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on Democratization**

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Abstract

Do United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) impact democratization in post-conflict states? Currently, this question is up for debate and this study builds on new relationships recently discovered in the literature. Blair, Di Salvatore, & Smidt (2023) argue that UN PKO tactics improve the likelihood of democratization. This relationship is tested through the examination of four mission tactics between the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA). The cases were selected using a most similar design, indicating the cases are similar in all regards, except for their democratization outcomes; Mozambique democratized, while CAR did not. The analysis revealed that ONUMOZ and MINURCA were very similar in their mission tactics and thus mission tactics cannot be considered the sole explanation for democratization. Rather, the size and budget of the mission, involvement of civilian personnel, and recurrence of violence provided more fruitful avenues for explaining the difference in the democratization outcomes. This research contributes to the literature and yields recommendations for future research on UN PKOs and democratization. Additionally, this research provides insight into how the UN can successfully design and implement PKOs aimed at democratization.

Introduction

In 1948, the United Nations (UN) started its legacy of Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) (*Our History*, n.d.). The UNTSO was tasked with monitoring the Armistice Agreement in the Middle East, between Israel and the neighboring Arab nations. Since then, the UN has launched over 70 peacekeeping missions, including region, mission objectives, and outcomes (*Our History*, n.d.). UN PKOs perform tasks ranging from the implementation and monitoring of ceasefires and peace agreements to the establishment of democratic institutions and regimes. However, the impact of UN PKOs on democratization is contested in the literature, dividing the authors into those who argue UN PKOs promote democratization and those who argue UN PKOs have little or no impact on democratization. This research posits itself within the camp of literature that argues UN PKOs can and do impact democratization. A recent article by Blair, Di Salvatore, & Smidt (2023) reveals how UN PKO tactics increase the likelihood of democratization in post-conflict states. This research builds on the work of Blair et al. (2023) to provide insight into how UN PKO tactics impact democratization on a case-study level. In the literature, UN PKO tactics denote the tasks PKOs are authorized to perform in post-conflict states.

Furthermore, this research contributes to the general literature on how UN PKOs impact democratization in post-conflict states, specifically by providing insight into how UN PKO tactics impact democratization. In addition, this research yields policy implications, such as insight into which UN mission tactics are more influential in promoting democratization. This insight can be taken into consideration by the UN during the design and implementation of PKOs aimed at democratization. This research addresses two gaps in the literature; the scarcity of systematic case study analysis and limited insight into the impact of UN PKO tactics on

democratization. The research question reads as follows: How do UN PKO tactics impact democratization in post-conflict states? Democratization is understood as the process of transforming from a less to a more democratic regime (Kipgen, 2021). This question is answered by examining the mission characteristics of two UN PKOs. The cases are selected using a most-similar systems design, which allows for the impact of UN PKO tactics to be studied in isolation from other factors aiding democratization. The cases are the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA). The mission tactics of educating voters, training political parties, promoting democratic institutions, and assisting elections were analyzed between the cases. The analysis revealed that UN PKO tactics cannot be considered the only determinant of democratization, based on the analysis of ONUMOZ in Mozambique and MINURCA in the Central African Republic (CAR).

The paper continues as follows; first, a review of the literature will provide insight into the literature's contributions and the remaining gaps. Secondly, the theoretical and conceptual framework provides the theories, assumptions, and concepts this research builds on. Thirdly, the methods and case selection section elaborates on how the data will be analyzed, and how the cases of ONUMOZ and MINURCA were chosen. Fourthly, the results of the analysis are presented and explained. Fifthly, the discussion section consists of alternative reasons for democratization, the implications, and the limitations of the research. Lastly, the conclusion of the paper will provide a summary of the research and recommendations for future research.

