



Universiteit
Leiden
The Netherlands

Addressing environmental issues in global framework agreements: A study of the Safran agreement

Beem, Sven van

Citation

Beem, S. van. (2023). *Addressing environmental issues in global framework agreements: A study of the Safran agreement*.

Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown)

License: [License to inclusion and publication of a Bachelor or Master Thesis, 2023](#)

Downloaded from: <https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3715470>

Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

Addressing environmental issues in global framework agreements

A study of the Safran agreement



Universiteit Leiden

Sven van Beem

Faculty of Humanities

Master of Arts International Relations

Global Political Economy

Supervisor/ first reader: Dr. Jonathan London

Second reader: Dr. Lindsay Black

Page number: 46

Word count: 14.318

Date of submission: December 15, 2023

Abstract

Climate change, environmental regulation, and the transition to renewable energy sources have a significant impact on the private and professional lives of workers in all parts of the world. In the absence of international law, multinational corporations (MNCs) are often relocating production to countries with insufficient social and environmental legislation, for the sake of profit maximalisation. Global union federations (GUFs) have started negotiating global framework agreements (GFAs) with MNC management to ensure the social rights of MNC employees in countries with inadequate legislation. As environmental strategies of MNCs are increasingly affecting employees, GFAs have been portrayed as a platform for union involvement in environmental issues. This thesis has investigated the potential of the inclusion of environmental issues in the GFA between the MNC Safran and IndustriALL Global Union. The results indicated that while the environmental clauses of the GFA had little concrete impact, the benefits of the inclusion are two-fold. Firstly, the creation of transnational social dialogue on the topic increased worker involvement on the MNC's environmental strategy. Secondly, the GFA created conflict resolution for potential future labour conflict on environmental issues.

Table of Contents

List of acronyms and abbreviations	4
1. Introduction	5
2. Literature review	6
2.1. Global framework agreements.....	6
2.1.1. Corporate social responsibility.....	6
2.1.2. Negotiating CSR	7
2.1.3. Sector	8
2.1.4. Management motivations for negotiation	10
2.1.5. Impact of global framework agreements.....	11
2.1.6. Environmental component of GFAs	13
2.2. Environmental labour studies	15
2.2.1. Jobs versus the environment	15
2.2.2. Legitimacy of union involvement in environmental regulation.....	16
2.2.3. Union strategies on environmental issues	17
2.2.4. Just transition	17
2.3. Theoretical framework	17
2.3.1. Unitary perspective	18
2.3.2. Pluralist perspective	18
2.3.3. Critical perspective	20
2.3.4. Conclusion	20
3. Research design	20
3.1. Research question.....	20
3.1.1. Negotiation	21
3.1.2. Monitoring	22
3.2. Research method	22
3.2.1. Case study	22
3.2.2. Selection of GUF	23
3.2.3. Case study selection	23
3.3. Data collection	25
3.3.1. Document analysis	25
3.3.2. Interview	26
4. Results	27
4.1. Document analysis.....	27

4.2.	Interview	28
4.2.1.	Negotiation	28
4.2.2.	Monitoring	30
5.	Discussion	33
5.1.	Negotiation	34
5.1.1.	GFA and Safran CSR	34
5.1.2.	Motivations	35
5.1.3.	Sector	36
5.2.	Monitoring	36
5.2.1.	Effects on monitoring	36
6.	Conclusion	37
7.	Bibliography	39
8.	Appendix	45

List of acronyms and abbreviations

CSDDD	Corporate Social Due Diligence Directive
CSR	Corporate social responsibility
ELS	Environmental labour studies
ETUC	European Trade Union Confederation
GFA	Global framework agreement
GUF	Global union federation
ICEM	International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers' Unions
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Metalworkers' Federation
IndustriALL	IndustriALL Global Union
IPCC	International Panel on Climate Change
ITGLWF	International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers' Federation
MNC	Multinational corporation
OHS	Occupational health and safety
PR	Public relations

1. Introduction

Since the 1980s, global framework agreements (GFAs), negotiated between global union federations (GUFs) and multinational corporation (MNCs), have emerged as a strategy to ensure workers' rights in the absence of international labour regulation. GFAs, also called international framework agreement or transnational company agreements, primarily deal with fundamental labour rights, such as the right to freedom of association, protection against discrimination, and the ban of child labour. These are part of the International Labour Standards of the International Labour Organization (ILO), to which GFAs generally refer (Papadakis, 2011a). Since these first GFAs, the contents of GFAs have expanded, and many now include additional clauses, such as environmental issues (Barreau, Havard, and Ngaha Bah, 2020; European Trade Union Confederation [ETUC], 2010; Schömann, Sobczak, Voss, and Wilke, 2008). However, literature on environmental clauses in GFAs is scarce, and there has been no previous research separate chapters on environmental issues in GFAs.

MNCs are companies that have business operations in at least one country other than its home country. This is generally in the form of a holding company, headquartered in a country in the global North, and one or more subsidiary companies in other countries which often based in the global South. There are several reasons why companies expand their business operations to other countries, such as avoiding trade barriers, lowering transportation costs, or gaining access to natural resources, but firms can also move parts of their production chain to countries where it is relatively cheaper to produce (Pandya, 2016). Trade between different subsidiaries of the same firm accounts for more than one third of all cross-border trade in the world (Pandya, 2016). Due to external pressure to address the negative consequences of increasing globalisation, many MNCs have adopted corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices (Sobczak, 2007; Schömann et al., 2008).

CSR practices generally consist of voluntary commitments which are unilaterally adopted by the MNC. However, one type of CSR, GFAs are the result of negotiations between representatives of managers and employees of an MNC, the latter generally represented by a GUF (Papadakis, 2011a; Schömann et al., 2008). Apart from having a higher legitimacy than the other types of CSR, GFAs allow GUFs to play a role in addressing the lack of international labour regulation. This feature creates transnational social dialogue between GUFs and MNCs, also allowing for the discussion of other topics.

While environmental issues might generally not be a priority for labour representatives, climate change can have large consequences on the global economy, and therefore on workers (International Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2022). Workers are affected both by environmental degradation as well as by environmental regulation (Räthzel, Stevis, and Uzzel, 2021). It is therefore advisable that workers' representatives are involved in the shaping of environmental policies, including those of MNCs. Although the addition of an environmental component in GFAs has been suggested in the literature (Schömann and Wilke, 2011; Stevis, 2011a, pp. 151-152), research into this topic has been limited to one study (ETUC, 2010). Furthermore, this research is relatively outdated due to the increasing salience of the topic of environmental issues and regulation, and the growing number of GFAs. This research attempts to further the knowledge on the subject by investigating the effects of the inclusion of environmental clauses. This is done with a case study on the GFA between Safran, an aerospace MNC headquartered in France, and IndustriALL Global Union (IndustriALL).

2. Literature review

2.1. Global framework agreements

2.1.1. Corporate social responsibility

Globalisation, driven by MNCs relocating production to countries with favourable conditions, poses challenges to workers and labour movements (Helfen and Sydow, 2013). To maximise profit, MNCs open subsidiaries in countries where operation costs are low (Pandya, 2016). These are generally countries in the global South, where production costs are low due to limited social, environmental, and other types of regulation. In the absence of international regulation on labour or pollution, workers, local communities, and the environment are affected by the negative effects of globalisation. Transnational labour organisations have therefore regarded globalisation as a threat to workers, which has prompted a search for responses (du Preez and Smit, 2017). Increasing awareness and social unrest about the negative effects of globalisation have persuaded many MNCs to adopt CSR practices (Papadakis, 2011a; Schömann et al., 2008).

There are different ways in which MNCs can carry out CSR. This includes: management-driven, unilateral codes of conduct on the business ethics of the MNC; public-private initiatives

such as the adoption of the ILO's Better Work Program or the United Nations Global Compact, as well some involvement of public international organisations in their implementation; the adoption of some sort of standards by a standards institute, such as the International Organization for Standardization's ISO 8000 or the ISO 26000; multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the Ethical Trade Initiative; and GFAs, negotiated between MNC management and GUFs (Papadakis, 2011a).

2.1.2. Negotiating CSR

GFAs have emerged as a mechanism to establish minimal standards for workers in MNC subsidiaries operating in countries with inadequate regulations. In contrast to the other types of CSR, GFAs are negotiated between workers and management within an MNC (Schömann et al., 2008). This has the potential to create transnational social dialogue aimed at creating intraorganisational international standards where international regulation is absent and national laws are inadequate. Additionally, in other types of CSR the monitoring of these commitments is generally the responsibility of company management or a third party, but in GFAs monitoring of the agreement is a shared responsibility between management and worker and/or union representatives (Papadakis, 2011a), which increases the legitimacy of MNCs' commitment to their CSR strategy. This also makes GFAs less cost-effective for public relations (PR) goals than other types of CSR, where monitoring is the responsibility of MNC management.

The negotiation of GFAs has been one of the main strategies of GUFs as a response to globalisation (See for example, Fichter, 2015; Papadakis, 2011a; Stevis and Boswell, 2007). While certain GUFs have pursued the strategy of GFA negotiation more actively than others, nearly all have signed at least one GFA. Data on negotiated GFAs, taken from the book of Papadakis (2011a), can be found in the table below.

