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Do Values Matter? Exploring the Impact of Human Values on Attitudes Toward EU Integration

Haßelt, Charlotta van

Citation

Haßelt, C. van. (2024). *Do Values Matter?: Exploring the Impact of Human Values on Attitudes Toward EU Integration*.

Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown)

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Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3715410>

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).



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Do Values Matter? Exploring the Impact of Human Values on Attitudes Toward EU Integration

Charlotta van Haßelt, s3087220

BSc Thesis

Department of Political Science, Leiden University

Supervisor: Dr. J. A. Robison

Second Reader: Dr. J. B. Schulhofer-Wohl

Word count: 7473

December 21, 2023

Embargo Statement: Public

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Introduction

Once considered a purely elite-driven process far removed from the public, European integration has become subject to mass politics in recent years (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). The European Union (EU) has grappled with a series of crises in the past decade, such as the 2009 Euro and 2015 refugee crises, prompting citizens to recognize the tangible impact of EU politics on their daily lives (De Vries, 2020). As a result, there has been a surge in popular contestation regarding the future of EU integration (De Vries, 2020; Dennison et al., 2021). On the one hand, this is evident in the electoral success of Euroskeptic parties across member states, and the UK's decision to exit the European Union (Dennison et al., 2020). On the other hand, there is a growing endorsement of pro-European parties and policies throughout the member states (Dennison et al., 2021).

Scholarly investigations into attitudes toward EU integration have identified factors like identity, immigration stance, and economic interests as crucial determinants (Boomgarden et al., 2011; De Vries, 2020; Gabel et al., 1998; Garry & Tilley, 2014; Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Houde et al., 2023; Luedtke, 2005). A less-explored yet potentially influential factor is basic human values, also referred to as personal values (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1994). Research suggests that personal values act as foundational guiding principles, shaping individuals' political attitudes (Goren, 2022; Goren et al., 2020; Sagiv & Schwartz, 2021). Every person possesses a distinct and enduring set of values (Schwartz, 1992). These values, remarkably stable across different situations, provide insight into the deeper motivations influencing attitudes and behaviors (Schwartz, 1994). This includes attitudes toward complex issues like EU integration as well as those factors identified as impacting attitude formation toward EU integration by previous research (Dennison et al., 2021). For individuals to determine their stance on issues such as immigration policy, economic interests, and identity perceptions, they

must know what is meaningful to them, and that is dictated by their personal values (Feldman, 1988).

Even though human values appear to be an important factor in attitude formation, few studies address the influence of human values on attitude formation within the EU context, and those that do are limited to particular issue areas. Dennison et al. (2020) for instance study the impact of human values on voting behavior in the Brexit referendum. Naturally, the findings of their study are limited to a British context, inadvertently excluding the broader European perspective. Moreover, previous research is focused on attitudes toward EU membership instead of EU integration (Dennison et al., 2020; Dennison et al., 2021). Distinguishing between the two is important, as people may support EU membership while differing on the level of integration they prefer and vice versa (Boomgaarden et al., 2011). There thus remains a significant gap in the existing literature, which is why this research attempts to answer the following question: *What is the effect of human values on attitudes toward EU integration?*

It will be argued that people's personal values significantly impact their attitudes toward EU integration. This is because people's actions and attitudes are driven by the inherent motivational goals prescribed by their personal values (Schwartz, 2012). People are more likely to support EU integration if they perceive it as aligned with their personal values. Conversely, if integration conflicts with their personal values, they may be less supportive. Based on Schwartz's (1992) conceptualization of basic human values, it will be posited that both 'Conservation values', centering around tradition and the preservation of the status quo, and 'Self-Enhancement' values, which prioritize the pursuit of power, dominance, and admiration, will align with a negative perspective on EU integration. In contrast, 'Openness to Change' values, highlighting autonomy and self-expression, along with 'Self-Transcendence' values, emphasizing tolerance and equality, will be linked to heightened support for EU integration.

This argument is tested using data from the 9th round of the European Social Survey (ESS). I find mixed support for this proposition. Whilst human values generally influence attitudes toward EU integration, there is a discernable difference in impact magnitude between the socially focused values, ‘Conservation’ and ‘Self-Transcendence’, and the personally focused values ‘Openness to Change’ and ‘Self-Enhancement’, with the latter exhibiting a diminished impact. The implications of this will be addressed in the conclusion.

The following paper first reviews previous research on the formation of attitudes toward EU integration, primarily focused on existent explanations for variations between attitudes. This is followed by introducing the concept of human values and their influence on attitude formation. The paper then discusses Schwartz’s (1992) value theory and its usefulness for examining the impact of human values on attitudes toward EU integration. Finally, the research design and the subsequent analysis will be outlined, before concluding with a discussion of the results and their implications.

EU integration

EU integration in this research refers to the strengthening and broadening of cooperation among EU member states, often via more unified institutions and policies (Nugent, 2017). Over an extended period, public opinion was considered insignificant in the study of European integration (De Vries, 2020; Hooghe & Marks, 2009). Neo-functionalists as well as liberal intergovernmentalists considered European integration to be a purely technocratic, elite-driven process, that was met with a general sense of approval among an indifferent European citizenry (De Vries, 2020; Hooghe & Marks, 2009). Over the past few decades, however, EU integration has transitioned into a political project, adopting a system of multi-level governance, in which member states jointly exercise policy-making power alongside

supranational EU institutions (De Vries, 2020). This change in the balance of power was accompanied by increased public contestation of the process of EU integration (De Vries, 2020). Attention therefore shifted towards theories explaining EU integration centered around individual attitudes and public opinion.

Research has found that public opinion on EU integration is structured around two distinct issue dimensions: a socio-economic dimension and a socio-cultural dimension (Abdallah, 2023; Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Schwartz, 1994). From a socio-economic/utilitarian perspective, EU integration hinges on considerations surrounding labor and social security, as well as economic prosperity (Helbing et al., 2010). Citizens are inclined to favor EU integration if it benefits them personally or the national economy as a whole (De Vries & Edwards, 2009; Gabel, 1998; Garry & Tilley, 2014). On socio-economic grounds, opposition toward EU integration is often based on arguments suggesting that the EU poses a threat to the national welfare system and the independence of individual states in shaping their social policies (De Vries & Edwards, 2009). Economic anxieties have been shown to be predictive of negative attitudes toward EU integration (Garry & Tilley, 2014).

