Bureaucratic Reputation of International Organizations and State Cooperation in Trade

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Abstract

In light of modern economic challenges, the significance of state cooperation as a subject of debate has gained prominence. Although long-established international relations theories provide answers for why and when states choose to cooperate, this thesis tests a novel explanation for state cooperation. It investigates the expectation that one can further learn about factors influencing state cooperation by examining the application of bureaucratic reputation theory from public administration. The research thus explores the expectation that an international organization's bureaucratic reputation causally affects states' willingness to cooperate in trade. By analyzing a single case study, the World Trade Organization, in-depth research explores whether the organization's reputation matters for its outcomes and successes. Through the method of process tracing by means of secondary data collection and a semi-structured interview, the research findings denote that bureaucratic reputation plausibly has some causal power; but acknowledges that it is unconvincing as the sole causal factor affecting state cooperation. The findings expand the applicability of bureaucratic reputation theory and advance the knowledge base of factors affecting state cooperation.

1. Introduction

1.1 The Puzzle

Does the reputation of international organizations matter for facilitating successful state cooperation in trade? This thesis explores the application of bureaucratic reputation theory from public administration to account for state cooperation. Notably, state cooperation, the collaboration of states to achieve common goals, has become an ever more important topic in the face of contemporary challenges ranging from economic crises, global warming, pandemics, and more (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985; Keohane, 2005). Hence there is great value in further studying what factors influence and promote cooperation.

However, it must be recognized that cooperation should not be taken for granted under the anarchical world system, with no global government to enforce rules and laws (Shepsle, 2002). Cooperation is not a straightforward choice for states. States are individually self-interested and will therefore pursue the actions from which they yield the highest possible utility and payoff (Von Neumann et al., 2004). Thus, self-interest often becomes an obstacle to cooperation, as states may be individually better off by not cooperating. States therefore face a Prisoner's Dilemma, where all would be collectively better off if all cooperated (Osborne, 2003). However, states are independently incentivized not to collaborate to increase their own selfish gains (Sheplse, 2002). Consequently, although cooperation would help to achieve common goals for the greater good and help to solve collective problems, states often lack the motivation to cooperate (Osborne, 2003; Von Neumann et al., 2004).

Fortunately, international institutions and organizations are widely acknowledged to help facilitate state cooperation (Keohane, 2005). Such organizations help to ensure repeated interactions between actors in the future, thus encouraging long-term partnerships (Shepsle, 2002). Similarly, these organizations are often endowed with monitoring and enforcement powers, reassuring states that their partners will uphold commitments and guarantee punishments for any defectors (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985). As a result, international organizations discourage cheating and lower the transaction costs of cooperation, to enhance the probability of successful state cooperation (Greico et al., 1993).

However, once international organizations are fully set up and functioning, one can question what factors contribute to the continued success of these organizations. This is the puzzle that this thesis seeks to tackle and advance on. In particular, this thesis strives to examine if an organization's bureaucratic reputation can account for state cooperation outcomes. Bureaucratic reputation refers to the beliefs about an organization's capacities, roles, intentions, history, and missions (Carpenter, 2010; Carpenter & Krause, 2012). Theories of the reputational logic argue that one often underestimates the value of a good reputation (Maor et al., 2013; Maor, 2014). Highlighting that reputation has proven to significantly affect an organization's performance, outcomes, and, therefore, successes (Carpenter & Krause, 2012; Maor et al., 2013). This research thus combines theories of state cooperation and reputation to investigate if and how bureaucratic reputation theory can give deeper insights into the successes and failures of an international organization. As such, the goal is to evaluate if international organizations can further learn from bureaucratic reputation theory in public administration.

Specifically, this research investigates to what extent bureaucratic reputation theory can account for state cooperation outcomes in international trade. In order to do so, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is studied in-depth as an international organization that promotes cooperation to liberalize international trade (WTO, 2023a). As the largest global trade organization, the WTO provides a forum for member states to negotiate trade agreements in trade rounds, settle disputes and monitor compliance with trade rules (WTO, 2023a; WTO, 2023b). As such, it is interesting to posit whether the reputation of the WTO can plausibly explain the organization's state cooperation successes. The research will thus question whether a good bureaucratic reputation of being impartial, effective, and fair enables the WTO to facilitate cooperation among its member states (Carpenter, 2010). As a result, this thesis will investigate whether the bureaucratic reputation of the WTO affected member states' willingness to cooperate in trade rounds.

1.2 Research Objective and Question

Based on existing research and studies on the effect of bureaucratic reputation on regulatory organizations, this research expects a similar result to be unveiled when studying the reputation of an international organization (Busuioc, 2016; Gilad & Yogev, 2012; Maor, 2014). Hence, in line with Carpenter (2010), it is expected that the bureaucratic reputation of the international organization will affect the organization's outcomes, performance and thus,

successes. In particular, it is predicted that if the international organization has a tarnished or poor reputation of potential biases and unfair treatment, the organization will fail to succeed in its intended outcomes, in this case successful state cooperation (Carpenter & Krause, 2012; WTO, 2023a; WTO, 2023b). To evaluate these expectations, the research tests the effect of bureaucratic reputation on outcomes of the international organization's trade rounds.

Subsequently, the unit of analysis is international organizations. The chosen case study is the WTO, as an international organization that enables and regulates global trade rules to ensure that states fairly maximize gains from trade (Oatley, 2018; WTO, 2023b). To assess the bureaucratic reputation of the international organization, this thesis analyzes two time periods of trade negotiation rounds in depth. Specifically, the Uruguay Round is examined as the trade round that resulted in successful trade cooperation, and the Doha Round is studied as the trade round that failed to achieve cooperation (WTOd, 2023; WTOe, 2023). For each round, the reputation of the international organization is investigated at length to address whether the organization's bureaucratic reputation could plausibly have accounted for the cooperation outcomes.

Further, the thesis uses process tracing as the primary research method (Bennett, 2010; Bennett & Checkel, 2014). The chosen method requires the use of diagnostic evidence to make inferences about the causal power of bureaucratic reputation (Bennett & Checkel, 2014). Process tracing allows for investigating the intermediate steps of the processes leading up to the trade round outcomes to make causal inferences about the role of bureaucratic reputation (Bennett & Checkel, 2014). Diagnostic evidence was similarly gained by means of secondary data collection and a semi-structured interview with the Head of External Relations at the WTO. These steps were taken to ensure data triangulation.

As a result, this thesis aims to explore whether an international organization's bureaucratic reputation matters for state cooperation; in doing so, the following research question is answered:

To what extent does the bureaucratic reputation of an international organization account for state cooperation in trade?

1.3 Scientific and Societal Relevance

The investigated relationship is scientifically and academically relevant because it advances the knowledge base of bureaucratic reputation theory and furthers its applicability. As such, the thesis takes what is already established about the reputations of regulatory organizations from scholars like Carpenter (2010), Gilad & Yogev (2012), and Maor (2014), and applies it to international organizations in order to produce potentially novel findings on the role of bureaucratic reputation. The research results thus expand the scope of reputation studies and advances our understanding of what factors can contribute to successful state cooperation.

Similarly, studying the role of reputation is incredibly relevant in the current era of modern information technology and information overload (Carpenter, 2010; Carpenter & Krause, 2012). As more and more information is publicized about the operations and transparency of organizations, an organization's audiences will rely more on heuristics and information shortcuts to process such information, and may as a consequence depend on reputation more than ever before (Carpenter & Krause, 2012). This research will therefore advance the knowledge and understanding of the consequences that reputation can have for the scientific community.

Societally and practically, this thesis is relevant because the research findings contribute to and create a deeper understanding of how to facilitate cooperation, which is fundamental in today's globalized and interconnected world. As such, the research significantly expands on when and why state cooperation occurs. The research findings may thus provide actionable advice for international organizations on how to promote state cooperation more effectively. This is societally important as a better understanding of what factors promote cooperation can have game-changing results for solving collective global and societal problems like climate change, poverty, and future pandemics.

Moreover, the research findings may produce essential insights into what behaviors or reputations international organizations should crucially avoid when trying to facilitate state cooperation. And may thus give further advice on how international organizations can better operate and succeed. All in all, this research can have potentially significant and novel insights into the relationship between the bureaucratic reputation of international organizations and state cooperation.

1.4 Structure of Thesis

To delve into this study, the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 introduces a short literature review of existing studies on state cooperation and bureaucratic reputation to better contextualize the research. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework by examining the theoretical embeddedness of research. Specifically, the chapter conceptualizes state cooperation as the dependent variable and the bureaucratic reputation of an international organization as the independent variable. The chapter concludes by bringing the two variables together, elaborate on the causal processes at play, and outline the research expectations.

Next, Chapter 4 clarifies the study's research design and data collection methods. It specifically advocates for the appropriateness of conducting process tracing as the primary research method, coupled with two data collection methods to enable data triangulation namely, secondary data collection and a semi-structured interview. Chapter 5 analyzes and report the diagnostic evidence and empirical research findings. Chapter 6 evaluates the research limitations and make recommendations for future research. Finally, chapter 7 summarizes the results of the research and answers the research question.

2. Literature Review

The following chapter elaborates on long-established theories that explain state cooperation and identify the power of bureaucratic reputation theory by evaluating the depth and breadth of existing theoretical works. Such evaluation will crucially allow for better contextualization and identification of the gap in research that this thesis seeks to advance.

2.1 State Cooperation

This section expands on long-lasting international relations theories that support why state cooperation can be successful or unsuccessful, depending on states' self-interests and the fear of being cheated (Greico et al., 1993; Keohane, 2005; Osborne, 2003; Shepsle, 2002). This is carried out by comparing arguments proposed by numerous theoretical approaches.

Accordingly, international relations theories broadly advocate that state cooperation fails when there are uncertain transaction costs, and uncertainties as to whether parties to an agreement will honor their commitments (Keohane, 2005). In particular, rational choice

theory argues that cooperation is often unsuccessful because states always choose the action from which they yield the highest individual utility (Shepsle, 2002; Von Neumann et al., 2004). This implies that cooperation may be hindered by states' self-interested cost-benefit analyses of alternative behaviors (Oatley, 2018). For this reason, if states can yield higher utility from not cooperating, cooperation will be unsuccessful.

The optimal way to exemplify the difficulties that states face when choosing whether to cooperate is by exploring the famous Prisoner's Dilemma. The story holds that two suspects, arrested on suspicion of committing a crime together, are questioned and must choose between two actions, either stay silent or snitch on their partner (Osborne, 2003; Von Neumann et al., 2004). Each action results in different utility payoffs, such as years sentenced to prison, represented in Figure 1 below. The game reveals that actors will choose the action that results in maximum individual utility and cooperation, therefore, fails (Oatley, 2018; Shepsle, 2002). Even though the actors could achieve the lowest combined prison sentence, one year each, if they chose to cooperate and therefore stay silent. As a result, one observes that when actors can gain utility, in this case, lower their prison sentence to zero, they will often choose to do so. This game illustrates that cooperation is frequently hindered by the fear of being cheated by others and the actors' ability to gain selfishly from not cooperating (Osborne, 2003).

Figure 1

Exemplified Prisoner's Dilemma with Two Actors

		Suspect 2	
Suspect 1		**Stay Silent**	**Snitch**
	Stay Silent	(1,1)	(5,0)
	Snitch	(0,5)	(3,3)

Note. Adapted from *Osborne, M. J. (2003). An Introduction to Game Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.*

The theoretical game models the choices states face when deciding whether to cooperate. It demonstrates that cooperation is often hindered because states choose the action that gives

them the highest individual utility (Osborne, 2003; Shepsle, 2002; Von Neumann et al., 2004).

Taking this simple model one step further, there are added complexities when trying to facilitate cooperation between more than two actors or states (Shepsle, 2002). In such situations, not only may states gain from not cooperating, but states can also benefit from the cooperative efforts of others (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 2007). Olson (1965) elaborates that individual states lack incentives to cooperate because this comes at an individual effort and cost. Hence, states can choose to free ride and enjoy the benefits of collective action from other states' efforts (Shepsle, 2002). Cumulatively, these models illustrate that because states often choose the actions with the highest individual utility, and cooperation is frequently hindered (Olson, 1965; Osborne, 2003).

Even so, numerous international relations theories support that successful state cooperation is often possible. Firstly, the realist theoretical approach argues that state cooperation can be successful when it is in the self-interest of states to collaborate (Waltz, 2010). In this respect, states will pursue any actions necessary, hence collaborate, to advance their interests (Mearsheimer, 2001). Realists establish that states will cooperate, for example, in trade, if they make absolute transaction gains and power from collaborating (Mearsheimer, 2001; Waltz, 2010). As such, realists view cooperation as a tool states can use to pursue their interests and power.

Comparably, social constructivists denote that state cooperation is frequently successful because states share values and norms, which shape their behavior (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Constructivists argue that states gauge mutual interests represented in values and norms through repeated interactions (Wendt, 1995). Hence, when states interact and are met with empathy and respect, they are likely to adopt a norm of successful cooperation (Wendt, 1995). And when cooperation becomes an established norm, states will uphold the norm in order to protect their relationships with other states (Wendt, 1995). Constructivists consequently perceive norms and values as tying states' commitments together, which forces them to act accordingly, and states will thus voluntarily choose to cooperate (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Wendt, 1995).

Finally, the theoretical argument proposed by liberal institutionalism promotes that state cooperation is possible and successful because of international institutions and organizations (Moravcsik, 1997). These organizations lay out the rules, norms, and procedures that states must follow and thus enable cooperation (Keohane, 2005). Institutions are seen as mediators that lay out agreement expectations and standards to which all parties must agree and accept (Keohane, 2005). International institutions are believed to facilitate an environment for effective cooperation by decreasing the likelihood of state defection and cheating (Greico et al., 1993). As a result, international organizations increase the probability of successful state cooperation (Keohane, 2005).

The international relations theories above provide long-established explanations for why state cooperation can be successful or unsuccessful. However, this thesis investigates a potential gap in these existing studies, and therefore probes a novel explanation for state cooperation. This thesis argues that existing theoretical arguments do not give enough credit to the soft power of an international organization's bureaucratic reputation to facilitate state cooperation. Consequently, the thesis will test whether the bureaucratic reputation theory has plausible casual implications for state cooperation.

2.2 Bureaucratic Reputation Theory

This section elaborates on the existing applications of bureaucratic reputation theory. This is done by examining research that has applied bureaucratic reputation theory to account for agencies' and organizations' performance, decision-making, legitimacy, and even accountability (Carpenter, 2010; Heims, 2019; Lodge & Wegrich, 2022; Maor, 2014). This discussion demonstrates that bureaucratic reputation theory has not yet been applied to explain state cooperation.

Reputation-based theories have a long academic history in public administration. Reputation emerged as a force when more power and authority started to be delegated to bodies other than the government (Carpenter & Krause, 2012). One of the most notable scholars, Carpenter (2010), used reputation to account for the evolution of the Federal Drug Administration (FDA). His research advocates that because reputations consist of powerful beliefs about an organization, reputation can embed perceptions of the organization in the minds of the organization's audiences. These perceptions, in turn, substantially affect the organization's legitimacy and performance (Carpenter, 2010). Thus, demonstrating that

researchers must analyze reputation as having the ability to weaken or empower an organization. Accordingly, Carpenter (2010) proved that reputation affected the FDA's decision-making, especially in licensing of drugs. The research, therefore, denotes that reputation must be analyzed as significantly affecting an organization's outcomes.

