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Role Change after Brexit? A Comparative Case Study of the United Kingdom in the 2014 and 2022 Ukraine Crises

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**Universiteit
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European Politics and Society

MA Thesis

Role Change after Brexit?: A Comparative Case Study of the United Kingdom in the 2014 and 2022 Ukraine Crises

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Introduction

Since British former Prime Minister David Cameron promised to throw a referendum on Britain's EU membership in January 2013, how the United Kingdom (UK) would position itself in the UK-European Union (EU) relations and in world politics has been debated among scholars of International Relations (IR) and commentators. The surprising outcome of Brexit referendum on 23 June 2016 marked an unprecedented event when the country voted to leave the EU by 51.9% to 48.1%. Despite a narrow victory of the Leave side, the result was perceived as the climax of right-wing populist trend (Koller, Kopf, and Miglbauer 2019). After months of negotiations and a couple of changes in leadership, the UK finally concluded a Withdrawal Agreement with the EU on 17 October 2019, followed by a EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement signed on 30 December 2020.

Despite the conclusion of bilateral agreements, the two parties did not put forward any future arrangement concerning the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) or the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Such developments seem to suggest a 'hard-Brexit' on the UK-EU foreign policy and defence cooperation. Following this logic, Lehne (2021) put forward three potential changes in the dynamic of the EU foreign policy-making. Firstly, France and Germany may take a bigger role in the shaping of the CFSP. Moreover, the big 3—Germany, France, and the UK, the most powerful member states in the EU—may work together in European defence in the format of E3. Secondly, with the UK's departure from the EU, along with its reservations and concerns, the EU security policy may finally move forwards. Thirdly, the EU's global influence may be reduced due to the UK's exit. Noteworthy, the EU may lose a good negotiator, since the UK has been able to help France and Germany to reach a common ground, and acted as a bridge to the Nordic and Central and Eastern European member states.

The fruitless result of the UK-EU cooperation in external actions is perhaps unsurprising as aspirations towards an independent international role for the UK had been part of the pro-Brexit narrative for a number of years. It is summed up in the notion of 'Global Britain,' which was first mentioned by Boris Johnson as Foreign Secretary in late 2016, and was laid out most recently in greater detail in the policy paper *Global Britain in a Competitive Age the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development*

and Foreign Policy, which lays out his government's vision for the UK in 2030. 'Global Britain' entails the UK's global leadership with a liberal institutionalist aspect of international order: partnership with the United States (US), collective security through NATO, and multilateralism. With British military strength and transatlantic strategic partnership, the UK's geopolitical interests will be shifted to the Indo-Pacific region by 2030.

This vision also intentionally downplays the UK's relationship with the EU (Shapiro and Witney 2021). Although foreign policy was not the main concern of the Leave campaigners, Boris Johnson has his own agenda to hammer the weakness of EU foreign policy decision-making (Brattberg 2020, 3). By distancing the UK from the EU, the UK could 'take back control from Brussels' and become a great power again. In other words, from the UK's perspective, without the UK's support, 'the EU's strategic autonomy will remain at the "soft power" end of the military spectrum' (Smith and Mills 2021, 6).

Despite the rhetoric of the great UK power, however, there are many reasons to doubt that Brexit would lead to great changes in the UK's foreign policy. First of all, in spite of the aim to speak with one voice, foreign policy in the EU is not harmonised and operates in an intergovernmental framework. Secondly, considering the key features of pragmatism and continuity in the UK's foreign policy, British elites perceived the EU as one of the international fora to promote and achieve its foreign policy objectives (Lehne 2021; Wright 2018, 38). Put differently, the UK remains embedded in international networks of cooperation. Thirdly, socialization within the EU and strategic considerations exert a powerful path dependence on state practices, especially below the most visible political level, i.e. within military and public administration.

Therefore, the thesis, through the lens of role theory, aims to examine firstly, how the UK perceived itself and interacted with other actors in the international system, and secondly, whether or not—if so, how—EU membership as a factor influenced the UK's role conceptions. With the empirical evidence of the UK's discourse and enactments, the thesis examines the UK's role conceptions in the context of the 2014 and 2022 Ukraine Crises.

Literature Review

Role theory

Role theory was first introduced by Holsti (1970) to foreign policy analysis as a social constructivist approach to examining the interactions between agents and the structure. According to Holsti, to begin with, *national roles* are the ‘patterns or typical decisions (245)’ from alters’ perspectives. In addition, *national role conceptions* are ‘the “image” of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or, in the external environment (246)’ and national role performance, namely decisions and actions, are shaped by the national role conceptions of highest-level policymakers, a nation’s status as well as role prescriptions of the other (alter). It is worth mentioning, in Holsti’s thesis, emphasis was laid on the relationship between national role performance and role conceptions, and *role prescription*, or expectations from the alter or the external environment, serves as a parameter for policymakers to reflect on the nation’s position in the international system. In the context of the Cold War, Holsti presented a typology of 17 national role conceptions, such as regional leader, regional protector and mediator, and argued that the structure of the international system could be predicted by ‘detailed knowledge of the number, types and the distribution of national role conceptions among the policymakers of that system (236).’

Instead of equating role with role performance, Aggestam (2018) focused on the nature of agency by adopting a sociological understanding of roles. She held that role expectation, role conceptions, as well as role performance, are three different fashions to define role. In other words, for Aggestam, the role is not composed of role expectation, role performance and role conceptions; it functions as a cognitive image – role ‘simplifies, provides guidance and predisposes an actor towards one intentional behaviour rather than towards another (page).’ Role can also be further divided into a meta role and context-specific roles (Bengtsson & Elgström 2011). Similar to Holsti’s connotation of role, a meta role is a ‘generalised role’ and its behaviour follows a pattern of consistency across policy areas and time. However, context-specific roles refer to the ‘expectations of behaviour that are particular to a certain policy area or geographical region (Bengtsson & Elgström 2011, 113).’

To study the links between national role conceptions and role enactment, Breuning (2012) proposed a cognitive model of the agent-structure relationship and

elaborated the sources of national role conceptions at domestic and international levels. More precisely, national role conceptions originate in decision-makers' self-understanding of the state's identity and cultural heritage, and their relative material capacity to other actors in the international system. By accommodating the ideational and material aspects of the international structure, national role conceptions would account for the actor's foreign policy behaviour. Building on Breuning's national role conception framework, Akbaba and Özdamar (2019) incorporated faith-based ideational factors into the study of national role conceptions and studied the role of religion in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

As suggested by Brexit, European integration was perceived by the public as an elite-led project and the outcome of the direct democracy exemplified vertical contestation (Hooghe and Marks 2009; Schimmelfennig 2018). Intending to challenge the unitary actor assumption in role theory analysis, Cantir and Kaarbo (2016) further explored the concept of domestic role contestations, and categorised them into vertical contestation (elites vs the public) and horizontal contestation (elites vs elites).

Gibbens' (2022) analysis of the British parliamentary debates on the Notification of Withdrawal Bill provided empirical evidence of the divide between the Leave and Remain sides in the House of Commons. More precisely, horizontal role contestations were based on the UK's identity in international politics (globalist vs isolationist), the understanding of democracy (citizen-led vs parliamentary democracy), and the benefits of EU membership (norm-based advantages for the UK vs Eurosceptic themes of 'EU as hegemon'). To compare Gibbens' findings with the 'Global Britain' role projected by the Boris government, it conforms with Johnson's Leave position by taking roles such as "UK as global trading state," "citizen-led democracy" and "the EU as hegemon." Having included more actors in the discussion of domestic contestations, Beasley, Kaarbo, and Oppermann (2021) operationalised the concept of sovereignty norms to examine the role-seeking process of the legitimate foreign policy actors in the UK. As Beasley and his colleagues pointed out, the issue of who had the sovereign control for enacting role change was intensified at two levels of the UK's political system: UK parliament vs UK government, and the devolved powers in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

Brexit and role change?

Through the perspective of role theory, whether the UK's exit from the EU would affect its roles and foreign policy can be approached with the academic debates on role change and the relationship between role and identity. In line with the connotation of role-sets, scholarship agrees that a state could occupy more than one role (Aggestam 2006; Cantir and Kaarbo 2016; Harnish 2016; Holsti 1970; Nabers 2016) and thus role conflict may arise, for example, when the ego's expectations deviate from the alters' expectations. In his research of role change, Nabers (2016) firstly clarified the ambiguity between role and identity, whose relationship has been perceived by some scholars as either 'interchangeable' or 'intertwined. Emphasising the importance of discourse to constitute and transport the meanings of both identities and roles, Nabers put forwards that 'identity means the incorporation of the meanings and expectations associated with a role into the self (83)' On the one hand, the behaviour of actors is chosen with consideration of role expectations, which could reinforce their identities. On the other hand, identities also influence role performance by attaching meaning to roles. Therefore, 'the relationship between roles and identities [is] a two-way process that reflects the reciprocity of agent and structure (83).' With a process- and meaning-based account of role and identity, Nabers argued that when an actor's behaviour does not correspond to identity, it can lead to role change.

Aggestam (2018) further approached the concept of collective identities by conceptualising a membership in a political community as a collective national identity which is articulated and institutionalised in the political culture. In other words, from perspectives of institution, interaction and intention, 'role conceptions are broad categories that allow a certain flexibility of interpretation, depending on the extent to which they have become formally institutionalised with a specific guide to action (90).' In the context of CFSP and the Europeanisation of foreign policy, by analysing the political discourse in Britain, France and Germany, Aggestam intended to examine whether their national identities converged with the European identity by discussing three roles in their national role conceptions: leader, partner and independent. These roles respectively stand for the policy-makers' perception of political influence, their commitments to the EU security community, and their primacy of national interests. Due to the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP, Aggestam argued that despite intensive interactions between actors and structure, the three largest EU member states

(at the time of her analysis) demonstrated ‘the uneven processes of socialisation and collective identity formation (97).’ Moreover, the Europeanised foreign policy was an additional instrument for them to achieve their foreign policy goals.

Aggestam’s operation of collective identities, however, raises the question of the construction process of the collective identity. As put forward, collective identity is not coherent as it is based on each member state’s national role conceptions, then how does the international socialisation take effect on the member in the organisational arrangement? Eder (2009) challenged the sociological approach to European identity and argued that “the political community as a legal space with rights and duties does not provoke identification, which means that they lack meaning beyond national culture” (433). According to Eder, instead of identification with political or cultural symbols, the foundation of forming an European identity lies in the storytelling of shared memory, which tends to trigger strong response of feelings. In other words, collective identities, as a space of communication, are constructed by narratives.

Therefore, the thesis bridges the role theory with the theory of identity politics, notably the study of European identity, by examining the international organisation with the concept of narrative identity. Through discourse analysis, the subjective dimension of a membership in an international organisation can be better understood.

Research Design and Method

The aim of the thesis is to examine the role of the UK in the international system and whether or not such role conceptions changed in regard to the EU membership. The thesis is structured around a comparative case study of the UK government's response to the 2014 and 2022 Ukraine crises. Precisely speaking, Ukraine Crisis is a series of turbulent events with its root in political cleavage between pro-EU and pro-Russia supporters in Ukraine with regard to then-President Viktor Yanukovich's refusal to sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, a bilateral agreement to deepen economic and political cooperation without the prospect of a EU membership, on 21 November 2013. Ensuing from widespread protests and the violence at Kyiv's Independence Square Euromaidan, the events developed to Russia's annexation of Crimea, armed conflicts in the Donbas region as well as the self-claim of independence in Donetsk and Luhansk by pro-Russia separatists in early 2014. In this thesis, the notion of the 2014 Ukraine Crisis refers to the political events between 21 November 2013 to the signing of the second Minsk Protocol on 12 February 2015.

In consequence of the failure to implement the Minsk Agreement, the 2022 Ukraine Crisis, in this thesis, started with the report of Russia's military presence near the Ukrainian borders on 13 November 2021. As speculated by the US and UK intelligence agencies, Russian President Putin announced 'a special military operation' in Ukraine on 24 February 2022, which marked the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In the time of writing, the conflict is not yet over. However, for the purpose of the thesis, the time frame of the 2022 Ukraine Crisis ends with the resignation of British Prime Minister Boris Johnson on 7 July 2022. Therefore, during the Ukraine crisis in the scope of the thesis, there was no change in the head of the UK government, and the key figures in British foreign policymaking, as identified in Table 1, are all members of the Conservative party.

