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Who's Afraid of Narendra Modi?: An Analysis of Dynastic and Non-Dynastic Party Manifesto Change In India since 2014

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Who's Afraid of Narendra Modi?:
An Analysis of Dynastic and Non-Dynastic Party
Manifesto Change In India since 2014

MSc Thesis

by

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Intro

Political dynasticism is a global phenomenon.¹ Common explanations as to why this is relate to the weak institutionalisation of personalist parties necessitating highly personal lines of loyalty in the absence of larger ideological or institutional mechanisms. This means that even while the founding leader of the party is still alive, the party leader usually begins promoting their relatives to high office within the party apparatus, thus making the party a “family business”. Multi-generational dynastic leaders are seen around the world, from Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. of the Philippines, to Keiko Fujimori of Peru, to Justin Trudeau of Canada. However, little has been written about the nature of programmatic appeals in dynastic parties, and the ability of these parties to react to new challenges after the founder dies. In short, do these dynastic parties have wider consistencies than merely the whims of the leader? It is this question that makes this study useful for deepening our understanding of contemporary dynastic politics, and nowhere is this more needed than for Indian dynastic politics.

While dynastic parties are common in many countries, India is noteworthy for the scale of the phenomenon,² with dynastic parties, i.e. those led and organised around a single family, being extremely prevalent.³ Since 2010, many of the first generation of regional dynastic politicians in India have died and their children have taken control of their parties. Academic

¹Farida Jalalzai and Meg Rincker. “Dynasties Still Run the World.” *The Conversation*, June 27, 2023.

²Chandra, Kanchan. "Democratic Dynasties: State, Party, and Family in Contemporary Indian Politics." In *Democratic Dynasties: State, Party, and Family in Contemporary Indian Politics*, edited by Kanchan Chandra, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. Page 12-14

³Pradeep Chhibber. “Dynastic Parties: Organization, Finance and Impact.” *Party politics* 19, no. 2 (2013): pages 287-289

focus has been on how these heirs have functioned vis-a-vis other parties and their electoral conduct,⁴ but not on programmatic consistencies of the party over time. This is a serious gap in the literature given the constraints these second-generation leaders operate under. Second-generation dynastic leaders inherit the political relationships and programmatic positions that the father created, while also responding to changed political circumstances. How these second-generation parties can react to changed political circumstances, while maintaining the support that the father forged, can give us information as to why dynastic parties have staying power upon the death of the founder. The structure of this thesis will try to examine these points, beginning with a theory section outlining the nature of dynastic parties and how they function when confronted with a challenger party. This thesis will then explain why India was chosen over other countries, and the parties chosen for this analysis, the Bharatiya Janata Party under Narendra Modi as a challenger party, the Shiv Sena and Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam for dynastic parties, and the Aam Aadmi Party and Communist Party of India (Marxist) for non-dynastic parties. The methodological section will then explain the quantitative manifesto analysis done to examine the overall programmatic change of the parties examined, followed by a qualitative discourse analysis on change concerning two specific two topics, secularism and regulation. The results sections for each analysis will then be shown, and finally, a conclusion to analyse what this thesis can tell us about the continued relevance of dynastic parties in India and around the world.

⁴Ambar Kumar Ghosh. "Understanding Layered Dominance of Political Dynasties in India: A de-Hyphenated Reading of Dynastic Representation and Dynasty-Led Parties." *Asian journal of comparative politics* 8, no. 3 (2023): page 728

Theory

Traditional explanations of charismatic parties are usually derived from Max Weber's classic paradigm: leaders can either routinize the emotional linkages of the party members to the leader, and depersonalise the party, or keep personalised links and risk the party collapsing upon the leader's death.⁵ Personalist parties are typically thought to suffer when anointed successors, those only chosen to succeed the party leader due to their loyalty and no other qualifications, take over these movements and not those who through their own actions become emotionally linked to the party's founder.⁶ However, this explanation fails to consider that parties can both remain personalist and also institutionalise the party structure. Charismatic leaders have an alternate path to institutionalise their parties by bureaucratizing, and thus routinizing, their authority, but maintain the emotive links tying the party to the leader by building a cult of personality.⁷ A paradigmatic example of this is the Muttahida Qaumi Movement of Pakistan, whose leader, Altaf Hussain, institutionalised the party's Mohajir⁸ nationalism into a sophisticated party structure, while constructing a cult of personality around himself.⁹ Dynastic parties follow this dualism, in that founders create an emotive link between the party's

⁵Thomas E Dow. "An Analysis of Weber's Work on Charisma." *The British Journal of Sociology* 29, no. 1 (1978): 83-93.

⁶Caitlin Andrews-Lee. "The Politics of Succession in Charismatic Movements: Routinization versus Revival in Argentina, Venezuela, and Peru." *Comparative Politics* 52, no. 2 (2020): pages 305-306

⁷Francesco Alberoni. "Institutionalization" in *Movement and Institution*, New York: Columbia University Press Pages 216-218

⁸Pakistanis who trace their ancestry from Indian-origin refugees during Partition

⁹Laurent Gayer. "'The Mohajirs have Arrived!'" in *Karachi: Ordered Disorder and the Struggle for the City*. Pages Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pages 90-96

bureaucracy and themselves, and, when they die, give power to someone with a direct emotional relation to them: their child. The heir thus acts as the link between the father and the institutionalised party, but because of that, these heirs are constrained by the founder.

Dynastic parties are usually considered purely personalist entities, without any larger ideological character.¹⁰ However, the founders of dynastic parties have a wider ideological appeal than this literature suggests. These “transformative” leaders are successful because they create linkages with social cleavages and fill ideological gaps in the political system.¹¹ Dynastic successors must then try to fill that same ideological gap and maintain those social-cleavage linkages while also inheriting a party structure which is defined by the founder. Another constraint is the limited institutionalisation of dynastic parties, which maintain personalised political linkages. The party lacks the institutional capabilities to internally resolve interpersonal and factional disputes because any challenges to the leader threatens the party’s very identity, and vice versa. This is compared to a highly institutionalised party like the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, which is able to manage party factionalism through sophisticated internal mechanisms.¹² Dynastic parties are consequently more likely to experience defections and party splintering by disaffected political elites than more institutionalised parties.¹³ Dynastic parties are thus institutionalised enough to have an identifiable political position based on the founder, in the

¹⁰Chhibber. “Dynastic Parties: Organization, Finance and Impact.” pages 278-279

¹¹Pradeep K. Chhibber, and Rahul Verma, 'Transformational Leaders and Ideological Shifts', in *Ideology and Identity: The Changing Party Systems of India* (New York, 2018; online edn, Oxford Academic, 20 Sept. 2018) pages 133-136

¹²Kim Eric Bettcher. “Factions of Interest in Japan and Italy: The Organizational and Motivational Dimensions of Factionalism.” *Party politics* 11, no. 3 (2005): 339–358. Page 346

¹³Pradeep Chhibber. “Dynastic Parties: Organization, Finance and Impact.” page 288

manner of institutionalised parties,¹⁴ but are not institutionalised enough to depersonalise leadership disputes and internal disagreements. These parties are thus in a unique position as they are located between clientelistic parties and institutionalised programmatic parties.¹⁵ Dynastic political heirs can maintain this tense balance, but the rise of challenger parties provides a shock to this fragile balance.