Global union federation	Number of negotiated GFAs (2011)
Union Network International (UNI)	30
International Metalworkers' Federation (IMF)	19
Building and Wood Workers International (BWI)	14
International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers' Union (ICEM)	13
International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers' Federation (IUF)	5
International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers' Federation (ITGLWF)	1
Public Services International (PSI)	1
International Federation of Journalists (IFJ)	1
Education International (EI)	0
International Transport Workers Federation (ITWF)	0

2.1.3. Sector

The sector in which an MNC operates influences is a crucial variable in the negotiation of GFAs (Davies et al., 2011; ETUC, 2010; Papadakis, 2011a; Schömann et al., 2008). The sector influences the nature of its production processes and how global supply chains are constructed. A key distinction can be made between producer-driven and consumer-driven global supply chains (Davies et al. 2011; Papadakis, 2011a; Rossi and Robertson, 2011). Producer-driven global supply chains can be found in technology- and capital-intensive sectors, such as aerospace, and they are characterised by strong workplace organisation and hierarchical supply chain structures, creating a higher degree of control over subsidiaries. This creates a conducive environment for GFA negotiation. On the other hand, consumer-driven supply chains, such as those in the garment sector, are characterised by high levels of subcontracting and low levels of unionisation among the workforce (Miller, 2011; Norpoth, Kaltenborn, and Neset, 2020).

In addition to its effect on negotiation, the contents of GFAs are also affected by the sector in which an MNC operates. In consumer-driven global supply chains, where the MNC exerts little control over its subsidiaries, the contents are more focused on the protection of core labour standards, such as working conditions, health and safety, and the eradication of child labour. Another core issue in GFA negotiation in these sectors is compliance of subcontractors, which is often mandatory (Miller, 2011; Norpoth, Kaltenborn, and Naset, 2020). This is in contrast with MNCs in producer-driven supply chains, where subcontractors play a smaller role, and are generally only encouraged to comply with the agreement.

The hierarchical nature of producer-driven global supply chains gives the MNC a higher level of control over its subsidiaries (da Costa and Rehfeldt, 2011; Stevis, 2011; Williams, Davies, and Chinguno, 2015). Implementation of, and compliance with GFAs is easier to obtain in these sectors. Most GFAs can therefore be found in sectors in producer-driven global supply chains (Papadakis, 2011a). Additionally, the contents of GFAs in the sectors can be broader as well as more specific. In his book, Papadakis (2011a) has categorised the negotiated GFAs per sector. These sectors can be found in the table below.

Type of sector	Number of negotiated GFAs (2011)
Construction industry	14
Automotive and transport equipment manufacturing industry	13
postal and telecommunications services	6
Temporary work services	6
Chemical industries/utilities (water, gas, and electricity)	5
Food and lodging	5
Retail	4
Property services	3
Media/culture graphical industries	3
Maritime sector*	0

*The maritime sector at the time had no negotiated GFAs. There was no need for that, as the whole sector is covered by a collective agreement between the International Maritime Employers' Committee and the Transport Workers' Federation.

2.1.4. Management motivations for negotiation

Whereas labour movements adopt a strategy of GFA negotiation as a response to the negative effects of globalisation, there can be multiple motivations for MNCs to negotiate a GFA. Research by Egels-Zandén (2009), Schömann et al. (2008), and Papadakis (2011b) has attempted to uncover these motivations. Egels-Zandén (2009) has found the following five potential reasons why MNC management adopt a GFA: 1) to retain, restore, and/or improve legitimacy; 2) to avoid governmental interference; 3) for ethical reasons; 4) to achieve competitive advantages; and 5) to retain trusting corporate-union relations.

The study by Egels-Zandén (2009) focuses on a GFA signed by a European MNC, and in this case he finds that the first four motives can only explain the signing of the GFA partially, and thus concludes that the main reason for GFA negotiation, at least in his case study, is to retain trusting corporate-union relations. An interesting result Egels-Zandén (2009) found is that the management representatives who were responsible for signing the GFA did not find it necessary or adding value, due to the reasoning that their company already had CSR practices and a corporate code of conduct. An agreement with unions was not perceived as adding value.

Compared to the conclusion of Egels-Zandén (2009), of the five management motivations for signing GFAs put forward by Schömann et al. (2008), two can be considered to 'retain trusting corporate-union relations'. These are 'fostering social dialogue' and the 'prospect of better conflict resolution mechanisms', and the study by Schömann et al. (2008) concluded that these are among the main management motivations. This study also finds that competitiveness and legitimacy-related motivations are important for management. However, in the study by Schömann et al. (2008) ethical reasons and the avoidance of governmental interference are not mentioned as management motivations. Different from Egels-Zandén (2009), they conclude that management can decide to sign a GFA to pave the way for implementing a corporate code of conduct.

Whereas Egels-Zandén (2009) and Schömann et al. (2008) primarily considered MNCs that are headquartered in Europe, Papadakis (2011b) focused on management motivations for GFA negotiation in MNCs that are headquartered outside of the EU and the US. Based on the findings of, amongst others, Egels-Zandén (2009) and Schömann et al. (2008), the author finds three categories of MNC incentives to sign GFAs. These are coercive factors, anticipatory factors, and civil society pressure factors. Incentives in the first category are not driven by profit-making, but due to strong external pressure to obtain social legitimacy for MNC decision-making. These factors include regulatory obligations, cultural expectations, especially in the MNC home state, and industry-specific factors, such as the MNC being active in a producer- or consumer-driven global supply chain. Anticipatory factors are to prepare the MNC for unexpected or future events and are expected to have a financial benefit. Factors include being ready for expansion into new market, for new legislation, and to shield operations for social and/or labour instability. The third category, civil society pressure factors, includes information and mobilisation campaigns by unions, sometimes in alliance with NGOs, to pressure MNCs into the negotiation or adoption of a GFA. This motivation was recognised in the study by Schömann et al. (2008), but not in the study by Egels-Zandén (2009). Furthermore, Papadakis finds that ethical motives do not seem to play an important role in the adoption of GFAs. The author concludes that civil society pressures and anticipatory factors seem to constitute key explanatory factors in the adoption of GFAs by MNCs headquartered outside of the EU or US.

2.1.5. Impact of global framework agreements

One of the key features of GFAs is that their negotiation creates an opportunity for global collective bargaining (Bourque, 2008). Additionally, the monitoring of the agreement creates a forum for continuous transnational social dialogue (Schömann, 2011). A group of scholars, including Helfen and Sydow (2013), argue that the institutionalisation of international dialogue is the most important property of GFAs. If one were to agree with this notion, then the topics that are being covered in a GFA and the creation of areas for dialogue would seem more important than the enforceability of the clauses in the agreement. Reflecting these different visions, Hammer (2005) recognises two types of GFAs: agreements that focus on ‘rights’ and their enforcement; and agreements that focus on ‘bargaining’. These are not exclusive though, and both aspects are crucial for the impact of a GFA, and they will therefore always include topics on both rights and bargaining. However, a differentiation can be made in the assessment

of the impact of GFAs, with some researchers focusing on how it affects transnational social dialogue, and other scholars being more interested in the GFA's effect on the enforcement of social rights.

Although there is a large body that focuses on the concrete impact of GFAs on social rights (for example, Norpoth, Kaltenborn, and Naset, 2020; Papadakis, 2011a; Williams, Davies, and Chinguno, 2015), it is recognised in the literature that it is difficult to measure the direct impact that GFAs make. This is explained by Isabelle Schömann (2011), who argues that the general lack of performance indicators and the confidentiality between management and unions on conflict make it difficult to assess the impact of GFAs. Additionally, annual company reports have no standard structure and generally do not include detailed information about conflict resolution. To further frustrate the analysis of concrete GFA impact, the contents often overlap with other CSR documents, making it difficult to establish which document was responsible for the perceived effects. Schömann (2011) therefore argues that investigating monitoring processes offers a practical alternative for assessing the impact of GFAs. Christian Welz (2011) similarly argues that the impact of GFAs can be assessed by investigating the monitoring of the agreement.

In a similar vein, Telljohann et al. (2010) recognise that the impact that GFAs make on industrial relations is largely dependent on successful monitoring of the agreement. Thus, investigating how conflicts are addressed and resolved within the framework of the agreement can offer a practical measure of its impact. The ability of GFAs to provide effective conflict resolution mechanisms is crucial for maintaining a constructive working relationship between management and labour representatives. This necessity of effective mechanisms in GFAs is also recognised by Sobczak (2007), who expands about the risks of non-compliance for both the GUF and the MNC.

Additionally, monitoring of GFAs is generally a shared responsibility between management and workers' representatives. This is a departure from the traditional management-driven approach in CSR (Schömann et al., 2008, p. 4), which indicates a willingness from management to engage in a more collaborative relationship with workers' representatives. Investigating the monitoring process thus provides a lens through which to assess the commitment of MNC management to the CSR principles that are included in the GFA.

Several authors have suggested that GFAs can play a role in the advancement of the environmental objectives of labour unions (Schömann et al., 2008; ETUC, 2010; Schömann and Wilke, 2011; Stevis, 2011a, pp. 151-152). Additionally, by the adoption of GFAs with environmental provisions, employees, through their representatives, will get a voice in the MNCs environmental plans as well as on its strategy regarding just transition. While employees and their representatives are often consulted in the establishment of MNCs' codes of conduct or other unilateral CSR plans, their bargaining power is a substantially weaker than in a GFAs negotiation process.