There are a handful of solid reasons for choosing Ukraine Crises as a comparative case study to understand whether or not Brexit changed the UK's foreign policy roles. First of all, generally speaking, the overall position of the Ukrainian government on the EU and the UK remained constant. Indeed, the 2014 Ukraine Crisis had its genesis in President Yanukovich's pro-Russia stance; however, ahead of his impeach, he fled the country in February 2014. The succeeding interim government and President

Poroshenko, during the 2014 Ukraine Crisis, and later President Zelenskyy, during the 2022 Ukraine Crisis, were in favour of deepening its relationship with the EU. Secondly, as mentioned above, the development of the 2022 Ukraine crisis is essentially a continuation of the 2014 Ukraine crisis which were initiated by Russian President Vladimir Putin with his aggression against Ukraine. Thirdly, despite the difference in their intensity, there was a global dimension of the crisis management where the international community spared no efforts in seeking peaceful solutions through multilateral diplomacy, such as the United Nations (UN), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Group of Seven (G7), the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Analytical framework

The overarching analytical framework in the thesis is based on Aggestam's role analysis framework (2007). By interpreting roles as a cognitive image, the concept of role is explored by three approaches, namely institution, interaction and intention. How an actor perceives its positioning in the international society is based on three elements: identity, institutional role expectations, and international role expectations. First, identity is derived from its political culture and internalised international socialisation. For the purpose of the thesis, identity is operationalised as British foreign policymakers' reference to its cultural heritage and role identifications with values. As the second element, institutional role expectations refer to narrative-constructed collective identity with its reference to norms, rights and duties in the political community. Lastly, international role expectations originate in the expectations from the alter. These three components account for how the actor sees its positioning in the structure and thus shape the ego of the actor, or role conception. In the process of role-playing, interactions with other actors in the system and the decisions and actions taken by the actor, or role performance, reinforce both the institutional role expectations and international role expectations.

Methodology

In accordance with the temporal divisions of the 2014 and 2022 Ukraine crises discussed above, each chapter is composed of a comparative study with the first chapter centring around the UK government's framing of the crisis and then the formation of Britain's role through their understanding of the crises, followed by the discussion of

role enactments in the second chapter. The methodology in this thesis follows qualitative analysis consisting of frame analysis and discourse analysis methods. Generally speaking, in role theory, the process of communication between agents could reduce uncertainty in the system. However, as a means of power politics, information exchange also entails the relationship of conflict or cooperation between signal sender and receiver (Walker 2013).

With the keyword ‘Ukraine,’ the primary materials in this thesis are collected from the ‘news and communications’ section published by GOV.UK during two periods: between November 2013 and 12 February 2015 and between 13 November 2021 and 7 July 2022. The official documents include press releases, joint statements, speeches, authored articles as well as oral and written statements to parliament. Considering the abundance of official governmental communications, the thesis focuses on that of British foreign policymakers who held the post of Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary, Defence Secretary, and Minister of State for Europe (before Brexit) within the time frame of the research. However, it is worth mentioning that due to the abundance of the available data in the 2022 Ukraine Crisis (857 results), the collection of data are filtered with selected person (see **Appendix 1**). In total 853 documents are reviewed, of which 489 documents concern the 2014 Ukraine Crisis and 364 are related to the current one.

Table 1. Key British Foreign Policymakers during the Ukraine Crises

	2014 Ukraine Crisis	2022 Ukraine Crisis
Time frame	21 November 2013 – 12 February 2015	13 November 2021 - 7 July 2022
Prime Minister	David Cameron (May 2010 - July 2018, <i>Conservative</i>)	Boris Johnson (July 2019 - present, <i>Conservative</i>)
Foreign Secretary	William Hague (May 2010 – July 2014, <i>Conservative</i>) Philip Hammond (July 2014 – July 2016, <i>Conservative</i>)	Lis Truss (September 2021 – present, <i>Conservative</i>)
Defence Secretary	Philip Hammond (October 2011 – July 2014, <i>Conservative</i>) Michael Fallon (July 2014 – November 2017, <i>Conservative</i>)	Ben Wallace (July 2019 – present, <i>Conservative</i>)
Minister of the State for Europe	David Lidington (May 2010 – July 2016, <i>Conservative</i>)	

Through the lens of power relations in discourse, in the first part of the analysis, discourse analysis is conducted to examine official documents with comprehensive messages, which are addressed to a specific target audience. On the other hand, press releases are not included due to the shortened and extracted nature. Similarly, joint statements as a final product of compromised interests among engaging actors do not reflect the national interest and foreign policy objective of a particular nation. Therefore, the analysis of speeches, authored articles, as well as oral and written statements to parliament, is to identify, first of all, how the crisis is framed; secondly, key themes and narratives that the government is employing about UK's role in the crisis, and last but not least, role expectations from the institutional setting and from the alter. By exploring how British foreign policymakers frame the crisis and present its positioning in international society for a specific target audience, it is interesting to examine whether or not – if so, how – the government changed its communicative strategy to deliver its foreign policy roles in light of Brexit where Euroscepticism prevailed in domestic politics (Aktipis and Oliver 2011).

In terms of the operation of discourse analysis, there are 12 oral/written statement to parliament, 4 authored articles, 22 speeches published during the 2014 Ukraine Crisis, and 13 oral statements to parliament, 11 authored articles and 36 speeches in the context of 2016 Ukraine Crisis. Codes are assigned to text manually on the qualitative data analysis software MAXQDA and the Code System is available in **Appendix 2**.

In the second part of the analysis, all the official documents are used as empirical evidence of British foreign policy behaviours throughout the course of crisis development. By analysing the UK's role-playing and role performance, it examines the UK government's international interactions with other agents within various political communities by means of diplomacy and actual actions that the UK government was engaged, in bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral formats. In other words, the analysis of the UK's role enactments helps clarify how the UK operated diplomacy in international society with the nature of intergovernmentalism, and what function, interests and meanings each international organisation transported from the UK's point of view. The results of the analysis would suggest the UK's relationship with international actors and the functions and meanings that the UK holds for each international organisation.

The UK's role conceptions in the 2014 and 2022 Ukraine crises

The framing of the Ukraine Crisis

To gain a more comprehensive idea of how the UK positioned itself in the times of upheaval, it is critical to understand how the UK government understood, interpreted and communicated the turbulent events with its nation and with other international actors. By mapping out key themes that the UK frequently associated the developing crisis with, it underlines the main areas where the UK's interests laid in a particular period of time.

2014 Ukraine Crisis

To begin with, the framing of the 2014 Ukraine Crisis comprises three critical events: violence against peaceful protestors at the Maiden Square, Russia's military incursion to Ukraine, and Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea. Following the Ukrainian President Yanukovich's announcement to suspend the trade and association talks with the EU and develop closer economic ties with Russia in November 2014, Ukrainian protestors took to the streets. However, in between December 2014 and February 2015, some peaceful demonstrations turned violent and 'more than 80 people were killed and 600 injured during the worst bloodshed in Ukraine since the fall of communism' (Hague 2014a). During a visit to Estonia on 29 April 2014, Minister for Europe David Lidington referred to this event as "Spirit of Maidan," which 'has reminded us is that in the EU, we should never underestimate how attractive the vitality of our democracy is. It is a key European value. We need, at every opportunity, to demonstrate our commitment to democracy, the rule of law and freedom' (Lidington 2014b).

Despite the strong opposition from the international community and economic sanctions from the EU and the US, Russian President Putin signed the law to formalise annexation of Crimea on 21 March 2014 as a result of the Crimea referendum. In Ukraine's eastern areas Donetsk and Luhansk, Ukraine's territorial integrity was once again challenged by a "self-rule" referendum announced by pro-Russia separatists on 12 May 2014. In addition to the internal armed conflicts with the separatists, the Ukraine government was also faced with the threats from Russian troops massed near its borders. The escalation of the conflict reached the apex with the downing of a

Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 with the passing of 298 victims, which, according to 15-month investigations, was shot down by a Soviet-designed Buk surface-to-air missile system. To bring military confrontation in the Donbas region to an end, the Ukrainian government and Russia-backed rebels reached the first Minsk Agreement on 5 September 2014 mediated by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Francois Holland in the so-called Normandy Format.

By framing the worsening situations in Ukraine as the ‘the most serious crisis in Europe since the end of the Cold War’ and an attack on the European values, the Cameron government linked the 2014 Ukraine Crisis to ‘the need for action to preserve and strengthen our values of safety, security and prosperity’ (Lidington 2014b). Against the backdrop of the rising Eurosceptism in domestic politics, the Cameron government advocated the reformation of the EU. At a European Council meeting, David Cameron firmly stated: ‘[w]hen I say Europe needs reform and the UK’s place in Europe needs reform, I mean it. And I argued hard for reform today’ (Cameron 2014c).

While advocating for the EU reform for a continued UK’s EU membership, Lidington also differed the viewpoint that it is a “British problem” when it comes the British voters’ trust issue with in Brussels. He mentioned that ‘And I agree that making British voters comfortable with the EU should also be a priority for the new Commission. I also agree very much with what President Barroso said last week about the interests of both the UK and the EU being in continued UK membership in a reformed EU. But as I hope I have outlined, this problem is not unique to the UK’ (Lidington 2014c). By putting forward the idea that a reformed EU serves the interest of the UK and other European countries, Cameron pointed out the necessity to cut red tape, to attract investment, and to stimulate innovation so that a more competitive, flexible and democratically accountable EU can be formed. In light of the 2014 Ukraine Crisis and Russia’s manipulation of energy supply for strategic purpose, Cameron also reiterated his geopolitical concerns, notably the issue of European dependence on Russia’s oil and gas, and urged the European Commission to review the EU’s energy policy and enhance its energy security.

According to Lindington, the challenge lay ahead of Europe was ‘a Russian crisis, of which Ukraine is the most acute manifestation’ and that the tragedy in Ukraine was ‘a deliberate, calculated policy of the Kremlin’ (Lidington 2014a). Moreover, in an

authored article, Cameron pointed out the consequences of inaction: ‘if we allow such fundamental breaches of international law to go unchecked, we will all suffer from the instability that would follow. Our strong and united response has sent an unmistakable message that the international community will not stand by as Russia attempts to destabilise Ukraine’ (Cameron and Obama 2015). However, by analysing British foreign policymakers’ reference to the 2014 Ukraine crisis, it was framed as ‘the mistakes of the past’ (Truss 2022e).

2022 Ukraine Crisis

Despite the poor implementation of the second Minsk Agreement which was signed on 12 February 2015 in the Normandy format, the conflicts in the Donbas region have been de-escalated to a great extent. However, on 22 February 2022, with the Russian President Putin’s recognition of the ‘independent’ people’s republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, the agreement was unilaterally scrapped. Two days later, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine commenced with Putin’s announcement of a “special military operation” on state television to ‘demilitarise and denazify’ Ukraine. Reacting to Putin’s claim that Russian military build-up on Ukrainian borders was a response to NATO aggression, the Boris government reiterated the nature of NATO as a peaceful and defensive alliance and differed from Putin’s imputation of NATO’s attempts to encircle Russia. Moreover, British foreign policymakers were quite cautious about NATO’s Open Door Policy: On the one hand, the UK welcomed Finland and Sweden’s aspirational membership, and on the other hand, it tended to reassure Russia with the unlikely event of Ukraine’s accession to NATO in the near future.

In its rhetoric strategy, the Boris government emphasised the fragility of peace and ‘historic duty’ to correct the mistake in the past to legitimise its help to Ukraine. The notion of ‘fragile peace’ was brought up by Boris Johnson on Victory in Europe Day to praise the heroism of the Russian people 77 years ago and then stressed that Putin’s campaign could put an end to the peace and stability. Additionally, the lack of actions against Russia during the 2014 Ukraine crisis was framed by British politicians as mistakes of the past, which accounted for a historic duty for the UK and for the West to ‘meet aggression with action and with strength’ (Truss 2022j). In other words, Russian aggression cannot be appeased.

Framing Russian aggression against Ukraine with normative accounts prevailed in the Boris government's statements and speeches. On the passing of a resolution at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) with an overwhelming support by 141 countries who called for Russia to immediately cease its military operation in Ukraine, Boris commented: "[R]arely has the contrast between right and wrong been so stark. 141 countries voted to condemn Putin's war (Prime Minister's Office 2022a)." Moreover, addressing the Ukraine Parliament on 3 May 2022, Boris Johnson bluntly stated:

"There are many reasons your country has evoked such astonishing sympathy in the British people. It is a conflict that has no moral ambiguities or no grey areas. This is about the right of Ukrainians to protect themselves against Putin's violent and murderous aggression. It is about Ukraine's right to independence and national self-determination, against Putin's deranged imperialist revanchism. It is about Ukrainian democracy against Putin's tyranny. It is about freedom versus oppression. It is about right versus wrong. It is about good versus evil. And that is why Ukraine must win."

(Johnson 2022e)

On her visit to Washington DC, Liz Truss mentioned that "the invasion of Ukraine is a paradigm shift on the scale of 9/11. And how we respond today will set the pattern for this new era (Truss 2022d)." Interestingly speaking, a similar tactic to incorporate moralist terms in discursive strategy was employed by the former president of the US George W. Bush in response to the 911 terrorist attack. Framing 911 as an attack on freedom and democracy, Bush waged a war against terrorism with the moral justification of a struggle of good versus evil. According to McCartney (2004), the universalism and exceptionalism embedded in the US's foreign policy were built on American traditional national identity: the civil religion of Christianity and the cultural heritage of the Enlightenment. In the case of the UK, however, apart from the emphasis on the UK's leadership role, there is a multilateral dimension of the normative values that the UK firmly stands on. Instead of the UK's unilateral efforts, these universal values, such as sovereignty, democracy, and rule of law, could only be upheld with unity among nations.