How dynastic parties are able to respond to new challenges is seen by how they react to challenger parties: those parties which enter the electoral arena and upset the existing balance of power and voter loyalties.¹⁶ These challenger parties operate according to new lines of conflict than those traditional parties were set up to represent, which forces existing parties to re-examine their programmatic appeals, which elicits “considerable risks”.¹⁷ For this thesis, challenger parties are seen as the causal factor by which we expect second-generation dynastic leaders to have to reconsider the programmatic appeals of the founder. Programmes are vital for dynastic parties as they are vital to articulating, and popularising, the appeal of the founder, given political programmes are the means by which parties articulate their identity.¹⁸ Because of this, changes to the party programme risks destabilising the social cleavage linkages the party has forged, which

¹⁴Nicolas Bouteuca, and Carl Devos. “Party Policy Change. Exploring the Limits of Ideological Flexibility in Belgium.” *Acta politica* 51, no. 3 (2016): pages 302-306

¹⁵Andreas Ufen. “Clientelist and Programmatic Factionalism Within Malaysian Political Parties.” *Journal of current Southeast Asian affairs* 39, no. 1 (2020): pages 75-77

¹⁶Catherine E. De Vries and Hobolt, Sara. "A Theory of Political Change" In *Political Entrepreneurs: The Rise of Challenger Parties in Europe*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020. Pages 43-46

¹⁷De Vries and Hobolt. "A Theory of Political Change" In *Political Entrepreneurs* page 55

¹⁸Nieves Zúñiga. “Methodologies for the Analysis of Political Party Programmes.” *Methodologies for the Analysis of Political Party Programmes*, March 16, 2018.

for fragile dynastic parties creates unique problems. When dynastic parties have to compete against a challenger party, it forces second-generation dynastic leaders into two choices. Either they maintain the founder's programmatic appeals, and risk being sidelined by the challenger party, or change their programmatic appeals and possibly dilute the founder's appeal, which risks destabilising the party itself.

What choice these second-generation leaders make depends on the programmatic distance the party has to the challenger given the need for a unique political identity in the face of new electoral conditions. If a dynastic party has an initially close programmatic distance with a challenger party, then we expect it to change their programmatic appeals. Conversely, if the dynastic party has a large programmatic distance from the challenger party, we expect consistency. The independent variable for both parts of the thesis will thus be the initial political context that the parties found themselves in after the rise of the challenger party. The dependent variable, and observable factor of analysis, will be programmatic consistency in party manifestos and whether its position on the representation or statist scale, as articulated in the methodology section, have changed. The challenger party will thus be expected to cause a change in the political programmes of parties "close" to it, and not for parties "far apart" from it, but there is no expectation of the degree or nature of programmatic change given the variability in the opportunity costs parties have in changing their manifestos.¹⁹

¹⁹De Vries and Hobolt. "A Theory of Political Change" In *Political Entrepreneurs* page 55-59

Case Selection

As Table 1 highlights, many countries have dynastic politics. Countries were chosen for Table 1 if they were post-colonial states that achieved independence after 1945 and had more than 50 million inhabitants, in order to ensure similar countries were chosen.

Table 1:

Country	Federal or Unitary	Dynastic Parties Present?	Dynastic Parties at sub-national level?	Independence
Bangladesh	Unitary	Yes	No	1971
Kenya	Federal	Yes	No	1963
India	Federal	Yes	Yes	1947
Indonesia	Unitary	Yes	No	1949
Nigeria	Federal	No	No	1960
Pakistan	Federal	Yes	No	1947
Philippines	Unitary	Yes	No	1946
South Korea	Unitary	No	No	1945
Tanzania	Federal	No	No	1961

Table 1 shows that while comparable countries like Indonesia, Kenya, Bangladesh, and the Philippines have had dynastic parties, only India has had both national and regionalized dynastic parties. Tanzania, South Korea, and Nigeria have not had explicitly dynastic parties, i.e. those led and organised around a single dynastic family, even if they have a party controlled by multiple dynasties or legacy candidates within the same party. Further, comparable countries are

different from India in some other respects. The Philippines has an extremely decentralised, weak party system,²⁰ while Indonesia does not have regionalized political parties.²¹

Choosing India for this thesis is due to the diversity of cases available. Most Indian states have at least one major dynastic party which has existed for decades, which allows this paper to have a rich source of cases to choose from in finding how dynastic parties react to challenger parties. Using Indian regional dynastic parties is also defensible in that their sheer size makes them comparable to the major dynastic or personalist parties at the national level of other countries. For instance, the dynastic Samajwadi Party of Uttar Pradesh received over 29 million votes in the 2022 state legislative election, making it one of the largest parties in the world.²² Using parties like this thus also allows us to study these “in-between” parties more successfully, compared to studying the purely legacy candidates seen in other comparable cases.²³ Further, India provides clear circumstances in how dynastic parties have reacted to challenger parties that have a clear positional distinction. As Chhibber and Verma note, the two main lines of conflict in India are on recognition, i.e. the inclusion of disadvantaged groups, vs statism, i.e. the role of the state in the economy. They derive this data from operationalizing responses from Indian National

²⁰Julio Cabral Teehankee and Yuko Kasuya. “The 2019 Midterm Elections in the Philippines: Party System Pathologies and Duterte’s Populist Mobilization.” *Asian journal of comparative politics* 5, no. 1 (2020): page 71

²¹Kenawas. “Twenty Years after Suharto: Dynastic Politics and Signs of Subnational Authoritarianism.”

²²Gilles Verniers. “35 Charts Decoding the 2022 Uttar Pradesh Verdict: Bipolarisation and BJP Consolidation.” *Scroll.in*, March 14, 2022.

²³Daniel M. Smith. “Selection: From Family Business to Party Priority” in *Dynasties and Democracy: The Inherited Incumbency Advantage in Japan*. 1st ed. Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 2018. Page 116

Election Studies and other surveys,²⁴ and use it to highlight the strong positional differences between the BJP and regionalist parties, which are overwhelmingly dynastic.²⁵ While these positional differences make the Indian party system unique compared to the traditional political spectrum based on the European party system, this framing allows a greater degree of specificity and clarity on the lines of contestation and difference for the parties chosen for this thesis. All of this ensures that India provides an excellent context from which to select cases from in order to analyse how dynastic parties react to challenger parties.

This paper is a most-similar case design, with parties excluded from case selection on three criteria. First, this study excludes parties which have been out of power in their respective states for ten years, thus highlighting their limited political importance. Second, parties where the founder is still alive, since that imparts greater legitimacy on the heir than if the founder has passed away, are excluded. And third, this study excludes parties which were founded by heirs after the death of their father, since the heir institutionalised control in a manner distinct from comparable dynastic parties. The challenger party for this paper will be the BJP. It has operated in Indian politics since the 1980s, but it has changed under its leader Narendra Modi, achieving the first single-party majority in the 2014 elections since 1984.

²⁴Pradeep K. Chhibber and Rahul Verma, 'Statism, Recognition, and Party System Change in India', in *Ideology and Identity: The Changing Party Systems of India* (New York, 2018; online edn, Oxford Academic, 20 Sept. 2018) pages 174-177

²⁵Chhibber and Verma, 'Statism, Recognition, and Party System Change in India', page 177-9

Table 2:²⁶

Party	Year Founded	Dynasty, State	Party Position:	Recently in Government?	Dynastic Head Deceased?
Biju Janata Dal	1997	Patnaik family, Odisha	-Pro-Recognition -Pro-State	Yes	Yes: 1997
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagan	1949	Karunanidhi family, Tamil Nadu	-Pro-Recognition -Pro-State	Yes	Yes: 2018
Indian National Lok Dal	1996	Chautala family, Haryana	-Pro-Recognition -Pro-State	No	Yes: 2001
Janata Dal (Secular)	1999	Deve Gowda family, Karnataka	-Pro-Recognition -Pro-State	Yes	No
Jharkhand Mukhti Morcha	1972	Soren family, Jharkhand	-Pro-Recognition -Pro-State	Yes	No
Nationalist Congress Party	1999	Pawar family, Maharashtra	-Pro-Recognition -Pro-State	Yes	No
Rashtriya Janata Dal	1997	Yadav family, Bihar	-Pro-Recognition -Pro-State	Yes	No
Samajwadi Party	1992	Yadav family, Uttar Pradesh	-Pro-Recognition -Pro-State	Yes	Yes: 2022
Shiromani Akali Dal	1920	Badal Family, Punjab	-Anti-Recognition -Anti-State	Yes	Yes: 2023
Shiv Sena	1966	Thackeray Family, Maharashtra	-Anti-Recognition -Anti-State	Yes	Yes: 2012
Telugu Desam Party	1982	NTR Family, Andhra Pradesh	-Pro-Recognition -Pro-State	Yes	Yes: 1996
YSR Congress	2011	Y.S. Reddy family, Andhra Pradesh	-Pro-Recognition -Pro-State	Yes	Yes: 2009

²⁶Ajay K. Mehra and Lars Peter Schmidt. "Regional/State Parties in India an Annotated Almanac." *Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. Liaison Office New Delhi*, March 2014.

