



Universiteit
Leiden
The Netherlands

Koopman of Dominee? The National Role Conception in Dutch Foreign Policy Towards China: The 2019 China Note

Bussink, Marloes

Citation

Bussink, M. (2023). *Koopman of Dominee?: The National Role Conception in Dutch Foreign Policy Towards China: The 2019 China Note*.

Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown)

License: [License to inclusion and publication of a Bachelor or Master Thesis, 2023](#)

Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3642624>

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

Koopman of Dominee?

THE NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTION IN DUTCH FOREIGN
POLICY TOWARDS CHINA: THE 2019 CHINA NOTE



**MA International Relations: Global
Order in Historical Perspective**

Name: Marloes Bussink

Supervisor: Dr. C. Wits

Submission Date: 01-07-2023

Word count: 12982

Content page

1. Introduction	3
2. Theoretical Framework	5
2.1 Role Theory	5
2.1.1 National role conception	5
2.2 Dutch foreign policy since 1945	6
2.2.1 Domestic situation	8
2.2.2 External situation	8
2.2.3 After the Cold War	9
2.2.4 Foreign policy in the European Union	9
2.3 Dutch National role conception	10
2.3.1 Expectations	10
2.3.2 Perceptions	10
3. Research Design	11
3.1 Case selection	11
3.2 Data Selection	11
3.3 Methods	12
3.4 Observable implications	12
4. The political system in the Netherlands	13
4.1 Political system	13
4.1.1 Foreign affairs	13
4.2 Situation in 2019	13
4.2.1 Political orientation	14
5. The China note	15
5.1 The policy document	15
5.1.1 International Cooperation	15
5.1.2 Alliance with the United States	16
5.1.3 Economy and trading	16
5.1.4 Values	17
5.1.5 National Role Conception	17
6. Reactions by parliament to the China note	18
6.1 Meeting on China note	18
6.1.1 Human rights	18
6.1.2 Economic relations	19
6.1.3 Cooperation	19
6.2 Motions	20

6.2.1 Human rights.....	20
6.2.2 Values.....	21
6.2.3 Trade and investments	22
6.2.4 Other motions.....	23
6.3 Questions submitted on human rights	23
6.4 National role conception parliament.....	24
7. Reaction by the government.....	25
7.1 Reaction to motions	25
7.2 Reaction to questions by parliament.....	26
7.3 National role conception	26
8. Discussion.....	27
8.1 Role conception government	27
8.2 Role conception parliament	27
8.3 Debate around China note	27
9. Conclusion.....	29
Bibliography	30

1. Introduction

China is becoming increasingly powerful as it grows economically and gets more political influence in the world. The country has a state-led capitalism model, and its political institutions are still based on communism, which means that the state has far reaching control over companies even if they are privately owned.¹ The Chinese government uses economic statecraft to exert influence in pursuit of their foreign policy goals. As China has a different political and economic system it is vital that the West has a clear strategy towards China. The United States seem to choose for confrontation with their trade war against China. The EU on the other hand seems to take a milder tone and focusses mostly on strategic independence with continued engagement, this strategy is however complicated by all the different member states in the EU having different goals. The Netherlands is an interesting case as it depends mostly on trade for economic growth and it does a lot of trade with China. Since the Euro crisis the European Union (EU) including the Netherlands has seen an increase in investments from China.² However, in the last couple of years there have been rising concerns on the risks and security issues that come with this as China is seeking greater economic and political influence.³ The AIVD, the Dutch Intelligence and Security Service, even called China the biggest threat to the economic security of the Netherlands in their 2021 annual report.⁴

China is an exceptional case in Dutch foreign policy as it is the only individual country that the Netherlands has published foreign policy documents about, as Dutch foreign policy is normally divided in themes or regions. In 2013 the first comprehensive document was published on China, where the focus was on increased trade and investments and the opportunities this brought. In 2018 the Dutch House of Representatives asked the minister of foreign affairs to write a new China strategy due to the changed circumstances since 2013. When the new China policy document was published in 2019 there was critique about its vagueness from inside and outside the Dutch house of representatives. It turned out to be an analysis instead of a strategy and many motions were submitted in parliament to change certain parts of the foreign policy towards China.⁵ This debate was not just the opposition against the government type of critique, the parties in parliament that are part of the coalition were also critical.

Why was there so much debate between the Dutch government and the house of representatives around the 2019 'China note'?

The China note is the outcome of foreign policy formulation, to understand how this policy is formulated role theory can be used to analyze foreign policy. Role theory in foreign policy

¹ Curtis J. Milhaupt, and Wentong Zheng, "Beyond ownership: State capitalism and the Chinese firm," *Georgetown Law Journal* 103, no. 3 (March 2015).

² Sophie Meunier, Brian Burgoon, and Wade Jacoby, "The politics of hosting Chinese investment in Europe – An introduction," *Asia-Europe Journal* 12, (2014), DOI:10.1007/s10308-014-0381; John Farnell, and Paul Irwin Crookes, "Investments," In *The politics of EU-China economic relations: An uneasy partnership* (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016); James Reilly, "China's economic statecraft in Europe," *Asia-Europe Journal* 15, (2017).

³ Farnell and Crookes, "Investments.;" Reilly, China's economic statecraft.

⁴ AIVD, 2021 Jaarverslag AIVD, Den Haag: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2022.

⁵ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, "Beleidsnotitie Nederland-China," Notaoverleg: Vaste commissie voor Buitenlandse Zaken, Algemene commissie voor Buitenlandse Handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, September 30, 2019, Video of notaoverleg, 04:21:58, <https://debatgemist.tweedekamer.nl/node/21693>.

analysis argues that every actor has a certain national role conception, shaped by perception of themselves and expectations from others. The expectations are shaped by the domestic situation and international actors, while the perception is shaped by ideational and material factors.⁶ National role conceptions influence the foreign policy behaviors of actors and can therefore explain foreign policy behaviors and rhetoric. An actor can have several role conceptions at the same time which can lead to role competition due to one conception taking resources and time away from another conception.⁷ Role conflict is also something that can happen, when other have inconsistent expectations of their leaders/government or when the states self-conception differs from the expectations of their surroundings.⁸

Role theory can be useful to understand role conceptions of different actors internationally as well as domestically. Role conceptions are used to analyze debates in foreign policy and is therefore useful for this research. To answer the question on why the debate around the China note happened, it is important to first conceptualize the national role conception of the Netherlands, so it can be used to assess the role conceptions of the government and parliament through an analysis of the China note and the reactions by parliament. This conceptualization of the national role conception is done in the theoretical framework using pre-existing literature on Dutch foreign policy.

Thereafter, the China note will be analyzed using the national role conception set out in the theoretical framework using the observable implications described in the research design. Then, the same will be done for the meeting on the China note that the Parliamentarian Committee on Foreign Affairs had with the minister of Foreign Affairs and the minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation on September 30, 2019, and the motions submitted during this meeting. The last part of the analysis will include the reaction on the motions by the respective ministers and the answers to questions submitted by parliament to get a better understanding on developments. The analysis will be concluded with a discussion on how the differing role concepts between the government and parliament caused this debate around the China note.

⁶ Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank, and Hanns W. Maull, "Introduction," In *Role theory in international relations: Approaches and analyses*, ed. Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank, and Hanns W. Maull (London: Routledge, 2011); Marijke Breuning, "Role theory research in international relations: State of the art and blind spots." In *Role theory in international relations: Approaches and analyses*, ed. Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank, and Hanns W. Mull (London: Routledge, 2011).

⁷ Stephen Walker, "The correspondence between foreign policy rhetoric and behavior: Insights from role theory and exchange theory," In *Role theory and foreign policy analysis*, ed. Stephen Walker (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987).

⁸ Dirk Nabers, "Identity and role change in international politics," In *Role theory in international relations: Approaches and analyses*, ed. Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank, and Hanns W. Maull (London: Routledge, 2011), 76.

2. Theoretical Framework

To understand why there was so much debate around the China note we first need to establish how foreign policy behavior is formed. Role theory is a way to analyze foreign policy in which they use national role conception of states to explain foreign policy behavior. This theoretical framework will first explain role theory before delving into the Dutch foreign policy since 1945 will be described and the establishing of the national role conception of the Dutch government. In the end it touches upon relations between China and the Netherlands.