Similarly, for the Boris government, the UK has the responsibility for confronting the authoritarian regimes in the ideological battle. There are two themes that are frequently mentioned: Putin's ruthless ambition and China's assertiveness. Similar to the notion of 'historic duty,' the reference to the 2014 Ukraine crisis laid the discursive foundation of Putin as a greedy aggressor who does not stop with the invasion of Ukraine and thus the UK and the free world must be united. As put by Truss, 'Putin must lose in Ukraine. And we will do anything we can to ensure that' (Truss 2022g); '[w]e need to ensure that any future talks don't end up selling Ukraine out or repeating the mistakes of the past. We remember the uneasy settlement in 2014, which failed to give Ukraine lasting security. Putin just came back for more' (Truss 2022e).

The UK's perception of China as potential challenger to international system is also revealed in British foreign policymakers, as Defence Secretary Ben Wallace states: 'Russia is not our only problem. An assertive China ready to challenge the rules-based system and democracy' (Wallace 2022b). Arguably, two critical events led to such role image of China as an assertive actor: the meeting with Putin at Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics and abstention at the UNSC. On February 4 2022, at the invitation of the Chinese President Xi Jinping Putin met his Chinese counterpart and attended the opening ceremony of the Winter Olympics, when the UK, along with the US, Canada, India, Australia, Lithuania, Kosovo, Belgium, Denmark and Estonia declared a diplomatic boycott out of their grave concerns of human rights abuses. Russia and China later issued a joint statement to criticise the NATO enlargement and the military expansion of the US in Indo-Pacific through the trilateral partnership AUKUS among the US, the UK and Australia (Dou 2022). Moreover, China's unwillingness to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine was on the spotlight for its abstention at the UNSC, which provoked the speculations over China's potential move to overtake Taiwan. Such view was also shared by the British foreign policymakers that the security issue of Taiwan was addressed to NATO and during a visit to Prague by Liz Truss. Last but not least, the UK also pointed out the damaging effects of China's economic coercive policies, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, on rules-based international order, which led to the G7's Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) initiative to finance infrastructure projects in the developing countries.

In the context of the 2022 Ukraine crisis, the UK government not only reaffirmed its interests in the regional security of Indo-Pacific, but also showed its engagement

with countries in the Commonwealth and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) to tackle the global impacts of the Russia-Ukraine conflicts. As a consequence of Russia's blockade of Ukraine's Black Sea Ports, the export of Ukrainian grains and agricultural products were restricted, which put global food supply under pressure with rising prices. Recognising that some Commonwealth countries were severely affected by the shortage of grain, the UK invested over £370 million in global food security to deal with Russia's 'weaponising global hunger' (Truss 2022k). With regard to energy security, from the outset of the Ukraine Crisis, it was crystal clear to the UK government to reduce dependence of Europe on Russian oil and gas. Along with the US's oil and gas embargo, the UK announced on 8 March 2022 to phase out Russian oil imports by 2023 'to starve Putin's war machine' (FCDO 2022; HM Government 2022). On top of that, the UK reached out to MENA countries such as Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Iraq with the aim to diversify its oil import, and, in the meanwhile, collaborating with European partners on the development of renewable energy.

In sum, the UK government's framing of the 2014 Ukraine Crisis focuses on the triggers of shared values and collective memory of the past to call for actions. In spite of the urgency to react and potential consequences of inactions, the discourse implies the restricted role of the UK in the crisis where emphasis was laid on united actions with the EU and G7. On the other hand, Russia's aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 had more profound implications for global security, notably in terms of regional stability, food and energy security. Having learnt from the past that Putin's aggression does not end with the invasion of Ukraine, the UK government adopted moralist terms in discourse with a clear divide between the right and wrong, democracy and autocracy. With the unity of the international community, the UK further called out China who was not willing to denounce Russia's breach of international law. However, what shares in common in the 2014 and 2022 Ukraine Crisis is the UK government's emphasis on European values that the world ought to defend—freedom and democracy.

Institutional role expectations

To understand how an organisation shapes its member state's role expectations and provides guidance to its foreign policy behaviour, we can firstly look at the difference in the concepts of role and identity. In the scholarship of role theory, role and identity are interconnected, where the former could be understood as "what we should do," and

the latter as “who we are,” which provides the role-beholder with more specific prescriptions of actions (Cantir & Kaarbo, 2016). For Nabers (2016), the formation of identity is based on roles and, the other way around, identity provides the meanings of the role-taking. However, collective identity should be understood as narrative identity as it is not identification with political and culture symbols but storytelling of shared memory that constructs the sense of belonging in a political community, a legal space with rights and duties (Eder 2009).

This section is devoted to understanding the institutional expectations for the UK’s roles in the Ukraine Crisis. Considering the significance for the Ukraine situations, the discussion is focused on two international organisations: the EU and NATO. With the help of discourse analysis on the official documents, the UK’s self-perceived role expectations in each organisation will be identified. Even though the UK frequently states its pride in the identity as a permanent member of the UNSC, this analysis does not cover how the UK perceives the UN, considering Russia’s veto power and thus the marginalised role of the UN in solving the Ukraine crisis. Bearing in mind the lack of the actual actions derived from the UN resolutions, in spite of the rich resources of speeches made by the Permanent Representative of the UK to the UN, it may be considered lip service at the UN.

EU

The 2014 Ukraine Crisis took place in the context of an EU with a potential Brexit scenario, as the British Prime Minister promised to throw a referendum on the UK’s EU membership if the Conservative Party wins the General Election in May 2015. From the perspective of electoral politics, David Cameron put forwards his vision for a reformed EU in which the UK has a place and British voters could see a EU with global competitiveness, flexibility and democratic accountability, namely a positive perception of Brussels. On top of the priority to reform the EU, the selection process of the European Commission president also triggered a fierce debate on how the UK perceived the EU with its reluctance of yielding more power to the supranational organisation. Upon the European Parliament election in 2014, David Cameron openly criticised the new *Spitzenkandidaten* (lead candidates) process and contended that, instead of European Parliament, it should be the European Council, the elected heads of government, to appoint the President of European Commission. In the similar vein

when the UK asserted its national sovereignty, Cameron opposed to the idea that the EU takes a lead in the policy area of defence, as indicated by his following statement:

“[P]rotecting our national security is a first priority for all of us as national leaders, and for the UK (let me be clear) NATO has been and will remain the bedrock of our national defence. Of course it is right for European nation states to cooperate on defence issues and, let us also be clear, the UK is always in the vanguard when European allies ask for our practical help. [...] Now the European Commission’s proposal on defence, published in July, explicitly suggested EU kit. [...] It was important for national leaders to be clear on this issue. Co-operation between nation states, yes. EU assets and EU headquarters, no.”

(Cameron 2013)

This statement further confirms the argument that the UK foreign policymakers instrumentalise the EU as an additional international forum to exert its influence and achieve its foreign policy objectives (Lehne 2021; Wright 2018, 38).

When it comes to the UK’s response to the Ukraine Crisis in the context of the EU, the Cameron government cooperated closely with other EU leaders and spoke with one voice on their Russia policy. The statement below, extracted from David Cameron’s speech at the European Council, showed the UK’s understanding of the issue and its general position:

This matters to people in Britain because we depend on a world where countries obey the rules. It matters because this is happening in our own neighbourhood - on the European continent where in the last 70 years we have worked so hard to keep the peace. And it matters because we know from our history that turning a blind eye when nations are trampled over and their independence trashed stores up far greater problems in the long run. So we must stand up to aggression, uphold international law and support people who want a free, European future. [...] We are facing the most serious crisis in Europe this century. Getting agreement from the elected leaders of 28 European nations is never easy. Britain has played an important part bringing countries together, setting out new measures that

need to be taken and insisting on clear values: standing up to aggression and backing the rule of law.


(Cameron 2014a)

Against such backdrop, Minister for Europe David Lidington proposed four key elements for the EU's collective actions: advancing diplomatic efforts with Russia and Ukraine, keeping up multilateral pressure on Russia, supporting the Ukrainian government, and, lastly, countering disinformation (Lidington 2014a). That being said, the UK showed its political will to de-escalate the conflicts hand in hand with the US, European partners and G7 with a variety of diplomatic tools. Within the EU, although the UK was probably the most vocal member state about launching tougher measurements on Russia, Prime Minister David Cameron admitted the difficulty to reach an agreement with leaders of the 28 European nations, and the divergent positions towards Russia among the EU member states were concluded as follows:

For too long there has been a reluctance on the part of too many European countries to face up to the implications of what is happening in eastern Ukraine. Sitting around the European Council table on Wednesday evening I saw that reluctance at work again. Some countries, with Britain at the forefront, have consistently pushed for action that reflects the magnitude of the long-term threat. They tend to be the countries with the closest physical proximity to Russia and the most direct experience of what is at stake. Their own independence and nationhood have come at a high price. They never forget it. But others seem more anxious to make this a problem to be managed and contained, not a challenge to be met and mastered.

(Cameron 2014e)

Diagram 1. British foreign policymakers' reference to the EU in the context of the 2022 Ukraine Crisis



During the 2022 Ukraine Crisis, the term European Union, or EU, was mentioned by the British foreign policymakers 43 times on their oral statement to parliament, speeches and authored articles. Among these reference, more than 60% of the mentions concern the UK's working with the EU, NATO and/or G7 to reach decisive decisions and exert pressure on Russia, including the coordination of stricter sanction measures, cooperation on the rebuilding of Ukraine, and provision of financial support, lethal and non-lethal aid, as well as humanitarian assistance. Ranked 2nd, institution as a group is more straightforward with the direct reference to the EU as an institution. In the third group of the perception of the EU, it indicates the UK's recognition of the EU as like-minded partner, and also sets out its expectations for the EU's role as a more pragmatic and outward-looking global player. The fourth group post-Brexit indicates the post-Brexit arrangements between the EU and the UK, namely the signing of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and, interestingly, the perceived 'constraints of the EU membership' and the 'advantages of Brexit,' which are basically two sides of the same coin. Speaking of the advantages of Brexit, Foreign Secretary Liz Truss stated: "After almost fifty years in the EU, once again all the levers of international policy are in our hands – diplomacy, development, trade and security," (Truss 2021) with the implication of a 'regained sovereignty.' Similarly, while addressing the issue of domestic living costs crisis where the price of oil and gas rose due to the Ukraine crisis and the related sanctions, Prime Minister Boris Johnson used this opportunity to criticise the EU's 'one-size-fit-all diktat' with the following statement:

“That is why we are now taking advantage of Brexit freedoms and accelerating reform of Solvency 2 – a one-size-fits-all EU diktat which has been unnecessarily preventing insurance and pension funds and others from making giant investments in UK firms and in infrastructure.”

(Johnson 2022f)

In sum, the UK as a EU member state was expected to seek for united decisions with other 27 leaders in spite of divergent positions and interests in various matters. By arranging a meeting ahead of formal meetings, British high ranking politicians were able to exchange their positions and collectively shape the agenda-setting with their European counterparts. To speak with one voice the EU was able to launch more effective measurements on Russia. However, the collective actions may be compromised in the track of negotiations. During the 2022 Ukraine Crisis, as suggested by the analysis of meaning attached to reference of the EU, British foreign policymakers put emphasis on the collective works with other international actors through multilateral settings, including the EU, to respond to Russian’s aggression with united decisions. In the meantime, they also used this chance to promote the benefits of Brexit by regaining sovereignty over external actions.

NATO

The UK’s role at NATO did not vary much during the 2014 and 2022 Ukraine Crisis, as ‘NATO has been and will remain the bedrock of our national defence’ (Cameron 2013) and even with the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, Boris Johnson reaffirmed that ‘the resolve of the United Kingdom to defend our NATO allies is absolute and immovable’ (Johnson 2022b). Perceiving its leading role in NATO, the UK responded to the looming military threats near NATO’s eastern flanks by building up its military presence in Estonia, Poland and Eastern Mediterranean.

Moreover, the membership at NATO constitutes a significant part not only in the UK’s foreign policy but also in its identity. As put forward by British foreign policymakers, the UK is proud to be the founding member and the largest European defence spender at ‘the world’s most successful military alliance’ (Hammond 2014).

Following Russia’s annexation of Ukraine in 2014, defence budget became the centre of discussion for the UK politicians at international occasions. In an authored

article with the US president Barack Obama, David Cameron wrote:

“Britain and America are two of only four NATO members to meet the target of spending 2% of our GDP on defence and other states must urgently step up their efforts to meet this too. [...] A network that Britain and America will continue to lead not just because it is morally right to do so, but fundamentally because it is only by supporting peace, democracy and human rights around the globe that we will keep British and American families safe today”

(Cameron and Obama 2014).