It has also rapidly expanded across India at both the national and state level on the back of new societal coalitions, positional distinctions, and personal leadership,²⁷ which has fundamentally upset the existing Indian party system as one would expect a challenger party would do so. As Table 2 highlights, every dynastic party, except Shiv Sena and the Akali Dal, can be operationalized as pro-representation and pro-statist and thus have a strong positional difference against the BJP.²⁸ The Shiv Sena, given its Hindu nationalism and pro-market positions, can be operationalized as anti-representation, anti-statist,²⁹ while the Akali Dal, a Sikh regionalist party, is more moderately anti-representation and anti-statist,³⁰ making them close to the BJP. The cases chosen for the most-similar case design will thus be Shiv Sena (SHS) and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK).

Both the DMK and SHS have been institutionally dynastic parties for decades,³¹ are on the second generation of leadership, and differ only on their original positionality towards the BJP. Additionally, in both cases, the groomed heir of the founder fended off rivals within their family,³² or party,³³ which ensured that when the new leaders took over, they operated with few

²⁷Chhibber and Verma, 'The BJP and an Ideological Consolidation of the Right?', in *Ideology and Identity: The Changing Party Systems of India* (New York, 2018; online edn, Oxford Academic, 20 Sept. 2018) pages 246-270

²⁸Mehra and Schmidt. "Regional/State Parties in India an Annotated Almanac." pages 7-121

²⁹Mary F Katzenstein. "Origins of Nativism: The Emergence of Shiv Sena in Bombay." *Asian survey* 13, no. 4 (1973): 387-388

³⁰Mehra and Schmidt. "Regional/State Parties in India an Annotated Almanac." page 86

³¹Mehra and Schmidt. "Regional/State Parties in India an Annotated Almanac." pages 63 and 95

³²Sujata Anandan. "Thackeray and Thackeray: A Tale of Two Cousins." *Outlook India*, June 20, 2022.

³³TN Gopalan. "The Fallen Fortunes of Vaiko: From DMK's Heir-Apparent to Leader without a Constituency." *The News Minute*, March 6, 2016.

internal rivals. This makes them highly comparable. Additionally, the internal validity of this thesis is strengthened given that the states in question, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu, are comparable given their leading economic³⁴ and social development.³⁵ This allows this thesis to examine which parameters differ between the two parties to explain reasons for differentiation.³⁶ The only other parties to choose from, the Shiromani Akali Dal and Samajwadi Party, both had their leaders die too recently to examine for this thesis, but are avenues for future research.

In order to examine the programmatic consistency of dynastic parties better, two other parties will be chosen to see how they have reacted to the rise of the BJP under Modi as well. It will be similar to the dichotomy of the one programmatic close, and one far apart, parties chosen for the dynastic cases, except only non-dynastic parties will be chosen. Given the limited number of non-dynastic parties in India,³⁷ this leaves only the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) for a programmatic close case, and the Communist party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M)) as “far apart.” Helpfully, both are national parties that compete against the BJP in multiple states, making them ideal parties for comparison. The CPI(M) was chosen for being the largest communist party in India and its consistent leftwing position in Indian politics, which views Hindu nationalism as antithetical to its avowedly Marxist-Leninist project.³⁸ The former party,

³⁴“India States Briefs – Tamil Nadu.” *World Bank*, January 31, 2018.

³⁵“India States Briefs – Maharashtra.” *World Bank*, January 18, 2018.

³⁶Dan Slater and Daniel Ziblatt. “The Enduring Indispensability of the Controlled Comparison.” *Comparative Political Studies* 46, no. 10 (October 2013): pages 1311-1314

³⁷Ajaz Ashraf. “Most Political Parties in India Are Dynastic. but Some Are More Dynastic than Others.” *Scroll.in*, February 23, 2017.

³⁸CPI(M) Central Committee Meeting. “Resolution on Ideological Issues.” Press Release, February 6, 2012.

the AAP, was chosen even though it was only founded in 2012, since its explicitly anti-dynastic and post-ideological, neoliberal politics make it close to the neoliberal BJP.³⁹ It is thus important to see how a party that is similar on the statist frame as the BJP competes against it during the rise of Modi in 2014. The limitations of analysing the manifestos of these parties have informed the methodology of the paper.

Methodology

This study will be a two-fold study. The first part is a small-n discourse analysis of the party manifestos of the BJP, DMK, CPI(M), AAP, and SHS in national elections in two points in time. The first period in time will be 2009 as it was the last pre-Modi national election, and the second will be the first election after the death of the founder since Modi rose to power in 2014,⁴⁰ so the 2014 or 2019 national elections. All of the manifestos will be compared to the corresponding BJP manifestos from 2009 to 2019 to see how the programmatic position between the parties have changed over time. The second part of the study will be a quantitative analysis where the programmatic positions of the manifestos on a representation and statist scale are derived and then computed using a Mokken scale analysis. This will be in order to test marked change of the party positions from 2009 to the second manifesto chosen. Using a party manifesto is vital since they “...communicate the values and concerns of a political party, as well as the ideas, the policies it advocates, and demands the party wishes to see enacted”.⁴¹ Additionally,

³⁹EPW Engage. “The AAP Audit: Can ‘alternative Politics’ Work?” *Economic and Political Weekly*, March 25, 2021.

⁴⁰Christophe Jaffrelot. "Hindu Nationalism: A Different Idea of India" In *Modi's India: Hindu Nationalism and the Rise of Ethnic Democracy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021 page 31.

⁴¹Zúñiga. “Methodologies for the Analysis of Political Party Programmes.”

Indian party manifestos, like those in other traditionally clientelist-dominated countries like Turkey,⁴² are important documents. They provide signals to voters based on the party's position on key voting parameters like religion, caste, or economic issues, which then has great influence on how Indian voters make their decision.⁴³ Additionally, since the 1990s, Indian politics have moved in a more programmatic direction,⁴⁴ as parties across India move away from purely clientelist appeals to expand their electoral bases.⁴⁵ This was seen best in the DMK's 2006 state assembly election manifesto, which was considered a sea-change manifesto for its universalist welfare proposals which transcended local clientelist networks, forcing its rivals to adopt its methods as well.⁴⁶ Indian parties, even while they engage in clientelism at the level of parliamentary constituency,⁴⁷ thus still engage in programmatic politics at the regional, state-wide level, making their manifestos important documents to study. Additionally, because manifestos are released at the same time, they are ideal comparative documents. This informs which manifestos were chosen for the paper.

⁴²Alper T. Bulut. "How Clientelistic Parties Go Programmatic: The Strategic Logic of Responsiveness in a Least Likely Case (the AKP of Turkey)." *Comparative politics* 52, no. 2 (2020): 333–356.

⁴³K. Saravana Rajasena and A. Thanikodi. "Election Manifesto is the Key Determinant of Voting Behaviour in Tamil Nadu Electoral Politics." *Asian Review of Social Sciences* 5 no. 2 (2016) pages 38–43.