Literature Review

The literature on UN PKO is a broad field of research covering multiple aspects and effects of UN PKOs on post-conflict states. The literature can be grouped into two categories; those who argue UN PKOs aid democratization and those who argue they do not. The first category consists of scholars who found positive relationships between UN PKOs and democratization in post-conflict states (Armey & McNab, 2015; Blair et al., 2023; Joshi, 2013; Heldt, 2011; Steinert & Grimm, 2015). These scholars focused on different mechanisms or relationships in their research, but all produced insights into how UN PKOs aid democratization. The authors argued UN PKOs promoted democratization by establishing and developing democratic institutions, which the state maintained after the UN PKO withdrawal (Armey & McNab, 2015; Blair et al., 2023; Joshi, 2013; Heldt, 2011; Steinert & Grimm, 2015). In addition to aiding democratization, the establishment of democratic institutions reduced the recurrence of violence by providing former rebels with the ability to voice their opinions using non-violent means (Joshi, 2013).

The relationship between UN PKOs and democratization was examined by controlling for other explanatory variables for democratization, including whether the state had been a democracy before, has democratic neighbors, or is oil-dependent for its export revenue (Armey & McNab, 2015; Blair et al., 2023; Joshi, 2013; Heldt, 2011; Steinert & Grimm, 2015). The control variables identified in the literature will be used in the creation of a most similar systems design. Lastly, most of the literature focused on cases of UN PKO globally, except for Blair et al. (2023) who limited their cases to UN PKOs in Sub-Saharan African countries. Blair et al. (2023) justified this as it is the region with the most UN PKOs aimed at democratization. Overall, this camp of the literature argues UN PKOs aid democratization in post-conflict states.

The studies that argue UN PKOs do not lead to democratization focused on the internal dynamics of a state which produce environments that are hospitable or inhospitable for democratization (Gurses & Mason, 2023; Fortna, 2008; Fortna & Huang, 2012). Gurses & Mason (2023) argued the interests of the state elites, such as their interest in democratization, have more influence on hindering or promoting democratization than UN PKOs do (Gurses & Mason, 2023). Furthermore, Fortna (2008) argued UN PKOs do not benefit democratization when compared to cases in which the UN did not intervene, and therefore UN PKOs did not impact democratization. Similarly, Fortna & Huang (2012) argued democratization in post-conflict states does not differ from the democratization process in general, decreasing the influence UN PKOs have. Therefore, this line of literature has argued that UN PKOs do not have a direct effect on democratization in post-conflict states. However, this category of the literature has not analyzed UN PKO tactics and whether they impact democratization. Thus, this research builds on previous literature and builds on the newly discovered relationship between UN PKOs and democratization.

The lack of consensus in the literature can be explained by different conceptualizations of democratization, the time scope used to measure democratization, and the use of different cases. Firstly, democratization is an intricate phenomenon in and of itself, further complicating the process of conceptualization. The process of measuring democratization starts with establishing a type of democracy, electoral or liberal, which is then used as a benchmark to observe democratization. Electoral and liberal democracies are similar as they both hold free and fair elections, however, liberal democracies extend beyond this and also provide freedom rights and the rule of law (Moller, 2007). Thus, the benchmark for democratization to electoral democracy is lower than that for liberal democracy. To observe democratization, the literature using

quantitative method has relied on using the Polity Score (Army & McNab, 2015; Fortna, 2008; Gurses & Mason, 2023; Joshi, 2013; Sambanis, 2008; Steinert & Grimm, 2015), the Freedom House Index (FHI) (Army & McNab, 2015; Fortna, 2008; Steinert & Grimm, 2015; Zurcher, Manning, Evenson, Hayman, Riese & Roehner, 2013) or the Varieties of Democracy Score (V-DEM) (Blair et al., 2023). The Polity Score focuses on aspects of electoral democracy whereas, the FHI and V-DEM scores focus on aspects of liberal democracy (Fortna, 2008). In qualitative studies, democratization was often measured using the features of an electoral democracy (Zurcher et al., 2013). The different conceptualizations hindered the generalizability of findings, therefore, the findings should be understood in regards to how the authors understand and measure democratization.