Although the UK politicians urged for an increase in defence investment by meeting the 2% target of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) after the 2014 Ukraine Crisis, it was only after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 that some NATO member states finally decided to increase their defence budgets, such as Germany, Italy, Sweden and Poland. Russian aggression in Ukraine also led to the bolster of NATO's eastern flanks where the UK doubled the deployment of troops in Estonia and Poland. However, to prepare for hybrid warfare and conflicts in new domains, the UK called for NATO member states to increase their military expenditure in order to modernise NATO, as suggested by Liz Truss:

“We must strengthen NATO's own defence by reinforcing our presence in the East and ensuring that we have the agility to strike aggressors where they are least expecting it. We must also adapt for the future by raising our collective spending and investing in modern capabilities to face the threats of tomorrow, whether they be on NATO's frontiers or in space and cyber.”

(Truss 2022f)

At the time of 2022 Ukraine Crisis, the UK's attitudes towards Russia and China became tougher as the crisis evolved. On the one hand, the UK intended to invalidate Russia's false premise of 'NATO aggression,' namely the expansion of NATO to its neighbouring countries such as Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, and contended that NATO is a defensive alliance and peaceful solutions through diplomacy were always available. On the other hand, the UK started to raise the issue of China's assertiveness and its potential challenge to the international system of democracy and rule-of-law. In

the meanwhile, the UK's foreign policy interest seemed to go beyond Indo-Pacific as it outlined in the 'Global Britain' policy strategy. That being said, along with NATO and the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), the UK stressed the importance of the 5 Eyes and the AUKUS partnership that it has with the US and Australia. Moreover, the UK proposed NATO with a global outlook. In her speech at the Lord Mayor's 2022 Easter Banquet, Foreign Secretary Liz Truss stated:

"We also reject the false choice between Euro-Atlantic security and Indo-Pacific security. In the modern world we need both. We need a global NATO. By that I don't mean extending the membership to those from other regions. I mean that NATO must have a global outlook, ready to tackle global threats. We need to pre-empt threats in the Indo-Pacific, working with our allies like Japan and Australia to ensure the Pacific is protected. And we must ensure that democracies like Taiwan are able to defend themselves."

(Truss 2022h)

In general, NATO is fundamental to the UK's foreign policy where the UK took on a leading role cooperating with its European partners and reassuring them the UK's commitment to European security. In the meanwhile, to maintain a more sustainable and balanced cooperation in the field of security and defence, the UK also pushed for higher commitment from other participating countries, since the US contributed to 70% of the total defence spending. Indeed, abiding by the principle of collective security and its self-established leadership, the UK's immediate response and military support are expected by other member states. However, with the expansion of the NATO membership since 1999, the UK also reckoned the need to sharpen the decision-making process and for a faster response in face of any threat against any NATO member, which explained the establishment of the JEF, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

International role expectations

International role expectations can be understood as the role prescriptions of the alter, namely how the other international actors' expectations for its foreign policy behaviour is perceived by a state (Holsti 1970; Aggestam 2018). In the context of Ukrainian crisis, several *significant others* can be identified in the process of communication who have an important influence on the role beholder's behaviour.

Thus, in this section we will explore how the UK perceived its relationships with the US and Ukraine. It is worth mentioning the reason that Russia is not included in the discussion: despite some exchange of information between the UK and Russia through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy at the outset of the crisis, the UK expressed its concerns of the credibility of communication. Despite the West's relentless calls for solving the conflicts with peaceful solutions over the course of the Ukraine crisis, the escalation of conflicts simply suggested Russia's reluctance to resort to diplomacy. Considering the difficulty to pinpoint the UK's role prescriptions from the Russian point of view, it will be omitted in the analysis.

the US

In the eyes of the UK government, NATO situates in the centre of the UK-US special relationship, which the UK takes pride in. On a televised interview, when the former BBC political editor Andrew Marr talked about NATO and the situations in Ukraine in 2014, Defence Secretary Philip Hammond remarked, 'Britain is the most obvious and most credible ally for the United States' (Ministry of Defence 2014). This view is also shared in an article co-authored with Obama, where Cameron pinpointed the UK-US relationship as follows: 'our special relationship as allies and partners has been the firm foundation of our shared security and prosperity' (Cameron and Obama 2015).

With regard to the Ukraine Crisis and its impacts on global security, it is argued that the US's expectations for how the UK should react to the crisis are embedded in the institutional setting of NATO, mostly concerning the unmet target of military expense from other European members. Thus, considering the importance of NATO in the UK-US special relationship and the fact that the UK was the largest donator in Europe, the UK then took on the role to encourage European partners to increase their investment in defence and modernise NATO. As discussed above, this point of view prevailed in the discourse of British foreign policymakers throughout the 2014 and 2022 Ukraine crisis. On the other hand, when it comes to the UK's actions in NATO operations, such as the supply of aircrafts and military personnel, the UK acted as an fully independent and sovereign and led military, humanitarian and financial support to the affected countries. Put differently, according to British government, the US leadership in NATO is mostly described in the context of military spending.

Ukraine

The UK's bilateral relations to Ukraine evolved in accordance with the Ukrainian leadership and the context of crisis development. Prior to the EaP Summit in Vilnius, Minister for Europe expressed his concerns for Ukraine's lag in reform progress and thus reserved the signing of the EU-Ukraine AA. With the interim government succeeding Yanukovych and President Poroshenko coming into office, the UK government was able to assist the Ukrainian government with reformation: working with the G7 to channel financial support to Ukraine via International Monetary Fund (IMF), sending financial experts and humanitarian aid. One example of interactions between the UK and Ukraine is shown in the following statement by David Cameron, which demonstrates the two-way process of interactions with the receipt and the delivery of a request from another international actor: 'At the request of the Ukrainian Prime Minister, we therefore agreed to bring forward the signing of the political part of the EU's association agreement with Ukraine, and we agreed to help Ukraine tackle corruption' (Cameron 2014b). In a more recent event, at the Ukraine Recovery Conference, which took place in Lugano, Switzerland on 4 July 2022, Foreign Secretary Liz Truss showcased the UK's leadership by mentioning the official endorsement of the Ukrainian President: 'We have led on support for Ukraine during the war and will continue to lead in supporting the Ukrainian government's Reconstruction and Development Plan. [...] The UK will be championing the recovery of the Kyiv region, in response to President Zelenskyy's specific request from our Prime Minister for UK leadership' (Truss 2022l).

The UK's unwavering support of Ukraine has been vocally expressed by the Boris government and remained robust and solid over the course of time. In light of Russia's military build-up at borders in January 2022, Defence Secretary Ben Wallace firstly stated in the House of Common: "The UK's position on Ukraine is also clear. We unequivocally support its sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, including Crimea. Ukraine is an independent, sovereign country of proud, independent Ukrainian people (Wallace 2022a). On February 24 2022, the day when the Russian troops marched towards Ukraine, Prime Minister Boris Johnson addressed to the Parliament and said:

"Shortly after 4am this morning, I spoke to President Zelenskyy of Ukraine

as the first missiles struck his beautiful and innocent country and its brave people, and I assured him of the unwavering support of the United Kingdom. [...] I am proud that Britain did everything within our power to help Ukraine prepare for this onslaught, and we will do our utmost to offer more help as our brave friends defend their homeland.”

(Johnson 2022c)

Since the Russian aggression against Ukraine, Boris Johnson has been in a close contact with Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy: 25 phone calls and two visits were made. 'We must do more for Ukraine,' said Johnson on 6 March 2022 (Johnson 2022d). A month later, Johnson, as the first G7 leader visiting Kyiv, showed his support to Ukraine with actions, on top of the military and economic assistance. For the UK, Ukraine is regarded a strategic ally and, most importantly, a friend. 'We in the UK will be guided by you and we are proud to be your friends' (Johnson 2022e).

There are three dimensions to examine the UK's responsibility for supporting Ukraine: historic ties, morality, as well as freedom and democracy. First of all, the historic aspect of the UK-Ukraine relationship is exemplified by Truss' statement: '30 years ago, Britain was one of the first countries to recognise Ukraine's independence. Today our commitment to Ukraine is unwavering. We stand with our friend against hostile actors' (Truss 2022a). A similar emphasis on historic ties is also mentioned by Truss, '[w]e feel a particular responsibility, as the UK is a signatory to the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which provided Ukraine with security guarantees' (Truss 2022c). Unfortunately, with Russia's annexation of Crimea, Russia already damaged the credibility of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, as the Memorandum was struck to uphold Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity in exchange of the return of nuclear weapons to Russia.

Secondly, morality has underlaid the tradition of British foreign policy towards Eastern European countries and the UK's interest in integrating countries from the Soviet bloc with the West (Lippert et al. 2001). However, what is more profound in the context of Ukraine Crises was the moral duty for the UK government to correct the mistakes in 2014, when the West failed to stand up against Russia in the event of Crimea annexation. Johnson shared his regret and determination to avoid such mistakes with the Ukrainian parliamentarians on 3 May 2022:

'And we who are your friends must be humble about what happened in in 2014, because Ukraine was invaded before for the first time, when Crimea was taken from Ukraine and the war in the Donbas began. The truth is that we were too slow to grasp what was really happening and we collectively failed to impose the sanctions then that we should have put on Vladimir Putin. We cannot make the same mistake again.' (Johnson 2022e)

Last but not least, the fight for freedom and democracy, as discussed above, is a key theme that the UK government commonly used to frame both the 2014 and 2022 Ukraine Crisis. In a broader context, it is not only the UK, but Europe, the West and the free world who have the responsibility to uphold democracy and freedom because 'we cannot afford to take our freedom, security and prosperity for granted. They are things we must work to strengthen, and to protect' (Lidington 2014b). The recent tragic events in Ukraine confirmed Lidington's point of view. In addition to the Boris government's praise for the heroism of the Ukrainian government and people to confront Putin's authoritarian regime and barbarism, it showed once again the need for actions and the unwavering support from the UK, as stated by Liz Truss:

"The United Kingdom is resolute in its support of Ukraine's territorial integrity and we will remain at Ukraine's side as it emerges as a strong and thriving democracy. President Zelenskyy you have demonstrated that Ukraine is a bastion of freedom and democracy, and it's our duty as your friends and allies, as the free world, to do whatever it takes to support you."

(Truss 2022l)

Interestingly speaking, by comparing the discourse of British foreign policymakers, it seems that during the 2014 Ukraine Crisis, the UK only stressed its leading role in NATO, along with the US, whereas in the 2022 Ukraine Crisis, leadership, or a leading role. To emphasis its leadership role in the 2022 Ukraine Crisis, the UK government reiterated its efforts in assisting the Ukrainian government, and the following is a summary of the achievements: the UK was the first European country to assist Poland by agreeing to send a small team of personnel to provide engineering support to ease pressure at the border, to put sanctions on the Lukashenko regime, on Belarus, to supply lethal military aid to Ukraine and we are a top humanitarian donor. In the press releases published to communicate the latest situations in Ukraine, the UK

government described the details of the foreign aid and quantified each package given to receiving countries in terms of the types of aid (e.g. humanitarian, military personnel, financial support), the items, the values of each package and overall packages that the UK has contributed.

Overall, the UK government has been a firm supporter to the Ukrainian governments since the outset of the Ukrainian Crisis. Due to the variance in the intensity of conflicts, the comparison between the British governments' response to the Ukrainian counterparts does not provide more insightful understanding. However, what stands out from the analysis is the close relationship between Johnson and Zelenskyy, and the Boris government's rapid response to Ukrainian's requests. In the phone call on July 7 2022 after Johnson resigned from the post of Prime Minister, he reiterated 'the UK's unwavering cross-party support for President Zelenskyy's people, and said the UK would continue to supply vital defensive aid for as long as needed' (Prime Minister's Office 2022).

UK's self-perceptions

To begin with, role conceptions are the subjective dimension of foreign policy and function as 'road maps' to navigate policymakers in the international system, through which the cultural norms and values are translated into their expected role enactments (Aggestam 2018). The values that the UK upholds—freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, transparency, tolerance, free trade, and open societies—are fundamental to the UK's foreign policy and collective identities.

Through the analysis of the UK's official documents in the selected periods, the UK government showed its firm stance on positioning the UK as a global player dissenting from an inward-looking role. As summarised in the following statement, Cameron refuted the argument that an isolated UK would bring peace to the country:

“There are those who believe we would be safer if we fundamentally retreated from the world. They see new warships and military investment and imagine a government bent on foreign adventurism. But the plain fact is that in the 21st century, you cannot defend the realm from the white cliffs of Dover. [...] Having a modern, technological, advanced and flexible armed forces to protect and advance these interests is not national vanity –

it is national necessity. Our national interest is served by Britain playing a role in the world.”

(Cameron 2014d)

In 2022, Foreign Secretary Liz Truss also emphasised a UK with a global outlook: ‘[a]s an outward-looking, sovereign nation, we are rebuilding our muscle to fulfil the promise of Global Britain – ready to win opportunities for our country and win the future for freedom (Truss 2021). It is worth mentioning, however, that the voice of an isolationist UK did exist in the foreign policy debate, which may result from the shame of the past, the negative experience of international intervention, notably the British participation in Iraq war between 2003 and 2009, or the lack of capabilities (Gaskarth 2016). One example of the UK’s restricted global role is the strong domestic opposition that the government was faced with, when deciding to launch a military operation in Syria against its use of chemical weapons.