From a socio-cultural/identity perspective, public opinion on EU integration varies as a function of identity (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). This view derives from social identity theory, which suggests that individuals are naturally inclined to safeguard the territory, cultural, social, and political spaces that resonate with their identity against external influences (Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Dennison et al., 2020). One's identity and sense of belonging significantly influence actions and decision-making across various aspects of life. Hence, identity may shape preferences about the delegation of powers, solidarity with fellow Europeans, and the redistributive policies of the EU (Carl et al., 2019; Dennison et al., 2020). Individuals usually have multiple identities ranging from the local, over the national, to the supranational level

(Hooghe & Marks, 2009). What matters for EU integration is the relation between various group identities a person possesses and how these identities are mobilized in elite discussion. The stronger an individual's exclusive identification with an ingroup, the less inclined they are to support a jurisdiction that includes outgroups (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). Therefore, individuals with a highly exclusive national identity are more likely to oppose EU integration, compared to individuals with highly inclusive identities in which national and European identities co-exist (De Vries, 2020; Helbing et al., 2010; Hooghe & Marks, 2009).

Whilst there appears to be a broad consensus that public opinion on EU integration is structured along both a socio-economic and a socio-cultural dimension, the question remains as to what makes people position themselves on issues within these two dimensions. Based on previous research this paper suggests that this can to a large extent be attributed to underlying psychological predispositions in the form of personal values.

Values

Personal values can be defined as “broad desirable goals that motivate people’s actions and serve as guiding principles in their lives” (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2022, p. 518). Individuals vary in the significance they place on particular values (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2022; Piruko et al., 2011). The more important a personal value is deemed to be, the more likely it is to inform an individual’s attitude or behavior. Personal values are highly stable and usually apply across various situations and over time – if a person places great emphasis on security, they will assign significance to feeling safe in every relationship and situation (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2022).

Research has shown that personal values are predictive of attitudes and behavior in a wide variety of contexts (Abdallah, 2023; Feldman, 1988; Goren, 2016; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1994). Attitudes are defined as “an individual’s disposition to react with a certain

degree of favorableness or unfavorableness to an object, behavior, person, institution or event” (Davidov & Meuleman, 2012, p. 760). A person’s reaction toward a particular object or situation will be influenced by whether the achievement or hindrance of the object aligns with the motivational goals associated with one’s values (Davidov & Meuleman, 2012). If a particular object or situation is in harmony with what a person values, their attitude toward it is likely to be positive. On the contrary, if it goes against their valued goals, their attitude will likely be negative (Davidov & Meuleman, 2012). Personal values act as a way for people to express what they care about, not just to others but also to themselves. Living according to one’s personal values can have positive emotional consequences, boosting self-esteem, and confirming one’s sense of identity (Goren, 2022). Conversely, value incongruence can create negative emotional consequences, such as uncomfortable feelings of dissonance caused by inconsistency between values and attitudes (Grey & Bjorklund, 2018). In summary, the relationship between personal values, goals, and attitudes plays a crucial role in shaping how people perceive and react to various aspects of life (Davidov & Meuleman, 2012).

Personal values also organize beliefs and emotions directed at political issues. Political values such as egalitarianism, civil liberties, or ethnocentrism are an expression of core personal values in the political world (Goren, 2022; Goren et al., 2016; Piruko et al., 2011; Schwartz et al., 2010). Most prior research on the role of values in politics is focused on isolating one or two political values believed to influence attitudes in a narrowly defined issue area (see Bansak et al., 2020; Converse, 1964; Goren et al., 2016). This neglects broader, underlying value systems and therefore leads to a highly fragmented field in the study of values in political science (Goren et al., 2016). This study aims to address this limitation by examining these systems of human values and providing a more comprehensive account of their role in the formation of attitudes toward EU integration.

Schwartz's Value Theory

A theoretical framework that is prominently featured in most previous research on the effect of human values on public opinion in politics is Schwartz's value theory (Rathbun et al., 2016). Schwartz (1992, 1994) poses that ten human values are universally recognized by all human beings. Table 1 outlines the ten value types based on the motivational goals they express.

The model arranges these values in a circular structure, as depicted in Figure 1. Values with closely aligned motivational goals are positioned adjacent to each other, while those with the least similarity in goals are situated opposite each other (Schwartz et al., 2014). The theory posits that the ten values can be further organized into four overarching value types. Values aligning in their higher-order dimension should exhibit a strong correlation (Schwartz, 1994). For instance, a person scoring high in the 'Achievement' value is likely also to score high in 'Power' since both fall within the higher order dimension 'Self-Enhancement'. 'Hedonism' occupies a position between the dimensions 'Self-Enhancement' and 'Openness to Change'.

The four value types can further be categorized into socially and personally focused values. 'Openness to Change' and 'Self-Enhancement' revolve around individual expression and personal characteristics, whereas 'Self-Transcendence' and 'Conservation' reflect a social focus, placing importance on interpersonal relationships and their impact on others (Schwartz, 2020; Goren et al., 2020; Rathbun et al., 2016). Prior research investigating the relative influence of these dimensions within politics has found that values falling within the socially focused dimensions have a significantly greater effect on attitude formation compared to those within the personally focused dimensions as they align more closely with discussions and considerations surrounding social and political issues (Goren et al., 2016).

Table 1 *Schwartz value types*


1. *Universalism values*—understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the well-being of everyone and nature
 2. *Benevolence values*—preserving and enhancing the welfare of those with whom one is in frequent personal contact
 3. *Conformity values*—restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses that are likely to upset or harm others and break social expectations or norms
 4. *Tradition values*—respect for, commitment to, and acceptance of the customs and ideas embodied by one’s culture or religious standards
 5. *Security values*—safety, harmony, and stability of the self, personal relationships, and society
 6. *Power values*—social status and prestige, control of or dominance over people and resources
 7. *Achievements values*—personal success acquired by demonstrating competence according to social standards
 8. *Hedonism values*—pleasure or sensuous gratification for oneself
 9. *Stimulation values*—excitement, novelty, and challenges in life
 10. *Self-direction values*—independent thought and action, choosing creating, exploring
-

Source Adapted from (Goren et al., 2016, p. 980; Schwartz, 1994, p. 22)

Schwartz’s value model has successfully been used to predict variation in attitudes by cross-cultural psychologists in numerous studies worldwide for the last four decades (Goren et al., 2022). Within political science research, these values have been shown to correlate with people's left-right and liberal-conservative positions, as well as their positions on economic, socio-cultural, and national security issues (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Goren et al., 2016;

Goren et al., 2020; Piruko et al., 2011; Rathbun et al., 2016; Schwartz et al., 2010). These findings are consistent across different disciplines and countries, suggesting that the set of values identified by Schwartz is well-suited for this research.

