastly I use the Data set of the NRR, to analyse these according to the theory on EU Differentials by De Vries (2018). I use the NRR's data set because in this set contains the right questions necessary for De Vries' theory, where my survey did not. As I am working with to different data sets, I am careful to not directly compare the results and analysis, as they are based on different questions.

5.2 Correlation and Collinearity

First I need to show that the factors I am comparing are not measuring the same underlying factor. Therefore I use the Pearson Correlation test and a collinearity test.

Pearson's *r* Test	This association agreement is positive for Ukraine	I am afraid of tensions with Russia because of this association agreement	I am positive about the European Union	Generally speaking I have faith in politics
This association agreement is positive for Ukraine	1	**-0.169** (almost no correlation)	**0.413**** (low correlation)	**0.402**** (low correlation)
I am afraid of tensions with Russia because of this association agreement		1	**-0.098** (not significant)	**-0.104*** (almost no correlation)
I am positive about the European Union			1	**0.602**** (moderate correlation)
Generally speaking I have faith in politics				1

**=p<0.001 *=p<0.05

Table 4.1 – Pearson's *r* Test, correlation between factors

The Correlations in the Pearson's *r test* are relatively low, which shows I'm measuring different influences with my questions. The exception is the correlation between "Faith in politics" and "thinking positively about the EU". Here the correlation is 0.602, which is a moderate correlation. This is something to keep in mind during my analysis.

To check for collinearity, I test the collinear diagnostics with a linear regression.

Collinearity	
Statement	VIF score
This association agreement is positive for Ukraine	1,291.000
I am afraid of tensions with Russia because of this association agreement	1,031.000
I am positive about the European Union	1,681.000
Generally speaking I have faith in politics	1,657.000

Table 4.2 – Collinearity between factors

The VIF scores are very low and far below 10, so I can state that there is no significant collinearity between the variables. This means that none of these factors can be predicted from the others with a substantial degree of accuracy, which shows that I am measuring different factors.

5.3. Logistic Regression and Frequencies Analysis

Table 4.3 shows the regression analysis of the model containing the four factors. It correctly predicts 82.6% of the voting behaviour[3]. The dependent variable is the 'Yes' vote. In the Omnibus Test Chi^2 is 308.056***, with df 4.

Logistic regression of the variables				
Statements	**Results**			
	B	**Constant**	**Exp(B)**	**P value**
Generally speaking I have faith	0.406	-7.487	1.501	0.000***

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[3] Shown in the classification table, cross-classified

|				
in politics				
I am positive about the European Union	0.656	-7.487	1.927	0.000***
The Association agreement is positive for the future of Ukraine	0.687	-7.487	1.988	0.000***
I am afraid of tensions with Russia because of this association agreement	-0.152	-7.487	0.859	0.030**

Table 4.3 – *Logistic regression of the four factors with voting behaviour.*
*Significance levels: * = 0.1; ** = 0.05; *** = 0.01.*

This logistic regression analysis of my data shows that two variables have the most influence on the odds of voting 'yes'. These two variables are 'The association agreement is positive for the Ukraine' and 'I am positive about the EU'. For both variables it is true that the more the respondent agrees with the statement, the higher the chance that the respondent voted 'Yes'. The amount that this likelihood increases is slightly higher for the variable about Ukraine (1.988) than for the variable about the EU (1.927), which, translated to percentages, indicates that for every step on the score range of 1 to 7 a respondent scored higher, the odds of the respondent voting 'Yes' increases with 92.7% (the more positively the respondent thinks about the EU) and 98.8% (the more positive the respondent thinks the association agreement is for Ukraine). This regression also shows, with a weaker relation, that for my dataset 'more faith in politics' also leads to an increasing likelihood of casting a 'Yes' vote. The higher a respondent scores the statement on 'fear of tension with Russia', the odds for a 'Yes' vote decrease. Therefore, this regression shows that, in the context of my sample, I can accept the hypotheses A.1. *Respondents who agree that this agreement is positive for Ukraine are more likely to vote 'Yes'.*, A.2. *Respondents who fear tensions with Russia are more likely to vote 'No'.*, A.3. *Respondents who are positive about the European Union are more likely to vote 'Yes'.* and A.4. *Respondents who have faith in politics in general are more likely to vote 'Yes'.* This is in line with the findings of the NRR. In the following frequency tables I illustrate these findings.

On the basis of the regression I have to reject hypothesis A.5. *Opinions on Ukraine and Russia will have a stronger correlation with the voting behaviour than opinions on politics in general and the EU.* Because for my data, increasing support for the factor 'positive for Ukraine' has the strongest relation with an increasing likelihood of 'Yes' vote and the factor 'Positive about the EU' has almost the same relationship. The factor 'Fear of tensions with Russia' has the weakest relation.

Graph 4.1 - *Agreement to the statement as a percentage of the 'for' and 'against' votes (all for votes = 100% and all against votes = 100%)*

The most frequently given answer by 'No' voters is to 'neither agree nor disagree'. A majority of the 'No' voters in my survey disagree (1+2+3) with the statement. The vast majority of 'Yes' voters somewhat agree, agree or strongly agree with the statement that the association agreement is positive for the future of Ukraine. Therefore, in the context of my sample, this underlines and illustrates the acceptance of hypothesis A.1. *Respondents who agree that this agreement is positive for Ukraine are more likely to vote 'Yes'.*

Graph 4.2 - *Agreement to the statement as a percentage of the 'for' and 'against' votes. (all for votes = 100% and all against votes = 100%)*

This graph shows that respondents of my survey are strongly divided on being afraid of tensions with Russia. Especially for 'No' voters it is interesting to see that the most given answer is to strongly agree, but almost just as often these voters strongly disagree. Also 'Yes'

voters are divided, but only a quarter of the voters agree to some extent, while 54% at least somewhat disagrees. 'No' voters are more spread over all the possible answers. Clear is that at least somewhat agreeing to this statement correlates with a 'No' vote. This underlines the result of the regression, that my hypothesis A.2. *Respondents who fear tensions with Russia are more likely to vote 'No'* can be accepted, but the relationship is weaker than that of the other hypotheses. This corresponds with what the NRR found. They showed that none of their respondents had a high trust in Russia, but those with more ambivalent feelings of trust were more likely to vote 'No'. On the basis of my data I cannot see this, because I used a different statement, but the reactions to this statement in my survey does also show ambivalence on fear of tensions with Russia among especially the 'No' voters.

Graph 4.3 - *Agreement to the statement as a percentage of the 'for' and 'against' votes (all for votes = 100% and all against votes = 100%)*

Graph 4.3. clearly shows that of my respondents, 'Yes' voters generally think a lot more positively about the EU. The large majority (76%) of the 'Yes' voters in my survey at least somewhat agree with this statement. For 'No' voters, the most frequently given answer is to neither agree nor disagree. Exactly half of the respondents at least somewhat disagree with the statement. This underlines and illustrates the acceptance of Hypothesis A.3. *Respondents who are positive about the European Union are more likely to vote 'Yes'*.

Graph 4.4 - *Agreement to the statement as a percentage of the 'for' and 'against' votes (all for votes = 100% and all against votes = 100%)*

This frequency graph shows that the faith in politics of 'Yes' voters in my survey is generally a lot higher than under the 'No' voters. More than sixty-five percent of the 'No' voters at least somewhat disagree with the statement. At the same time, almost sixty percent of the 'Yes' voters at least somewhat agree with the statement and 83% of the 'Yes' voters does not disagree. Therefore, this graph underlines and illustrates the acceptance of hypothesis A.4. *Respondents who have faith in politics in general are more likely to vote 'Yes'.*

5.4 Analysis with the Multi-Dimensional Approach

As shown earlier in subsection 2.3, Van Spanje and De Vreese (2011) looked at the underlying motivations to vote Eurosceptic in the European elections of 2009. The five EU dimensions they distinguish are democratic deficit, low perceived utility of the EU for the country, negative affection towards the EU, opposition to EU integration, and an absence of EU identity. In my survey during the Ukraine referendum I asked the voters the same questions as Van Spanje and De Vreese (2011) did, to measure the participants' stance on these different dimensions. In the following analysis I show which of these dimensions have the most influence on the voting behaviour in this referendum. To see how the participants score on these dimensions I want to take the average score of the different questions that tap into the same dimension, according to Van Spanje and de Vreese. To check if these questions indeed measure the same dimension, also in my dataset, I do a reliability analysis and look at the value of the Crombach's Alpha. If this is higher van 0.7, the variables are validated for measuring the same dimension.

Dimensions measured by opinions on the statements	Crombach's Alpha of the scores

Democratic deficit	0.884
Low perceived utility for the EU country	0.883
Absence of negative affection towards the EU	0.855
Opposition to EU integration	0.763
Absence of EU identity	0.854

Table 4.4 – *Crombach's Alpha, measuring the same dimensions*

Seeing that all the values of the Crombach's Alpha are higher than 0.7, I have validated that also in my dataset these statements are measuring the same dimension. Now I can take the variables together as one variable and see which Dimension of Euroscepticism has the most influence on the vote.