2.1 Role Theory

As said, role theory is a way to analyze foreign policy. It uses role conceptions to explain foreign policy behavior. The term national role conception was first used by Holsti in his article from 1970 on roles of states in international relations. The idea of roles comes from sociology and uses assumptions and values that individuals bring to their interaction with others.⁹ Since then, several other authors have used national role conception to explain the foreign policy behavior of different states. Walker explains the concept of role conception as foreign policy rhetoric, while foreign policy behavior is called role enactment.¹⁰ Roles are seen as social constructs that are constantly being reconstructed, and modified through interaction with others although roles have a high degree of path dependency and do not often change radically.¹¹

Sometimes role conceptions and role enactment do not align, this is called role competition and/or role conflict. With role competition actions taken for one role conception compete in time and resources with actions that are necessary to meet another role conception.¹² Which role conception will take the forefront in the role enactment is often dependent on the cues given by the receiving actor and the expected reward for the role enactment.¹³ Role conflict happens when others have inconsistent expectations of their leaders/government or when the states self-conception differ from the expectations of their surroundings.¹⁴

2.1.2 National role conception

The role conception of an actor is shaped by its perception of their position vs others and the role expectations of others. The role expectations consist of two factors, the ego expectations which consist of the domestic expectations of the appropriate role of the actor and what this role implies. The second is the alter expectations which consists of implicit or explicit demands by others.¹⁵ The perception of their position consists of ideational factors and material factors.

National role conceptions combine ideational and material factors, to explain foreign policy behavior.¹⁶ Ideational factors are the culture, history, perceived identity. Material factors,

⁹ Harnisch, Frank, and Maull, "Introduction," 1.

¹⁰ Walker, "Foreign policy rhetoric and behavior."

¹¹ Harnisch, Frank, and Maull, "Introduction," 2.

¹² Walker, "Foreign policy rhetoric and behavior."

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Nabers, "Identity and role change," 76.


¹⁵ Sebastian Harnisch, "Role theory: operationalization of key concepts," In *Role theory in international relations: Approaches and analyses*, ed. Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank, and Hanns Maull (London: Routledge, 2011).

¹⁶ Breuning, "Role theory research."

sometimes called national attributes, are size or capability, economic development, political orientation, and perception of dominance or influence.¹⁷

The national role conception of a state is thus constructed through expectations and perceptions of others and themselves. The expectations are influenced by the domestic space as well as the international order. The perceptions are influenced by how an actor perceives its identity and by their perceived material power related to other states.

Below is a schematic image of the framework I will be using to establish the national role conception of the Netherlands.



2.2 Dutch foreign policy since 1945

Several scholars have examined patterns in the foreign policy of the Netherlands. My focus will be on the foreign policy of the Netherlands since the end of the second world war in 1945. This date is chosen because the changed situation since 1945 of the international order and the Dutch orientation since then has not changed much even with the ending of the Cold War, thus this period is the most relevant for today's foreign policy. I call them patterns and not principles or ideals because as Hellema argues these foreign policy characteristics are not fixed they might change over time.¹⁸ Even though there are certain constants that seem to remain over time that define Dutch foreign policy. This is also how role theory conceives national roles and thus patterns can help us establish what these roles are in the case of the Netherlands.

Before 1945 Dutch foreign policy was mostly based on neutrality, this strategy was given up when Nazi-Germany invaded the Netherlands in 1940. After the war, the conceived failure of neutrality led to a shift towards collective security. This meant that the Dutch government put much importance on the Atlantic alliance with the US, through NATO, as well as economic

¹⁷ Naomi Bailin Wisch, "National attributes as sources of national role conceptions: A capability-motivation model." In *Role theory and foreign policy analysis*, ed. Stephen Walker (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987).

¹⁸ Duco Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld: buitenlandse politiek van Nederland* (Houten: Spectrum, 2010).

cooperation through European integration.¹⁹ In the first decade after WWII the Netherlands was a faithful ally of the US and the Atlantic alliance and NATO were especially important, as the Cold War went on Dutch foreign policy broadened its scope and they began to increasingly work multi-laterally or through UN agencies. Through the UN the focus was mostly on the international legal structure a traditional interest of the Netherlands.²⁰

The foreign policy of the Netherlands is often said to consist of two elements 'the merchant' and 'the preacher.' Where there is always a balance between economic (trade) interest and ideational interest such as human rights. However, the merchant often takes prominence over the preacher.²¹

A pattern in Dutch foreign policy before and after the second world war has been the interest of trade due to its dependence on trade for a prosperous economy. For trade to prosper peace was necessary, this explains the focus of neutrality before the war and on collective security after the war, as both facilitated trade.²²

The preacher is visible in their active promotion of human rights which gained prominence since the 1970's and the large footprint the Netherlands has had over the decades in development aid which point towards a form of internationalist idealism. Even in these topics economic interest is never far away as developmental aid is often distributed through companies.²³ However, if the Netherlands needs to make a choice between economic interests and human rights, the economic interests prevail.²⁴

Another constant in Dutch foreign policy is promotion of international law. They advanced the national interest and security through the strengthening of the peace structure of the world after 1945. International law and international cooperation were advanced through common interest to create interdependence which allowed the Netherlands to balance the powers of other states.²⁵

In his study Holsti assign three national role conceptions to the Netherlands: regional-subsystem collaborator, developer, and faithful ally. Regional-subsystem collaborator is the

¹⁹ J.C.C. Voorhoeve, *Peace, profits and principles: A study of Dutch foreign policy* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979); Ben Tonra, *The Europeanisation of national foreign policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish foreign policy* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001); Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld*; Juliet Kaarbo, "Dutch foreign policy: excessive compromise in coalition politics?" In *Coalition politics and cabinet decision making: A comparative analysis of foreign policy choices* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012).

²⁰ Tonra, *Europeanisation of national foreign policy*; Kaarbo, "Dutch foreign policy."

²¹ Joost Herman, "The Dutch drive for humanitarianism: inner origins and development of the gidsland tradition and its external effects," *International Journal* 61, no. 4 (Autumn 2006); Ph.P. Everts, *Controversies at home: Domestic actors in the foreign policy of the Netherlands* (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1985); Voorhoeve, *Peace, profits and principles*.

²² Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld*; Niels van Willigen, "Dutch foreign policy: staying the course amid a changing world." In *Foreign policy change in Europe since 1991*, ed. Jeroen Joly and Tim Haesebrouck (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021); Susanna Erlandson, "Rethinking small state security: Dutch alignment in the 1940s compared to Swedish neutrality," In *Shaping the international relations of the Netherlands, 1815-2000: A small country on the global scene*, ed. Ruud van Dijk, Samuël Kruizinga, Vincent Kuitenbrouwer, and Rimko van der Maar (London: Routledge, 2018).

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Everts, *Controversies at home*.

²⁵ Amry Vandenbosch, *Dutch foreign policy since 1815: a study in small power politics* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1959).

Dutch efforts in European integration, developer indicates the efforts made to assist underdeveloped countries and faithful ally indicates its strong commitment to the Atlantic alliance.²⁶

2.2.1 Domestic situation

Before the 1960's foreign policy had been an elite undertaking, and the general public did not show much interest in foreign policy. This made it easy for the foreign affairs minister to make the policy they wanted, as parliament did not involve itself heavily in foreign affairs. In the 1960's this changed, the public got more involved in foreign policy matters which made parliament show more attention to foreign affairs and therefore the foreign affairs minister had less space to do whatever they wanted.²⁷ Verbeek and Van der Vleuten attribute this increased interest by the general population towards depillarization in the sixties and seventy's.²⁸ The pillar system was the religious or ideological divide in Dutch society, every group had their own pillar with their own schools, trade unions, newspapers, broadcasting corporations which did not overlap. The pillars consisted of Protestant, Roman Catholic, Socialist, and Liberal.²⁹ Depillarization caused people to get out of their own sub-society and this caused an increased interest in foreign policy under the general public.³⁰

Scholars have also noted how in the 1970's there was a struggle between the Prime minister and the minister of Foreign Affairs on who should represent the Netherlands abroad especially when the prime minister became more important in EU relations with the establishment of the European Council.³¹ However, this only pertains to representation abroad, decisions are either made inside the departments or inside the cabinet and thus not the full responsibility of either the minister of Foreign Affairs nor the Prime minister.³²

2.2.2 External situation

Foreign policy in the Netherlands is influenced by external circumstances due to its small size and open economy.³³ They therefore often work from the idea of small power caution where they were careful in the statements made.³⁴ An example of this is the selectiveness in who they criticized in terms of human rights violations.³⁵ However they are not only careful in their statements, but also in their actions towards bigger powers or important economic partners as to not antagonize them.³⁶ Kaarbo adds how this caution is also influenced by coalition

²⁶ K.J. Holsti, "National role conceptions in the study of foreign policy." *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 3 (September 1970).

²⁷ Peter Baehr, "The Dutch foreign policy elite: A descriptive study of perceptions and attitudes." *International Studies Quarterly* 24, no. 2 (June 1980): 225; Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld*, 315-316; Everts, *Controversies at home*; Jerome Heldring, "Rhetoric and reality in Dutch foreign policy," *The World Today* 34, no. 10 (October 1978).

²⁸ Bertjan Verbeek, and Anna van der Vleuten, "The domesticization of the foreign policy of the Netherlands (1989–2007): The paradoxical result of Europeanization and Internationalization," *Acta Politica* 43, (2008).