Secondly, the literature has used different time frames within which democratization was observed. The literature agreed that pre-conflict regime type should be measured a year before the conflict ends, apart from Fortna & Huang (2012) who use five years pre-war as the benchmark. However, the authors differed on how long after the UN PKO withdrawal democratization should be observed, ranging from one-year post-conflict (Fortna, 2008), to two years (Fortna, 2008; Fortna & Huang, 2021), to five years (Armey & McNab, 2015; Fortna, 2008; Gurses & Mason, 2023; 2015; Steinert & Grimm, 2015; Zurcher et al., 2013) and even to ten years (Gurses & Mason, 2023). Nevertheless, five years is the most common benchmark within the literature as it is a critical juncture for democratization because the effects of democratization significantly decrease after those five years (Steinert & Grimm, 2015). The inconsistency regarding the time frame in which democratization is measured further hindered the generalizability of findings.

Lastly, the research differed in which UN PKOs were included as cases. The cases differed along two lines: the role of the PKO and the PKO mandate. Firstly, the literature uses cases of UN PKOs with different roles. The literature included cases in which UN PKOs aided in conflict resolution and then peace-keeping (Blair et al., 2023 & Sambanis, 2008) or UN PKOs which were only involved in peace-keeping (Armey & McNab, 2015; Fortna 2008; Fortna & Huang, 2012; Gurses & Mason, 2023; Heldt,2011; Steinert & Grimm, 2015; Zurcher et al., 2013). A focus on UN PKOs which only aid in peacebuilding and not conflict resolution isolated the effect UN PKOs have on peacebuilding and democratization. The second distinction focused on which UN PKOs are included as cases; those with a democracy-promoting mandate, and those without. Focusing on cases with a democracy-promoting mandate further isolated the cases to those in which the UN PKO is actively trying to achieve democratization within the state (Heldt, 2011; Steinert & Grimm, 2015). Thus, the cases should consist of UN PKOs involved in peacekeeping with democracy-promoting mandates, to isolate the impact of UN PKOs on democratization. Overall, the use of different conceptualizations, time scopes, and cases has made it increasingly difficult to provide a comprehensive understanding of how UN PKOs impact democratization. Thus, this research made informed decisions about which conceptualizations, time scopes, and cases to adapt.

Two main gaps can be identified within the literature. Firstly, the field of literature consists mostly of large-N statistical analyses, which are beneficial for producing general knowledge and identifying general causal relationships (Munck, 2007). Despite these advantages, these analyses are limited as the relationships they identify cannot account for how the factors present themselves in specific cases and the variation between them. Therefore, case studies provide the opportunity to examine how findings from large-N statistical analyses apply

and present themselves in specific cases, allowing for theory testing. In doing so, it is recognized that case studies are limited by a lack of universal findings (Sotomayor, 2014). Secondly, the literature would benefit from research into the impact of UN PKO tactics on democratization. Blair et al. (2023) recently published research that conducted a large-N statistical analysis to examine how UN PKO tactics, educating voters, training political parties, supporting democratic institutions, and assisting with elections impact democratization within a state. Therefore, the literature would benefit from research expanding on this newly discovered relationship. In-depth case studies and research on UN mission tactics and the promotion of democratization address the gaps mentioned above.

The literature consists of two camps; one that argues UN PKOs do aid democratization, and one that argues they do not. The lack of consensus can be accounted for by the inconsistencies in the conceptualization and measurement of democratization, and the selection of cases. Thus, new research into UN PKOs and democratization must be informed and cautious of the conceptualization, time scopes, and cases that are used. In addition, the contributions of new research must be understood in such terms. Two main gaps in the literature remain; a dominance of large-N statistical analyses and limited insight into how UN PKO tactics impact democratization. This research contributes to the field by addressing the two gaps mentioned above. Furthermore, this research contributes to the debate on how UN PKOs impact democratization and situates itself within the literature that argues UN PKOs promote democratization. In doing so, the literature mostly drew on Blair et al. (2023) and Steinert & Grimm (2015) in the understanding and measurement of democratization, how PKOs are conceptualized, and which cases will be included.

Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

The role of International Organizations (IOs) in international relations differs between various schools of thought, with the most dominant being realism, liberalism, and constructivism. Firstly, realism has argued IOs are instruments of states that are used to pursue their self-interest and therefore cannot independently pursue their policies or objectives (Hurd, 2022). Secondly, liberalism agrees states will pursue their interests but argues they can achieve cooperation through international organizations, despite the condition of anarchy or self-interest (Ikenberry, 2020). Lastly, constructivism views IOs as actors that influence the diffusion and promotion of norms (Percy & Sandholtz, 2022). Overall, the role of IOs in international relations differs between theories. For this research, the liberal conception of IOs and international relations was adopted.

Liberalism views world politics as an open, rule-based system that allows for cooperation and trade between states, eventually leading to the achievement of mutual gains (Ikenberry, 2020). Liberalism has argued that rules and institutions enable cooperation despite the anarchic nature of the international system. Furthermore, liberalism acknowledges that states are not the only actors in international relations, but rather it consists of several important actors including international organizations, transnational networks, interest groups, and transgovernmental policy networks (Grieco, 1988). Liberalism provides this study with its first important theoretical distinction; IOs are independent actors within international relations who, in partnership with states, can promote liberal ideas and systems. Therefore, the UN can be viewed as an actor with the ability to design and implement PKOs.

The UN as an actor

The UN as an IO in the international system has various responsibilities, tasks, and missions. The most relevant to this research is the task of the UN to maintain international peace and security (Weiss, Forsythe, Coate & Pease, 2013). The UN does this through peacebuilding which it defines as "reducing the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management" (*Terminology,* n.d.). Thus, PKOs are understood as UN missions aimed at preserving peace and creating and supporting democratic institutions in post-conflict states.

Barnett, Fang & Zurcher (2014) identify two features of contemporary peacebuilding that can be observed in UN PKOs. Firstly, PKOs aim at reconstructing governance institutions to provide citizens with physical and economic security. Secondly, PKOs have an inherent desire to produce a liberal democratic state, as observed through the UN's focus on democracy promotion in PKOs. The UN has identified its interest in democracy promotion through the Agenda For Peace, in which the UN argues democracy ensures peace and stability, development, and adherence to human rights norms and laws (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Thus, the UN has an inherent interest in creating and promoting democracy within states, which it accomplishes through PKOs. The scope of PKOs for this study will be restricted to PKOs with democracy-promoting mandates to isolate the UN PKOs actively working towards democratization (Steinert & Grimm, 2015). Therefore, through its PKOs, the UN aims to provide peace and build democratic institutions in post-conflict states.

UN PKO tactics

Blair et al. (2023) investigate the relationship between UN PKO tactics and their influence on democratization, and how this relationship differs during times of peace and violence. This study built on their findings during times of peace, as PKOs in this research only

included cases of PKOs after conflict resolution, i.e., during times of peace. The UN PKO

mission consists of four tactics; educating voters, training political parties, supporting democratic

institutions, and assisting with elections (Blair et al., 2023). Blair et al. (2023) argue UN PKOs

that include and perform these mission tactics increase the likelihood of democratization in

post-conflict states. The UN PKO tactics provided this research with four hypotheses, based on

the four mission tactics used by Blair et al. (2023).

H1: When a UN PKO educates voters, then the UN PKO is more likely to promote

democratization in post-conflict states.

Voter education consists of educating the state's citizens on their new rights and roles

within a democracy. When the PKO withdraws from a state, it leaves behind educated citizens

with the ability to participate in elections. Therefore, it is expected that the citizens are more

aware of their rights within, and the responsibilities of, a democratic government. Educated

voters are expected to increase the government's accountability and their trust in democracy.

Therefore, when a UN PKO educates voters, then democratization is more likely to be promoted.

H2: When a UN PKO trains political parties, then the UN PKO is more likely to promote

democratization in a post-conflict state.

