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## **Dutch support to the Ukraine-Russian war: Understanding and Analysing the Factors Influencing Support Mechanisms in the Context of a developing World Order**

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# Dutch support to the Ukraine-Russian war: Understanding and Analysing the Factors Influencing Support Mechanisms in the Context of a developing World Order

Master Thesis Public Administration: Economics & Governance

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## Preface

I enjoyed the process of writing this MSc Thesis. Though it presented challenges along the way, the outcome was truly rewarding, providing valuable insights into geopolitics and the significant impact our actions can have on the geopolitical stage. I sincerely hope you find reading this MSc thesis as enjoyable as I found creating it.

Completing this MSc Thesis would not have been possible without the unwavering support, guidance, and inspiration from several individuals. First and foremost, I express my gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Jaap Reijling, whose time, guidance, and feedback were instrumental in shaping this work. His expertise made a crucial difference.

I also extend my thanks to all the respondents who generously participated in the interviews, sharing their time, and engaging in thought-provoking conversations. Their valuable contributions enriched this study significantly.

Lastly, I am indebted to my friends and family and for patiently listening to my research stories and the details of the interviews I conducted. Their unwavering support, motivation, and belief in me fuelled my determination to complete this thesis.

Thank you all for being a part of this journey.

Andries Knöps

*Rotterdam, July 2023*

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## *Chapter 1: Introduction*

On the 24<sup>th</sup> of February 2022 Russian president Vladimir Putin ordered to launch a “special military operation” against the Ukraine. The launch of the special military operation followed a long period of unrest at the border of Ukraine. In March 2014 Russia invaded Crimea, subsequently Russia annexed Crimea. After the annexation of Crimea unrest remained at the border of Ukraine. At the beginning of 2022 the tension increased by Russia moving troops into Belarus for military exercises and Putin ordered troops to move into the separatist regions in Ukraine. One of the many reasons for Putin to undertake these actions was because the Ukrainian government was leaning more and more towards the West.

Since the February 2022, the conflict has escalated and now involves many states in addition to Russia and Ukraine. The attack on Ukraine is by many states seen as an undermining of the democratic values Ukraine stands for (Stanford University, 2022). During the conflict other states, such as the Netherlands got involved. The states got involved by providing Ukraine financial and military support. However, none of these states that offer support are involved in direct combat since they are not at war with Russia. So, they play a more indirect supporting role in the war.

The United States (US) is the biggest provider of financial, military, humanitarian support to the Ukraine. The US donated in several support packages an amount of 3.8 billion euros (IFW, 2023). Other states in the top eight donators are United Kingdom (UK), Germany, and the Netherlands. This is remarkable because the Netherlands is a small country compared to the other top donators. It is also remarkable that all the states in the top eight are NATO member states.

NATO was founded to stop Russian influence towards Western Europe. Therefore, NATO and its member states can be seen as a reflection of Western civilization (Huntington, 1997). The conflict in Ukraine can be seen as a ‘clash of civilisation’ (Huntington, 1997; Van der Horst, 2023). Therefore, the conflict might be endangering world order. Since the Netherlands is a member of NATO and a strong supporter of justice, peace, and stability on a world scale, it is interesting to study the reasoning behind the support to Ukraine from the perspective of the Dutch government. This will be studied using three perspectives on world order. The most known perspectives are realism (Mearsheimer, 2001), liberalism (Doyle, 1983), and constructivism (Wendt, 1992). Each theory is looking for a balance and mutual understanding amongst actors, institutional design, and instruments of power (Zing & Lim, 2017). It will be interesting to see which perspective or a combination of perspectives,

explains the support provided by the Netherlands and whether such support can be seen as a contribution to a stable world order.

Combining the three perspectives on world order with the support provided by the Netherlands leads to the following research question: *How can the support provided by the Netherlands to Ukraine be explained from a system of (new) world order?*

### Societal and scientific relevance

The Netherlands as such can be seen as a strong supporter of world peace and justice. It can be assumed that military and financial support measures from the Netherlands are not merely trying to influence the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, but also support a more long-term strategic agenda on the world stage. The research question therefore focusses on the fundamental and strategic reasons and causes that push a country to send help to another country in the context of a constantly shifting world order, so the answer has societal relevance. At a broader level the question seeks to reveal the dynamics of power and influence in the international system of international relations. By examining why a country decides to provide military aid to another, a light can be shed on the underlying drivers of international relations and the role that countries play in shaping the global order.

Additionally, the research question is directly relevant to society since it can help policymakers and analysts better understand the dynamics of the conflict and possible solutions by revealing why financial, military, and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine is given. The research question also touches upon the issue of international laws and norms, because providing military aid to another country during a conflict can raise questions about the legality and legitimacy of such actions under international laws.

By answering the research question, knowledge is not only contributed to society but also to the international relations literature. The research question provides an opportunity to examine theoretical frameworks in real life situations. By doing so, it contributes to advancing our theoretical understanding of international relations and the dynamics of the world order. By combining the international relations theories with a real-life case, the validity and applicability of these theories can be determined in the context of global order.

The research question also addresses the current knowledge gap in the literature regarding the conflict in Ukraine. This research can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the conflict and the factors that are driving it.

Combining the existing theories with the support provided to the Ukraine by different states sheds a new light on the dynamics of the international political order and how states are shaped by their interests and values. This is particularly important because there is the potential that the growing tension between Russia and the West escalates into a wider long-term conflict. Answering the research question is also relevant for understanding the role of the EU in global politics and its relationship with individual member states. The provision of financial, military, and humanitarian support to the Ukraine by some EU states can raise questions about the goals, coherence, and consistency of the EU's foreign policy.

In the following chapter the theoretical foundation for answering the research question will be introduced. In chapter three the method for the conducted research is explained. Following the methods chapter, the results of the conducted research will be presented. In the final chapter of this thesis the conclusion will be drawn upon the results. This is followed by a discussion of the conducted research and the presented results.



## *Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework*

To be able to address the research question that was posted, it is first necessary to see what theories are available that can address world order systems. Secondly, it is needed to develop an analytical framework on how those systems are evolving. Therefore, a basis for comparison around mediating variables is needed. This will result in a conceptual framework that captures the moderating influence of the support provided by the Netherlands on the mediating variables. This framework offers insights into the further development of world order systems.

### *Realist perspective*

First, the realist perspective of international relations will be discussed, using John Mearsheimer's (2001) book "The tragedy of Great Power Politics". The Tragedy of Great Power Politics is based on five assumptions. The first assumption that is depicted by Mearsheimer, is that the international system is anarchic. With anarchy he means that within the international system there are no controlling rules or principles that establish order. There is no overarching authority or global government to regulate the actions of states. However, it is important to realize that this assumption does not mean that the international system of disorder is driven by disorder or chaos.

The second assumption draws upon the offensive military capabilities of great powers. States have offensive military capability, which they can use to hurt and destroy each other. Some states have a more extensive military capability than others. Mearsheimer (2001) also states that even if there were no weapons, individuals can use their feet and hands to attack each other. This implies that population size is part of a states' military power.

The third assumption comes from uncertainty. A state can never be sure another state will not use its offensive military power to attack against them. States can be driven by multiple aggression possibilities to do so, since Mearsheimer (2001) argues that there are many possible causes of aggression. A state' intention can also change quickly; one can be friendly one day and hostile on the next day.

The fourth assumption is that survival is the primary goal of great powers. States seek to maintain their territorial integrity and the autonomy of their political order (Mearsheimer, 2001). Survival is dominating because when a state is conquered it is unlikely that this state can pursue its other goals.

The fifth assumption is that great powers are rational actors. This means that states are aware of their external environment, and they think strategically about how to survive in the given environment. States consider the preferences of other states and how their actions may affect those of other states. States consider both the long-term consequences and the immediate consequences of their actions.

With these five assumptions Mearsheimer (2001) argues that states are constantly trying to accumulate power and that the five assumptions can create powerful incentives for states to think and act offensively against each other. The states' offensive behaviour and the willingness to become more and more powerful, makes cooperation between states difficult.

### Liberal perspective

The liberal viewpoint on the international order will be used as the second perspective in this thesis. The paper "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs" by Michael W. Doyle (1983) will be mostly used to illustrate this viewpoint. The institutions of liberalism have influenced how states perceive international relations. The most essential principle within liberalism is the freedom of the individual. One person's freedom is protected by a set of rights. The first right is the freedom from any capricious power (Doyle, 1983). The second right comprises advancing and defending one's ability and chance to exercise freedom. Participation in and representation in democratic processes is the final right that liberalism recognises (Doyle, 1983).

According to Doyle (1983), states have the right to be free from outside interference within the context of liberal international theory. States have the freedom to enjoy political independence if they democratically reflect the rights of their citizens to liberty. Its political independence should be respected by another liberal state. When people are allowed to form private international ties and when nations can respect one another, profitable trading can take place. Doyle (1983) contends that liberal governments can forge peace between themselves after this mutual regard has been established. This does not imply that liberal democracies are not at war. Doyle (1983) asserts that liberal states are more inclined to wage war on non-liberal states than on one another. Liberal states are likely to end up on the same side of a conflict that impacts the entire world (Doyle, 1983).

Adding to these points is that liberals believe that international institutions play a key role in cooperation among states. International institutions play a big role because they create

interdependence between states. This interdependence, where states rely on each other makes them harder to go at war with each other.

### Constructivists perspective

The third and final perspective on world order that is constructivism. Alexander Wendt is a prominent author of constructivism in the field of international relations. In his 1992 article 'Anarchy is what States Make of it: The social Construction of Power Politics' Wendt lays the theoretical foundation for a constructivist perspective on world order. Wendt (1992) argues that international competitive power politics is not a given, but is a result from interaction between actors in the international arena. The interaction between states in the international system created an anarchic international world order (Wendt, 1992).