For a first evaluation of the different dimensions I look at the means of the different dimensions for the 'Yes' voters and the 'No' voters, in a T Test in Table 4.5

Variable	Mean 'Yes' vote	Mean 'No' vote	Difference	Standard deviation 'Yes' vote	Standard deviation 'No' vote
Democratic deficit	4.3	2.9	1.4***	1.0	1.3
Perceived utility	5.7	3.7	2.0***	1.1	1.5
Absence of negative affection	6.1	4.8	1.4***	0.9	1.4
Opposition to integration	3.9	2.5	1.3**	1.2	1.4
Absence of EU identity	4.6	3.2	1.4**	1.3	1.5

Table 4.5 – *Means and standard deviations*
*Significance levels: * = 0.1; ** = 0.05; *** = 0.01.*

In this table comparing the means and the standard deviation of the opinions of the people who voted for and the people who voted against, a few interesting observations can be made. First of all it is interesting to see that 'Yes' voters score higher on every dimension than 'No' voters and this difference is significant. The second observation that can be made is that the standard deviation of the 'Yes' voters is always smaller than the standard deviation of the 'No' voters. This shows an interesting result, namely that the 'Yes' voters agree more strongly among one another, while the opinions of the 'No' voters are more spread. Thirdly, this table shows that the biggest difference in opinion is found in the perceived utility of the European Union. 'Yes' voters on average rate the utility of the EU two whole points higher on the 7 point scale, and they agree with each other rather strongly (sd 1.1), while for 'No' voters this is one of the statements on which they have the most diverse opinions among one another, but on average they score these statements with a 3.7, just under the median of the scale.

Lastly, the scores on the absence of negative affection are rather high in comparison to the scores on the other statements. Looking at the questions, these are formulated negatively ("I am scared of the EU", "The EU disgusts me") and all participants on average gave them very low scores. All other statements were formulated positively, so for comparative reasons I reversed the scores, which leads to scores on the absence of negative affection. Van Spanje and De Vreese do the same with these statements and also find strong results on these statements (2011, p.419).

To get more insight into which of these dimensions tapped the most into the motivations to vote 'Yes' or 'No', I need to analyse with a logistic regression. The different dimensions have a medium-high correlation with each other, all between 0,687 and 0.379. But the VIF values in a linear regression are all between 1.636 and 2.931, so the scores are suitable to analyse with a logistic regression to see for which dimension the change in score has the most influence on the chances of the participants voting for or against. Table 4.6 shows the regression analysis of the model containing the five dimensions. It correctly predicts 81.4% of the voting behaviour[4]. The dependent variable is the 'Yes' vote. In the Omnibus Test Chi^2 is 253.442***, with df 5.

Dimensions	Results			
	B	Constant	Exp(B)	Significance
Democratic Deficit	0.399	-8.260	1.491	0.002***
Low perceived utility	0.634	-8.260	1.885	0.000***

[4] Shown in the classification table, cross-classified

Statement/dimension	B	Constant	Exp(B)	Significance
Negative affection towards EU	0.382	-8.260	1.466	0.001***
Opposition to integration	0.305	-8.260	1.357	0.003***
Absence of EU identity	0.029	-8.260	1.029	0.784

Table 4.6 – *Logistic regression of the five dimensions.*
*Significance levels: * = 0.1; ** = 0.05; *** = 0.01.*

Table 4.6 shows that four out of five dimensions have a significant relation with the voting behaviour of the respondents. The score that our participants gave to the questions about their feelings of EU identity does not give us significant information on their voting behaviour. The other dimensions do give this information. The most effect is seen from the perceived utility. The lower the participant scored the utility that the Netherlands has from being a member of the EU, the larger the chance that this participant voted against. The chance increases 88,5% per step down on the 7 point scale. Believing more in this utility increases the chances of voting in favour the fastest, compared to the other dimensions. Next in line are the opinions on the democratic deficit of the EU (49,1%), closely followed by the feelings of negative affection towards the EU (46,6%). Lastly also opposing more strongly to more EU integration increases the chances of a 'No' vote in this referendum (35,7%).

To show the influence of the dimensions, I first show a regression with all factors and dimensions (Table 4.7). It correctly predicts 84.9% of the voting behaviour [5]. The dependent variable is the 'Yes' vote. In the Omnibus Test Chi^2 is 334.334***, with df 9.

Statement/dimension	B	Constant	Exp(B)	Significance
This association agreement is positive for the future of Ukraine	0.668	-10.148	1.950	0.000***
Generally speaking I have faith in politics	0.340	-10.148	1.405	0.002***
I am afraid of tensions with Russia because of this association agreement	-0.144	-10.148	0.866	0.067*
I am positive about the European Union	0.298	-10.148	1.347	0.028**
Democratic deficit	-0.030	-10.148	0.971	0.865
Low perceived utility for the EU country	0.455	-10.148	1.576	0.006***

[5] Shown in the classification table, cross-classified

Negative affection towards the EU	0.189	-10.148	1.209	0.195
Opposition to integration	0.303	-10.148	1.353	0.013**
Absence of EU identity	0.103	-10.148	1.109	0.417

Table 4.7 – *Logistic regression of the four factors and five dimensions together*
*Significance levels: * = 0.1; ** = 0.05; *** = 0.01.*

Table 4.7 shows that the factor "I am positive about the EU" decreases in strength when the five dimensions about the EU are added. This is of course logical, as the dimensions also measure feelings and opinions about the EU. The table also shows that the other factors barely change in strength, which means that the dimensions do not tap into these factors. Bringing back to mind that the model with the "I am positive about the EU" factor and the other factors (Russia, Ukraine and faith in politics, (Table 4.3)) had an explanatory value of 82.6%. This shows that taking the dimensions of Van Spanje and De Vreese into account increases the explanatory value of the model. It is important to note that only two dimensions, namely 'perceived utility' and 'opposition to integration', are significant in this model. These dimensions even show a stronger influence on the voting behaviour in my sample then the general factor "being positive about the EU".

To dive deeper into what the explanatory value of the different dimensions distinguished by Van Spanje and De Vreese (2011) are for this referendum, I ran multiple regression analyses to compare the influence of different dimensions on their own with the factors already shown to have significant influence, and ran multiple regressions exchanging the general "Being positive about the EU"-factor for single or multiple dimensions. For an overview of these regression analyses see Appendix B; here I only describe the most relevant findings. These findings are that the dimension 'utility' has the most effect on the explanatory value of the model.

Using the dimension 'utility' instead of the general "I am positive about the EU" statement on its own with the other factors (Russia, Ukraine, faith in politics), increases the explanatory value of the model for voting variation to 85.1% (Table B.7 in Appendix B.) As can be seen in Table B.6 (Appendix B), when comparing it to the regression table 4.3 of the original factors (Russia, Ukraine, faith in politics and positive about the EU), the other factors barely change, but the dimension 'utility' is much bigger that the factor 'positive about the EU'. So, comparing the two models in this regression analysis, I see that the being more 'positive about the EU' had an influence, increasing the voter's likelihood to vote in favour of the association agreement with a factor 1.988 per step (=99%) on the 7 point scale, in a model that predicts 82.7% correctly. While the dimension utility increases the chances of the voter to vote in favour with a factor of 2.337 (=124%) per step on the 7 point scale, in a model that predicts 85.1% correctly.

I also find that the dimension 'opposition to further integration' is of significant influence combined with the dimension 'utility' or with the factor 'faith in the EU', but it does not increase the predictive value of the model on its own, when compared to those two. Beyond this, it increases the values of the other factors (mainly 'faith in politics' and 'positive for Ukraine') which makes the comparison tricky. For the other dimensions I did not find a significant influence when combining all dimensions and factors, so I do not take these factors further into consideration.

Coming back to the dimension 'utility', I find that the model best predicts the voting behaviour when both the factor 'I am positive about the EU' and the dimension 'utility' are run in the regression, as can be seen in Table 4.8. It predicts 86.1% of the voting behaviour correctly[6]. Note that this is a higher percentage than when the dimension 'opposition to further integration' is also added to the regression (See appendix B). The dependent variable in table 4.8 is the 'Yes' vote. In the Omnibus Test Chi^2 is 329.095***, with df 5.

Statement	B	Constant	Exp(B)	Significance
This association agreement is positive for the future of Ukraine	0.639	-8.879	1.895	0.000***
Generally speaking I have faith in politics	0.327	-8.879	1.387	0.002***
I am afraid of tensions with Russia because of this association agreement	-0.149	-8.879	0.862	0.042**
I am positive about the European Union	0.372	-8.879	1.450	0.002***
Dimension: Low perceived utility for the EU country	0.653	-8.879	1.922	0.000***

Table 4.8 – *Logistic regression of the four factors and the dimension perceived utility Significance levels: * = 0.1; ** = 0.05; *** = 0.01.*

As can be seen in table 4.8, adding both the dimension 'utility' and the factor 'I am positive about the EU' to the regression shows that both have a substantial influence on the chances of voting in favour. Of the two, a more positive opinion in the dimension 'utility' has the most influence (1.92) on chances of voting in favour in this referendum. It is interesting to see that its influence is even a little bit larger than the influence of scoring higher on the statement 'this association agreement is positive for Ukraine (1.89)' even when being positive about the EU is measured as a separate factor in the regression.