²⁹ Voorhoeve, *Peace, profits and principles*, 59.

³⁰ Verbeek and van der Vleuten, "Domesticization of the foreign policy."

³¹ Verbeek and van der Vleuten, "Domesticization of the foreign policy;" Kaarbo, "Dutch foreign policy."

³² Ibid.

³³ Everts, *Controversies at home*, 27.

³⁴ Vandenbosch, *Dutch foreign policy since 1815*.

³⁵ Herman, "Dutch drive for humanitarianism."

³⁶ Everts, *Controversies at home*.

politics and the need for compromise within the coalition when parties do not agree on a topic.³⁷

2.2.3 After the Cold War

With the end of the cold war, it seemed as if a more humanitarian approach would be possible in the foreign policy of the Netherlands, but these were often put aside for economic interests. This is especially visible in the relations with China, the economic interests were so important that difficult questions were not asked, or critique was not given.³⁸

Since the 2000's there is a growing insecurity regarding the long-term goals in the Dutch foreign policy. There is no cold war divide anymore and the international system is moving from unipolarity of the US directly after the cold war towards multipolarity with rising powers such as China in the 2000's and beyond. The Netherlands increasingly justifies policy in terms of national interests, but that is a term that is hard to define and does not seem to be based on anything substantial.³⁹

From the beginning of relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) it has been clear that the relations have been about trade and economic gain, human rights might have been seen important in reaction to Tiananmen square incident, but relations were soon repaired in 1991 without much fanfare. These economic relations gained even more importance since the sharp economic growth of China in the 2000's. The economic relations are however marked by a trade imbalance, the Netherlands imports more from China than that they export to China, and economic and political relations are tightly interwoven.⁴⁰

2.2.4 Foreign policy in the European Union

Since the Maastricht treaty of 1992 foreign policy falls under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar of the European Union (EU). This pillar is characterized by intergovernmentalism, and vetoes are possible as well as abstentions.⁴¹ The Netherlands was at first hostile regarding foreign & security policy co-operation in the EU as they felt this would undermine the Atlantic alliance. Today, however, they are supportive because they understand that they are a small power in the world order without the EU. Although they remain receptive of issues that might weaken the Atlantic alliance. The Netherlands tries to seek consensus instead of acting independently for fear of being isolated or a loss of influence.⁴²

Due to its intergovernmental nature the foreign policy in the EU is fully based on consensus seeking between the member states. This often makes the EU react late to changed situations, but it also means that the foreign policy in the EU is not necessarily strong due to the different views of the member states.⁴³

³⁷ Kaarbo, "Dutch foreign policy."

³⁸ Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld*; Willigen, "Dutch foreign policy."

³⁹ Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld*, 448-449.

⁴⁰ Yvonne van der Heijden, *De dans van de leeuw en de draak: Verleden, heden en toekomst van de Nederlands-Chinese handelsbetrekkingen* (Amsterdam: Business Contact, 2009).

⁴¹ Tonra, *Europeanisation of national foreign policy*.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

2.3 Dutch National role conception

The national role conception can be described as follows,

2.3.1 Expectations

Domestic

Domestic expectations are first characterized by the need to have a consensus in the coalition on the foreign policy direction. The fact that the Netherlands is a small country also influences the caution that is taken not to antagonize other countries and to make sure that when action is taken it is in coalition with other countries.

International

Internationally the most important factors for Dutch foreign policy are NATO and the Atlantic alliance with the United States and the European Union. The US and the EU allies expect the Netherlands to be on their side and will have the most expectations from the Netherlands. On the other side in relations with China the Netherlands is aware of their size difference and the power China has on the Netherlands economically.

2.3.2 Perceptions

Ideational factors

The ideational factors in Dutch foreign policy are mostly based on human rights, developmental aid and promotion of international law and the idea of being a trader' nation or as some scholars have called it the preacher and the merchant.

Material factors

The Netherlands is a small country in size but with a large economy based mostly on trade. However, research done under the foreign policy elite show that even though they acknowledge that the Netherlands is a small state they believe that the Netherlands can still have considerable influence on the world stage.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Baehr, "Dutch foreign policy elite."

3. Research Design

3.1 Case selection

The Netherlands can be seen as representative for a small global north actor that has extensive economic ties with China. Due to its reliance on trade for their economic growth they are particularly vulnerable to external events in the international system. Research has shown how the foreign policy of smaller actors are greatly influenced by external circumstances, the same is true for the Netherlands.⁴⁵

Previous research on Dutch foreign policy has focused on the 20th century and early 21st century, not on the years since 2010. It has also focused on foreign policy in general or towards allies such as the US and European integration. Research on relations between the Netherlands and China have either focused on the time of the Chinese empire or the establishment of relations with the communist regime. Relations and foreign policy between the Netherlands and China since China's economic rise have not been examined.

The International relations research on the Netherlands have thus far mostly focused on behavior in relations with others in general, but not on how this foreign policy behavior is established and how this behavior is influenced. There has been no recent research in the Dutch national role conception and the influence on foreign policy.

China is special in Dutch foreign policy as it is the only country that the Netherlands has a specific policy towards. Therefore, making it a case where specific foreign policy behaviors and role conception can be evaluated on in the Dutch case. The 2019 China note is the newest policy document from the Dutch government about China and thus the best case to analyze how the current national role conception is reflected. This thesis will not discuss the foreign policy of the Netherlands towards China in the sense of right or wrong, its focus is on the national role conception and why there was discussion on the China note. The substance and feasibility of the foreign policy will therefore not be analyzed.

3.2 Data Selection

The data is selected based on the chosen case of the 2019 Dutch China note, thus the 2019 policy document is analyzed. The debate on 30 September 2019 between the parliament and the ministers as well as the motions submitted by several parliamentarians during this meeting are also part of this research. The reactions by the respective ministers on the motions and questions submitted by parliament are the last part of the analysis. All these documents are public record and available on the government website of the Netherlands.

The documents before the publication of the 2019 China note and/or the documents after the last reaction by the government towards the motions and questions of the House of Representatives on foreign policy towards China are not considered. Even though they might be interesting to look at they fall outside of the scope of this research as the research focusses specifically on the debate around the 2019 China note and not the general debate on Dutch foreign policy towards China.

⁴⁵ Hellema, *Nederland in de wereld*.

3.3 Methods

Process tracing will be used to analyze the where the critique on the China note came from and to understand this critique. Process tracing uses causal inference via a within-case analysis to affirm or disconfirm explanations through hypothesis testing. It usually is a combination of induction and deduction to explain cause and effect.⁴⁶ Within process tracing the analyticist approach fits well with foreign policy analysis. The analyticist approach sees the causal mechanisms as analytical constructs that define how a given set-up or entity transfers motion in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations.⁴⁷ This works well for a case study on the Dutch China note and its ensuing debate, as it helps differentiate between the different instances. Qualitative content analysis is used to analyze the various written documents and the meeting on 30 September 2019.

3.4 Observable implications

For the documents to fit the national role conception of the Netherlands the following observable implications should be visible (at least 5):

- A preference to act together with other actors;
- The importance of the NATO/US alliance and EU cooperation;
- Awareness of its small size, but a perception of influence and moral responsibility;
- The promotion of human rights and the focus on developmental aid;
- The importance of international law and international institutions;
- The importance of trade and the open economy;
- A struggle between preacher and merchant identities.

⁴⁶ David Waldner, "What makes process tracing good? Causal mechanisms, causal inference, and the completeness standard in comparative politics," In *Process tracing: From metaphor to analytic tool*, ed. Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

⁴⁷ Hilde van Meegdenburg, "Process tracing: An analyticist approach," In *Routledge Handbook of Foreign Policy Analysis Methods*, ed. Patrick O. Mello and Falk Ostermann (London; New York: Routledge, 2023).

4. The political system in the Netherlands

To understand the relations between the government and parliament this chapter will discuss the political system of the Netherlands in general as well as specifically on foreign relations. Afterwards the political situation in 2019 will be described to understand the relations between the cabinet and parliament at that time.