Wendt (1992) describes three main points of constructivism. In his first point he argues that anarchy cannot be a self-help system. The reason for this is because a state interacts differently with an enemy compared to a friend. Wendt (1992) argues that relations between states can also change overtime. Relations can change because of changing interactions, he also states that no other theory can explain this than constructivism. In his second point Wendt (1992) states that anarchy was created when states started to interact with each other. Constructivists believe that there are no expectations or interests before states start interacting with each other. This also means that before states interact with each other there is no anarchic feelings towards each other. In his final point Wendt (1992) states that the identities and interest of states are constructed. When identities and interest change than the international political system also must change. By changes in the international political system anarchic feelings between states can also change. According to Wendt (1992) there are three independent variables that can alter the interest and identities form states in anarchy. The variables are sovereignty, evolution of cooperation and collective security.

### Comparison of main theories

In the way that the three perspectives are presented above, they are incomparable. To be able to compare their views on world order, it is necessary to structure them. Zhing & Lim (2017) offer three aspects that can be used to explain the evolution of world order systems. These aspects can be seen as the mediating variables in this study, each influencing world order. The first aspect is the changing relations among and between sovereign states or actors, being the prime constituents of international relations. Realist, liberalist, and constructivist

have all different perception on who or what is the main actor in world order. The second aspect is the institutional design or global governance structure. The main actors interact with each other through these institutional designs. Zhing & Lim (2017) state that these structures are weakening. The third aspect is the bases for influence of the world order by actors; the instruments of power. Instruments of power can be hard like military or economic power instrument; they can also be soft like diplomatic power or cultural instruments. Zhing & Lim (2017) for instance state that developing countries, like China, are actively resisting globalisation trends that could lead to stronger interdependencies.

### Main actor comparison

Realists believe that the main actors in world order are sovereign states. According to this perspective, states are the primary actors in international relations, and they operate within a self-help system where they pursue their own interests. Realists view states as rational and self-interested, always seeking to maximize their power and security within an anarchic international system (Mearsheimer, 1994). Sovereign states are motivated by their own interests, including national security, power, and wealth (Wendt, 1992). As a result, weaker states are often dominated by stronger ones, which leads to a small number of global powers dominating the world order.

In contrast to realists, liberalists consider a wide range of actors to be important in international relations. These include not only sovereign states but also international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and multinational corporations (Keohane & Nye, 1977). Liberalists believe that cooperation and interdependence between these actors can lead to the creation of international regimes and the promotion of common interests and values. According to the liberalist view, the involvement of various actors in international relations can help to create a more collaborative and interconnected global system (Keohane, 1984). By working together, these actors can establish shared norms and institutions that promote peace, stability, and prosperity (Keohane, 1984). This approach emphasizes the potential benefits of cooperation and interdependence, rather than the competition and conflict that realists often highlight.

Constructivists take a different approach than realists and liberalists when it comes to understanding world order. They emphasize the importance of ideas, norms, and identities in shaping international relations, rather than focusing solely on actors like sovereign states (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). According to constructivists, the behaviour of actors in the

international system is not only driven by material interests, but also by the way they perceive and understand the world around them. In contrast to realists and liberalists, constructivists view social movements, transnational networks, and individuals as key actors in shaping world order. These actors are not defined solely by their material resources, but also by the ideas, norms, and identities that they hold (Barnett & Duvall, 2005). By promoting new ideas and norms, these actors can challenge and reshape the existing power structures in international relations. Overall, constructivists see the world as being shaped by both material and ideational factors (Barnett & Duvall, 2005). They argue that by understanding the ideas and norms that shape the behaviour of actors, we can better understand and navigate the complexities of international relations.

### Global governance structure comparison

Realists view sovereign states as the primary actors in world order and believe that national interests should shape their behaviour. According to realism, sovereign states interact primarily through institutions that are designed to promote their interests and maintain stability in the global system. The most important institutions in the realist view are those that focus on national security, as the survival of the state is the primary goal of sovereign states (Mearsheimer, 2001).

To ensure their survival, sovereign states interact with other states mainly through military alliances and international organizations that prioritize security issues (Donnelly, 2000). For instance, NATO is a military alliance where states work together to guarantee their survival. Economic institutions also play an essential role as forums for sovereign states to negotiate trade agreements and advance their economic interests (Donnelly, 2000). However, realists emphasize that these institutions are ultimately subordinate to the power and interests of sovereign states (Donnelly, 2000). Their effectiveness is limited by the anarchic nature of world order.

Liberalists have a broader view of international relations than realists and believe that a wide range of actors are important in the global system. Institutions are viewed as critical in promoting cooperation and dialogue between these actors. According to liberalists, institutions provide forums where sovereign states can promote international cooperation and resolve conflicts peacefully (Moravcsik, 1997). An example of such an institution is the United Nations (UN). In addition to promoting cooperation and dialogue, liberalists emphasize the importance of protecting individual freedom and rights. Sovereign states'

freedoms are protected by rights, according to liberalists (Doyle, 1983; Moravcsik, 1997). Therefore, liberalists see the importance of international law and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in promoting adherence to international norms and resolving conflicts between states. Apart from political institutions, actors in the international system also interact through economic institutions that are designed to promote cooperation and economic development. Liberalists believe that economic institutions can help promote mutual gains and reduce conflict between states (Baylis, 2020). These institutions can create interdependence between actors, leading to greater cooperation and stability in the global system (Baylis, 2020; Moravcsik, 1997).

Constructivists have a different view of institutions compared to realists and liberalists. They argue that institutions are not only formal international organizations or structures, but also include ideas, norms, and identities that shape the behaviour of actors in the world order. According to constructivists, institutions are shaped and transformed through social interaction, and in turn, they shape the identities and interests of actors in the world order (Wendt, 1999). In addition to formal international organizations, constructivists also believe that actors interact through informal institutions such as civil society networks, cultural and social norms. These informal institutions play a critical role in shaping state behaviour and promoting common interests and values (Wendt, 1999). For instance, constructivists argue that international human rights norms emerged through informal institutions like civil society groups and formal institutions like international organizations. These norms have played a critical role in shaping state behaviour and promoting human rights globally. By shaping state behaviour and promoting shared values and norms, institutions help to create a more stable and cooperative global system.

### Instruments of power comparison

Realists view the international system as anarchic, with states pursuing their own interest through institutions and competing for power and resources (Donnelly, 2000; Mearsheimer, 2001). In such a world order system, sovereign states must be prepared to use force and coercion to protect their interest and ensure their survival. From a realist perspective it can be argued that realists prefer hard power instruments (Morgenthau, 1954). Hard power instruments are seen as the most effective tool for achieving foreign policy objectives (Gilpin, 1981). A realist approach to foreign policy might involve using military force to protect national security interests, (Carr Edward, 1964; Gilpin, 1981) such as

defending against a potential military threat. Economics sanctions can be used to pressure other states to comply with the national interests like gaining an advantage in trade negotiations (Morgenthau 1954). Diplomatic may be used, but as a mean of achieving hard power objectives.

Liberalism is close to the concept of soft power (Nye, 2011). Liberalists believe that the international system can be transformed through cooperation and the spread of liberal values such as democracy, human rights, and free trade (Doyle,1983). Soft power instruments such as diplomacy, economic aid, cultural exchanges, international institutions are seen as the most effective tools for achieving policy objectives (Nye, 2011). These instruments allow states to build relationships and promote cooperation throughout the international system. Soft power instruments are used particularly in shaping behaviour of states over the long term (Nye, 2011). A liberalist approach to foreign policy is using economic aid to promote development and democracy in other states, engage in cultural exchanges, and support international institutions that promote the liberal values (Nye, 2005). Diplomatic efforts are pursued as means of achieving cooperation and resolving conflicts.

In international relations constructivist see power as socially constructed and argue that ideas, norms, and identities play a crucial role in the forming the behaviour of states (Wendt, 1992). As a results constructivist do not prioritize the of hard or soft power instruments, they rather view the effectiveness of power instruments as being contingent on the social context in which they are employed (Onuf, 1989; Wendt, 1992). Power can be exercised through a variety of means including military force, economic coercion, diplomacy, cultural exchanges, and international institutions. The effectiveness of these instruments depends on the norms and identities of the actors involved, as well as the social context in which they are employed (Wendt, 1992). Military force may be effective in deterring potential adversaries or achieving short-term objectives, but it may create negative social identities and norms that make long-term cooperation difficult. Similarly, economic sanctions may be affecting, but they may also create negative perceptions of the sanctioning state and undermine its legitimacy in the international system.

## Conceptual framework

The Netherlands is providing support to Ukraine and this support consist mainly of military aid, financial aid, economic sanctions, and humanitarian support. The support is provided bilateral, in cooperation with other countries, and through different international organisations such as the EU, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank (Ministerie van Algemene Zaken, 2023). The support provided by the Netherlands can be seen as the moderating variable influencing the mediating variables: main actors, institutional design, and instruments of power.

Since sovereign states are the prime constituents of international relations, it is essential to describe the relationship between the main actors in world order and the support provided by the Netherlands. Providing support to the Ukraine changes relationships in the international arena. Zing & Lim (2017) describe that the chaotic disorder in the world can be explained by changing relations among and between sovereign states. A similar view is presented by Lahneman (2003). He describes that the most significant changes in world order will be the result of changing relations between the US, China, Russia, and the EU (Lahneman, 2003). By providing support to one party of the conflict the Netherlands is taking a side in the conflict which in turn changes relations with other sovereign states.

A relation can also be seen between the institutional design and the support packages by the Netherlands. World order is not solely determined by material capabilities of sovereign states but also by ideas and institutions (Cox, 1981). International institutions like IMF and the World Bank are not neutral actors but are shaped by and reflect the interest of their member states (Cox, 1981). This view on international organisations is supported by Keohane & Martin (1995). They developed the theory that international institutions are created simply in response to the interest of states and that their character is structured by the prevailing distribution of capabilities (Keohane & Martin, 1995). Since the support is provided through international organisations the Netherlands is exposing their interests within these organisations and influencing the way they contribute to world order.

A state can use different instruments of power in the international arena. Which instruments of power a state is going to use is determined by its domestic affairs (Zing & Lim, 2017). There is a relationship between a state's domestic policy and the way the same states project its influence in the international arena (Zing & Lim, 2017). This is supported by Lumsdaine (1996). He argues that domestic political factors can affect international politics which in turn shape the international system (Lumsdaine, 1996). This means that the



supported provided by the Netherlands is partly a result of domestic affairs. This in turn affects about which instruments of powers are chosen in the international arena. Therefore, a relation can be seen between the Dutch support and the types of instruments of power.

