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## EU integration attitudes guiding support for right-wing populists: The educational divide

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Thesis

RQ: Does the impact of EU integration attitudes on support for right-wing populist parties depend on educational attainment?

**“EU integration attitudes guiding support for right-wing populists: The educational divide”.**

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## Table of Contents

Introduction.....	2
Literature review and hypotheses.....	5
What are right-wing populist parties?.....	5
Major debates on support for RPPs .....	6
Anti-EU integration attitudes .....	8
Effect of educational attainment.....	11
Research Design .....	15
Case selection: Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS), 2019 .....	15
Data source: European Social Survey (ESS).....	16
DV: Support for RPPs .....	17
IV: EU integration attitudes.....	17
Moderator: Educational attainment .....	18
Statistical model.....	19
Control variables.....	20
Results and Analysis .....	21
Conclusion .....	25
References.....	29
Appendix A: Descriptive statistics and model assumptions .....	35
Appendix B: Control variables.....	44

## Introduction

The phenomenon of right-wing populist parties (RPPs) has been a topic of extensive scholarly discussion and has become more relevant as numerous RPPs assume roles in governments (Bayerlein 2021; De Lange & Van Der Brug, 2014; Greven, 2016; Halikiopoulou, 2018; Rooduijn). The causes of the rise of populism have also been subject to substantive debates, with socioeconomic and cultural explanations competing for relevance (Gidron & Hall 2020; Taşci, 2019; Wasil-Rusecka, 2020). Within the European Union (EU), an additional factor emerged: anti-EU integration sentiments which project both economic and cultural concerns of ‘losers of globalisation’ within the EU, causing the citizens to support RPPs (Santana, Zagórski & Rama, 2020, p. 291). However, relatively few studies have been conducted on the effect of anti-EU sentiments on the rise of RPPs, and even if the factor of EU attitudes has been included, it has been mainly studied in the context of Western European states (Kaya, 2018).

This study adds to the knowledge about the relationship between EU attitudes and support for RPPs, focusing its attention particularly on Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). It builds on the existing work of Santana, Zagórski and Rama (2020) and Bartels (2023), who find that negative EU integration attitudes in CEE boost support and voting for RPPs. Their findings are puzzling, since the public support for EU integration in CEEs generally is high, with over 70% of Eastern Europeans in favour of speeding up the EU integration process (Hobolt & De Vries, 2016). Despite the large support for EU integration, CEE governments often include or are challenged by RPPs, such as Fidesz in Hungary, PiS in Poland, ANO in Czechia or Direction – Social Democracy in Slovakia (Halikiopoulou 2018, Santana et al., 2020).

To contribute to the knowledge on the topic, the paper carries out a case study of Poland, which has been governed by an RPP, the Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – PiS), since 2015. During this time, Poland experiences democratic backsliding and a series of

conflicts with the EU over the rule of law and human rights (Holesch & Kyriazi, 2022; Sweeney, 2018). The frequent disputes between the Polish RPP government with the EU happened despite the favourable opinion 84% of Poles have on the EU (Wike, et al., 2019). It makes Poland an important CEE case study of the effect of EU integration attitudes on the support for RPPs. Unlike the two existing studies, this paper does not use the Polish post-2015 election data. Instead, the post-2019 election surveys are used to examine whether Santana, Zagórski and Rama's (2020) and Bartels' (2023) results hold true even with PiS returning as an incumbent party after its conflicts with EU institutions.

Studying support for PiS has also been chosen due to its increasingly Eurosceptic narrative and its salient anti-EU messages in the 2019 campaign (Cymer, 2022, p. 96; Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, 2019). Per Canavan's (2004) definition, a populist party reasserts people as a source of power which suggests that a populist party should be particularly prone to adjusting to people's demands. In that case, if PiS uses increasingly Eurosceptic narratives, this should also reflect increasing mainstream Euroscepticism amongst voters. However, Poles are among those nations with the most favourable opinion on the EU (Wike et al., 2019). The overwhelming support for the EU suggests that anti-EU sentiments would be an unlikely factor contributing to support for PiS, yet Santana, Zagórski and Rama (2020) find that it is. That is the puzzle this paper aims to address. If anti-EU integration attitudes lead to support for RPPs, and most Poles are not Eurosceptics, how come Eurosceptic sentiments contributed to electing PiS, a party known for employing Eurosceptic rhetoric?

This paper looks for the answer to this puzzling relationship between anti-EU attitudes and support for PiS in the role that education plays. Based on the previous literature on the moderating effect of education in support of RPPs, this paper expects that PiS's political advertising and populist rhetoric unequally influence the electorate, generating support for PiS amongst particularly, the lower educated (Bos & Van Der Brug, De Vreese, 2013; Schmuck &

Matthes, 2015). This effect of political advertising is potentially so strong that less educated people might be swayed by the influence of RPP's discourse and as a result support RPPs, even if that disagrees with their EU integration attitude. Therefore, this research compares the effect of EU integration attitude on support of RPPs amongst lower and higher-educated people. It aims to answer the following question: *Does the impact of EU integration attitudes on support for right-wing populist parties depend on educational attainment?*

The paper argues that negative EU integration attitudes increase the probability of supporting RPPs, and that this relationship is stronger amongst highly educated than amongst lower educated people. The results of the four binary logistic models from the 2019 election in Poland provide evidence that indeed, anti-EU integration attitudes increase the probability of supporting RPPs. The models also indicate a larger effect among the highly educated. However, due to a lack of statistical significance, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected with a very high level of precision.

The paper begins with a conceptualisation of right-wing populist parties and gives an overview of the most prominent factors of RPP support that have been discussed in previous literature: socio-economic and cultural factors. Then, the existing theory on the effect of EU integration attitudes and education on support for RPPs is considered and the hypotheses are presented. Furthermore, the research design section justifies the choice of Poland and PiS as a case study and the European Social Survey (ESS) as the data source. The variables are then operationalised, and the binary logistic models are presented. The following section analyses the results. The conclusion contains the contribution of the paper and recommendations for further research.

## Literature review and hypotheses

### What are right-wing populist parties?

To understand support for right-wing populist parties, one must know what is meant by populism and right-wing parties. There is a multitude of definitions and terms used to describe right-wing populist parties: extreme right, radical right, radical right-wing populism, national populism, new populism, populist nationalism, and others (Mudde, 2009, pp. 11-12). As Mudde (2009, p. 12) explains, the problem is not a lack of consensus over the definitions, but rather a lack of clear definitions. Some scholars define right-wing populism as a unified concept (Canovan, 2004) while some differentiate between radical right and populism. Greven (2016), for example, writes “Populism is a particular style of politics that is intricately related to particular political ideologies” (p. 2) which implies that populism is already linked to more extreme ideologies such as right-wing ideologies.