⁴⁴J. Phillips. "Can Bihar Break the Clientelist Trap? The Political Effects of Programmatic Development Policy." *International Growth Centre Working Paper* (2017) S-34311-INB-1.

⁴⁵Ankita Barthwal and Asim Ali. "Bypassing the Patronage Trap: Evidence from Delhi Assembly Election 2020." *Studies in Indian politics* 9, no. 2 (2021): 254–272.

⁴⁶Andrew Wyatt. "Combining Clientelist and Programmatic Politics in Tamil Nadu, South India." *Commonwealth & comparative politics* 51, no. 1 (2013): 27–55.

⁴⁷Ajay Shenoy, and Laura V Zimmermann. "The Workforce of Clientelism: The Case of Local Officials in the Party Machine" *UC Berkeley: Center for Effective Global Action* (2021) pages 1-39

The manifestos chosen for this paper are the 2009 Lok Sabha manifestos for all cases, and then the 2014 AAP, BJP SHS, and CPI(M) manifestos, and the 2019 DMK, BJP and AAP manifestos. This is to see the original positionality of the parties pre-Modi, and then the parties post-Modi. The 2014 Shiv Sena manifesto and the 2019 DMK manifesto were chosen as Bal Thackeray, the leader of the SHS, died in 2012,⁴⁸ and M. Karunanidhi, the leader of the DMK, in 2018.⁴⁹ The independent variable for all parties will be the initial political context that the parties found themselves in after the rise of the BJP under Modi, i.e. whether or not the party had an initially close or far-apart programmatic distance to the BJP. The dependent variable will be programmatic consistency, i.e. if its position on the representation or statist scale has changed. However, Indian manifestos do have certain limitations. Indian parties vary wildly in the length of manifestos, with Shiv Sena's manifestos being only 4-5 pages, while the DMK, CPI(M), AAP, and BJP manifestos being 40-60. Additionally, few of the Shiv Sena manifestos have been saved in online format after the Shiv Sena website was deleted amid a party split in 2022, with only the online source, MumbaiVotes, having condensed versions. The method of analysis for this paper takes these limitations into account through coding two main themes as it relates to the positional differences on the representation and statist frames.

The nature of the discourse analysis will be a thematic analysis focusing on how each party has changed concerning "secularism" from the representation frame and "regulation" from the statist frames. This analysis focuses on both the content of the manifesto, but also larger

⁴⁸Mala Das. "Bal Thackeray Dies at 86; Shiv Sena Appeals for Calm." *NDTV.com*, November 14, 2012.

⁴⁹Ghosh. *Understanding Layered Dominance of Political Dynasties in India* page 738

context concerning how the party has dealt with the two themes. The main focus will be on the consistency of the party on these two topics over time, especially as it concerns the party's position vis-a-vis the BJP. Both topics chosen derive from the positions of India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, who led the country from 1947-1964 and whose vision of India has been foundational to the country's politics. In Nehru's conception of secularism, the Indian state is separate from religion, but is able to intervene into the majority religion (Hinduism) on social justice grounds, i.e. by banning caste discrimination, while accommodating minority religions through funding educational institutions and cultural autonomy.⁵⁰ And on regulation, under Nehruvian influence, India operated under a state-led, socialist-inspired economic system. The state would intervene heavily in the economy, with state-run enterprises competing alongside the private sector, to promote social justice and balanced economic growth.⁵¹ Thus for each party involved, the party's position on these two defining aspects of Indian politics will be analysed to see how they have changed, beginning with the BJP to see how it itself has changed under the leadership of the man who made the BJP the challenger party for this paper, Narendra Modi. This analysis is key in order to understand how parties articulate ideological change over time through programmatic appeals, and will help operationalize programmatic changes of these parties against one another. As per the hypothesis, we expect more continuity in programmatic appeals from the DMK and the CPI(M), than the SHS and AAP.

⁵⁰Rajeev Bhargava. "The Distinctiveness of Indian Secularism." *Critique internationale* (Paris. 1998), no. 2 (2007): 121-147.

⁵¹Kuldip Singh. "Nehru's Model of Economic Growth and Globalisation of the Indian Economy." *South Asian survey* (New Delhi, India : 1994) 19, no. 2 (2012): pages 243-245


For the quantitative examination, the programmatic positioning will integrate Chibber and Verma's representation and statist frames into a manifesto analysis based on De Lange's analysis of European party systems in their response to far-right populism.⁵² The operationalization will involve multiple values, nine for the statist frame and seven for the representation. For statist, it will gauge the party's support for a state-led or market-led economy, ranging from expanding the market in economy vs keeping state enterprises (X1), whether the party supports building physical infrastructure like railways and roads (X2) or building social infrastructure like housing and hospitals (X3), whether the party promotes entrepreneurship (X4), or expanding the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), which creates a national work program for rural areas (X5), support for free trade vs protection of industries (X6), and support for waiving farmer loan (X7) or raising Minimum Support Price for crops (X8), and lastly support for deregulation to help the business environment vs regulation to help people (X9). For representation, the values will be based on support for minority and lower caste communities. This ranges from their position on whether to expand reservation policy into other sectors or keeping the status quo (Y1), support for Muslim autonomy or limits on their autonomy (Y2), expanding Hindu institutions vs secularism (Y3), supporting subnational identities or making Indian identity paramount (Y4), the party's stance on supporting or limiting Kashmiri autonomy (Y5), having limited or expanded conceptions of citizenship (Y6), and the party's support for states rights vs. a strong central government (Y7). For the statist and representation frames, a +2 score denotes anti-statist or anti-representation

⁵²Sarah L. de Lange. "A New Winning Formula?: The Programmatic Appeal of the Radical Right." *Party politics* 13, no. 4 (2007): 411–435.

scores, +1 a neutral response or no mention of the topic, and 0 a pro-statist or pro-representation score. As per the theory of this paper, we expect greater consistency from the parties programmatically far apart from the BJP initially, the CPI(M) and DMK, than those close to the BJP initially, the AAP and SHS. Once the data is collated, it will then be put into a Mokken scale analysis to test marked difference using the Loevinger’s H value. This will enrich the robustness of the analysis of the paper by showing whether or not programmatic change is observable. In the conclusion, this paper will thus help us understand how dynastic parties are able to respond to new parties, and also how more generally weakly institutionalised parties are able to remain electorally and ideologically relevant in changing political circumstances, giving it wider appeal beyond an Indian dynastic politics frame.

Quantitative Findings

Per the expectations of this paper, we could expect greater programmatic change in the parties programmatically close to the BJP, the SHS and AAP, than parties far apart from the BJP, the DMK and CPI(M).



Graphs 1 and 2 provide a visual representation of the coding results found in Appendix A, and has parties initially close to the BJP exhibiting the largest amount of change.

This fits the theoretical expectations of the paper. There were no expectations on the degree of score change, just that the change was present and observable, which is why a Mokken scale analysis was conducted, given that the amount of parties studied was less than the minimum required for a proper statistical significance test. The Mokken scale analysis shows that a marked change over time did occur from the first to second manifestos.⁵³ Per the findings, on both the statist and representation frames, the parties initially far apart from the BJP programmatically, the DMK and CPI(M), exhibited programmatic consistency, with both parties having identical statist and representation scores in the first manifesto as they did in the second manifesto. This is compared to the parties close to the BJP programmatically, the SHS and AAP. For the SHS and AAP there were diverging positions as it impacted the statist and representation scores.