Realism, liberalism, and constructivism are seen in this study as the independent variables. They are operated through the mediating variables. The mediating variables are the main actors, through which institutions these actors are interacting and about what instruments of power they use. The main actors, institutional design, and instruments of powers have a contribution to a stable world order, which is the dependent variable. The support provided by the Netherlands is affecting the mediating variables. This leads to the conceptual model in figure 1 and the following research question: *How can the support provided by the Netherlands to Ukraine be explained from a system of (new) world order?*

This question can be answered by examining the ideas and considerations behind the support provided. From a realist perspective, the Netherlands' support can be attributed to the balance of power between Russia and NATO, as well as the Dutch national interest in promoting regional stability and curbing Russian expansionism. A liberalist explanation of the support revolves around the Dutch commitment to democratic values, human rights, and international law, along with their economic interests in fostering a stable and prosperous Ukraine. Lastly, from a constructivist point of view, the support can be understood in the context of evolving norms and discourses surrounding state sovereignty, international law, and global power distribution in the post-Cold War era. These changes have prompted a redefinition of the Netherlands' identity and role in the international system. Overall, the expected ideas and considerations behind the provided support can be seen as a combination of realist, liberalist, and constructivist perspectives.




Figure 1: Theoretical Framework

## Chapter 3: Methodology

In this chapter the method behind the conducted research will be discussed. More specifically it will address the study design, data-collection and -analyses and a discussion about the reliability and validity of the conducted research.

### Design of the study

To answer the research, question a comprehensive qualitative study is conducted. This type of research is chosen because qualitative research is used to gain a deeper understanding of the complex Ukraine war. A holistic approach is chosen due to the unique and complex nature of the Ukraine conflict, which requires a deep exploration of the phenomenon and a thorough understanding of the conflict (Moser & Korstjens, 2018). A holistic research approach is particularly useful in exploring the Ukraine conflict, which has not been extensively studied before. This approach can help to gain insights into the conflict and generates knowledge to answering the research question and for future research (Moser & Korstjens, 2018).

The purpose of the research is to gain insight in what the influence is of the Dutch support to Ukraine on a (new) system of world order. In figure 1 the conceptual model is presented. The research question is: *How can the support provided by the Netherlands to Ukraine be explained from a system of (new) world order?*

In the previous theoretical chapter, it was explained what the main international relations theories say about world order. We then defined how they relate to mediating variables, being the view on main actors, institutional design, and instruments of power. This then forms the basis for addressing the remaining sub questions:

1. *What is the influence of the support provided by the Netherlands to Ukraine on the main actors, institutional design, and instruments of power?*
2. *Is the combination of the Dutch influence on the mediating variables contributing to a stable world order?*

### Case selection

To explain to Dutch support within the context of the new world order, it is crucial to carefully select relevant cases that can uncover the underlying dynamics and shed light on the complex interplay between Dutch actions and the evolving global landscape. Therefore, the research includes various actors.

While the Netherlands is a primary actor chosen for this study, it is important to note that it is not the sole state supporting Ukraine in the war. There are multiple other countries also providing support. These additional countries are included in the research because the Netherlands, on its own, lacks the capacity to effect significant change in the world order. The inclusion of these supportive countries in the research is contingent upon their support being driven by similar reasons as the Netherlands.

Additionally, the supportive countries, the roles of the US, China, and Russia are also emphasized in the research. These countries are specifically targeted due to their significant influence in shaping the current global order. Excluding them from the research would hinder our ability to fully comprehend how the support provided by the Netherlands is shaping the world order. Including these nations in the study is crucial as they represent the major powers that are actively shaping the global landscape.

In addition to different states, several institutions are included in this study. Specifically, we focus on the most significant alliances for the Netherlands, namely the EU, NATO, and the UN. The EU holds a special role in this study as we examine how it, as an independent actor, is evolving within the world order.

## Data collection

The conducted research consists of a document study and semi-structured interviews. Moser & Korstjens (2018) state that when doing qualitative research is done, the usage of difference sources is recommended. This is called triangulation. Triangulation is applied by doing desk research using different documents and field research by doing interviews.

Interviews play a significant role in the study as they provide valuable context to the document analysis. This is because the authors of the documents possess unique perspectives on the subject matter. Consequently, interviews are utilized to offer both context and explanations to complement the documents.

## Document study

A document study is conducted to give substance to the theoretical framework. The documents for the study were obtained first from the Dutch government's official website about the war in Ukraine, especially letters to parliament. To ensure that only relevant documents were used for the study, documents dated after the 24th of February 2022 were considered, with the aim of filtering out those related to the conflict in Ukraine before the

Russian invasion. Secondly, actual comments and articles from Dutch and Foreign thinktanks were assembled. To include the perspectives of the relevant world actors and institution's opinion articles are included as well. Only opinion articles of respective think tanks are used to maintain the quality of the research. Finally, policy documents from the Dutch Minister of Defence and State secretary were used. See table 1 for all the documentation sources that are used for the document study. A full detailed list of the documentation used in the research can be found in the list of documentation in the Appendix 1.

Category (number of documents)	Source
Letters to parliament (6)	Government.nl Tweedekamer.nl Officielebekendmakingen.nl
Thinktanks and opinion articles (16)	Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken (AIV) Better World Campaign Bloomberg Carnegie Endowment for International Peace European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) Foreign Affairs Friends of Europe HCSS International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) Kiel Institute NRC Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) Project Syndicate The Foreign Policy Centre
MOD and Foreign Affairs (3)	Goverment.nl Defensie.nl

Table 1: Overview documents

## Interviews

To answer the research question, expertise is required from both the operational side as well the administrative political side to fully understand the consequences of the provided support. There is focused on the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially within policy departments. In order to have a perspective on the Russian side of the research, interviewees were found that can be seen as Russia connoisseurs. The following interviewees, who meet these criteria, have been identified and are presented in table 2.

In total five interviews with a total of seven interviewees were conducted. The number of interviewees is not equal to the number of interviews because during one interview multiple people joined. The full list of interviewees, time and if the interview was live or through teams can be found in Table 2. In the table it is shown that a few interviewees wanted to remain anonymously.

The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner, allowing for follow-up questions to be asked if necessary to obtain additional information. During the interviews, notes and recordings were taken with the purpose of transcribing them afterward. Transcripts were offered to University of Leiden through the thesis-supervisor for transparency.

Interviewee	Function title	Teams/live	Time	Date
Harry van der Horst Lt. Col. NLAf ret.	Russia connoisseur and author on East-Europe perspectives	Live	12:00	1st of June 2023
Esselien van Eerten	Deputy Head of Mission Dutch Embassy Kyiv	MS Teams	09:00	2 <sup>nd</sup> of June 2023
Kol. Tonny van den Belt	Program Manager Transition Team at Ministry of Defense	MS Teams	12:30	12 <sup>th</sup> of June 2023
René van der Linden	Former secretary of state foreign affairs, former chairman of the senate, and former chairman of the Parliamentary	Live	14:30	5 <sup>th</sup> of July

	assemble of the Council of Europe			
Policy officer Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1	Policy Officer Ukraine at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs	MS Teams	15:00	10 <sup>th</sup> of July
Policy officer Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2	Policy officer Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs Support/Reconstruction Ukraine.	MS Teams	15:00	10 <sup>th</sup> of July
Policy officer Ministry of Foreign Affairs 3	Policy Officer at the Eastern Europe Department of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs	MS Teams	15:00	10 <sup>th</sup> of July

Table 2: List of Interviewees

### Methodical topic analysis

All interviews and studied documents will be coded and labelled, this will be done using topic lists. Topic lists are used because it is a deductive qualitative study (Doorewaard et al., 2016). The topic list has been continuously adjusted during the research process. This is due to the discovery of new operationalizations because of studying new interviews or documents. The ongoing improvements made to the topic list reflect the evolving nature of the research. The documents will be analysed using the same topic list. The topic list is presented in table 3 below.

Based on this topic list, the interview questions were formulated. A comprehensive list of the interview questions can be found in Appendix 2. It is important to note that not all interview questions were asked during the various interviews. This approach was taken to maintain the semi-structured nature of the interviews.

Concept	Operationalization	Indicator	Source (Policy brief/Interview)
Support	Military support	Phases of military support Training programs Offensive capabilities	Letters to parliament MOD Foreign Affairs
	Financial support	Increased budget allocation Channelling through international financial institutions Favourable loan conditions	
	Humanitarian support	Gift-based assistance Human rights organizations and initiatives Nature of humanitarian support	
	Sanctions	Economics consequences Economic isolation	
Vision on geopolitics and its main actors	Role EU	Strengthened cooperation between EU and the US EU's enhanced role and resilience	Thinktanks MOD Foreign Affairs

	Key actors	Shifts in global actor relationships Strengthened cooperation between EU and the US EU's enhanced role and resilience Misinterpretation and tensions Dominance of the Western coalition	
	Role Russia	Russian reasons for going to war Chinese perspective and learning	
Institutional design	Vision on involvement of International Organisations (IO)	Utilization of new and existing forums Weakening of established global governance institutions Cooperation within EU	Letters to parliament and thinktanks MOD Foreign Affairs
	Role NL within IO	Forward leaning Leader in providing support Bilateral	



		Coalitions Cooperation within EU	
	Application of International Law	ICJ Justice Repayments	
Instruments of Power	Vision on interdependencies between use of hard and soft power	Shift in emphasis between hard and soft power Multilateral engagement	Letters to parliament and thinktanks MOD Foreign Affairs
	Military vs Financial (carrot and stick approach)	Military involvement Financial involvement Multilateral engagement Military operations vs. diplomatic efforts	
World peace and stability	Vision on stabilizing mechanisms	Role China/US Stabilizing factors Deterrence mechanisms Long/Short term	Thinktanks MOD Foreign Affairs

Table 3: Topic List and Coding Scheme

In Figure 2, three steps are defined regarding the analysis of textual data. These steps include the overall analysis of the text material, the detailed examination of text passages, and the determination of findings and conclusions. To prepare the collected empirical material for these steps, the examined texts were coded (Rietjens, 2014). This involved the application of both "open", "axial", and "selective" coding. The use of "open" and "axial" coding primarily focuses on the overall analysis of the textual material. Open coding entails assigning labels to quotes from the studied documentation and interviews. This is crucial for contextualizing and interpreting texts within their specific context (Fairclough, 2003: 28) since statements have no meaning without context.