5.5 Conclusion Analysis Multi-Dimensional approach
Distinguishing the opinions about the EU on the basis of the dimensions that Van Spanje and

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[6] Shown in the classification table, cross-classified

De Vreese (2011) see in positions of voters towards the EU seems to have a limited effect on the predictive value of the model for predicting the voting behaviour in this referendum. The explained variation increases from 82.6 to 84.9 per cent. This effect seems to be only caused by the dimensions 'opposition to integration' and 'perceived utility for the EU country'.

Looking into the dimensions separately shows that especially taking into account the dimension 'utility' increases the predictive value of the model for my data (to 86,1 percent). Beyond this, every step a respondent scores higher on the dimension 'utility' increases the probability of them voting in favour by 92.2%, even when the factor 'being positive about the EU' is already taken into account. This finding strongly suggests that this dimension has influence separate from being positive or negative about the EU. Based on this finding, which is of course only valid in the context of my dataset, I would suggest that perceived utility from the EU is indeed a separate dimension in thoughts about the EU, which significantly influences voting behaviour on its own. I also find a suggestion that being opposed to further integration could be a separate dimension, but not as strong as utility. I do not find any clues that opinions on democratic deficit, EU identity, or negative affection are separate dimensions which played a role in the voting behaviour in this referendum.

I therefore reject hypothesis B.1., which stated that *the dimension of being positive or negative about further integration will have the strongest correlation with voting behaviour*. I accept hypothesis B.2. which is: *The dimension of utilitarianism will also have strong correlation with the voting behaviour.* Because it is not the dimension 'integration' which has the strongest correlation, but the dimension 'utility'.

5.6 Analysis on the Basis of EU Differentials

Interestingly, this concept of perceived utility is the basic thought behind the theory of De Vries (2018). As explained in the earlier chapter, she compares the public's satisfaction with the EU with the satisfaction with their own government. She does this both for indicators of appreciation of the regime (democratic value, trust in the system) and for indicators of appreciation of the policy (wish for more integration, country going the right way, government doing a good job). De Vries defines Euroscepticism as the difference between the evaluation of the EU and the evaluation of the nation. Her argument for this is that the individual weighs the benefits and the costs of being in the EU against the benefits and the costs of being a nation outside the EU. As questions of the utilitarian type (for example 'The Netherlands profits from being a member of the EU') have the strongest effect on the chances of a for or against vote (see table above), I take a look at the data with the theory of De Vries in mind.

As thoroughly explained in subsection 2.4, De Vries introduces the concept of the EU differential, which is the positive or negative difference between the evaluations of the nation and the EU. The EU differential can be calculated both for opinions on the regime and opinions on policy. As stated thoroughly before, it is important to note that in my data I do

not have the appropriate questions to calculate the EU differentials. Fortunately, the data of the National Referendum Research does provide this information. Therefore I will use their data[7] from here on. I do not directly compare the data from NNR and my own dataset, because they are based on different questions.

The questions I used from the NNR's data to come to the differentials are:

For regime:
EU: How much trust you personally have in: The European Union
NL: How much trust you personally have in: The Dutch House of Representatives
(Scored on a range 0-10)

For policy[8]:
EU: The European integration has gone too far[9]
(scored 1-5)
NL: Overall, how do you think the Netherlands is faring? Do you think that things are heading in the wrong direction or in the right direction?
(scored 1-4)

This leads to the following plot of the means of EU differentials.

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[7]Made accessible in the LISS Data Archive. Dataset used of the survey held in week 14-16, right after the referendum.
[8] As you can see for policy the EU question is formulated negatively and on a different range than the NL question, so for comparison reasons I reversed and computed the scores to a range 1-4
[9] I use this question because De Vries (2018) uses the same question in her research to measure EU policy support

Graph 4.4. – *Plot of the means of the for and against voters*
(Y=EU Regime differential, X= EU Policy differential. Standard deviations shown)

This table shows that for both 'For' voters and for 'Against' voters in NRR's survey, the EU differentials are negative, both on regime and policy. This means that the respondents on average all evaluate their national regime and policy as better than the EU policy and regime. Because 'Yes' voters on average have negative EU differentials, I reject hypothesis C.1. *'Yes' voters will on average have a positive EU differential in regime and policy.* and because 'No' voters on average have negative EU differentials I accept hypothesis C.2. *'No' voters will on average have a negative EU differential in regime and policy.*

It is also clear that the EU differentials of 'Against' voters are on average significantly greater than the EU differentials of 'For' voters. This means that 'Against' voters evaluate their own countries' policy and regime as more positive, compared to the EU policy and regime, than 'For' voters. Differently said, the 'Against' voters experience a larger gap between quality of the EU and the quality of their own country, both when it comes to policy and regime. I therefore accept hypothesis C.3. *The differential for 'No' voters will be more negative than the differential for 'Yes' voters.*

A very cautious comparison can be made between this plot of the position of 'Yes' and 'No' voters and the plot of the position of the Netherlands in the research from De Vries (see figure 2. in subsection 2.4). The averages of the EU differentials from the participants of the NRR survey are more negative than the position shown of the Netherlands in Figure 4. This could be an indication that between 2014 and 2016 the Netherlands' EU regime differential has increased. Although this difference could also be caused by the selection of people that participated in the referendum and the NRR survey.

	Policy Sceptics	Loyal Supporters
For	22%	32%
Against	32%	14%
	Exit Sceptics	Regime Sceptics
For	26%	20%
Against	48%	7%

Table 4.10 – *Voters shown in scepticism categories*
(all for votes = 100% and all against votes = 100%)

Table 4.10 shows what kind of sceptics the voters are, as a parallel to figure 1 in subsection 2.4. Interestingly, 'For' voters are spread over all four forms of scepticism, and the majority are sceptic on regime, policy or both (68%). But also, as can be expected, a large group are loyal supporters. As for the 'Against' voters, almost all are sceptical of the policies of the EU (80% in total) and a majority is sceptical of the EU regime (55%). The largest group are both, thus Exit Sceptics (48%). As 'Yes' voters belong to the group of loyal supporters more often than 'No' voters, I accept hypothesis C.4. *'Yes' voters will belong to the group of 'loyal supporters' more often than 'No' voters.* And as 'No' voters more often belong to the group of Exit Sceptics, I accept hypothesis C.5. *'No' voters will more often belong to the group of 'exit sceptics' than 'Yes' voters.*

5.7 Conclusion Analysis with EU Differentials

The analysis on the basis of EU differentials shows that on average, all voters in the NRR survey have more trust in their national government than in the EU. According to De Vries' theory, they can on average be categorized as Exit Sceptic. At the same time there is a significant difference between the 'Yes' voters and the 'No' voters, because the latter experience a larger gap between the quality of their national state and the quality EU. Also important to note that the 'Yes' voters are more evenly divided over the four categories of EU supporters, while the 'No' voters are concentrated on the sceptic sides of the model. On the basis of De Vries' theory, reasoning that countries that trust their own government less, see the EU as a safety net, I can conclude that the Dutch voters in the Ukraine referendum do not consider the EU a safety net or *lifeboat* (See De Vries 2018 in subsection 2.4).

Chapter 6. - Conclusion

In general, the analysis of my dataset is in line with the voting motivations and the correlations that were found by the NRR. In my dataset, the correlation between a positive opinion of the EU, and believing that this association agreement is positive for Ukraine, have the strongest and almost equal correlation with a 'Yes' vote. NRR found that trust in Ukraine and distrust in Russia have the strongest correlation with a 'Yes' vote. In my data I found that 'being afraid of tensions with Russia' has a correlation with the voting outcome, but it is the weakest of the factors measured. An interesting new insight is that, in my data set, the 'Yes' voters agree more among each other on every question than the 'No' voters. The 'No' voters are more divided in opinions on Ukraine, Russia, political trust and the EU. This could indicate that there were people voting against the association agreement among every group in society, while the people that voted in favour were mostly from the group of people that generally has faith in politics and is moderately positive about the EU. This is interesting in comparison to the conclusion from Steenvoorden *et al* (2016), that only the optimistic and the most pessimistic voters came out. (see subsection 1.2). For my research this can be concluded at least for the 'Yes' voters. So both the regression analysis as The frequency tables in previous chapter show that for my data set, the most distinguishing factor between voting Yes and No, is if the voters thinks that the association agreement in good for Ukraine. Closely followed by faith in politics and trust in the EU. This marks the main difference between 'Yes' and 'No' voters in Heemskerk.

The analysis of my dataset with a multidimensional approach shows that not all dimensions distinguished by Van Spanje and De Vreese (2011) significantly tap into the voting behaviour in Heemskerk. The dimensions which do are 'perceived utility of the EU' and 'opposition to further integration of the EU'. This is partly in line with the results that Van Spanje and De Vreese (2011) found during the EU election of 2009, because they found that all dimensions had "an impact on the vote"(p.423). But they do also conclude that "In terms of relative importance, dimensions 4 (strengthening integration) and 2 (the EU's utility) in particular stand out as key predictors of Eurosceptic voting." (p.423) On the basis of the notion by Van Spanje and De Vreese (2011) that "some attitudes are more important in some contexts than others" (p.424), I expected integration to be the strongest dimension, seeing that future membership of Ukraine was a topic in the campaign. My dataset, however, shows that by far, perceived utility is the dimension with the strongest correlation with the voting outcome. The dimension 'utility' is also the only dimension which on its own strengthens the predictive value of my model. Additionally, for my dataset, perceived utility has the highest value in the regression when measured together with the original four factors; stronger than being positive about the EU and even slightly stronger than being positive about Ukraine, though the difference is not significant. This suggests that the voters in Heemskerk were mostly weighing the economic influence (that influences utility) of the association agreement, and less the integrational influence.