Scholars have struggled to agree upon a single definition of populism, and some have even raised concerns that populism might not have a set of core characteristics (Margalit 2019; Zaslove, 2008, p. 320). Zaslove (2008) highlights the disagreements on whether populism is “an ideology, a mentality or a political style” (p. 320). He determines, however, some core characteristics upon which academic literature has agreed, and defines populism as a party type that separates the common people from the elites by using ‘us vs. them’ discourse, highlights perceived threats, and is led by a charismatic and popular leader (Heinisch, 2003, p. 94; Zaslove, pp. 323-324). Conversely, Canovan (2004) focuses more on the people rather than party leadership. She defines populism, which she calls “New Populism”, as movements that challenge existing parties and mainstream policies and reassert people as the “rightful source of legitimate power” (Canovan, 2004, p. 242). She emphasizes that the new populist movements are on the right side of the political spectrum (Canovan, 2004). This paper combines various

conceptualisations, focusing on core aspects, and defines populism *as a centralised party type that challenges mainstream parties, reasserts popular rule, and exhibits the us vs them discourse.*

Right-wing parties stress traditional values and go even further, advocating cultural and ethnic autonomy (Heinisch, 2003, pp. 95-96). Mudde (2007, p. 23) conceptualises the extreme right as a ladder, starting at nativism and ending with extreme right. He defines the extreme radical right as containing elements of nativism and authoritarianism and antidemocracy (Mudde, 2007, pp. 23-24). Nativism refers to the idea that a state should only be inhabited by exclusive members of the native group and anything foreign or different to the characteristics of the nation is a threat (Mudde, 2007, p. 22). Authoritarianism pertains to strict submission to authority (Mudde, 2007, p. 23).

The combination of the definitions of populism and right-wing parties shows how right-wing populism adds a second layer to the ‘us vs them’ discourse (Greven, 2016, p. 1). This way, the *people* are defined as culturally homogenous, and their interests and identity are being contrasted with the identity and interests of *the other* be that migrants or other minorities (Greven, 2016, p. 1). Combining the definitions of various scholars, this paper defines RPPs as *parties characterised by nativist messages, and authoritarianist tendencies, employing ‘us vs them’ discourse with strong party leadership and emphasis on people as the legitimate source of power.*

### **Major debates on support for RPPs**

Most scholars have focused their research on the rise of RPPs by examining socio-economic factors and cultural factors (Gidron & Hall 2020; Kashynskiy, 2018; Orenstein & Bugarič 2022; Stanley & Czeńnik 2019; Taşci, 2019; Wasil-Rusecka, 2020). Additionally, anti-elitism and anti-leftism have been identified as contributing factors to the rise of RPPs (Wasil-



Rusecka, 2020). Presently, the prevailing view among scholars is that the success of populism is a consequence of a mix of factors, mainly economic and cultural ones (Gidron & Hall 2020; Kashynskiy, 2018; Orenstein & Bugarič 2022; Stanley & Czeńnik 2019; Taşci, 2019).

Various economic problems lead people to express support for right-wing populist parties. Taşci (2019, pp. 13-14) traces the root of support for RPPs to the Great Recession of 2008, and later to the 2009 Sovereign Debt and Banking Crisis, which led to financial instability and youth unemployment. These crises caused people to fear for their job security due to migrants taking over lower-skilled jobs and thus created support for RPP's anti-immigration platform (Taşci, 2019, p. 14). Orenstein and Bugarič (2022, pp. 177-178) build on this line of reasoning, claiming that the 2008 crisis became a trigger for a delayed expression of backlash against neoliberalism in Central and Eastern Europe. Gidron and Hall (2020, p. 1032) explain how the economic situation, such as increasing income inequality and outsourcing of manufacturing jobs abroad, created an insecurity and feeling of exclusion, particularly among low-skilled workers of highly developed economies. This feeling of economic marginalisation translates into a decline in attachment to the normative social order and makes people more likely to feel alienated from mainstream politics and to support radical parties, such as RPPs (Gidron & Hall, 2020, p. 1033).

An important cultural factor explaining the rise of RPPs is the threat perception of immigration. Whereas Gidron and Hall (2020) and Taşci (2019) contend that the immigration crisis heightens specifically economic insecurity, Margalit (2019) points to migrants' cultural perceived threat. The latter argues that the association between immigration and populism originates from social and cultural dimensions (Margalit, 2019, p. 163). Factors like changes in local culture and social dynamics, extend the impact of immigration beyond just economic considerations, to influencing society and civic culture (Margalit, 2019, p. 163). Those changes in the social order make room for "anti-elite, anti-liberal, and anti-immigration appeals" of RPPs

towards ‘losers of globalisation’ (Orenstein and Bugarič, 2022, p. 190). For example, RPP governments in Poland and Hungary developed a populist model grounded in the principles of conservative nationalism, natalism, and sovereignty (Orenstein & Bugarič, 2022, p. 190). In these countries, the RPPs in power rallied support by effectively employing the ideology of nationalistic objectives, such as promoting childbirth, limiting immigration, and supporting families (Orenstein & Bugarič, 2022, p. 190).

### **Anti-EU integration attitudes**

The paper is concerned with EU integration attitudes for three reasons: they embody the culture versus economy debate on RPP support, the topic has been less discussed in the literature on support for RPPs in the context of CEEs and EU integration attitudes are very relevant to the development of the European Union.

Firstly, the relationship between EU integration attitudes and RPPs relates to the culture versus economy debate. International trade and economic integration are categorised as economic and cultural threats in most of the literature (Santana et al., 2020). However, in the EU those processes are closely connected with the process of European integration (Santana et al., 2020). Those adversely affected by globalization are likely to be more Eurosceptic compared to those who benefit from it, and they may be drawn more to the populist and nationalist narratives advocated by RPPs (Santana et al., 2020). For example, the cultural and economic threats of immigration may be heightened by the currently proposed EU relocation mechanism and thus, turn threat perception into anti-EU integration sentiments (Kentmen-Cin & Erisen, 2017). Those who feel threatened may also then be drawn to the anti-EU narratives advocated by RPPs and therefore increase support for RPPs (Greven, 2016; Santana et al., 2020).

Secondly, relatively few studies have been conducted on the effect of EU integration attitudes on the support for RPPs, and even if the factor of EU attitudes has been included, it has been mainly studied in the context of Western European states (Kaya, 2018). As Santana, Zagórski and Rama (2020, p. 289) note, given the relevance of cases such as Poland and Hungary for democratic backsliding, it is surprising that so little scholarly attention has been given to populism in Central and Eastern Europe.

Furthermore, EU-integration attitudes are becoming an increasingly more relevant and debated concept in the European context and have even been called a ‘super issue’ or a ‘sleeping giant’ (De Vries, 2007; Otjes & Katsanidou, 2017). When aggregated, attitudes form mass political behaviour that both “shapes and constraints the process of European integration” (Gabel, 1998, p. 333). Gabel (1988, p. 333) goes as far as saying that aggregated attitudes form public support that provides the political foundation for EU integration. That is because public acceptance of EU law acts as an enforcement mechanism due to lack of EU’s own supranational enforcement mechanism (Gabel, 1998, p. 333). It shows that EU integration attitudes are relevant to EU integration processes and makes it equally interesting to see if integration attitudes are also important for national elections.

There are two crucial components of EU integration attitudes: EU integration as a process and attitudes towards it. Attitudes can be defined as “an enduring organization of several beliefs focused on a specific object (physical or social, concrete or abstract) or situation, predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner” (Rokeach, 1968, p. 550). EU integration can be understood as regional integration in economic, political, or social dimensions (Börzel, 2018, p. 477). Scholars have identified two different kinds of this process in the EU: deepening and widening (Hobolt, 2014; Nugent, 2017, p. 47). Widening refers to horizontal integration, i.e., the territorial expansion of the EU and the accession of new member states (Nugent, 2017, p. 47). Deepening refers to vertical integration which is the intensification

of integration processes as shown by the development of treaties, policy processes, and policies (Nugent, 2017, p. 47). This thesis is concerned with the ‘deepening’ aspect of EU integration as this has been the more salient political debate in Poland (Cianciara, 2014, p. 181).