2.1.6. Environmental component of GFAs

The first GFAs had a narrow scope, often only promoting a base line of MNCs' respect for labour rights or international labour standards (Hammer, 2005; ETUC, 2010). According to Schömann and Wilke, in 2011 roughly 90% of GFAs contained provisions on the prohibition of discrimination and the promotion of diversity (2011, p. 17). Other core elements of GFAs include fundamental social rights as defined by the ILO, such as the right to freedom of association. They are thus mainly focused on the reaffirmation and strengthening of social and political rights in the workplace. However, since these first agreements, many GFAs have included provisions beyond basic labour rights (ETUC, 2010; Schömann et al., 2008). This includes, for example, the fight against AIDS, development for local communities, or environmental protection provisions.

The study by the ETUC (2010, p. 20) finds that, as part of their development, GFAs have grown in their scope, coverage, and in terms of enforcement mechanisms. However, they conclude that this has not been an easy process, and that an increase in topics that are covered has been an especially sensitive area. This is because the different parties recognise each other's legitimacy and authority in certain areas, such as occupational health and safety (OHS), but not in all. A lot of negotiation is therefore necessary, and the inclusion of a certain topic suggests that both parties recognise the salience of the topic.

The ETUC (2010) finds three determinants for the inclusion of certain contents in GFAs. The first is the perception of relevancy of the subject. The second is the relation of the GFA to other policies and codes of conduct of the MNC: in some cases certain subjects such as the

environment are not covered in GFAs as these are already covered in other documents such as the code of conduct. However, this second determinant can also work the other way, when MNCs want the GFA to be coherent with their overall CSR strategy. The third determinant is the breadth and structure of the GFA: more elaborate GFAs generally cover more subjects as well.

The ETUC study (2010) finds that of the active GFAs up to 2009, 48,4% mention the environment, and that 30,5% of GFAs include clauses on environmental issues. The article by Schömann and Wilke (2011) is unclear about the prevalence of the inclusion of environmental issues in GFAs, stating at one point that environmental protection provisions appear in roughly half of all GFAs, and later that environmental issues appear in one-quarter of GFAs. The report by Schömann et al. (2008) concludes that at the time of writing 49% of GFAs included provisions on the environment, compared to 82% of codes of conduct. It is suggested in these articles that the scope of GFAs has increased over the years, and it is thus likely that the number of GFAs that include an environmental component has increased since the publishing of these articles.

The studies by Schömann and Wilke (2011) and ETUC (2010) conclude that the significance of environmental issues is increasing for both GUFs and for MNCs. The authors expect that the inclusion of environment issues in GFAs will encourage MNC to look favourably towards trade union involvement on environmental issues as well as in the debate on sustainable development.

The transition from fossil to renewable energy, also known as the carbon transition, and sustainable development will strongly affect sectors and workers in these sectors. Globalisation of MNCs has increased in the last decades, which makes national social dialogue insufficient in tackling issues regarding environmental issues (du Preez and Smit, 2017). As GFAs are a very useful tool for creating international social dialogue, the inclusion of environmental issues in GFAs will increase worker involvement in environmental issues. The inclusion of environmental issues in GFAs will increase the scope of the GFA and transnational social dialogue, which also increases the sphere of influence of the relevant GUF.

The study by the ETUC (2010, p. 33) concludes that the sector in which the MNC and the GUF are active is a strong determinant for the importance of environmental issues in GFAs. The salience of environmental issues is determined by the need for the sector to change due to environmental regulations or the carbon transition. The insecurity for current and future employment in these sectors creates an important role for unions. In these sectors the topic of just transition is more important than in other sectors. Likewise, Schömann and Wilke (2011) conclude that environmental issues are more often found in GFAs that are signed with MNCs in which environmental issues are a key issue. Additionally, the authors find that in sectors where environmental issues are important, there is generally a high level of trade union membership. These sectors include chemical, mining, metal, energy, and building. This finding is supported by the article of Thomas and Doerflinger (2020), who conclude that union membership is higher in sectors that have a large environmental impact. However, whereas Thomas and Doerflinger suggest that the trade union strategy of opposing environmental regulation is more common in these sectors, other articles, such as Rinqvist (2022) and Chen (2017), find that working in more polluting sectors is not a determinant for opposing environmental regulation.

2.2. Environmental labour studies

2.2.1. Jobs versus the environment

The academic field of environmental labour studies (ELS) emerges at the intersection of environmentalism and labour movements, examining the intricate relationship between workers, industries, and ecological sustainability. Historically marked by distrust, the relationship between environmentalists and labour movements has evolved, leading to the establishment of a distinct field of study known as ELS (Räthzel and Uzzel, 2013). ELS initially focused on the environmental policies of labour unions across the world. In the last years the definition has been stretched to include more aspects of the relationship between labour and the environment, such as how workers in any workplace or community are involved in environmental policies and how they are affected by environmental degradation in the broadest sense (Räthzel, Stevis, and Uzzel, 2021). In the field of ELS, Stevis (2022) advances a relational approach between the fields of labour studies, industrial relations, and ELS, which provides more compelling explanations to the choices made by labour, capital, and states regarding environmental protection. Such an approach could explain how, in many unions, environmental strategies have developed from OHS concerns (Silverman, 2006; ETUC, 2010).

The initial hostility between environmental movements and labour unions was the result of perceived opposite objectives of these movements (Räthzel and Uzzel, 2013). Environmental movements were perceived by labour to threaten jobs, where these environmentalists claimed that labour unions were protecting jobs regardless of their cost to nature. This debate has been coined the *jobs versus the environment* dilemma in the academic literature. Goodstein (1999) recognised a widespread perception in the US that environmental regulation is threatening jobs. The perception is that environmental regulation costs more job than it creates, and that regulation will lead to changes in production which leads to mass-layoffs. These perceptions are closely related to the pollution haven hypothesis, whereby due to increased environmental regulation corporations will move production plants to countries with less stringent regulation (Räthzel and Uzzel, 2011). Although Goodstein (1999) asserted that there was no empirical basis for a trade-off between environmental protection and employment, the ‘jobs versus the environment dilemma’ has historically created animosity between the labour movement and environmentalists (Räthzel and Uzzel, 2011; Rinqvist, 2022). This perception, however, is shifting in favour of worker support for environmental regulation (Rinqvist, 2022), and several studies have found that union members generally support environmental policies rather than oppose them (Chen, 2017; Vachon and Brecher, 2016).

2.2.2. Legitimacy of union involvement in environmental regulation

Involving labour unions in the debate on environmental regulation is important for several reasons. The first is the position of unions as workers’ representatives. Environmental degradation and climate change have an impact on both the professional and the social lives of workers (Räthzel and Uzzel, 2013; Stevis and Felli, 2015), and it is thus important that they have a voice in the management of these issues. Additionally, the largest share of emissions is caused by production and transportation (IPCC, 2022), sectors that are dominated by MNCs. Unions have proven to be able to influence the behaviour of MNCs, which could be consequential in the transition to more sustainable production and transportation (Stevis, 2011). Furthermore, the carbon transition will have a substantial impact on many sectors, ranging from changing to more sustainable types of production, for which additional training might be necessary, to the loss of jobs, and even the possible decimation of entire sectors, such as fossil fuel production and certain types of mining. On the other side, the carbon transition will lead to new ‘green’ jobs, but so far unionisation in these new green sectors is relatively low (Thomas

and Doerflinger, 2020). To ensure worker support for the transition, which can prove to be crucial for its success, it is necessary to include the interests of workers in transition strategies (Felli, 2014; Stevis and Felli, 2015).

2.2.3. Union strategies on environmental issues

Thomas and Doerflinger (2020) recognise three different union strategies on climate change mitigation. These three strategies are dubbed *opposition*, *hedging*, and *support*. In the first strategy, opposition, unions oppose environmental regulations to protect the employment of the workers which they represent. In the second category, hedging, unions will not deny the need for environmental regulation, but will seek to minimise regulation that can have a negative effect on their members and for this will use the notion of a dichotomy between environmental regulation and employment. The third category, support, is adopted by unions that have a proactive approach to climate change mitigation. Additionally, the authors find that many unionised workers are active in relatively old and environmentally damaging sectors, such as extractive, fossil fuel-related, and manufacturing industries. These are industries that will be most impacted by environmental regulation. In contrast, many of the new, green, workplaces are not well unionised.

2.2.4. Just transition

However, with governments supporting a sustainable transition, whereby fossil fuels are being replaced by renewable energy sources as the main driver of society, jobs in fossil fuel industries will either disappear or change significantly. Many unions have therefore shifted their environmental strategies to create a transition that is ‘just’ for workers (Felli, 2014; Stevis and Felli, 2015). This just transition implies that workers that lose their jobs because of the energy transition will receive training and that new jobs for these workers, preferably in the sustainable economy, are created.

2.3. Theoretical framework

Most research on GFAs is done within the study field of industrial relations. Hyman (1975) defines industrial relations as having an unceasing power struggle between employers and employees at its centre. In his definition, power is “the ability of an individual or group to control his (their) physical and social environment; and, as part of this process, the ability to influence the decisions which are and are not taken by others” (Hyman, 1975, p. 26). Conflict

in industrial relations conventionally centres around the distribution of salaries and wages. There are three main frames of reference in industrial relations, namely the unitary perspective, the pluralist perspective, and the critical perspective.

2.3.1. Unitary perspective

According to Heery (2016), in the unitary perspective only one source of authority is recognised within industrial relations, which is management. This authority stems from the ownership of and control over the mechanisms of decision-making during wage setting and periods of bargaining. This is one of the most important points of departure from the other perspectives, which generally emphasise the agency of other actors within industrial relations, such as unions, governments, political parties, and workers themselves (Heery, 2016, p. 16). The unitary approach is especially popular in management and human resource studies but is adopted less in the field of industrial relations.