Figure 1 *Adapted version of Schwartz’s value model*



Source Adapted from (Schwartz, 1994, p. 24; Schwartz, 1992, p. 14)

Application and Hypotheses

The fundamental relationship between personal values and attitudes is that individuals will opt to think and act in a manner that aligns with what best fosters the realization of the goals underlying their prioritized values (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2022). One can therefore expect that certain human values will affect attitudes toward EU integration if integration has consequences that are relevant to the attainment of the motivational goals associated with these

values (Davidov & Meuleman, 2012). With this in mind, clear predictions can be made concerning the connection between personal values and attitudes toward further EU integration.

‘Conservation’ values highlight an inclination to avoid conflict, unpredictability, and change and emphasize keeping the status quo (Schwartz et al., 2014). In a study on the impact of human values on attitudes toward Brexit, Davidov and Meuleman (2012) for instance show that scoring high on values grouped under ‘Conservation’ indicates an increased chance for a leave vote. They attribute this to a conflict between traditional national sovereignty and the increasing EU jurisdiction, as well as the danger of having to follow laws imposed by the EU that could be harmful to Britain. Additionally, by definition further EU integration is associated with change, which conflicts with a need to keep the status quo (Dennison et al., 2021). More generally, it has been found that conservation values correspond with a more exclusive national identity (Dennison et al., 2021; Roccas et al., 2010), and negative attitudes toward immigration (Davidov & Meuleman, 2012), both factors associated with a more negative attitude toward EU integration on the socio-cultural dimension (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998). From this derives the first hypothesis:

H1: Conservation values will be negatively correlated with support for further EU integration.

‘Openness to Change’ values are associated with the goal of autonomy and self-expression (Schwartz, 1992). As mentioned earlier, ‘Hedonism’ shares characteristics with both ‘Self-Enhancement’ and ‘Openness to Change’ and may fit within both dimensions. However, as per Schwartz (2012), similarly to ‘Self-Direction’ and ‘Stimulation’, ‘Hedonism’ represents a value that is free from anxiety, meaning it is not driven by the need for self-protection or personal advancement (Schwartz, 2012). In contrast, the values grouped under ‘Self-

Enhancement’ are inherently motivated by a desire to improve oneself and dominate, which makes them anxiety driven (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2022; Schwartz, 2012). Consequently ‘Hedonism’ is considered under the higher dimension of ‘Openness to Change’ as it can be argued that it aligns more appropriately with this dimension.

It is more difficult to situate ‘Openness to Change’ values within the context of EU integration, given their inward focus, and there is reason to believe that their impact on attitude formation will be less significant in comparison to socially focused values (Goren et al., 2022). However, it has been argued, that values such as ‘Hedonism’ or ‘Self-Direction’ may be linked to the support of freedom for sexual minorities, for which the EU is an important advocate and vehicle (Abdallah, 2023). This may be a result of the media and cultural representations depicting sexual minorities as hedonistic (engaging in pleasure-seeking behaviors) (Abdallah, 2023). Further, the EU as an inherently liberal project puts great emphasis on protecting and promoting the freedom and rights of individuals, which may be conducive of the values included under ‘Openness to Change’ (Abdallah, 2023). Attributing high importance to ‘Openness to Change’ values has further been found to correspond to a weaker national identity (Roccas et al., 2010). It is therefore hypothesized that:

H2: Openness to Change values including Hedonism will be positively correlated with support for further EU integration.

‘Self-Transcendence’ values in essence are concerned with the tolerance, appreciation, and protection of the welfare of all people and nature (Schwartz, 1992). As such valuing ‘Self-Transcendence’ has been shown to correspond positively with accepting immigration (Davidov & Meuleman, 2012), adopting a more inclusive identity, supporting egalitarian policies (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998), and – within a US context – adopting a more cooperative international posture (Rathbun et al., 2016). For individuals valuing ‘Self-Transcendence’, the transnational

nature of EU integration and the strengthening of cooperation under a common institutional framework may be perceived as an opportunity to dismantle barriers, reduce intolerance, foster understanding among people, and effectively address collective action problems (Dennison et al., 2020). Moreover, the EU's prominent role in environmental protection – which hinges on greater cooperation and collective action – may appeal to people with strong ‘Self-Transcendence’ values (Dennison et al., 2020). This suggests that:

H3: Self-transcendence values will be positively correlated with support for further EU integration.

‘Self-Enhancement’ values emphasize the importance of overcoming potential sources of anxiety through the attainment of dominance or admiration (Schwartz, 1992). Again, given the inward focus of ‘Self-Enhancement’ values it is difficult to attribute a distinct role to them and their impact may be less significant (Goren et al., 2020; Goren et al., 2022). ‘Self-Enhancement’ values are believed to have the most influence on attitude formation when economic issues are at play (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998). Valuing ‘Self-Enhancement’, particularly ‘Power’, is associated with the belief in the necessity for social institutions to uphold status differentiation, negative attitudes toward economic redistribution, as well as diminished support for the freedom of minority groups (Abdallah, 2023; Barnea & Schwartz, 1998). Additionally, those who value ‘Power’ are more likely to endorse right-wing economic policies and support non-libertarian political parties (Abdallah, 2023; Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Schwartz et al., 2014). This implies a preference for national sovereignty, reduced government intervention, and skepticism toward supranational institutions (Piruko et al., 2011; Schwartz et al., 2013). These characteristics are more likely to align with a critical stance on EU integration (Akaliyski et al., 2022). Achievement values contribute to this dynamic by

emphasizing individual success and autonomy (Schwartz, 1992). Therefore, it will be hypothesized that:

H4: Self-enhancement values will be negatively correlated with support for further EU integration.