4.1 Political system

The Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy with a representative parliamentary system. The monarch has a ceremonial role as head of state while the prime minister is head of government and responsible for the conduct of the government. Parliament consists of the house of representatives with 150 members and the senate with seventy-five members. The house of representatives participates in day-to-day decision making and is there to check the Cabinet, while the senate works part-time and is there to review laws.⁴⁸ The Netherlands has a multi-party system in which no party has a majority therefore the Cabinet is formed in a coalition of several parties.⁴⁹

4.1.1 Foreign affairs

In foreign affairs there are two important ministers. The first one is the minister of Foreign Affairs, and the second is the minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation. The House of Representatives has a Committee for Foreign Affairs which meet regularly to discuss foreign relations. They are often joined by the minister of foreign affairs for information or clarification of conducted or proposed policy.⁵⁰

In foreign affairs policy the most used instrument parliament has is the right to introduce motions and the right to ask questions. Motions reflect the opinion or request of the house of representatives, and the government is not required to carry them out. Motions and question do however require a response by the Cabinet.⁵¹

4.2 Situation in 2019

In 2019 four parties were part of the coalition namely, VVD, CDA, D66 and CU. The VVD was the biggest party with thirty-three seats and therefore the prime-minister Mark Rutte is from the VVD. The last elections for the house of representatives had been in 2017. Parliamentarians are elected for a 4-year term and thus 2019 was half-way in their term. Size of the parties in the house of representatives after the 2017 elections was:⁵²

Party	Number of seats
VVD	33
PVV	20
CDA	19

D66	19
GroenLinks	14
SP	14
PvdA	9

⁴⁸ Voorhoeve, *Peace, profits and principles*, 56-57.

⁴⁹ Ibid, 59.


⁵⁰ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, "Vaste commissie: Buitenlandse Zaken," Accessed June 27, 2023, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerleden_en_commissies/commissies/buza.

⁵¹ Everts, *Controversies at home*, 103.

⁵² Kiesraad, "Officiële uitslag Tweede Kamer verkiezing 15 maart 2017," Accessed June 27, 2023, <https://www.kiesraad.nl/actueel/nieuws/2017/03/20/officiële-uitslag-tweede-kamerverkiezing-15-maart-2017>.

CU	5
PvdD	5
50plus	4

SGP	3
DENK	3
FvD	2



4.2.1 Political orientation

VVD (liberal right), D66 (center-left liberal progressive), CDA (center or center-right Cristian democratic), and CU (Cristian party conservative on medical/ethical issues and progressive on social and ecological issues).

The other parties important for this research are SP (Socialist), GroenLinks (progressive leftwing/green), PvdA (social-democratic/labor party), PvdA (animal rights party), SGP (Cristian conservative), PVV (populist party).⁵³

⁵³ Stichting PDC, "Partijen in tweede en eerste kamer," Parliament.com, Accessed June 27, 2023, https://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhrpfxut/partijen_in_tweede_en_eerste_kamer.

5. The China note

The China note officially called “Beleidsnotitie Nederland-China: een nieuwe balans” [Policy report Netherlands-China: a new balance] is a policy document from the Dutch government on their policy towards China. The Dutch house of representatives asked for a new China strategy in May 2018 through a motion. The motion mentions that given the increasing role of China on the world stage in military, economic and political terms and the effects this increasing influence of China has on the position of the Netherlands and the EU, given that it is unclear how the Netherlands and the EU are going to tackle the growing influence of China, parliament believes that a clear future proof strategy is unmissable and therefore requests the cabinet to make a China strategy and to do the same on EU-level.⁵⁴

The new China policy document was sent to parliament on 15 May 2019 exactly a year later replacing the old policy document from 2013.⁵⁵ The note got quite some critique from parliament and many motions were submitted. This chapter will first discuss the document itself and compare it to the national role conception of the Netherlands as described in the theoretical framework. In the next chapter we will look at the reactions by parliament.

5.1 The policy document

The document consists of nine chapters based on different themes, namely: 1) sustainable trade and investments; 2) peace, security, and stability; 3) values; 4) climate, resources, and energy; 5) development cooperation; 6) the multilateral system; 7) cooperation in Europe; 8) cooperation in the Kingdom; 9) players in the bilateral relations with China and cooperation within the Netherlands.

5.1.1 International Cooperation

The most noticeable part of the national role conception of the Netherlands reflected in the China note is the importance of EU cooperation in the relation with China. In all the nine chapters EU cooperation is at least mentioned once. Other international institutions such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization are also mentioned several times as well as working together with likeminded states. This indicates that the Netherlands prefers working through international organizations or with other states rather than acting alone. Seen for example in the chapter on values: *“The cabinet puts the situation in China on the agenda were relevant, preferably in EU context, but also bilaterally and through the UN, openly as well as through silent diplomacy.”*⁵⁶ Or even more prevalent in the chapter on trade and investment: *“This is possible through the WTO, the EU and in cooperation with likeminded countries to encourage China to play by the international rules on issues where this is not the case yet.”*⁵⁷

They also recognize the relative small size of the Netherlands in the world, seen in this example: *“Our size and the changed multipolar world mean that Dutch interests should be promoted in a bigger*

⁵⁴ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *Internationale Veiligheidsstrategie: Motie van het lid Becker C.S* (33694 nr. 16), May 15, 2018,

<https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2018D28574&did=2018D28574>.

⁵⁵ Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, *Nederland-China: een nieuwe balans*, 2019.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 51.

⁵⁷ Ibid, 30.

context – the EU – to give them more strength.”⁵⁸ These examples show that at least three of the observable implications from the national role conception are present, namely, 1) the preference to act together with others; 2) the importance of the NATO/USA alliance and EU cooperation; 3) the awareness of its small size. The next part shows that the alliance with the United States is also present in the policy document.

5.1.2 Alliance with the United States

The introduction of the policy document mentions the United States (US) as an important ally of the Netherlands, but also emphasizes the independent policy the Netherlands has towards China. *“The US is an important ally, inside NATO, but also on many issues outside NATO. We share Western values and are from China’s perspectives seen as part of the Western trans-Atlantic bloc. While we are on many issues closer to the US than China, we always make our own considerations and strive towards a more intensive relation with China.”*⁵⁹

However, the conclusion mentions the importance of keeping in mind the relations with the US and the consequences certain actions in the relation with China can have on the relations with the US. *“The Netherlands keeps in mind actions in the relation with China (of the Netherlands) that can have consequences on the relation with the US, and the other way around.”*⁶⁰

These two instances show the importance of the US in Dutch foreign relations, and how on the one hand the Netherlands wants to have relations with China independent of the relations the US has with China, while on the other hand keeping in mind sensitive issues and a balance in relations with the US and China as to not antagonize either.

5.1.3 Economy and trading

The economy and trading are also seen as important for the Netherlands. The first chapter is dedicated to trade and investments, and in other chapters the importance of trade for the Dutch economy is also mentioned such as in the chapter on peace, security, and stability: *“This can have consequences for the international sea routes, which are essential for the Dutch economy (the so called flow security).”*⁶¹ The chapter on climate, resources, and energy also mentions how China offers opportunities for Dutch businesses, *“Chinese ambitions in this area offers opportunities for the environment and (Dutch) business.”*⁶² This alludes to the merchant identity present in the national role conception. This merchant identity is explicitly mentioned in the chapter on trade: *“In part thanks to our commercial spirit-.”*⁶³

However, not only trade is important the document also mentions how the Dutch government wants to work through the EU on four topics regarding relations with China. 1) trade and investments; 2) Implementation of the Paris Climate agreements; 3) Human Rights issues in China; 4) the international legal order.⁶⁴

⁵⁸ Ibid, 19.

⁵⁹ Ibid, 14.

⁶⁰ Ibid, 94.

⁶¹ Ibid, 39.

⁶² Ibid, 56.

⁶³ Ibid, 24.

⁶⁴ Ibid, 76.

5.1.4 Values

On values the document mentions human rights, democracy, rule of law, the international legal order. Seen in this example, *“These values result in a political system that is based on democracy and rule of law, and result in foreign policy that promotes the international legal order and human rights.”*⁶⁵ Further on in the document it is mentioned how it is important to keep the current international system: *“For the welfare and security of the Netherlands it is important to keep the current system, including its values.”*⁶⁶

There is also a chapter on developmental cooperation. This chapter focuses on what China does in terms of developmental aid and how they conduct development cooperation, mainly in Africa, and how the Netherlands should cooperate and counter this.⁶⁷

This shows that the following observable implications of the national role conception are also present, 1) promotion of human rights and the focus on developmental aid; 2) the importance of international law and international institutions. The importance of international institutions was already shown in the first paragraph of this chapter.

5.1.5 National Role Conception

As shown above the following observable implications can be found in the policy document.

- A preference to act together with others;
- The importance of the NATO/US alliance and EU cooperation;
- Awareness of its small size;
- The promotion of human rights and the focus on developmental aid;
- The importance of international law and international institutions;
- The importance of trade and an open economy;

The observable implication of awareness of its small size also includes a perception of influence. This is not visible in the document and therefore this observable implication will be excluded to be cautious not to prescribe parts of the national role conception that are not there.

The only other observable implication not visible is the struggle between preacher and merchant identities. Although as shown above both the merchant and preacher identity can be identified in the document however, they do not come into conflict in the document as they are needily separated into different parts of the document.

⁶⁵ Ibid, 48.

⁶⁶ Ibid, 70.

⁶⁷ Ibid, 62-66.