Most research in the unitary frame of reference has focused on whether employers are achieving their goals, and not on whether workers are achieving theirs. Therefore, research into GFAs using the unitary perspective will likely focus on the gains for the employer, in this case the MNC. Furthermore, within the unitary framework there is generally scant interest in trade unions, civil society organisations, and governments, as the working assumption is that their influence is limited (Heery, 2016, p. 23). The unitary frame of reference is therefore of limited use for the research of GFAs.

2.3.2. Pluralist perspective

Contrary to the unitary perspective, authors in the pluralist perspective advance that organisations, such as companies, are coalitions of competing interests. In these coalitions, the role of management is to mediate amongst the different interest groups (Heery, 2016). In the pluralist framework unions are seen as legitimate representatives of the interests of employees. Stability in industrial relations require concessions and compromises between unions and management. Also contrasting with the unitary framework, industrial conflict is not necessarily perceived as negative, but considered conducive to innovation and growth. Furthermore, conflict in industrial relations is considered inevitable and needs to be contained in the social mechanism of collective bargaining, conciliation, and arbitration. The pluralist perspective is the most common framework within the field of industrial relations (Heery, 2016, p. 37).

Authors in the pluralist tradition are generally concerned with institution-building and the evolution of current institutions in industrial relations (Heery, 2016; Strauss and Whitfield, 1998, pp. 36-37). Alston et al. (2018) define institutions as the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction, and they differentiate between formal and informal institutions. In this definition, institutions can include liberal democracy, the welfare system, unions, and systems of collective bargaining. GFAs, as systems of collective bargaining, are thus considered institutions as well, as exemplified by the study of Helfen and Sydow (2013) on GFA negotiation as institution-building process. While authors in the pluralist frame have historically focused on national institutions, Heery (2016, p. 68) argues that the pluralist perspective has, on all aspects, become more international in scope. There has been a growth in comparative research as pluralist authors have attempted to identify how different forms of regulation and worker representation function in different countries. Prescriptions for new and more effective forms of advancing the interests of workers are often pitched at the international level, while recognising the limitations of nation-specific responses in an international economy. Dehnen and Pries (2014) recognise that these pluralist scholars have heavily borrowed concepts and research strategies from neo-institutional comparative international relations research and comparative political research.

According to Heery (2016), in the pluralist perspective unions are recognised as agents working for the benefit of workers, and cooperation between unions and management is seen as crucial in the establishment of sustainable industrial relations. This includes international unions, and their strategy of negotiating GFAs is therefore of interest. Authors in the pluralist tradition are interested in the institution-building side of GFAs, where deliberation between MNC management and GUFs is being normalised and institutionalised (see, for example, Barreau et al., 2020; Helfen and Sydow, 2013; Schömann, 2011). While some pluralist authors will have more interest in the process of international negotiation as an institution-building process to achieve a balance between the interests of workers and management, others are more focused on the creation of regulation that requires management to consider the interests of their employees (for example, Colenbrander, 2016; Sobczak, 2007; Telljohan et al., 2009).

2.3.3. Critical perspective

The critical perspective within industrial relations is mainly build on Marxist arguments (Heery, 2016). These arguments are based on the notion that the economic activities of extraction, production, manufacturing, and distribution are primarily governed by profit maximalisation by the capitalist class. This will inevitably lead to decreasing the costs of labour, and in the critical frame industrial relations is therefore, as in the pluralist frame, defined by industrial conflict. However, departing from the pluralist perspective, in the critical frame of refence industrial conflict is strongly related to social and political conflict (Hyman, 1975).

2.3.4. Conclusion

Where the pluralist frame of reference argues that industrial conflict can be decreased by establishing institutions of negotiation and cooperation between employers and employees, in the critical perspective it is argued that employment conditions will only improve if employers and legislators are forced to do so, generally by mass mobilisation of workers (Heery, 2016, p. 108). Since the goal of GFA negotiation is establishing institutions for social dialogue between workers' representatives and management, the critical frame of reference is less suited for its assessment than the pluralist frame. The unitary frame of reference was also not considered useful for this research, due to its dismissal of the agency of workers and their representatives. Therefore, a pluralist frame of reference has been adopted for this research. The explanatory power of this frame on both the negotiation process as well as on the monitoring of GFAs is suited for the investigation of the case study in this thesis.

3. Research design

3.1. Research question

Previous literature on the inclusion of an environmental component in GFAs has made remarks on the potential of this phenomenon, and the increasing number of GFAs that included an environment component. At the time of this research, literature on the subject has been published more than a decade ago and no follow-up research has been encountered. In the years since the last research on this topic the negative effects of climate change have become more tangible (IPCC, 2022), and the internationalisation of the global economy has continued (du Preez and Smit, 2017). Additionally, where previous research has emphasised the potential of the inclusion of an environmental component in GFAs (Schömann et al., 2008; Schömann and

Wilke, 2011; Stevis, 2011, p. 151-152), and the only significant study on the topic (ETUC, 2010) was aimed at combined clauses on occupational health, safety, and environment, this thesis has attempted to assess the impact of separate environmental clauses. To further the knowledge on the impact of GFAs and specifically on the inclusion of an environmental component in these, the following research question was developed:

What are the effects of the addition of environmental clauses in the Safran global framework agreements?

The scope of the research question was intentionally kept quite broad, to appreciate the complex system of transnational bargaining of which GFAs are a part, and to accommodate both inductive and deductive research. The effects of environmental clauses were assessed in two different stages of the GFA, namely negotiation and monitoring. This division allowed the investigation of both the effects on transnational bargaining as well as the practical impact of the environmental clauses.

3.1.1. Negotiation

Negotiation of GFAs is a part of transnational bargaining, and a large share of the literature on GFAs has focused this subject (for example, Barreau et al., 2020; Bourque, 2007; Helfen and Sydow, 2013). Based on the literature on MNC motivation for signing GFAs (Egels-Zandén, 2009; Papadakis, 2011b; Schömann et al., 2008), several non-exclusive motivations for MNCs to include an environmental component in a GFA were expected. These are: 1) management recognises the union's authority on the subject; 2) the topic was part of voluntary CSR documents on which the GFA is based; 3) for PR reasons; or 4) because of low cost of compliance with the goals.

Similarly, several expectations were made regarding GUF motivation for including environmental clauses in GFAs. These expectations were made on the basis of the ETUC (201) study and motivations for union engagement with the environment from ELS literature (such as: Chen, 2017; Rätzl and Uzzel, 2011; Rinqvist, 2022; Stevis and Felli, 2015). These expected motivations are: 1) inclusion is part of GUF's strategy to expand their areas of influence; 2) because of members' concerns regarding the environment; 3) because of members' concerns regarding employment; or 4) for PR reasons.

3.1.2. Monitoring

The monitoring of GFAs is generally a shared responsibility of the MNC and the union federation (Papadakis, 2011a). The monitoring of the GFA can shed light on the power of the GFA and on the compliance of the agreement, as well as on the power relationship between the monitoring committee and unions on one side, and management on the other (Schömann, 2011; Welz, 2011). Therefore, if environmental clauses are generally not included in the monitoring of the agreement, its inclusion will have little effect. On the other hand, if environmental clauses are actively being monitored, and the monitoring group can influence MNC behaviour, its inclusion will have an effect.

3.2. Research method

3.2.1. Case study

The impact of GFAs is difficult to quantify, partially due to overlap with other CSR practices, due to a lack of agreed-upon indicators in many GFAs, or a lack of data (Schömann et al., 2008). Additionally, there is a relatively small number of negotiated GFAs, with a large heterogeneity regarding their content. Furthermore, there are many other variables that can influence the negotiation or compliance with the agreement. In the literature on GFAs and transnational bargaining variables can be found such as: strategies and power of the GUF, the strategy and the power of the MNC, the sector in which the MNC is active, (laws in) the MNC home, and more. Due to the limited knowledge about the inclusion of environmental clauses in GFA, the large number of potential interfering variables cannot be disregarded. Distilling one or a few variables while not considering or controlling for other variables would inevitably lead to an omitted variable bias of the research (Lopes, 2016).

These characteristics and limitations therefore make a quantitative approach to the research question not suited, and with a high risk of severe bias due to unrepresentative data. Conversely, a qualitative approach would be more suitable to give insights on the question given the characteristics of the research topic (Strauss and Whitfield, 1998, p. 15). To do justice to the intricate nature of the research topic the method of case study analysis was selected. Case studies can involve several data collection techniques, such as interviews, observations, questionnaires, and documentary sources (Strauss and Whitfield, 1998, pp. 55-57). Case studies, especially when combined with open or semi-structured interviews, enable the full in-

depth investigation of processes (Strauss and Whitfield, 1998, pp. 57). This research methodology is therefore well-suited for investigating the research question of this thesis.

For the research, a single case research design was adopted. This was done to increase the depth of the inquiry compared to a multiple case study. Single case studies have several weaknesses, mainly regarding generalisability (Strauss and Whitfield, 1998, p. 57). However, due to the intricate nature of GFA negotiation and GFAs heterogeneous content, difficulties with generalisability will also appear in multiple case studies. The more detailed investigation that was possible in a single case study therefore outweighs this issue.

Although the expectations that were made regarding the research question have been based on the literature, the qualitative nature of the research has allowed room for more than just hypotheses testing. The research therefore has a deductive as well as an inductive nature. The outcomes of the research reflect this open-ended nature of the research by presenting results on the proposed hypotheses as well as new findings.