Figure 2: Relationship between data collection and data analysis

Text segments were labelled with the indicators identified in Table 3. Subsequently, axial coding was applied by grouping coded texts according to themes. Selective coding, on the other hand, aligns with the second step of the analysis, namely the detailed examination of text passages. In this step, we qualify the meaning of specific statements from the perspective of the interviewees and the actor group they represent. According to Fairclough (2003), three aspects of meaning can be represented in any text. Fairclough derives this categorization from the following statement by Foucault:

*“[These] practical systems stem from three broad area's: relations of control over things, relations of action upon others, relations with oneself. This does not mean that each of these three area's is completely foreign to the others. It is well known that control over things is mediated by relations with others; and relations with others in turn always entails relations with oneself, and vice versa. But we have three axes whose specificity and whose interconnections have to be analyzed: the axis of knowledge, the axis of power, the axis of ethics... How are we constituted as subjects of our own knowledge? How are we constituted as subjects who exercise or submit to power relations? How are we constituted as moral subjects of our own actions?”*  
(Foucault, 1984, p. 318)

The final step in the analysis involved reaching findings and conclusions by comparing the thus coded qualitative data per actor group and research phase, and then incorporating theoretical insights.

### Reliability and validity

Research can be seen as reliable if during the execution little to no errors are made. Hereby it is important the repetition of the research will lead to the same results over and over (Doorewaard et al., 2016). The reliability of the research study can be increased by maintaining close contact with an academic/PhD supervisor throughout the research process, including the development of topics and interview questions.

The validity of research in which way the study design, data collection and data analyses lead to correct results. Validity can be obtained internally and externally. Internal validity concerns the extent to which the results are valid within the framework of this study. External validity pertains to the validity in a broader context.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, this research study drew upon existing research literature, which significantly enhances its validity. By utilizing established research methods and building upon a foundation of validated knowledge, the study benefits from the credibility and reliability of previous work. In addition, triangulation was employed as a methodological approach, which involved the meticulous search for literature from various reputable sources. This extensive exploration and inclusion of multiple perspectives not only

strengthens the study's validity but also adds robustness and comprehensiveness to its findings.

Furthermore, to gather data for this research, semi-structured interviews were conducted. The decision to use this approach was driven by the unique nature of the research topic, which necessitated a flexible and adaptable approach to capture the rich and nuanced experiences of the interviewees. By employing semi-structured interviews, the researcher was able to delve deeply into the thoughts, perspectives, and insights of the participants, allowing for a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. This approach also provided an opportunity for unexpected or unexplored aspects to emerge, contributing to the richness and depth of the data.

To ensure accurate interpretation and analysis of the collected data, the researcher employed the listening, summarizing, and probing (LSP) technique. This methodological approach involves actively listening to the participants, summarizing their responses to confirm understanding, and asking follow-up questions to delve deeper into specific areas of interest. The LSP technique not only facilitates a more comprehensive understanding of the data but also ensures that potential biases or misinterpretations are minimized, thereby enhancing the overall reliability and validity of the study's findings.

However, it is important to note that the external validity of this research may be limited. The study's results are tailored to a specific research question and may not be readily generalizable or applicable to similar studies or broader contexts. The unique nature of the Ukraine conflict complicates it.

## Chapter 4: Results

In this chapter, the results of the document study and interviews related to the conceptual framework are presented. The chapter is divided into five subchapters: support, global actors, institutional design, instruments of power, and the conclusion. Each subchapter has its own sub conclusion, which will be used to construct the main conclusion.

### Support

Before the effects on of the Dutch support on the mediating variables can be determined, it is essential to map out what the support provided by the Netherlands entails. The support provided by the Netherlands has been studied using interviews and documents. Based on the interviews and the documents, it can be inferred that the Dutch support consists of three components. The three components are military support, financial support, and humanitarian support. The interviews and documents reveal that the Netherlands is providing indirect support to Ukraine through the imposition of sanctions on Russia<sup>1</sup>.

The military component is supplied in three phases<sup>2</sup>. The first phase was aimed at supplying weapons to stop Russia's initial advance. The second phase was aimed at reversing the large asymmetry in artillery and taking the fight to Russia in the Donbas and southern Ukraine. Phase three is aimed at enabling Ukraine to take the offensive and regain occupied territory. In addition to the material support, the Dutch army is also providing trainings for the Ukrainian army. The military support to Ukraine is seen as a gift to Ukraine, that means that Ukraine does not have to return the weapons and the vehicle that are provided. A full list of the support provided by the Netherlands can be found in Appendix 3.

The Netherlands does not provide financial support to Ukraine as a gift, nor does it give it directly to the Ukrainian Ministry of Finance. Instead, the financial support is channelled through international financial institutions such as the EU, World Bank, and IMF<sup>3,4</sup>. The Netherlands is increasing its budget allocation for these international financial institutions. As a result, Ukraine can approach these institutions and request a loan, which is offered to Ukraine under favourable conditions. Since the Netherlands is a member of these

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<sup>1</sup> Letter to parliament: Beantwoording schriftelijke vragen over de militaire steun aan Oekraïne

<sup>2</sup> The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. (2023, June 7). A Comprehensive Strategy to secure Ukraine's Future | The Alphen Group (TAG) - HCSS. HCSS.

<sup>3</sup> Interview: Policy Officer Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1, Policy Officer Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2 & Policy Officer Ministry of Foreign Affairs 3 10 July 2023

<sup>4</sup> Ministerie van Algemene Zaken. (2023, June 16). Dutch aid for Ukraine: from day to day. War in Ukraine | Government.nl. <https://www.government.nl/topics/russia-and-ukraine/dutch-aid-for-ukraine>

international financial institutions, a portion of these loans is allocated to the Netherlands<sup>5</sup>. Ukraine is restricted in how it can utilize the funds obtained through the loans. The money is subject to specific spending conditions, meaning each loan is designated for a particular sector or purpose. This is done to prevent the Ukraine spending the money on military goods. This information is also supported by an interviewee<sup>5</sup>. A full list of the support provided by the Netherlands can be found in Appendix 3.

Humanitarian support is extended to Ukraine through two main channels. Firstly, a portion of the humanitarian assistance is given as a gift, like the military support. This component primarily comprises medicine and other essential goods<sup>4</sup>. Secondly, humanitarian support is provided to Ukraine through donations made to human rights organizations and initiatives, such as the UN human rights organization OHCHR, the Human Rights Fund, and the Grain from Ukraine initiative<sup>4</sup>. These organizations then allocate the specific humanitarian support that Ukraine needs. A full list of the support provided by the Netherlands can be found in Appendix 3.

## Global actors

The documents used for the research and interviews highlight several significant shifts in global actor relationships following the Ukraine war. Firstly, this subchapter will examine the perspectives of China and Russia. Secondly, there is a discussion of the relationship between the EU and the US. Thirdly, the focus is on the evolving dynamics among the EU member states. Lastly, the implications for the world order are identified and if the changing relationships will contribute to a stable world order.

To fully comprehend the consequences of the support provided by the Netherlands, the Russian perspective on the war must be considered. From the documents and interviews several Russian reasons for going to war become evident. In Russia, there was a growing predisposition towards war since January 2021 (Sherr & Gretskiy, 2023). The global correlation of forces did not represent a direct urgency to Russia beyond its immediate periphery. The perceived weakness by the West, played a significant role in Russia's assessment of risk (Sherr & Gretskiy, 2023). It becomes clear that the West's good intentions had no relevance, and the only question that mattered to Russia was whether the West was prepared to enter serious discussions on Russia's basis or oppose Russia's military technical

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<sup>5</sup> Interview: Esselien van Eerten 2 June 2023

alternative (Sherr & Gretskiy, 2023). For those governing Russia the combination of economic pressure and military weakness is not a deterrent but an inducement to war. Two interviewees offer a different perspective of why Russia went to war comes forward. One interviewee argued that the expansion of NATO is not understood in Russia and therefore can be perceived as a threat<sup>6</sup>. Another interviewee compared to Ukraine war with the Cuba crisis<sup>7</sup>. During the Cuba crisis the US also perceived the instalment of Russian missiles in Cuba as a threat. While Russia is seeing a neighbouring NATO-member states as a treat, in the event of Ukraine becoming part of NATO.

China, alongside Russia, holds a distinct perspective on the Ukraine war and plays a significant role on the geopolitical stage. The perspective of China on the Ukraine war is that it can learn a lot from the reactions around the world (Sacks, 2023). China sees Russia's struggles as a preview of the costs it would bear if it resorted to war against Taiwan. Chinese leaders will examine and learn from Russia's failures and avoid making the same mistakes. In addition, Chinese leaders believe that they are entering a more dangerous era and that the US will not contemplate direct military intervention against a nuclear-armed opponent (Sacks, 2023). These believes are likely to increase defence spending and further investment in its nuclear arsenal (Sacks, 2023). The fact that China is learning from the Ukraine war is also claimed by one the interviewees<sup>5</sup>. Which is illustrated by the following statement:

*“So, if we don't put a stop to the territorial ambitions of the Russian regime at this point, it will have major consequences for other countries with territorial ambitions.” – Esselien van Eerten, 2<sup>nd</sup> of June 2023*

In the last decade, notions of European sovereignty and strategic autonomy have moved to the heart of European debates. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia changed this perspective. The invasion by Russia has renewed the centrality of American power to Europe (Garton et al., 2023). The US-led transatlantic alliance is doing better than expected in its response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine<sup>8</sup>. Of the 38 Ukraine supporting countries the US is the biggest donator (IFW, 2023). The US-led effort in maintaining Ukrainian war effort has created unity across the Atlantic and given new life for Western-led

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<sup>6</sup> Interview: Harry van de Horst 1 June 2023

<sup>7</sup> Interview: René van der Linden 5 July 2023

<sup>8</sup> Ferguson, N. (2023, June 18). America Still Leads the World, But Its Allies Are Uneasy. Bloomberg.com. <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-06-18/us-can-t-depend-on-ukraine-coalition-to-stop-china-niall-ferguson>

institutions such as NATO (Garton et al., 2023). NATO is of basic importance for the provided support to Ukraine<sup>9</sup>. This point of view is also supported by two interviewees. The interviewee claims that there seems to be a growing awareness of the need to strengthen NATO. This can result in the deepening of the relationships within NATO<sup>7,10</sup>. Therefore, the Ukrainian war has consolidated the relationship among the US and the EU member states. One example of the strengthened relationship between the US and the EU member states, given by an interviewee, is that the European countries persuaded the US in giving permission for the delivery of the F-16s and tanks to Ukraine<sup>5</sup>. Even though the relationship between the US and the EU is strengthening there are potential threats to this relationship. This threat is likely to come from within and has to do with the populist tendencies in the US (Krastev & Leonard, 2023)<sup>7</sup>.