6. Reactions by parliament to the China note

On 30 September 2019, a meeting was held on the China note in which the parliamentary commission for foreign relations had a discussion with the minister of foreign affairs Mr. Blok and the minister for foreign trade and development cooperation Mrs. Kaag.⁶⁸ During this meeting 20 motions were submitted by both parliamentarians of the coalition as well as the opposition showing broad disagreement with the China note written by the government. On October 8, 2019, the motions were voted on, sixteen motions were submitted for a vote and in the end twelve motions were adopted by parliament.⁶⁹ First an analysis of the meeting on 30 September will be discussed, afterwards the motions that were submitted will be analyzed.

6.1 Meeting on China note

As is usually the case in these kinds of meetings the parliamentarians each get a few minutes to talk about their parties' arguments and point of view. The main issue that the parliamentarians mentioned was about the way human rights were mentioned in the note and how human rights should be included more in the relations with China.

6.1.1 Human rights

There were four different points that the parliamentarians made on human rights during the meeting. Firstly, that human rights are only briefly mentioned in the note and several important human rights violations such as Tibet, organ harvest in the Falun-gong movement and Christians are not mentioned in the note. Secondly, they would have liked a more strategic note on how the government wants to handle these human rights violations by China. Thirdly, several parliamentarians agree that human rights should not be subordinate to trade. And fourthly, most agree that the Netherlands should discuss human rights with China and that we have the moral obligation to try improving the human rights in China even as a small country.⁷⁰

These critiques were given by both coalition and opposition parties meaning it is not just a political talking point of the opposition.⁷¹ CDA parliamentarian van Helvert for example says this about the human rights chapter in the note: "I find the chapter that the minister wrote about values - that is what he has decided to call it - to meager, because I also want to see how the Netherlands will handle this strategically in the future." Mw. Karabulut from the SP highlights how Amnesty International feels their conversations with the ministry is not reflected in the note while the lobby organization for companies VNO-NCW sees many of their views reflected in the note, showing how human rights seem to be seen as less important by the government.⁷²

In the struggle between merchant and preacher most parties in parliament were leaning more towards preacher on this topic. For example, Mr. Bisschop from the SGP specifically says:

⁶⁸ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, "Beleidsnotitie Nederland-China," Notaoverleg.

⁶⁹ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *Stemmingen moties Beleidsnotitie Nederland-China*, October 8, 2019, https://www.tweedekamer.nl/debat_en_vergadering/plenaire_vergaderingen/details/activiteit?id=2019A04242.

⁷⁰ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, "Beleidsnotitie Nederland-China," Notaoverleg.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

“Therefore the SGP faction does not agree with setting trade at number one in the relationship with China. The Netherlands should, also in international cooperation, promote other values that are important in the relations with China.”⁷³ Mw. Ouwehand from the PvdD also added: “The party of the animals says: human rights first. We should honestly look from the human rights perspective and decide which position we should take in regards with China to defend these human rights autonomously. And if we want things from China that is difficult.”⁷⁴ Also adding how “The Party for the animals was unpleasantly surprised that universal human rights, of which this cabinet says they support, is dismissed as some sort of divergence of opinion between China and the Netherlands. It is spoken about as values instead of rights that we should defend-.”⁷⁵

They also mention how it is our obligation to do something about the human rights situation in China even if this might be difficult. Sjoerdsma from the D66 says: “I understand that the human rights situation in China will not improve in an instance and that we cannot improve the situation by ourselves. That is nonsense. But it does not relieve us of the responsibility to do what is possible.”⁷⁶ Bisschop from the SGP also discusses how yes, we are small, but we have the obligation to stand up for what is at stake, which is values and human dignity.⁷⁷

6.1.2 Economic relations

Other issues that were continuously mentioned where the lack of reciprocity in economic relations by China and that the Netherlands should be critical on what they allow China to invest in, as well as if we should want Huawei in our 5G network.

PVV parliamentarian de Roon says: “Therefore it is of crucial importance that the Netherlands will be safeguarded from Chinese investments in companies and sectors which touch on national security.”⁷⁸ Koopmans the VVD parliamentarian present focusses on reciprocity in economic relations. He says: “We want good relations with China, wherein there will be mutual trade and investments in economic opportunities.”⁷⁹

6.1.3 Cooperation

Some parliamentarians also mentioned cooperation in the EU. Koopmans from the VVD mentions “We might not be able to do that alone as the Netherlands; we should to that as the EU.”⁸⁰ Van Helvert from CDA also adds how we are not able to do this alone so we should work together in the EU and with the US and UN, but we should not underestimate the Netherlands.⁸¹

Mr. Sjoerdsma from D66 also mentions how economic relations and human rights are intertwined. “Our economic policy is our human rights policy; our human rights policy is our

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

economic policy. If China breaks us apart economically (the EU) than we lose. But if that also means that we must give up our human rights policy than we lose-lose. Therefore, I believe, my faction believes, that we must change these issues on the EU level.”⁸² Showing how economic relations and human rights are intertwined and should not be seen as two different fields of cooperation.

6.2 Motions

When looking at the motions that were submitted at the end of the meeting on the China note we can again clearly see the preacher identity present. Many motions were submitted on human rights in general and more specifically on issues such as freedom of religion and minority protection. Motions were also submitted on the economic side of relations with China, sometimes intertwined with human rights. Below the motions will be described and analyzed on how the Dutch national role conception is reflected in them.

6.2.1 Human rights

Of the twenty motions submitted six were on human rights. The one cosigned the most was the motion by CDA parliamentarian Van Helvert asking the government to rewrite the human rights chapter in the China note, supported by D66, CU, PvdA, GroenLinks, SGP, and Denk.⁸³ Later also cosigned by 50Plus. The motion passed with the support of almost all parties in the parliament, with the most noticeable exception being the VVD the biggest party in parliament.⁸⁴

Other motions on human rights include a motion by SP parliamentarian Karabulut and co-signed by PvdA, GroenLinks and PvdD asking the government to include human rights in every field of cooperation with China and explicitly ask to include civil society in the execution of the China note.⁸⁵ A motion by D66 parliamentarian Sjoerdsma and co-signed by CDA, CU, GroenLinks, PvdA, and SP requests the government to speak out more often and with more conviction, bilaterally or through the EU, when human rights in China are under threat.⁸⁶ Both motions were adopted by parliament. A motion submitted but, in the end, not going up for voting was the motion by Sjoerdsma asking the government to set up a human rights impact assessment for the export of IT products that can be used for mass surveillance.⁸⁷

An motion that is combines the human rights issues with economic relations is the motion by CU parliamentarian Voordewind, the motion asks the government to give pro-active support to companies to prevent complicity in human rights violations and to not give export credits

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *China: Motie van het lid Van Helvert C.S* (35207 nr. 4), September 30, 2019, <https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019Z18364&did=2019D38247>.

⁸⁴ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *Stemmingen moties*.

⁸⁵ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *China: Motie van het lid Karabulut C.S* (35207 nr. 11), September 30, 2019, <https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019D38265&did=2019D38265>.

⁸⁶ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *China: Motie van het lid Sjoerdsma C.S* (35207 nr. 13), September 30, 2019, <https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019D38268&did=2019D38268>.

⁸⁷ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *China: Motie van het lid Sjoerdsma* (35207 nr. 14), September 30, 2019, <https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019Z18379&did=2019D38270>.

when the risk of human rights violations is present.⁸⁸ The last motion submitted on human rights was also by CU parliamentarian Voordewind, asking the government to pursue human rights as a strategic interest in relations with China specifically in the negotiations between the EU and China on the investment agreement. It also asks the government to identify which means of pressure can be used bilaterally and through the EU to further this goal.⁸⁹

6.2.2 Values

When looking at other values reflected in the motions besides general human rights it is noticeable that two motions were submitted about freedom of religion, both by parties with a Christian background. However, both motions passed with a broad support of parliament showing that this is not just a position of the Christian parties. Both motions are quite similar, the motion submitted by Voordewind and van Helvert asks the government to explicitly make freedom of religion part of their policy towards China.⁹⁰ While the motion submitted by Bisschop and van Helvert asks the government to give priority to the promotion of freedom of religion for among other Christians and Uighurs in the bilateral relations with China.⁹¹ The second one therefore being more explicit. Freedom of religion is not really mentioned in the China note even though both motions got 'judgment chamber' by the minister.⁹² This means that the minister does not object the motion, but also does not give an opinion and they let parliament decide to adopt the motion or not.⁹³

GroenLinks parliamentarian Ojik submitted a motion that requested the government to set up a central report center where Uyghurs can report their issues to better understand the intimidations they face and to identify missing family members to then be able to insist with the Chinese authorities to give information on these missing persons.⁹⁴ In the end this motion was held back and not voted on.⁹⁵

A motion that could also be considered to be in the values category is the motion by Bisschop and van Helvert (SGP and CDA) asking the government to support Taiwan in their wish to participate in international organizations.⁹⁶ Later changed to seeking support in the EU for

⁸⁸ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *China: Motie van het lid Voordewind* (35207 nr. 22), September 30, 2019, <https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019D38285&did=2019D38285>.