3.2.2. Selection of GUF

For the investigation IndustriALL Global Union (IndustriALL) was selected. IndustriALL is the result of a merger between three GUFs, namely the International Metalworkers' Federation (IMF), International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers' Unions (ICEM), and the International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers' Federation (ITGLWF). IndustriALL was selected as it has an active strategy of GFA negotiation (IndustriALL, n.d.-b). In 2012 the IMF, ICEM, and ITGLWF combined had signed 33 GFAs (Papadakis, 2011a). In 2023 this number had increased to 47 GFAs (Industriall-union.org, n.d.-a). Additionally, IndustriALL has a record of including an environmental component in GFAs. According to the ETUC (2010), in 2010 the ICEM mentioned the environment in 71,4% of their GFAs, where the IMF did so in 38,9% of their GFAs. The ITGLWF had only signed one GFA at that time, which did mention the environment.

3.2.3. Case study selection

For the case study it was decided that a GFA with an extensive separate chapter on environmental issues would be selected. It was expected that a more detailed chapter on environmental issues would make the effect of its inclusion more evident. For the investigation

of the monitoring, the GFA had to be in force at the time of the investigation. For the investigation of the negotiation, it was preferred that the GFA was negotiated less than ten years before the investigation.

For the selection of the case an analysis was done by reading and analysing the texts of the 47 GFAs that were signed by IndustriALL up to 2023. This analysis covered several aspects. Firstly, general characteristics, such as the MNC home country, the sector, and the date of GFA negotiation and, if applicable, dates of renewals. Secondly, it was reviewed whether the GFA applied to subcontractors and how the monitoring mechanisms were constructed. Thirdly, it was measured if, and in how many chapters of the agreement the topics of *environment/climate*, *sustainable production*, and *just transition* were mentioned. Fourthly, environmental clauses were reviewed, and it was noted whether this was a separate chapter on the issue or if these were combined with another topic, such as OHS. Fifthly and finally, additional interesting features of the GFA were noted.

Of the 47 GFAs which were analysed, 36 mention the environment (76,6%), of which 29 were further elaborated into clauses (61,7%). This shows that the frequency as well as the scope of environmental issues in GFAs has increased since 2010 (ETUC). A significant share of the agreements had separate chapters on the environment, with some covering the environment in several chapters. If the environment was covered in several chapters, one was generally dedicated to *environment* or *environmental protection*, and another to *occupational health, safety, and the environment* or *Human rights and the environment*. Chapters on the environment were generally short and did not conclude concrete commitments. The majority of the agreements provided the establishment of a monitoring committee for the monitoring, which generally meets on a yearly basis.

The GFA that was signed in 2017 with Safran, a French aerospace corporation, stood out with regards to the inclusion of environmental issues. In the agreement there are three chapters dedicated to environmental issues, namely chapter 5, *Sustainable development*, chapter 13, *Health, safety, and the environment*, and chapter 14, *Environmental protection*. These chapters were quite extensive compared to most other agreements. Furthermore, the GFA states that Safran will communicate, and have discussions with its employees or their representatives regarding environmental issues. The monitoring of the agreement was done by the *global*

monitoring committee, which meet twice yearly, with one of the meetings located at the headquarters in France and the other in one of Safran's subsidiaries outside of France. This feature was unique among the analysed agreements. The Safran GFA was selected as the case study due to the extensive coverage of environmental issues, the relative recent date of negotiation, and the monitoring mechanism.

3.3. Data collection

The data for this study was obtained in two ways. Firstly, documentary sources such as articles, annual monitoring reports, publications on the internet, and background information regarding Safran and IndustriALL strategies were collected.

Secondly, there in-depth interview was held with people involved in the negotiation and the monitoring of the Safran agreement.

3.3.1. Document analysis

An analysis was done of documents about Safran's CSR strategy and documents about or mentioning the Safran GFA. The goal of this analysis was to obtain background information about the subject, and to reveal certain characteristics of the GFA which could be further investigated in the interview.

For information on Safran's CSR goals and environmental challenges of the Safran group two articles were consulted. These obtained from the Leiden University Library database. The first article, *What are the environmental issues for the Safran Group?* (Briquet and Fiol, 2009) was written by the, at the time of writing, deputy director of sustainable development at Safran and an environmental officer at the industrial directorate of the Safran Group. This article was not of much value due to its age and one-sided contents. The second article, by Ar and Abbas (2022), on CSR projects by MNCs, used Safran's Mexico subsidiary as a case study. Information about this case was concise, and did not relate to Safran's general CSR policy.

Information about Safran's CSR policies were obtained from several publicly available documents, most notably the Annual Universal Registration Documents, that are published on the Safran website. In these documents Safran publishes its annual results as well as its strategies and goals, including on CSR and on the GFA. The version that was mainly consulted was the 2022 report (Safran, 2023a), although previous versions were occasionally consulted

as well (Safran, 2019; Safran, 2021). The most useful part from the 2022 report was its description of Safran's CSR strategy, titled *Engage for the Future*. This is described in Chapter 5 (Safran, 2023a, pp. 254-323). In this chapter of the rapport the GFA is covered as well. Chapter 6, on corporate governance, was used as well. Information regarding the compensation structure of upper management was taken from the Safran website as well (Safran, 2023b, Safran 2023e).

Other sources on Safran's CSR policy included the Safran *Code of Conduct* (Safran, 2022a), Safran's *Ethical Guidelines* (Safran, 2022b), the brochure on CSR (Safran, 2017), and the Health, Safety and Environment Policy (Safran, 2021b). Another useful source regarding the CSR position of Safran, especially on environmental issues, were the *Answers to written questions from shareholders* from Safran's 2023 annual general meeting (Safran, 2023c). The questions which are answered in this document were submitted by a shareholder group called *the French Sustainable Investment Fund*. The submitted questions are focused on the environmental strategy of the Safran Group and covers the topic of employee consultation and representation in this strategy and process.

The strategy and the attitude from Safran and its management regarding the GFA were taken from these documents. These documents provided sufficient insights on the strategy and position of Safran regarding the GFA.

Information about IndustriALL was mainly collected from their website. This included information about GFA strategy (IndustriALL, n.d.-b), just transition strategy (IndustriALL, n.d.-c), industry 4.0 (IndustriALL, n.d.-c), and publications about the aerospace sector (IndustriALL, n.d.-d). This data gave a reflection of the strategies and practices of IndustriALL regarding CSR and provided context and information about the Safran GFA.

The original GFA was retrieved from the IndustriALL website (IndustriALL, 2017), and was analysed with a specific focus on the chapters mentioning the environment or Just Transition. The 2023 agreement, which at the time of writing was not published on the Safran or IndustriALL website, was shared with the author by an IndustriALL representative.

3.3.2. Interview

As was recognized by Schömann (2011), due to the confidentiality between management and trade unions, publicly available information about the functioning and negotiation of the agreement is limited. Safran management was approached for an interview, but there was no response to this request.

It was decided to do an in-depth interview with union representatives about the environmental component of the Safran GFA. To respect the confidentiality between management and the unions, this interview was done on the basis of anonymity. The participants of the interview were a member of the monitoring committee and a representative of IndustriALL. The participants were asked to sign a consent form for the use of the data prior to the interview, which can be found in the appendix. The interview took place shortly after the signing of the renewed GFA between Safran and IndustriALL following one and a half year of negotiations between the parties (Safran Group, 2023).

The interview took place online on December 6, 2023, and lasted approximately one hour. The interview was semi-structured, which allowed for the further investigation of interesting or unexpected responses. The research was subsequently transcribed and coded in topics that were deemed relevant to the research question.

4. Results

4.1. Document analysis

The documents that were reviewed gave a clear image of the strategy and commitments made on CSR by the Safran Group. These documents reveal that Safran has an extensive CSR strategy, which suggest that Safran takes CSR seriously. Whereas some MNCs do not communicate about their GFA (Egels-Zandén, 2009), the publications about and mentioning of the GFA on the website and in corporate communication suggest that the agreement is partially used for legitimacy or image related reasons by Safran management.

Comparison of the original and the renewed GFA with Safran's documents on CSR revealed that there was a large overlap between the environmental commitments laid out in the GFAs and in Safran's unilateral CSR documents. The original GFA did not include indicators, but the indicators regarding environmental issues in the renewed GFA were similar to the

indicators in the unilateral CSR documents. Additionally, the renewed agreement included a section on just transition, whereas the original GFA did not include this topic.

4.2. Interview

The results of the interview have been categorised in two main categories, namely negotiation and monitoring. The results are presented in the next section.

4.2.1. Negotiation

Within the theme of *negotiation* the topic of *strategy* regarding GFA negotiation was included. This consisted of data regarding the strategy that IndustriALL and Safran have regarding GFA negotiation. Responding to a question about the strategy of signing GFAs at IndustriALL, one participant said:

It's actually one of our main pillars. [...] So therefore, besides this first pillar, where we try to defend the basic labour rights, which are mainly based on the ILO conventions, then there is a second pillar in our work which is clearly dedicated to building trade union networks globally, both in sectors but also at company level, and with this goes the instrument of global framework agreements.

Adding on the importance of GFAs for IndustriALL's members, the representative stated:

We have signed as industrial about around 50 global framework agreements, so it's not a big number actually. If you look at the huge number of multinationals that are out there, but yeah, it's still, it's a very important instrument because also with the, with the global framework we have, I mean we cover a lot of big companies.