Similarly, bureaucratic reputation theory has been utilized to account for organizational decision-making and outputs (Lodge & Wegrich, 2022). Demortain & Borraz (2021), for instance, used reputation to explain how an organization, the European Food Safety Authority, changed the methods it used to assess the risk of certain chemicals, when the technique was deemed controversial. Therefore, suggesting that agencies and organizations use strategies to manage their reputations (Demortain & Borraz, 2021). The study endorses the importance of reputation and the lengths that organizations will go to ensure they are perceived as reliable and trustworthy. Bureaucratic reputation theory, therefore, sees organizations as actively protecting their reputations (Gilad & Yogev, 2012). Rimkute (2018) similarly applied bureaucratic reputation theory to account for the European Food Safety Authority's scientific outputs, finding that reputational threats reduce the quantity and quality of the organization's outputs. As a result, these studies stress the importance of examining reputation when trying to account for an organization's performance and successes.

Further, existing research has used bureaucratic reputation to explain why and when organizations choose to cooperate with one another (Busuioc, 2016; Heims, 2019). Research finds that the choice of whether to cooperate, depends on the reputational impact of cooperation for different organizations (Heims, 2019). Similarly, finding that inter-agency cooperation can improve efficiency, but it may also challenge organizational reputations (Busuioc, 2016). As such, bureaucratic reputation theory has been applied to various studies to account for organizational outcomes and performance.

Altogether, these studies have progressed the application of bureaucratic reputation theory and significantly expanded its power to explain the performances and outcomes of organizations. Yet, this thesis seeks to advance the applicability of bureaucratic reputation theory further and tests its application to account for state cooperation under an international organization.

3. Theoretical Framework

This chapter provides justification for the theoretical embeddedness of the research. The chapter first focuses on conceptualizing state cooperation as the dependent variable. This is done by defining state cooperation and explaining, with examples, what is understood as successful and unsuccessful cooperation. Then it expands on state cooperation in the specific context of trade under an international organization. Secondly, the chapter conceptualizes the bureaucratic reputation of an international organization as the independent variable. This is carried out by defining the reputation of an international organization and expanding on what is understood as a good or poor reputation of an organization. Then it proceeds to elaborate on the reputation of the international organization in the context of trade. Thirdly, the end of the chapter brings the two variables together by further exploring the causal processes at play and deductively develops research expectations.

3.1 Dependent Variable: State Cooperation

This section defines, exemplifies, and contextualizes state cooperation in line with international trade under an international organization.

State cooperation is the dependent variable of interest. This thesis adopts the definition of state cooperation per Axelrod & Keohane (1985) as occurring when states adjust their actions to the preferences of others. This necessarily means that cooperation involves voluntary collaboration and interaction between states to achieve common goals (Keohane, 2005). Numerous factors contribute to cooperation, such as mutual preferences and interests, objectives, and the number of actors involved (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985).

More specifically, this research conceptualizes state cooperation as either successful or unsuccessful. This conceptual classification is endorsed by existing research that investigates cooperative outcomes. Several studies have used this binary classification to account for state cooperation in research on various topics, including transnational climate change governance, security collaborations, and territorial conflicts (Andonova et al., 2009; Diehl & Balas, 2010; Huth & Allee, 2003). This thesis, therefore, justifies conceptualizing state cooperation as successful or unsuccessful because it allows for effectively classifying cooperative outcomes in a simplistic and replicable manner.

Cooperation will be classified as successful when all intended states agree to collaborate with one another to achieve a common goal (Axelrod & Keohane; 1985; Keohane, 2005). An example of successful state cooperation is the EU single market, created to improve economic growth through the free movement of goods, capital, and persons between EU member states (EU, 2023). All EU states agreed to eliminate trade and legal barriers and adopted common policies on agriculture and labor, thus illustrating a case of successful state cooperation (EU, 2023).

Conversely, state cooperation will be classified as unsuccessful when not all states agree to collaborate to achieve a common goal (Keohane, 2005). An example of unsuccessful state cooperation is the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, which aimed at reducing carbon emissions of all states globally (UNFCC, 2023). Unfortunately, only approximately 40 states ratified the agreement, and major carbon-polluting countries such as China and India took no interest in the agreement (UNFCC, 2023). The Kyoto Protocol is, therefore, an example of unsuccessful state cooperation, as not all states ratified the agreement. The examples above illustrate the varied application of state cooperation and denote the appropriateness of conceptualizing state cooperation as successful or unsuccessful.

Bringing together the arguments proposed above, this research conceptualizes state cooperation in the specific context of trade under an international organization. As such, state cooperation is narrowed down to the cooperation of member states of the WTO (WTO, 2023a). Hence, state cooperation is specifically conceptualized as whether or not all member states of the WTO sign on to a new trade negotiation round (WTO, 2023a; WTO, 2023b). State cooperation is classified as successful if all member states sign on to the new trade round. And vice versa, cooperation is classified as unsuccessful if not all member states sign on to the new trade round.

3.2 Independent Variable: Bureaucratic Reputation of an International Organization

This section focuses on the bureaucratic reputation of the international organization as the independent variable of research. The following first defines bureaucratic reputation by adopting a recognized academic definition, and elaborate on its influence. Secondly, it differentiates a good reputation from a poor reputation by evaluating the complex dimensions

of reputation. Finally, it conceptualizes the reputation of an international organization in the context of international trade.

This thesis defines bureaucratic reputation as a set of beliefs about an organization's capacities, roles, intentions, history, and missions (Carpenter & Krause, 2012). Reputation is therefore not a formalized entity; instead, it is constructed by symbolic and powerful beliefs held by the audiences or members of an organization (Carpenter, 2010). Subsequently, the reputation of an organization is conceptualized as retaining four dimensions: a performative, moral, procedural, or technical reputation, which together shape how the organization behaves and achieves outcomes (Carpenter & Krause, 2012). The first dimension rests on the performative reputation of the organization, which assesses the quality of an organization's decision-making and efficiency in achieving outcomes. The second dimension questions the organization's morality, probing whether the organization is compassionate and honest and protects the interests of its members. The third dimension focuses on procedural reputation and asks whether the organization follows accepted norms and rules that the organization is expected to uphold. The fourth and final dimension, technical reputation, explores the capacities and skills of the organization, irrespective of performance (Carpenter & Krause, 2012). These definitional dimensions help to denote the complexity of evaluating bureaucratic reputation and demonstrate that reputation must be considered as having the ability to empower or weaken an organization (Carpenter, 2010).

Moreover, bureaucratic reputation is crucial for an organization because a good reputation can increase its legitimacy and overall performative output (Busuioc & Rimkutė, 2017; Carpenter, 2010; Maor, 2014). As such, the beliefs held by an organization's audience are fundamental to its successes (Carpenter, 2010). An audience perceives an organization favorably when it produces consistent quality of activities over time and is recognized as doing so effectively (Maor, 2014). A favorable reputation among an organization's audience can similarly generate backing for its missions and recommendations, which explains why organizations will go to great lengths to maintain their reputations (Krause & Douglas, 2005; Maor et al., 2013). Organizations will therefore take on considerable efforts to protect their reputations to avoid being perceived as inferior (Krause & Douglas, 2005; Maor et al., 2013). Organizations thus actively seek to avoid reputational damage, acknowledging how deeply they value reputation (Maor et al., 2013). These insights denote that when an organization is

perceived favorably in the eyes of its audiences, bureaucratic reputation can empower an organization, thus significantly adding to its value (Carpenter, 2010; Maor, 2014).

Further, this research explicitly conceptualizes an international organization's bureaucratic reputation as either good or poor. This conceptual classification is endorsed by existing research that investigates the impact of reputation on an organization's performance or outcomes (Daugirdas, 2019; Deephouse & Carter 2005; Roberts & Dowling, 2002). For instance, Deephouse & Carter (2005) classified reputation as good or poor and found that organizations with good reputations are seen as more legitimate. Accordingly, conceptualizing the bureaucratic reputation of an international organization in this manner is justified and appropriate because it allows for a replicable assessment of the effect of reputation on the organization's outcomes.

An organization's bureaucratic reputation will be denoted as good if it aligns positively according to the four elaborated dimensions of reputation. This would follow that the organization is perceived as having a favorable, performative, moral, procedural, or technical reputation (Carpenter & Krause, 2012). This means that an organization's members or audiences perceive the organization as having an excellent performative reputation and is believed to be competent and efficient in its decision-making abilities (Carpenter, 2010). Next, a good moral reputation denotes that members see the organization as compassionate and invested in protecting their best interests (Carpenter & Krause, 2012). A good procedural reputation elaborates that the organization is trusted to follow commonly accepted rules and norms. Lastly, when an organization has a good technical reputation, the organization is perceived to have the capacities and skills required for dealing with complex environments (Carpenter, 2010). Consequently, when the organization possesses a good reputation along these four dimensions, its reputation is classified as good. Conversely, when the organization maintains a flawed bureaucratic reputation along these four dimensions, its reputation will be classified as poor.

Bringing together the conceptualizations elaborated above, this research proceeds to explore the bureaucratic reputation of the international organization in the specific context of international trade. Accordingly, the bureaucratic reputation of the WTO is investigated in-depth and will be classified as either good or poor depending on how member states and audiences of the organization perceived it during trade negotiation rounds.

3.3 Research Expectations

This section elaborates on the connection between the independent and dependent variables, namely the bureaucratic reputation of the international organization and state cooperation, in order to produce relevant research expectations. First, to better understand the proposed relationship between the variables, the power of a good bureaucratic reputation for an organization is advanced. This is done by employing existing research on the influence of reputation on an organization. Next, a good bureaucratic reputation is evaluated as enabling the international organization to facilitate state cooperation, which constructs the first research expectation. Conversely, a poor reputation is further examined as hindering the international organization from producing state cooperation, thus, giving rise to the second research expectation.

So why is bureaucratic reputation so important? Reputation has the power to enable an organization (Carpenter, 2010). If good reputations are formed and the organization's audiences perceive it as reputable, reputation can be used as an asset to enhance the organization's credibility and trustworthiness (Maor, 2014). A good reputation can likewise generate greater public support for the organization's overall missions and goals (Maor et al., 2013; Maor, 2014). A favorable bureaucratic reputation can therefore increase the legitimacy of an organization, especially in the eyes of the organization's stakeholders or members (Busuioc & Rimkutė, 2017). This is due to the fact that a good reputation shows the organization's audience that it is capable of further meeting their wishes and needs and is therefore of value to them (Fombrun et al., 2000). Which in turn, has important consequences for the trust and support of an organization's members (Keohane, 2005; Maor et al., 2013; Maor, 2014). Accordingly, a good reputation can correspondingly have crucial implications for an organization's performance and success (Carpenter & Krause, 2012).

More specifically, reputation serves as a facilitator for international organizations. A good reputation is a form of soft power that permits an international organization to achieve its goals (Daugirdas, 2019; Keohane & Nye, 1998; Lange & Dai, 2011; Tomz, 2012). To exemplify the power of reputation, Kickbusch et al. (2010) demonstrated that the good reputation of an international organization, the World Health Organization, aided the organization in implementing policy decisions and gathering resources. As a result, a good bureaucratic reputation must be recognized as having the ability to significantly impact the outcomes of international organizations.

Moreover, bureaucratic reputation has implications for the cooperation of actors or members within the organization. Firstly, when the international organization is perceived as trustworthy and reputable, members of the organization will be more likely to cooperate with one another and follow the recommendations produced by the organization (Keohane & Nye, 1998; Lange & Dai, 2011; Tomz, 2012). A good reputation can therefore generate trust among members and establish an environment for effective cooperation (Daugirdas, 2019; Keohane & Nye, 1998). Secondly, the reputation of an international organization can deter members from cheating or violating collective agreements (Abbott & Snidal, 2000). A good reputation can thus increase the costs of defection and will therefore discourage members from defecting. Finally, a good reputation reassures members of the organization and thus lowers the transaction costs for cooperation (Keohane, 2005). Consequently, a reputable reputation of an international organization plausibly eliminates the obstacles to state cooperation and thus enables it.

Further, when the power of bureaucratic reputation is applied to the WTO, the international organization's reputation is expected to affect member states' willingness to cooperate. The logic follows that the WTO holds a reputation composed of symbolic beliefs, which represent the organization's history, mission, and capacities (Carpenter, 2010). The audiences of the organization, including the organization's member states will therefore perceive the organization in accordance with its reputation (Carpenter & Krause, 2012). Subsequently, member states will perceive the organization to have either a good or a poor reputation depending on its competence, performance, and capabilities (Carpenter, 2010). And as a consequence of these perceptions, member states will either be willing to cooperate or not be willing to cooperate. If the organization is perceived favorably, as trustworthy and legitimate, member states are expected to be more willing to cooperate (Carpenter & Krause, 2012; Keohane, 2005; Maor, 2014). Whereas as if the organization is perceived unfavorable and as carrying a poor reputation member states are expected to less inclined to cooperate (Fombrun et al., 2000; Keohane, 2005). One can thus see the imperative role that reputation is expected to play in determining state cooperation under the international organization. Hence, this research probes that the state cooperation result depends on the international organization's bureaucratic reputation.

As a result, this research expects a positive relationship between the variables in question. Hence a good bureaucratic reputation should facilitate successful state cooperation, and vice

versa, a poor bureaucratic reputation should produce unsuccessful state cooperation. Accordingly, the conceptual framework can be split into two, the consequences of a good bureaucratic reputation and a poor bureaucratic reputation, which correspondingly produce the two research expectations.

Firstly, the expected consequences of a good bureaucratic reputation of the international organization are examined, as represented in Figure 2. In accordance with Carpenter & Krause's (2012) four dimensions of reputation, this would imply that member states of the international organization perceive the organization as having a good performative, moral, procedural, or technical reputation. This suggests that the organization is perceived by the members as competent and capable of doing the job it is tasked with and thus has the skills required to achieve state cooperation to liberalize global trade (Carpenter, 2010; Maor, 2014 WTO, 2023b). Similarly, member states perceive the organization as efficient and able to produce outcomes in line with their best interests (Carpenter & Krause, 2012). The organization is, therefore, seen as valuable to members, as they see the WTO as a channel of pursuing their interests and wishes (Fombrun et al., 2000). In the eyes of the member states, the organization is thus seen as credible, legitimate, and trustworthy (Busuioc & Rimkutė, 2017; Carpenter & Krause, 2012; Maor, 2014).

Figure 2
Conceptual Framework of a Good Bureaucratic Reputation



Note. This figure demonstrates the expected causal process of a good bureaucratic reputation of the international organization and its consequences for state cooperation.

Accordingly, when the organization is perceived as reputable, member states are more likely to cooperate with one another to achieve common goals (Keohane & Nye, 1998; Tomz, 2012). The good reputation of the organization promotes trust between the member states, it reassures safe cooperation, and deters member states from cheating (Abbott & Snidal, 2000;

Keohane, 2005; Tomz, 2012). The good reputation of the organization iterates to member states that the organization is capable of enabling their interests and wishes, and secures that the organization is the best method for states to realize their collective goals (Fombrun et al., 2000). In doing so the reputation of the organization effectively lowers transaction costs for cooperation and thus encourages cooperation (Keohane, 2005).

When these positive perceptions of member states are taken together, the good reputation of the international organization is expected to eliminate obstacles to state cooperation. Accordingly, the reputable reputation of the organization is expected to cause members to cooperate more easily (Keohane & Nye, 1998; Tomz, 2012). As a result, when the organization bears a good bureaucratic reputation, member states will trust each other to uphold commitments, view the organization as competent and acting in their favor and are therefore expected to be more inclined to sign up to new trade negotiation rounds under the WTO, which directly produces successful state cooperation (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985; Carpenter, 2010; Maor, 2014; Keohane & Nye, 1998; Tomz, 2012).