⁸⁹ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *China: Motie van het lid Voordewind* (35207 nr. 23), September 30, 2019, <https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019D38287&did=2019D38287>.

⁹⁰ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *China: Motie van de leden Voordewind en Van Helvert* (35207 nr. 21), September 30, 2019, <https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019D38284&did=2019D38284>.

⁹¹ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *China: Motie van de leden Bisschop en Van Helvert* (35207 nr. 7), September 30, 2019, <https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019D38258&did=2019D38258>.

⁹² Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, "Beleidsnotitie Nederland-China," Notaoverleg.

⁹³ Stichting PDC, "Motie," Parliament.com, Accessed May 15, 2023, <https://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhrogvv2/motie>.

⁹⁴ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *China: Motie van het lid Van Ojik* (35207 nr. 18), September 30, 2019, <https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019Z18384&did=2019D38276>.

⁹⁵ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *Stemmingen moties*.

⁹⁶ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *China: Motie van de leden Bisschop en Van Helvert* (35207 nr. 8), September 30, 2019, <https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019Z18371&did=2019D38261>.

participation of Taiwan in international organizations.⁹⁷ This shows both the importance of EU cooperation and international institutions.

6.2.3 Trade and investments

Six motions are about economic relations, some about more free trade but others about trade restrictions. Something not reflected in the China note by the government, which does not talk directly about restrictions in specific.

The two motions adopted with unanimity were submitted by VVD parliamentarian Koopmans with support of CDA, SGP, D66, and CU. The first one asks the government to build a broad international coalition to take concrete steps in the EU and were needed in the WTO to: get equal access for European and Chinese companies in each other market; to combat unequal competition by state supported companies; to keep in mind with public procurements that in a lot of cases European companies have to meet more rules than Chinese companies; and to strengthening intellectual property protection by China. The motion also asks the government to identify which European or national measures can be taken to achieve these goals.⁹⁸ The second motion asks the government to form an international coalition with the goal to make sure that China does not get unfair advantages due to their developmental status in the WTO.⁹⁹ These two motions are mostly based on free trade principles and the need for a more equal playing field that will facilitate trade.

There were also two motions adopted that are asking for restrictions. A motion by Sjoerdsma and van Helvert (D66 and CDA) asks the government to advocate for an international procurement instrument in the EU, that if needed can ban companies from outside the EU if European companies have unequal access in those countries.¹⁰⁰ The other motion requesting restrictions was submitted by GroenLinks parliamentarians van Ojik and Diks, asking the government to set up a license requirement for the export of surveillance technology as these can be and are used to oppress people.¹⁰¹ Linking economic relations with human rights. The motion was later changed and clarified by adding that first extra effort should be made in getting an EU license requirement and if this does not work then a national license requirement should be implemented.¹⁰² Showing the importance of EU cooperation, although when looking at the meeting on 30 September 2019 the clarification was a request by the minister of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation for her to be able to try once again to get an EU license requirement.¹⁰³

⁹⁷ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *Stemmingen moties*.

⁹⁸ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *China: Motie van het lid Koopmans C.S* (35207 nr. 5), September 30, 2019, <https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019D38250&did=2019D38250>.

⁹⁹ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *China: Motie van het lid Koopmans C.S* (35207 nr. 6), September 30, 2019, <https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019D38254&did=2019D38254>.

¹⁰⁰ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *China: Motie van de leden Sjoerdsma en van Helvert* (35207 nr. 15), September 30, 2019, <https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019D38272&did=2019D38272>.

¹⁰¹ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *China: Motie van de leden van Ojik en Diks* (35207 nr. 16), September 30, 2019, <https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019Z18382&did=2019D38273>.

¹⁰² Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *Stemmingen moties*.

¹⁰³ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, "Beleidsnotitie Nederland-China," Notaoverleg.

Three motions that were rejected are a motion by SGP parliamentarian Bisschop asking the government to take a stronger stance regarding China when needed through the EU. This motion is quite strong as it for example connects economic consequences with the situation of Chinese Christians and other minorities.¹⁰⁴ A motion by GroenLinks parliamentarian Ojik asking the government to join the already existing initiative to reform the European competition framework to make sure that the forming of European champions is not unnecessarily blocked.¹⁰⁵ And a motion by PVV parliamentarian de Roon asking the government to decide immediately to ban Huawei from the construction of the 5G network.¹⁰⁶

6.2.4 Other motions

Two motions were submitted by parliamentarians of the Partij van de Dieren (PvdD) on animal related issues. One was about actions against pig pest in China and sending of international observers and the other motion was about the rejection of the veal deal with China.¹⁰⁷ This fits the ideology of the PvdD, as they are advocating for animal welfare. The most curious motion is the one submitted by SP parliamentarian Karabulut on a United States strategy, although asking for a US strategy is not necessarily strange considering that there is a China strategy however it did not have anything to do with the current issues discussed.¹⁰⁸ In the end both motions by PvdD were held back and not voted on during the voting sessions on October 8 and the one about the US strategy was rejected as there wasn't a majority in the parliament.¹⁰⁹

6.3 Questions submitted on human rights

After parliament received the letter by the minister of foreign affairs on November 11, 2019, with the reaction to the human right motions submitted, they send a list with questions to the government regarding human rights in China. In this list of questions, we again see several observable implications that fit the national role conception. Due to the nature of the topic the promotion of human rights is extremely visible, but the importance of international law and international institutions is also visible. Example, "Which role do you believe the International Criminal Court and/or the International Court of Justice should play regarding the massive, systematic human rights violations in Xinjiang? Which role is the Netherlands willing to play in charging China?"¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁴ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *China: Motie van het lid Bisschop* (35207 nr. 9), September 30, 2019, <https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019Z18372&did=2019D38263>.

¹⁰⁵ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *China: Motie van het lid van Ojik* (35207 nr. 17), September 30, 2019, <https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019Z18383&did=2019D38274>.

¹⁰⁶ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *China: Motie van het lid de Roon* (35207 nr. 10), September 30, 2019, <https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019Z18373&did=2019D38264>.

¹⁰⁷ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *China: Moties van de leden van Raan en Ouwehand* (35207 nr. 19), September 30, 2019, <https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019D38278&did=2019D38278>; Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *China: Moties van de leden van Raan en Ouwehand* (35207 nr. 20), September 30, 2019, <https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019Z18387&did=2019D38282>.

¹⁰⁸ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *China: Motie van het lid Karabulut* (35207 nr. 12), September 30, 2019, <https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019Z18376&did=2019D38267>.

¹⁰⁹ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *Moties Stemmingen*.

¹¹⁰ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *China: Lijst van vragen en antwoorden* (35207 nr. 34), June 24, 2020, <https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/detail?id=2020D24349&did=2020D24349>, 7.

They also ask questions regarding the alliance with the US and if we should not work together on the topic of human rights. “Why do you not mention the West as a defender of democracy and human rights? Why do you limit the conveying of a more assertive story on human rights and the international legal order to Europe, and leave out the United States? Do you not see the United States, who take a stronger stance on human rights violations by China than the EU, not as an ally?¹¹¹

6.4 National role conception parliament

The observable implications that are present in the statements made by the parliamentarians and the motions submitted during this meeting are:

- The importance of the NATO/US alliance and EU cooperation;
- Awareness of its small size, but a perception of influence and moral responsibility;
- The promotion of human rights and (the focus on developmental aid);
- The importance of trade and the open economy;
- A struggle between preacher and merchant identities.

The focus on developmental aid is not visible in the statements and motions, this is understandable as the relation with China is not based on developmental aid. Still the promotion of human rights is clearly visible and therefore this observable implication is still included. The struggle between preacher and merchant identities is clearly visible in the importance some parliamentarians put on trade while at the same time they are willing to impose restrictions for other goals such as human rights.

In the questions sent to the minister after their reply on human rights motions also shows an extra observable implication namely,

- The importance of international law and international institutions.

¹¹¹ Ibid, 3.

7. Reaction by the government

7.1 Reaction to motions

As many different motions were submitted and adopted by parliament on the human rights situation in China and the policy that the Netherlands is following the government send one reply of ten pages on the policy regarding human rights in China.¹¹²

This reply shows that the Dutch government supports and promotes human rights in China. It also shows that sanctions are to be done on EU or UN level and it also shows the importance of EU cooperation and the need for one EU strategy regarding human rights violations and promotion in China. However, it also shows the hesitance to impose any trade related restrictions or to use trade as pressure for better human right policy in China beyond export restrictions of certain products that can violate human rights such as surveillance technology.¹¹³

The cabinet reacted to the motion about unequal access by Koopmans C.S and the motion by Sjoerdsma on an international procurement instrument in the same instance through a letter send on December 6, 2019.¹¹⁴ The reaction again shows the importance the Dutch government holds towards taking measures through the EU. What is surprising however, is the changed support for an international procurement instrument that should address the lack of access of EU companies in third countries by making it harder for companies from these specific third countries to get public procurements in the EU.¹¹⁵ This can be seen as opposite to free trade and an open economy which is part of the national role conception of the Dutch government.