The same interviewee was asked about a potential strategy from IndustriALL on the inclusion of an environmental component in GFA negotiation. He responded:

Mixed, I would say. I think there is no, I hope there is no global framework agreements where we do not talk about environmental issues, so there should be, actually it's one of the prerequisites for us to have such a chapter, but to be totally frank and honest, it

is certainly not the most important chapter in in many of these global framework agreements.

A large share of the interview was about the inclusion of CSR in the GFA, with a specific focus on the environmental component in the agreement. The participants were asked about their views on the motivation of Safran and IndustriALL to include these topics in the GFA. The IndustriALL representative stated that the expansion of contents of GFAs, which was initially supported by certain MNCs, is now being challenged:

But in those [MNCs] which are really progressive, they would now actually come to us and say, well, why should I actually sign an agreement with the Union? Only I better also have like civil society organizations, et cetera, et cetera.

This indicates that the expansion of areas of influence in which the parties recognise each other are disputed, and that the expansion of subjects in which unions are seen as appropriate parties should not be taken too lightly.

So the dimension of this is really getting much larger, and I think although the Safran agreement certainly has deficiencies and some issues. But understanding this, this, this broader responsibility, this at least I think is shown by the way, that they now also include these CSR aspects and their Charter on ethics et cetera, et cetera. So it's a small step I guess, but probably it's quite an important step.

However, one of the participants also stated that in his view the ambitions of the agreement on CSR and specifically on environmental protection were far from ambitious.

[When] Safran started to think about putting environment in the GFA they use the thing they were already doing regarding CSR and so there weren't any ambitions regarding the environment and the indicator regarding environment was the strategy already put in place to answer to themes of how you can't reject your polluted waste into the river or et cetera. So it was an obligation of the French law [to have a CSR strategy] and so as they try to do that in every in every country, to respect the laws.

This low level of ambition was emphasised several times in the interview. It was stated that the goals in the GFA were not any more ambitious than the goals that Safran has already adopted in its CSR policies, and that for the new agreement, which is more ambitious, the goals that have been adopted will become mandatory under the European Corporate Social Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), which is expected to come into force in 2024, the year following the renewal of the GFA.

So I think this law is going to push very, very strong the European company to have a road map regarding those, those issues, environmental issues and I know that this law will [make] the environmental part in the GFA in 2024 quickly obsolete because of the of the obligation of the SAFRAN company regarding environment.

One of the participants of the interview suggested that the inclusion of an environmental clause in the GFA was motivated by personal objectives of Safran upper management. He clarified that the bonus structure of Safran's upper management created a financial incentive to pursue good scores on certain environmental indicators. Talking about the environmental indicators that were included in the agreement, the participant said:

But in fact that it is not really an ambitious indicator, or it is a [reproduction] of the personal objectives of the main director.

4.2.2. Monitoring

The impact that a GFA can make is for a large part dependent on the *monitoring* of the agreement. This is dependent on, among others, the power that the monitoring committee has, cooperation with management, the indicators that are in the agreement, and the enforceability of the agreement.

The power of the committee was described in the interview as:

I think with the committee, there is the smallest influence and it's not really because of its organization, not because of the Unionist, but because of the company.

This lack of ability to monitor and ensure compliance with the agreement was mainly the result of two impeding factors, namely the lack of time that committee members were assigned to work on the agreement, and the weak power of the committee vis-à-vis management, as well as managements attitude towards the committee. On the assigned time for committee members one of the participants responded:

And we don't have officially hours to work on the on the agreement, we, every unionist in this committee, already have other mandates and those mandates give us enough time to, if we want to, work on the agreement but the means are not really big to work on it.

Furthermore, it was added that although the agreement states that there should be two meetings yearly, one in France and a second in another country where Safran is active, the second meeting has only taken place twice in the six years that the GFA was in force. On the functioning of the committee vis-à-vis management it was stated that:

If we say 'what you are doing is good' they are OK, but when we say 'you should change this or this' It's always a no go and it's very, very hard to have small actions or make even small decision when the agenda of the meeting is decided by the directors of the company. And when we want to change a subject to put it in priority, it's always a no-go. So it's very frustrating to work in this in this committee.

This uncooperative position of management was even more tangible when it came to environmental clauses of the agreement, due to the unclear language on the subject in the agreement:

So it's a good thing that Safran has this agreement [...], but when you really want to use it, when there is a problem, you come into discussion with the top management of the company and it is quickly a very hard discussion and regarding specifically as a the environmental part it's a small part, really fuzzy general sentences which they put in the agreement.

The monitoring of the environmental component of the agreement is further complicated by the vagueness of the indicators by which it is measured:

So they [the indicators for the environment] are not really applicable in in society. When you have an indicator regarding the safety of workers you can count in every company how many incidents there are more than they are in the indicator, and every company has to regulate so it is as the figures, but regarding the climate issue it is a macro indicator created at the top of Safran.

The participants were positive that if the environmental clauses were brought up to the committee, or if the committee would make environmental issues a key priority, that the GFA could have a significant impact, which was exemplified by the following statement:

Now I'm sure if we as a committee, as a monitoring committee, we decide our #1 priority is environment, then a lot will probably happen or we will try to a lot, we will try to make things happen in this context.

However, it was emphasised several times in the interview that the environmental component of the GFA has no priority, neither for management nor the committee. The case of a recent conflict was mentioned:

One of the main issues you had recently, was first of all to have trade unionists in a company. So before a regarding an environmental strategy the first problem is to respect the law of the workers, the rights of the workers.

In addition to monitoring, in accordance with Chapter 17 of the agreement, the committee can also play a role in dispute settlement. There are two ways in which a dispute can be referred to the committee, the first being through the referral of a local union, and the second being through what was named the 'company hotline', through which the dispute would be referred to both company leadership and the committee. The latter has not been used to date, but the first way has several times. The dispute settlement procedure has been successful in these instances:

We had one case, or several cases actually, which were brought up by trade unions in certain countries and then brought to the attention of the monitoring committee, and we dealt with it together with the company.

A unique feature about the Safran GFA is that it is enforceable under French law. During the renegotiation of the agreement Safran attempted to not include this legal basis in the new agreement:

This is why the first agreement also says it's a French agreement and it's signed by the French unions and the company now said in the in the renewal, they rather wanted an international agreement as they were not so keen on continuing this.

The interview made clear that there are internal discussions at IndustriALL about the goals of GFAs, as well as the instruments that should be included in the agreement:

It's a core discussion we are having at industriALL between the agreement as a basis for dialogue and the agreement being enforceable. So this is one of the major conflicts inside our organization as well.

5. Discussion

The goal of this research is to investigate the effects of the addition of environmental clauses to GFAs. This was investigated with a case study on the GFA between Safran and IndustriALL. The data from the interview reveals that, contrary to the communication from Safran, that the GFA between Safran and IndustriALL is a contentious area. This is exemplified by the statements over the balance of power between the committee vis-à-vis management, labour conflicts, and a low level of ambition from Safran regarding the agreement. The inclusion of the environmental component in the framework, although of lower priority and debatable success, seems to be beneficial for both union representatives as well as company management, albeit for different reasons.

Both the analysis on the 47 GFAs signed by IndustriALL as well as information from the interview indicated that there is a trend of increasing topics that are covered in GFAs. This was

recognised in the studies by the ETUC (2010) and Schömann et al. (2008), and the data from this research reveals that this trend has continued. In line with arguments by Papadakis (2011b) and the ETUC (2010) this indicates that global unions and MNCs are recognising each other's authority on these topics and are using GFAs to channel discussions on these topics. This increase of covered topics can be interpreted as demonstrating the increasing importance of GFAs as channels of transnational labour relations.

Several expectations were made regarding the motivations of MNCs to include an environmental component in GFAs. The data revealed that Safran's attitude towards the inclusion of committee members on environmental issues was hostile. This hostile attitude by management was not uniquely aimed at the environmental clauses of the GFA, but towards the rest of the GFA's content as well. However, the unclear language of the parts on the environment, and its lower priority compared to other clauses exacerbated the issue. This does not support the expectation that management recognises the authority of the unions on this topic, or at least does not see it as an important issue in the labour-management relationship.

5.1. Negotiation

5.1.1. GFA and Safran CSR

It was pointed out during the interview that the ambitions of the environmental clauses in the GFA were in not more ambitious than those that had already unilaterally been adopted by Safran in the company's CSR strategy. While the agreement was not modelled after Safran's CSR strategy, the environmental goals seem to be strongly inspired by this. The data indicated that the inclusion of an environmental component for management might be inspired by PR reasons. The environmental component of the agreement is prominently featured on company publications on the subject and is carried out to shareholders as well. Ultimately, it was expected that a low cost of compliance with the environmental goals of the agreement make it more attractive for management to include this in the GFA. The data from the interview and the annual reports indicated that the costs of compliance was low. Since the environmental goals of the original agreement were no more ambitious than the CSR strategy, which itself is not much more ambitious than Safran's obligations under French law, compliance with these goals should not be difficult. The environmental goals of the renewed agreement are slightly

more ambitious, but not more ambitious than the legal obligations under the CSDDD, which is expected to go into force in 2024.

5.1.2. Motivations

Although there has been no research focused on motivations to add environmental clauses to GFAs, it is useful to compare the results to the studies by Schömann et al. (2008), Egels-Zandén (2009) and Papadakis (2011b) on MNC motivations for adopting GFAs. The MNC motivations in the framework by Schömann et al. do not reflect the findings of this study. In the framework by Egels-Zandén and Papadakis, the motivations that for the inclusion of environmental clauses that have been identified in this research would fall in the category ‘to retain, restore, and/or improve legitimacy. According to Papadakis (2011b) GFAs signed based on these motives are generally weak, which suggests that the environmental clause would be weak as well. The limited discussion of the topic in the monitoring committee supports this suggestion. The inclusion of the environmental is nonetheless beneficial for the MNC, which enjoys reputational benefits from involving social partners in its environmental strategy.