*“If the risk of a transatlantic split still exists, it comes from within: a possible victory by Donald Trump in the American presidential election in 2024 could be more threatening to Western unity than anything that Russia has so far been able to muster.” – Garton et al., 2023, p. 15*

Due to the potential threats to the relationship among the US and EU member states it is also important to dive into the relationship among the EU member states. One interviewee claimed that due to the populist tendencies in the US the cooperation among EU member states is enhanced<sup>7</sup>. This is not the only reason why the relationship between the EU member states is enhanced. Other reasons for the enhancement are namely Ukraine’s success on the battlefield and the way the Ukrainian war has united both sides of the political spectrum (Krastev & Leonard, 2023). The provided support by the 38 Ukraine supportive countries is partly responsible for this success. As a results of this enhanced ties between EU member states the EU can position itself better on the geopolitical stage<sup>11</sup>. Which is illustrated as following:

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<sup>9</sup> Letter to parliament: Terug en vooruitblik na een jaar Russische oorlog in Oekraïne

<sup>10</sup> Interview: Kol. Tonny van den Belt 12 June 2023

<sup>11</sup> Taylor, P. (2023, June 15). After the war: how to keep Europe safe - Friends of Europe. Friends of Europe. <https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/after-the-war-how-to-keep-europe-safe/>



*“The war has also hastened the transformation of the European Union from an overwhelmingly civilian economic and regulatory organisation into a geopolitical player” – Taylor, 2023, p. 21*

This is supported by an interviewee<sup>7</sup>. The interviewee claimed that the EU should form a strong European presence within NATO. Another interviewee sees a growing importance of the role of the EU in the world order<sup>10</sup>. Although there is evidence that the EU is increasing its importance on the geopolitical stage some comments are made of the EU position. The Dutch Minister of Defence Hoekstra stated that the EU must strengthen the EU’s political and economic foundations and expand their geopolitical actions<sup>12</sup>. One interviewee also mentioned that the EU is probably not going to be invited when and if it comes to peace talks<sup>6</sup>. As illustrated by the following statement:

*“And then we (EU) can be happy if we can sit down at the table.” – Harry van der Horst, 1<sup>st</sup> of June 2023*

As the relationship within the EU and between the EU and US strengthens due to the Ukraine war, it does not automatically imply that this Western coalition will dominate the new world order. One significant reason for this is the rise of China, which is actively expanding its influence on the geopolitical stage beyond its borders<sup>6,7,8</sup>. Tensions between the US and China have emerged due to China's growing influence, particularly in places like Taiwan<sup>5</sup>. China is also learning from Russia's mistakes in the Ukraine war and striving to reduce its dependence on other countries by shaping its economy accordingly (Sacks, 2023).

This situation raises questions about the EU's role in the conflict. If the US focuses more on its tensions with China, it is likely to divert attention away from the EU, potentially leading to neglect (Garton et al., 2023; Krastev & Leonard, 2023). Consequently, the EU must strengthen its collective defence and security programs. This perspective is shared by multiple interviewees who suggests that the EU should enhance its resilience to defend itself without relying on the US<sup>6,7</sup>. The divided attention of the US is a contributing factor to the Western world not dominating the global order.

Another crucial aspect to consider regarding the influence of the West is the potential lack of understanding from other countries when it comes to extending influence. One

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<sup>12</sup> Speech by Minister Hoekstra at the EU Heads of Mission (HoMs) meeting 17 April 2023

example of this is the misinterpretation of NATO's expansion, as highlighted by one of the interviewees<sup>6</sup>. This lack of understanding can lead to reluctance and tension among outsiders towards NATO and the Western alliances. The expansion of NATO can be perceived as a threat by non-members, further exacerbating tensions.

It can be concluded that Ukraine war has brought significant shifts in global actors' relationships, particularly in the perspective of China and Russia, the relationship between the EU and the US, and the dynamics among EU member states. The invasion of Ukraine by Russia has renewed the centrality of American power to Europe, resulting in strengthened cooperation between the US and EU member states. There are some potential threats to the US-EU relationship driven by populist tendencies within the US and the growing tension between the US and China which is likely to divert the attention from EU.

Within the EU enhanced cooperation among member states has emerged due to Ukraine's success on the battlefield. This has allowed the EU to position itself better on the geopolitical stage and calls for a strong European presence within NATO and a deepening of EU defence and security policy. This Western coalition may not automatically dominate the new world order.

## **Institutional design**

This subchapter aims to examine the institutions that play a role in determining support for Ukraine on the world stage and compare them to existing institutions. It is divided into two parts: the first part discusses the institutions involved in providing military support, while the second part focuses on the institutions involved in financial and humanitarian support.

### *Military support*

The military support provided by the Netherlands and the other 38 countries supporting Ukraine is coordinated through various institutional organizations. The documents and interviews reveal that both existing and new forums are being utilized for this coordination. The weakening of established global governance institutions, such as the UN, World Bank, and IMF, plays a significant role in this shift (Zheng & Lim, 2017). The UN Security Council's inability to prevent the Russian invasion, mainly due to Russia's permanent membership, has rendered the UN relatively powerless and created space for other

international institutions to step in<sup>13</sup>. The war in Ukraine weakens institutions, but it also poses threats to existing security institutions such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE)<sup>14</sup>. Consequently, the OSCE is not able to effectively deal with not only the problems arising from the war in Ukraine but also other with several other threats<sup>14</sup>.

One forum that has emerged as a key player in this regard is NATO, recognized as the primary security organization for Europe. Multiple documents emphasize its security relevance<sup>9,11,15</sup>. The EU and NATO have collaborated in promptly responding to the war in Ukraine, and it is advised that they continue working together to ensure the strategic reordering of the European continent<sup>9</sup>. Two interviewees noted that cooperation among NATO members is deepening because of the war<sup>5,7</sup>. While NATO has always been a significant institutional presence globally, the conflict in Ukraine has revitalized its relevance on the geopolitical stage<sup>10</sup>. One interviewee stated it like this:

*“Yes, I think we, as NATO, are closer than ever because we do see that these kinds of military scenarios are no longer purely theoretical but actually occur in practice.” - Kol. Tonny van den Belt, 12<sup>th</sup> of June 2023*

The EU is also emerging more as a defence organisation<sup>11</sup>. The reason why the EU is emerging more as defence organisation is because of the volatile US domestic politics. In the long run, the US is expected to prioritise other geographic theatres than Europe<sup>16</sup>. Any change in the domestic politics of the US leave the EU defence vulnerable (Krastev & Leonard, 2023). Therefore, the realization has come that European leaders should use this as reason to strengthen their own defence considering these factors. The EU is moving more towards a common security and defence policy (Whitman, 2004). This view is supported by

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<sup>13</sup> Eleven, E. (2023). The United Nations & Ukraine: Explaining the UN's Role in 9 Questions. Better World Campaign. <https://betterworldcampaign.org/peace-and-security-issues/the-united-nations-ukraine-explaining-the-uns-role-in-9-questions>

<sup>14</sup> Wolff, S. (2023, February 24). One year on: Is the war creating an existential crisis inside the OSCE? - The Foreign Policy Centre. The Foreign Policy Centre. <https://fpc.org.uk/one-year-on-is-the-war-creating-an-existential-crisis-inside-the-osce/>

<sup>15</sup> Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken. (2023, April 19). AIV-briefadvies: de Oekraïne-oorlog als geopolitieke tijdschok. Publicatie | Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken. <https://www.adviesraadinternationalevraagstukken.nl/documenten/publicaties/2022/10/20/aiv-briefadvies-de-oekraïne-oorlog-als-geopolitieke-tijdschok>

<sup>16</sup> Boswinkel, L., & Sweijts, T. (2023, February 24). Wars to come, Europeans to act | A multimethod foresight study into Europe's military future - HCSS. HCSS.

Mark Rutte, Dutch Prime minister. He states that the time has passed where Europa could cheaply rely on the defence policies of the US<sup>17</sup>.

The Ukraine war gives way to new institutions, that are being used to coordinate the military support. A new institution that emerged is the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (UDCG) often referred to as the Ramstein format. UDCG is initiated by the US and consists of all the 31 NATO-members and 23 additional states. This is the place where major donors align aid with the need of the Ukrainian army<sup>18</sup>. The role of the UDCG is emphasized by one of the interviewees<sup>5</sup>.