On October 9, 2019, the government reacted to the motion of PvdD on sending international observers to China for the pig pest. This however is impossible because such an international instrument and China refuses any help related to this.¹¹⁶ In this reaction to the motion none of the observable implications for the national role conception are visible, none the less there are also no characteristics present that make it seem that it is not in line with the national role conception. This occurs due to its short message of effectively only one page of text and due to the topic, it is therefore not a deviation of the national role conception but a neutral text, in terms of the national role conception at least.

¹¹² Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *China: Brief van de minister van Buitenlandse Zaken* (35207 nr. 32), November 11, 2019,

https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2019D45263&did=2019D45263.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *China: Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en de staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken en Klimaat* (35207 nr. 33), December 6, 2019,

https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2019D50481&did=2019D50481.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *China; Dierziektebeleid: Brief van de minister van Buitenlandse Zaken* (35207; 29683 nr. 31), October 9, 2019,

https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2019D40057&did=2019D40057.

7.2 Reaction to questions by parliament

After parliament, and more specifically the parliamentary commission on foreign affairs, received the reply on the motions on human rights they send a list of ninety-one questions on human rights to the cabinet. The respective minister of foreign affairs Mr. Blok has sent an answer to these questions on 17 June 2020.¹¹⁷ This is effectively the last communication between the government and parliament that relates to the debate around the China note and will therefore be the last document analyzed and considered.

The observable implications of the Dutch national role conception that are visible in the reaction to these questions are the need to work together and not act alone, the importance of EU cooperation, the importance of trade. Example, "The cabinet prefers to do this through the EU and in any case in cooperation with likeminded countries."¹¹⁸

The reaction by the government shows that they did not change their national role conception due to pressure from the parliament. They feel more pressure from China to not take a strong stance on the promotion of human rights. Which fits the idea of pressure from other actors in role theory.

7.3 National role conception

The observable implications visible in the reaction from the government on the motions and questions submitted by the parliament are the following,

- A preference to act together with other actors;
- The importance of the NATO/US alliance and EU cooperation;
- The promotion of human rights and (the focus on developmental aid);
- The importance of trade and the open economy;
- A struggle between preacher and merchant identities.

These are effectively the same as in the China note except for the fact that in this correspondence the struggle between preacher and merchant identities are clearly visible. In some cases, they are for example willing to impose trade restrictions while in other cases this is not done.

¹¹⁷ Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, *China: Lijst van vragen en antwoorden* (35207 nr. 34), June 24, 2020, <https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/detail?id=2020D24349&did=2020D24349>.

¹¹⁸ Ibid, 15.

8. Discussion

This chapter will discuss the differences in the role conception of the government and parliament to explain why the debate around the China note happened. For this role theory will be used.

8.1 Role conception government

As established the following observable implications are visible in the China note. A preference to act together with others, the importance of the NATO/US alliance and EU cooperation, the promotion of human rights and the focus on developmental aid, the importance of international law and international institutions, and the importance of trade and an open economy.

The observable implications visible in the reaction by the Cabinet on the motions and questions by the house of representatives are the need to work together and not act alone, the importance of EU cooperation, the importance of trade, and the struggle between preacher and merchant identities.

Together this means the following parts of the national role conception fit the governments foreign policy towards China through the China note and following discussions:

- A preference to act together with others;
- The importance of the NATO/US alliance and EU cooperation;
- The promotion of human rights and the focus on developmental aid;
- The importance of international law and international institutions;
- The importance of trade and the open economy;
- A struggle between preacher and merchant identities.

8.2 Role conception parliament

The observable implications visible in the statements made by the parliamentarians during the meeting on the China note as well as in the motions and questions are as following:

- The importance of the NATO/US alliance and EU cooperation;
- Awareness of its small size, but a perception of influence and moral obligation;
- The promotion of human rights and (the focus on developmental aid);
- The importance of international law and international institutions;
- The importance of trade and the open economy;
- A struggle between preacher and merchant identities.

8.3 Debate around China note

The debate around the China note mostly focused on the differences in opinion on what the government should focus on between the Cabinet and Parliament. When looking at the differences in the observable implications that were visible in the documents and meeting the difference is that the government has the preference to act together with others while the parliament is aware of the small size of the Netherlands and therefore sees the need to work together with other but also have less ambivalence to act alone when needed due to the perceived moral obligation to for example act on human rights violations.

The role conceptions of the government and the house of representatives therefore do not fully align with each other. This can cause role conflict due to the differing expectations on foreign policy.¹¹⁹ Parliament expects more agency and actorness from the government, while the government is careful not to antagonize foreign actors by working in coalitions.

The domestic role conflict is also caused by the differing importance they bestow on economic relations and human rights. In the Netherlands there is always the conflict between economic interest and more humanitarian interest as seen in the observable implication of the struggle between merchant and preacher identities. In this struggle the government ends up on the merchant side while a majority of the house of representatives ends up on the preacher side. So even though the national role conception is the same they differ in the importance they put on one or the other which causes contestation in the foreign policy they want to see.

¹¹⁹ See Walker 1987.

9. Conclusion

To answer the question on, why was there so much debate between the Dutch government and the house of representatives around the 2019 'China note'? The national role conception of the Netherlands was established. To analyze and compare the national role conception several observable implications were determined namely,

- A preference to act together with other actors;
- The importance of the NATO/US alliance and EU cooperation;
- Awareness of its small size, but a perception of influence and moral responsibility;
- The promotion of human rights and the focus on developmental aid;
- The importance of international law and international institutions;
- The importance of trade and the open economy;
- A struggle between preacher and merchant identities.

The national role conception was then compared to the China note with the help of these observable implications. The same was done to the statements by parliamentarians during the meeting on the China note and the submitted motions and questions. The analysis showed that in the China note there was a clear notion of wanting to act together with others as to not antagonize China, while the analysis of the meeting and motions showed less hesitation by the parliamentarians to act alone due to the perceived moral responsibility to act on human rights violations. The other observable implications were all present in both cases. This difference in role conceptions caused domestic role conflict as the parliament felt like the government was not acting with the same conviction as they wanted. While the government thought that parliament wants them to act to harshly and without regard for other interests.

The conflict in roles is what can explain the debate around the China note. Although the government and the house of representatives have largely the same national role conception they differ on the point on how to act. The government wants to mainly work with others in coalitions, while parliament expect the government also to act when others are not willing to act against China. Another conflict is the matter in if trade or human rights are the most important matter in foreign relations with China. Although the role conceptions on this point do not differ in their content, they do differ in the importance that is bestowed on one or the other. This is also visible in the observable implication of struggle between preacher and merchant identities. In this struggle the government ends up on the merchant side, while a big part of parliament ends up on the preacher side. This causes a conflict in how to handle human rights violations as the government is more careful in these due to economic relations while parliament expects more actorness of the government.

So even though the role conceptions of parliament and the government reflect in large part the national role conception of the Netherlands. They do differ in the governments preference to act together and not antagonize, due to economic interest. While parliament has less hesitations to act alone due to perceived moral responsibility and the importance they bestow on human rights.

Bibliography

- AIVD. *2021 Jaarverslag AIVD*. Den Haag: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2022.
- Baehr, Peter. "The Dutch foreign policy elite: A descriptive study of perceptions and attitudes." *International Studies Quarterly* 24, no. 2 (June 1980): 223-261.
- Breuning, Marijke. "Role theory research in international relations: State of the art and blind spots." In *Role theory in international relations: Approaches and analyses*, edited by Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank, and Hanns W. Mull, 16-35. London; New York: Routledge, 2011.
- Erlandson, Susanna. "Rethinking small state security: Dutch alignment in the 1940s compared to Swedish neutrality." In *Shaping the international relations of the Netherlands, 1815-2000: A small country on the global scene*, edited by Ruud van Dijk, Samuël Kruizinga, Vincent Kuitenbrouwer, and Rimko van der Maar, 117-139. London: Routledge, 2018.
- Everts, Ph. P, ed. *Controversies at home: domestic actors in the foreign policy of the Netherlands*. Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1985.
- Farnell, John, and Paul Irwin Crookes. "Investments." In *The politics of EU-China economic relations: An uneasy partnership*, 95-120. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016.
- Harnisch, Sebastian, Cornelia Frank, and Hanns W. Maull. "Introduction." In *Role theory in international relations: Approaches and analyses*, edited by Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank, and Hanns W. Maull, 1-4. London; New York: Routledge, 2011.
- Harnisch, Sebastian. "Role theory: operationalization of key concepts." In *Role theory in international relations: Approaches and analyses*, edited by Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank, and Hanns Maull, 7-15. London; New York: Routledge, 2011.
- Heijden, Yvonne van der. *De dans van de leeuw en de draak: Verleden, heden en toekomst van de Nederlands-Chinese handelsbetrekkingen*. Amsterdam: Business Contact, 2009.
- Heldring, Jerome. "Rhetoric and reality in Dutch foreign policy." *The World Today* 34, no. 10 (October 1978): 409-416. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40395020>.
- Hellema, Duco. *Nederland in de wereld: buitenlandse politiek van Nederland*. Houten: Spectrum, 2010.
- Herman, Joost. "The Dutch drive for humanitarianism: Inner origins and development of the gidsland tradition and its external effects." *International Journal* 61, no. 4 (Autumn 2006): 859-874. <https://doi.org/10.2307/40204220>.
- Holsti, K.J. "National role conceptions in the study of foreign policy." *International Studies Quarterly* 14, no. 3 (September 1970): 233-309.