Notably, the good reputation of the international organization is also expected to solve the Prisoner's Dilemma that member states face when choosing whether to cooperate (Osborne, 2003). The international organization acts as a mediator that reduces transaction costs and uncertainties of cooperation, in order to enhance trust and negotiation possibilities (Keohane & Nye, 1998). It is thus expected to cause states to agree to new trade rounds, enabling successful cooperation (Keohane, 2005). For these reasons, an international organization with a good reputation is expected facilitate the trust, accountability and credibility needed to produce an environment for efficient and safe cooperation (Abbott & Snidal, 2000; Maor, 2014; Tomz, 2012).

As a result, a good bureaucratic reputation of the international organization produces the first research expectation, which falls in line with existing research on the power of reputation from authors like Carpenter (2010), Keohane & Nye (1998), and Maor (2014), in order to expect that:

Research Expectation 1: When the international organization has a good bureaucratic reputation amongst its member states and audiences, state cooperation in trade rounds will be successful.

Conversely, the expected consequences of a poor bureaucratic reputation of the international organization are examined, as presented in Figure 3. A poor reputation implies that the international organization's members perceive the organization as having a flawed performative, moral, procedural, or technical reputation (Carpenter & Krause, 2012). This suggests that the organization is perceived by the member states as potentially incompetent and incapable of liberalizing global trade (Carpenter, 2010; Maor, 2014; WTO, 2023b). Similarly, member states may perceive the organization as potentially biased and unfair, favoring the needs and wants of certain members and neglecting others (Carpenter, 2010). In the eyes of the member states, the organization may thus lack legitimacy, credibility and is viewed as untrustworthy (Busuioc & Rimkutė, 2017; Maor, 2014).

Figure 3
Conceptual Framework of a Poor Bureaucratic Reputation



Note. This figure demonstrates the expected causal process of a poor bureaucratic reputation of the international organization and its consequences for state cooperation.

When member states hold such flawed perceptions, the international organization is expected not to be able to promote the trust needed for cooperation and would therefore be unable to prevent cheating (Abbott & Snidal, 2000). The flawed reputation of the international organization means that the organization is unable to reduce the transaction costs of cooperation (Keohane, 2005). As a result, when the organization bears a poor bureaucratic reputation, member states will be unwilling to trust each other and the organization (Carpenter, 2010; Maor, 2014). This therefore implies that member states will be hesitant to sign new trade negotiation rounds, which directly hinders state cooperation in trade (Abbott & Snidal, 2000; Keohane & Nye, 1998).

Further, this illustrates that a Prisoner's Dilemma cannot be avoided when members perceive the organization as having a poor reputation (Osborne, 2003). Due to its reputation, the

organization cannot reduce the uncertainties needed to facilitate effective cooperation (Keohane, 2005). Similarly, the international organization cannot establish the trust and credibility required for cooperation (Keohane & Nye, 1998; Maor, 2014). Therefore, the international organization's poor bureaucratic reputation is expected to negatively affects states' willingness to sign off on new trade rounds, and the organization is thus unable to eliminate the obstacles to state cooperation.

As a result, a poor bureaucratic reputation of the international organization produces the second research expectation, namely:

Research Expectation 2: When the international organization has a poor bureaucratic reputation amongst its member states and audiences, state cooperation in trade rounds will be unsuccessful.

Altogether, the conceptual frameworks established above demonstrate the power of an organization's bureaucratic reputation and advocate how valuable a good reputation is expected to be for facilitating an organization's outcomes (Carpenter, 2010; Maor, 2014). The thesis will proceed to test the two proposed expectations on outcomes of the international organization, namely state cooperation in trade rounds, to assess the causal role of the bureaucratic reputation.

4. Methodology

This chapter provides justification for the methodological choices of this study. The chapter will be structured as follows. First, it justifies a single case study design and the chosen case study. Second, it highlights why process tracing was the selected research method. Next, it operationalizes the dependent and independent variables of the research. Fourth, it elaborates on the data collection process by means of triangulating data from secondary content analysis and a semi-structured conducted interview. The chapter ends by addressing the reliability and validity of the chosen research design.

4.1 Research Design and Case Selection

A case is an instance of a class of events, for example war or revolution, a case is therefore a social construction which scholars alike try to study and contestably define (George & Bennett, 2005). Accordingly, a single case study across two time periods, has been chosen as the most appropriate research design to test if the bureaucratic reputation of the international

organization can account for state cooperation in trade. A single case study design best allows for detailed analysis of a case and thorough clarification of causal processes between the variables in question (Bennett, 2010; Bennett & Checkel, 2014). A single case study permits a greater level of description, which other research designs would not adequately permit (Halperin & Heath, 2017). The design particularly allows for careful deductive theory testing to explore observable implications of the casual processes within the case (Bennett & Checkel, 2014). Hence, within-case evidence can be used to make causal inferences about whether the theory, bureaucratic reputation, can explain the state cooperation outcomes.

The World Trade Organization has been chosen as the most applicable case study. The WTO is a representative case from a broader population of international organizations who employ efforts to expand interstate cooperation to achieve collective goals (Halperin & Heath, 2017; Keohane, 2005; Potter, 1935). More specifically, the WTO is a representative case of an international organization that aims to facilitate state cooperation in trade by lowering trade barriers (WTO, 2023a). The WTO is an appropriate case study as it regulates and maps out the rules of trade which all member states must adhere to (WTO, 2023a). The standards and expectations laid out by the WTO similarly intend to produce more certainty in gains from trade and thus plausibly enable an environment for effective and safe state cooperation (WTO, 2023b). Likewise, the WTO is endowed with monitoring and sanctioning capabilities which further ensures member states that their potential partners will hold up their commitments (WTO, 2023b). Consequently, this thesis seeks to advance on the narrow and contextualized case study of the WTO, and focuses solely on state cooperation of WTO member states during the organization's trade negotiations rounds.

Accordingly, the research explicitly analyzes two time periods of trade negotiation rounds. These trade negotiation talks, frequently called trade rounds, were adopted by the WTO from its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), intended to negotiate further trade agreements between member states. The rounds predominantly aim at reducing trade barriers and increasing gains from trade (WTO, 2023c). The selected time periods are the Uruguay Round and the Doha Round because these are the most recent trade rounds.

The Uruguay Round commenced in 1986 and has been classified as the trade round that resulted in successful state cooperation. The Uruguay Round focused on lowering protectionist trade measures such as tariffs, reducing agricultural subsidies, and increasing the

protection of intellectual property rights (WTO, 2023d). All member states eventually compromised and signed off on the new trade agreements based on consensus decision making, and state cooperation was therefore successful. Admittedly, this thesis acknowledges that the Uruguay Round took place when the international organization was still technically called the GATT. Still, since the GATT transitioned and expanded into the WTO, this thesis justifies that the same international organization is under investigation (WTO, 2023d). The GATT today still exists as an umbrella treaty of the WTO, and members of the GATT automatically became members of the WTO (GATT, 1994a; WTO, 2023d). This denotes that the base organization is the same; only its rules and powers have expanded. Further justifying that the organization did not change. Therefore, this thesis will denote both trade rounds as part of the same broader international organization. The research thus deems the Uruguay Round comparable to the Doha Round and will proceed to focus the investigation on the WTO.

Conversely, the Doha Round commenced in 2001 and has been classified as the trade round that resulted in unsuccessful state cooperation. The Doha Round hoped to improve trade opportunities for developing member states by focusing on expanding agricultural trade, reducing export subsidies, and increasing market access of services (WTO, 2023e). However, despite numerous attempts to get all member states to sign the new trade round, member state cooperation failed. Not all member states agreed to the new agreements, which led the trade round into a stalemate, and an unofficial end of the round in 2011 (WTO, 2023e).

Respectively, the two time periods above, demonstrate one time period of successful state cooperation in trade, the Uruguay Round, and one time period of unsuccessful state cooperation in trade, the Doha Round. As such, the differences in the dependent variables of the time periods, hope to allow for a thorough deductive investigation of the causal power the independent variable, namely bureaucratic reputation of the WTO.

4.2 Research Method: Process Tracing

This research utilized process tracing as the primary research method. This research method is increasingly prevalent in contemporary research and permits identifying the causal process between independent and dependent variables (Bennett & Checkel, 2014). Process tracing involves observing empirical evidence from within a single temporally bound case to test hypothesized explanations of that case (Bennett, 2008; Bennett & Checkel, 2014). In other words, the method allows for the historical examination of evidence on processes and

sequences of events within a case, to test whether a theory on these mechanisms explains the case (Bennett & Checkel, 2014). The method explores the intermediate steps of a process to make inferences about how an outcome took place, and tests whether research expectations plausibly generate the outcome of interest (Bennett & Checkel, 2014). Accordingly, it allows for assessing causal mechanisms in greater detail, by getting closer to the way in which the causal processes operate in a certain context of a particular case (Bennett & Checkel, 2014). By focusing on causal processes and mechanisms the research method thus permits for more thorough examination of the causal relationship between the variables (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

More specifically, process tracing is a tool of causal inference, it requires finding evidence to carefully unfold the outcome of interest (Collier, 2011). Process tracing collects copious pieces of evidence and observations through research and data collection, to make inferences about the unobservable causal explanation between the variables (Bennett & Checkel, 2014). This method thus crucially permits the establishing of causal relationships by identifying the processes through which they operate. Correspondingly, when evidence convincingly intervenes between the studied cause and effect, the evidence becomes diagnostic in nature (Bennett & Checkel, 2014). As such, the empirical observations from data collection become evidence of the causal explanation between the variables.

Further, process tracing is particularly valuable for contexts where traditional designs are not most fitting or ethical, such as when studying an organization's reputation (Bennett & Checkel, 2014). Process tracing is most fitting because it allows for examining the casual processes at a deeper level than other methods would acknowledge (Bennett & Checkel, 2014). It permits going beyond merely identifying correlations between variables and thus allows for more intensely examining the complex relationship between the bureaucratic reputation of the WTO and state cooperation under a figurative microscope (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

Similarly, due to the fact that process tracing is well suited for testing hypothesized causal processes, it is an appropriate research method when studying the proposed relationship between the bureaucratic reputation and state cooperation in trade (Bennett & Checkel, 2014). The research method allows for careful investigation and collection of quality evidence to observe the bureaucratic reputation of the WTO during the two trade rounds, to

infer if and how bureaucratic reputation effected the state cooperation outcomes. Hence, process tracing allows for deductively testing observable implications of the expected causal process and mechanisms within the case, to test whether bureaucratic reputation theory explains the outcome of interest (Bennett & Checkel, 2014).

Process tracing thus aims to identify the perceptions of the international organization's member states and audiences during each trade round, reconstruct a timeline of the behaviors of the member states during each round, and infer if and how the bureaucratic reputation of the international organization could have accounted for the observed state cooperation outcomes. Process tracing thus attempts to observe the relationship between bureaucratic reputation and state cooperation, and explore how the processes unfold in order to assess the causal role of bureaucratic reputation (Bennett & Checkel, 2014).

The following method was used for each time period. First, a research time frame was established (Bennett & Checkel, 2014). The allocated time frame for the Uruguay Round started in September 1986 when member state ministers agreed to launch a new trade round, until April 1994 when all members agreed and signed the new agreement (WTO, 2023d). In comparison, the starting point for the Doha Round was November 2001 up until 2011 when a ministerial conference failed to convince further member states to sign the new agreement, unofficially ending the round (WTO, 2023e). Secondly, extensive empirical data was collected on both time periods during their established time frames, through means of secondary data analysis and a semi-structured interview. A more detailed understanding of the data collection process is explored in the section below. Next, the empirical evidence deemed diagnostic was taken together to account for each trade cooperation outcome sequentially (Bennett & Checkel, 2014). Finally, all diagnostic evidence was analyzed to accept or discard the research expectations. Each time period is therefore analyzed with detail and care to explore the plausible causality between the bureaucratic reputation of the organization and state cooperation in trade.

Accordingly, process tracing is denoted as the best-fit tool to assess the observable implications of the expected causal process between the bureaucratic reputation of the international organization and state cooperation in trade (Bennett & Checkel, 2014). The method allows for a comprehensive analysis of evidence to test if the research expectations causally explain the case (Bennett & Checkel, 2014).

4.3 Operationalization of Variables

Operationalization is the translation of concepts into observable phenomena in the empirical world (Toshkov, 2016). Hence, this section turns the dependent and independent variables into operationalized constructs that can be empirically observed.

Accordingly, the dependent variable, state cooperation, is translated into a directly observable indicator (Toshkov, 2016). As such, state cooperation is operationalized as the empirical observation of either successful state cooperation during a trade round or as unsuccessful state cooperation during a trade round. Empirical evidence from data collection will therefore either denote that all member states signed on to the new trade round or that not all states signed on to the round (WTO, 2023d; WTO, 2023e).

Whereas the independent variable, the bureaucratic reputation of the international organization, is translated into an indirect indicator that detects the presence or absence of a phenomenon; the phenomenon being reputation (Toshkov, 2016). As such, the bureaucratic reputation of the international organization is operationalized as observing either the presence of a good reputation or a poor reputation (Simmons, 1998). Bureaucratic reputation will therefore be empirically observed through systematic analysis of the language, tone, and context of data and diagnostic evidence that describe the international organization (Maor et al., 2013). This includes evidence that expresses how member states of the international organization and other audiences, perceived the international organization during each trade round, and how these perceptions caused them to behave. Evidence will therefore describe whether the international organization had a good or poor bureaucratic reputation, and whether this plausibly affected states to cooperate successfully. Assessing the language and tone of each source is particularly useful since it articulates the content of the message but also elaborates on the author's perspective and attitude (Maor et al., 2013). Empirical evidence is therefore assessed to test the observable implications of the bureaucratic reputation of the international organization.

Consequently, the international organization's bureaucratic reputation is thoroughly analyzed to observe empirical implications and establish any causal relationship between the variables in question.

4.4 Data Collection

Data was collected for the purpose of analysis to find answers to the research question and expectations. As aforementioned, process tracing relies on gathering copious quantities of diverse and relevant data; to triangulate and find diagnostic evidence (Bennett, 2010; Bennett & Checkel, 2014). As a result, two data collection methods were deemed appropriate. The following first elaborates on how evidence was gathered by means of secondary data collection which was accompanied by a source selection assessment. Next, the section denotes how evidence was collected through a semi-structured interview.

4.4.1 Secondary Data Collection

This thesis primarily collected and analyzed secondary data. Utilizing secondary data was justified as this is a historical study that sought to account for events that occurred in the past (Hague et al., 2016). Further, to improve the replicability of the research, secondary data was narrowed to fit the time frames established for the two trade rounds, namely 1986-1994 for the Uruguay Round and 2001-2011 for the Doha Round. Similarly, relying on existing data increased the research's effectiveness since process tracing had to be carried out for two time periods, not just one (Hague et al., 2016). Likewise, it is admitted that directly studying the effect of bureaucratic reputation on trade cooperation outcomes was out of the scope of the research, primarily due to the inaccessibility of such data and time constraints of the thesis (Bennett & Checkel, 2014).

Secondary evidence was gathered from a combination of sources to obtain the most reliable data. Data was collected from reports produced by the WTO, academic articles from experts and organizations in the field of study such as the International Monetary Fund, publications voicing the opinions of member states, as well as newspaper articles (IMF, 2011). Collecting such varied data allowed for gaining deeper insights into the events that to place in order to better account for the trade cooperation outcomes (Bennett & Checkel, 2014). Similarly, collecting secondary data allowed for building and expanding on already existing knowledge and expertise on the topic of research (Hague et al., 2016).