An analysis of the dataset from the NRR with the model of the benchmark theory shows that both 'Yes' voters and 'No' voters on average have a higher trust in the national government than in the EU, both for regime- and policy-related opinions. Important is to note that for 'No' voters the EU differential is much larger. So 'No' voters experience a significantly larger gap between the quality of their national government and the quality of the EU. But it also has to be said that for both groups of voters, the EU is not a so called *lifeboat*, which means that the dataset from the NRR shows no incentive for the Dutch citizen to be part of the EU as a failsafe for their own government. This is important to note, because the essence of De Vries' theory is that the distinguishing factor of considering to leave the EU is not the degree of positivity about the EU, but the calculation of how good the country would be off without the EU, and the difference between in or out. The results of this research show that in 2016 both 'Yes' and 'No' voters think higher of their own government than of the EU. This might suggest that, in accordance with De Vries' theory, this would create fruitful soil for thoughts about exiting the EU. I do not conclude this, because De Vries also showed that the distinguishing difference for a 'Stay' or 'Leave' vote during the Brexit referendum was not so much made by a difference of opinion of the voter on migration or economics (though these were the main topics) but by a difference of priority on these two issues. Combining this knowledge with the conclusion that utility came out as a stronger factor for voting behaviour than integration, I could cautiously conclude that this indicates that the voter in this referendum (at least in Heemskerk) gives utility more priority than (opposition to) further integration. Which makes a distinguishing difference with the voting motivations of the British during Brexit.

To clarify, combining the analysis and theory, I can cautiously (see discussion) conclude that this thesis adds the following information to the NRR's conclusions. For the 'Yes' voters, alongside the people who believe that this association agreement is positive for Ukraine and the group that is positive about the European Union, there is also a group of 'Yes' voters for whom believing that the Netherlands benefits from the EU was a separate strong motivation for the 'Yes' vote. For the 'No' voters, generally speaking, next to not believing that this association agreement is not positive for Ukraine or not being positive about the EU, a separate, strong motivation was not believing that the Netherlands benefits from the EU. Add to this that on average the 'No' voters had a larger negative EU differential on both policy and regime, and they are therefore strong Exit Sceptics by the definition that De Vries uses.

Therefore, there is a group of voters in my dataset who, even though they do not need the EU as a lifeboat, and they might only think moderately positively about the EU, they do believe that the Netherlands benefits from membership in the EU and with that, they are willing to support the association agreement with Ukraine. On the other side there is a group of voters in my dataset who do not believe in the utility of the EU and are not willing to support the association agreement with Ukraine, adding that a large group also does not believe the agreement is positive for Ukraine.

On the basis of this conclusion, in the scope of my dataset, the most distinguishing factors between 'Yes' and 'No' voters, were first of all their ideas about if this association agreement is a good thing for Ukraine. Second, their perceived utility of the EU had an important role. And, different from the British voting in Brexit, it seems that the Dutch priorities utility over integration. This means that during the Ukraine Referendum the voters have sent the Dutch government a strong message: Being convinced of the profit for the Netherlands is what counts in participation with the EU. So they ask the government to show what the EU brings, to make sure that citizens can see what they gain from membership of the EU and that it keeps bringing people this utility, because this is a dimension separate from trust or positivity in the EU which leads to consent with this international agreement which is important to the EU. When this utility is no longer convincing, or the priorities shift (as they shifted for the British voters during the Brexit referendum), the Netherlands could be the next in line wanting to leave the EU because there is on average less trust in the EU regime and policy than in the national one.

Lastly, looking at what the government did with the results of the referendum, adding the legally binding annex to the agreement, this answers mostly to the fear of some voters that Ukraine would become part of the EU. Looking at the conclusions of this Thesis, the government is advised to focus more on two other things, to gain support for the association agreement: 1. Show that the association agreement really serves the interests of Ukraine. 2. Show that the Netherlands benefits from EU membership.

Chapter 7. - Discussion

This thesis has its limitations and gives opportunities for further research. The most significant are discussed in this chapter.

First, the data for this thesis was collected in 2016. Significant events have happened since on the topic of Euroscepticism, the most important being the Brexit referendum and its lengthy aftermath. This could have caused citizens of the Netherlands to have changed their mind on the EU. By including De Vries' theory in this thesis, I have tried to at least analyse the Ukraine Referendum on the basis of a theory developed with new knowledge gained by this significant event.

Second, the method of data collection is new and experimental. As already discussed in the method chapter (4), this brings limitations. I would like to see this thesis as a first attempt to introduce a way of forming a representative research group with the help of average towns. This could give opportunities for more reliable datasets with smaller numbers of participants, but it should still be thoroughly researched if this is indeed the case. The current data selection shows an overrepresentation of people with the age 50+. I do recommend for the reader to look into Appendix A for a more detailed description of the survey group and its comparability of the outcome of the survey with the national outcome.

Third, the survey itself had its limitations. The survey was long (47 questions) and participants complained about the time it took to complete. This may have caused less carefully chosen answers. If I would do this research over, I would ask a few different questions (for example tapping into perceived economic benefit of the association agreement and the EU) and would leave a large part of the questions out. I only used a small selection of the data gained from my survey, which leaves open possibilities for further research.

Within the used data, the factor on thoughts about Russia shows to be difficult to measure. Both in the analyses of the NRR and in my analysis, it is seen that respondents give a high variation of answers on questions relating to Russia. It would be an interesting topic for additional research to dive deeper into this factor. My dataset contains additional questions that could be analysed in further research.

The analysis makes use of both my own dataset and the dataset of the NRR. I have been careful to not directly combine this analysis within the chapter. For my conclusion, I took more freedom to combine the conclusions of both analyses, because this gives a broader view on the value of this thesis.

For further research I think it would be interesting to dive into the balance between the benefits of being part of a group (the EU), which on one side provides safety, mitigates risks (much like insurance), and allows members to collectively gain far greater prosperity and

influence on a world stage. On the other side, being part of the EU limits the influence within the own country, for example on migration. The Netherlands seems to experience that it does not need the safety of the EU (people do not experience it as a lifeboat) but does value the collective ability to gain prosperity and world influence, and the Dutch citizens give this priority. When this is no longer experienced as effective, the balance of these priorities could shift. For further research it would be interesting to find where this balance is according to the Dutch citizens, for example by using survey questions with these balances in them.

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Appendix A.

This appendix consists of a more thorough comparison of the demographics and the voting behaviour of The Netherlands, Heemskerk and my survey respondents.

Comparison between the population of the Netherlands and the population of Heemskerk

CBS 2016	**The Netherlands**	**Heemskerk**	**Difference**
Population total	16.979.120	39.299	
% Men	49,6%	49,1%	0,5 pp
%Women	50,4%	50,9%	-0,5 pp
Average age in years	41,5	43,4	-1,9
Average age women	42,3	44,4	-2,1
Average age men	40,6	42,3	-1,7
Population density people/km^2	409,6	1.240	-830,4
population age 15-24	12,3%	12,0%	0,3 pp
Population age 25-34	12,3%	10,3%	2,0 pp
Population age 35-44	12,5%	11,3%	1,2 pp
Population age 45-54	15,1%	16,0%	-0,9 pp
Population age 55-64	13,1%	14,0%	-0,9 pp
Population age 65-74	10,5%	11,0%	-0,5 pp
Population age 75-84	5,6%	7,4%	-1,8 pp
Population age 85+	2,1%	2,4%	-0,3 pp
% Natives	77,9%	80,9%	-3,0 pp
% Allochthones	22,1%	19,1%	3,0 pp
% Western allochthones	9,8%	9,3%	0,5 pp
% non-Western allochthones	12,3%	9,8%	2,5 pp

Table A1. Heemskerk-the Netherlands population comparison, gender, age and origins.

As can be seen in Table 1. The composition of the Heemskerk population and the composition population of the Netherlands as a whole, differs 0,5 percentage point when it comes to gender, less than 2 years when it comes to mean age and less than 2 percentage point when it comes to age groups. What can be seen is that the population in Heemskerk is older, because age groups up to 44 are underrepresented and age groups from 45 are overrepresented. Heemskerk has slightly more non-western allochthones than the Netherlands as a whole, 2,5 percentage point more. The only big difference is the population density. Heemskerk is three times more densely populated than the Netherlands as a whole. In the Netherlands, the population is quite concentrated in the area at the coast, so there aren't many places where there is an average population density. I have no reason to assume that a difference in population density will influence the opinion, when other factors are alike.