- Kaarbo, Juliet. "Dutch foreign policy: Excessive compromise in coalition politics?" In *Coalition politics and cabinet decision making: a comparative analysis of foreign policy choices*, 67-121. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012.
- Kiesraad. "Officiële uitslag Tweede Kamer verkiezing 15 maart 2017." Accessed June 27, 2023. <https://www.kiesraad.nl/actueel/nieuws/2017/03/20/officiële-uitslag-tweede-kamerverkiezing-15-maart-2017>.
- Meegdenburg, Hilde van. "Process tracing: An analyticist approach." In *Routledge handbook of foreign policy analysis methods*, edited by Patrick O. Mello and Falk Ostermann, 405-420. London; New York: Routledge, 2023.
- Meunier, Sophie, Brian Burgoon, and Wade Jacoby. "The politics of hosting Chinese investment in Europe – An introduction." *Asia-Europe Journal* 12, (2014): 109-126. DOI:10.1007/s10308-014-0381.
- Milhaupt, Curtis J., and Wentong Zheng. "Beyond ownership: State capitalism and the Chinese firm." *Georgetown Law Journal* 103, no. 3 (March 2015): 665-722.
- Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken. *Nederland-China: een nieuwe balans*, 2019.
- Nabers, Dirk. "Identity and role change in international politics." In *Role theory in international relations: Approaches and analyses*, edited by Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank, and Hanns W. Maull, 74-92. London; New York: Routledge, 2011.
- Reilly, James. "China's economic statecraft in Europe." *Asia-Europe Journal* 15, (2017): 173-185.
- Stichting PDC. "Motie." Parliament.com. Accessed May 15, 2023. <https://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhrogv2/motie>.
- Stichting PDC. "Partijen in Tweede en Eerste Kamer." Parliament.com. Accessed June 27, 2023. [https://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhrpfxut/partijen in tweede en eerste kamer](https://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhrpfxut/partijen%20in%20tweede%20en%20eerste%20kamer).
- Tonra, Ben. *The Europeanisation of national foreign policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish foreign policy*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001.
- Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. "Beleidsnotitie Nederland-China." Notaoverleg: Vaste commissie voor Buitenlandse Zaken, Algemene commissie voor Buitenlandse Handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking. September 30, 2019. Video of notaoverleg, 04:21:58. <https://debatgemist.tweedekamer.nl/node/21693>.
- . *China: Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Handel en Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en de staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken en Klimaat* (35207 nr. 33). December 6, 2019. https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2019D50481&id=2019D50481.
- . *China: Brief van de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken* (35207 nr. 32). November 11, 2019.

https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2019D45263&id=2019D45263.

----- . *China; Dierziektebeleid: Brief van de minister van Buitenlandse Zaken* (35207; 29683 nr. 31), October 9, 2019,

https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2019D40057&id=2019D40057.

----- . *China: Lijst van vragen en antwoorden* (35207 nr. 34). June 24, 2020.

<https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/detail?id=2020D24349&did=2020D24349>.

----- . *China: Motie van de leden Bisschop en van Helvert* (35207 nr. 7). September 30, 2019.

<https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019D38258&did=2019D38258>.

----- . *China: Motie van de leden Bisschop en van Helvert* (35207 nr. 8). September 30, 2019.

<https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019Z18371&did=2019D38261>.

----- . *China: Motie van de leden Sjoerdsma en van Helvert* (35207 nr. 15). September 30, 2019.

<https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019D38272&did=2019D38272>.

----- . *China: Motie van de leden van Ojik en Diks* (35207 nr. 16). September 30, 2019.

<https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019Z18382&did=2019D38273>.

----- . *China: Motie van de leden van Raan en Ouwehand* (35207 nr. 19). September 30, 2019.

<https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019D38278&did=2019D38278>.

----- . *China: Motie van de leden van Raan en Ouwehand* (35207 nr. 20). September 30, 2019.

<https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019Z18387&did=2019D38282>.

----- . *China: Motie van de leden Voordewind en van Helvert* (35207 nr. 21). September 30, 2019.

<https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019D38284&did=2019D38284>.

----- . *China: Motie van het lid Bisschop* (35207 nr. 9). September 30, 2019.

<https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019Z18372&did=2019D38263>.

- . *China: Motie van het lid de Roon* (35207 nr. 10). September 30, 2019.
<https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019Z18373&did=2019D38264>.
- . *China: Motie van het lid Karabulut C.S* (35207 nr. 11). September 30, 2019.
<https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019D38265&did=2019D38265>.
- . *China: Motie van het lid Karabulut* (35207 nr. 12). September 30, 2019.
<https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019Z18376&did=2019D38267>.
- . *China: Motie van het lid Koopmans C.S* (35207 nr. 5). September 30, 2019.
<https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019D38250&did=2019D38250>.
- . *China: Motie van het lid Koopmans C.S* (35207 nr. 6). September 30, 2019.
<https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019D38254&did=2019D38254>.
- . *China: Motie van het lid Sjoerdsma* (35207 nr. 14). September 30, 2019.
<https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019Z18379&did=2019D38270>.
- . *China: Motie van het lid Sjoerdsma C.S* (35207 nr. 13). September 30, 2019.
<https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019D38268&did=2019D38268>.
- . *China: Motie van het lid van Helvert C.S* (35207 nr. 4). September 30, 2019.
<https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019Z18364&did=2019D38247>.
- . *China: Motie van het lid van Ojik* (35207 nr. 17). September 30, 2019.
<https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019Z18383&did=2019D38274>.
- . *China: Motie van het lid van Ojik* (35207 nr. 18). September 30, 2019.
<https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019Z18384&did=2019D38276>.
- . *China: Motie van het lid Voordewind* (35207 nr. 22). September 30, 2019.
<https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019D38285&did=2019D38285>.
- . *China: Motie van het lid Voordewind* (35207 nr. 23). September 30, 2019.
<https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2019D38287&did=2019D38287>.
- . *Internationale Veiligheidsstrategie: Motie van het lid Becker C.S* (33694 nr. 16). May 15, 2018.

<https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/moties/detail?id=2018D28574&did=2018D28574>.

----- . *Stemmingen moties Beleidsnotitie Nederland-China*. October 8, 2019.

https://www.tweedekamer.nl/debat_en_vergadering/plenaire_vergaderingen/details/activiteit?id=2019A04242.

----- . "Vaste commissie: Buitenlandse Zaken." Accessed June 27, 2023.

https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerleden_en_commissies/commissies/buza.

Vandenbosch, Amry. *Dutch foreign policy since 1815: A study in small power politics*. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1959.

Verbeek, Bertjan, and Anna van der Vleuten. "The domesticization of the foreign policy of the Netherlands (1989–2007): The paradoxical result of Europeanization and Internationalization." *Acta Politica* 43, (2008): 357-377. DOI:10.1057/ap.2008.12.

Voorhoeve, J.C.C. *Peace, profits and principles: a study of Dutch foreign policy*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979.

Waldner, David. "What makes process tracing good? Causal mechanisms, causal inference, and the completeness standard in comparative politics." In *Process tracing: From metaphor to analytic tool*, edited by Andrew Bennett and Jefferey T. Checkel, 126-152. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

Walker, Stephen. "The correspondence between foreign policy rhetoric and behavior: Insights from role theory and exchange theory." In *Role theory and foreign policy analysis*, edited by Stephen Walker, 81-93. Durham: Duke University Press, 1987.

Wisch, Naomi Bailin. "National attributes as sources of national role conceptions: a capability-motivation model." In *Role theory and foreign policy analysis*, edited by Stephen Walker, 94-103. Durham: Duke University Press, 1987.

Willigen, Niels van. "Dutch foreign policy: Staying the course amid a changing world." In *Foreign policy change in Europe since 1991*, edited by Jeroen Joly and Tim Haesebrouck, 205-231. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021.