Moreover, what type of evidence was specifically needed and crucial for the research? Different types of data and evidence hold different values or weights (Bennett & Checkel, 2014). Van Evera (1997) differentiates between four types of evidence depending on their level of certitude: the likeliness to find evidence if the hypothesis is true and their level of

uniqueness, and their level of uniqueness: which is the likeliness to find evidence no matter whether the hypothesis is true or not. These dimensions further produce four types of evidence, visualized in Figure 4.

Figure 4

Types of Evidence and Implications

		Certitude	
		High	**Low**
Uniqueness	**High**	Double Decisive: Evidence is necessary and sufficient to confirm a hypothesis.	Smoking Gun: Evidence is sufficient to confirm a hypothesis. If evidence is not found, the hypothesis could still be true.
	Low	Hoop: Evidence is necessary to confirm a hypothesis.	Straw in the Wind: Evidence is not sufficient nor necessary to confirm a hypothesis.

Note. Adapted from work by *Van Evera, S. (1997). Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Cornell University Press.*

Accordingly, evidence that represents a straw in the wind, fails to establish whether a research hypothesis or expectation is true or false, and doubly decisive pieces of evidence are scarce and almost impossible to justify (Van Evera, 1997). As such, these types of evidence were discarded from the research. The research thus relied on finding evidence that could be considered hoops or smoking guns. Evidence was considered a hoop when it could confirm a hypothesis or research expectation (Van Evera, 1997). And any evidence was considered a smoking gun when finding a piece of evidence was enough to reject alternative hypotheses, but not finding the evidence was also not a reason to abandon the hypothesis; they are not mutually exclusive (Van Evera, 1997).

For example, as per Research Expectation 1: *When the international organization has a good bureaucratic reputation amongst its member states and audiences, state cooperation in trade rounds will be successful.* Reliable evidence would have to find that the WTO had a good

reputation among its member states and demonstrate that this perception led states to cooperate and sign the new trade round.

Further, when collecting the data, it was necessary to consider any potential biases and adverse motives of the evidentiary sources (Bennett, 2010; Bennett & Checkel, 2014). As such, a source assessment for each source used in the analysis was carried out and can be found in Appendix A. The source assessment helps to ensure that the sources are reliable and that the information they produce are credible (Irwin & Mandel, 2020). Although this assessment technique is most often limited to military or intelligence studies, when conducting research with such copious quantities of evidence, like process tracing, the source assessment helps to ensure that unbiased, accurate information is analyzed. As such, the source assessment was an imperative part of the research process, which required dedicating sufficient time to examine any source biases in a critical manner (Bennett & Checkel, 2014). Altogether, the extensive data collection method and carefully considered measures above, hope to ensure the research is replicable and measures the genuine relationship between the variables (Bennett & Checkel, 2014; Toshkov, 2016).

4.4.2 Semi-Structured Interview

Evidence was further triangulated by means of a semi structured interview. Data triangulation hopes to increase the validity of the observable research implications and strengthen confidence in any inferred causal relationship that is identified between the variables (Bennett & Checkel, 2014; Hague et al., 2016). An interview was an appropriate and beneficial addition to this research as it provided primary insights into the interviewee's thoughts, experiences, and opinions on the research topic (Halperin & Heath, 2017). A semi-structured interview was therefore deemed the most applicable tool to further explore the role of the bureaucratic reputation of the international organization and its effects on trade cooperation.

A semi-structured interview was chosen as opposed to a structured interview or an unstructured interview because it allowed explicitly for more open-endedness in question answers and probing to follow up on interviewee responses (Halperin & Heath, 2017). Similarly, a semi-structured interview method allowed for more depth of empirical evidence

and causal processes, which could not be gathered in other interview methods (Bennett & Checkel, 2014; Halperin & Heath, 2017).

Further, as for the interview sample, a one-to-one interview was conducted with the Head of External Relations at the World Trade Organization. In line with standard ethical practices of qualitative research, the respondent was recruited by email and consented to participate in a call-in interview (Ritchie et al., 2014). Before the interview, the respondent was sent a brief summary of the thesis project and its goals per research integrity standards, which can be found for replicability purposes in Appendix B (Ritchie et al., 2014). The summary concluded with a set of guiding interview questions which can be found below:

1. What factors do you think are important when an organization like the WTO tries to facilitate member-state cooperation in trade agreements?
2. What do WTO member states rely on the organization for? Is it for advice or expertise or something else?
3. My research tries to look at what caused the Doha Trade Round into a stalemate. Do you have any knowledge about the difficulties of the Doha Round? Why do you think some countries hesitated to sign off on the new agreements?
4. What caused the Doha Round to fail? Was there one big reason? Or many small reasons?
5. Do you have any thoughts on why previous trade Rounds were more successful? For example, the Uruguay Round, why did member-states more easily sign off to these agreements?

Take note that none of the questions above directly mentioned the word reputation. It was deemed more appropriate not to directly state the word so as to approach the research topic carefully and cautiously. Similarly, any follow-up questions from the respondent about question clarification or examples were also noted. The data collected from the interview was further stored and transcribed for ease of analysis. Although transcription is not a technical formality per se, it was deemed the best tool to analyze the respondents' answers, and thus a verbatim record was produced (Mergenthaler & Stinson, 1992). The interview data was then analyzed in depth to provide primary and novel insights into the research topic.

The research acknowledges that only one interview was conducted, but its insights were nevertheless imperative. The interview allowed for interesting and detailed insights from the point of view of the international organization, which would otherwise have gone unknown. Similarly, the interview served as a method of gaining primary data, which could be triangulated and compared to the data found in the secondary sources (Hague et al., 2016). The semi-structured interview was thus deemed imperative to gain insights into and examine the observable implications of the bureaucratic reputation of the international organization.

4.5 Reliability and Validity of Research Design

This chapter ends with evaluating the reliability and validity of the research. Firstly, the research design above has been described in-depth to ensure that the case selection, the research method, and the operationalization of the variables, are reliable. Thus, if other researchers apply the same approach, they will get similar results (Toshkov, 2016). Likewise, the research design has been denoted in great detail and with a narrow approach in order to make certain that the research is precise and will thus capture the real relationship between the variables in question (Bennett & Checkel, 2014). These steps have been carried out to warrant that the study's findings are reliable and replicable.

Moving on to the research validity. Process tracing privileges internal validity over external validity (Bennett & Chekel, 2014). The research design therefore embodies strong internal validity as the relationship between the variables is significantly embedded in theory and heavily contextualizes the evidence to reconstruct causality of the case study (Bennett & Checkel, 2014; Thomas, 2006; Halperin & Heath, 2017). Reliance of copious quality evidence thus permits generating a relatively complete explanation of a case (Bennet, 2010; Bennett & Checkel, 2014). The research is therefore expected to capture the genuine relationship between the variables.

On the other hand, the external validity of the research cannot be guaranteed. Firstly, since only one case is examined, generalizations beyond the case must be cautioned (Bennett, 2010; Bennett & Checkel, 2014). However, Toshkov (2016) notes that indirect generalizations to a broader population may be possible if the case study is sufficiently embedded in theoretical arguments and theory. A second external limitation of the research design is that it relies predominantly on secondary data to find diagnostic evidence and causal

explanations (Halperin & Heath, 2017; Toshkov, 2016). Hence, if such evidence is missing or weak, it is challenging to produce compelling explanations for the outcome of interest (Bennett, 2010; Bennett & Checkel, 2014).

Further, while the goal of process tracing is to unravel a sufficient explanation for the outcome in question, this does not necessarily mean that the discovered explanation is the only possible correct answer. Unconscious human biases may occur when selecting observations during research, which can produce unrepresentative evidence and may thus result in misjudging the importance of other potential causal mechanism (Bennett, 2010). These limitations advocate for the importance of theoretically embedding the single case study and render great caution when selecting diagnostic evidence (Bennett & Checkel, 2014).

The noted reliability and validity of the research above ensure transparency and replicability of the research design to causally infer the relationship between the bureaucratic reputation of the international organization and state cooperation in trade.

5. Analysis & Results

This chapter analyzes the gathered diagnostic evidence and presents the research findings. It first examines the Uruguay Round, then analyzes the Doha Round, and reports each trade round's corresponding research results.

5.1 Uruguay Round Analysis

The Uruguay Round was the largest-ever successful multinational trade negotiation round. It entailed 123 member states of the international organization participating to liberalize trade (Harmsen et al., 1995a). The trade round brought together member states of varying levels of development, ranging from less developed to developing and more developed states, to broaden the world trading system. The Uruguay Round aimed to facilitate three results: to reduce tariffs and non-tariff barriers on goods, to enlarge trade rules into new areas, and to expand the international organization (Harmsen & Subramanian, 1994). Major controversial topics during the round included increasing market access to member states' national sectors like agricultural and textiles and expanding trade rules to cover new areas like services and intellectual property rights (WTO, 2023d).

It is crucial to note that member states had varying interests and objectives for the Uruguay Round. Several developing member states largely urged for more developed states to lower their agricultural subsidies and provide greater access to their manufacturing and agricultural sectors (Harmsen et al., 1995a). Whereas the European member states and Japan, conversely, wanted to increase the protection of national agricultural sectors from foreign competition (WTO, 2023d). Meanwhile, the US broadly sought greater market access to foreign service markets and increased rules on intellectual property rights (De Paiva Abreu, 1989). Consequently, with over one hundred member states negotiating with varying objectives, compromise was inevitable for state cooperation to succeed.

From the diagnostic evidence collected on the Uruguay Round between the time period of 1986 to 1994, evidence found that member states had varying perceptions about the international organization, the Uruguay Round's agenda, and the expansion of trade rules to cover new areas (WTO, 2023d). However, collectively, member states saw the organization as enabling trade liberalization and capable of effectively settling disputes multilaterally (European Commission, 1994). This can be represented by the fact that developed and developing member states alike agreed to further negotiations, compromise, and adapt throughout the trade round (Harmsen & Subramanian, 1994; Paarlberg, 1992).

Nonetheless, a group of hardliners led by India and Brazil quickly criticized the international organization for favoring the agenda of more developed states (Kirmani, 1989; Kleen, 2008). India specifically opposed expanding trade rules to cover services and intellectual property (Desai, 1989). The group voiced that increasing intellectual property rights would limit developing states' access to medicine and technology from Western states (Desai, 1989; Nachiappan, 2019). Brazil likewise reasoned that the international organization's rules permitted more developed states to unfairly subsidize agricultural sectors, making it increasingly difficult for developing states to compete (Farias, 2010). Hence, several developing member states criticized that the organization lacked recognition of developing states' needs and wishes (De Paiva Abreu, 1989; Thornton, 2019). However, the initial oppositions were later resolved. Member states, including India and Brazil, eventually agreed to trade liberalization in all trade areas, including services, intellectual property, and agriculture (Kleen, 2008). Thus, demonstrating that member states recognized the broader positive implications of successful trade liberalizations and acknowledged their support for the mission of the international organization (Harmsen & Subramanian, 1994).

Similarly, other developing member states heavily endorsed the international organization's pursuit to expand trade rules and further lower trade barriers in both goods and services (De Paiva Abreu, 1989; Department of Trade and Industry, 1994). These states included numerous Latin American member states, such as Mexico and Venezuela (De Paiva Abreu; Kleen, 2008). These states perceived great value in expanding rules to cover new trade areas, primarily due to their limited success with import substitution policies (GATT, 1994a; Kleen, 2008). These states thus readily supported the Uruguay Round's agenda. Comparably, the Cairns Group, a mixed group of developed and developing agricultural exports, denoted their support for the organization (Kleen, 2008). However, the Cairns Group voiced their perceptions that international organizations' rules did not sufficiently promote agricultural reforms (Tyers, 1993). The Group advocated that the negotiations needed to focus more on increasing market access for agricultural products and reducing trade and market-distorting subsidies in more developed member states (Higgott & Cooper, 1990). Thus, the Cairns Group favored the broader organization's mission to expand trade liberalization but necessitated that agriculture rules be prioritized in the negotiations (Higgott & Cooper, 1990; Tyers, 1993).

Another area of trade that caused contentious debate and varying opinions among member states was textiles and clothing (WTO, 2023d). Numerous developing member states and the US favored the Uruguay Round's agenda to increase access to more developed states' markets for textile exportation (Fieleke, 1995). However, this was criticized by several European member states and Japan, who sought to further protect their national sectors (Kirmani & Wong, 1997). As a result, the European member states and Japan were more reluctant to the international organization's agenda to liberalize textile industries and questioned the pursuit of making industries more open to foreign competition (Kirmani & Wong, 1997).

Further, majority of the more developed member states praised the international organization's pursuit to expand market access and reduce trade barriers. Specifically, more developed member states, including the European members, Japan, and the US, supported the expansion of trade rules to cover trade in services (Harmsen et al., 1995b). This expansion included activities in financial services like banking, securities and insurance, and all participating member states would be subject to the same rules and disciplines (European Commission, 1994). Member states sustained that service liberalization would necessarily increase market access, promote domestic reforms, and positively influence economic growth

(Charlton & Stiglitz, 2005b). The US, in particular, supported reducing trade barriers in agriculture to strengthen intellectual property rights for its national firms and businesses (Harmsen & Subramanian, 1994). The US maintained that higher standards of intellectual property rights protection would positively expand sales and profit and encourage research and development of global businesses (Subramanian et al., 1995). Several member states thus saw the organization as working in accordance with their best interests to improve standards and global coordination in new trade areas (Harmsen & Subramanian, 1994).

Nevertheless, it must be noted that the European member states further hesitated to expand trade liberalization in agricultural sectors. These members perceived the organization and the Uruguay Round's agenda as neglecting the need to protect agricultural sectors from foreign competition (Josling, 1998). European member states thus viewed negotiations as giving insufficient consideration to protecting national farmers and preserving price stability (Paarlberg, 1997). However, the European member states later resolved their hesitations and compromised by recognizing the good that agricultural liberalization would do worldwide (Josling & Moyer, 2002; Paarlberg, 1992).

When putting together the evidence above, it is denoted that member states had varying perceptions and opinions about trade liberalization pursuit of the international organization throughout the Uruguay Round. Further, it is acknowledged that the evidence of member state perceptions above does not cover all topics and trade areas up for debate during the Uruguay Round. Other issues for discussion included safeguards, anti-dumping, trade-related investment measures, and sanitary and phytosanitary measures (Department of Trade and Industry, 1994). However, the evidence adequately shows that negotiations were not met without criticism. Numerous developing member states and agricultural exporters perceived the organization as not paying adequate attention to their objectives and needs (Kirmani, 1989; Kleen, 2008; Tyers, 1993). Meanwhile, the more developed member states insisted that the organization's negotiations needed to focus more on trade liberalization in areas like services and intellectual property protection (Charlton & Stiglitz, 2005b; Harmsen et al., 1995b).

Nonetheless, what can be crucially perceived from the evidence, is that collectively, despite differences in opinions about specific trade areas of liberalization, member states plausibly believed in the international organization's commitment and mission to liberalize global trade

rules. Member states believed in the organization and thus accepted the need to compromise, adjust their original objectives, and settle their disputes multilaterally to advance the trade agreements (De Paiva Abreu, 1989; European Commission, 1994). Consequently, member states plausibly perceived the international organization as having a good bureaucratic reputation throughout the trade round.