	The Netherlands	**Heemskerk**	**Difference**
CBS 2016			

Nett employment [%]	65,80%	67,50%	-1,7 pp
Bruto employment [%]	70,10%	71,50%	-1,4 pp
Nett employment natives [%]	67,40%	69,20%	-1,8 pp
Nett employment allochthones [%]	59,90%	60,30%	-0,4 pp
Unemployment rate [%]	6,10%	5,60%	0,5 pp
Working population (as a percentage of the total population between 15-65)	80,50%	84%	-3,5 pp
Low educated working population (as an percentage of the total population between 15-65)	17,60%	20%	-2,4 pp
Secondary educated working population (as an percentage of the total population between 15-65)	33,90%	40%	-6,1 pp
High educated working population (as an percentage of the total population between 15-65)	28%	24%	4,0 pp

Table A2a. Heemskerk-the Netherlands population comparison, employment, working population, education. (Source: Waarstaatjegemeente.nl[10])

As shown in table 2a. The employment figures in Heemskerk and the Netherlands differ max. 2 percentage point. The working population (shown as a percentage of the population between 15-65) seems slightly bigger in Heemskerk (3,5 pp), but this is a bit distorted by the fact that the total population between 15-65 is slightly bigger in the Netherlands. The same goes for the education of the working population, because these are number related to the total work population. The absolute percentages are shown in table 2b. In table 2b it is shown that the difference between the education average in Heemskerk and the education average in the Netherlands is mostly in the secondary and higher educated group. In Heemskerk there are 3 pp less high educated people in the working population and 3,3 percentage point more Secondary educated people.

CBS2016	**The Netherlands**	**Heemskerk**	**Difference**
Population age 15-65	65,3%	63,6%	1,7 pp
Working population between 15-65 (as a percentage of the total population)	52,6%	53,4%	-0,8 pp
Low educated working population between 15-65 (as a percentage of the total population)	11,5%	12,7%	-1,2 pp
Secondary educated working population between 15-65 (as a percentage of the total population)	22,1%	25,4%	-3,3 pp
High educated working population between 15-65 (as a percentage of the total population)	18,3%	15,3%	3,0 pp

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https://www.waarstaatjegemeente.nl/jive?cat_open_var=bbondl_pdi&var=bbondl_pdi&geolevel=gemeente&favorite=gemeente_396) last viewed 10-02-2023

Table A2b. Heemskerk-the Netherlands population comparison, employment, working population, education, in absolute percentages.

Thirdly, the house prices and housing situation in Heemskerk compared to the Netherlands.

CBS 2016	The Netherlands	Heemskerk	Difference
Average valuation of houses	€209.000	€213.000	1,9 pp
House ownership	56,20%	53,60%	2,6 pp
Private rent	13,60%	13,90%	-0,3 pp
Social rent	30,30%	32,60%	-2,3 pp
Living alone	37,60%	33,40%	4,2 pp
Living together without children	29%	30,60%	-1,6 pp
Living with children	33,40%	36%	-2,6 pp

Table A3. Heemskerk-the Netherlands population comparison, House prices, ownership, households

In table 3. is shown that in Heemskerk there are 2,6 percentage point less house owners, 2,3 pp more social rent, 4,2 pp less people living alone and 2,6 pp more people living with children compared to the Netherlands as a whole.

My conclusion from this analysis of the municipality of Heemskerk based on the categories of population, gender, age, employment, education, housing and households, is that Heemskerk is to a large extent representative for the Netherlands as a whole. The differences in most factors are smaller than 2 percentage point and no larger than 4,2 pp. Concluding this, it is time to look at the voting behaviour of the Heemskerk population, to see if this is also representative of the Netherlands to a large extent.

Earlier voting results compared

To analyse the representativeness of the voting behaviour in Heemskerk, I will compare the results of four elections to the results of the Netherlands as a whole. For this comparison I take the three most recent elections for the national parliament and the election for the European Union. Due to the fact that in local and provincial elections different political parties participate in different regions, these elections are not suitable for comparison. I compare the results elections for the national parliament of 2010, 2012 and 2017, and the EU election of 2014[11].

Parliamentary elections 2010			Absolute	Relative
	The Netherlands	Heemskerk	Difference	Difference
Political party	Votes	Votes	NL-HK	NL-HK
CDA *(Christian Democrats)*	13,61%	13,11%	0,50 pp	3,67%
PvdA *(labour)*	19,63%	19,32%	0,31 pp	1,58%
SP *(Socialistist party)*	9,82%	10,32%	-0,50 pp	-5,09%
VVD *(Liberals)*	20,49%	21,71%	-1,22 pp	-5,95%
PVV (Partij for freedom)	15,45%	16,55%	-1,10 pp	-7,12%
GroenLinks (green left)	6,67%	7,59%	-0,92 pp	-13,79%

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[11] Data from: http://www.verkiezingsuitslagen.nl/ for the national results and http://www.verkiezingen-heemskerk.nl/ for the Heemskerk results

ChristenUnie (christians)	3,24%	1,41%	1,83 pp	56,48%
D66 *(social liberals)*	6,95%	6,92%	0,03 pp	0,43%
PvdD (party for animals)	1,30%	1,60%	-0,30 pp	-23,08%
Piratenpartij (pirates party)	0,11%	0,13%	-0,02 pp	-18,18%
SGP (conservative christians)	1,74%	0,09%	1,65 pp	94,83%

Table A4a. Election results Heemskerk-the Netherlands, parliamentary elections 2010

Parliamentary elections 2012			Absolute	Relative
	The Netherlands	Heemskerk	Difference	Difference
Political party	**Votes**	**Votes**	**NL-HK**	**NL-HK**
VVD	26,58%	28,21%	-1,63 pp	-6,13%
PvdA	24,84%	26,13%	-1,29 pp	-5,19%
PVV	10,08%	10,80%	-0,72 pp	-7,14%
SP	9,65%	9,78%	-0,13 pp	-1,35%
CDA	8,51%	7,94%	0,57 pp	6,70%
D66	8,03%	7,13%	0,90 pp	11,21%
50PLUS	1,88%	2,80%	-0,92 pp	-48,94%
Partij voor de Dieren	1,93%	2,44%	-0,51 pp	-26,42%
GROENLINKS	2,33%	2,12%	0,21 pp	9,01%
ChristenUnie	3,13%	1,29%	1,84 pp	58,79%
Piratenpartij	0,32%	0,39%	-0,07 pp	-21,88%
SGP	2,09%	0,17%	1,92 pp	91,87%

Table A4b. Election results Heemskerk-the Netherlands, parliamentary elections 2012

European Parliament elections 2014			Absolute	Relative
	The Netherlands	Heemskerk	Difference	Difference
Political party	**votes**	**Votes**	**NL-HK**	**NL-HK**
PVV	13,32%	15,92%	-2,60 pp	-19,52%
D66 – ALDE	15,48%	15,76%	-0,28 pp	-1,81%
CDA - Europese Volkspartij	15,18%	14,50%	0,68 pp	4,48%
PvdA/Europese Sociaaldemocraten	9,40%	10,82%	-1,42 pp	-15,11%
VVD	12,02%	10,80%	1,22 pp	10,15%
SP	9,64%	10,77%	-1,13 pp	-11,72%
GROENLINKS	6,98%	6,74%	0,24 pp	3,44%
50PLUS	3,69%	4,84%	-1,15 pp	-31,17%
PvdD	4,21%	4,53%	-0,32 pp	-7,60%
ChristenUnie-SGP	7,67%	2,28%	5,39 pp	70,27%
Piratenpartij	0,85%	0,96%	-0,11 pp	-12,94%

Table A4c. Election results Heemskerk-the Netherlands, European Parliament elections 2014

Parliamentary elections 2017			Absolute	Relative
	The Netherlands	Heemskerk	Difference	Difference
Political Party	**Votes**	**Votes**	**NL-HK**	**NL-HK**
VVD	21,20%	24,10%	-2,90 pp	-13,68%
PVV	13,00%	13,80%	-0,80 pp	-6,15%
D66	12,20%	12,20%	0,00 pp	0,00%
CDA	12,40%	10,70%	1,70 pp	13,71%
SP	9,10%	9,50%	-0,40 pp	-4,40%
GroenLinks	9,10%	9,20%	-0,10 pp	-1,10%
PvdA	5,70%	6,30%	-0,60 pp	-10,53%
50Plus	3,10%	4,10%	-1,00 pp	-32,26%
PvdD	3,20%	3,20%	0,00 pp	0,00%
FvD (forum for Democracy)	1,80%	2,40%	-0,60 pp	-33,33%
DENK (THINK)	2,00%	1,50%	0,50 pp	25,00%
ChristenUnie	3,40%	1,40%	2,00 pp	58,82%
VNL (for the Netherlands)	0,40%	0,50%	-0,10 pp	-25,00%
Piratenpartij	0,30%	0,40%	-0,10 pp	-33,33%
SGP	2,10%	0,20%	1,90 pp	90,48%

Table A4d. Election results Heemskerk-the Netherlands, parliamentary elections 2017

When starting this research, only tables 4a-c. were considered, because the parliamentary elections of 2017 took place after the referendum. The 2017 results are put in this paper because it shows that the similarity of election results between Heemskerk and the Netherlands is still there up until the last elections.

As can be seen in table 4a-d. the results of the elections in Heemskerk and the results of the Netherlands as a whole generally differ less than 2 percentage points. Of course relative differences (negative or positive difference of Heemskerk as a percentage of the result for the Netherlands as a whole) are only relevant for the bigger parties, because with smaller parties a minor difference already means a large percentage. What we cán see with these relative differences is that the voting behaviour of Heemskerk is not representative for the Christian parties *ChristenUnie* and *SGP.* At all analysed elections, the difference for Christenunie is 60% and for SGP 90%. Conservative Christian votes in the Netherlands are concentrated in a few areas, called 'the Bible belt'. We must conclude that Heemskerk is not representative in voting for these two parties.