Support to Ukraine is also provided using bilateral and coalition agreements. Bilateral and coalition agreements are necessary to ensure the intimate deliveries of military supplies<sup>19</sup>. These self-formed coalitions trace their roots back to the Ramstein-format<sup>5</sup>. In collaboration with the Nordic countries, the Netherlands has formed coalitions aimed at providing Ukraine with tanks and F-16 fighter jets. According to an interviewee, the Nordic countries share political, decision-making, and military cultures, making it easier to form coalitions with them **Error! Bookmark not defined.**

*“So those are the countries that have a political culture, a decision-making culture and a military culture that is closest to the Netherlands. You can switch quickly with that.” –  
Esselien van Eerten, 2<sup>nd</sup> of June 2023*

In conclusion, the military support provided to Ukraine involves the engagement of both new and existing international organizations. This shift is driven by the weakening of global governance structures, such as the UN, OSCE, and the revitalization of NATO's role as a defence organization due to the war in Ukraine. Additionally, the EU has recognized the need to strengthen its own defence policies, acknowledging the unreliable nature of US domestic politics. As a result, new forums like the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (UDCG) have emerged, alongside the utilization of bilateral and coalition agreements, to facilitate support for Ukraine. These developments reflect a proactive approach in adapting to the changing geopolitical landscape and ensuring effective assistance to Ukraine.

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<sup>17</sup> Rutte, M. (2023, February 20). Met steun aan Oekraïne verdedigen we onze manier van leven. NRC. <https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2023/02/20/met-steun-aan-oekraïne-verdedigen-we-onze-manier-van-leven-a4157623>

<sup>18</sup> Letter to parliament: Aanvullende Nederlandse bijdrage aan Oekraïense luchtverdediging

<sup>19</sup> Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken. (2023, June 6). Interview Bert Koenders over de oorlog in Oekraïne - De Veiligheidsdiplomaat. <https://magazines.rijksoverheid.nl/bz/veiligheidsdiplomaat/2023/03/interview-bert-koenders-over-de-oorlog-in-oekraïne>

### *Financial support*

Although the existing global governance structures, such as the World Bank and IMF, are weakening (Zing & Lim, 2017). They still play an important role in the establishing financial support for Ukraine. A big part of the financial support that the Netherlands is providing to Ukraine goes through international financial institutions<sup>3,4</sup>. The World Bank and IMF are part of these international institutions. The importance of the international financial institutions was emphasized by one of the interviewees<sup>5</sup>. The interviewee explained that a big part of the financial support of the Netherlands runs through these institutions. Through IMF the Dutch government reserved 200 million for loans to Ukraine and for through the World Bank an amount of 100 million. Next to the budgetary reservations, the donations are done to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)<sup>4</sup>.

Another interviewee explained that a big part of the financial support goes through the financial institutions that belong to the EU<sup>5</sup>. This claim is supported by the documents<sup>4</sup>. The documents and the interviewees explained that if the EU goes over budget when donating to Ukraine. The amount that goes over budget is divided among the member states. The Dutch government reserved 200 million for this<sup>3,4</sup>. Since a big part of the financial support runs through the EU, one of the interviewees sees the EU of growing importance in the future<sup>3</sup>.

*“I truly believe that the EU is going to play a central role in the coming years.” - Policy Officer Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2, 10<sup>th</sup> of July 2023*

The economic sanctions against Russia also indicated a strong cooperation on the EU level<sup>9,11</sup>. The effectivity of the sanctions depends on a strong cooperation between the EU-member states otherwise the sanctions have little effect<sup>20</sup>. Cooperation between EU-member states is necessary to relieve the economic distress that is felt in the member states caused by the sanctions. To keep the pressure on the Russian economy, it is essential to maintain the sanctions.

It can be concluded that for the financial support provided by the Netherlands the common institutions such as the World Bank and IMF are of essence. It is also found that the financial institutions that belong to the EU are used. The sanctions against Russia are an example of the cooperation between the EU-member states.

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<sup>20</sup> Schott, J. J. (2023, April 24). Economic sanctions against Russia: How effective? How durable? PIIE. <https://www.piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/economic-sanctions-against-russia-how-effective-how-durable>

## Instruments of power

This subchapter examines the role of power instruments in the Ukraine war. It researches the role of hard and soft power instruments and combination of these forms of power. The subchapter will start with the reasoning behind the provided support by the Netherlands and how the support is shifting the balance between hard and soft power instrument. In addition, the subchapter examines the role of interdependencies among states in the Ukraine war.

From the interviews and documents, it becomes evident that there is a rationale behind the Netherlands' provision of support to Ukraine. The Russian attack on Ukraine is widely regarded as an unlawful act of war<sup>3,5,9</sup>. It is argued that, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, Ukraine possesses the right to defend itself against such aggression<sup>3,10,21</sup>.

Another key aspect of this reasoning is that Ukraine acts as a buffer zone between Russia and Europe<sup>5</sup>. Consequently, offering support is deemed more cost-effective than engaging in a direct war<sup>5</sup>. Furthermore, the Netherlands provides support due to the shared norms and values between Ukraine and themselves<sup>21,22</sup>.

*“We condemn this unprecedented act of aggression against a democratic European country.” - Mark Rutte, 28<sup>th</sup> of February 2023*

The provision of support to Ukraine is shifting the balance between hard and soft power. According to one of the interviewees **Error! Bookmark not defined.**, this shift is due to the Netherlands and the EU increasingly opting for hard power instruments. The interviewee highlighted that while soft power tools such as diplomacy and economic aid have traditionally been favoured, the current situation in Ukraine has prompted a stronger emphasis on hard power measures. This shift signifies a recognition of the need for tangible actions and resources to address the complex challenges faced by Ukraine, including security concerns and the restoration of stability. The interviewee further explained that if the conflict in Ukraine persists, the balance between hard and soft power instruments may eventually shift back<sup>7</sup>. It was emphasized by the interviewee that prolonged conflicts often necessitate a comprehensive approach that combines both hard and soft power elements. While hard power measures may initially dominate due to the urgency of the situation, there remains

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<sup>21</sup> Letter to parliament: Verklaring van minister-president Mark Rutte in de Tweede Kamer over de oorlog in Oekraïne

<sup>22</sup> Letter to parliament: Beantwoording schriftelijke vragen over de militaire steun aan Oekraïne

recognition of the importance of soft power tools, such as diplomacy, dialogue, and development assistance, in achieving a sustainable resolution and long-term stability. The balance between these approaches could potentially be restored as the conflict evolves and diplomatic efforts gain momentum<sup>7</sup>. This view is supported by another interviewee. This interviewee saw a shift to hard power instruments at the beginning of the war, but now slowly sees the use of soft power instruments increasing again<sup>3</sup>.

Both hard power and soft power are being used in the Ukraine war. Hard power instruments will determine the outcome of the war in the short run<sup>23</sup>. This is emphasized by one interviewee who claims the importance of hard power, because it is too late to use diplomatic soft power to end the war in Ukraine<sup>5</sup>. Soft power is being used in persuading countries like the Netherlands to deliver support to Ukraine<sup>23</sup>. Soft power is a form of power that operates more subtle and over a long-time horizon, but it can be less costly than the use of hard power instruments<sup>23</sup>. This is also emphasized by one of the interviewees<sup>7</sup>. This interviewee argued that while the government is now sympathetic with the norms and values of Ukraine, in the long run this can change because of another formation of the government or other matters that require the Dutch government's attention.

The support provided by the Netherlands and the other supportive countries is blurring the lines between hard and soft power<sup>24</sup>. An example of this are the economic sanctions against Russia, in which the Netherlands is participating. While economic sanctions are considered a form of hard power, the corporate pull-out, by well-known brand such as McDonald's and Starbucks, amplified the economic effects of the economic sanctions but also carried out the condemnation and the shaming of the Russian attacks<sup>24</sup>. The combination created a synergy between the hard economic sanctions and the use soft power norms and values. This fusion of hard and soft power elements yielded noteworthy outcomes. While the economic sanctions exerted direct pressure on Russia's economy, the corporate pull-out by globally recognized brands added another layer of influence. It not only intensified the economic repercussions but also delivered a powerful symbolic message. By withdrawing their presence, these brands publicly aligned themselves with the condemnation of the Russian attacks, thereby leveraging their reputation and influence to amplify the international response<sup>24</sup>. This combined strategy showcases how countries like the Netherlands effectively

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<sup>23</sup> Nye, J. S., Jr. (2022, May 5). Soft Power After Ukraine. Project Syndicate. <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/soft-power-after-russia-war-in-ukraine-by-joseph-s-nye-2022-05>

<sup>24</sup> Kavanagh, J. (2022). The Ukraine War Shows How the Nature of Power Is Changing. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/06/16/ukraine-war-shows-how-nature-of-power-is-changing-pub-87339>

combine various tools to exert pressure, both economically and diplomatically, enhancing their overall impact and demonstrating the fluid nature of power dynamics in international relations.

*“First, while sanctions are typically considered a form of hard power, the corporate pullout from Russia amplified both the sanctions’ hard economic effects and the implied condemnation and shaming of Russian actions thanks to the well-publicized exits of brands such as Starbucks and McDonald’s” – Kavanagh, 2022, p. 3*

Concluding, the research indicates that hard power instruments, such as military aid and economic sanctions, play a significant role in determining the short-term outcomes of the war. On the other hand, soft power instruments, including diplomatic talks and the influence of norms and ideas, are crucial for securing support from other countries like the Netherlands. The study reveals the importance of considering the interplay between hard and soft power. Interviewees emphasize that while hard power may be necessary for immediate impact, the long-term influence of soft power should not be underestimated. The fluidity of power dynamics is evident, as the government's sympathies and support can be subject to change depending on various factors.

## Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter has presented the results of a document study and interviews related to the conceptual framework, specifically focusing on support, global actors, institutional design, and instruments of power. The chapter has been divided into four subchapters, each with its own sub conclusions, which will contribute to the main conclusion in the following chapter.

The subchapter on support examined the components of the Dutch support provided to Ukraine, including military, financial, and humanitarian support. The Netherlands has supplied weapons, training, and other resources to Ukraine through different phases of military support. Financial support is channelled through international financial institutions, such as the EU, World Bank, and IMF, with specific spending conditions to prevent misuse. Humanitarian support is extended through gifts and donations to organizations that allocate assistance to Ukraine. This comprehensive support highlights the Netherlands' commitment to Ukraine and its efforts to address the conflict.