Compared to the first manifesto, when the party was close to the BJP on the representation scale, SHS became more pro-representation and pro-statist in its second manifesto. This is compared with the AAP, which was close to the BJP on statist frame but far apart on representation, becoming more anti-representation and anti-statist from the first to second manifesto. For the AAP, because the 2019 manifesto failed to mention many values for this analysis, outside journalistic sources on the party's positioning were used to help derive scores. All of these findings meet the theoretical expectations of the paper. Faced with a challenger party reshaping

⁵³CoefH scores:

For Statist: \$H Scale H 0.630, se (0.055)

For Representation:\$H Scale H 0.536, se (0.080)

Indian politics, parties with an initially close programmatic position exhibited marked change in their programmatic positions compared to parties that were far apart from the initial positions of the challenger party. This was regardless of the dynastic nature of the parties, with the DMK and SHS having second-generation leaders in the second manifestos analysed for this thesis compared to the non-dynastic CPI(M) and AAP. Additionally, there were no unidirectional changes in the programmatic positions for the AAP and SHS. Both parties changed programmatically from the initial manifesto, but one became more pro-representation and pro-statist, while the other more anti-representation and anti-statist. This suggests that the parties reacted in distinct ways to the challenger party and not uniformly one way or another, but more study is required to trace the process by which this change occurred. What is also interesting is that while the SHS and AAP were initially quite far apart positionally, they have converged to become more positionally close in the second manifestos analysed. These findings are enriched by a discourse analysis of the nature of shifts on two positions, X5 on regulation, and Y5 on secularism, to further examine how all the parties studied changed, or did not change, in the period of study.

Qualitative Findings

BJP

The 2009 BJP manifesto would be issued as it attempted to return to power after losing the 2004 election, led by one of the founders of the BJP, L.K. Advani. In the manifesto, the BJP would be anti-secular, but neutral, i.e. neither pro-business nor pro-people, on regulation. On secularism, the 2009 manifesto advocates its traditional Hindu nationalism. The BJP is the

premier Hindu nationalist party in India, formed by its ideological parent, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), to make India an explicitly Hindu state.⁵⁴ The party thus calls for construction of a Temple to the god Ram at Ayodhya, the site that Hindus claim to be Ram's birthplace,⁵⁵ and is the site of a Mosque which was destroyed by Hindu fanatics in 1992.⁵⁶ Additionally, under Nehruvian secularism Muslims operate under their own civil code based on traditional Islamic jurisprudence, unlike Hindus who operate under a secular civil code.⁵⁷ Conversely, the BJP has consistently advocated a Uniform Civil Code (UCC), which would have all Indians under one civil code regardless of religion. The party says a UCC is needed to protect women's rights,⁵⁸ but it would also serve the purpose of limiting Muslim autonomy. However, the BJP did attempt to accommodate Muslim concerns in 2009. The party notably calls for cross-community dialogue concerning religious conversions,⁵⁹ a point of concern to Hindu nationalists given the fear of Hindus converting to other religions.⁶⁰ To compensate for this loss of cultural autonomy, the party offers greater educational and entrepreneurial opportunities for Muslims.⁶¹ Therefore, the BJP opposes Nehruvian secularism, though the party maintains it is supporting

⁵⁴Jaffrelot. "Hindu Nationalism" page 19-23

⁵⁵BJP, 2009, 'Good Governance, Development, Security' Page 48-49

⁵⁶Jaffrelot. "Hindu Nationalism" page 21

⁵⁷Pradeep K.Chhibber, and Rahul Verma, 'Intellectual Lineages of the Politics of Statism and Recognition', in *Ideology and Identity: The Changing Party Systems of India* (New York, 2018; online edn, Oxford Academic, 20 Sept. 2018) pages 65-70

⁵⁸BJP, 2009, 'Good Governance, Development, Security' page 35

⁵⁹BJP, 2009, 'Good Governance, Development, Security' page 39-40

⁶⁰Jaffrelot. "Hindu Nationalism" page 16

⁶¹BJP, 2009, 'Good Governance, Development, Security' page 39-40

“the true meaning of secularism”,⁶² while maintaining some accommodation of Muslim concerns.

On regulation, the party is neutral. The manifesto calls for pro-business policies like improved credit availability, making “Indian brands globally competitive”,⁶³ and improved intellectual property protections, but also policies to clamp down on corporate fraud and strengthen labour rights.⁶⁴ The BJP historically supported moving away from the Nehruvian economy, but under an economic nationalist framework. Advani advocated a middle path between “free-for-all capitalism or freedom-killing communism” through “swadeshi,” self-rule, integrating the concerns of all sections of society to manage the economy.⁶⁵ The BJP wanted the Nehruvian economic model to be dismantled, but for that to mean internal liberalisation, i.e. helping domestic Indian businesses, but not external liberalisation, i.e. opening the country to foreign consumerism and corporations.⁶⁶ This is best seen in the party’s opposition in the 1990s to an Enron energy investment in the state of Maharashtra, seeing it as a “symbol of the imperialist version of globalization”.⁶⁷ This results in a manifesto that is not expressly pro-business, nor pro-people, attempting to allay both positions. This combination of anti-secularism

⁶²BJP, 2009, ‘Good Governance, Development, Security’ Page 8

⁶³BJP, 2009, ‘Good Governance, Development, Security’ Pages 19-20

⁶⁴BJP, 2009, ‘Good Governance, Development, Security’ Pages 30-31

⁶⁵L. K. Advani. “India Needs a Swadeshi Development Model.” *Rediff.com*, February 12, 2009.

⁶⁶Baldev Raj Nayar. “The Limits of Economic Nationalism in India: Economic Reforms under the BJP-Led Government, 1998-1999.” *Asian Survey* 40, no. 5 (2000): page 798-800

⁶⁷Julia M. Eckert. “Shivshahi in Limbo” in *The Charisma of Direct Action: Power, Politics, and the Shiv Sena* (Delhi, 2003; online edn, Oxford Academic, 18 Oct. 2012) page 243

and neutral regulatory positions would not work, as the BJP would lose the 2009 election. A new generation would rise in the party,⁶⁸ led by the Chief Minister of Gujarat, Narendra Modi.

While Chief Minister of Gujarat from 2002-2014, Modi created the Gujarat Model, unique in two ways. First, it was explicitly pro-business and foreign investment, hoping to make the state “highly investor-friendly” and “the most favoured investment destination in India”.⁶⁹ Second, Modi was associated with hardline Hindu nationalism and extreme anti-Muslim violence, due to his involvement in the 2002 Gujarat riots which killed thousands and made him an international pariah.⁷⁰ As party head, he would go national with his Gujarat Model, first on regulation in the 2014 manifesto, and on secularism in the 2019 manifesto. In the 2014 BJP manifesto, the party became strongly pro-business. The party calls for streamlined regulations and cutting of red tape, lower taxes, privatisation of state-owned businesses, and more economic freedom.⁷¹ Modi himself noted in a speech in 2013, “It is my philosophy that the government has no business doing business”.⁷² Unlike the neutral stance of 2009, Modi embraced a pro-business regulatory position, marking a fundamental break with Nehruvian socialism. The party was still economically nationalist, with the party encouraging Indian firms to be globally competitive,

⁶⁸Jaffrelot. “Hindu Nationalism” page 30

⁶⁹Government of Gujarat, “Industrial Policy—2009”, January 2009, 3, <http://www.ic.gujarat.gov.in/pdf/industrial-policy-2009-at-a-glance.pdf>.

⁷⁰Asghar Ali Engineer. “Gujarat Riots in the Light of the History of Communal Violence.” *Economic and Political Weekly* 37, no. 50 (2002): 5047–54. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4412966>.