Above this, during the European Parliamentary elections of 2014 there was a 2,6 pp difference between national voting for the PVV and the voters in Heemskerk, so almost 20% above average votes for PVV in Heemskerk. And in 2017 almost 14% (2,9pp) more votes for VVD in Heemskerk than national and almost 14% (1,7 pp) less to CDA.

Lastly, the turn out numbers can be compared:

Voters turnout	The Netherlands	Heemskerk	Difference
Parliament 2010	75,40%	75,28%	0,12 pp
Parliament 2012	74,47%	75,19%	-0,72 pp
European Parliament 2014	37,32%	35,15%	2,17 pp

Parliament 2017	81,40%	81,90%	-0,50 pp

Table A5. Voters turnout compared.

In table 5. We see that the voters turn outs are quite similar, but the turnout at the European Parliament elections were 2,17 pp less in Heemskerk.

Considering this, I conclude that there are enough similarities in population and in voting behaviour to justify that Heemskerk can to a great extent be seen as representative to research to measure the opinion of the Netherlands as a whole. We do have to take into account that the population density is four times higher and that conservative Christian parties are underrepresented.
Also we have to keep in consideration that the differences were slightly bigger at the European Elections than at national elections, both in terms of the result and the turnout.

4.3 representativeness of the polling stations

For the execution of the research I have a group of volunteers that took shifts at polling stations to ask voters to fill in the survey. I had the capacity to man three polling stations. I analysed the different polling stations to see which have the most representative outcome. I found three polling stations that, when the results are taken together, have the most similar result as Heemskerk as a whole. These polling stations are: Heemskerk polling station 2: Nursing Home *Meerstate*, polling station 7: City Hall Heemskerk and polling station 8: Living community *Burisbeek*.

Parliamentary elections 2010				
	The Netherlands	Heemskerk	Polling stations 2+7+8	Absolute difference
Political party	**Votes**	**Votes**	**Votes**	**NL-Ps2+7+8**
CDA *(Christian Democrats)*	13,61%	13,11%	14,06%	-0,45 pp
PvdA *(labour)*	19,63%	19,32%	18,12%	1,51 pp
SP *(Socialistist party)*	9,82%	10,32%	10,13%	-0,31 pp
VVD *(Liberals)*	20,49%	21,71%	21,64%	-1,15 pp
PVV (Partij for freedom)	15,45%	16,55%	16,43%	-0,98 pp
GroenLinks (green left)	6,67%	7,59%	7,83%	-1,16 pp
ChristenUnie (christians)	3,24%	1,41%	1,46%	1,78 pp
D66 *(social liberals)*	6,95%	6,92%	6,81%	0,14 pp
PvdD (party for animals)	1,30%	1,60%	1,77%	-0,47 pp
Piratenpartij (pirates party)	0,11%	0,13%	0,20%	-0,09 pp
SGP (conservative christians)	1,74%	0,09%	0,11%	1,63 pp

Table A6a. 2010 voting compared with polling stations 2+7+8

Parliamentary elections 2012				
	The Netherlands	Heemskerk	Polling stations 2+7+8	Absolute difference
Political party	**Votes**	**Votes**	**Votes**	**NL-Ps2+7+8**
VVD	26,58%	28,21%	28,21%	-1,63 pp
PvdA	24,84%	26,13%	25,50%	-0,66 pp

PVV	10,08%	10,80%	9,13%	0,95 pp
SP	9,65%	9,78%	10,38%	-0,73 pp
CDA	8,51%	7,94%	9,42%	-0,91 pp
D66	8,03%	7,13%	6,80%	1,23 pp
50PLUS	1,88%	2,80%	2,73%	-0,85 pp
Partij voor de Dieren	1,93%	2,44%	2,84%	-0,91 pp
GROENLINKS	2,33%	2,12%	2,24%	0,09 pp
ChristenUnie	3,13%	1,29%	1,36%	1,77 pp
Piratenpartij	0,32%	0,39%	0,38%	-0,06 pp
SGP	2,09%	0,17%	0,21%	1,88 pp

Table A6b. 2012NP voting results compared with polling stations 2+7+8

European Parliament elections 2014				
	The Netherlands	Heemskerk	Polling stations 2+7+8	Absolute difference
Political party	**votes**	**Votes**	**Votes**	**NL-Ps2+7+8**
PVV	13,32%	15,92%	15,17%	-1,85 pp
D66 – ALDE	15,48%	15,76%	15,52%	-0,04 pp
CDA - Europese Volkspartij	15,18%	14,50%	15,88%	-0,70 pp
PvdA/Europese Sociaaldemocraten	9,40%	10,82%	10,61%	-1,21 pp
VVD	12,02%	10,80%	11,50%	0,52 pp
SP	9,64%	10,77%	10,08%	-0,44 pp
GROENLINKS	6,98%	6,74%	7,21%	-0,23 pp
50PLUS	3,69%	4,84%	4,07%	-0,38 pp
PvdD	4,21%	4,53%	5,17%	-0,96 pp
ChristenUnie-SGP	7,67%	2,28%	1,59%	6,08 pp
Piratenpartij	0,85%	0,96%	0,97%	-0,12 pp

Table A6c. 2014EP voting results compared with polling stations 2+7+8

(The results per polling station of the 2017 parliamentary elections are not available (yet), so I cannot compare those with the national outcome.)

When we look at table 6a-c we can see that the three polling stations chosen together represent a result in these elections that is very similar to the national result. The differences in voting behaviour are all smaller than 2 percent point, except for the Christian parties *ChristenUnie* and *SGP* during the EP2014 elections. As earlier mentioned, this research group has an underrepresentation for supporters of these parties.

Conclusion usability of the method

To come to a representative research group for my survey on voting motivations for the Ukraine referendum, I analysed 'middle town' Heemskerk. The outcome of this analysis is that the

municipality has a population composition that is very much like that of the Netherlands as a whole. First I showed the similarities when it comes to age, gender, origin, income, housing etc. (tables 1,2,3). Then I analysed the election results from the last four national elections, which showed that the voting behaviour of Heemskerk is very similar to the national voting behaviour (tables 4,5). Due to the capacity of my research, I limit my research to three polling stations. In tables 6a-c I showed that the three polling stations chosen together had election results that are much alike to the national outcome. Actually the voting results of the three polling stations are more alike to the national outcome than the voting results of Heemskerk as a whole.

This method does have its limitations. First of all, though the composition of the Heemskerk population is the same as the population of the Netherlands, I cannot be sure that the voters that come to the three polling stations also have this composition, as I only have information on their voting behaviour. Second of all the survey is voluntary and I cannot control that certain groups will participate more than others. Thirdly the voters for conservative Christian parties *SGP* and *ChristenUnie* are underrepresented in Heemskerk, so I expect this group to be underrepresented in my survey.

Taking this all into account, , I have enough indications from the analysis of the composition of the Heemskerk population and the Heemskerk voting behaviour to expect that a survey conducted at the three chosen polling station will to a large extent be representative for the voters in the Netherlands. Therefore this survey was held in the hall of three polling stations in Heemskerk, on the 6th of April 2016.

Representativeness of the research group, analysed after the survey took place

In total, 541 surveys were completed. In the first part of this paragraph I will show the incompleteness , indistinctness and mistakes of my data.
After this I first show the composition of my research group of 541 Heemskerk citizens. I will compare this to the composition of the population of Heemskerk and to the population of the Netherlands. Next I will show the voting behaviour of my research group, compared to Heemskerk and the Netherlands.

Missing Data

Out of all surveys, 431 are filled in completely. 110 have missing values. Most of these missing values are the ages of the participant. Due to the lay out of the survey, this question was easily overlooked. When this was noticed during the execution of the research, the volunteers pointed out to the participants to fill in this question. In total, 59 surveys have a missing value on the age question.
A different reason for the missing values can be that the survey was quite long and contained several pages. Seeing that several surveys are stopped halfway, this could be an indication that participants thought the survey was too long. This was also feedback given by participants when handing in the survey to my volunteers. Also, some participants seem to have missed a page.
Lastly, Some questions might have been too hard or too briskly formulated according to some participants and some participants might have left questions open because they did not know what to answer. I will come back to the consequences of this in the analysis of my results.

Composition of the research group compared with the national turn out

In the survey, participants were asked to fill in their sex, their age, their level of education and which party they would vote if there were parliamentary elections. I can now compare these results with the data from the *Nationaal Referendum Onderzoek* (National Referendum Research) by Jacobs et al[2016].

First I look at the proportion of men and women that filled in the survey.

Sex	National turn out (NTO)[12]	Survey	Difference NTO-Survey
% Men	54,2%	54,5%	-0,3 pp
%Women	45,8%	45,5%	0,3 pp

Table A7a. turn out and survey compared, sex.

In table 7a. we can see that the gender composition of my sample is as good as the same as the national turn out.