The two main pieces of work that examine the direct relationship between EU integration attitudes and RPP support are both recent studies. Santana, Zagórski and Rama (2020) focus on six radical right populist parties within Central and Eastern Europe, looking for common reasons for casting votes for RPPs. Bartels (2023) looks at the relation of populism to the erosion of democracy, testing for the explanatory power of anti-EU unification attitudes. Both papers thus include an assessment of the impact of anti-EU unification attitudes on the support for right-wing populist parties as well as the 2015 electoral support for PiS in Poland similar to this case study. Both articles find that anti-EU sentiment played a role in the 2015 election PiS support. They use similar definitions of anti-EU feelings, the same data source – the 2016 European Social Survey, and similar statistical models testing the effects of the EU integration attitudes on the likeliness of voting for a right-wing populist party compared to a non-populist party. Bartels (2023, p. 201) found EU integration attitudes to have a *modest* effect and Santana, Zagórski and Rama (2020, pp. 279, 295) conclude that anti-EU feelings play a *substantial* part in electoral support for PiS.

The converging results of Santana and colleagues (2020) and Bartels (2023) serve as the justification for this paper’s hypothesis. People with more Eurosceptic attitudes are more likely to support RPPs whereas people with pro-EU integration views are less likely to support RPPs. This is expected because RPPs are often Eurosceptic which resonates with the citizens who lost out or feel threatened by the process of EU integration and thus formed Eurosceptic integration attitudes (Greven, 2016; Santana et al., 2020).


*H1: Higher support for EU integration is associated with a lower probability of supporting a right-wing populist party.*

### **Effect of educational attainment**

Previous research has shown that negative EU integration attitudes foster support for RPPs (Bartels, 2023; Santana, et al., 2020). However, various surveys show that Polish people are supportive of EU integration. 86% of Poles have a favourable opinion of the EU in general and 76.5% are neutral or supportive of EU integration specifically (ESS, 2020, Wike et al., 2019). Nevertheless, PiS managed to gather enough support to win, while emphasizing sovereignty and putting anti-EU integration messages at the forefront of their 2019 campaign (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, 2019). If anti-EU integration attitudes lead to support for RPPs, and most Poles are not Eurosceptics, how come Eurosceptic sentiments contributed to electing PiS, a party known for employing Eurosceptic rhetoric?

There are reasons to believe that the answer to this puzzle lies in the moderating impact of education. Previous research has shown that a lower or middle education levels have an impact on the probability of voting for extreme right, Eurosceptic, or populist parties (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Van Elsas, 2017). The 2019 election data reinforce the puzzle. Among ESS (2020) respondents, 75% of those without higher education (less than a bachelor's degree) are neutral or supportive of EU integration, and amongst people with higher education, this number is 80.3%. It shows that no matter the education group, there is widespread support for EU integration. However, support for PiS seems to decrease as the education level rises. As reported by TVN24 newspaper, in the 2019 elections, 63.3% of people with primary and middle school education voted for PiS, 64.0% of people with vocational education, 45.6% with secondary education and 36.6% of people with higher education cast a vote for PiS ("KO", 2019). PiS was in the lead for all education levels except for higher education ("KO", 2019).

As visible in Figure 1, also in ESS (2020) survey data, the share of higher education level is much lower amongst PiS voters than other voters. Those differences and previous findings on impact of education motivate this research paper to pose a question about the moderating role of education in support of RPPs.



*Figure 1: A stacked bar chart showing the percentage of votes for PiS and not for PiS with information on the educational level of voters. Own adaptation from the European Social Survey (2020)*

A potential mechanism through which education moderates the relationship between EU integration attitudes and support for RPPs is political rhetoric. PiS might have been able to use its political rhetoric to influence particularly the less educated people (Van Elsas, 2017). Ever since 2015 when PiS took power, they have assumed control over the national media, enabling them to use political rhetoric to control public opinion on a large scale (Leszczyńska, 2020). Tomal (2019) analysed the PiS leader’s discourse and found that Kaczyński adjusts his discourse on the EU to the situation and electorate. He engaged in more positive rhetoric before

the EU Parliament elections, but less favourable dialogue during the time in between (Tomal, 2019). However, the author does not discuss what electorate type is the one that the anti-EU integration messages are directed at. This research expects it to be the less educated electorate. This way, those in favour of the EU and EU integration could be influenced by PiS rhetoric to either change their attitudes about the EU or vote for PiS even though their EU integration position is inconsistent with PiS's position on the EU.

Previous research also reveals how the use of populist rhetoric and political advertising influences people with different educational attainment and how that discourse can generate support for a party (Bos et al., 2013; Schmuck & Matthes, 2015). Bos, Van Der Brug and De Vreese (2013) find that using populist rhetoric is successful in appealing to lower educated and creating legitimacy for RPPs. The populist rhetoric is understood as anti-establishment or anti-elitist appeals whereas legitimacy is understood as not posing a threat to democracy and is found to be important for electoral success (Bos et al., 2013). As Bos and colleagues (2013) explain, lower-educated people are more vulnerable and affected by the transition to post-industrial capitalist society, migration, and globalisation and thus feel insecure about certain aspects of their lives. Messages of the RPPs feed off that insecurity and promise protection from the changing world and a sense of identity (Bos et al., 2013). Additionally, RPPs tend to use simpler language and refer to ordinary people (Bos et al., 2013). Such populist rhetoric results in the lower educated being more attracted to RPPs (Bos et al., 2013).

This finding could be applied to Poland when PiS uses *us vs them* rhetoric, pitting the common people against EU institutions and EU elites. For example, PiS presented the previous governing coalition as unable to protect Polish cultural identity and values from the Brussels-based cosmopolitan elites (them) using anti-elitist and anti-EU messages and a narrative of institutional incompetence, which generated support for PiS to win the 2015 election (Stanley & Czeńnik, 2019, p. 79). Therefore, this paper hypothesizes that the populist, anti-EU rhetoric

employed by PiS played a role in garnering support during the 2019 elections, especially among individuals with lower educational attainment. This distorted the direct relationship between previous EU-integration attitudes and support for PiS, particularly amongst the less educated.

This expectation is further reinforced by the findings of Schmuck and Matthes (2015) on the appeal of political advertising of RPPs amongst younger voters. They find that economic threats from immigration propagated by RPPs are more appealing to the lower educated than they are to the higher educated (Schmuck & Matthes, 2015). This is because the economic situation of the less educated is more at risk with the threats presented by RPPs (Schmuck & Matthes, 2015). The less educated usually face more difficulties in the labour market and they directly compete with immigrants in the job and housing markets (Schmuck & Matthes, 2015). The difference in the appeal of threats of immigration among education levels can serve as an explanation of how RPPs use political advertising to effectively influence lower-educated people and thus generate support for themselves. During its first term in office (2015-2019), PiS used both symbolic and economic immigration threats. For example, it suggested that the re-location system proposed by the German-dominated EU was an attempt of to destroy Polish ethnic homogeneity (Stolarczyk, p. 35). PiS also emphasised the economic risks of immigrants posing competition to the labour market and resources (Legut & Pędziwiatr, 2018, p. 47).

The employment of populist rhetoric and political advertising by PiS can consequently exert influence, particularly among individuals with lower educational backgrounds, and thereby foster support for the party. This would weaken the link between their EU integration attitude and party preferences. Thus, the following hypothesis is posited.