⁷¹BJP, 2014, ‘Ek Bharat Shreshtha Bharat, Sabka Saath Sabka Vikas Election Manifesto 2014’ Pages 26-30

⁷²Mail Today Bureau. “Batting for Privatisation, Narendra Modi Presents Himself as a Right-Wing Alternative to Congress Party’s Centre-Left Policies.” *India Today*, April 9, 2013.

with foreign direct investment only brought into certain industries that needed it.⁷³ However, on secularism, in 2014 the BJP was unchanged, supporting Hindu nationalist policies (Ram Temple, UCC) while promising policies to offset Muslim fears. This ranges from advocating an ill-defined “National Madarsa Modernization programme,” a promise to promote Urdu, a language spoken by Indian Muslims, and the creation of an interfaith dialogue council. Hypocritically for a figure associated with the Gujarat riots, Modi also promised to “Ensure a **peaceful** and **secure** environment, where there is no place for either the perpetrators or exploiters of fear. (emphasis original)”⁷⁴ If in 2014 the party embraces pro-business policies while attempting to allay Muslim fears, this was cast off in 2019.

Modi’s nationalisation of his Gujarat Model was complete by 2019. The party continues its pro-business regulatory stance, praising India’s improved ease of doing business ranking, and promises more pro-business regulations and private-sector investments.⁷⁵ The party also abandons any continuity with Nehruvian secularism. The party calls for the Supreme Court to review its Sabarimala decision, which ruled a Hindu temple could no longer exclude women from entering,⁷⁶ in order to “secure constitutional protection on issues related to faith and belief.” This is along with the Modi government beginning the construction of the Temple to Ram at

⁷³BJP, 2014, ‘Ek Bharat Shreshtha Bharat, Sabka Saath Sabka Vikas Election Manifesto 2014’ Page 27

⁷⁴BJP, 2014, ‘Ek Bharat Shreshtha Bharat, Sabka Saath Sabka Vikas Election Manifesto 2014’ Pages 17

⁷⁵BJP, 2019, ‘Sankalp Bharat Sashakt Bharat’ pages 17-19

⁷⁶Sugam Pokharel, and Nikhil Kumar. “First Women to Enter India Temple in Centuries Now in Hiding as Protests Rage.” *CNN*, January 3, 2019.

Ayodhya.⁷⁷ Ominously, there is no mention of any autonomy for religious minorities, with the party only noting, “We are committed to the empowerment and ‘development with dignity’ of all minorities”.⁷⁸ This is combined with the Modi government from 2014-2019 removing sections of Muslim civil code autonomy, banning obscure and unpopular sections such as banning triple Talaq, which allowed Muslim men to divorce Muslim women by saying talaq three times.⁷⁹ The 2019 manifesto thus has the party moving India away from Nehruvian secularism, to a model protecting majority religious practices even at the expense of minority communities. Under Modi, the BJP has thus shifted to pro-business regulatory and anti-secularism stances, abandoning any Nehruvian continuity, which has informed the party change for the rest of the Indian party system.

DMK

The DMK (Dravidian Progressive Federation), based in the state of Tamil Nadu, takes strongly secular and neutral regulatory stances in both its 2009 and 2019 manifestos. In the 2009 manifesto, the party takes a resolutely secular stance: “secularism in India is the only cementing force integrating the people of diverse religions and different faiths”.⁸⁰ The party links this secularism to Periyar, the founder of the Dravidian movement by which the DMK takes its name and of whom Karunanidhi was a devoted follower. The secularism of the Dravidian movement is noteworthy for its rationalism, viewing traditional Hindu practices, specifically caste, as

⁷⁷BJP, 2019, ‘Sankalp Bharat Sashakt Bharat’ page 36-37

⁷⁸BJP, 2019, ‘Sankalp Bharat Sashakt Bharat’ page 34

⁷⁹BJP, 2019, ‘Sankalp Bharat Sashakt Bharat’ page 31

⁸⁰DMK, 2009, 15th Lok Sabha Election 2009 pages 7

immoral, irrational, and oppressive, and has taken extensive policies regulating Hindu practices in Tamil Nadu to ensure social justice.⁸¹ Karunanidhi frequently got in trouble for his public atheism, at one point being threatened with beheading by a BJP member for insulting the god Ram.⁸² This secularism, based on ensuring religious harmony,⁸³ and quintessentially Nehruvian, continued in the 2019 manifesto by Karunanidhi's son, M.K. Stalin.⁸⁴ The party continues to defend its secular credentials, and links it to DMK founder C.N. Annadurai, repeating his religious universalist slogan "God is seen in the smiles of the poor," with the party noting it is "staunchly committed to promoting and safeguarding communal harmony". However, the party is more defensive about its secularism in 2019. The party notes its support for the protection of religious idols, something the party did not mention in 2009, and includes a new ending slogan: "We'll not exclude any religion! We'll protect all religions!".⁸⁵ Taken with Stalin's own public comments that his party is not anti-Hindu,⁸⁶ the DMK's articulation of its secularism became more defensive than in 2009, even if the party has remained secular.

⁸¹Lloyd I. Rudolph. "Urban Life and Populist Radicalism: Dravidian Politics in Madras." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 20, no. 3 (1961): page 286.

⁸²HT Correspondent. "Karuna Unfazed by Death Threat." *Hindustan Times*, September 22, 2007.

⁸³DMK, 2009, 15th Lok Sabha Election 2009 page 3

⁸⁴In Tamil Naming conventions, the name goes- name of caste or village, Father's Name, then Personal Name, so M.K. Stalin is short for Muthuvel Karunanidhi Stalin, with Muthuvel being his caste/village, Karunanidhi the name of his father, and Stalin his personal name

⁸⁵DMK, 2019, 17th Parliamentary Elections, page 69-71

⁸⁶PTI. "DMK Is Not Anti-Hindu, Says DMK Chief M K Stalin." *Moneycontrol*, April 2, 2019.

On regulation, the DMK is also consistent. Since its founding, the party had spoken of the need for the uplifting of the common man, while not being opposed to capitalism per se.⁸⁷ Under Karunanidhi, the party's regulatory position in 2009 was neutral: pro-foreign investment while supporting a strong public sector, with the goal of ensuring social justice. The 2009 manifesto thus praises Karunanidhi for promoting foreign investment in Tamil Nadu and calls on the central government for policies to protect industry and business from the global 2009 recession,⁸⁸ all while maintaining public sector industries.⁸⁹ The DMK in 2009 was thus neutral, neither overwhelmingly pro-business nor pro-people, under a social justice framework. In 2019 this is continued. The party continues its neutral regulatory stance to promote social justice by demanding reservation in jobs for lower caste communities to expand to the private sector, with a tax break for corporations if they do so voluntarily.⁹⁰ Additionally, the DMK denounces the Modi government's attempts at privatising publicly owned banks, while promising to bring in more foreign direct investment in Tamil Nadu.⁹¹ Therefore, the party in 2019 continues to be neutral concerning regulation. M.K. Stalin in 2019 thus kept the programmatic stances of his father on secularism and regulation from 2009. This matches the theoretical expectations of the paper, as the party's initially far apart position from the BJP is maintained, with the only changes being how the party articulates its positions.