Age	Netherlands 100% = 25-65+	Heemskerk 100% = 25-65+	Difference NL-HK	National Turn out[13] 100% = 25-65+	Survey 100% = 25-65+	Difference NTO - survey
18-24						
25-34	17,3%	14,2%	**3,1 pp**	13,7%	12,9%	**0,8 pp**
35-44	17,6%	15,6%	**2,0 pp**	12,5%	10,5%	**2,0 pp**
45-54	21,2%	22,1%	**-0,9 pp**	20,5%	18,9%	**1,6 pp**
55-64	18,4%	19,3%	**-0,9 pp**	21,9%	24,5%	**-2,6 pp**
65+	25,5%	28,7%	**-3,2 pp**	31,4%	33,1%	**-1,7 pp**
Total				100%	100%	

A7c. National turn out and survey compared, age groups

To be able to compare, in table 7c I recalculated the ages from table 1 in such a way that age groups 25-65+ are 100%. This was necessary because the younger age group from CBS starts at 15 and because voting age is 18, my groups start at 18. Therefore, I can only compare the percentages of the age groups starting from 25-34.

As can be seen in table 7c., the survey has an underrepresentation of 0,8 pp, 2,0 pp and 1,6 pp in the age groups 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, compared to the national turn out according to Jacobs et al[2016]. For the first two groups this can be explained by the fact that Heemskerk has an underrepresentation

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[12] Data from Jacobs et al[2016] corrected for national men/women rate according to CBS2016
[13] Data from Jacobs et al[2016] corrected for national age rate according to CBS2016

of these age groups compared to national (3,1 pp and 2,0 pp). The underrepresentation of the age group 25-34 is less then would be expected. So either this group turned up more at the surveyed polling stations than nationally or in this age group the willingness to fill in the survey was relatively high. The age group 45-54 is overrepresented in Heemskerk, but underrepresented in the survey. So either this age group turned up less at the surveyed polling stations than nationally or the willingness of people in this age group to fill in the survey was relatively low.

Also in table 7c. it can be seen that the survey has an overrepresentation of the age groups 55-64 and 65+ of respectively 2,6 pp and 1,7 pp. This can partly be explained by the fact that Heemskerk has an overrepresentation for these groups compared to the Netherlands as a whole. The overrepresentation for the age group 55-64 is larger than expected, so either this group turned up less at the surveyed polling stations than nationally or this group was less willing to fill in the survey. The overrepresentation for the age group 65+ is smaller than expected, so either this age group turned up to vote more at the surveyed polling stations or this age group was more willing to fill in the survey.

In graph 1. Shows that partly the differences in age groups between the Netherlands and Heemskerk are also seen in the difference between the national turn out and the participant of the survey.

Graph A1. Age groups compared for the Netherlands, Heemskerk, the national turn out and the survey.

Thirdly, I would like to compare the level of education of the turnout according to Jacobs et al[2016] and the participants of my survey. Unfortunately this is not possible because CBS2016 and Jacobs et al[2016] use different categorisations for education levels.
I can only look at the proportion of low, middle and highly educated working population[14] in the Netherlands and Heemskerk and the proportion of low, middle and highly educated participants.

_____

[14] For definitions of low, middle and high education from CBS, see:
https://www.waarstaatjegemeente.nl/info/CbsArbeidsdeelname.html?rnd=1504725720422. The same definition is used for the survey data.

Even though this is far from precise, it can give an some indication of how representative my group is when it comes to education. For the Netherlands and Heemskerk, the numbers from table 2b. are used.

CBS 2016	Netherlands	Netherlands Working pop. betw. 15-65 = 100%	Heemskerk	Heemskerk Working pop. betw. 15-65 = 100%	Survey	
Working population between 15-65 (as a percentage of the total pop.)	52,6%	**100%**	53,4%	**100%**	Participants between 18-64	**100%**
Low educated working population between 15-65 (as a percentage of the total pop.)	11,5%	**21,9%**	12,7%	**23,8%**	Low educated	**14,2%**
Secondary educated working population between 15-65 (as a percentage of the total pop.)	22,1%	**42,0%**	25,4%	**47,6%**	Secondary educated	**43,6%**
High educated working population between 15-65 (as a percentage of the total pop.)	18,3%	**35,0%**	15,3%	**28,7%**	High educated	**42,1%**

Table A8a. Ratio of working population education level in the Netherlands and Heemskerk.

Table A8b. Ratio of survey participants education level.

Table 8a. and 8b. give an indication that my survey is filled in more by people with a higher education and less by people with a lower education. This cannot be said with certainty, as the data is not comparable.

Jacobs et al[2016] shows the turnout divided by degree of education.

Level of Education	low education	Low education	Secondary education	Secondary education	High education	High education
Dutch degree	Elementary school	VMBO	HAVO/VWO	MBO	HBO	WO
Voted	22,7%	32,6%	34,75	30,0%	37,0%	30,5%
Did not vote	77,3%	67,4%	65,3%	70,0%	63,0%	69,5%

Table A10. turnout divided by educational level

Table 10 shows that the turn out differs per education, but not to the same extend as it does in my survey. So even though these statistics are not comparable with the CBS2016 database due to different categorisation, what can be seen is that the large underrepresentation of low educated people in my survey can only to a small extent be explained by the different voter turnout for this group.

Conclusion and discussion on representativeness of the survey

As shown in paragraph 5.3 the man-women representation of this survey highly similar to the national turn out according to Jacobs et al[2016]. When it comes to age, this survey has an underrepresentation between 0,8 and 2,0 pp for ages up to 54 and an overrepresentation between 1,7 and 2,6 pp for people over 54 years old. For education, on the basis of the available information it cannot be said of the survey is comparable to the national turn out. The analysis in paragraph 5.3 gives an indication that low educated people are underrepresented in this survey.

There are two possible reasons why the survey is not completely representative for the national turn out. First of all, I do not have information on the composition of the turnout in Heemskerk nor at the three polling stations where the survey was held. Second of all the group that filled in the survey could be different from the group that turned out to vote at the three polling stations. On this last reason the following can be said:
In total, 2312 people voted at the three investigated polling stations. 541 filled in the survey. So 23,4% of my potential research group participated. Apart from the most busy moments at the polling stations, during which the research capacity was insufficient, every voter at the polling station was asked to fill in the survey. So all voters, and when too busy, a random selection of voters were asked to participate. The researchers did not collect any data from the people who were not willing to participate. Therefore the following information about this group is purely based on the observation of the researchers.
Noticeable is that during the morning (pre-work hours) and during dinner time (post-working hours), the willingness to fill in the survey was lower than during daytime and in the evening (often heard comment: "Dinner/work is waiting"). This can be explained by the fact that during these times, people with the busiest lives came to vote. This could be an explanation for the overrepresentation of the age category of 65+.

Also, the survey required quite some reading and was experienced as 'long' and 'difficult' by some participants. This could possibly explain the low participation of lower educated people.

Overall the conclusion on the basis of the available information and the available research capacity is that this survey can be considered reasonably representative. The method used can have further potential when researched in more depth.
The results presented in this thesis should be read with the critical remarks from paragraph 4.4 and this paragraph in mind.

Analysis of survey results

In this paragraph the results on voting behaviour in the survey is compared to the voting behaviour in the Netherlands, for which the data from Jacobs et al [2016] is used. The general outcome and the differences in outcome for the features sex and age of 'yes' and 'no' voters are compared. Abstained votes and spoilt votes are left out of the analysis, because the quantity is too small and they are not relevant for this research.

The turnout in Heemskerk for this referendum was 36,30% and the national turnout was 32,28%. Against expectations on the basis of earlier elections (see paragraph 4.1.2.), the outcome of the referendum in Heemskerk was different than the national outcome. In Heemskerk the outcome was 32,99% 'yes' votes and 67,01% 'no' votes. The national outcome was 38,51% yes votes and 61,49% no votes. As can be seen in table 11, the outcome in the three polling stations was similar to the outcome in Heemskerk. The voters outcome in the survey is 39,0% 'yes' votes and 61,0% 'no' votes. This outcome is similar to the outcome in the Netherlands. An explanation for the this fact on the basis of the research setup cannot be given.

Voting result	Netherlands	Heemskerk	Three polling stations	Survey
Yes	38,51%	32,99%	32,22%	39,0%
No	61,49%	67,01%	67,78%	61,0%

Table A11. referendum outcome

6.1

In this paragraph the composition of the survey participants is compared to the composition of the national turn out, for the features

	Women in the Netherlands	Women in the survey	Men in the Netherlands	Men in the survey
Yes	39,6%	39,5%	37,6%	38,6%
No	60,4%	60,5%	62,4%	61,4%

Table A12. voting behaviour shown per sex

Age	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+
Yes NL	45,0%	39,2%	28,9%	31,2%	38,9%	44,0%

Yes Surv	33,3%	32,0%	34,1%	39,2%	33,7%	49,6%
no NL	55,0%	60,8%	71,1%	68,8%	61,1%	56,0%
no Surv	66,7%	68,0%	65,9%	60,8%	66,3%	50,4%

Table A13. voting behaviour shown per age group

Graph A2. Voting behaviour shown per age group

Table 13 and graph 2 show that the survey is not representative for the individual age groups. The young Yes voter is underrepresented (or the young No voter is overrepresented) and the middle aged no voter is underrepresented (or the middle aged yes voter is overrepresented).