*H2: The effect of EU integration attitudes on support for RPP is weaker amongst lower-educated people than higher-educated.*




## Research Design

### Case selection: Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS), 2019

Poland has been chosen as the case study, given that for the past eight years it was ruled by PiS, an RPP. During that time, it has experienced serious democratic backsliding, which makes it a relevant example of the threat to democracy that RPPs pose (Bernhard, 2021). PiS has been selected as it has been classified as a Eurosceptic far right, populist party according to the PopuList, thus making it relevant to the research question (Rooduijn et al., 2023). The PopuList dataset includes all populist, far left, or far right parties which have won at least one seat or a 2% vote in national parliaments in European countries. It also uses definitions consistent with Mudde (2004, 2007) and those employed by this paper. Far-right parties are considered as nativist and authoritarian, whereas populist as those contrast ‘the pure people ‘against ‘the corrupt elite’, emphasising the will of the people (Rooduijn et al., 2023, p. 3). The PopuList is thus an appropriate analytical tool which allows to confirm that the chosen party (PiS) is indeed a right-wing populist party.

Furthermore, as Figure 2 below shows, PiS voters seem to have more negative EU integration attitudes compared to other voters, thus making them an interesting case study to study the relationship between EU integration attitudes and support for RPPs.

The research takes into consideration the 2019 Parliamentary electoral support for PiS as this year PiS entered as an incumbent party. 2019 was also the year with the most recent Polish election with European Social Survey results available.



*Figure 2: Distribution of EU integration attitudes by party preferences in Poland in 2019. Own adaptation from the European Social Survey (2020)*

**Data source: European Social Survey (ESS)**

The research uses the ESS round 10SC edition 3.0, from 2020-2023. The European Social Survey contains a variety of indicators of people’s attitudes. The 10 SC edition was completed through either self-administers paper questionnaires or computer-assisted web interviewing (ESS, 2020). In Poland, the data was collected between 25-01-2022 and 25-05-2022 to which a proportional stratified probability sampling was used. The obtained response rate was 39.2% (ESS, 2020). It includes an indicator for self-reported vote cast for each of the Polish parties in the most recent election before the ESS round thus showing support for PiS, making it suitable to study the research’s dependent variable (DV). It also contains a measure of attitude towards EU integration, providing data on the independent variable (IV). It surveys people on their highest education level thus delivering the information on the moderator. Finally, the total N is 1512, and the N admitted to model is 1138 making it a suitable sample size for statistical analysis.

## **DV: Support for RPPs**

To study the effect of EU integration on support for RPPs, the support is operationalised *as the casting of a vote for it in the last national election*. For the Polish case study, it means voting for PiS in the 2019 election. Operationalising support for parties usually happens through measuring party affiliation, including actual voting behaviour or hypothetical voting behaviour, through either voting intentions or current party preference (Lutz & Lauener, 2020; Oesch, 2008).

The research uses ESS's (2020) question "Which party did you vote for in that election?". The data is then recoded into a binary variable when 0 is not voting for PiS and 1 is casting a vote for PiS. 73.2% of respondents declared they voted, out of that 41.4% voted for PiS and 58.6% voted for another party.

## **IV: EU integration attitudes**

There are multiple ways to study public attitudes towards EU integration. One can look at the diffuse support toward the EU, support for specific EU institutions, or support for further deepening and widening of EU integration (Hobolt, 2014, p. 665). The most common way to operationalise the EU integration attitude is through general questions on support for EU unification or on whether EU membership is perceived as 'good' (Hobolt, 2014, p. 665). More recently, there have been studies that consider widening of EU integration such as enlargement attitudes, especially when it comes to Turkey (Hobolt, 2014, p. 665). However, as this study is concerned primarily with the deepening aspect of EU integration, the IV will be operationalised *as public support for further deepening of EU integration*.

In the ESS, respondents were asked for their support for EU integration via this question: "Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further.

Others say it has already gone too far. Which number on the scale below best describes your position?" (ESS, 2020). Respondents were requested to position themselves on a scale from 0 (unification has gone too far) to 10 (Unification should go further). The variable is ordinal, with 11 categories and therefore it will be treated as continuous. The variable's mode is 5, the mean is 6.01, and the standard deviation is 2.979. The figure below shows the distribution of the responses.




Figure 3: Distribution of EU integration attitudes in Poland. Own adaptation from the European Social Survey (2020)

**Moderator: Educational attainment**

Educational attainment can be conceptualised as the *highest level of education that a person has successfully completed* (Schneider, 2016). It is operationalised through a binary variable: less than a bachelor's degree (or equivalent) or BA and above. Data on an obtained diploma, goes beyond academic competencies, signalling cognitive and learning abilities, discipline, and motivation (Schneider, 2016). This is consistent with Feldman's (2021) approach to measuring education as a moderator in his study of right-wing populism.

This paper uses the ESS generated variable (“eisced”) on highest educational attainment. It is a harmonised version of variable “edulvlb” that asked “Starting from the top and moving down the list, please select the highest level of education you have completed from these options. If you have not completed any of these, tick ‘None of these’ at the bottom” (ESS, 2020). Then, the variable was recoded into a binary variable where 0 is lower than a bachelor’s degree (for example secondary school, vocational school, sub-degrees) and 1 represents the successful completion of a bachelor’s degree and further studies.

### **Statistical model**

This paper conducts a binary logistic regression with support for EU integration as the IV, educational level as the moderator and a binary dependent variable of voting for PiS. It makes use of four models. Model 1 includes only IV, DV and control variables, where education is treated as control. This model tests the first hypothesis and the direct relation between EU integration attitudes and support for RPPs. Models 2, 3 and 4 aim to test the second hypothesis that accounts for differences in education. Model 2 selects only respondents with an education level lower than a BA and includes only IV, DV and control variables. Model 3 was conducted only on a sample of respondents who obtained at least a bachelor’s degree. Model 4 includes EU integration attitudes, educational level, the interaction term of EU attitudes and education, control variables and vote for PiS. To obtain meaningful information from the logistic models predicted probabilities will be compared of the lowest (0) and highest (10) reported EU integration attitudes.

The appendix shows the summary statistics (observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum) for each variable. It also contains details on assumption checks. There are neither concerns about data clusters nor multicollinearity. There are outliers present, but

they are not influential cases. This means that the model is less sensitive to extreme values, making it more robust.

### **Control variables**

The control variables include age, gender, income, urban dwelling, religiosity, and political ideology which are potential confounders and have been included as control variables in other studies (see Bartels, 2023; Santana et al., 2020). All the variables are contained in the ESS (2020) study. Gender has been recoded where 0 is male and 1 is female. Age is given in years and remains a scale variable. Income was determined in one of the 10 decile categories. Urban dwelling refers to the degree of urbanisation of the home place and was determined as categories from 1 (big city) to 5 (countryside). The religiosity was measured on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very religious) by asking “regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?” (ESS, 2020). Ideology was determined on a scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right) and respondents were asked to place themselves on this scale (ESS, 2020).