By exploring the construction of an outward-looking UK, there are differences in the substance of the power and partners over the course of time. Let’s first discuss the concept of power. During the premiership of David Cameron, British foreign policymakers evaluated the UK’s influence on the globe with its soft power, notably its diplomatic network, and the economy and military power. When addressing on the future of British foreign policy, Foreign Secretary William Hague mentioned:

“Our history is often one of hard power. But in the coming years we will do even more to unleash these rivers of soft power across the world, so that we cultivate influence that flows rather than power that jars. On top of this, we are one of the few nations with the diplomatic network, the capabilities and the willingness to bring the world together to tackle vast problems, as we have done over the last two years on Somalia.”

(Hague 2014c)

In the Boris government, however, the focus was beyond the traditional lens of defence but on information, where the UK had to build up its leadership based on ideas, influence and inspiration ‘with our friends to form a network of liberty that spans the world,’ to defeat authoritarianism (Truss 2021).

“In fashionable circles, people talked about how we should be ashamed of our history and doubtful about our future. [...] Now is the time for the free world to fight back, and to use the power of economics and technology to promote freedom not fear. [...] So our foreign policy will project pride in our country and in all its elements.”

Secondly, the governments had different vision on the partnership that they intended to build. Foreign Secretary William Hague argued that, from an economic point of view, Britain’s international influence can be expanded with building relationships with new partners: “To build up Britain’s ties beyond Europe and our historic alliances. To connect our country up to the world’s fastest-growing economies. And to maintain Britain’s global role, for that is how we best protect our national interest.” (Hague 2014b) However, such idea would probably be slammed by the incumbent British foreign policymakers due to the ideological battle that the UK is now situated.

As discussed above that the Ukraine Crisis was framed by British foreign policymakers as a fight for freedom and democracy, with the evidence of discourse the UK took on the role as a values defender with the emphasis on its identity as a credible NATO and European ally:

“Britain will always stand up for freedom and democracy around the world, and when we say that our commitment to European security is immovable and unconditional, our deeds show that we mean our words. We are making the biggest contribution to NATO of any European ally because we understand the importance of collective security. “

(Johnson 2022a)

“Britain has always stood up to bullies. We have always been risk takers. So we are prepared be bold, using our strength in security and diplomacy, our economic heft, and our will and agility to lead the way. We are already stepping up in Ukraine. The war in Ukraine is our war – it is everyone’s war because Ukraine’s victory is a strategic imperative for all of us. Heavy weapons, tanks, aeroplanes – digging deep into our inventories, ramping up production. We need to do all of this. “

(Truss 2022h)

Another interesting observation that can be extracted from the changes in British foreign policy is the UK's shifted interests in the region Indo-Pacific. Due to its Commonwealth legacy, the region has been in the UK's interest. As noted by Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond (2015), trade and investment was the main interest of the Cameron government in the Asia Pacific: "free trade is in Britain's DNA and that is the code that is unlocking prosperity across the Asia Pacific region. So it is in all our interests to maintain the momentum behind trade and investment liberalisation in the region." Such viewpoints remained unchanged upon the release of the policy paper 2021 Global Britain, in which the UK positioned itself as a "maritime trading nation." However, China's growing influence with malign intentions and tolerance on Russia's atrocities in Ukraine changed the picture that the UK had on this region, as China could be the next challenger to regional stability and an international order based on rules-of-law.

When it comes to the UK's understanding of the impact of Ukraine crisis on international order, it is clear from British foreign policymakers' discourse that rules-based international system were under attack. By perceiving Putin as 'a desperate rough operator with no interest in international norms' (Truss. 2022h), the Ukraine crisis can be understood as a threat to the UK's national interest. Most importantly, having played a leading role in the designing of it since World War II, the UK regarded an international system of rules-of-law as its fundamental national interest, as noted by William Hague:

"[W]e have a vital interest in the upholding of international law and the UN charter, the honouring of treaties, and the maintenance of a rules-based international system. Russia's actions in Crimea run roughshod across all of these fundamental principles and threaten the future of Ukraine. [...] Our national interest depends on a rules-based international system where nations uphold bilateral and global agreements in a whole variety of areas from trade to security."

(Hague 2014b)

In sum, drawing on Gaskarth's (2014) typology of British foreign policy roles, the

analysis shows that, in the context of the 2014 and 2022 Ukraine crises, the UK has shown its reluctance to be a regional player and, in both Cameron and Johnson governments, emphasised the outward-looking aspect of its global position. Similarly, the UK took the roles of a rule-of-law state and thought leader, which respectively fit with its self-identities as being a norm entrepreneur and a constructive member of international society.

The UK's role enactments in the 2014 and 2022 Ukraine crises

The main purpose of this part of the analysis is to identify the UK government's role-playing and role performance during the 2014 and 2022 Ukraine crises by examining its interactions with other actors in the international system and decisions and actions, such as national and internationally coordinated measurements.

Role-Playing: Interaction with other actors

According to the official documents published by the GOV.UK, 194 and 235 diplomatic actions are identified during the 2014 and 2022 Ukraine crises respectively, among which bilateral diplomacy is the most common practice (see **Diagram 2**). Considering the differences in the length and intensity of both crises, instead of the frequency of contacts, the focus of the analysis is to identify key actors and themes that the UK frequently interacted with in different phases of the crisis, which may imply strategic changes in the UK's foreign policy in the post-Brexit era.

Diagram 2. Types of Diplomatic Contacts during the 2014 and 2022 Ukraine Crises




Table 2. Multilateral Diplomacy during the 2014 Ukraine Crisis

(In)Formal meeting	Frequency
UN	31
UNSC	22
UNHRC	7
UNGA	2
EU	18
Foreign Affairs Council	6
European Council	7
EU Energy Council	2
Call with European Council President Herman Van Rompuy	1

Contact Group meeting for the Geneva talks	1
EU defense ministers meeting	1
OSCE	8
Ministerial Councils	8
NATO	7
Foreign Ministers Meeting	3
Defence Ministers Meeting	1
NATO summit	1
Visit to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)	1
NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC)	1
G7	7
Joint Statement	3
Finance Ministers	1
Energy Ministers	1
G7 Summit	1
G7 Meeting	1
Others	5
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	1
Ukraine Forum on Asset Recovery	1
G20	1
The Shangri-La dialogue	1
the Northern European Defence Policy Forum	1
Total	76

Table 3. Multilateral Diplomacy during the 2022 Ukraine Crisis

(In)Formal meeting	Frequency
UN	34
UNSC	31
UNHRC	1
Call with United Nations Secretary-General	1
UNGA	1
NATO	12
Foreign Ministers Meeting	4
Defence Ministers Meeting	2
Call with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg	2
NATO-Russia Council	1
NATO Summit	1
Meeting with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg:	1
Call with NATO leaders	1
G7	10
G7 Foreign Ministers Meeting	5
Video conference	2
Statement	1
Call	1
G7 Summit	1
OSCE	5
Ministerial Councils	5

EU	3
Call with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen	1
on the sidelines of the G7 meeting in Brussel	1
Call with President of the European Council Charles Michel	1
Commonwealth	1
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM)	1
Others	14
Joint Expeditionary Force	4
International Criminal Court (ICC)	3
International Defence Donor Conference for Ukraine	2
Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group (ACA)	1
the Northern Group	1
the Ukraine Recovery Conference	1
World Bank	1
Munich Security Conference	1
Total	79

Multilateral diplomacy

In the context of the Ukraine crises, the UK government tended to seek peaceful solutions through the United Nations, particularly the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). However, as one of the 5 permanent members (P5) of the UNSC, Russia exercised its veto power and blocked a draft resolution on 15 March 2014, which urged the international community not to recognise the results of Crimea's secession referendum on joining Russia. In the event of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, another resolution proposed on 26 February 2022 demanding Russia stop its attack on Ukraine and withdraw its troops was also vetoed by Russia with China, India, and the United Arab Emirates' abstentions. On 2 March 2022, a resolution on Ukraine was passed at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) with an overwhelming majority of 141 against 5 in favour of it.

At multilateral fora, the UK actively exercised its soft power in addressing the deteriorating human rights records in the Russia-Ukraine conflicts. The Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE) as the world's largest security organisation was requested by the Ukrainian government to send a Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine in light of the tensions with Russia. With the consensus among all 57 participating nations, on 21 March 2014 the OSCE SMM was mandated to be deployed in all regions in Ukraine to reduce tensions, provide impartial and objective reports on the situation in Ukraine, and facilitate dialogues. As a strong supporter of the world's

largest security organisation, the UK provided not only personnel but also significant financial assistance: among the 700 unarmed civilian monitors, 100 of which were British, and as of 2019, the UK became the second largest contributor to the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).

In the recent development of Russian aggression, the UK was committed to holding Russia accountable for its atrocities to ensure justice is done by channelling military, policing and financial resources to International Criminal Court (ICC). On 2 March 2022, the UK, along with Lithuania, coordinated a referral by a group of 41 states to call for an ICC investigation into Russia's war crime. With the coverage of the appalling acts of the Russian force in Irpin and Bucha, a severe violation of human rights was reported including the growing records of sexual violence and rape. Since 2012, ending sexual violence has been a priority for the UK government – notably during the UK's membership of the UNHRC between 2014 and 2016 – and over £50 million were mobilised for preventing assaults against women in conflict zones (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2014; UK Government 2022). Therefore, in mid-April 2022, the UK government appointed Lord Ahmad as the Prime Minister's Special Representative on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict and collaborated with Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Nadia Murad and Institute for International Criminal Investigations to improve the evidence collection from survivors and witnesses of conflict-related sexual violence with the Murad Code. In addition, to support war crime investigation by the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine (OPG), the Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group (ACA) was created by the UK, the EU and the US in late May 2022. On top of the operational and financial support, the UK also led the diplomatic efforts to suspend Russia's membership of the UNHRC, which was supported by 93 nations in favour of the resolution at the UNGA.

Recognising the 'veto problem' and the UN's inability to react to Putin's aggression, the Boris government did express their frustration with global diplomacy and reckoned the importance of bilateral and plurilateral groups. This view is also manifest in Foreign Secretary Liz Truss' remark: "[l]et's be honest. The architecture that was designed to guarantee peace and prosperity has failed Ukraine. [...] Russia is able to block any effective action at the UN Security Council. Putin sees his veto as a green light to barbarism (Truss 2022h)." Therefore, in line with the result of the analysis, the UK worked closely with other nations in the formats of EU, NATO and G7 to

coordinate economic sanctions and financial support.

Indeed, as shown in Table 2 and Table 3, the UK's interactions with the EU significantly reduced in the 2022 Ukraine Crisis, for the UK no longer participated in the EU's formal meetings as a result of Brexit. In the context of the 2014 Ukraine Crisis, the British Prime Minister tended to arrange phone calls with the German Chancellor and French President to discuss the agenda of the upcoming European Council and the latest developments such as the Geneva talks. Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary, Defence Secretary and Minister for Europe also regularly delivered written or oral statements to conclude their meetings with EU counterparts and present the UK's positions and call for actions to the House of Common. Considering the UK's interactions with the EU in the post-Brexit Era on the matter of the 2022 Ukraine Crisis, most contacts that the UK had with the EU were at the G7 to which the High Representative of the EU and/or the President of the EU Commission were also invited.

Nonetheless, the result of the analysis suggests that in light of Russian aggression, the UK has even closer ties with the European partners in defence and security, which is evident in three dimensions: NATO, plurilateral and bilateral cooperation. To begin with, the UK reiterated its commitment to NATO and European security by its leading roles in being one of the Alliance's founding members and the largest European spender on defence in NATO. In response to Russia's annexation of Crimea, the UK deployed Royal Air Force (RAF) Typhoon aircraft to Lithuania and enhanced NATO air-policing mission in Baltic states. With the looming pressures from the Russian military presence near the Ukrainian borders, the UK further bolstered NATO Eastern flanks by increasing the deployed personnel in Estonia and sending two additional RAF Typhoons to Romania.

Plurilateral diplomacy

In terms of plurilateral cooperation in enhancing European security, a UK-led multinational force, Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) is noteworthy due to its unique focus on the other NATO's frontline–Northern Europe. Established at the 2014 NATO summit in Wales, JEF comprises Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK, and can provide an agile response to crises even to hybrid threats (Monaghan 2022). As mentioned in the Joint Statement by Defence Ministers of the JEF on 22 February 2022, “[n]ever has the JEF been more

important and relevant than it is today”

With the deepening relationship with the Nordic countries after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the UK showed full support to Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO with the reference to NATO’s Open Door Policy at the outset. Similarly, the UK also took part in the Northern Group Ministerial Meeting to discuss the security issue in Northern Europe with Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Sweden.

As a ‘global Britain,’ the UK’s military partnerships surely are not confined to Europe. With its foreign policy tilting to the Indo-Pacific, the UK took part in the Five Eyes, an intelligence alliance among US, UK, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, and AUKUS, a trilateral security partnership among UK, US, and Australia. The UK also expressed its interest in developing deeper military cooperation with Japan, India and Indonesia (Truss 2022h).