The data also suggested another possible motivation for management towards the inclusion of environmental goals in the GFA. The variable compensation for upper management, most notably the Chief Executive Officer, are dependent on a number of personal performance objectives. The 2022-2023 objectives include objectives on ‘Climate – Low carbon’. The same goals have also been adopted in the 2023 renewed GFA. This potential motivation for the inclusion of certain subjects in GFAs has not been discussed in previous research, and should be further investigated before statements about this can be made. This finding could be useful for sustainable activist shareholders (see, for example, Yang, Uysal, and Taylor, 2018), who can vote on the approval of the compensation structure.

Expectations were also made regarding the motivation of GUFs to include an environmental component in GFAs. The data supported the expectation that the inclusion is part of the GUF’s strategy to expand their areas of influence. IndustriALL has a strategy of including environmental issues in their GFAs, although this understandably is not the main priority during negotiation. This strategy appears to secure the position of unions as MNCs main social partner, whereas MNCs would also be willing to enter agreements with other social organisations. As was suggested in the ETUC (2010) study, this broadening of topics where

GUFs are seen as legitimate social partners is recognised as an important step for IndustriALL. Little evidence was found that suggested that GUFs include environmental issues in GFA negotiation because of members' concerns regarding the environment or for PR reasons. IndustriALL's strategy on Just Transition, and the inclusion of the topic in the new agreement did indicate that environmental issues were included because of members' concerns regarding employment.

5.1.3. Sector

Thomas and Doerflinger (2020) recognised three different positions that unions can take on climate change mitigation. The position of IndustriALL, regarding the inclusion of environmental clauses, can be described as 'support'. This can partially be explained by the fact that Safran is expected to increase its economic activity due to climate change mitigation factors. Support for environmental clauses therefore does not threaten the employment of union members. However, climate change regulation can and does change certain business operations. This explains the inclusion of a chapter on Just Transition in the new agreement (Safran Group, 2023d), that is focused on a skills transition for workers. This is in line with the conclusions from the study by the ETUC (2010) and the book chapter by Schömann and Wilke (2011), who found that the sector is an important variable for the inclusion of CSR practices, including environmental clauses, in GFAs.

5.2. Monitoring

5.2.1. Effects on monitoring

It was also attempted to determine the effect of environmental clauses by investigating the monitoring of the agreement. It was expected that if environmental clauses were generally included in the monitoring its inclusion would have an effect. The data revealed that this was generally not the case, which was the result of several factors. First of all, the agenda for the committee meetings is set by management and does not include environmental issues. The hostile attitude from management towards the monitoring committee made it difficult to put other subjects on the agenda. This especially the case for the environmental clauses, which are written in unclear, fuzzy language, and has less priority than other topics. Additionally, although the committee members were assigned hours for their mandates as employee

representatives, in the old agreement committee members were not assigned extra hours to work on the agreement. The means to work on the agreement were therefore limited.

The data revealed that, despite the hostile attitude of management towards the monitoring committee, it was able to influence MNC behaviour in certain cases. The committee has been successful in resolving labour conflict with group management and defending the right to association. These are subjects that are understandably prioritised over environmental issues. However, it was suggested that the monitoring committee has the potential of influencing the MNC on environmental issues, if time were available and there were no other priorities.

Schömann (2011) and Welz (2011) have suggested that the impact of GFAs can be measured by investigating the monitoring of the agreement. Although the monitoring of the agreement was frustrated because of its members limited means and the hostile attitude of management, the monitoring of the agreement on labour issues is relatively successful. The same cannot be said, however, about the monitoring of the environmental component of the agreement, which does not have clear performance indicators and is of lesser priority compared to other issues.

Although the impact of the GFA on the monitoring of the environmental clauses is not very strong, the inclusion of an environmental component in the Safran GFA seems to be beneficial for both Safran management and IndustriALL. For management the added value is mainly for their public image, as well as increasing the legitimacy of its environmental strategy by including social partners. The cost of implementation for management can be low, as it is generally not more ambitious than existing CSR strategy. For IndustriALL this is mainly the securing of unions' position as the main social partner of MNCs, as well as expanding its areas of influence in transnational bargaining. Additionally, having the environmental component in the agreement could be a useful area for negotiation if the issue becomes more important or if conflict arises around environmental issues.

6. Conclusion

Literature on environmental clauses in GFAs is scarce, and there has been no previous research on the separate chapters on environmental issues in GFAs. This study has attempted to further the knowledge on this subject. By investigating the global framework agreement between Safran and IndustriALL, this thesis has shown how the inclusion of an environmental

component has affected (re)negotiation, and what the impact of this environmental component is. The research has shown that although the environmental clauses of the GFA do not have a strong effect on Safran's behaviour on environmental issues, its inclusion is beneficial for both Safran management and IndustriALL. Perhaps most importantly, the inclusion of environmental clauses means an increase of topics where IndustriALL is recognised as a formal negotiation partner. It has also created a forum where potential labour conflict around Safran's environmental strategy can be discussed.

As the research was a single case study, it is difficult to generalise these findings to other GFAs or their negotiation. However, the qualitative nature of the research allowed for a more in-depth investigation into the dynamics surrounding environmental clauses in the GFA, which can be useful for future research. Business operations at Safran are currently not threatened by climate change regulation, and environmental issues are therefore not a major area of conflict between Safran and IndustriALL. Future research could focus on sectors where operations and employment are more likely to decline. This could provide information on how GFAs can function as a forum for labour conflict around environmental issues. Additionally, the results of the study suggested that management might be motivated by personal compensation to include or exclude certain topics or indicators in GFAs. Further research on how the compensation structure within companies might influence management behaviour in bargaining and compliance with GFAs could shed light on this phenomenon.

7. Bibliography

- Alston, E., Alston, L., Mueller, B., & Nonnenmacher, T. (2018). Part III. In *Institutional and Organizational Analysis: Concepts and Applications (New Approaches to Economic and Social History)*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Ar, A. Y., & Abbas, A. (2022). Corporate social responsibility projects to support multinationals' reputation building efforts in Mexico. *Journal of public affairs*, 22(2).
- Barreau, J., Havard, C, & Ngaha Bah, A. (2020). Global union federations and international framework agreements: Knowledge exchange and creation. *European Journal of Industrial Relations*, 26(1), 41-57.
- Bourque, R. (2008). International Framework Agreements and the future of collective bargaining in Multinational Companies. *Just Labour*, 12(1).
- Briquet, R., and Fiol, B. (2009). What are the environmental issues for the Safran Group? *Responsabilité & environnement*, 54(1), 52-59.
- Chen, M. (2017). Job versus environment: an examination on the attitude of union members toward environmental spending. *Environmental Economic Policy Studies*, 19, 761-788.
- Colenbrander, A. (2016). International framework agreements: An analysis of the international framework agreement as an instrument for improving working standards in global business operations. *Utrecht Law Review*, 12(1), 109-121.
- da Costa, I., and Rehfeldt, U. (2011) Transnational restructuring agreements: General overview and specific evidence from the European automobile sector. In S. Papadakis (Ed.), *Shaping global industrial relations: The impact of international framework agreements* (pp. 143-163). London, UK: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Davies, S., Hammer, N., Williams, G., Raman, R., Ruppert, C., and Volynets, L. (2011). Labour standards and capacity in global subcontracting chains: Evidence from a construction MNC. *Industrial Relations Journal*, 42(2), 124-138.
- Dehnen, V., and Pries, L. (2014). International framework agreements: A thread in the web of transnational labour regulation. *European Journal of Labour Regulation*, 20(4), 335-350.
- Egels-Zandén, N. (2009). TNC motives for signing international framework agreements: A continuous bargaining model of stakeholder pressure. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 84(1), 529-547.

- European Trade Union Confederation (2010). *Environment and occupational health and safety clauses in the International Framework Agreements: A study*. Brussels, Belgium: ETUC.
- Felli, R. (2014) An alternative socio-ecological strategy? International trade unions' engagement with climate change. *Review of International Political Economy*, 21(2), 372–398.
- Fichter, M. (2015). Modelling a global union strategy: The arena of global production networks, global framework agreements and trade union networks. In N. Pons-Vignon and M. Nkosi (Eds.), *Struggle in a time of crisis* (pp. 155-160). London, UK: Pluto Press.
- Goodstein, E.S., 1999. *The Trade Off Myth: Fact and Fiction about Jobs and the Environment*. Washington, DC: Island Press.
- Hammer, N. (2005). International framework agreements: Global industrial relations between rights and bargaining. *Transfer*, 11(4), 511-530.
- Heery, E. (2016). *Framing work: Unitary, pluralist and critical perspectives in the 21st century*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Helfen, M., & Sydow, J. (2013). Negotiating as institutional work: The case of labour standards and international framework agreements. *Organization Studies*, 34(8), 1073-1098.
- Hyman, R. (1975). What is industrial relations? In *Industrial Relations*. London, UK: Palgrave MacMillan.
- IndustriALL. (2017, October, 18). IndustriALL signs Global Framework Agreement with Safran. Retrieved from <https://www.industriall-union.org/industriall-global-union-signs-global-framework-agreement-with-safran>
- IndustriALL. (n.d.-a). Global Framework Agreements. Retrieved October 11, 2023, from <https://www.industriall-union.org/global-framework-agreements>
- IndustriALL. (n.d.-b). IndustriALL Global Union's guidelines for global framework agreements (GFAs). Retrieved October 11, 2023, from https://www.industriall-union.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/GFAs/industriall_gfa_guidelines_final_oversver_exco_12-2014_english.pdf
- IndustriALL. (n.d.-c). *Just Transition*. Retrieved October 13, 2023, from <https://www.industriall-union.org/what-we-do/just-transition>