Subsequently, how did these perceptions and disagreements about the trade round's agenda cause member states to behave? For starters, it took member states almost twice the original deadline to reach the final trade agreement (Fieleke, 1995). Member states negotiated for over seven years throughout a series of ministerial conferences and meetings after the launch of the round in 1986 (WTO, 2023d). Member states thus firmly disagreed on specific topics up for discussion and tightly held onto their beliefs.

Importantly, what made the Uruguay Round different and more complex from previous trade rounds, was that developing nations took a more active role in the negotiations and committed more deeply to trade liberalization reforms (Finger, 2002). For instance, for the first time, developing member states tried blocking the agenda that more developed members had proposed by including trade liberalization in services (Hamilton & Whalley, 1989; Kirmani, 1989). Similarly, developing states committed themselves to specific reforms that were just as broad as the more developed states (Finger, 2002). For example, several developing states adopted economic reforms that bound foreign access and national treatment of services (Finger, 2002). These examples denote active participation by the developing member states and illustrate the actions developing states took to ensure their own objectives were presented in the agreements of the Uruguay Round.

Nevertheless, due to outstanding disagreements, member states put together a mid-term meeting in Montreal in 1998; in hopes of settling their differences (GATT, 1988). Continued member states disagreements broadly covered the topics of agriculture, intellectual property, textile, and safeguard systems (De Paiva Abreu, 1989). Unsurprisingly, the meeting ended in a deadlock. Member states had varying reasons for disagreeing. For instance, Chile protested that the organization's rules favored the European states' import licensing of apples. In comparison, Canada complained about the European ban on meat imports with artificial hormones (Kirmani, 1989). These instances demonstrate the sheer complexity of the negotiations and the resulting differences in member states' behaviors.

However, the principal obstacle of the Montreal meeting lay in the fact that the US firmly held onto its belief that all subsidies on agriculture that distorted trade must be eliminated, which was intolerable to the European member states (De Paiva Abreu, 1989). Both sides toughly advocated for their positions. The US firmly promoted the need to liberalize agriculture, while the European states necessitated that subsidies crucially protected their farmers (Paarlberg, 1992). These fundamental differences in opinions meant that member states could not complete the midterm review of the trade round until the next meeting in Geneva in 1989 (WTO, 2023d). Although, the extended negotiation period did enable member states to employ more research and preparation in the negotiations, facilitating positive agreement advancements. Member states thus agreed on trade rules in areas such as market access for tropical products and the trade policy review mechanism, which was created to review all national trade policies of members (WTO, 2023d).

Next, member states held another meeting in Brussels in 1990, which had been the intended end date of the round, to further settle their differences (GATT, 1990). The meeting resulted in another deadlock, and the decision was taken to extend the round beyond its original deadline. The reason for the deadlock continued to be agriculture. The US and the European states held firm positions (Paarlberg, 1992). The US insisted on necessarily reducing more than 70% of support for farmers and export subsidies, while the European states, backed up by Japan, were only offering a reduction of 30% (Paarlberg, 1992). However, despite such outstanding differences, member states were successfully able to compromise and produce the first draft of the Final Act, and the final legal agreement of the round was completed in 1991 (WTO, 2023d).

On this positive streak of negotiation advancements, the European member states and the US finally compromised and settled their difference in agriculture, to which they signed the Blair House agreement in 1992 (Josling & Moyer, 2002). The agreement permitted the European states to continue to support specific nationally sensitive oilseeds productions but largely restricted the support that government could employ (Josling & Moyer, 2002). This paved the way for further successful negotiations. At the G7 Summit in Tokyo in 1993, the more developed member states, including the prior disputing US and the European members, reached agreements in negotiations in areas such as tariffs and market access (Stewart, 1999). Soon after, member states settled their differences on other issues, trade in services, and the negotiations were predominantly concluded (WTOd, 2023).

As a result, in December 1993, negotiators representing the member states reached final agreements on the contents of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, producing the most comprehensive international trade agreement to date (Fieleke, 1995). Finally, in April 1994, ministers of the member states came together in Marrakesh to sign the Uruguay trade agreement (GATT, 1994b). After over seven years of negotiation and compromise, the Uruguay Rounded ended in agreement to expand global trade rules.

So, how did the actions taken by member states affect their overall cooperation in trade? What can be fundamentally observed is that even with differing perceptions of the organization and Uruguay Round's agenda, all intended member states signed the new trade agreement in Marrakesh (GATT, 1994b). Despite several deadlocks and initial oppositions by member states, over one hundred and twenty member states compromised, cooperated, and signed off on the new trade round. Member states were able to work through their differences and plausibly acknowledge the greater importance of what the international organization was trying to achieve (De Paiva Abreu, 1989; European Commission, 1994; Kleen, 2008; WTOd, 2023). Similarly, states recognized the value of expanding global trade liberalization and its potentially positive implications for the member state citizens (Harmsen & Subramanian, 1994). As such, member states put their differences aside and trusted each other and the organization to liberalize global trade (Harmsen & Subramanian, 1994).

Further, the cooperation outcome can be triangulated with the evidence gained from the interview with the WTO employee (B. Kuiten, personal communication, April 20). To great surprise, the individual actively participated in the Uruguay negotiations. The interview corroborated that member states had a sense of anticipation and excitement to liberalize trade further and transform the current organization into the WTO. Member states thus believed in expanding the organization and the global progress that would occur if member states agreed on the negotiations. This, in turn, brought about a plausible sense of trust and commitment from member states, which enabled the negotiations and led them to cooperate and sign off on the new trade agreements. If member states had perceived the organization unfavorably, they would not have voiced the same level of excitement and anticipation to expand the organization further. Thus, it is my understanding that member states favorably perceived the international organization during the Uruguay Round.

The process tracing results are visualized in Figure 5. Relative to the power bureaucratic reputation theory, insights from the empirical evidence iterate that the good reputation of the international organization plausibly contributed to the successful state cooperation outcome. In the words of Carpenter & Krause (2012), the member states plausibly perceived the international organization as having a good bureaucratic reputation during the Uruguay Round. The organization had a good performative and technical reputation as member states perceived the organization as being capable of facilitating trade liberalization and settling any disputes amongst members (Carpenter, 2010; De Paiva Abreu, 1989; European Commission, 1994). Further, the organization had a good moral reputation where members supported the broader mission of the organization and viewed it as furthering their best interests (Harmsen & Subramanian, 1994; Paarlberg, 1992; WTO, 2023d). Theoretically this denotes that the international organization plausibly used its reputation as a form of soft power to achieve cooperation (Keohane & Nye, 1998; Tomz, 2012). The international organization's reputation thus plausibly played a role in the process of facilitating state cooperation.

Figure 5

Visualization of Uruguay Round Process Tracing



Note. This figure demonstrates the causal process of the international organization's bureaucratic reputation during the Uruguay Round, and its implications for state cooperation.

Nevertheless, alternative explanations for the state cooperation outcome must be acknowledged. Factors such as member state self-interest and interest alignment, regardless of the organization's reputation, cannot be discarded as causal explanations for the cooperation result. It is plausible that member states' self-interests regarding trade during the

Uruguay Round were simply the same (Waltz, 2010). Hence states may have collaborated due to the fact that all had interests to liberalize global trade. At this point in time the international organization may have been the most convenient pathway of doing so, independently of whether member states perceived the organization favorably or unfavorably. Another casual explanation for the successful state cooperation outcome could simply be that states' interests aligned during the trade round (Harmsen & Subramanian, 1994; Mearsheimer, 2001). Accordingly, this may have allowed them to put their differences aside and collaborate with one another for the greater good (Harmsen & Subramanian, 1994; Josling & Moyer, 2002; Paarlberg, 1992).

As a result, the diagnostic evidence demonstrates that the member state plausibly perceived the international organization to have a good bureaucratic reputation during the Uruguay Round. The empirical evidence similarly iterates that a good bureaucratic reputation conceivably played a role in facilitating state cooperation in trade (De Paiva Abreu, 1989; European Commission, 1994; Harmsen & Subramanian, 1994; Paarlberg, 1992). However, bureaucratic reputation as a standalone independent variable does not produce a convincing undisturbed casual process to explain successful state cooperation (Bennett & Checkel, 2014). Alternative explanations including member state self-interest and interest alignment cannot be discarded as having causal power.

5.2 Uruguay Round Results

From the gathered evidence, the Uruguay Round resulted in successful member-state cooperation in trade, and the organization's good bureaucratic reputation conceivably played a role in this outcome. All member states signed the Final Act of the Uruguay Round and collaborated to advance world trade liberalization (WTO, 20203d). It has been estimated that from the full implementation of the Uruguay Round, the annual gains in world income would range from $210 to $250 billion, where approximately $80 billion annually would be experienced by developing states (Harmsen & Subramanian, 1994). The cooperation success largely lends itself to the compromises made by member states, where member states trusted the bigger intentions of the organization and believed in what the Uruguay Round was trying to achieve (De Paiva Abreu, 1989; European Commission, 1994).

Notably, Brazil and India put their oppositions about the international organization behind, seemingly favoring the more developed states, and agreed to advance trade liberalization services and intellectual property (Kleen, 2008). Similarly, numerous developing states and the Cairns Group pushed for the organization, and the negotiations to further liberalization of member states' agricultural sectors (Higgott & Cooper, 1990). Likewise, member states were able to settle their differing positions on the topic of liberalization of textiles industries (Kirmani &Wong, 1997). Finally, the European states were able to compromise on the belief that the organization's agenda was too centered on agriculture (Josling & Moyer, 2002).

The diagnostic evidence together, denotes that member states plausibly perceived the international organization to have a good bureaucratic reputation during the Uruguay Round. Member state positively perceived the organization as capable of doing its job of enabling trade liberalization and settling member disputes (Carpenter, 2010; De Paiva Abreu, 1989; European Commission, 1994). Members similarly saw the organization as working in accordance with their best interests to improve standards and coordination in new global trade areas (Harmsen & Subramanian, 1994; Paarlberg, 1992). The evidence implies the reputation of the organization conceivably helped to facilitate successful state cooperation. Member states believed in and trusted the bigger intentions of the organization and thus cooperated to liberalize global trade (De Paiva Abreu, 1989; European Commission, 1994; Harmsen & Subramanian, 1994). This suggests that the international organization was capable of solving the Prisoner's Dilemma that member states faced, and implies that the international organization's reputation positively affected member states' willingness to sign off on the new trade agreements. Therefore, facilitating successful state cooperation to liberalize global trade.

The research findings above demonstrate that the first research expectation, *when the international organization has a good reputation amongst its member states and audiences, state cooperation in trade will be successful,* cannot be discarded. It is plausible that the international organization's good reputation was a factor that affected member states decisions to sign off on the Uruguay Round. However, other reasons for the success cannot be excluded. Accordingly, member state self-interests and interest alignment, regardless of the international organization's reputation, cannot be excluded as causal explanations for the resulting state cooperation in trade. The bureaucratic reputation of the international organization during the Uruguay Round thus fails to produce an undisturbed causal process to

explain state cooperation (Bennett & Checkel, 2014). It is therefore most convincing that bureaucratic reputation of the international organization acted simultaneously with other factors like state self-interest and interest alignment to produce the successful state cooperation outcome.

5.3 Doha Round Analysis

The Doha Round commenced in November 2001. It entailed 157 WTO member states negotiating to further reduce trade barriers (WTO, 2023e). The international organization experienced a substantial increase in membership since the Uruguay Round, inviting the accession of over thirty new member states, most of which were developing states. Similarly, compared to previous negotiations, the Doha Round specifically aimed to make trade rules fairer for the developing member states in hopes of furthering their development (WTO, 2004). Major topics up for discussion once again included the reduction of subsidies within more developed states' agricultural sectors, expanding the market access of developing states, mainly in the industrial and service sectors, improving anti-dumping rules, and advancements of intellectual property rights (WTO, 2004). The Doha Round thus hoped to increase access to new markets for developed member states and to enhance already existing markets in developing member states.

Accordingly, agriculture quickly became the most prominent and controversial topic during the Doha Round (CRS, 2023). The liberalization of agricultural tariffs became the primary objective of developing member states (Charlton & Stiglitz, 2005a). However, the more developed members like the EU states once again expressed their reservations about further reducing agricultural barriers, as existing tariffs protected their national farming industries (European Parliament, 2022; Ingco & Nash, 2004). The more developed member states, including the EU members, Canada, the US, and Japan, conveyed that their primary objective of the round was to liberalize and gain access to the developing states' industrial and service sectors (Charlton & Stiglitz, 2005a). Hence, states had varying and opposing objectives for the Doha Round, which fostered different perceptions of the international organization.

From the diagnostic evidence collected on the WTO throughout the Doha Round between the time period of 2001 to 2011, evidence was found to follow along three broad themes. Firstly, in the eyes of the developing member states, the WTO was seen as favoring the more

developed state's needs (Ingco & Nash, 2004). Secondly, according to the developing states, the Doha Round agenda became too minimalistic (Charlton & Stiglitz, 2005a). And thirdly, some member states perceived the WTO as serving the interests of multinational corporations and not its member states (Global Exchange, 2005; Rodrik, 2001).

Firstly, empirical evidence found that the international organization's less developed and developing member states viewed the WTO's rules and intentions as prioritizing the needs of more developed states (Ingco & Nash, 2004). The developing member states urged for new trade rules to reduce more developed member states' agricultural tariffs and national subsidies in order to increase their exports to the Western world (CRS, 2023; Hanrahan, 2005). Lowered barriers to agricultural trade depicted a significant opportunity since developing states tend to be abundantly endowed with favorable agricultural environments (Ingco & Nash, 2004). Likewise, agriculture tends to be the largest sector and employer for developing states (Ingco & Nash, 2004). Hence, gaining access to more developed member states agricultural markets served as a chance to expand export productions and to learn from more developed states to improve productivity and modernize agricultural sectors (De Vylder et al., 2007). Similarly, such agricultural expansion would reduce poverty in developed states (Gallagher, 2008).

Nonetheless, the WTO's rules permitted the more developed states to preserve tight protectionist barriers in their agricultural sectors, thus reinforcing tariffs and subsidies instead of liberalizing them (Subramanian & Wei, 2003). Existing trade rules of the organization largely exempted the developed member states from lowering any trade barriers on nationally deemed sensitive sectors such as agriculture, clothing, or textiles (WTO, 2023e). The EU member states advocated that lowering trade barriers on agriculture would detrimentally shut down their grain and oilseed production, thus expressing that existing tariffs and rules were crucial to the survival of their national sectors (European Parliament, 2022; Ray, 2015). The more developed states thus insisted that high tariffs and subsidies were justified to keep national sectors alive.

As such, developing states perceived the WTO and its rules throughout the Doha Round to favor more developed, wealthier member states (Ingco & Nash, 2004). And as few actionable steps were taken to change such rules, developing member states had little evidence to support that the international organization was committed to furthering their development

(Scott & Wilkinson, 2011; Walker, 2011). Altogether, developing member states perceived the WTO as favoring the needs and wants of more developed states and therefore viewed the organization as not being committed to creating fairer trade rules, which the organization had promised at the start of the Doha Round (Ingco & Nash, 2004; Scott & Wilkinson, 2011; Walker, 2011).