Research Design and Methodology

This research will carry out a cross-country study of EU member states, using data from the 9th round of the European Social Survey (ESS) conducted between 2018 and 2020. The ESS is a semi-annual cross-national survey performed by the ESS European Research Infrastructure Consortium (European Social Survey [ESS], n.d., About ESS). It aims to monitor the changing attitudes, values, perceptions, and behavioral patterns among citizens in Europe (ESS, n.d., About ESS). Data collection is based on face-to-face interviews of approximately one hour.

The 9th round of the ESS includes data on 30 European states, of which 24 are EU member states (including the United Kingdom, given that it still was a member at the time of the survey). No data was collected in Greece, Luxembourg, and Malta. Romania participated on a pilot basis, but the final dataset does not include these observations (ESS, n.d., Participating C.). The ESS uses different sampling strategies in every participating country; however, some general guidelines have to be followed. “Samples must be representative of all persons aged 15 and over [...] resident within private households in each country, regardless of their nationality, citizenship or language” (ESS, n.d., Sampling). Additionally, individuals at every stage must be selected via strictly random probability methods, ensuring unbiased, representative samples (ESS, n.d., Sampling). Working with nationally representative samples from across Europe ensures a comprehensive study of the impact of human values on attitudes

toward EU integration that is broader in scope than previous studies and ensures higher generalizability of the findings.

This specific release of ESS data was chosen for a variety of reasons. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, data from the most recent 10th round in 2020 does not include data on human values in nine countries as they changed to self-completion tests. Further, countries achieved significantly lower response rates in 2020 compared to earlier rounds (EES, 2020). Whilst it would have been preferable to use the most current data, these circumstances make its use for this research unsuited which is why data from the 9th round, the most recent round before that, will be used. All relevant indicators for both the independent and dependent variables as well as the control variables are included in this round.

Dependent Variable: Attitude toward EU Integration

A person's attitude toward EU integration will be measured with the question "Some say EU unification should go further, others say it has already gone too far. What number on the scale best describes your position" (ESS, 2018, p.13). The answer scale ranges from 0 'too far', to 10 'should go further'. For the subsequent analysis, the variable was transformed to lay on a scale ranging from 0-1, with 0 representing the least support for further EU integration and 1 representing the most support. On average, attitudes towards further EU integration were fairly neutral ($M = 0.53$) with moderate variation as indicated by a standard deviation of 0.27.

There are some inherent issues stemming from the broad nature of the question mentioned above, primarily because it is difficult to ascertain the specific associations individuals have with EU unification. This becomes significant because the alignment of EU integration with personal values may vary depending on the specific aspects that come to mind when contemplating it. Importantly, the ESS codebook (2018) explicitly states that unification

within this question entails further vertical integration rather than enlargement. However, it does not become clear from the codebook if people were told to consider vertical integration only, which introduces some ambiguity. This presents an important limitation, given that this study aims to gauge the effect of human values on attitudes toward the deepening of EU integration specifically. Whilst this needs to be kept in mind, the question generally captures the essence of public opinion on EU integration and therefore should suffice for this research.

Independent Variable: Human Values

To measure human values, previous research has used the Schwartz Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ) (Davidov et al., 2008; Rathbun et al., 2016). A condensed version of this can be found in the ESS human value scale which comprises verbal descriptions of 21 people, matching the gender of the respondent (ESS, 2018).¹ Each portrait outlines a person's goals, aspirations, or wishes, indicating the significance of a particular value (Davidov et al., 2008). Respondents are read these statements and asked to rate how much that person is/is not like them (ESS, 2018). For instance, a portrait inquiring about the extent to which a person values 'tradition' may read: "Tradition is important to him. He tries to follow the customs handed down by his religion or his family" (ESS, 2018, p. 98). Respondents' answers are measured on a six-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 'Very much like me' to 6 'Not like me at all'. Each value is represented by two portraits, except 'Universalism', which incorporates three due to its broadness. The variables were recoded to lie on a 0-1 scale, where 0 indicates no alignment with the statement and 1 signifies the highest level of alignment. An index for each value is then created by averaging the items belonging to it (Davidov et al., 2008). Further, to capture the broader value dimensions, four new variables are created representing the mean score of

¹ See Appendix A for a detailed description of the ESS Human Value Scale Questionnaire.

the corresponding subordinate values. Table 2 outlines the weighted mean and standard deviation for the four higher-order dimensions, as well as their reliability statistics.² A value closer to 1 indicates a greater affinity with the respective Schwartz value.

Individuals are prompted to compare the portrait to themselves rather than evaluate themselves against the portrait, ensuring they concentrate exclusively on the value aspects depicted (Fotopoulos et al., 2011). The PVQ has been shown to have high validity in examining the constancy of values and predicting individual behaviors and attitudes across various scientific disciplines (Fotopoulos et al., 2011). In addition, it was found that the measures of the PVQ included in the ESS are appropriate for measuring the ten human values, and there appears to be a consistent understanding of the values and their indicators across different individuals in Europe (Davidov et al., 2008).

Table 2 *Schwartz Values descriptive and reliability statistics*

Schwartz Value	Mean (Sd)	Cronbach's Alpha
Conservation	0.66 (.16)	0.71
Openness to Change	0.60 (.18)	0.75
Self-Transcendence	0.78 (.14)	0.73
Self-Enhancement	0.49 (.20)	0.71

Table 2 shows that on average, respondents show greater affinity with the socially focused values ‘Conservation’ (0.66) and ‘Self-Transcendence’ (0.78) as opposed to the personally focused values ‘Openness to Change’ (0.60) and ‘Self-Enhancement’ (0.49). This trend is consistent with research by Sagiv et al. (2017) which suggests a clear cross-cultural

² The mean and standard deviation values were calculated based on the original sample size of 42467 and weighted by the ESS ‘analysis weight’.

pattern in value hierarchy. This likely stems from the adaptive functions values play in maintaining societies (Sagiv et al., 2017). ‘Self-Transcendence’ values are the most conducive to this by fostering cooperative and supportive relationships with others, while ‘Conservation’ values contribute to harmonious social relations by preventing conflicts and norm violations (Sagiv et al., 2017). ‘Openness to Change’ values, play a role in facilitating creativity, innovation, and adaptive responses to challenges, rendering them moderately important. The lower importance of ‘Self-Enhancement’ values, specifically ‘Power’, is due to the potential harm to social relations caused by the pursuit of power and dominance (Sagiv et al., 2017).

As shown in Table 2, all higher-order value dimensions exhibit a Cronbach’s Alpha value above 0.70. This indicates that the measures within these dimensions likely capture a single concept, and there is no concern about combining them (Field, 2018).