The subchapter on global actors explored the perspectives of China and Russia, the relationship between the EU and the US, and the evolving dynamics among EU member states. The Russian perspective on the war reveals a combination of factors, including perceived threats and historical parallels. China sees the Ukraine war as a learning opportunity to avoid similar mistakes in its own conflicts. The relationship between the EU and the US has strengthened in response to the Russian invasion, with NATO playing a crucial role. Enhanced cooperation among EU member states has also emerged, allowing the EU to better position itself on the geopolitical stage. However, potential threats to the US-EU relationship and the rise of China challenge the dominance of the Western coalition in shaping the new world order.

The subchapter on institutional design examined the institutions involved in providing military, financial, and humanitarian support. The shift in global governance structures has led to the utilization of both new and existing forums for coordination. NATO has revitalized its role as a primary security organization in Europe, while the EU is emerging as a defence organization. New institutions, such as the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (UDCG), have also emerged to facilitate military support. Financial support involves the use of international financial institutions, EU institutions, and economic sanctions against Russia. The coordination among these institutions highlights the proactive approach in adapting to the changing geopolitical landscape and ensuring effective assistance to Ukraine.

The subchapter on instruments of power analysed the role of hard and soft power in the Ukraine war. The provision of support by the Netherlands is driven by a rationale based on Ukraine's right to self-defence, shared norms and values, and the strategic importance of Ukraine as a buffer zone. The balance between hard and soft power instruments has shifted in response to the war, with a stronger emphasis on hard power measures. However, the importance of soft power tools, such as diplomacy and development assistance, remains recognized for achieving long-term stability. The combination of hard and soft power elements, as seen in economic sanctions and corporate pull-outs, showcases the fluidity of power dynamics and the effectiveness of synergistic approaches.

### *Combining sub conclusions*

Combining these sub conclusions, it is possible to find support for the grand international relations theories that are introduced earlier and to answer the research question. The use of international financial institutions and the coordination of support through forums like NATO and the EU align with liberal notions of collective action and international

relations. This emphasizes the importance of multilateral consultation in addressing the Ukraine war and providing support to Ukraine. The use of international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and IMF, underscores the value of collective action and cooperation among nations. By channelling financial support through these institutions, the Netherlands ensures that the aid provided is aligned with international norms and standards, promoting transparency and accountability. Adding to this, the coordination of support through forums like NATO and the EU demonstrates the significance of multilateral consultation in addressing complex security challenges. These efforts align with liberal notions of collective action in international relations, highlighting the effectiveness of collaboration and the recognition that shared challenges require a collective response. The involvement of multiple actors in decision-making and resource allocation enhances the legitimacy and effectiveness of the support provided, ultimately contributing to a more comprehensive and sustainable approach to resolving the Ukraine conflict.

Additionally, the emphasis on the shared norms and values between the Netherlands and Ukraine suggest a liberal understanding of international relations, where the support provided by the Netherlands is based on principle of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The support provided by the Netherlands can be explained as instruments to maintain balance of power in the current world and protect the interest of the Netherland in Ukraine. This is a realistic perspective on the support provided by the Netherlands. The discussion surrounding the tensions resulting from NATO's expansion and the rise of China on the geopolitical stage reflects the constructivist perspective. This perspective focuses on the construction and contestation of identities, interests, and power dynamics.

The support provided by the Netherlands raises questions about its implications for the world order, considering the significant shifts that have occurred due to the Ukraine war. While the support is indicative of the renewed relationship between the US and the EU, as well as among EU member states, several factors make it difficult to predict the establishment of a new world order. Populistic tendencies in the US and tensions with China contribute to this uncertainty, as they challenge the dominance of the Western coalition. Additionally, the rise of China and its expanding influence on the geopolitical stage further complicate the situation. The development of the EU as a key actor on the geopolitical stage is another factor that plays a role in shaping the evolving world order.

### *Answer research question*

To answer the research question: *How can the support provided by the Netherlands to Ukraine be explained from a system of (new) world order?* The answer to this question is that the support provided by the Netherlands to Ukraine overall can be explained from a liberal international relation perspective. The support provided by the Netherlands can partly be explained from small elements of realism and constructivism. It is important to note the three perspectives are not mutually exclusive and the study incorporates elements from all three approaches.

The Second answer that can be given to the research question is how the support provided by the Netherlands is influencing the world order. First, it is possible to see shifts in the importance of global actors. The US has traditionally been the world's leading power. However, the war in Ukraine has shown that the US is no longer the only superpower in the world. China has emerged as a major challenger to the US and Russia has shown by invading Ukraine that it is still a powerful force on the world stage. China has been rising in importance in the world order for many years. The war in Ukraine has accelerated this trend, as China has been seen as an alternative to the US. China did not take sides in the war, but it has provided economic and military assistance to Russia. This has led to concerns that China is seeking to undermine the US and the Western-led world order.

Another upcoming global actor is the EU. The Netherlands is contributing to the rising position of the EU, by providing support through various institutions that are part of the EU. In addition, the Netherlands is providing military support bilaterally, in cooperation with other EU member states, and through international institutions such as the NATO. The Dutch support for the Ukraine is an important part of the Dutch foreign policy. The Netherlands is committed to liberal values and to strengthening the EU's role in the world. The support provided by the Netherlands is having a significant impact on the future of the EU in the establishing world order.

Shifts in the usage of international institutions are visible. The most obvious shift is the re-emergence of NATO. The Ukraine war has shown that Russian military scenarios are no longer purely theoretical but occur in practice. The support provided by the Netherlands has also given an increase to the realisation that the EU should invest more in its own security and defence programs. The realisation has come that the EU should start taking care of its own defence and not rely on the US for protection. New institutions are also appearing because of the support provided by the Netherlands. Examples of these new institutions are the UDCG and bilateral coalition for the provision of military support. The financial support

that the Netherlands is providing highlights the importance of financial institutions and EU institutions. The growing importance of the EU institutions is contributing to the rising position of the EU as a geopolitical actor and the promotion of liberal norms and values.

The third way in which the world order is being influenced by the support provided by the Netherlands is through the shift in the use of power instruments. In the institutions mentioned above, the focus has shifted towards the use of hard power instruments, such as military support for Ukraine and economic sanctions against Russia. These hard power instruments are mostly useful in creating short-term stability. The Netherlands and other supporting countries are using these instruments to deter Russia from continuing its attack. However, the importance of soft power instruments, such as diplomacy and development assistance, remains recognized as the instruments for achieving long-term stability. These soft power instruments can help to build trust and cooperation between countries, which can help to prevent conflict in the long run.

## *Chapter 5: Discussion and reflection*

In this chapter, we will delve into a more detailed discussion of the results and the answer to the research question presented in the conclusion. We will begin by examining the results, and then move on to discussing the limitations of the study. Following the limitation of the study, recommendations for future research will be made.

### *Discussion of the results*

The presented answer to the research question, which suggests that the support provided by the Netherlands to Ukraine can be best explained by liberalism, aligns with the expectations set in one of the working hypotheses in the theoretical framework. Additional context reveals that this conclusion stems from the understanding that the Netherlands is a relatively small state in the global arena. As such, it recognizes the need to actively engage in multilateral organizations and initiatives to establish fulfil its national interests within the broader world order. This rationale finds resonance with the theoretical framework that outlines the characteristics of liberalism.

According to the theoretical framework, liberalism emphasizes the importance of international cooperation, collective decision-making, and the pursuit of common interests. These traits align with the Dutch foreign policy approach in the Ukraine war. It aligns with these traits because the Netherlands is providing the support to Ukraine through various international institutions and partnerships with other countries. as it actively participates in multilateral forums such as the United Nations, European Union, and various international treaties. By doing so, the Netherlands seeks to shape global governance, advocate for liberal values such as human rights and democracy, and ensure its voice is heard on the international stage.

While the theoretical framework also encompasses characteristics associated with realism and constructivism, the results of the study indicate that the evidence supporting these perspectives is not as compelling as that supporting the liberalistic characteristics. These perspectives are not as compelling because the Netherlands is a relatively small country on the geopolitical stage. Therefore, it does not have the power to pursue national self-interest without cooperation with other countries and organisations. In the light of constructivism, it is hard for a country as small as the Netherlands to shape the geopolitical norms, ideas, and identities. While realism and constructivism may be present to some extent,

the study finds the evidence for liberalism more persuasive in explaining the Dutch support provided to Ukraine.

Another focus point of discussion is the long-term unpredictable outcome of the Netherlands' support in contributing to a stable world order. This uncertainty arises from the fact that the Netherlands is not the sole country providing military, financial, and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. A coalition of Western nations supports Ukraine, but this coalition faces various threats that hinder its dominance in the world order. The first threat originates from external sources, particularly China's emergence as a significant geopolitical player aligning with Russia in the Ukraine conflict. This opposing actor poses an unpredictable challenge to the Western coalition, and the extent of its impact remains uncertain.

There is an internal threat to the coalition resulting from populist tendencies within the United States. As mentioned earlier, a change in the US domestic politics could influence the coalition. Since the United States is the primary contributor of assistance, its withdrawal would create a void within the coalition. Currently, it is impossible to determine whether such a re-election will occur and the subsequent impact it would have on the Western coalition. Populist governments being elected in other countries also affect the coalition but to a lesser degree.

In the short term it is easier to predict that the world order is not stabilizing because of the supported provided by the Netherlands. At the moment of writing there is no prospect on peace talks or negotiations. The weapon deliveries to Ukraine keep on going and are intensifying. The supportive countries are sending heavier weapons and it is unlikely that this scares Russia. Therefore, the prediction is that the war will keep on going for some time and the world order will not stabilize in the short run.

Based on the conclusion and the long and short-term views, it is possible to form a future perspective on the world order. The US, China, and the EU will continue to be the most important players on the geopolitical stage. The US will likely remain the leading military power, but it will have to share economic and political leadership with China. China will keep on growing economically and militarily, becoming more influential in global affairs. The role of the EU depends on its assertiveness and unity. If the EU could become more assertive and united, as is happening because of the Ukraine war, it could play a more active role in global affairs. However, if the EU becomes more divided and inward-looking, it could lose influence on the geopolitical stage.