Secondly, the evidence demonstrated that the more developed members states, including the EU states, the US, Canada, and Japan believed that the WTO and the Doha Round had a too minimalistic agenda, focusing too much on agriculture and neglecting other sectors of trade liberalization (Charlton & Stiglitz, 2005a). Accordingly, the more developed member states insisted that trade negotiations needed to focus more on expanding access to the less developed and developing member states' industrial and service sectors (CRS, 2023). Such liberalizations would allow the more developed member states to gain market access to new regions of the world, particularly in the banking sector of developing states (Akyüz et al., 2006). Hence, the more developed member states wanted the Doha Round and changing trade rules of the organization to focus more on lowering barriers in the sectors outside of agriculture (Akyüz et al., 2006; IMF, 2011).

The more developed member states thus viewed the WTO as limiting the Doha Round negotiations to the topic of agriculture (Charlton & Stiglitz, 2005a). The more developed member states perceived the organization as only furthering the interests of developing states interests, whose objectives centered around agriculture (Scott & Wilkinson, 2011; Subramanian & Wei, 2003). As a result, the more developed states gave less importance to the Doha negotiations (Charlton & Stiglitz, 2005a; CRS, 2023). Therefore, demonstrating that the Doha Round outcomes were overall less significant to developed members.

The evidence above illustrates that more developed and less developed member states were pinned against each other during the Doha Round, creating a clear-cut division amongst the WTO member states (Ingco & Nash, 2004; Subramanian & Wei, 2003). As both sides equally advocated that the WTO favored their adversaries.

Thirdly, the empirical evidence demonstrated that the WTO was affected by the criticism that the organization served the interests of multinational corporations (Global Exchange, 2005; Rodrik, 2001). Protesters even took to the streets of Geneva outside the organization's

headquarters to express their discontent (Aljazeera, 2009). Notably, the WTO aims to promote international trade and protect intellectual property rights; as such, the organization doubtlessly expands the power of multinational corporations, which are engines of free trade (Kinley, 2009; Shafaeddin, 2008). Yet, the organization was explicitly accused of benefitting multinational corporations while disadvantaging local firms and industries, especially in developing member states (Bergan, 2011; Sundaram & von Arnim, 2009).

However, it must be iterated that the member states' governments write the WTO's rules, and hence no external actors have direct access to the trade negotiations rounds (WTO, 2023f). As such, the member state governments may consider the views of other actors like multinational corporations or lobbyist organizations in their decision-making process (Joseph, 2013). As a result, corporations may be indirectly favored in WTO trade rules. Similarly, considering external actors' interests is particularly plausible for more developed member states, which may be especially pressured to consider the wants and needs of powerful external actors like corporations (Global Exchange, 2005; Rodrik, 2001).

The three themes of the evidence above illustrate how the WTO was perceived varied significantly among member states. On the one hand, less developed member states perceived the organization as catering to the interests of more developed states and thus indirectly favoring the interests of global corporations and other external actors (Bergan, 2011). Consequently, the less developed states argued that existing trade rules left their local industries disadvantaged and powerless (Sundaram & von Arnim, 2009). On the other hand, the more developed member states saw the organization as pursuing a minimalistic agenda, ignoring potential trade liberalization of sectors outside of agriculture (Charlton & Stiglitz, 2005a). Altogether this illustrates that member states of the WTO were necessarily pitted against each other, with both sides criticizing the organization for favoring their adversaries. Thus, depicting that members viewed the organization to have a potentially tarnished bureaucratic reputation throughout the Doha Round.

Subsequently, how did these differing perceptions about the organization cause member states to behave? Well, since decision-making under the WTO is made by consensus and therefore requires agreement from all members, member states held several ministerial meetings and conferences to try and settle their differences (WTO, 2023e).

In 2003 member states held a ministerial conference in Cancún in hopes of settling their differences and agree on clear objectives for the Doha Round (WTO, 2023e). The developing member states firmly held their stance, forming a trade bloc, the G20, to defend their position in hopes of convincing the more developed states to agree to lower trade barriers in agriculture (Narlikar & Wilkinson, 2004). However, the more developed states had little interest in caving into such wishes, thus further fostering a north-south divide of the negations and pushing the Doha agreements to a standstill.

Finally, in 2004, member states agreed on the Doha Framework Agreement, which specified the topics that trade negotiations would follow, including agriculture, market access, and services (WTO, 2004). Further positive developments were achieved during the ministerial conference in Hong Kong in 2005, where member states agreed to lower overall agricultural subsidies by 2013 (WTO, 2023e). However, backtracking occurred in 2006 as member states disagreed on trade rules regarding farming subsidies and import tariffs (Wright & Weisman, 2006).

Furthermore, in 2008, negotiations broke down during another conference held at the headquarters in Geneva (Beattie & Williams, 2008). Throughout the meeting, the US, the EU member states, India, and China were unable to settle their differences over issues in agriculture, specifically in disagreements about allowing protection for poor farmers in the event of rapid price falls (Beattie & Williams, 2008). The developing member states continued to lack the motivation to sign off on the new agreements, as more developed states were unwilling to compromise on lowering tariffs in their agricultural sectors (IMF, 2011). The more developed members also disagreed with allowing developing states to increase their own farmers' protections (Beattie & Williams, 2008). As such, less developed member states lacked incentives to cooperate with the more developed states.

The Doha Round negotiations came to another standstill. With little luck, the developing member states continued to urge for the more developed states to accept lower agricultural trade barriers (Charlton & Stiglitz, 2005a). Particularly requesting the EU states to accept tariff cuts and the US to accept cuts in farming subsidies (IMF, 2011). Likewise, without such changes and commitments, the developing member states lacked incentives to sign off on the Doha trade agreements. On the other side of the negotiations, the more developed states were not interested in liberalizing their agricultural sectors and opening them to foreign

competition (CRS, 2023). The more developed states thus saw the agenda of the Doha Round as being too minimalistic, believing that the WTO largely ignored the more developed states' interests in expanding the market access of developing states (Charlton & Stiglitz, 2005a). Altogether, despite the efforts and the numerous conferences held, member states were unable to compromise and progress on trade agreements during the Doha Round (WTO, 2023e).

How did these behaviors, in turn, affect member state cooperation in trade? Doha Round effectively stalled after 2008 as the Director General of the WTO denoted that members were unable to bridge their differences (BBC, 2008). Trade negotiations were at a stalemate until 2011, when member states finally agreed to unofficially conclude the Doha Round after ten years of negotiations, as differences in opinions had proven insurmountable (IMF, 2011). As a result, state cooperation in the Doha Round failed, and member states were unwilling to commit and compromise on effective trade agreements (WTO, 2023e).

Further, these observable implications of the cooperation failure can be triangulated through the evidence gained in the interview (B. Kuiten, personal communication, April 20). The interview shed light on two significant components during the Doha Round. Firstly, a likely explanation for the cooperation failure may have been the simple fact that the Doha Round was too ambitious; it tried to achieve too much. Furthering the development of a state is a complex process with no single correct route. From this insight, it is my interpretation that this could be linked back to the reputation of the organization. Hence, if member states cannot reach their intended objectives of trade liberalization through the WTO, then member states may question the effectiveness of the organization, thus tarnishing its reputation (Carpenter, 2010; Carpenter & Krause, 2012). This could be evidenced by the fact that states actively turned to more bilateral trade agreements, rather than pursuing multilateral negotiations through the WTO (IMF, 2011).

Secondly, the interview shed light on the fact that negotiations take time, and agreement is difficult to form when trying to achieve commitment from over one hundred states. Similarly, once agreement is established, the members must also ratify the agreement, which further takes time to accomplish. From my interpretation of this insight, it can also be linked back to the reputation of the organization. Hence, the Doha Round commenced in 2001, and its intended deadline was set to 2005 (WTO, 2023e). However, because this deadline was not

met and negotiations were extended, this could have been an inflexion point for states to question whether the organization was the most effective route to achieve trade agreements. This thought could be supported by the aforementioned note that states increasingly sought to pursue bilateral trade agreements (IMF, 2011). This iterates that the organization's reputation was plausibly tarnished during the Doha Round.

Accordingly, the process tracing findings are summarized in Figure 6. Relative to the power bureaucratic reputation theory, insights from the empirical evidence iterate that the poor reputation of the international organization plausibly contributed to the unsuccessful state cooperation outcome. In the words of Carpenter & Krause (2012), the developing member states and external audiences plausibly perceived the WTO as having a poor reputation (Aljazeera, 2009; Bergan, 2011; Ingco & Nash, 2004; Global Exchange, 2005; Rodrik, 2001; Sundaram & von Arnim, 2009). The organization conceivably had a tarnished moral reputation amongst developing member states as the WTO did not change its rules to ensure that more developed member states lowered trade barriers in highly protected agricultural sectors (Charlton & Stiglitz, 2005a; CRS, 2023; IMF, 2011; WTO, 2023e). Hence, the developing member states viewed the organization as favoring the needs of more developed states (Ingco & Nash, 2004; Scott & Wilkinson, 2011; Walker, 2011). This further follows that developing member states credibly perceived the organization as having a tarnished performative and technical reputation, as developing states saw the organization as lacking the capacities needed to increase and expand their development, which the foundations of the Doha Round had promised (Carpenter & Krause, 2012; Ingco & Nash, 2004; WTO, 2004). Developing member states thus lacked incentives to cooperate and to sign off on the new trade agreements, as they thoroughly perceived the organization and its mission as neglecting their best interest (Ingco & Nash, 2004; Scott & Wilkinson, 2011; Walker, 2011).

Figure 6

Visualization of Doha Round Process Tracing



Note. This figure demonstrates the causal process of the international organization's bureaucratic reputation during the Doha Round, and its implications for state cooperation.

On the other side of the negotiations, the more developed member states also credibly perceived the WTO as having a poor reputation. The developed states viewed the organization as minimalizing the trade agenda to the topic of agriculture (Charlton & Stiglitz, 2005a). This effectively tarnished the organization's performative and technical reputation as more developed states viewed the organization as unable to produce effective trade negotiations in other areas of trade (Akyüz et al., 2006; Carpenter & Krause, 2012; CRS, 2023). This also plausibly tarnished the international organization's moral reputation, as developed states perceived the organization as favoring and only furthering the interests of developing states interests (Carpenter & Krause, 2012; Scott & Wilkinson, 2011; Subramanian & Wei, 2003).

The member states of the international organization thus plausibly perceived the organization to have a poor reputation during the Doha Round, and the organization's reputation conceivably contributed to member states unwillingness to cooperation in trade. The member states problematically saw the organization as favoring their adversaries, and unable to expand trade rules their wanted sectors (Charlton & Stiglitz, 2005a; CRS, 2023; IMF, 2011; Scott & Wilkinson, 2011; Subramanian & Wei, 2003). Due to these perceptions, member state alike lacked incentives to cooperate in trade and sign the new trade agreements (Charlton & Stiglitz, 2005a; CRS, 2023; IMF, 2011).

However, the international organization's reputation may not be the only, nor potentially the principal, reason why state cooperation failed. From the interview two alternative causal explanations for the cooperation failure where gained (B. Kuiten, personal communication, April 20). Firstly, tensions between member states may simply have been too high to reach agreement on trade rules. Member states had differing agendas and objectives for the Doha Round and thus their interests were critically misaligned. Similarly, and tensions in areas such as agriculture were once again brought up in negotiations causing vigorous debates. From my understanding of this insight, member states may thus have lacked incentives to compromise thus fostering the cooperation failure regardless of the organization's reputation. Similarly, these disagreements could have brought about a lack of trust between member states, which is fundamental competent required when establishing consensus decision-making (Wu et al., 2017).

Secondly, the interview shed light on the fact that any agreed-on trade agreements of the WTO are legally binding to member states in the future. As such, it is no wonder member states may hesitate to sign off on new agreements since they legally commit their future governments to uphold the agreements. As a result, member states may be reluctant to legally commit to trade agreements that do not specifically further their exact agenda and objectives. Accordingly, there are several causal explanations for the Doha Round cooperation failure, regardless of the bureaucratic reputation of the international organization.

So, what do these research findings mean for the causal power of bureaucratic reputation? Given the diagnostic evidence and the alternative explanations advanced above, bureaucratic reputation as a sole independent variable does not convincingly produce the state cooperation failure. Reputation of the organization does not have independent and uninterrupted causal power to explain the outcome of interest (Bennett & Checkel, 2014). Other explanations such as member state tensions, differing agendas as well as legal commitments of the trade round cannot be discarded as causal factors that explain the outcome. Hence, although the poor bureaucratic reputation of the international organization during the trade round plausibly affected member states' reasons for failing to cooperate, it is not the only convincing explanation for the failure.

5.4 Doha Round Results

Altogether, the Doha Round resulted in unsuccessful member state cooperation, and diagnostic evidence suggests that the poor bureaucratic reputation of the international organization was one factor that seemingly contributed to the failure. The failed cooperation outcome meant that all member states lost out on potential gains from trade that a successful negotiation round would have brought (IMF, 2011). The failure essentially boiled down to the tensions between the developing and more developed states' differing objectives and agendas, which pitted member states against each other (Akyüz et al., 2006; Bergan, 2011; Charlton & Stiglitz, 2005a; CRS, 2023; Ingco & Nash, 2004).

Notably, on the one hand, the developing member states plausibly perceived the WTO as favoring more developed states. Developing states criticized the organization's trade rules for allowing more developed members to maintain high trade barriers in national agriculture sectors, which developing states wanted to increase competition with (Ingco & Nash, 2004; Subramanian & Wei, 2003). Developing member state discontent can potentially be evidence in the creation of the G20, to strength their stance to be heard and their needs to be prioritized (Narlikar & Wilkinson, 2004). On the other hand, the more developed member states perceived the WTO's agenda for the Doha Round as too simplistic and only covering the topic of agriculture (Charlton & Stiglitz, 2005a; CRS, 2023). The developed states thus asserted that the Doha Round ignored trade liberalization in other sectors like industry and services, which the developed states aimed to gain market access to (Charlton & Stiglitz, 2005a). The combination of these perceptions of the WTO plausibly caused members not to sign off on the Doha Round trade agreements, thus facilitating unsuccessful state cooperation in trade.

These diagnostic evidence found imply that the organization's poor bureaucratic reputation contributed to the cooperation failure of the Doha Round. Developing member states perceived the organization as incapable of doing its job of furthering their development like the trade round had first promised and accused the organization of favoring the needs of more developed states (Ingco & Nash, 2004; Global Exchange, 2005; Scott & Wilkinson, 2011; Subramanian & Wei, 2003; Walker, 2011). The more developed members similarly advocated that the organization was not working in accordance with their best interests to expand trade rules in new areas like services (Akyüz et al., 2006, Charlton & Stiglitz, 2005a;

European Parliament, 2022; IMF, 2011; Ray, 2015). Both sides thus negatively argued that the organization favored their adversaries.

This further implies that the international organization plausibly failed to solve the Prisoner's Dilemma that member states experienced during the trade round (Osborne, 2003). It suggests that the international organization was incapable of solving the Prisoner's Dilemma at member states faced, and implies that the international organization's reputation negatively affected member states' willingness to sign off on the new trade agreements. Therefore, actively facilitating the state cooperation failure.

The research findings and empirical evidence above depict that the second research expectation, *when the international organization has a poor reputation amongst its member states and audiences, state cooperation in trade rounds will be unsuccessful,* cannot be discarded. As such, it is plausible that the international organization's poor bureaucratic reputation during the Doha Round affected member states decisions to not sign off on the new trade agreements. However, from the evidence gathered through the interview, other explanations for the failure cannot be excluded. Hence, member state tensions, differing agendas and objectives and the requirement for legally binding agreements are plausible alternative explanations for the state cooperation failure during the Doha Round.