## Results and Analysis

**Table 1: Logistic regression model of casting a vote for PiS depending on EU integration attitudes**

	Model 1
(Constant)	-2.255*** (0.443)
Support for further EU integration	-0.167*** (0.028)
Education level (Ref. Lower education)	
Higher educated	-0.771*** (0.188)
Urban dwelling (Ref. Town)	
Big city	-0.288 (0.216)
Suburbs	0.035 (0.389)
Country Village	0.450* (0.191)
Countryside	0.167 (0.403)
Religiosity	0.179*** (0.032)
Gender (Ref. Male)	
Female	0.030 (0.162)
Age	-0.001 (0.005)
Income	-0.036 (0.031)
Ideology	0.378*** (0.443)
-2LL	1010.253
Cox and Snell's $R^2$	0.370
Nagelkerke's $R^2$	0.499
N	1138

*Note: binary logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets*

\*\*\*p<0.001, \*\*p<0.01, \*p<0.05

In hypothesis 1, this paper argued that EU integration attitudes negatively predict support for radical-right populist parties. Table 1 reports the results from a logistic regression model examining this claim. As hypothesised, the coefficient for EU integration support is negative and statistically significant ( $p < 0.001$ ). As support for EU integration increases, the probability of voting for PiS decreases. The magnitude of this change is substantial. When all control variables are held at their mean or modal values, respondents who reported being extremely against EU integration have a predicted probability of voting for PiS of approximately 56% while those who are very much in favour of EU integration have a predicted probability of voting for PiS of 25%. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that anti-EU integration attitudes promote voting for right-wing populist parties. Citizens use their EU integration attitudes to structure their support for RPPs. This paper, therefore, reaffirms the findings of Santana and his co-authors (2020) and Bartels (2023) and finds that their results were still applicable in the 2019 election with PiS running as an incumbent.

**Table 2: Logistic regression model of casting a vote for PiS depending on EU integration attitudes accounting for moderating effect of education**

	<b>Model 2: Low education</b>	<b>Model 3: High education</b>	<b>Model 4: Interaction</b>
(Constant)	-2.418*** (0.516)	-2.759** (0.929)	-2.360*** (0.452)
Support for further EU integration	-0.147*** (0.033)	-0.231*** (0.054)	-0.144*** (0.033)
Education level (Ref. Lower educated)			
Higher educated			-0.342 (0.395)
Support for EU integration x higher education			-0.076 (0.061)
Urban dwelling (Ref. Town)			



Big city	-0.056 (0.275)	-0.740* (0.366)	-0.287** (0.061)
Suburbs	0.590 (0.506)	-0.932 (0.687)	0.027 (0.392)
Country Village	0.539* (0.217)	0.270 (0.421)	0.463* (0.191)
Countryside	0.207 (0.466)	0.194 (0.797)	0.183 (0.403)
Religiosity	0.180*** (0.040)	0.181** (0.057)	0.179*** (0.032)
Gender (Ref. Male)			
Female	-0.063 (0.192)	0.310 (0.314)	0.041 (0.163)
Age	0.000 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.005)
Income	-0.044 (0.036)	0.006 (0.062)	-0.036 (0.031)
Ideology	0.375*** (0.038)	0.370*** (0.070)	0.367*** (0.033)
-2LL	709.560	209.004	1008.712
Cox and Snell's $R^2$	0.347	0.305	0.371
Nagelkerke's $R^2$	0.463	0.457	0.500
N	739	399	1138

*Note: binary logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets*

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$

Hypothesis 2 predicted that the effect of EU integration attitudes on support for RPPs is weaker amongst lower-educated people than higher-educated. Models 2 and 3 provide some evidence on the matter by showing results amongst the two different education levels. The coefficients of EU integration in Models 2, -0.147 [95% CI: 0.809, 0.992,  $p < 0.001$ ], and in Model 3, -0.231 [95% CI: 0.714, 0.882,  $p < 0.001$ ], in Table 2 suggest that EU integration attitudes of people with lower education are less predictive of their vote choice than it is for highly educated respondents. Model 1, which is based on responses of only lower educated expects the probability of voting for PiS of those most supportive of EU integration to be 33

percentage points higher than that of the least supportive. Model 2, based on responses of higher educated expected this difference to be 48 percentage points. Bigger differences across the spectrum of EU integration attitudes indicate a more substantive effect of EU integration attitudes on support for RPPs. Thus, consistent with the expectations, there is a bigger effect among the highly educated, where the differences across integration attitudes' spectrum is 15 percentage points larger than for the less educated. However, as the confidence intervals overlap, just assessing those models is not enough to reject the null hypothesis and provide sufficient evidence that the relationship between EU integration attitudes and support for RPPs is different between people with lower and higher education. Thus, Model 4, which includes the interaction term, is considered.

**Table 3: Predicted Probability of voting for PiS by education levels, based on Model 4**

	Low education (0)	High education (1)
Low support for EU integration (IV=0)	60%	52%
High support for EU integration (IV=10)	26%	11%

Table 3 reports the predicted probability of voting for PiS based on support for EU integration and education level, when all control variables are held at their mean or modal values. Hypothesis 2 expected there to be a bigger effect among the more highly educated. This would mean that the difference between the probability of voting for PiS amongst people with high and low EU integration support would be larger for people with high education rather than lower education. Indeed, this seems to be the case in Model 4. Out of respondents with an education lower than BA, those characterised by low support for EU integration are 34 percentage points more likely to vote for PiS than those with supportive attitudes toward EU integration. Out of respondents with an education higher than BA, those characterised by low support for EU integration are 41 percentage points more likely to vote for PiS than those with

supportive attitudes to EU integration. This is in line with the hypothesis, as it predicted that the effect of the relationship would be stronger amongst the higher educated. However, this difference between higher and lower educated is only 7 percentage points which does not make it very substantively significant. Additionally, the results of Model 4 on the interaction of EU integration attitudes and education level were not statistically significant ( $b=-0.076$ ,  $p=0.217$ ). The evidence from this model is in line with expectations from hypothesis 2, as there does seem to be a slightly larger effect of EU integration attitudes on support for PiS among the more highly educated, but the null hypothesis that the effect is the same, cannot be rejected with a high level of precision.

There are some potential reasons why the second hypothesis was found to be statistically and substantively insignificant. On one hand, lower educated people, who generally hold pro-EU integration attitudes, might be more easily influenced to vote for PiS, despite the lack of support toward PiS's EU stance and thus their probability of voting for PiS is higher than the hypothesis expected. Alternatively, there might be other strong pull factors that increase the probability of lower educated people voting for PiS which are more important than EU integration attitudes. In all models, political ideology, which was used as a control variable had a larger coefficient which can suggest it is a stronger predictor than EU integration attitudes. The reason for the small difference in the effect of EU integration attitudes on support for PiS among the educational groups could also be due to highly educated people with anti-EU integration views having other reasons that prevented them from voting for PiS, despite the overlapping EU views. There might be other, more salient reasons for disillusionment of educated people with PiS.

### **Conclusion**

This study examined the impact of EU integration attitudes on support for RPPs and considered the moderating role of education. It was motivated by the findings of Santana and

colleagues (2020) and Bartels (2023) who found that anti-EU integration attitudes make people more likely to vote for RPPs. This finding was puzzling in the context of CEE where people tend to have pro-integration attitudes, yet still RPPs are found in Polish and Hungarian governments and as challengers in Slovakia and Czechia (Halikiopoulou, 2018; Hobolt & De Vries 2016; Santana et al., 2020). The paper contributes to the topic with a case study of Poland and the 2019 electoral support for PiS, using ESS (2020) survey data. Even though the context changed from 2015 to 2019 due to PiS returning as the incumbent party with an intensified anti-EU integration rhetoric and after conflicts with the EU, the findings of this paper are consistent with the findings of Santana and colleagues (2020) and Bartels (2023). There is evidence that anti-EU integration attitudes make people more likely to vote for PiS.