Mediators and Controls

Based on findings in the literature review, there is reason to believe, that the relationship between human values and attitudes toward EU integration may be partly working through mediating variables (Dennison et al., 2021). These include the degree of ex-/inclusivity of an individual’s identity (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998), attitudes toward immigration (Davidov & Meuleman, 2012), and socio-economic preferences (Abdallah, 2023; Barnea & Schwartz, 1998). Human values most likely influence all of the above, which in turn influence the formation of attitudes on EU integration. Hence, it is important not to control for any of the determinants mentioned above, as this would lead to ‘controlling away’ the very processes of interest and consequently misestimating the magnitude of the causal effect (Rohrer, 2018).

At the same time, certain variables need to be controlled for to ensure a proper isolation of the explanatory relationship. Drawing on previous findings (see Abdallah, 2023;

Boomgaarden et al., 2011; Dennison et al., 2021; Gabel, 1998) these include socio-demographic characteristics such as age, sex, income, education, and whether a respondent resides in a rural or urban area.³ It has been shown that individuals who are young, well-educated, and have a high income are more prone to hold positive attitudes toward further EU integration (Boomgaarden et al., 2011; Down & Wilson, 2017; Gabel, 1998). Regarding differences between sexes, there has been some evidence pointing to distinct values emerging between sexes as a result of adapting early to gendered role expectations and opportunities (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2021). Additionally, it has been found that sex may impact attitude formation on EU integration with women on average being more skeptical of EU integration than men (Nelsen & Guth, 2000). Lastly, people living in rural areas have been shown to generally hold more negative attitudes toward EU integration compared with people in urban settings (De Dominicis et al., 2022). The forthcoming analysis will account for the above-mentioned factors to ensure enhanced internal validity of the findings.

Statistical Model

The independent and dependent variables are measured using a Likert-type rating scale, placing them within the ordinal level of measurement (Jamieson, 2004). There is a prevalent agreement, however, that if a variable has at least five categories, it may be appropriately treated as continuous (Jamieson, 2004). For this research, the independent and dependent variables will be recoded to lie on a 0-1 scale, ensuring all independent variables share the same range.

Given the presence of multiple independent variables and one dependent variable, all treated as continuous, an ordinary least square regression, specifically a multiple regression, is

³ See Appendix B for a detailed description of the control variables and their measurement.

used as a statistical model (Fields, 2018). Due to the cross-national nature of this study, and the use of diverse sample designs across countries, any analysis undertaken must carefully address variations in selection probability, clustering, and stratification resulting from this (Abadie et al., 2023). This is crucial to avoid inaccurate standard errors and, consequently, biased statistical significance tests. In line with the guidelines presented in the ‘Guide to Using Weights and Sample Design Indicators with ESS Data’ by Kaminska and Lynn (2017), this analysis takes into account these methodological issues. The ESS dataset conveniently provides variables corresponding to each of these factors. The ‘Analysis Weight’ variable is used to adjust for the variation in selection probability, with ‘Primary Sampling Unit’ serving as the cluster variable and ‘Sampling Stratum’ as the stratification variable.

Further, country-level-fixed effects in the form of dummy variables (1 = respondent from that country, 0 = respondent not from that country) were included in the model, allowing for the controlling of between-country variation in the dependent variable. The analysis was carried out using the corresponding plan file and including all but one country dummy variable acting as the reference category. After filtering the data for EU member states the sample size (N) is 42467, however, due to missing values, the analysis is working with a slightly smaller N of 31520.

Results

Two Complex Sample General Linear Models (CSGLM) were conducted.⁴ Model 1 comprises the independent variables and country fixed effects, while Model 2 additionally introduces the control variables. The outcomes of these regressions are presented in Table 3.

⁴ The assumptions have been tested using an OLS regression, see Appendix C for further detail.

Whilst included in the model, country-fixed effects are not reported in Table 3 for space considerations, a complete model can be found in Appendix D.

Recall that Hypothesis 1 states that ‘Conservation’ values will be negatively correlated with support for further EU integration. A negative coefficient for ‘Conservation’ would be consistent with this hypothesis. The coefficient for ‘Conservation’ is indeed negative, and statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) in both models. Based on Model 2, support for further EU integration is expected to decrease by approximately 0.179 [95% CI: -0.214, -0.144] scale points for each one unit increase in ‘Conservation’ holding constant respondent age, household income, sex, domicile, and education level. Upon computing predicted values for attitudes toward EU integration an individual scoring 0 on the ‘Conservation’ measure is expected to have a value of 0.61 for EU integration, suggesting mild support for further integration. In contrast, an individual scoring 1 on the same measure is expected to have a value of 0.43, indicating mild opposition to further EU integration. The observed difference between these two scores amounts to 18% of the length of the scale on which EU integration attitudes are measured, representing a moderate effect. This difference holds significance as it delineates between support and opposition to further EU integration. The evidence in Table 3 is thus consistent with Hypothesis 1.

Hypothesis 2 posits that ‘Openness to Change’ values including ‘Hedonism’ will be positively correlated with support for further EU integration. The values in Table 3 are consistent with this expectation with a positive coefficient in both models. Based on Model 2, a one-unit increase in ‘Openness to Change’ is associated with an expected increase of approximately 0.010 [95% CI: -0.028, 0.047] scale points in support for further EU integration, while controlling for age, household income, sex, domicile, and education level. However, the statistical significance in Model 1 ($p < 0.001$) diminishes when introducing the controls in

Model 2. This suggests that the relationship between ‘Openness to Change’ and attitudes toward EU integration might be spurious and influenced by demographic factors. This finding aligns with the notion that personally focused values might hold less significance in shaping attitudes toward EU integration compared to socially focused values. The expected value for EU integration for a person scoring high (1) on the ‘Openness to Change’ measure is 0.50, whilst it is 0.49 for an individual scoring low (0) on the same measure. Irrespective of a person’s stance on ‘Openness to Change’, support for further EU integration remains neutral, holding all other factors constant. This difference constitutes only about 1% of the scale length, signifying a low influence especially when compared to the impact of the ‘Conservation’ measure. Hypothesis 2 is supported by the evidence presented in Table 3.