⁸⁷Rudolph, "Urban Life and Populist Radicalism: Dravidian Politics in Madras." page 285

⁸⁸DMK, 2009, 15th Lok Sabha Election 2009 pages 12-13

⁸⁹DMK, 2009, 15th Lok Sabha Election 2009 pages 21

⁹⁰DMK, 2019, 17th Parliamentary Elections, pages 47

⁹¹DMK, 2019, 17th Parliamentary Elections, pages 24-25

SHS

The Shiv Sena (the Army of Shivaji), based in the state of Maharashtra, is clear on regulation and secularism, even if it does not directly mention the latter in either of its manifestos. The party's position on secularism, however, can be derived implicitly, and from outside context about its founder, Bal Thackeray. SHS has always been Hindu nationalist and uniquely violent. When it ruled Maharashtra with the BJP from 1994-1999, Bal threatened to wipe out Muslims after an assassination threat and passed Hindu nationalist policies, including laws protecting the cow from slaughter, the cow being sacrosanct in Hinduism.⁹² For the 2009 manifesto, Shiv Sena links its extreme Hindu nationalism to terrorist attacks that hit India from 2004-2009, ominously demanding that "Indians should be keenly in search of the opportunity to take revenge....".⁹³ This is in conjunction with Bal's demand in 2008 that "Hindu suicide squads should be readied to ensure existence of Hindu society and to protect the nation".⁹⁴ The party's extreme Hindu nationalism, antithetical to Nehruvian secularism, was heavily moderated in 2014. The 2014 manifesto took place under the new party leader, and Bal's son, Uddhav. He is considered more moderate and inclusive than his father, and is seen as trying to make SHS more respectable.⁹⁵ One method of this moderation was lowering the anti-migrant rhetoric of the party and issuing the 2014 manifesto with several Dalit parties, the SHS being associated with anti-

⁹²Jyoti Punwani. "Bal Thackeray: A Politics of Violence." *Economic and Political Weekly* 47, no. 47/48 (2012): 12–15. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41720399>.

⁹³SHS, 2009, 2009 Manifesto page 1

⁹⁴PTI. "I Want Hindu Suicide Squads: Bal Thackeray." *India Today*, June 19, 2008.

⁹⁵Omkar Poojari. "The Reincarnation of Shiv Sena." *KochiPost*, May 19, 2020.

Dalit policies in the past.⁹⁶ He still kept the party's Hindu nationalism, with Uddhav in 2014 praising the head of the RSS, Mughan Baghwant, for his remarks saying India is a Hindu nation and that Hindutva (Hindu-ness) is its identity.⁹⁷ There is no significant mention of Hindu nationalism or related topics in the 2014 manifesto, unlike the implicit mention in 2009, but the lack of extremely violent rhetoric marks an innovation for the party. SHS thus did not change its position concerning secularism in 2014, but moderated its extremism, which is still a noticeable shift for the party.

The SHS is much more explicit when it comes to regulation. The party was founded to defend "the sons of the soil i.e. the speakers of Marathi,⁹⁸ from migrants from the rest of India and defend these sons from exploitation.⁹⁹ The party always said it was working for "...the common people's livelihood," but Bal had always had a "vision of the entrepreneurial spirit which was supposed to grip the Maharashtrian man" once his party took over Maharashtra.¹⁰⁰ Thus, the party had an ambiguous legacy as it concerned regulation. In 2009 the party took several positions which put it firmly as "pro-people": from ensuring jobs and houses for cotton mill workers from factories unjustly closed by owners, to "releasing the code under the Environmental Ministry for the benefit of the common man".¹⁰¹ However, the party in 2014

⁹⁶PTI. "RPI(a) Has Not Adopted Ideologies of 'Mahayuti': Athawale." *Business Standard*, March 25, 2014.

⁹⁷PTI. "Shiv Sena President Uddhav Thackeray Supports RSS Chief's Hindu Rashtra Comment." *India Today*, August 21, 2014.

⁹⁸The dominant linguistic community in Maharashtra

⁹⁹Ram Joshi. "The Shiv Sena: A Movement in Search of Legitimacy." *Asian survey* 10, no. 11 (1970): page 968

¹⁰⁰Eckert. "Shivshahi in Limbo" Page 245-246, Manoos is a Marathi term for the sons of the soil

¹⁰¹SHS, 2009, 2009 Manifesto pages 2-4

became less pro-people and more pro-business. The party supports making Maharashtra roads toll-free to stop the government from “trying to torture the businessmen in society”, and noting it “Shall encourage the (sic) native business”.¹⁰² The party also advocates state support for fishermen, which it claims are being outfished by modern fishing trawlers of other countries and leaving them impoverished. The party is less hostile to business in 2014, but is still defensive in protecting what it sees as oppressed Marathis, except in 2014 its business owners and fishermen and not the mill workers of 2009. Thus, on secularism there is no change from 2009 to 2014 beyond noticeable rhetorical moderation, but a pro-business turn on regulation. This fits the theoretical expectations of the paper, as the party experienced noticeable programmatic change in 2014 while facing a new challenger in Modi’s BJP, to which it had an initially close programmatic position.

CPI(M)

The Communist Party of India (Marxist) was founded in 1962 by left-wing members of the Communist Party of India who split over the CPI’s support for the Indian National Congress (INC) and the Soviet Union. It quickly became the largest Communist party in India, competing across the country.¹⁰³ The party’s structure, with a Politburo and cadre-based membership, make it one of the premier non-dynastic parties in India, along with the BJP. On the two frames, secularism and regulation, the party took resolute stances in 2009 and 2014. On secularism, the CPI(M) is aggressive in its denunciation of Hindu nationalism, calling the BJP a “regressive,

¹⁰²SHS, 2014, 2014 Manifesto pages 2-3

¹⁰³Ouseph Varkey. “The CPI-Congress Alliance in India.” *Asian Survey* 19, no. 9 (1979): 881–95.

backward-looking party based on obscurantist ideology”.¹⁰⁴ The party thus makes its secularism clear: “The CPI(M) stands for the separation of religion and politics...Secular values should be promoted by the State in all spheres”.¹⁰⁵ The CPI(M) gets to this secular stance due to its Communist heritage, with the party continuing to lay claim to the legacy of Marxism.¹⁰⁶ This legacy also explains the party’s stance on regulation. The CPI(M) stands vehemently against “neo-liberal, anti-people policies” with Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister from 2004-2014, working “overtime to pamper the super rich”.¹⁰⁷ Thus, the party calls for “alternative economic policies” which include greater state-led economic planning and regulation of business to protect everyday Indians.¹⁰⁸ The CPI(M) is thus the most secular and pro-people regulatory of all the parties discussed in this paper. These positions are unchanged in 2014.

The CPI(M) in 2014 did not make any changes to its secularism or regulation stances, but linked its stances together to attack Modi and the BJP. The party specifically denounces Modi’s Gujarat Model as a “...a dangerous mix of patronage for the big business and corporates combined with rabid communalism.” On secularism, the party attacks Modi for espousing “an ideology which is inimical to the vision of a modern secular State.” And on regulation, the party attacks Modi’s BJP for being “an ardent adherent of neo-liberal policies” and that, “however much the BJP may present its model of development and good governance, the reality is that its

¹⁰⁴CPI(M), 2009, Communist Party of India (Marxist) Manifesto for the 15th Lok Sabha Elections page 11

¹⁰⁵CPI(M), 2009, Communist Party of India (Marxist) Manifesto for the 15th Lok Sabha Elections page 14

¹⁰⁶CPI(M) Central Committee Meeting. “Resolution on Ideological Issues.” Press Release, February 6, 2012.

¹⁰⁷CPI(M), 2009, Communist Party of India (Marxist) Manifesto for the 15th Lok Sabha Elections pages 2

¹⁰⁸CPI(M), 2009, Communist Party of India (Marxist) Manifesto for the 15th Lok Sabha Elections pages 14-19

model is a reactionary and retrograde one”.¹⁰⁹ There is thus no change in the party’s secular and regulation stances, with the party maintaining its highly secular and pro-people regulatory stances from 2009. This fits the theoretical expectations of the paper, as the CPI(M) is just as far apart from the BJP in 2014 as in 2009. The party does risk being a bit repetitive, as essentially all of the positions in 2009 are replicated, almost verbatim, in 2014. It is thus a sign of programmatic consistency, earned by ideological dedication, at the expense of innovation.