The study also provides an initial finding on education's effect on this relationship. It seems to be the case that highly educated people are more affected by their EU integration attitudes than less educated. However, this difference between the two groups only ranges between 7 (as shown by model 4) and 15 (informed by models 2 and 3) percentage points and thus is neither statistically, nor substantively significant.

This low difference between the two groups points to the fact that highly educated people with anti-EU integration views have other reasons that prevent them from voting for PiS, despite overlapping EU views. More broadly, it means education might not only moderate this relationship, through the effect of political advertising and influencing the lower educated. Instead, education could be directly related to support for RPPs. The findings of this paper suggest that people with higher education are in general less likely to support RPPs, which would be consistent with previous findings of Oesch (2008) and Evans (2005). Oesch (2008) explained that education has a 'liberalising effect' which leads people to be more culturally open. Thus, it makes highly educated people less likely to perceive immigration as a cultural threat which in turn directly lowers their support for RPPs (Oesch, 2008, p. 352). This paper

suggests further research on the direct relationship between education and support for RPPs and further examination of education as a moderator, but with more educational attainment categories to get a fuller spectrum of data.

The paper is also limited by the data source. The 2020 ESS round gathered data in Poland in early 2022. This was a time when COVID was still a current issue in people's minds which potentially affected people's attitudes on EU integration depending on how they evaluated the EU's actions during the pandemic. This means there might be a systematic error. Additionally, the response rate is 39.2% which potentially introduced non-random errors as people who chose not to participate in the survey might be characterised by particular attitudes that are not reflected in the results of this study's models. This paper recommends going beyond observational data and conducting further experiment-based research on two educational groups to measure the direct effect of EU integration attitudes on support for RPPs. This could eliminate some of the issues associated with using survey data and some of the confounding variables.

Furthermore, this paper was limited to a single case study of the post-2019 elections in Poland. Further research should include a wider time frame, from 2015 to 2023. To understand the relationship between EU integration attitudes and support for PiS more in-depth, further studies could compare the salience of EU integration on the party level and individual level throughout 2015 till 2023. The aim would be to see how and if the increasingly anti-EU narrative of PiS raised the salience of EU-integration attitudes in national elections and if that increased support for PiS during this timeframe. This change would be interesting especially across 2015 to 2019. Before 2015 PiS was a challenger party with the ability to criticize the former 2011 to 2015 government for potentially disadvantageous Polish relationship with the EU, however, after 2015, PiS was the responsible incumbent party. It would be relevant to then compare these findings with the 2023 election when PiS did not receive an absolute majority.

This would allow to check if, during the most recent 2023 elections, people were guided by EU integration attitudes to a larger extent than before and if those elections reflected more accurately the favourability of the public towards the EU integration. Additionally, further studies on the moderating effects of education should be conducted on cases other than Poland.

Despite the limitations and undetermined results of the second hypothesis, this paper still contributes to the knowledge on the subject. The study replicated previous conclusions of Santana and colleagues (2020) and Bartel (2023) with application to the 2019 election, reaffirming their results. It attempted to understand the moderating effect of education on the relationship between EU integration attitudes and support for RPPs. Finally, the findings are not only relevant to Poland but for the broader understanding of populism. In 2023, Poles voted to government a non-RPP coalition and since then Poland has been expected to ‘return to the EU’ (Krastev, 2023). Understanding this benchmark election can turn out to be important in the real world and research on the decline of populist parties and EU integration attitudes. This paper and further research on the relationship between EU integration attitudes and RPPs could have implications for other EU countries with RPPs on the rise.

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## Appendix A: Descriptive statistics and model assumptions

### Descriptive statistics

Statistics

	Vote for PiS	Partly voted for in last national election, Poland (2019)	European Union: European unification go further or gone too far	Highest level of education, ES - ISCED	Education level	EUintegration_x_education	Domicile, respondent's description	How religious are you	Gender	Gender (original variable)	Household's total net income, all sources	Age of respondent, calculated	Placement on left right scale	City	Suburbs or outskirts	Country village	Countryside
N	Valid	1512	1512	2020	1994	1990	1991	1989	2001	2065	1579	1972	1965	1989	1989	1989	1989
	Missing	553	553	45	71	75	74	76	64	0	486	93	100	76	76	76	76
Mean		,4140	3,78	6,01	4,24	,3015	1,8915	2,88	5,22	,5167	1,52	5,50	48,99	5,56	,2363	,0508	,3358
Mode		,00	5	5	2	,00	,00	3	5	1,00	2	2	65 <sup>a</sup>	5	,00	,00	,00
Std. Deviation		,49272	1,634	2,979	2,980	,45903	3,29798	1,210	3,013	,49984	,500	2,885	18,928	2,881	,42492	,21960	,47240
Range		1,00	6	10	54	1,00	10,00	4	10	1,00	1	9	75	10	1,00	1,00	1,00
Minimum		,00	1	0	1	,00	,00	1	0	,00	1	1	15	0	,00	,00	,00
Maximum		1,00	7	10	55	1,00	10,00	5	10	1,00	2	10	90	10	1,00	1,00	1,00

a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown

### Multicollinearity

In Model 1, multicollinearity is low for all variables, ranging from 1 to 2 which is not a cause for concern.

Coefficients<sup>a</sup>

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	,081	,067		1,204	,229		
	European Union: European unification go further or gone too far	-,025	,004	-,155	-6,150	<,001	,879	1,137
	City	-,034	,030	-,031	-1,129	,259	,750	1,334
	Suburbs or outskirts	,000	,057	,000	-,004	,997	,910	1,099
	Country village	,098	,029	,092	3,362	<,001	,743	1,346
	Countryside	,021	,060	,008	,347	,728	,928	1,077
	How religious are you	,027	,005	,171	5,973	<,001	,678	1,475
	Gender	-,006	,024	-,006	-,256	,798	,950	1,052
	Age of respondent, calculated	,001	,001	,022	,870	,385	,857	1,166
	Household's total net income, all sources	-,012	,004	-,070	-2,691	,007	,832	1,202
	Placement on left right scale	,062	,005	,382	13,730	<,001	,717	1,394

a. Dependent Variable: Vote for PiS

In Model 2, multicollinearity is low for all variables, ranging from 1 to 2 which is not a cause for concern.

**Coefficients<sup>a</sup>**

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	,043	,083		,516	,606		
	European Union: European unification go further or gone too far	-,022	,005	-,134	-4,300	<,001	,908	1,101
	City	-,005	,043	-,004	-,122	,903	,788	1,268
	Suburbs or outskirts	,101	,081	,039	1,257	,209	,930	1,075
	Country village	,095	,036	,092	2,660	,008	,741	1,349
	Countryside	,028	,073	,012	,389	,697	,918	1,089
	How religious are you	,030	,006	,173	4,830	<,001	,684	1,463
	Gender	-,013	,031	-,013	-,416	,677	,953	1,050
	Age of respondent, calculated	,000	,001	,013	,406	,685	,840	1,190
	Household's total net income, all sources	-,007	,006	-,039	-1,226	,221	,862	1,160
	Placement on left right scale	,066	,005	,414	12,080	<,001	,751	1,331

a. Dependent Variable: Vote for PiS

In Model 3, multicollinearity is low for all variables, ranging from 1 to 2 which is not a cause for concern.