Hypothesis 3 assumes that ‘Self-Transcendence’ values will be positively correlated with support for further EU integration. The coefficient for ‘Self-Transcendence’ should therefore be positive. Both Model 1 and Model 2 affirm this expectation, with a positive and statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) coefficient. According to Model 2, the expected increase in support for EU integration is approximately 0.287 [95% CI: 0.246, 0.329] scale points for each one-unit rise in ‘Self-Transcendence’, while controlling for respondent sex, age, household income, domicile, and education level. The expected value for someone scoring high (1) on ‘Self-Transcendence’ is 0.56, which represents moderate support for further integration. Meanwhile for an individual scoring low (0) on the same measure this value is 0.27, corresponding with considerable opposition to further EU integration. This difference represents roughly 29% of the scale length on which EU integration is measured, indicating a somewhat significant deviation. This is significant, as it delineates between mild support and moderate opposition to integration. Hypothesis 3 is thus consistent with the evidence in Table 3.

Table 3 *Complex Samples General Linear Model*⁵

	Model 1	Model 2
(Intercept)	0.335*** (0.018)	0.279*** (0.022)
Conservation	-0.231*** (0.016)	-0.179*** (0.018)
Openness to Change	0.050*** (0.017)	0.010 (0.019)
Self-Transcendence	0.300*** (0.019)	0.287*** (0.021)
Self-Enhancement	0.050*** (0.016)	0.034* (0.017)
Sex (Ref. = Male)		0.009* (0.005)
Education		0.015*** (0.002)
Household Income		0.004*** (0.001)
Age		0.000** (0.00)
Domicile (Ref. = Town)		
Big City		0.017* (0.008)
Suburb of Big City		0.005 (0.009)
Country Village		-0.021** (0.007)
Countryside		-0.022* (0.011)
R ²	0.085	0.113
N	38837	31520

Note: CSGLM regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets.

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Lastly, Hypothesis 4 suggests that ‘Self-Enhancement’ values will be negatively correlated with support for further EU integration, hence expecting a negative coefficient for

⁵ Because a CSGLM was used, no value for Adjusted R Squared is reported.

‘Self-Enhancement’. However, the findings in Table 3 reveal an unexpected outcome: a positive coefficient for ‘Self-Enhancement’ that is statistically significant in both Model 1 ($p < 0.001$), and Model 2 (albeit on a lower level, $p < 0.05$). This again supports the notion that personally focused values may be less significant than socially focused ones. Based on Model 2, support for further EU integration increases by 0.034 [95% CI: 0.000, 0.067] scale points for each one-unit increase in ‘Self-Enhancement’, holding all other variables constant. A person scoring high (1) on the ‘Self-Enhancement’ measure is expected to hold a neutral opinion on further EU integration reflected by an approximate value of 0.51. Conversely, someone scoring low (0) on the same measure is expected to display a value of 0.48, indicating a slightly less supportive but overall, still relatively neutral stance on the issue. This marginal difference amounts to only about 3% of the length of the scale for EU integration, which is relatively low and does not decisively tip the balance between opposition and support. Overall, the evidence in Table 3 is not consistent with Hypothesis 4.

General Discussion and Conclusion

This study set out to assess the previously unexplored impact of human values on attitudes toward EU integration. Employing cross-national data from the 9th round of the European Social Survey, two Complex Samples General Linear Regressions were conducted.

The results yield a mixed picture. On the one hand, it was found that socially focused values had a substantial influence on attitudes toward further EU integration. Notably, both ‘Conservation’ values and ‘Self-Transcendence’ values emerged as significant factors. Respondents with high scores on ‘Conservation’ values tend to express a more negative stance regarding further EU integration than those scoring low on the same measure. Conversely, those scoring high in ‘Self-Transcendence’ exhibit a more positive opinion on the issue

compared to those scoring low on the measure. In both cases, this decided between support and opposition for further EU integration.

On the other hand, in line with previous research (Goren et al., 2016; Goren et al., 2022), personally focused values exhibited a less significant impact on attitudes toward EU integration. ‘Openness to Change’, after the introduction of control variables, was determined to be statistically insignificant. ‘Self-Enhancement’ values showed some level of significance even after the introduction of controls. Nevertheless, the impact was relatively small, and the difference in attitudes toward EU integration between a respondent with the highest and lowest scores on ‘Self-Enhancement’ was minor – just 3% of the entire scale range. Contrary to expectations, however, ‘Self-Enhancement’ values were positively correlated with attitudes toward further EU integration. The precise reason for this remains uncertain. The hypothesis expected valuing ‘Self-Enhancement’ to conflict with EU integration, particularly due to concerns about redistribution – a matter centering on material interests and egalitarian policies. It is plausible, that individuals may not perceive EU integration through this lens, therefore rendering this mechanism less influential (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2022). It may also be the case that people who value ‘Self-Enhancement’ are more likely to pursue careers in fields that benefit from EU integration, such as business, finance, and banking (see Sagiv, 2002; Sagiv and Schwartz, 2022). As a result, they may support EU integration, as it contributes to the achievement of their motivational goals. Additionally, ‘Power’ and ‘Achievement’ may exert divergent influences on attitudes toward EU integration, with ‘Achievement’ potentially having a more positive effect compared to ‘Power’ alone, thereby leading to a positive correlation (Abdallah, 2023).

Overall, attitudes toward EU integration appear to be shaped to some extent by underlying psychological predispositions, a factor that has largely been overlooked in previous

research. Hence, this study contributes to the existing literature on public opinion towards EU integration. It shows that basic human values, in particular those with a social focus, serve as a motivational foundation for attitudes toward EU integration. This highlights the importance of going beyond surface-level observations and exploring the deeper psychological roots of attitude formation, potentially revealing insights that may have been previously overlooked. Moreover, findings within this research provide additional evidence for the predictive power of human values in the realm of political science.