Accordingly, poor bureaucratic reputation fails to produce an undisturbed causal process to explain the state cooperation failure (Bennett & Checkel, 2014). It is therefore most convincing that bureaucratic reputation of the international organization acted simultaneously with other factors like member state distrust and opposing agendas, to produce the cooperation failure.

6. Research Limitations and Future Recommendations

In this chapter, the research findings will be further evaluated. First, the study's limitations will be acknowledged for the purpose of research transparency. Secondly, the chapter formulates recommendations for future research.

The primary limitation of the research is that the diagnostic evidence found could not establish a single causal chain between the independent and dependent variables (Bennett &

Checkel, 2014). It is, therefore, unconvincing that the bureaucratic reputation of the international organization was the sole cause of the state cooperation outcomes in the trade rounds.

Accordingly, for the Uruguay Round, the research findings could not isolate that a good bureaucratic reputation of the international organization was the only reason member states successfully cooperated (De Paiva Abreu, 1989; European Commission, 1994; Harmsen & Subramanian, 1994). Alternative explanations primarily gained from the interview, such as member state self-interests and interest alignment, cannot be ruled out (B. Kuiten, personal communication, April 20). Such alternative explanations may have promoted the successful state cooperation outcome, irrespective of the organization's reputation. It is, therefore, most convincing that the successful state cooperation outcome was facilitated by several variables and factors acting simultaneously. Accordingly, it is still conceivable that the bureaucratic reputation of the international organization had some causal power, but it most persuasively acted in combination with other variables to produce state cooperation.

Similarly, for the Doha Round, the research findings could not establish that the international organization's poor bureaucratic reputation was the sole cause of the state cooperation failure. Accordingly, alternative explanations from the interview plausibly produce the outcome regardless of the organization's reputation (B. Kuiten, personal communication, April 20). Firstly, member state tensions and fundamentally misaligned state interests for the trade round convincingly explain the cooperation failure. Secondly, cooperation could have been hindered by the fact that any trade rules that member states sign are legally binding in the future. Hence, member states may be hesitant to commit themselves to future responsibilities. Accordingly, these alternative explanations for the cooperation failure could be ruled out. As a result, it is most persuasive that the poor bureaucratic reputation of the international organization, alongside these other factors, caused the ultimate cooperation failure. And bureaucratic reputation must therefore be taken in combination with other variables to explain the outcome convincingly.

This limitation denotes that alternative explanations could not be ruled out as explaining the state cooperation outcomes. However, considering these alternative explanations is an essential step in the best practices of process tracing (Bennett & Checkel, 2014). Any transparent research must therefore consider any alternative causal processes from which the

outcome in question could have occurred (Bennett & Checkel, 2014). Further, these identified alternative explanations do not render the gathered research results insignificant. Instead, it demonstrates that the independent variable in question, the bureaucratic reputation of the international organization, is unlikely the stand-alone cause of the state cooperation outcomes.

Secondly, the research findings imply that bureaucratic reputation theory alone, cannot substitute the long established international relations theories that explain state cooperation, such as realism or socialist constructivism (Keohane, 2005; Mearsheimer, 2001; Moravcsik, 1997; Osborne, 2003; Waltz, 2010; Wendt, 1995). Instead, the research findings corroborate how important state interest alignment is in order for cooperation to be successful, which greatly supports the arguments proposed by liberal institutionalist theory (Greico et al., 1993; Keohane, 2005; Moravcsik, 1997). Hence, the research findings potentially suggest that only once state interests and objectives align, can factors like the bureaucratic reputation of the international organization matter for successful state cooperation (Charlton & Stiglitz, 2005b; De Paiva Abreu, 1989; Harmsen & Subramanian, 1994, European Parliament, 2022; Ingco & Nash, 2004). Accordingly, although bureaucratic reputation theory does not replace existing theories of cooperation, it can contribute interesting insights to further their explanations and provide greater details to their reasonings.

The third research limitation lies in the availability and accessibility of public data (Bennett, 2010; Bennett & Checkel, 2014; Hague et al., 2016). Since the research heavily relies on secondary data, any results are limited to the data that is published openly (Bennett & Checkel, 2014; Toshkov, 2016). As such, there may be insights from member states that are unavailable to the public, and the existence of such closed data is highly probable. The research findings are thus limited to what is publicly accessible or available through the university's certifications and licenses.

The fourth limitation of the research is that only one interview was conducted (Halperin & Heath, 2017). Although the interview gave invaluable insights to the study and allowed for gathering more in-depth information about the WTO, other relevant explanations for the outcomes may have been gained if additional interviews had been conducted. A single interview sample may produce potential biases as well as its findings may be less generalizable (Hague et al., 2016).

A fifth and final limitation of the research is the scope of the study. The research solely looks at the WTO as a single case study. Therefore, any results drawn from the analysis may not be fully generalizable to the broader population of international organizations (Bennett, 2010; Bennett & Checkel, Potter, 1935). Other international organizations may possess different members and audiences, so the environment under which they operate may differ (Potter, 1935). Accordingly, the external validity of the research is limited, as the research findings rely on the evidence from the singularly contextualized case (Bennett & Checkel, 2014; Toshkov, 2016).

The research limitations discussed above give rise to three recommendations for future research.

Firstly, to advance this specific study, the bureaucratic reputation of the WTO can be further studied as one of multiple independent variables that affected state's willingness to cooperate in trade rounds. This could enable a quantitative study and would allow for the ability to test the causal power of the different independent variables. Such expanded research would necessarily advance the investigation of the causal power of bureaucratic reputation. For instance, Keohane & Nye (1973) have conducted research that considers reputation as one variable affecting state cooperation; future studies could thus consider this research as a starting point.

Secondly, to further advance this study, future research could conduct more interviews. Interviews could be expanded by two methods. Firstly, additional interviews could be conducted with several employees at the international organization. Evidence from multiple interviewees may bring about additional insights into the role of the WTO, which may either corroborate the findings of this research or produce novel insights. Secondly, interviews could be extended by interviewing representatives of different member states. This may bring about more detailed insights into the experiences and perceptions of individual member states during the trade rounds.

The third recommendation regards the research generalizability and the applicability of bureaucratic reputation theory. It is advised that future research advance studies on the effect of bureaucratic reputation on other international organization's outcomes and performances. Suggestions for international organizations to be studied could include the Organisation for

Economic Co-operation and Development or The North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Firstly, such research could expand the generalizability of the research findings of this study. Secondly, advanced research would further extend the applicability of bureaucratic reputation theory and would further test its causal power.

The above recommendations have provided suggestions on how to further develop the findings of this thesis and the application of bureaucratic reputation theory to expand its generalizability.

7. Conclusion

This chapter summarizes the research and reflects on the study's broader purpose and implications.

Notably, factors influencing state cooperation is a long-studied phenomenon (Osborne, 2003; (Von Neumann et al., 2004). However, this thesis justified that existing studies and theories on state cooperation give insufficient consideration to the soft power of an international organization's bureaucratic reputation to facilitate state cooperation (Keohane & Nye, 1998; Tomz, 2012). Recent research on bureaucratic reputation has expanded in both scope and size in public administration, each study has demonstrated the power that bureaucratic reputation can have for an organization's behaviors, legitimacy, outputs, and performance (Carpenter & Krause, 2012; Lodge & Wegrich, 2022; Rimkute, 2018). The intended contribution of this thesis was, therefore, to expand the application of bureaucratic reputation theory to account for states' willingness to cooperate, specifically in trade. Accordingly, it aimed to answer the following research question:

To what extent does the bureaucratic reputation of an international organization account for state cooperation in trade?

The thesis examined the World Trade Organization as a case study of a representative international organization that promotes trade between states (Halperin & Heath, 2017; Keohane, 2005; Potter, 1935; WTO, 2023a). Two time periods of trade negotiation rounds, the Uruguay Round and the Doha Round, were analyzed in-depth to investigate whether the reputation of the international organization could have accounted for each trade round's

corresponding state cooperation outcome. Accordingly, the process tracing research method was applied to each trade round, and the findings were triangulated with evidence from secondary data collection and a semi-structured interview with the Head of External Relations at the World Trade Organization.

To answer the research question, the findings demonstrate that the bureaucratic reputation of the international organization has some plausible causal power to explain state cooperation in trade. The good bureaucratic reputation of the international organization among member states during the Uruguay Round conceivably contributed to the successful state cooperation outcome. Member states compromised on their objectives and credibly believed in the international organization's mission to further liberalize trade and expand trade rules (Charlton & Stiglitz, 2005b; De Paiva Abreu, 1989; Harmsen & Subramanian, 1994).

Similarly, the poor bureaucratic reputation of the international organization during the Doha Round plausibly contributed to the unsuccessful state cooperation outcome. The developing member states perceived the organization to favor more developed states, whereas the more developed states blamed the organization's agenda for the trade round to be too minimalistic (Charlton & Stiglitz, 2005a; Ingco & Nash, 2004; IMF, 2011). Likewise, external audiences and member states accused the organization of favoring the interest of multinational corporations (Aljazeera, 2009; Global Exchange, 2005; Rodrik, 2001).

However, after data triangulation, the evidence supports that bureaucratic reputation alone, could not be isolated as the sole cause of successful or unsuccessful state cooperation in the trade rounds. Instead, the bureaucratic reputation of the international organization is likely one of many simultaneously acting variables that facilitated the state cooperation outcomes. As such, although the research expectations tested cannot be discarded, alternative explanations for the cooperation outcomes can similarly not be ruled out.

Importantly, these findings do not render the research insignificant. Although the novel explanation for state cooperation is not convincing as a stand-alone causal explanation, it nonetheless furthers the application of bureaucratic reputation theory. The findings advocate that bureaucratic reputation should be tested in combination with other independent variables when trying to account for the outcomes of international organizations. The research results

thus encourage future studies to apply and test bureaucratic reputation to account for the outcomes of organizations and agencies.

Similarly, this research only scratched the surface of possibilities when exploring bureaucratic reputation and cooperation. It should thus provide a starting point for other researchers to expand on. In the future, state cooperation will only grow in importance as we globally have to tackle further challenges such as climate crises or potential pandemics. Thus, any research which advances potential factors that contribute to establishing stronger state cooperation must be pursued. Likewise, this research only skimmed on one application of bureaucratic reputation theory. Therefore, insinuating that the full explanatory potential of bureaucratic reputation theory has not yet been unleashed and necessitates further research. All in all, this thesis hopes to encourage future research on state cooperation and promotes further application of bureaucratic reputation theory.

8. References

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WTO. (2004). *Doha Work Programme: Decision Adopted by the General Council*. World Trade Organization. Retrieved April 14, 2023, from https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/ddadraft_31jul04_e.pdf

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WTO. (2023e). *The Doha Round*. The World Trade Organization. Retrieved March 31, 2023, from https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm

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9. Appendices

Appendix A

The following source assessment is based on NATO's source reliability and information credibility assessment (Irwin & Mandel, 2020). The source assessment is carried out in order to ensure unbiased evidence was used in the research. Source reliability is ranked on a scale of A-F from completely reliable to reliability cannot be judged; and credibility of information is ranked on a scale of 1-6 from completely reliable to truth cannot be judged (Irwin & Mandel, 2020).

Akyüz, Y., Milberg, W., & Wade, R. (2006). Developing Countries and the Collapse of the Doha Round: A Forum. *Challenge*, 49(6), 6–19.

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
Taylor & Francis Group	Developing states focus on agriculture expansion, developed states focus on industry and services	B2	Evidence produced by renowned publisher of peer- reviewed academic journals.

Aljazeera. (2009, November 29). WTO Protest Turns Violent. *Aljazeera.* Retrieved April 16, 2023, from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2009/11/29/wto-protest-turns-violent

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
Al Jezeera	Citizens protest WTO in Geneva.	C3	Independent news, information provider.

BBC. (2008, July 29). World trade talks end in collapse. *BBC News.* Retrieved April 16, 2023, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7531099.stm

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
BBC	Member states cannot bridge differences	C3	Independent news, reliable source.

Beattie, A., & Williams , F. (2008). Doha Trade Talks Collapse. *Financial Times*. Retrieved April 16, 2023, from https://www.ft.com/content/0638a320-5d8a-11dd-8129-000077b07658

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
Financial Times	WTO members disagree about farming subsidies and protection	B3	Independent news, reliable publication.

Bergan, R. (2011, July 29). WTO Fails the Poorest – Again. *The Guardian*. Retrieved April 16, 2023, from https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jul/29/wto-doha-fails-poorest-countries

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
The Guardian	WTO benefit corporations, harm local firms	C3	Independent news, reliable source.

Charlton, A.H. & Stiglitz, J.E. (2005). A Development-friendly Prioritisation of Doha Round Proposals. *World Economy*, 28, 293-312.

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
Wiley Online Library	Liberalization of tariffs, agriculture, subsidies	B2	Evidence produced by renowned multinational publishing company. Work is peer-reviewed, credible source.

Charlton, A.H. & Stiglitz, J.E. (2005b). The Uruguay Round and the Developing Countries. In *Fair Trade for All: How Trade Can Promote Development (pp. 39-65).* Oxford University Press.

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
Oxford University Press	Uruguay Round, increase economic growth, increase market access	B2	Evidence produced by academic known publishing company. Credible source of information.

CRS. (2023). *World Trade Organization Negotiations: The Doha Development Agenda*. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved April 15, 2023, from https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL32060.html

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
Congressional Research Service Reports	Developing member states seek to lower tariffs in West.	B3	Evidence produced by non-partisan members of congress. Work is reviewed.

De Paiva Abreu, M. (1989). Developing Countries and the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations. The *World Bank Economic Review*, 3, 21–46.

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
World Bank Economic Review	Uruguay Round, welfare benefits, developing states	B3	Evidence produced by renowned, peer reviewed- verified,

			research journal. Information likely reliable.

Department of Trade and Industry. (1994). *The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 1986-94.* UK Government. Retrieved April 26, 2023, from https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/272015/2579.pdf

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
UK Government	Uruguay Round, market access, agriculture, services, intellectual property, anti-dumping	B3	Evidence produced by UK Government. Information is reliable. But biases may be cautioned.

Desai, A. V. (1988). India and the Uruguay Round. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 23(45/47), 2371–2384. Retrieved April 27, 2023, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4394007

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
Economic and Political Weekly	Uruguay Round, market access, agriculture, services, intellectual property, anti-dumping	C3	Independent publisher. Biases may be cautioned.

De Vylder, S., Nycander, G. A., Laanatza, M., & Froude, A. (2007). The Least Developed Countries and World Trade. *Sida*. Retrieved April 15, 2023, from https://cdn.sida.se/publications/files/sida986en-the-least-developed-countries-and-world-trade.pdf

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
The Sida Studies	Access to more developed members agricultural markets would benefit developing states. Modernize sectors, eliminate poverty.	B2	Evidence produced Swedish Government agency for development cooperation. Information is reviewed, credible source.

European Commission. (1994). *The Uruguay Round Global agreement Global benefits*. European Commission. Retrieved Apr 27, 2023, from http://aei.pitt.edu/39843/1/A4208.pdf

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
European Commission	Uruguay Round, trade in services	A2	Evidence produced by credible source. Provides independent factual analyses.

European Parliament. (2022*). The Doha Round and Agriculture*. European Parliament. Retrieved April 15, 2023, from https://www.europarl.europa.eu/erpl-app-public/factsheets/pdf/en/FTU_3.2.8.pdf

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
European Parliament	Lowering tariffs would harm EU national agricultural sectors.	A2	Evidence produced by credible source. Provides independent factual analyses.