AAP

When the AAP (the Common Man’s Party) was founded in 2012, it billed itself as a “not just another party”.¹¹⁰ It was formed from anti-corruption protests centred in Delhi against the Manmohan Singh government, and quickly dominated Delhi.¹¹¹ Its non-ideological and technocratic 2014 manifesto was thus its national coming out party, attempting to upend politics as usual. On secularism, the party praises India’s religious diversity and says it will do everything to protect minority religious beliefs and promote communal dialogue, and promises Muslims that it will prevent communal violence between Muslims and Hindus. However, the party notes that “neither majority beliefs nor minority should be used to justify practices which are in violation of the basic rights and values for all men and women enshrined in our constitution”.¹¹² This phrase is odd for a secular party because this idea, of minority rights

¹⁰⁹CPI(M), 2014, Communist Party of India (Marxist) Manifesto for the 16th Lok Sabha Elections page 5

¹¹⁰AAP, 2014, National Party Manifesto page 3

¹¹¹“Our History: Aam Aadmi Party.” *Aam Aadmi Party*, July 31, 2018. <https://aamaadmiparty.org/about/our-history/>.

¹¹²AAP, 2014, National Party Manifesto page 19

possibly infringing on women's rights, echoes the BJP's own rhetoric on the need of a UCC.¹¹³

This makes the AAP's secularism negative, focused on preventing violence rather than promoting values and is more reminiscent of the BJP's claims to be hard on communal violence,¹¹⁴ than the DMK or CPI(M)'s secularism. On regulation, the party is avowedly pro-business, wanting more "honest entrepreneurship" in India and says the AAP will work to unleash "India's entrepreneurial energy". The party explicitly says "the Indian government should not be in the business of running business",¹¹⁵ which is identical to Modi's own rhetoric in 2014. This results in a manifesto that is pro-business and pro-secularism, but close to the BJP frameworks on both. The AAP would win its first major election in 2015, the Delhi mayoral election, so the party would transform from an up and coming party to a party in office with a record to prove. And so its 2019 manifesto would be very different.

In 2019, the AAP did not release a national manifesto, but a manifesto only focused on Delhi statehood. Delhi is not a state but a Union Territory, meaning the Central Government retains final say on land use and other issues. So the 2019 manifesto was issued as part of a specific strategic choice of the AAP to praise its record of office in Delhi, while avoiding mentioning Modi. On regulation, the party praises its small business creation and formalisation of small traders, and promises even more entrepreneurship opportunities in the city after statehood.¹¹⁶ This is on top of the party's privatisation of the state liquor trade in 2019,

¹¹³BJP, 2019, 'Sankalp Bharat Sashakt Bharat' page 37

¹¹⁴BJP, 2014, 'Ek Bharat Shreshtha Bharat, Sabka Saath Sabka Vikas Election Manifesto 2014' Pages 17

¹¹⁵AAP, 2014, National Party Manifesto page 10-12

¹¹⁶AAP, 2019, Delhi Manifesto pages 21

highlighting its consistent pro-business regulatory position.¹¹⁷ However, on secularism, which has no mention in the manifesto, there are distinct changes since 2014. Arvind Kejriwal, the Chief Minister of Delhi and leader of the AAP, has taken publicly anti-secular positions since 2014, with the most infamous being after 2019. In 2022, Kejriwal has called for Hindu Gods to be put on Indian currency to boost the economy,¹¹⁸ and welcomed the Supreme Court allowing the construction of the Ram Temple at Ayodhya, hoping that it would end tensions.¹¹⁹ In a broad sense, then, the party has shifted towards a moderate version of Hindu nationalism since 2014:¹²⁰ not explicitly excluding Muslims, but still publicly supporting Hindu causes. This programmatic change on secularism fits the theory of the paper, in that the party shifted more from its initial programmatic position than the similarly non-dynastic CPI(M). However, compared to SHS, the AAP has gotten more anti-secular while the SHS has moderated on its anti-secularism, which shows that the nature of programmatic change is not unidirectional.

Conclusion

As this paper confirms, dynastic parties function similarly to non-dynastic parties when it comes to programmatic responses to challenger parties. Both party types respond to the challenger party, the BJP, based on their initial programmatic distance, with parties close to the challenger programmatically changing more than parties far apart from the challenger. This

¹¹⁷Sapna Singh. "Aap Govt Tweaks Order on Liquor after Uproar." *The Pioneer*, September 1, 2019.

¹¹⁸The Hindu Bureau. "To Improve India's Economy, Print Images of Hindu Deities Ganesh, Lakshmi on Currency, Kejriwal Tells Modi." *The Hindu*, October 26, 2022.

¹¹⁹PTI. "Arvind Kejriwal Welcomes SC Verdict in Ayodhya Case, Appeals to People to Maintain Peace and Harmony." *The Times of India*, November 9, 2019.

¹²⁰Anuttama Banerji. "AAP's Dangerous Turn toward Hindutva." – *The Diplomat*, June 11, 2022.

finding is significant as it gives us a more sophisticated understanding of dynastic parties as programmatic entities, beyond the non-ideological, personalist parties through which they have traditionally been viewed.¹²¹ In this way, the goal of this paper was achieved. However, there are two limitations to this thesis. One, it does not describe why parties changed. This is significant as the process by which parties internally decide to go about these programmatic changes can tell us much about the internal nature of these dynastic parties, and how they conceive of the changes they've done. Two, it does not show the results of possible programmatic changes. Analysing how these programmatic changes, or lack thereof, can impact these parties' long-term ability to remain electorally relevant can tell us about how important these programmatic changes actually are to the party's continued relevance. This thesis just finds that, in the period covered, programmatic changes did occur in parties initially close with the BJP. This is still a significant addition to the literature, but one that can be expanded by further research on the topic. However, this thesis helps us understand dynastic politics in two ways. First, in a specifically Indian context, it highlights the specific changes Modi has made to first the BJP and then wider Indian party politics, which helps us understand the nature of contemporary Indian politics better. This is especially useful as India is to have a national election in 2024, and if Modi wins, he will become the longest serving Prime Minister since Jawaharlal Nehru, who built so much of the political consensus that Modi has torn down. Second, and more globally, this analysis can help us understand how dynastic parties continue to remain relevant after the death of the dynastic founder by showing that dynastic parties can exhibit programmatic flexibility in reacting to

¹²¹Chhibber. "Dynastic Parties: Organization, Finance and Impact." pages 278-279

challenger parties. This helps us better understand the continued electoral relevance, and presence, of dynastic parties around the world. Hopefully, this paper will help drive new debates on the nature of dynastic politics not just in India, but around the world as well.

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Appendix A

Initial Statist Position	AAP	BJP	CPI(M)	DMK	SHS
X1	2	2	0	1	1
X2	1	2	2	2	2
X3	1	0	0	0	1
X4	2	1	1	1	1
X5	1	1	0	0	1
X6	2	2	0	0	1
X7	1	0	0	1	0
X8	0	1	0	0	0
X9	2	2	0	0	0
	12	11	3	5	7

Post-Modi Statist Position	AAP	BJP	CPI(M)	DMK	SHS
X1	2	2	0	1	1
X2	1	2	2	2	2
X3	0	1	0	0	1
X4	2	2	1	1	1
X5	1	1	0	0	0
X6	1	2	0	1	1
X7	1	1	0	0	1
X8	1	0	0	0	1

X9	2	2	0	0	1
	10	13	3	5	9

Initial Representation Position	AAP	BJP	CPI(M)	DMK	SHS
Y1	0	2	0	0	1
Y2	0	1	0	0	2
Y3	0	2	0	0	1
Y4	2	2	1	0	2
Y5	0	2	0	1	2
Y6	1	1	0	0	2
Y7	1	1	0	0	0
	4	11	1	1	10

Post-Modi Representation Position	AAP	BJP	CPI(M)	DMK	SHS
Y1	1	1	0	0	0
Y2	1	2	0	0	1
Y3	2	2	0	0	1
Y4	2	2	1	0	1
Y5	2	2	0	1	1
Y6	2	2	0	0	1
Y7	0	1	0	0	0
	10	12	1	1	5