- IndustriALL. (n.d.-d). *Industry 4.0*. Retrieved October 13, 2023, from <https://www.industriall-union.org/what-we-do/future-of-work/industry-40>
- IndustriALL. (n.d.-d). *Aerospace*. Retrieved October 14, 2023, from <https://www.industriall-union.org/aerospace>
- International Panel on Climate Change. (2022). Summary for policymakers. In *Climate Change 2022: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability*. Retrieved from https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGII_SummaryForPolicymakers.pdf
- Lopes, H. F. (2016, September 21). *Omitted Variable Bias: The Simple Case*. Hedibert. <http://hedibert.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Bias-omittedvariable.pdf>
- Miller, D. (2011). Global social relations and corporate social responsibility in outsourced apparel supply chains: The Inditex global framework agreement. In S. Papadakis (Ed.), *Shaping global industrial relations: The impact of international framework agreements* (pp. 179-200). London, UK: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Norpoth, J., Kaltenborn, M., and Naset, C. (2020). Implementation of the H&M global framework agreement in Cambodia: Producing outcomes despite a challenging context? *The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations*, 36(2), 169-194.
- Pandya, S. (2016). Political economy of foreign direct investment: Globalized production in the twenty-first century. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 19(1), 455-475.
- Papadakis, K., Ed. (2011a). *Shaping global industrial relations: The impact of international framework agreements*. London, UK: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Papadakis, K. (2011b). Adopting international framework agreements in the Russian Federation, South Africa and Japan: Management motivations. In S. Papadakis (Ed.), *Shaping global industrial relations: The impact of international framework agreements* (pp. 61-84). London, UK: Palgrave MacMillan.
- du Preez, H., & Smit, P. (2017). The role of international framework agreements in transnational labour regulation. *South African Journal of Labour Relations*, 41(1), 64-74.
- Räthzel, N., & Uzzel, D. (2011). Trade unions and climate change: The jobs versus environment dilemma. *Global Environmental Change*, 21, 1215-1223.
- Räthzel, N., & Uzzell, D. L. (2013). Trade unions in the green economy: Working for the environment. New York, NY: Routledge.

- Räthzel, N., Stevis, D., and Uzzel, D. (2021). *The Palgrave handbook on environmental labour studies* (Eds.). London, UK: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Rinqvist, J. (2022). Union membership and the willingness to prioritize environmental protection above growth and jobs: A multi-level analysis covering 22 European countries. *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 60(3), 662-682.
- Robinson, P. K. (2011). International framework agreements: Do workers benefit in a global banana supply chain? In S. Papadakis (Ed.), *Shaping global industrial relations: The impact of international framework agreements* (pp. 164-178). London, UK: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Rossi, A., & Robertson, R. (2011). Better factories in Cambodia: An instrument for improving industrial relations in a transnational context. In S. Papadakis (Ed.), *Shaping global industrial relations: The impact of international framework agreements* (pp. 220-241). London, UK: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Safran Group. (2017). *Corporate Social Responsibility*. Retrieved from <https://www.safran-group.com/group/commitments/decarbonizing-aeronautics>
- Safran Group. (2019). *2018 Universal Registration Document*. Retrieved from <https://www.safran-group.com/publications>
- Safran Group. (2021a). *2020 Universal Registration Document*. Retrieved from <https://www.safran-group.com/publications>
- Safran Group. (2021b). *Group policy: Health, safety and environment*. Retrieved from <https://www.safran-group.com/publications>
- Safran Group. (2022a). *Code de Conduite*. Retrieved from <https://www.safran-group.com/group/commitments/a-responsible-industry>
- Safran Group (2022b). *Ethical Guidelines*. Retrieved from: <https://www.safran-group.com/group/commitments/a-responsible-industry>
- Safran Group. (2023a). *2022 Universal Registration Document*. Retrieved from <https://www.safran-group.com/publications>
- Safran Group. (2023b). *Corporate Officer Compensation (2022-2023)*. Retrieved from <https://www.safran-group.com/group/profile/governance>
- Safran Group. (2023c, May 25). *Answers to written questions from shareholders*. Retrieved from <https://www.safran-group.com/finance/annual-general-meeting>
- Safran Group. (2023d, December 4). *Safran and IndustriALL Global Union renew Global Framework Agreement on CSR*. Retrieved from [42](https://www.safran-</p>
</div>
<div data-bbox=)

group.com/pressroom/safran-industriall-global-union-renouvellent-leur-accord-cadre-mondial-responsabilite-societale-2023-12-04

- Safran Group. (2023e). *2023 Long term incentive plan: Grant of performance shares to the Chief Executive Officer, inclusion of non-financial performance conditions*. Retrieved from <https://www.safran-group.com/group/profile/governance>
- Schömann, I., Sobczak, A., Voss, E., & Wilke, P. (2008). *Codes of conduct and international framework agreements: New forms of governance at company level*. European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- Schömann, I., & Wilke, P. (2011). Towards a sustainable economy: The potential contribution of international framework agreements. In S. Vitols, & N. Kluge (Eds.): *The sustainable company: A new approach to corporate governance* (pp. 167-183). Brussels, Belgium: European Trade Union Institute.
- Schömann, I. (2011). The impact of transnational company agreements on social dialogue and industrial relations. In S. Papadakis (Ed.), *Shaping global industrial relations: The impact of international framework agreements* (pp. 21-37). London, UK: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Silverman, J. (2006). Green unions in a grey world: Labor environmentalism and international institutions. *Organizations & Environment*, 19(2), 191-213.
- Sobczak, A. (2007). Legal dimensions of International Framework Agreements in the field of corporate social responsibility. *Industrial Relations*, 62(1), 466-491.
- Stavis, D., & Boswell, T. (2007). International framework agreement: Opportunities and challenges for global unionism. In K. Bronfenbrenner (Ed.), *Global unions: Challenging transnational capital through cross-border campaigns* (pp. 174- 194). Cornell, UK: Cornell University Press.
- Stavis, D., & Felli, R. (2015). Global labour unions and just transition to a green economy. *International environmental agreements*, 15(1), 29-43.
- Stavis, D. (2011a). Unions and the environment: Pathways to global labor environmentalism. *Working USA: The journal of labor and society*, 14(1), 145-159.
- Stavis, D. (2011b). The impact of International Framework Agreements: Lessons from the Daimler case. In S. Papadakis (Ed.), *Shaping global industrial relations: The impact of international framework agreements* (pp. 116-142). London, UK: Palgrave MacMillan.

- Stavis, D. (2022). Towards a relational environmental labour studies. *Journal of Industrial Relations*, 64(4), 608-619.
- Strauss, G., & Whitfield, K. (Eds.). (1998). *Researching the world of work: Strategies and methods in studying industrial relations*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Telljohann, V., da Costa, I., Müller, T., Rehfeldt, U., & Zimmer, R. (2009). *European and international framework agreements: Practical experiences and strategic approaches*. European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- Thomas, A., & Doerflinger, N. (2020). Trade union strategies on climate change mitigation: Between opposition, hedging and support. *European Journal of Industrial Relation*, 26(4), 383-399.
- Vachon, T. E., & Brecher, J. (2016). Are union members more or less likely to be environmentalists? Some evidence from two national surveys. *Labor Studies Journal*, 41(2), 185-203.
- Welz, C. (2011). A qualitative analysis of international framework agreements: Implementation and impact. In S. Papadakis (Ed.), *Shaping global industrial relations: The impact of international framework agreements* (pp. 38-59). London, UK: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Williams, G. Davies, S., & Chinguno, C. (2015). Subcontracting and labour standards: reassessing the potential of International Framework Agreements. *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 53(2), 181–203.
- Yang, A., Uysal, N., & Taylor, M. (2018). Unleashing the power of networks: Shareholder activism, sustainable development and corporate environmental policy. *Business Strategy and the Environment*, 27(6), 712-727.

8. Appendix



Universiteit
Leiden

Consent form

For the research project on environmental provisions in GFAs, it is necessary to use your personal data. To use this data during our research we need your consent.

What data are being used?

The data that is collected includes: contact details, such as names, e-mail addresses, and job titles; and an audio recording of the interview. Data will be anonymized, and personal data will not be made public.

What happens if I change my mind?

If you change your mind, you can send an e-mail to s.t.van.beem@umail.leidenuniv.nl with a short message indicating that you withdraw your consent for (a part of) the interview. The interview will then be deleted, as well as any other information that can be traced back to you.

What will be done with my data after the research project?

Your data will be stripped of your name and other information that can identify you, and the audio recording will be deleted one month after the research is concluded. This is planned to be February 29, 2024. If, for any reason, it is deemed useful or necessary to keep this data after this date, you will be contacted to ask permission for this.

If you have any questions regarding this interview, please feel free to contact me:

Sven van Beem

Phone: *****

E-mail: *****

Please place a cross in the box that is applicable.

I do not consent to any use of the information collected about me.

I consent to the use of the information collected about me for this research project.

Name, date, location and signature