Farias, R. de S. (2010). Sowing the Seeds of Leadership: Brazil and the Agricultural Trade Negotiations of the Uruguay Round. *Journal of World Trade*, 661–685.

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
Kluwer Law Online	Uruguay Round, Brazil, concern agriculture	C3	Global information provider. Biases may be cautioned. But fairly credible source

Fieleke, N. S. (1995). The Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations: An Overview. *New England Economic Review*, 3-15.

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
Kluwer Law Online	Uruguay Round, US, developing states pursue textile expansion.	B3	Global information provider. Biases may be cautioned. Fairly credible source.

Finger, J. M. (2002). *The Doha Agenda And Development: A View From The Uruguay Round*. ERD Working Paper No. 21. Asian Development Bank.

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
Asian Development Bank	Uruguay Round, developing state participation active	B2	Reliable information provider. Credible information.

Gallagher, K. P. (2008). Understanding Developing Country Resistance to the Doha Round. *Review of International Political Economy*, *15*(1), 62–85.

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
Taylor & Francis Group	Developing states can expand exports if developed members lower tariffs.	B2	Evidence produced by renowned publisher of peer- reviewed academic journals.

GATT. (1988). *Meeting at Ministerial Level Montreal (Canada), December 1988: UNITED STATES*. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Retrieved April 28, 2023, from https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/UR/TNCMIN88/ST2.PDF

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade	Montreal meeting 1988	A2	Primary evidence of US trade representative at conference. Credible source.

GATT. (1990). *Meeting at Ministerial Level Brussels, December 1990: SPAIN*. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Retrieved April 28, 2023, from https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/UR/TNCMIN90/ST58.PDF

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade	Montreal meeting 1988	A2	Primary evidence from Spanish trade representative at conference. Credible source.

GATT. (1994a). *Developing Countries and the Uruguay Round: An Overview. Committee on Trade and Development*. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Retrieved April 26, 2023, from https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/GG/COMTD/W512.PDF

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade	Developing countries, the Uruguay Round, trade rules, market access, industrial products, agricultural products, intellectual property rights	A2	Evidence produced first hand the organization. Credible information.

GATT. (1994b). *Meeting At Ministerial Level Palais des Congres. Marrakesh (Morocco), 12-15 April 1994*. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Retrieved April 28, 2023, from https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92150329.pdf

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade	Uruguay Round, Marrakesh, sign agreements, success	A2	Evidence produced first hand the organization. Credible information.

Global Exchange. (2005). Who? The World Trade Organization. *Review of African Political Economy*, *32*(103), 163–167.

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
Taylor & Francis Group	WTO serve multinational corporations. WTO not democratic.	B3	Evidence produced by renowned publisher of peer- reviewed academic journals.

Hamilton, C., & Whalley, J. (1989). Coalitions in the Uruguay Round. *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, 125(3), 547–562.

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
Digizeitschriften	Uruguay Round, India, Brazil, block services	B3	German ditigial publisher, provided by university. Source likely reliable.

Hanrahan, C.E. (2005). Agriculture in the WTO Doha Round: The Framework Agreement and Next Steps. CRS Report for Congress. *Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress*. Retrieved April 14, 2023, from http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/RS21905.pdf

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
Congressional Research Service Reports	Tariff exemption WTO Doha Round, USA incentivize limiting import sensitive goods	B3	Evidence produced by non-partisan members of congress. Work is reviewed.

Harmsen, R. T., & Subramanian, A. (1994). I Economic Implications of the Uruguay Round. *International Monetary Fund*. Retrieved April 26, 2023, from https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781557754578/ch01.xml

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
International Monetary Fund	Uruguay Round, trade liberalization, tariffs, non-tariff reductions, new areas of expansion	A2	Evidence produced by credible source. Peer-reviewed research. Information reliably produced.

Harmsen, R. T., Leidy, M. P., Kirmani, N., Subramanian, & Uimonen, P. P. (1995a). *International Monetary Fund*. Retrieved April 26, 2023, from https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/book/9781557754691/9781557754691.xml

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
International Monetary Fund	Uruguay Round, 125 member states, varying development	A2	Evidence produced by credible source. Peer-reviewed research.

	of members, achievements of trade negotitation		Information reliably produced.

Harmsen, R. T., Kirmani, N., Leidy, M. P., Subramanian, A., & Uimonen, P. P. (1995b). III The Uruguay Round. *International Monetary Fund*. Retrieved Apr 27, 2023, from https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/book/9781557754691/ch03.xml

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
International Monetary Fund	Uruguay Round, Expansion of trade rules to services	A2	Evidence produced by credible source. Peer-reviewed research. Information reliably produced.

Higgott, R. A., & Cooper, A. F. (1990). Middle Power Leadership and Coalition Building: Australia, the Cairns Group, and the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations. *International Organization*, 44(4), 589–632.

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
MIT Press	Uruguay Round, Cairns Group, Agriculture	B3	Evidence produced by scholarly publisher. Information likely true.

IMF. (2011). The WTO Doha Trade Round—Unlocking the Negotiations and Beyond. *International Monetary Fund Policy Papers*, 2011(95).

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
International Monetary Fund	Lower agricultural tariffs and subsidies to farmers	A2	Evidence produced by objective credible source. Information very reliable.

Ingco, M. D., & Nash, J. D. (Eds.). (2004). *Agriculture and the WTO: Creating aTtrading SystemFfor Development*. World Bank Publications.

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
World Bank	WTO developing member states, lower tariffs in agriculture,	A2	Evidence produced objectively. Work is peer-reviewed, credible source.

Joseph, S. (2013). *Blame it on the WTO: A Human Rights Critique*. Oxford University Press.

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
Oxford University press	Member states consider views of	A2	Leading university press, reliable and credible source.

	external actors in decision making		Information likely reliable.

Josling, T. (1998). *Agricultural Trade Policy: Completing The Reform* (Vol. 53). Peterson Institute.

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
Peterson Institute for International Economics	Uruguay Round, Europeans protect national farmers	B3	Independent nonprofit, nonpartisan research organization. Information likely reliable.

Josling, T. & Moyer, W. (2002). *Agricultural Policy Reform: Politics and Process in the EU and US in the 1990s.* Routledge & CRC Press.

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
Routledge & CRS	Uruguay Round, Protect Agriculture, oilseed	B3	Global publisher, reliable source. Credible information.

Kinley, D. (2009). *Civilising Globalisation: Human Rights and the Global Economy*. Cambridge University Press.

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
Cambridge University Press	Corporations are engines of free trade	A2	Academic publisher. Credible peer-reviewed academic journals.

Kirmani, N. (1989). The Uruguay Round: Revitalizing the Global Trading System, *Finance & Development, 0026*(001), A002. Retrieved Apr 28, 2023, from https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/022/0026/001/article-A002-en.xml

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
International Monetary Fund	Uruguay Round, complex negotiations, Chile complain, Canada opposition.	A2	Evidence produced first hand by reliable organization in question. Credible information.

Kirmani, N., & Wong, C. (1997). An Overview of the Uruguay Round. In *Trade Policy Issues*. *International Monetary Fund*. Retrieved Apr 27, 2023, from https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/book/9781557756213/C10.xml

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
International Monetary Fund	Uruguay Round, European states, Japan protect textiles.	A2	Evidence produced first hand by reliable organization in question. Credible information.

Kleen, P. (2008). So Alike and Yet So Different: a Comparison of the Uruguay Round and the Doha Round. *Jan Tumlir Policy Essays*. Retrieved April 27, 2023, from https://ecipe.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/so-alike-and-yet-so-different-a-comparison-of-the-uruguay-round-and-the-doha-round.pdf

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
European Centre for International Political Economy	International Organization favored more developed states in Uruguay Round	B3	Independent and non-profit policy research think tank.

Nachiappan, K. (2019). India and the Uruguay Round Trade Agreement. In K. Nachiappan (Ed.), *Does India Negotiate?*. Oxford University Press.

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
Oxford University Press	Uruguay Round, Indian opposition	B3	Evidence produced by academic known publishing company. Information reliable.

Narlikar, A., & Wilkinson, R. (2004). Collapse at the WTO: A Cancun post-mortem. *Third World Quarterly*, *25*(3), 447–460.

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
Taylor & Francis Group	WTO developing members form strong trade bloc.	B2	Evidence produced by renowned publisher of peer- reviewed academic journals.

Paarlberg, R. L. (1992). How Agriculture Blocked The Uruguay Round. *Sais Review*, 12(1), 27–42.

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
Johns Hopkins University Press	Uruguay, deadlock, agriculture	A3	Evidence produced by scholarly publisher. Information credible.

Paarlberg, R. (1997). Agricultural Policy Reform and the Uruguay Round: Synergistic Linkage in a Two-Level Game? *International Organization*, 51(3), 413–444.

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
MIT Press	Uruguay Round, EU member states, agriculture protection, price stability	B3	Evidence produced by scholarly publisher. Information likely true.

Ray, D. E. (2015). *World Bank Study: Trade liberalization would shut down two-thirds of EU's grain and oilseed production*. Iowa State University Digital Repository. Retrieved April 14, 2023, from https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/38930962.pdf

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
CORE	WTO Doha Framework, Negotiation Topics.	B2	Evidence published by credible company, work is reviewed. Information likely credible.

Rodrik, D. (2001). *The Global Governance of Trade as if Development Really Mattered*. New York: UNDP.

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
Harvard University Publication	WTO serve interests of corporations.	B2	Evidence published by credible publisher, peer- reviewed. Information likely credible.

Scott, J., & Wilkinson, R. (2011). The Poverty of the Doha Round and the Least Developed Countries. *Third World Quarterly*, *32*(4), 611–627.

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
Taylor & Francis Group	WTO favors more developed members.	B2	Evidence produced by renowned publisher of peer- reviewed academic journals.

Shafaeddin, S. M. (2008). *Is Industrial Policy Relevant in the 21st Century? Third World Network*.

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
Third World Network	WTO indirect expands power of corporations.	B3	Independent non-profit international research and advocacy organisation.

Stewart, T. (1999). *The Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History 1986 - 1994*. Kluwer Law International B.V.

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
Kluwer Law	Uruguay Round, Tokyo summit, advancements in negotiations, tariffs, market, access.	B2	Global information provider and publisher. Information likely reliable.

Subramanian, A. & Wei, S-J. (2003). The WTO Promotes Trade, Strongly But Unevenly. *International Monetary Fund Working Papers*. Retrieved April 15, 2023, from https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/30/The-WTO-Promotes-Trade-Strongly-But-Unevenly-16822

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
International Monetary Fund	WTO rules protect nationally sensitive sectors.	A2	Evidence produced first hand by reliable organization in question. Credible information.

Sundaram, J. K., & von Arnim, R. (2009). Trade Liberalization and Economic Development. *Science*, *323*(5911), 211–212.

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
American Association for the Advancement of Science	WTO benefit corporations	B3	Evidence published by reviewed source. Non-partisan information provider.

Thornton, R. (2019). *World Trade Organizations*. ETP. Retrieved April 27 2023 from https://www.google.nl/books/edition/World_Trade_Organizations/tYNJEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
Ed Tech Press	Uruguay Round, insufficient attention to needs of developing states	B3	Independent international publisher of science, technology and medicine. Work is peer-reviewed, credible source.

Tyers, R. (1993). The Cairns Group and the Uruguay Round of International Trade Negotiations. *Australian Economic Review*, 26(1), 49–60.

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
Wiley Online Library	Uruguay Round, Cairns Group, agriculture	B2	Evidence produced by renowned multinational publishing company. Work is peer-reviewed, credible source.

Walker, A. (2011, November 14). The WTO has failed developing nations. *The Guardian*. Retrieved April 15, 2023, from https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/nov/14/wto-fails-developing-countries

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
The Guardian	WTO favor developed members, negotiations weak for developing members.	C3	Independent news, reliable source.

Wright, T., & Weisman, S. (2006, July 26). World Trade Talks Fail over Impasse on Farm Tariffs—Business—International Herald Tribune. *The New York Times*. Retrieved April 15, 2023, from https://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/25/business/worldbusiness/25iht-web.0725tradefront.2284379.html

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
The New York Times	Member states cannot agree on farming subsidies.	B2	Independent news, reliable source. Informational likely true.

WTO. (2004). *Doha Work Programme: Decision Adoted by the General Council*. World Trade Organization. Retrieved April 14, 2023, from https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/ddadraft_31jul04_e.pdf

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
World Trade Organization	WTO Doha Framework, Negotiation Topics.	A2	Evidence produced first hand the organization in question. Reliable source. Credible information.

WTO. (2023d). *The Uruguay Round*. The World Trade Organization. Retrieved March 31, 2023, from https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm#:~:text=It%20took%20seven%20and%20a,wild%20rice%20to%20AIDS%20treatments

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
World Trade Organization	Uruguay ROund	A2	Evidence produced first hand by WTO. Reliable source.

WTO. (2023e). *The Doha Round*. The World Trade Organization. Retrieved March 31, 2023, from https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
World Trade Organization	WTO Doha Round	A2	Evidence produced first hand by WTO. Reliable source.

WTO. (2023f). *Top 10 Reasons to Oppose the World Trade Organization? Criticism, yes … misinformation, no!* The World Trade Organization. Retrieved April 16, 2023, from https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min99_e/english/misinf_e/01multi_e.htm

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
World Trade Organization	WTO Criticisms, favor develop states, Multinational Corporations	A2	Evidence produced first hand by the organization in question. Credible and reliable source.

Wu, J., Chiclana, F., Fujita, H., & Herrera-Viedma, E. (2017). A visual interaction consensus model for social network group decision making with trust propagation. *Knowledge-Based Systems*, *122*, 39–50.

Source:	Key Terms:	Source Assessment Score (A1-F6)	Explanation of source assessment:
Elsevier	Requirements for consensus decision making, trust	B3	Evidence produced renowned publisher of trust worthy information. Likely unbiased, also licensed by Leiden University.

Appendix B

Interview Questions and Research Summary

Name of interviewee: Bernard Kuiten
Position: Head of External Relations at the World Trade Organization

Main question of the research: What makes state cooperation in trade successful? How can an international organization help to facilitate cooperation?

Brief Outline: I base my study on numerous international relations theories that argue that an international organization like the WTO makes it easier for states to cooperate with each other, to achieve goals like trading internationally. The organization essentially lowers the transaction costs and uncertainties of cooperation and can monitor state behavior and compliance.

So, what will I analyze in the thesis? I look at two cases of trade negotiation rounds namely, the Uruguay Round and the Doha Round. For the sake of simplicity, I denote the Uruguay Round as resulting in very successful trade cooperation between states, and the Doha Round as resulting in unsuccessful cooperation.

Then I study both cases in depth in order to try to account for why they resulted in such different outcomes. The study involves mainly document analysis, where I try to find evidence of what led up to the Uruguay Round success and why the Doha Round had less success.

Questions:

1. What factors do you think are important when an organization like the WTO tries to facilitate member-state cooperation in trade agreements?
    a. Rephrased: What is really important to consider when creating trade agreements between different states?
2. What do WTO member states rely on the organization for? Is it for advice or expertise or something else?
3. My research tries to look at what caused the Doha Trade Round into a stalemate. Do you have any knowledge about the difficulties of the Doha Round? Why do you think some countries hesitated to sign off on the new agreements?
4. What caused the Doha Round to fail? Was there one big reason? Or many small reasons?
5. Do you have any thoughts on why previous trade Rounds were more successful? For example, the Uruguay Round, why did member-states more easily sign off to these agreements?