**Coefficients<sup>a</sup>**

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	,096	,114		,836	,403		
	European Union: European unification go further or gone too far	-,032	,007	-,222	-4,737	<,001	,806	1,241
	City	-,067	,043	-,077	-1,562	,119	,732	1,366
	Suburbs or outskirts	-,105	,076	-,062	-1,382	,168	,876	1,141
	Country village	,040	,056	,034	,708	,479	,782	1,279
	Countryside	,037	,117	,014	,315	,753	,951	1,051
	How religious are you	,022	,007	,162	3,247	,001	,711	1,407
	Gender	,039	,038	,046	1,035	,301	,893	1,120
	Age of respondent, calculated	,000	,001	,008	,176	,860	,936	1,068
	Household's total net income, all sources	,001	,007	,004	,096	,924	,887	1,127
	Placement on left right scale	,048	,008	,307	5,967	<,001	,665	1,503

a. Dependent Variable: Vote for PiS

In Model 4, multicollinearity is low for most variables, ranging from 1 to 2 which is not a cause for concern. The VIF values are elevated to 5 and 6 only for education and interaction terms, but as this was purposeful, it is not a cause for concern.

**Coefficients<sup>a</sup>**

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	,086	,068		1,253	,211		
	European Union: European unification go further or gone too far	-,023	,005	-,145	-4,865	<,001	,619	1,617
	Education level	-,100	,057	-,097	-1,742	,082	,178	5,621
	EUintegration_x_education	-,002	,008	-,018	-,302	,763	,161	6,214
	City	-,022	,030	-,020	-,718	,473	,742	1,347
	Suburbs or outskirts	,006	,056	,003	,114	,909	,909	1,100
	Country village	,085	,029	,080	2,899	,004	,727	1,375
	Countryside	,023	,061	,009	,378	,706	,927	1,078
	How religious are you	,027	,005	,166	5,788	<,001	,674	1,484
	Gender	,006	,024	,006	,267	,789	,931	1,074
	Age of respondent, calculated	,000	,001	,015	,609	,543	,857	1,167
	Household's total net income, all sources	-,005	,005	-,031	-1,128	,260	,743	1,346
	Placement on left right scale	,061	,004	,379	13,700	<,001	,719	1,391

a. Dependent Variable: Vote for PiS

### Independence of errors

Independence of errors can be assumed as there were no over-time clusters or geographical clusters. The data was gathered at a single point in time and the sampling ensured even geographical distribution of responses (ESS, 2020).

### Influential cases

In neither one of the four models, Cook's distance is larger than 1, therefore influential cases are not a cause for concern.

## Outliers

### Model 1

**resid\_329**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	1123	54,4	98,7	98,7
	1,00	15	,7	1,3	100,0
	Total	1138	55,1	100,0	
Missing	System	927	44,9		
Total		2065	100,0		

**resid\_258**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	1107	53,6	97,3	97,3
	1,00	31	1,5	2,7	100,0
	Total	1138	55,1	100,0	
Missing	System	927	44,9		
Total		2065	100,0		

**resid\_196**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	1077	52,2	94,6	94,6
	1,00	61	3,0	5,4	100,0
	Total	1138	55,1	100,0	
Missing	System	927	44,9		
Total		2065	100,0		

There is 1.3% of cases with standard residuals over 3.29, 1.5% of cases over 2.58 and 5.4% of cases over 1.96. This means that outliers are in fact a cause for concern. However as there are no influential cases, they should not distort the results too much.

### Model 2

**resid\_329**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	729	52,4	98,6	98,6
	1,00	10	,7	1,4	100,0
	Total	739	53,2	100,0	
Missing	System	651	46,8		
Total		1390	100,0		

**resid\_258**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	719	51,7	97,3	97,3
	1,00	20	1,4	2,7	100,0
	Total	739	53,2	100,0	
Missing	System	651	46,8		
Total		1390	100,0		

**resid\_196**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	698	50,2	94,5	94,5
	1,00	41	2,9	5,5	100,0
	Total	739	53,2	100,0	
Missing	System	651	46,8		
Total		1390	100,0		



There is 1.4% of cases with standard residuals over 3.29, 1.4% of cases over 2.58 and 5.5% of cases over 1.96. This means that outliers are in fact a cause for concern. However as there are no influential cases, they should not distort the results too much.

### Model 3

**resid\_329**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	393	65,5	98,5	98,5
	1,00	6	1,0	1,5	100,0
	Total	399	66,5	100,0	
Missing	System	201	33,5		
Total		600	100,0		

**resid\_258**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	390	65,0	97,7	97,7
	1,00	9	1,5	2,3	100,0
	Total	399	66,5	100,0	
Missing	System	201	33,5		
Total		600	100,0		

**resid\_196**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	378	63,0	94,7	94,7
	1,00	21	3,5	5,3	100,0
	Total	399	66,5	100,0	
Missing	System	201	33,5		
Total		600	100,0		

There is 1.5% of cases with standard residuals over 3.29, 2.3% of cases over 2.58 and 5.3% of cases over 1.96. This means that outliers are in fact a cause for concern. However as there are no influential cases, they should not distort the results too much.

### Model 4

**resid\_329**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	1123	54,4	98,7	98,7
	1,00	15	,7	1,3	100,0
	Total	1138	55,1	100,0	
Missing	System	927	44,9		
Total		2065	100,0		

**resid\_258**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	1107	53,6	97,3	97,3
	1,00	31	1,5	2,7	100,0
	Total	1138	55,1	100,0	
Missing	System	927	44,9		
Total		2065	100,0		

**resid\_196**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	.00	1078	52,2	94,7	94,7
	1,00	60	2,9	5,3	100,0
	Total	1138	55,1	100,0	
Missing	System	927	44,9		
Total		2065	100,0		

There is 1.3% of cases with standard residuals over 3.29, 1.5% of cases over 2.58 and 5.3% of cases over 1.96. This means that outliers are in fact a cause for concern. However as there are no influential cases, they should not distort the results too much.

## Outputs of logistic regression

### Model 1

		Variables in the Equation					95% C.I. for EXP(B)		
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	Lower	Upper
Step 1 <sup>a</sup>	European Union: European unification go further or gone too far	-,167	,028	35,741	1	<,001	,846	,801	,894
	Education level	-,771	,188	16,765	1	<,001	,463	,320	,669
	City	-,288	,216	1,783	1	,182	,749	,491	1,145
	Suburbs or outskirts	,035	,389	,008	1	,928	1,036	,483	2,221
	Country village	,450	,191	5,587	1	,018	1,569	1,080	2,279
	Countryside	,167	,403	,171	1	,679	1,181	,536	2,603
	How religious are you	,179	,032	31,368	1	<,001	1,197	1,124	1,274
	Gender	,030	,162	,034	1	,854	1,030	,749	1,417
	Age of respondent, calculated	-,001	,005	,034	1	,853	,999	,989	1,009
	Household's total net income, all sources	-,036	,031	1,374	1	,241	,964	,908	1,025
	Placement on left right scale	,378	,033	128,380	1	<,001	1,460	1,367	1,559
	Constant	-2,255	,443	25,944	1	<,001	,105		

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: European Union: European unification go further or gone too far, Education level, City, Suburbs or outskirts, Country village, Countryside, How religious are you, Gender, Age of respondent, calculated, Household's total net income, all sources, Placement on left right scale.