Bilateral diplomacy

Besides the closer ties that the UK built with the Nordic and Baltic states, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine further reinforced the UK-Poland relationship. British foreign policymakers, drawing on the lesson of the last 100 years learned, recognised Poland’s critical role in the Russia-Ukraine conflicts and Europe’s stability and perceived it as a close ally and friend. Referring to Poland as the frontline of freedom, the UK promptly sent troops to strengthen NATO’s Eastern flanks and humanitarian aids to Poland in response to the increasing pressures at borders with the arrival of Ukrainian refugees and the malign intention of Russia. In support of Ukraine, the UK, Poland and Ukraine built a trilateral strategic partnership on 17 February 2022 with the aim to build resilience in Ukraine. In a joint statement by Boris Johnson and Polish President Andrzej Duda in April 2022, the UK and Poland ‘consider[ed] each other among the closet of our European partners’ and announced to ‘revolutionise our cooperation on defence and security.’

As aforementioned, since the 2014 Ukraine Crisis, the UK has urged European countries and G7 to reduce their dependence on Russia’s oil and gas in case of the weaponisation or manipulation of energy supply by Russia. For that reason, the UK has been vocally opposed to construction of the Russia-German Nord Stream 2 pipeline.

Therefore, when the German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced the suspension of the project, Boris Johnson publicly praised his bravery and regarded it as a significant move for the EU to cut strategic dependence on Russia. However, with hindsight, an energy secure future that the UK government pictured for European partners was failed to achieve as shown in the 2022 Ukraine Crisis. As a result, in addition to defence and security, energy is another policy area that the UK and EU member states intended to cooperate with each other: to reduce dependency on Russian hydrocarbons, and to work on the development of renewable energy, notably with the Visegrad group (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland), Estonia, Greece and Portugal.

Table 4. Bilateral Diplomacy during the 2014 Ukraine Crisis

Country	Frequency	EU	49
non-EU	58		
Ukraine	15	Germany	15
US	12	France	6
Russia	11	Poland	4
Australia	5	Italy	4
China	3	Netherlands	3
Canada	2	Latvia	3
Switzerland	1	Bulgaria	3
Georgia	1	Slovenia	2
India	1	Hungary	2
Singapore	1	Estonia	1
Azerbaijan	1	Finland	1
Iceland	1	Portugal	1
Turkey	1	Czech Republic	1
Kazakhstan	1	Sweden	1
Moldova	1	Lithuania	1
Japan	1	Ireland	1
		Grand Total	107

Table 5. Bilateral Diplomacy during the 2022 Ukraine Crisis

Country	Frequency		
non-EU	102	South Korea	2
Ukraine	39	Qatar	2
US	7	Norway	2
Russia	7	UAE	1
Turkey	5	Georgia	1
Australia	4	Guyana	1
Japan	4	Oman	1
Canada	4	China	1
India	3	Serbia	1
Rwanda	2	Belarus	1
		Argentina	1

Ghana	1	Finland	3
Saudi Arabia	1	Hungary	3
Egypt	1	Sweden	3
Kurdistan Region of Iraq	1	Romania	2
Chile	1	Denmark	2
Uruguay	1	Spain	2
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1	Lithuania	2
Jamaica	1	Czech Republic	2
Pakistan	1	Netherlands	2
Switzerland	1	Slovenia	1
South Africa	1	Slovakia	1
Nigeria	1	Croatia	1
New Zealand	1	Ireland	1
EU	54	Portugal	1
Poland	9	Greece	1
Germany	7	Latvia	1
France	6	Total	156
Estonia	4		

Role performance: Foreign policy behaviours

In this section the focus is shifted to the decisions and actions of the UK government in response to the development of the Ukraine Crisis in 2014 and 2022 respectively.

2014 Ukraine Crisis

To begin with, as a trigger to the 2014 Ukraine crisis, the EU was about to meet other Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries at the EaP Summit Vilnius in November 2013 and sign the Association Agreement (AA) including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with Ukraine. Ahead of the Summit in November 2013, Minister for Europe David Lidington published an Op-Ed for *Den* paper with the title “Ukraine and the EU: Stronger Together.” On the one hand, Lidington welcomed a EU Open Door Policy which welcomes any new member, especially from the previous Soviet bloc, and bluntly wrote: “[s]ince the collapse of the Soviet Union, Britain has championed the entry into the EU of those countries that lost so many years to Communism. We hope that one day Ukraine will also become a Member State if that is what its people want.” Such a statement reflected the UK’s consistent position on EU Enlargement policy that as a pragmatic EU member state, the UK has been a firm supporter of deepening political and economic relationships with neighbouring countries due to geopolitical and economic interests (Lippert et al. 2001). On the other

hand, he also expressed the UK's reservations about signing the AA as a result of the lack of commitments to reform from the Yanukovych government.

Therefore, after Yanukovych was impeached by the Ukrainian Parliament and fled the country, the UK worked with the IMF, the World Bank, the OSCE and the EU to facilitate economic and governance reforms in Ukraine. In addition to multilateral actions, bilateral efforts were also made to support Ukraine: the UK sent funds, financial experts and technical teams to recover misappropriated assets and strengthen public financial management, allocated £4.3 million to the UK-Ukraine Reform Assistance Program in August 2014, £15 million to humanitarian aid in February 2015, and provided non-lethal support by sending medical, logistics, infantry and intelligence capacity building training from March 2015. For instance, through Operation ORBITAL, the British Armed Forces have trained more than 22,000 Ukrainian troops to strengthen their defence capabilities.

2022 Ukraine Crisis

Unlike Russia's annexation of Crimea which came out as a surprise to NATO, the presence of Russian military troops at the Ukrainian borders was detected and revealed by British intelligence. As an unexpected move, the British Ministry of Defence tweeted an "intelligence update" to publish the information with a narrated video on social media on 17 February 2022, as a means of combating disinformation from Russia (Sabbagh 2022). With the spectre of war looming ahead, British foreign policymakers started to prepare restrictive measures against Russia and provide Ukraine with military aid. Considering the intensity of crisis, the UK altered its policy of military assistance by offering lethal aid to Ukraine. On his delivery of an oral statement to the House of Common on 17 January 2022, Defence Secretary Ben Wallace confirmed that, in the security assistance package, the government has taken the decision to send defensive weapons to Ukraine. As 'the first European nation to send defensive weapons to the country (Truss 2022c),' the UK also called for other countries to provide more lethal aid to stop Putin's aggressive ambitions.

The UK's role performance in the 2022 Ukraine Crisis originated in the so-called Six Point Plan for Ukraine, which was later converted to as a hard-headed approach. Firstly announced on 5 March 2022, Boris Johnson put forward that the Six Point Plan for Ukraine will ensure Putin fail his military operation in Ukraine, in which he outlined

that: we must mobilise an international humanitarian coalition, we must do more to help Ukraine to defend itself, we must maximise the economic pressure on Putin's regime, we should always be open to diplomacy and de-escalation, and lastly, we must act now to strengthen Euro-Atlantic security.

Later on, the Six Point Plan for Ukraine was rarely mentioned in the UK's official documents and what substituted was the hard-headed approach, with the substance of the policy varying over the course of time. At the outset of the crisis, the approach means a trade-off between short-term pain and long-term gain, mainly by imposing tough sanctions and cutting strategic dependence. Noteworthy, with the UK's exit from the EU, the UK has an independent sanctions policy. By amending the existing legislation and passing of the new Economic Crime Act, the UK has the power to impose stricter sanctions against Russia. On top of the coordinated sanctions with the EU and G7, the UK introduced the toughest sanctions targeted at more than 1000 Russian and Belarusian elites. Furthermore, as an enactment of the callings for reducing dependence on Russia's imports, the UK, along with the US, announced to phase out Russia's oil by 2023 to end the major financial source of the war machine.

In late April 2022, Foreign Secretary Liz Truss fleshed out its Russian policy with threefold dimensions: military strength, economic security, and deeper global alliance. Firstly, in the area of military strength, the UK asserted that the NATO Eastern flanks must be strengthened, and not only the resilience and capabilities of Ukraine but also that of the Western Balkans including Moldova and Georgia must be built up. In addition, it is imperative to modernise NATO's defence capabilities and be prepared for potential threats in the Indo-Pacific. Secondly, in terms of economic security, the UK is exercising the economic power of itself and the G7 as diplomatic tools to counter Russia and China's threats, such as sanctions, tariffs and access to markets. Thirdly, the UK aims to build partnerships with states who share fundamental values such as rule of law, democracy and freedom. With like-minded states, the Network of Liberty will be established and security and prosperity will be achieved.

Overall, as Boris Johnson highlighted in his resignation speech as one of the achievements of the Boris government, the UK did "lead the West in standing up to Putin's aggression in Ukraine." By harnessing its military, economic and soft power at multilateral, plurilateral and bilateral means, the UK showed its unwavering

commitment to Ukraine. According to Boris Johnson, as of 4 July 2022, the total military, humanitarian and economic support since 24 February 2022 amounted to £4 billion. In line with the UK's hard-headed approach, with the amendments to domestic legislation, the UK was able to launch national sanction measures and implement harsh economic sanctions against individuals involved in Russia's aggression in a timely manner. In the meanwhile, the UK kept urging for tougher measurements against Russia at multilateral fora such as the exclusion of Russian banks from the SWIFT system and cutting down dependence on Russia energy import. As for the exercise of soft power, the UK has led the ICC investigations into war crimes in Ukraine and provided BBC World Service with additional funding of £4.1 million to support its Ukrainian and Russian language services in Ukraine and Russia.

Conclusion

The UK's 47 year-long participation in the EU officially came to an end on 31 December 2020, which leaves a lot of questions open, such as the future UK-EU relationship and the UK's role in the globe. With the Boris government publishing the policy paper 'Global Britain,' the foreign policy role of the UK was depicted as a 'maritime trade nation' with its pivoting to the Indo-Pacific. Despite a global dimension that the policy paper intended to present, it suggested a marginalised Europe in the future of the UK.

How the UK positioned itself in the international system and whether or not the EU membership would lead to a role change in the UK's foreign policy are the main puzzles that the thesis aims to solve. Based on Aggestam's role analysis framework, the thesis uses a comparative case study of the UK's response to the 2014 and 2022 Ukraine Crisis as empirical evidence. The main body of the thesis comprises two chapters: in the first chapter, a frame analysis is firstly conducted to construct the UK's understanding of the crises, followed by the analysis of institutional role expectations, international role expectations, as well as the UK's self-perceptions of its roles. The second chapter focuses on the UK's interactions with other actors in the international system and its role enactments, namely its foreign policy behaviour.

In the context of the framing of the 2014 Ukraine crisis, British foreign policymakers associated the tragic events of Euromaidan and Russian annexation of Crimea with the utmost importance to uphold European values through EU reformation. The Cameron government also urged European partners and G7 leaders to face the issue of energy security. For the Boris government, to reduce dependence on Russia's gas and oil remained an item on the UK's agenda at the multilateral meetings with other leaders. Moreover, the Boris government referred to moralist terms and lessons of the past to claim the UK's responsibility to step up against Russia in case of Putin's ruthless ambition and the worse consequences in the future. It also pointed out the threat from China with its assertiveness and coercive economic policies.

The EU and NATO are the two institutions that we looked into to understand the UK's institutional expectations. During the 2014 Ukraine Crisis, when the UK remained a EU member state, it followed the intergovernmental decision-making process of the CFSP with the aim to respond to Russia with united decisions. The UK

called for tougher economic sanctions on Russia. Throughout the 2022 Ukraine crisis, the UK remained its coordination with the EU, along with the US, NATO, and G7, to coordinate sanctions. In the official documents, the EU was mostly mentioned to describe the mutual cooperation. On a couple of occasions, British foreign policymakers referred to the EU for expressing the advantages of Brexit. As for the institutional role expectations from NATO for the UK, the UK, as the largest European donor and a close ally with the US under the special relationship, was encouraging NATO member states to increase their military spendings. During the 2022 Ukraine crisis with the UK officially left the EU, the UK reassured ally, mostly EU member states, its commitment to European security through NATO.

International expectations from the US for the UK were embedded in the setting of NATO where, as mentioned, its special relationship with the US motivated the UK to revitalise NATO with other member states' contributions. Ukraine, as the victim of Russian aggression, did have high expectations for the UK, especially during the 2022 Ukraine crisis. As requested by the Ukrainian government, Boris Johnson, with his unwavering support of Ukraine, took a leading role in assisting Ukraine with military, humanitarian and financial aid. According to the UK government, the UK has responsibilities for helping out Ukraine because of the historic ties, moral duty and normative values.

The analysis of the UK self-perceptions suggests that the UK has been reluctant to play the role of a regional player in Europe, and, with its outward-looking global positioning, the UK has played the roles of rule-of-law state and thought leader, matching its identities as a norm entrepreneur and a constructive member of international society.