The future of the geopolitical stage will be characterized by increasing competition between the US and China. These two countries have different perspectives on the future of the world, and they are likely to clash on topics such as trade, technology, and security. The EU will need to find a way to navigate this competition. It is crucial that the EU maintains good relations with both countries, but it should not lose sight of its own interests.

## Limitations

It is important to note that there are multiple limitations to this study. The first limitation of the study has to do with the scope of the study. Due to the focus on detailed exploration this study may have a narrower scope compared to quantitative studies. This makes the study hard to generalize to other Dutch foreign policies. The result of this study applies only to the context of the Netherlands providing support to Ukraine and not to other aspects of the Dutch foreign policy.

Next, a limitation arises from the inherent subjectivity and potential researcher bias in this qualitative study. The interpretation and subjective understanding of the data heavily depend on the researcher. Their bias, perspectives, and prior assumptions may have influenced data collection, analysis, and interpretation. The same applies to the conducted interviews. Also, not all the interviews are done in the same way. Some interviews were conducted live while other interviews were done through MS Teams. During one interview multiple interviewees took part in one interview which changed the way the interview was done. During this interview not all the interviewees had the same amount of speaking time, and it is possible that their answers were influenced by the presence of the other interviewees. This has had an impact on the results because it is not comparable to the other interviews that are done. To limit the researcher bias triangulation and transparent documentation is applied.

Another limitation to mention is the limited control over the research context. This qualitative study was conducted within a real-world setting, where researchers have limited control over the research context. It is worth noting that during the study, the ongoing war in Ukraine and the increasing Dutch support to Ukraine might have impacted the research process and influenced the results. It has impacted the results research process and the results because at one point the decision had to be made with information is going to be included in the thesis and which information is going to be left out.

## Study recommendations

Based on the limitations discussed in the previous section, we can propose several recommendations for future studies. Firstly, it is recommended to conduct a comparative study that compares the Ukraine war with other territorial conflicts. By examining multiple cases, we can potentially identify patterns, variations, and factors that contribute to different outcomes. This approach will provide a broader understanding of territorial conflicts.

Additionally, further research should be conducted on different forms of support. This research could involve analysing the outcomes and long-term effects of each type of assistance, to gain a comprehensive understanding of their effectiveness. Furthermore, it is advisable to evaluate the role of international institutions through additional research. This exploration can delve into the functioning and effectiveness of these institutions in addressing conflicts and promoting collective action. It may involve examining their role in resolving tensions, strengthening defence policies, and facilitating cooperation among member states.

Lastly, there is a need for further research on the interplay between hard and soft power instruments. Future studies should aim to gain a deeper understanding of how the combination of these instruments shapes outcomes and influences international relations. By investigating this dynamic, we can enhance our comprehension of how different approaches impact conflicts and diplomatic efforts.

## Policy recommendations

Based on the findings of this study, there are policy recommendations to consider. The first recommendation is for the Dutch government to strengthen its defence policies and institutions. The conflict in Ukraine serves as a clear signal that the Netherlands should prioritize reinvesting in its defence capabilities. Relying solely on the security provided by the United States is no longer sufficient. Consequently, it is crucial for the Netherlands to allocate more resources towards defence spending and actively pursue alliances within Europe. Likewise, the EU should recognize the urgency of the situation and work towards closer collaboration on defence policies for similar reasons.

The Dutch government needs to be vigilant regarding the tensions resulting from global power shifts. It is essential to acknowledge the challenges posed by NATO expansion and China's rise on the geopolitical stage. Learning from the unexpected Russian invasion of Ukraine, it is crucial to closely monitor these developments to avoid being caught off guard again. Specifically, the growing tension between China and Taiwan should be closely



observed, as it shares similarities with the situation in Ukraine. To promote understanding and peaceful coexistence, the Dutch government should actively engage in diplomatic dialogues, negotiation processes, and diplomatic channels. By doing so, they can contribute to maintaining stability and fostering productive relationships amidst evolving global dynamics.

Building on this, it is imperative for the Dutch government to strike a balance between employing hard and soft power instruments. Maintaining a well-rounded approach in international relations is crucial. This entails using economic sanctions as a means of exerting pressure, when necessary, while also actively engaging in diplomatic talks and leveraging soft power instruments to foster cooperation and persuasion. Seeking synergies between hard and soft power is key, as it enables a more efficient and effective approach to achieving desired outcomes. By combining the strengths of both approaches, the Dutch government can maximize its impact and influence in the global arena.

Lastly, it is essential for the Netherlands to continue promoting democratic values and human rights. Considering the shared values between the Netherlands and Ukraine, the Dutch government should persist in championing these principles. One effective way to promote these values is through international organizations such as NATO and the EU. By doing so, the Netherlands can contribute to strengthening international cooperation and collective action among states, fostering a united front in upholding democratic values and human rights globally.

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## Appendix

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## Appendix 2: Interview questions

### 1. Support

- What motivated the Dutch government to provide support to Ukraine?
- What were the main challenges the Dutch government faced in providing support to Ukraine?
- What are the potential risks associated with providing support to Ukraine?
- What does the support to Ukraine include?
- Can the economic sanctions against Russia be seen as a way of supporting Ukraine?

### 2. Global Actors

- How do you see the Dutch decision to provide aid to Ukraine potentially impacting the larger system of international relations and global power dynamics?
- How do you think the Dutch decision to provide support to Ukraine fits into its broader foreign policy goals and priorities?
- Which key actors are part of an evolving system of world order, and to what extent is their position strengthened/changed/threatened because of the support from the Netherlands in the conflict?
- Does the support provided by the Netherlands contribute to any (existing) system of world order, and why?" or "Based on what grounds do you believe that the support from the Netherlands contributes to any system of world order?

### 3. Governance Systems

- What role do you think the Dutch membership in international organisations (such as NATO or the EU) plays in its decision to provide aid to Ukraine?
- Which forum or forums are most suitable for consultation on support for Ukraine in the short term (during the war) and the long-term effects (after the war)?
- Through which channel(s) is the current discussion taking place regarding the support to be provided by the Netherlands, and to what extent can this be seen as a structural forum for discussion even after the conflict?



#### 4. Instruments of Power

- What is the significance of Dutch support for the influence derived from military relations compared to economic, energy, or other relations that lead to interdependencies on a global scale?
- Does the military support provided also form part of a broader range of support measures, and how do they relate to each other?

#### 5. World peace and Stability

- According to you, what are stabilizing factors in a system of world order?
- When do you consider the world to be stable?

### Appendix 3: List of support provided by the Netherlands to Ukraine

Name programme	Amount (€)	Explanation
Military support		
Total of military support (bilateral)	1900 million	The assistance includes weapons, ammunition, vehicles (both land and water), demining equipment, bridges, fuel, medical supplies, and rations.
Other Dutch contributions	200 million	One part of the funding, €100 million, is allocated to the International Fund for Ukraine (IFU). This fund is used to purchase goods for Ukraine directly from the industry. The other €100 million is directed towards the NATO Ukraine Comprehensive Assistance Package (UCAP), which covers non-lethal support provided by NATO. This support includes items such as fuel, medical supplies, winter equipment, and drone jammers.
National (NL) contributions		

<p>Contribution International Financial Institutions</p>	<p>300 million</p>	<p>In March 2022, the Netherlands contributed to financial assistance to Ukraine through the World Bank with a guarantee of EUR 100 million. Out of this amount, EUR 79.75 million was provided as budget support, while the remaining EUR 20.25 million was allocated for project financing.</p> <p>Additionally, the Netherlands announced a loan of EUR 200 million to Ukraine through the IMF in Lugano, pending parliamentary approval.</p>
<p>Humanitarian aid</p>	<p>40 million</p>	<p>The Netherlands provides contributions to humanitarian organizations specifically for the situation in and around Ukraine, as well as the delivery of goods during the acute crisis phase. Additionally, the Netherlands provides annual unearmarked contributions to humanitarian organizations, enabling them to respond directly to acute crisis situations, such as in Ukraine. The Netherlands allocates contributions to various organizations</p>

		including the World Food Programme, UNICEF, and the UN Refugee Agency.
Other non-military aid	15 million	This support includes, among others, the provision of ambulances, field hospitals, medical supplies, cultural aid goods, and financial contributions to investigations by the International Criminal Court and the UN Human Rights Office (OHCHR).
Mitigating the impact of the war in Ukraine on global food security	57 million	Through additional unearmarked contributions to the UN Central Emergency Response Fund, the World Food Programme, and the Crisis Response Initiative of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the funds can be utilized for global food crises.
<b>Support to Ukraine from the EU budget</b>		
Macro-financial assistance	1200 million	Through Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA), the EU contributes to reducing Ukraine's financing gap by providing loans.
Additional macro-financial assistance	1000 million	Additional MFA support aims to assist Ukraine in maintaining essential services. A

		<p>specific proposal was published on Friday, July 1, and is still pending decision-making by the Council and the European Parliament. The loan will be guaranteed by the MFA Guarantee Fund, which is part of the EU budget.</p>
Upcoming additional macro-financial assistance	8000 million (max)	<p>In the European Council conclusions of May 30 and 31 2022, the Commission was requested to publish a concrete proposal. Member states are expected to be asked to support this assistance with bilateral guarantees.</p>
Instrument for Neighbourhood, Development, and International Cooperation	1000 million	<p>Through the Neighbourhood, Development, and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), financial support is provided to Ukraine, contributing to state-building efforts. This includes budget support of 120 million euros, supplemented by a recently approved 500 million euros for internally displaced persons and food security in Ukraine. Additionally, the European</p>

		Commission developed an Emergency Support Program worth 330 million euros, focusing on access to basic services.
Programme for Humanitarian Aid	335 million	The European Commission provides humanitarian aid to Ukraine through UN agencies, the Red Cross movement, and NGOs. A total of 335 million euros in humanitarian assistance has been allocated specifically for Ukraine.
Union Civil Protection Mechanism	400 million	More than 40,000 tons of aid goods have been delivered to Ukraine through the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM). Additionally, the rescEU mechanism has provided 14 million euros worth of medical supplies to Ukraine. The EU is also working on establishing logistical hubs in Ukraine's neighbouring EU countries.