### Model Summary

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	1010,253 <sup>a</sup>	,370	,499

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by less than ,001.

Model 1: Predicted probability of voting for PiS when EU integration attitudes are at its minimum (IV=0) is 64%. Predicted probability of voting for PiS when EU integration attitudes are at its maximum (IV=10) is 64%.

## Model 2

### Variables in the Equation

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% C.I. for EXP(B)	
							Lower	Upper
Step 1 <sup>a</sup>								
European Union: European unification go further or gone too far	-,147	,033	19,340	1	<,001	,863	,809	,922
City	-,056	,275	,041	1	,840	,946	,552	1,621
Suburbs or outskirts	,590	,506	1,361	1	,243	1,804	,670	4,861
Country village	,539	,217	6,151	1	,013	1,714	1,120	2,624
Countryside	,207	,466	,197	1	,657	1,230	,493	3,068
How religious are you	,180	,040	20,685	1	<,001	1,197	1,108	1,293
Gender	-,063	,192	,108	1	,742	,939	,644	1,368
Age of respondent, calculated	,000	,006	,000	1	,983	1,000	,988	1,011
Household's total net income, all sources	-,044	,036	1,479	1	,224	,957	,891	1,027
Placement on left right scale	,375	,038	97,504	1	<,001	1,455	1,351	1,568
Constant	-2,418	,516	21,937	1	<,001	,089		

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: European Union: European unification go further or gone too far, City, Suburbs or outskirts, Country village, Countryside, How religious are you, Gender, Age of respondent, calculated, Household's total net income, all sources, Placement on left right scale.

### Model Summary

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	709,560 <sup>a</sup>	,347	,463

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by less than ,001.

Model 2 (low educated respondents only): Predicted probability of voting for PiS when EU integration attitudes are at its minimum (IV=0) is 57%. Predicted probability of voting for PiS when EU integration attitudes are at its maximum (IV=10) is 24%.

### Model 3

#### Variables in the Equation

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% C.I. for EXP(B)	
								Lower	Upper
Step 1 <sup>a</sup>	European Union: European unification go further or gone too far	-,144	,033	18,919	1	<,001	,866	,811	,924
	Education level	-,342	,395	,750	1	,387	,711	,328	1,540
	EUintegration_x_education	-,076	,061	1,521	1	,217	,927	,822	1,046
	City	-,287	,216	1,765	1	,184	,750	,491	1,146
	Suburbs or outskirts	,027	,392	,005	1	,946	1,027	,476	2,214
	Country village	,463	,191	5,876	1	,015	1,588	1,093	2,309
	Countryside	,183	,403	,207	1	,649	1,201	,546	2,646
	How religious are you	,179	,032	31,097	1	<,001	1,196	1,123	1,274
	Gender	,041	,163	,062	1	,803	1,041	,757	1,433
	Age of respondent, calculated	-,001	,005	,069	1	,793	,999	,989	1,008
	Household's total net income, all sources	-,036	,031	1,366	1	,243	,964	,908	1,025
	Placement on left right scale	,376	,033	126,660	1	<,001	1,456	1,364	1,554
	Constant	-2,360	,452	27,315	1	<,001	,094		

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: European Union: European unification go further or gone too far, Education level, EUintegration\_x\_education, City, Suburbs or outskirts, Country village, Countryside, How religious are you, Gender, Age of respondent, calculated, Household's total net income, all sources, Placement on left right scale.

#### Model Summary

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	293,004 <sup>a</sup>	,305	,457

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than ,001.

Model 3 (highly educated respondents only): Predicted probability of voting for PiS when EU integration attitudes are at its minimum (IV=0) is 61%. Predicted probability of voting for PiS when EU integration attitudes are at its maximum (IV=10) is 13%.

## Model 4

### Variables in the Equation

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% C.I. for EXP(B)	
							Lower	Upper
Step 1 <sup>a</sup> European Union: European unification go further or gone too far	-,231	,054	18,472	1	<,001	,793	,714	,882
City	-,740	,366	4,093	1	,043	,477	,233	,977
Suburbs or outskirts	-,923	,687	1,806	1	,179	,397	,103	1,527
Country village	,270	,421	,411	1	,522	1,309	,574	2,987
Countryside	,194	,797	,059	1	,808	1,214	,255	5,788
How religious are you	,181	,057	10,110	1	,001	1,198	1,072	1,340
Gender	,310	,314	,972	1	,324	1,364	,736	2,525
Age of respondent, calculated	-,003	,010	,091	1	,763	,997	,978	1,016
Household's total net income, all sources	,006	,062	,010	1	,921	1,006	,891	1,137
Placement on left right scale	,370	,070	27,772	1	<,001	1,448	1,262	1,662
Constant	-2,759	,929	8,826	1	,003	,063		

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: European Union: European unification go further or gone too far, City, Suburbs or outskirts, Country village, Countryside, How religious are you, Gender, Age of respondent, calculated, Household's total net income, all sources, Placement on left right scale.

### Model Summary

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	1008,712 <sup>a</sup>	,371	,500

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by less than ,001.

## Appendix B: Control variables

Descriptive statistics of control variables only

		Statistics									
		Education level	City	Suburbs or outskirts	Country village	Countryside	How religious are you	Gender	Age of respondent, calculated	Household's total net income, all sources	Placement on left right scale
N	Valid	1990	1989	1989	1989	1989	2001	2065	1972	1579	1965
	Missing	75	76	76	76	76	64	0	93	486	100
Mean		,3015	,2363	,0508	,3358	,0362	5,22	,5167	48,99	5,50	5,56
Median		,0000	,0000	,0000	,0000	,0000	5,00	1,0000	49,00	5,00	5,00
Mode		,00	,00	,00	,00	,00	5	1,00	65 <sup>a</sup>	2	5
Std. Deviation		,45903	,42492	,21960	,47240	,18683	3,013	,49984	18,928	2,885	2,881
Minimum		,00	,00	,00	,00	,00	0	,00	15	1	0
Maximum		1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	10	1,00	90	10	10

a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown

All controls and questions come from the European Social Survey (2020)

- Education (used as a control in Model 1)
  - Respondents were asked the following question: “Starting from the top and moving down the list, please select the highest level of education you have completed from these options. If you have not completed any of these, tick ‘None of these’ at the bottom.”
  - The variable was later recoded in 0 as lower education and 1 as higher education (BA and above) (mode = 0, SD= 0.459)
- Urban dwelling
  - Respondents were asked the following question: “Which of the following phrases best describes the area where you live?” with options of answers of 1- a big city, 2- suburbs or outskirts of big city, 3- town or small city, 4- country village, 5-farm, or a house in countryside. (mode = 3, SD = 1.21)
- Religiosity

- Question asked: “Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?”. 0 marked not religious at all and 10 meant very religious. (mean = 5.22, SD = 3.01)
- Gender
  - Question: “What is your sex?”, where 1 was male and 2 was female.
  - The variable was then recoded to where 0 was male and 1 was female (mode = 1, SD = 0.4)
- Age
  - The variable for age was a calculated variable that came from another variable that asked the question of “In which month and year were you born?” (mean 48.99, SD=18.93)
- Income
  - Question: “What is your household’s total income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources?”. Respondents were asked to classify themselves in income deciles from 1 to 10<sup>th</sup> decile. (mean =5.5, SD=2.89)
- Ideology
  - The question posed: “In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right”. Where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?”. (mean=5.56, SD=2.89)