When it comes to the UK's role enactments in the 2014 and 2022 Ukraine crises, multilateral diplomacy remained the main channel for the UK to address the issues. However, in the UN system the effect of multilateral diplomacy was significantly reduced due to Russia's veto power. Nonetheless, the UK worked closely with G7, NATO and the EU for coordinated actions. In the recent crisis, the UK worked closely with the Nordic and Baltics states to foster closer defence cooperation through plurilateral networks such as the JEF and the Northern Group in light of Russian aggression. It also enhanced its military cooperation with partners in the Indo-Pacific

region through the Five Eyes and AUKUS. Bilaterally, the UK's relations to Poland and Ukraine were significantly improved.

In sum, the thesis argues, with the examination of the UK's response to the 2014 and 2022 Ukraine crises, that despite the UK's withdrawal from the EU, its foreign policy roles still align with the previous roles that it took on. Moreover, the UK even developed closer ties with EU member states in the northern, central and eastern Europe. However, it may be the case of the UK's 'context-specific roles' in the policy field of defence and security, considering the CFSP's intergovernmental nature.

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Appendix 1. Data Collection and Filter Set-up

Topic

Content type

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2 selected

2 selected

2 selected

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First published during the 2010 to 2015 Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government

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Statement by Ambassador Mark Lyall Grant of the UK Mission to the UN at the Annual OSCE Debate

Updated: 24 February 2015

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Press briefing: morning 25 February 2015

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Updated: 25 February 2015

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The Prime Minister Boris Johnson spoke to President Zelenskyy this afternoon.

Updated: 7 July 2022

Prime Minister Boris Johnson's statement in Downing Street: 7 July 2022

Prime Minister Boris Johnson gave a statement in Downing Street.

Updated: 7 July 2022

Appendix 2. Code System Report (exported from MAXQDA)

Code System	Frequency
Code System	1581
Autocode - ANY: interest	86
EU	43
EU\Institution	7
EU\perception of the EU	6
EU\perception of the EU\pragmatism from the EU	1
EU\perception of the EU\an outward-looking EU	2
EU\perception of the EU\like-minded friends	3
EU\Post-Brexit	4
EU\Post-Brexit\constraints from membership	1
EU\Post-Brexit\advantage of Brexit	1
EU\Post-Brexit\post-brexit arrangement	2
EU\Working with the EU	0
EU\Working with the EU\Response to Ukraine Crisis	25
EU\Working with the EU\Response to Ukraine Crisis\collective actions	5
EU\Working with the EU\Response to Ukraine Crisis\financial supports	1
EU\Working with the EU\Response to Ukraine Crisis\alignment on position	1
EU\Working with the EU\Response to Ukraine Crisis\cut Russian energy imports	1
EU\Working with the EU\Response to Ukraine Crisis\provision of humanitarian aid	1
EU\Working with the EU\Response to Ukraine Crisis\provision of lethal aid	3
EU\Working with the EU\Response to Ukraine Crisis\rebuild Ukraine	4
EU\Working with the EU\Response to Ukraine Crisis\tough sanctions	9
EU\Working with the EU\Western Balkans	1
EU	0
👉 Boris gov achievement	2
GREEN	13
Morality	10
BLUE	1
RED	4
UK's issue framing	0
UK's issue framing\fragile peace	4

UK's issue framing\2022 Ukraine Crisis	2
UK's issue framing\2022 Ukraine Crisis\China as a potential challenger	5
UK's issue framing\2022 Ukraine Crisis\China as a potential challenger\economic coercive policies	3
UK's issue framing\2022 Ukraine Crisis\Russia's invasion of Ukraine	46
UK's issue framing\2022 Ukraine Crisis\Russia's invasion of Ukraine\dividing line between right and wrong	4
UK's issue framing\2022 Ukraine Crisis\Russia's invasion of Ukraine\NATO aggression	1
UK's issue framing\2022 Ukraine Crisis\Russia's invasion of Ukraine\Putin's aggression	6
UK's issue framing\2022 Ukraine Crisis\Russia's invasion of Ukraine\Putin's aggression\Russia as a threat to Europe	1
UK's issue framing\2022 Ukraine Crisis\Russia's invasion of Ukraine\Putin's aggression\Reference to the past	2
UK's issue framing\2022 Ukraine Crisis\Russia's invasion of Ukraine\struggle for freedom and democracy	6
UK's issue framing\2022 Ukraine Crisis\Russia's invasion of Ukraine\struggle for freedom and democracy\rule-of-law international system	3
UK's issue framing\2022 Ukraine Crisis\Russia's invasion of Ukraine\struggle for freedom and democracy\survival of a Europe / European security	3
UK's issue framing\2022 Ukraine Crisis\Russia's invasion of Ukraine\Putin's expectations	1
UK's issue framing\2022 Ukraine Crisis\Russia's invasion of Ukraine\Global impacts	2
UK's issue framing\2022 Ukraine Crisis\Russia's invasion of Ukraine\Global impacts\global food security	5
UK's issue framing\2022 Ukraine Crisis\Russia's invasion of Ukraine\Global impacts\global food security\Rising costs	2
UK's issue framing\2022 Ukraine Crisis\Russia's invasion of Ukraine\Disinformation war	1
UK's issue framing\2022 Ukraine Crisis\Russia's invasion of Ukraine\Disinformation war\lies and disinformation	5
UK's issue framing\2022 Ukraine Crisis\Russia's invasion of Ukraine\Unity among nations	16
UK's issue framing\2022 Ukraine Crisis\Russia's invasion of Ukraine\Unity among nations\Myth: Consequences of supporting Ukraine	3
UK's issue framing\2022 Ukraine Crisis\Russia's invasion of Ukraine\Unity among nations\Myth: Consequences of supporting Ukraine\Messages to the global south	1
UK's issue framing\2022 Ukraine Crisis\Russia's invasion of Ukraine\UK's responsibility	10
UK's issue framing\2022 Ukraine Crisis\Russia's invasion of Ukraine\UK's role	16

UK's issue framing\2022 Ukraine Crisis\the era of authoritarianism	8
UK's issue framing\2022 Ukraine Crisis\the era of authoritarianism\barbarism and war crime	7
UK's issue framing\2022 Ukraine Crisis\the era of authoritarianism\barbarism and war crime\killing of civilians in Irpin and Bucha	3
UK's issue framing\2014 Ukraine Crisis	0
UK's issue framing\2014 Ukraine Crisis\Euromaidan	5
UK's issue framing\2014 Ukraine Crisis\Euromaidan\Impeachment	1
UK's issue framing\2014 Ukraine Crisis\Euromaidan\EU-mediated peace pact	1
UK's issue framing\2014 Ukraine Crisis\reluctance from EU MSs	1
UK's issue framing\2014 Ukraine Crisis\Crimea	10
UK's issue framing\2014 Ukraine Crisis\Crimea\illegal referendum	2
UK's issue framing\2014 Ukraine Crisis\Crimea\UK's objectives	2
UK's issue framing\2014 Ukraine Crisis\Crimea\UK's interest	4
UK's issue framing\2014 Ukraine Crisis\the UK's interest	8
UK's issue framing\2014 Ukraine Crisis\Freedom and democracy	8
UK's issue framing\terrorism	1
UK's issue framing\Russia's military incursion to UA	33
UK's issue framing\Russia's military incursion to UA\unity in Europe	2
UK's issue framing\Russia's military incursion to UA\the UK's hard-headed approach	4
UK's issue framing\Russia's military incursion to UA\stability in Asia-Pacific	2
UK's issue framing\Russia's military incursion to UA\Russia's influence on neighbouring countries	1
UK's issue framing\Russia's military incursion to UA\the free world must rise	1
UK's issue framing\Russia's military incursion to UA\peaceful solution to the conflict	3
UK's issue framing\Russia's military incursion to UA\Normandy Format	2
UK's issue framing\Dependence on Russia energy	6
UK's issue framing\Dependence on Russia energy\transition to low carbon energy	1
YELLOW	27
UK's perceptions	1
UK's perceptions\the Nordic partners	1
UK's perceptions\the West	3
UK's perceptions\the UK & UA	21
UK's perceptions\the UK & UA\ORBITAL	2

UK's perceptions\the UK & UA\Trilateral partnership with Poland	1
UK's perceptions\the UK & UA\Message to the Ukrainian People	2
UK's perceptions\the UK & UA\the UK's hard-headed approach	2
UK's perceptions\the UK & UA\the UK's hard-headed approach\deeper global alliances	5
UK's perceptions\the UK & UA\the UK's hard-headed approach\economic security	2
UK's perceptions\the UK & UA\the UK's hard-headed approach\military strength	1
UK's perceptions\the UK & UA\A Six-Point Plan for Ukraine	5
UK's perceptions\the UK & UA\the UK's leadership	20
UK's perceptions\Commonwealth	10
UK's perceptions\Commonwealth\Global food supply	1
UK's perceptions\Commonwealth\Climate Change	1
UK's perceptions\OSCE	8
UK's perceptions\OSCE\the OSCE's challenge	2
UK's perceptions\OSCE\the OSCE's challenge\journalists' safety and freedom	1
UK's perceptions\OSCE\UK's role in the OSCE	2
UK's perceptions\domestic contestation	2
UK's perceptions\domestic contestation\providing heavy weapon	1
UK's perceptions\domestic contestation\Brexit	2
UK's perceptions\domestic contestation\inward looking	6
UK's perceptions\domestic contestation\inward looking\military intervention	0
UK's perceptions\domestic contestation\inward looking\military intervention\Iraq and Afghanistan	1
UK's perceptions\domestic contestation\inward looking\military intervention\inaction in Syria	1
UK's perceptions\the UK & the US	5
UK's perceptions\the UK & the US\Special relationship	2
UK's perceptions\the UK & the US\TTIP	1
UK's perceptions\UK & Germany	7
UK's perceptions\UK & RU	7
UK's perceptions\UK & RU\NATO aggression	4
UK's perceptions\IMF	1
UK's perceptions\Self perceptions	9
UK's perceptions\Self perceptions\commitment to European security	1
UK's perceptions\Self perceptions\Pride in the UK	5
UK's perceptions\Self perceptions\economic power	5
UK's perceptions\Self perceptions\global actor	3

UK's perceptions\Self perceptions\global actor\the UK's leadership	11
UK's perceptions\Self perceptions\global actor\the UK's leadership\covid vaccination	1
UK's perceptions\Self perceptions\global actor\the UK's leadership\JEF	1
UK's perceptions\Self perceptions\Foreign policy objectives	1
UK's perceptions\Self perceptions\Foreign policy objectives\CPTPP	1
UK's perceptions\Self perceptions\Foreign policy objectives\Future of the UK	4
UK's perceptions\Self perceptions\military capacities	10
UK's perceptions\Self perceptions\military capacities\security partnerships	1
UK's perceptions\Self perceptions\national measures	1
UK's perceptions\EU	17
UK's perceptions\EU\Enlargement Policy	2
UK's perceptions\EU\Europeanisation of defence policy	1
UK's perceptions\EU\EU's response to the Ukraine Crisis	13
UK's perceptions\EU\EU's response to the Ukraine Crisis\Economic sanctions	1
UK's perceptions\EU\EU Commission	5
UK's perceptions\EU\EU-UA	1
UK's perceptions\EU\Transatlantic relationship	2
UK's perceptions\EU\Transatlantic relationship\the US's commitment to European security	1
UK's perceptions\EU\NATO fundamental to the EU's security	2
UK's perceptions\EU\EU reformation	17
UK's perceptions\EU\EU reformation\Because the status quo is not right for the EU and it is certain	1
UK's perceptions\EU\EU reformation\European values	2
UK's perceptions\EU\EU reformation\UK's contribution to the EU	4
UK's perceptions\EU\UK's role in the EU	12
UK's perceptions\EU\UK's role in the EU\in responding to the Ukraine Crisis	3
UK's perceptions\G7	2
UK's perceptions\G7\G7 as an economic NATO	1
UK's perceptions\G7\UK's role in G7	1
UK's perceptions\international orders	15
UK's perceptions\international orders\Global security	3
UK's perceptions\international orders\Global security\Western Balkans	5
UK's perceptions\international orders\Global security\Asia	13