Importantly, this study faces some limitations. First, the measure used to assess respondents' attitudes toward EU integration was considerably broad. People were asked to express their opinions on whether they believed EU unification had gone too far or should go further. Since the question did not provide clear details or definitions related to EU unification, there is uncertainty about what respondents exactly had in mind when answering. Opinions on EU integration are multidimensional, and people evaluate EU integration on various aspects (De Vries, 2020; Easton, 1975; Gabel, 1998). Boomgaarden et al., (2011) identify at least five attitude dimensions, that make up the overall concept of EU attitudes. It is reasonable to assume that the measure captures respondents' general attitudes toward the broadest interpretation of EU integration. However, the vagueness and imprecision of the survey question risks oversimplifying their views. As a consequence, establishing a robust connection between personal values and attitudes may be more challenging, as the measured attitudes might not fully and accurately represent respondents' nuanced views. A potential avenue for future research could involve working with a more comprehensive and detailed tool to measure attitudes toward EU integration. This may include using customized surveys that directly measure the meanings of attitude objects instead of relying on indirect interpretations derived from contextual variables. Such an approach would diminish ambiguity and provide a more

precise understanding of how personal values influence attitudes across various dimensions of EU integration.

Moreover, it is important to note that inferring causality from observational data, particularly cross-sectional data, is difficult (Levin, 2006). The relationship between human values and attitudes toward EU integration may not be strictly unidirectional; it could be bidirectional or even reverse. Although this study assumes, based on prior research, that human values influence attitudes, the opposite may also hold true. Bakker & Lelkes (2022) point out a research gap in understanding the extent to which psychological dispositions, such as human values, genuinely play a causal role in the development of ideology. This gap is similarly present in investigating the causal relationship between values and attitudes. Someone with a highly positive attitude towards EU integration may be more likely to adopt greater self-transcendence values. It is probable that values exert a stronger influence on attitudes, considering their stable and personal nature compared to the more variable and context-dependent nature of political attitudes (Dennison et al., 2021). However, this is not certain, and additional research is needed to identify the precise direction of the causal relationship between values and attitudes.

Despite the limitations mentioned above, the findings of this research still hold significant implications. Regardless of the growing role of EU integration in mass politics, a widespread lack of knowledge about EU politics persists among the general population (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). While EU matters gain political importance, individuals often lack detailed information about EU policies, institutions, and processes (Steenbergen et al., 2007). However, the findings of this research suggest that people can form attitudes on these issues regardless, based on their fundamental human values. Human values serve as an intuitive guide for people. Even without in-depth knowledge, they can assess whether EU integration aligns

with the motivational goals prescribed by their personal values, and subsequently form relatively consistent and accurate attitudes on the issue. This supports findings by Feldman (1988) and Rokeach (1973) suggesting values can serve as useful heuristics.

Additionally, knowing that personal values impact attitude formation, suggests that appealing to people's personal values can be a powerful political strategy. While personal values remain stable, their perceived importance can shift based on the context (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2022). When specific aspects of EU integration are made salient to voters by political parties (Hooghe & Marks, 2009), those are the elements that are weighted against their personal values and subsequently inform their attitudes. The takeaway point is that human values matter as they exert a crucial influence on the formation of attitudes.

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Appendix A

The ESS Human Value Scale Questionnaire

Table 3 *The ESS Human Value Scale, 9th Round (N = 42467)*

Schwartz Value	Item # (according to its order on the ESS) and Wording	Mean (Sd)
Conservation		
Conformity	7. He believes that people should do what they're told. He thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching. 16. It is important to him always to behave properly. He wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong	0.60 (.22)
Tradition	9. It is important to him to be humble and modest. He tries not to draw attention to himself 20. Tradition is important to him. He tries to follow the customs handed down by his religion or his family.	0.67 (.20)
Security	5. It is important to him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything that might endanger his safety. 14. It is important to him that the government insures his safety against all threats. He wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens.	0.73 (.20)
Openness to Change		
Self-Direction	1. Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him. He likes to do things in his own original way. 11. It is important to him to make his own decisions	0.71 (.19)

	about what he does. He likes to be free to plan and not depend on others.	
Stimulation	<p>6. He likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do. He thinks it is important to do lots of different things in life</p> <p>15. He looks for adventures and likes to take risks. He wants to have an exciting life.</p>	0.49 (.24)
Hedonism	<p>10. Having a good time is important to him. He likes to “spoil” himself.</p> <p>21. He seeks every chance he can to have fun. It is important to him to do things that give him pleasure.</p>	0.60 (.24)
<hr/>		
Self-Transcendence		0.78 (.14)
Universalism	<p>3. He thinks it is important that every person in the world be treated equally. He believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life</p> <p>8. It is important to him to listen to people who are different from him. Even when he disagrees with them, he still wants to understand them.</p> <p>19. He strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to him.</p>	0.77 (.16)
Benevolence	<p>12. It's very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to care for their well-being.</p> <p>18. It is important to him to be loyal to his friends. He</p>	0.80 (.16)

	wants to devote himself to people close to him.	
Self-Enhancement		0.49 (.20)
Achievement	<p>4. It's important to him to show his abilities. He wants people to admire what he does</p> <p>13. Being very successful is important to him. He hopes people will recognize his achievements.</p>	0.54 (.24)
Power	<p>2. It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive things.</p> <p>17. It is important to him to get respect from others. He wants people to do what he says</p>	0.44 (.21)

Source Adapted from (Davidov et al., 2008, pp. 427-28; ESS, 2018, pp. 95-98)

Appendix B

Control Variables

- **Education**

- Education was measured by asking respondents about the highest level of education they have successfully completed. Answers to the question were then harmonized to fit within the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCE). The options were: (1) ES-ISCED I, less than lower secondary; (2) ES-ISCED II, lower secondary; (3) ES-ISCED IIIb, lower tier upper secondary; (4) ES-ISCED IIIa, upper tier upper secondary; (5) ES-ISCED IV, advanced vocational, sub-degree; (6) ES-ISCED V1, lower tertiary education, BA level; (7) ES-ISCED V2, higher tertiary education, \geq MA level. The 'Other' response category, which contains 104 cases, is treated as missing. For the purpose of this analysis, the variable was treated as continuous given the presence of 7 categories (Mean = 3.744; SD = 1.89).⁶

- **Sex**

- Sex was recoded into a binary dummy variable so that 0 = female and 1 = male (Mode = 0).

- **Age**

- Age is a continuous variable ranging from 15 to 90 (M = 48.51; SD = 19.03).

- **Income**

- Income was measured by asking respondents which letter describes their household's total income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources. Answer options were: (1) J - 1st decile; (2) R - 2nd decile; (3) C - 3rd decile; (4) M - 4th decile; (5) F - 5th decile; (6) S - 6th decile; (7) K - 7th decile; (8) P - 8th decile;

⁶ The Mean and SD were calculated from the weighted data and may differ slightly from the final data used in the CSGLM.