Jacobs et al [2016] shows that the turnout under young people was significantly lower than in the older age groups. This does nog mean that young people voted differently; the youngest age group and the oldest age group both voted in favour relatively more, but in all age groups the majority voted 'no'. This last fact also shows in the survey. Jacobs et al [2016] suggests that the differences seen in voting behaviour under different age groups could be an artefact of the effect of the education level. The factor education is shown in table 14 and graph 3.

education	basissch	vmbo	havo/vwo	mbo	Hbo	wo
Yes NL	25,1%	28,0%	40,8%	28,6%	50,5%	64,5%
Yes Survey	44,4%	20,0%	43,6%	28,6%	44,0%	63,6%
No NL	74,9%	72,0%	59,2%	71,4%	49,5%	35,5%
No Survey	55,6%	80,0%	56,4%	71,4%	56,0%	36,4%

Table A14

Graph A3. Voting behaviour and level of education

Appendix B.

This appendix consists of a more thorough analysis of the data with the multidimensional approach of Van Spanje(2011).

B1. Regression of all dimensions Van Spanje

This model explaines 81.4% of the voting variation

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	Democratic deficit	,399	,128	9,719	1	,002	1,491
	Low perceived utility for the EU country	,634	,136	21,794	1	,000	1,885
	Positive affection towards the EU	,382	,117	10,758	1	,001	1,466
	Opposition to integration	,305	,104	8,553	1	,003	1,357
	Absence of EU identity	,029	,106	,075	1	,784	1,029
	Constant	-8,260	,767	116,008	1	,000	,000

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Democratic deficit, Low perceived utility for the EU country, Positive affection towards the EU, Opposition to integration, Absence of EU identity.

(Note that the factor identity is not significant)
Table B.1

B2. Regression of all dimensions + factor Russia, Ukraine and Trust in politics

This model explaines 84% of the voting variation

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	Democratic deficit	,106	,162	,431	1	,512	1,112
	Low perceived utility for the EU country	,518	,159	10,552	1	,001	1,679
	Positive affection towards the EU	,235	,144	2,645	1	,104	1,264
	Opposition to integration	,327	,119	7,534	1	,006	1,387

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Absence of EU identity	,121	,125	,938	1	,333	1,129
This association agreement is positive for the future of Ukraine	,667	,097	47,140	1	,000	1,949
Generally speaking I have faith in politics	,365	,109	11,141	1	,001	1,441
I'm afraid of tensions with Russia because of this association agreement	-,140	,078	3,223	1	,073	,869
Constant	-10,160	1,108	84,009	1	,000	,000

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Democratic deficit, Low perceived utility for the EU country, Positive affection towards the EU, Opposition to integration, Absence of EU identity, This association agreement is positive for the future of Ukraine, Generally speaking I have faith in politics, I'm afraid of tensions with Russia because of this association agreement.

Table B2.

Note that the identity factor, the democratic deficit factor and the affection towards the EU are not significant, p>0.05

B3. Regression factoren Van Spanje + positief over EU, Rusland, Oekraïne en Politiek

Regression of all factors Van Spanje + factors Positive about the EU, Russia, Ukraine and Trust in politics

This model expaines 84,9% of the voting variation

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	This association agreement is positive for the future of Ukraine	,668	,100	44,968	1	,000	1,950
	Generally speaking I have faith in politics	,340	,111	9,325	1	,002	1,405
	I'm afraid of tensions with Russia because of this association agreement	-,144	,079	3,347	1	,067	,866
	I'm positive about the European Union	,298	,136	4,825	1	,028	1,347
	Democratic deficit	-,030	,175	,029	1	,865	,971
	Low perceived utility for the EU country	,455	,164	7,667	1	,006	1,576

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Positive affection towards the EU	,189	,146	1,683	1	,195	1,209
Opposition to integration	,303	,122	6,178	1	,013	1,353
Absence of EU identity	,103	,127	,659	1	,417	1,109
Constant	-10,148	1,129	80,846	1	,000	,000

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Democratic deficit, Low perceived utility for the EU country, Positive affection towards the EU, Opposition to integration, Absence of EU identity.

Table B3.

Note that the dimensions low perceived utility and opposition to integration increase the predictive value of the model. The other dimensions do not.

B4. Regression with the dimensions low perceived utility, opposition to integration and the factors Russia, Ukraine and trust in politics.

This model explains 84.9% of the voting variation

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	This association agreement is positive for the future of Ukraine	,675	,096	49,835	1	,000	1,964
	Generally speaking I have faith in politics	,414	,102	16,522	1	,000	1,513
	I'm afraid of tensions with Russia because of this association agreement	-,150	,074	4,174	1	,041	,860
	Low perceived utility for the EU country	,720	,129	31,154	1	,000	2,055
	Opposition to integration	,359	,113	10,039	1	,002	1,432
	Constant	-9,236	,924	99,971	1	,000	,000

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: This association agreement is positive for the future of Ukraine, Generally speaking I have faith in politics, I'm afraid of tensions with Russia because of this association agreement, Low perceived utility for the EU country, Opposition to integration.

Table B.4

B5. Regression of dimensions perceived utility, opposition to further integration and the factors Russia, Ukraine, trust in politics and positive about the EU

This model explains 85.6% of the voting variation.

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	This association agreement is positive for the future of Ukraine	,668	,099	45,926	1	,000	1,950
	Generally speaking I have faith in politics	,341	,106	10,356	1	,001	1,406
	I'm afraid of tensions with Russia because of this association agreement	-,161	,075	4,636	1	,031	,851
	Low perceived utility for the EU country	,563	,143	15,546	1	,000	1,756
	Opposition to integration	,311	,117	7,027	1	,008	1,365
	Ik ben positief over de Europese Unie	,331	,126	6,931	1	,008	1,392
	Constant	-9,417	,953	97,579	1	,000	,000

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Ik ben positief over de Europese Unie.
Table B.5

B6. Regression of the dimension utility and the factors Russia, Ukraine, trust in politics and positive about the EU.

This model explains 86.1% of the voting variation.

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	This association agreement is positive for the future of Ukraine	,639	,094	46,183	1	,000	1,895
	Generally speaking I have faith in politics	,327	,105	9,745	1	,002	1,387
	I'm afraid of tensions with Russia because of this association agreement	-,149	,073	4,122	1	,042	,862
	Low perceived utility for the EU country	,653	,138	22,379	1	,000	1,922

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
	Ik ben positief over de Europese Unie	,372	,123	9,178	1	,002	1,450
	Constant	-8,879	,891	99,320	1	,000	,000

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Ik ben positief over de Europese Unie.

Table B.6

B7. Regression of the dimension utility and the factors Russia, Ukraine, trust in politics

This model explains 85.1% of the voting variation.

Variables in the Equation							
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	This association agreement is positive for the future of Ukraine	,646	,091	50,419	1	,000	1,908
	Generally speaking I have faith in politics	,414	,100	17,218	1	,000	1,513
	I'm afraid of tensions with Russia because of this association agreement	-,137	,072	3,638	1	,056	,872
	Low perceived utility for the EU country	,849	,122	48,525	1	,000	2,337
	Constant	-8,598	,860	100,070	1	,000	,000

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: This association agreement is positive for the future of Ukraine, Generally speaking I have faith in politics, I'm afraid of tensions with Russia because of this association agreement, Low perceived utility for the EU country.

Table B.7

B8. Regression of the dimension opposition to further integration and the factors Russia, Ukraine, positive about Europe and trust in politics.

This model explains 83.7% of the voting variation.

Variables in the Equation							
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	This association agreement is positive for the future of Ukraine	,694	,097	51,268	1	,000	2,002

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
	Generally speaking I have faith in politics	,416	,103	16,369	1	,000	1,516
	I'm afraid of tensions with Russia because of this association agreement	-,167	,074	5,145	1	,023	,846
	Opposition to integration	,423	,111	14,427	1	,000	1,527
	Ik ben positief over de Europese Unie	,562	,115	23,900	1	,000	1,753
	Constant	-8,490	,885	92,036	1	,000	,000

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Ik ben positief over de Europese Unie.

Table B8.

B9. Regression of the dimension opposition to further integration and the factors Russia, Ukraine and trust in politics

This model explains 81.3% of the voting variation.

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	This association agreement is positive for the future of Ukraine	,700	,090	60,240	1	,000	2,015
	Generally speaking I have faith in politics	,603	,093	42,040	1	,000	1,828
	I'm afraid of tensions with Russia because of this association agreement	-,167	,070	5,633	1	,018	,846
	Opposition to integration	,577	,103	31,630	1	,000	1,781
	Constant	-7,251	,761	90,754	1	,000	,001

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: This association agreement is positive for the future of Ukraine, Generally speaking I have faith in politics, I'm afraid of tensions with Russia because of this association agreement, Opposition to integration.

Table B.9

B10. Regression with only factor Ukraine and dimension utility

This model explains 83.3% of the voting variation.

Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1[a]	This association agreement is positive for the future of Ukraine	,725	,091	63,789	1	,000	2,064
	Low perceived utility for the EU country	1,032	,114	82,441	1	,000	2,807
	Constant	-8,770	,771	129,289	1	,000	,000

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: This association agreement is positive for the future of Ukraine, Low perceived utility for the EU country.

Table B.10