Pacific	
UK's perceptions\international orders\Global security\Asia Pacific\Taiwan	3
UK's perceptions\international orders\Global security\Asia Pacific\Five Power Defence Arrangements	5
UK's perceptions\international orders\Message to China	9
UK's perceptions\international orders\Network of Liberty	3
UK's perceptions\NATO	16
UK's perceptions\NATO\the NATO Summit in Wales	2
UK's perceptions\NATO\New strategic approach: defense deterrence	2
UK's perceptions\NATO\NATO's open door policy	3
UK's perceptions\NATO\NATO's open door policy\Sweden and Finland's membership	4
UK's perceptions\NATO\NATO's open door policy\Ukraine's NATO membership	2
UK's perceptions\NATO\NATO allies' response to Ukraine Crisis	6
UK's perceptions\NATO\reform of NATO	5
UK's perceptions\NATO\UK's role in NATO	14
UK's perceptions\NATO\NATO's purpose as an organisation for collective defence	4
Trigger	0
Trigger\EU-UA AA	1
Trigger\resignation	1
Trigger\resignation\Boris Johnson's achievements	1
Trigger\Russian invasion of Ukraine on Feb 24	10
Trigger\Russian invasion of Ukraine on Feb 24\Irpın and Bucha	2
Trigger\OSCE	0
Trigger\OSCE\OSCE Special Monitoring Mission	1
Trigger\OSCE\OSCE Ministerial Council	1
Trigger\Crimea Referendum	1
Trigger\Crimea Referendum\Russian annexation of Crimea	2
Trigger\an incursion into Ukraine	6
Trigger\an incursion into Ukraine\the build-up of Russian troops on the border of Ukraine	0
Trigger\migrant crisis in Belarus	1
Occasion	0
Occasion\Ukraine Recovery Conference	1
Occasion\Commonwealth Summit	1
Occasion\CHOGM	2
Occasion\Victory in Europe Day: the end of WWII	1
Occasion\Brave Ukraine fundraising event	1

Occasion\Munich Security Conference	1
Occasion\EU-UA AA	1
Occasion\G7	2
Occasion\European Council	8
Occasion\Diplomatic visit	2
Occasion\Diplomatic visit\visit to Turkey	1
Occasion\Diplomatic visit\visit to Prague	1
Occasion\Diplomatic visit\visit to Finland	1
Occasion\Diplomatic visit\visit to ukraine	4
Occasion\Diplomatic visit\visit to PL	3
Occasion\Diplomatic visit\visit to Sweden	1
Occasion\Diplomatic visit\visit to the US	1
Occasion\Diplomatic visit\visit to Estonia	2
Occasion\NATO	5
Occasion\OSCE	0
Occasion\OSCE\Ministerial Council	3
Actor	0
Actor\UK delegation to the OSCE	1
Actor\Foreign Office Minister	0
Actor\Foreign Office Minister\David Lidington	7
Actor\Foreign Secretary	0
Actor\Foreign Secretary\Philip Hammond	1
Actor\Foreign Secretary\Liz Truss	28
Actor\Foreign Secretary\Liz Truss\with Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba	1
Actor\Foreign Secretary\William Hague	4
Actor\PM	0
Actor\PM\Boris Johnson	25
Actor\PM\David Cameron	12
Actor\PM\David Cameron\with Barack Obama	1
Actor\Defence Secretary	0
Actor\Defence Secretary\Ben Wallace	5
Actor\Defence Secretary\Philip Hammond	2
Actor\Defence Secretary\Ukraine Defence Minister Olek	0
Partner country	0
Partner country\Turkey	1
Partner country\Turkey\Sweden and Finland joining NATO	1
Partner country\Turkey\Grain export	1
Partner country\Czechia	2

Partner country\Finland	1
Partner country\India	2
Partner country\Australia	5
Partner country\Australia\Technology cooperation	1
Partner country\Australia\Security cooperation	5
Partner country\Australia\Security cooperation\AUKUS	8
Partner country\Australia\Economic cooperation	2
Partner country\Australia\Economic cooperation\TPP	1
Partner country\Australia\Economic cooperation\Calling out China	1
Partner country\Poland	7
Partner country\Poland\Uk's commitment to PL	1
Partner country\Poland\geopolitical/strategic importance	1
Type of document	0
Type of document\Speech	19
Type of document\Speech\Domestic	2
Type of document\Speech\Domestic\to the Nation	1
Type of document\Speech\Domestic\to the Nation\to the British people	3
Type of document\Speech\Domestic\to the Nation\to the people of Ukraine	6
Type of document\Speech\Domestic\to the Nation\to the people of Russia	6
Type of document\Speech\Domestic\House of Commons	23
Type of document\Speech\Domestic\Mansion House	2
Type of document\Authored article	7
Type of document\Authored article\European newspapers	1
Type of document\Authored article\European newspapers\Die Welt, La Repubblica (IT), Le Figaro (FR)	1
Type of document\Authored article\European newspapers\Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung	1
Type of document\Authored article\National media	3
Type of document\Joint statement	0
Time	0
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis	0
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\29 January 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\7 July 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\4 July 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\30 June 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\28 June 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\27 June 2022	1

Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\24 June 2022	2
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\23 June 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\17 June 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\16 June 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\9 June 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\27 May 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\11 May 2022	2
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\5 May 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\3 May 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\27 April 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\26 April 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\25 April 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\22 April 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\9 April 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\6 April 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\5 April 2022	2
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\4 April 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\28 March 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\25 March 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\24 March 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\9 March 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\8 March 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\6 March 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\1 March 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\28 February 2022	2
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\27 February 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\25 February 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\24 February 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\23 February 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\22 February 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\21 February 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\19 February 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\17 February 2022	2
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\10 February 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\25 January 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\21 January 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\17 January 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\06 January 2022	1

Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\8 December 2021	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\2 December 2021	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\27 April 22	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\26 May 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\29 June 2022	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\2 December 2021	0
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\30 November 2021	0
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\14 November 2021	1
Time\2022 Ukraine Crisis\16 November 2021	0
Time\2014 Ukraine Crisis	1
Time\2014 Ukraine Crisis\8 September 2014	1
Time\2014 Ukraine Crisis\20 December 2013	1
Time\2014 Ukraine Crisis\28 April 2014	1
Time\2014 Ukraine Crisis\24 February 2014	1
Time\2014 Ukraine Crisis\10 December 2013	1
Time\2014 Ukraine Crisis\23 February 2015	1
Time\2014 Ukraine Crisis\10 February 2015	1
Time\2014 Ukraine Crisis\15 January 2015	1
Time\2014 Ukraine Crisis\15 December 2014	1
Time\2014 Ukraine Crisis\5 December 2014	1
Time\2014 Ukraine Crisis\27 October 2014	1
Time\2014 Ukraine Crisis\4 September 2014	1
Time\2014 Ukraine Crisis\3 September 2014	1
Time\2014 Ukraine Crisis\1 September 2014	1
Time\2014 Ukraine Crisis\17 July 2014	1
Time\2014 Ukraine Crisis\30 June 2014	1
Time\2014 Ukraine Crisis\26 June 2014	1
Time\2014 Ukraine Crisis\5 June 2014	1
Time\2014 Ukraine Crisis\3 June 2014	1
Time\2014 Ukraine Crisis\13 May 2014	2
Time\2014 Ukraine Crisis\16 April 2014	1
Time\2014 Ukraine Crisis\26 March 2014	0
Time\2014 Ukraine Crisis\21 March 2014	1
Time\2014 Ukraine Crisis\18 March 2014	1
Time\2014 Ukraine Crisis\10 March 2014	1
Time\2014 Ukraine Crisis\6 March 2014	1
UK calls for action	1
UK calls for action\No appeasement	6

UK calls for action\Rebuilding Ukraine	6
UK calls for action\Rebuilding Ukraine\Joint Reconstruction Coordination Group	1
UK calls for action\UN	2
UK calls for action\UN\UNHRC	2
UK calls for action\UN\UNHRC\Provision of defensive weapons and humanitarian aids	3
UK calls for action\ICC / war crime investigation & justice	2
UK calls for action\Stricter sanctions on Russia	2
UK calls for action\Stricter sanctions on Russia\cutting out Russia from SWIFT	2
UK calls for action\Reduce dependence on Russia's oil and gas -> weaponisation	6
UK calls for action\Reduce dependence on Russia's oil and gas -> weaponisation\Nord stream 2	1
UK calls for action\G7	4
UK calls for action\G7\tougher sanctions on Russia	2
UK calls for action\NATO	7
UK calls for action\NATO\A global NATO	1
UK calls for action\NATO\East flank	2
UK calls for action\NATO\NATO Allies to increase financial commitments	3
UK calls for action\NATO\NATO Allies to increase financial commitments\modernisation	2
UK calls for action\OSCE	2
UK calls for action\EU	5
UK calls for action\EU\EU-China FTA	1
UK calls for action\Domestic politics	0
UK calls for action\Domestic politics\2.5% of GDP on defence	1
UK calls for action\Domestic politics\living costs crisis	4
UK calls for action\Domestic politics\Humanitarian supports	1
UK calls for action\Domestic politics\Cut off Russia energy import	2
UK calls for action\The West	2
UK calls for action\The West\Bosnia and Herzegovina	1
UK calls for action\Russia and Ukraine	2
UK calls for action\Russia and Ukraine\humanitarian access	1
UK calls for action\Russia and Ukraine\Minsk Agreements	1
UK calls for action\Russia and Ukraine\1994 Budapest Memorandum	1
UK calls for action\Russia and Ukraine\peace and stability	0
UK calls for action\encourage countries to support Ukraine's defences	2
UK calls for action\Top of the Foreign Secretary's agenda is the need for Allies to	0

UK calls for action\in opposing the construction of the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline	1
UK's Identity	1
UK's Identity\Global Britain	2
UK's Identity\Strength	1
UK's Identity\Strength\soft power	2
UK's Identity\G7	1
UK's Identity\Network of Liberty	3
UK's Identity\Responsibility	4
UK's Identity\Leadership	3
UK's Identity\Leadership\the campaign to end sexual violence	1
UK's Identity\NATO	1
UK's Identity\NATO\we remain the largest European spender on defence in NATO	1
Russia	1
Russia\NATO expansion /aggression	4
Russia\Influence on international organisation	2
Russia\Message to Russia	20
Russia\Responsibility	0
Russia\Responsibility\They must press the Belarusian authorities to end the crisis an	1
Partners	1
Partners\Sweden	1
Partners\Estonia	0
Partners\Estonia\security commitment	1
Partners\Ukraine	0
Partners\Ukraine\EU-UA AA	0
Partners\Ukraine\Expectations from Ukraine	1
Partners\Ukraine\Ukraine and the United Kingdom are strategic partners in securi	0
Partners\ENP	1
Partners\ENP\Bosnia and Herzegovina	2
Partners\ENP\Bosnia and Herzegovina\UK's supports	3
Partners\ENP\Moldova & Georgia	2
Partners\ENP\Moldova & Georgia\G7	2
Partners\the US	0
Partners\the US\the framing of the Ukraine Crisis	1
Partners\the US\UK-US relations	2
Partners\the Visegrad Four	1
Partners\Poland	0

Enactment	2
Enactment\UN	2
Enactment\UN\Resolution on Ukraine	2
Enactment\UNSC	1
Enactment\Collective actions from many countries	1
Enactment\Cut down on reliance of Russia's oil and gas	1
Enactment\Cut down on reliance of Russia's oil and gas\Nord Stream 2	2
Enactment\NATO	0
Enactment\NATO\NATO eastern flank	2
Enactment\NATO\NATO eastern flank\the UK's contribution	4
Enactment\NATO\NATO-Russia Council	1
Enactment\Rebuilding Ukraine's economy	1
Enactment\the UK	8
Enactment\the UK\2014 Ukraine Crisis	0
Enactment\the UK\2014 Ukraine Crisis\NATO	1
Enactment\the UK\2014 Ukraine Crisis\Financial support to UA	1
Enactment\the UK\Support the OSCE	1
Enactment\the UK\diplomacy	1
Enactment\the UK\ICC investigations	2
Enactment\the UK\ICC investigations\Sex violence	1
Enactment\the UK\Domestic	1
Enactment\the UK\2022 Ukraine Crisis	1
Enactment\the UK\2022 Ukraine Crisis\non-lethal aid	1
Enactment\the UK\2022 Ukraine Crisis\lethal aid	11
Enactment\the UK\2022 Ukraine Crisis\lethal aid\international donor conference	1
Enactment\the UK\2022 Ukraine Crisis\lethal aid\building Ukraine's military capacities	2
Enactment\the UK\2022 Ukraine Crisis\financial aid	1
Enactment\the UK\2022 Ukraine Crisis\humanitarian aid	3
Enactment\the UK\offer training to Ukrainian army	0
Enactment\the UK\Sending financial experts to UA	6
Enactment\the UK\Security assistance	1
Enactment\the UK\Security assistance\investment in armed force	2
Enactment\G7	2
Enactment\G7\Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment	2
Enactment\G7\end dependence on Russian oil and gas permanently	2
Enactment\G7\coordinated sanctions with G7 allies	7

Enactment\the OSCE	5
Enactment\Ban on arm export to Russia	1
Enactment\Diplomacy	8
Enactment\Diplomacy\Geneva Talks	1
Enactment\Diplomacy\ bilateral diplomacy with Russia	4
Enactment\EU's collective actions	5
Enactment\EU's collective actions\EU-UA AA	2
Enactment\Economic sanctions	14
Enactment\Economic sanctions\the UK national sanction regime	12
Enactment\Economic sanctions\the UK national sanction regime\Economic Crime Bill	1
Enactment\Economic sanctions\EU	8
Enactment\Economic sanctions\EU\Minsk Agreement	1
UK's Values	3
UK's Values\shared values	2
UK's Values\renewed confidence in the strength of our values	1
UK's Values\freedom and democracy	20