(9) D - 9th decile; (10) H - 10th decile. The variable was treated as continuous (M = 5.49; SD = 2.80).

- **Domicile**

- Domicile is measured by asking respondents which best describes the area where they live. The answer options are (1) A big city; (2) Suburbs or outskirts of a big city; (3) Town or small city; (4) Country village; (5) Farm or home in countryside. The variable was treated as categorical, with (3) Town or small city acting as the reference category (Mode = 3).

Appendix C

Linear Regression Assumption Checks⁷

Independent Errors

As this analysis is working with cross-national survey data from the ESS, there are certain issues when it comes to the assumption of independent errors. Sampling designs vary significantly among countries as they are tailored to achieve a minimum effective sample size for each respective country and its unique characteristics (Kaminska & Lynn; 2017). Due to this, countries exhibit differences in selection probabilities, their variability, and clustering and stratification (Kaminska & Lynn; 2017). If weighting, clustering, and stratification are not considered this may lead to underestimated standard errors and subsequently overly fitted models and biased hypothesis tests.

Based on the ‘Guide to Using Weights and Sample Design Indicators with ESS Data’ by Kaminska and Lynn (2017), this analysis considers the effects of stratification, clustering, and weighting. The weight variable used is ‘Analysis Weight’, whilst the cluster variable used is ‘Primary Sampling Unit’ and the stratification variable is ‘Sampling Stratum.’

Multicollinearity

The degree of correlation between the various independent variables and the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) should be less than 5. In this analysis, there is no issue with multicollinearity since none of the VIF statistics are above 5, let alone above 10, and all tolerance statistics are above 0.2. See Table C1 below.

⁷ Note: The assumptions were tested by separately fitting a weighted linear regression model without clustered standard errors and stratification.

Table C1 *VIF and Tolerance Values*

	VIF	Tolerance
Conservation	1.394	0.717
Openness to Change	1.436	0.696
Self-Transcendence	1.392	0.718
Self-Enhancement	1.335	0.749
Gender	1.035	0.966
Education	1.247	0.802
Household Income	1.203	0.832
Age	1.184	0.844
Big City	1.261	0.793
Suburbs	1.209	0.827
Country Village	1.332	0.751
Countryside	1.075	0.930

Outliers

Outliers are data points that have unusually high residual values. It is important to identify and examine outliers to ensure non-biased statistical results. There is no problem with outliers in this analysis. None of the cases has a standardized residual value higher than 3.29, which is considered the threshold for extreme outliers. Only 11 cases have a standardized residual higher than 2.58 (<1%), and 3.3% of cases have a standardized residual higher than 1.96 (<5%). Overall, the presence of outliers in this analysis is not a cause for concern.


Influential Cases

Influential cases are cases that have a large effect on the model. To identify influential cases, one may look at the maximum value for Cook's distance given by the residual statistics. Cook's distance should remain below 1 to exclude the presence of influential cases in the data. This analysis has no issues with influential cases, as the maximum value for Cook's distance is $0.001 (< 1)$.

Linearity

OLS regressions aim to represent linear relationships between variables. Thus, the data should not exhibit any clear (non-linear) patterns. Figure B1 displays a scatterplot of standardized predicted values by standardized residuals, which does not indicate an apparent non-linear pattern. This suggests that an OLS regression can be employed.

Figure C1 Scatterplot of standardized residual errors by standardized predicted values




Homoscedasticity

To assess whether there is a violation of the assumption of homoscedasticity, i.e., whether some cases fit the model better than others, the standardized residuals of the model were plotted by the standardized predictions of the model, shown in Figure B1. There appears to be no violation of the assumption of homoscedasticity.

Normally distributed errors

The distribution of errors in the population was tested using a normal Probability-Probability plot, as shown in Figure B2. The values closely follow the ideal line, indicating that there is no violation of normally distributed errors.

Figure C2 *Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual*



Appendix D

Complex Samples: General Linear Model with country-fixed effects

Table D1 *Complex Samples General Linear Model with country-fixed effects*

	Model 1	Model 2
(Intercept)	0.335*** (0.018)	0.279*** (0.022)
Conservation	-0.231*** (0.016)	-0.179*** (0.018)
Openness to Change	0.050*** (0.017)	0.010 (0.019)
Self-Transcendence	0.300*** (0.019)	0.287*** (0.021)
Self-Enhancement	0.050*** (0.016)	0.034* (0.017)
Gender (Ref. = Male)		0.009* (0.005)
Education		0.015*** (0.002)
Household Income		0.004*** (0.001)
Age		0.000** (0.00)
Domicile (Ref. = Town)		
Big City		0.017* (0.008)
Suburb of Big City		0.005 (0.009)
Country Village		-0.021** (0.007)
Countryside		-0.022* (0.011)
Country (Ref. = Austria)		
Belgium	0.081*** (0.011)	0.085*** (0.011)
Bulgaria	0.087*** (0.014)	0.096*** (0.015)
Cyprus	0.068*** (0.015)	0.063*** 0.017
Czechia	0.003 0.011	0.003 (0.012)
Germany	0.130*** 0.011	0.138*** (0.012)
Denmark	0.087*** (0.012)	0.092*** (0.013)

Estonia	0.029* (0.011)	0.016 (0.011)
Spain	0.150*** (0.011)	0.161*** (0.013)
Finland	0.025* (0.010)	0.018 (0.11)
France	0.049*** (0.011)	0.058*** (0.012)
UK	-0.024* (0.011)	-0.029* (0.012)
Croatia	0.059*** (0.012)	0.083*** (0.013)
Hungary	0.013 (0.012)	0.020 (0.015)
Ireland	0.046*** (0.011)	0.040** (0.012)
Italy	0.039** (0.013)	0.41** (0.015)
Lithuania	0.203*** (0.014)	0.196*** (0.015)
Latvia	0.035* (0.015)	0.024 (0.016)
Netherlands	0.055*** (0.010)	0.060*** (0.011)
Poland	0.165*** (0.012)	0.166*** (0.013)
Sweden	0.023* (0.011)	0.011 (0.012)
Slovenia	0.114*** (0.011)	0.119*** (0.012)
Slovakia	0.023 (0.018)	0.026 (0.020)
R ²	0.085	0.113
N	38837	31520

Note: CSGLM regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets.

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05