Blair et al. (2023) identify that violent conflict can significantly hinder political parties,

as they can become disorganized, underfunded, understaffed, or lack trust from citizens (Blair et

al., 2023). UN PKOs can address this, through creating or reviving competitive multiparty

systems by training political parties (Steinert & Grimm, 2015). In addition, multi-party systems

allow former insurgents and/or opposition groups to voice their opinions through non-violent

means (Steinert & Grimm, 2015). Thus, training political parties ensures political parties are

aware of their roles in the newly established competitive multi-party system.

H3: When a UN PKO supports democratic institutions, then the UN PKO is more likely to promote democratization in a post-conflict state.

Blair et al. (2023) specify democratic institutions to rule of law programs and legislatures. Thus, UN PKOs support democratic institutions, such as the legislature and judiciary. In doing so, the UN PKO establishes or re-strengthens the legislature and judiciary to be able to thrive in a democratic system. The strength of a democratic regime largely depends on its ability to provide and maintain strong democratic institutions (Fish, 2006). In addition, a strong judiciary and legislature create checks and balances for the government in power. Checks and balances are essential to a new democracy as they ensure the government is resilient to democratic backsliding or a return to authoritarianism. Therefore, UN PKOs aid democratization by supporting democratic institutions.

H4: When a UN PKO provides electoral assistance, then the UN PKO is more likely to promote democratization in a post-conflict state.

Electoral assistance is the first step to establishing an electoral democracy as citizens elect their new leaders and become socialized into the democracy (Steinert & Grimm, 2015). Furthermore, free and fair elections can trigger two democracy-promoting mechanisms within the state. Firstly, free and fair elections could incentivize politicians to act by their voter's preferences, in the interest of re-election (Steinert & Grimm, 2015). Secondly, free and fair elections mark a moment of regime transformation, in which disagreements are addressed through democratic institutions rather than violent means (Steinert & Grimm, 2015). Therefore, electoral assistance can socialize citizens, increase the accountability of politicians, and facilitate the expression of contrasting opinions.

Democratization

Democratization is the process states undergo to transform from a less to a more democratic regime (Kipgen, 2021). The literature posits two theories regarding the source of democratization; the preconditions and universalist schools (Heldt, 2011). The former argues specific domestic factors lead to democratization, while the latter argues the democratization process is triggered through external intervention or aid (Heldt, 2011). This research prescribes to the universalistic school of thought and assumes UN PKOs initiate and promote democratization in post-conflict states.

Methodology & Case Selection

Methodology

The impact of UN PKO tactics on democratization was analyzed using the method of structured focused comparison. The method of structured-focused comparison allowed for both an in-depth examination of the cases, as well as a systematic comparison of the findings between the cases (George & Bennett, 2005). In addition, the structured-focused comparison was compatible with the theory testing of the argument put forth by Blair et al. (2023). Moreover, structured-focused comparison provided a framework of analysis that can be applied to other case studies in future research. Thus, structured-focused comparison provided a systematic method of analyzing and comparing the impact of UN PKO tactics on democratization.

George & Bennett (2005) highlighted two considerations for the researcher before conducting a structured-focused comparison. Firstly, the researcher should be cautious about which previous studies and variable definitions to build on, as it significantly steers the research and results (George & Bennett, 2005). As the aim of this research was theory-testing, the research used variables and definitions compatible with those of Blair et al. (2023). In addition, the foundation for this research combined multiple studies, so the compatibility of concepts and measurements was considered throughout. Secondly, structured-focused comparison requires the researcher to create standardized questions that will be considered throughout each case which constitutes the focused aspect of the analysis. Furthermore, the structured-focused comparison had the advantage of providing a method of clear, systematic examination of case studies (Drozdova & Gaubatz, 2017).

Structured, focused comparison is the most relevant method to examine the research question, however, Jankauskas, Eckhard & Ege (2023) point out two main disadvantages.

Firstly, Jankauskas et al. (2023) are skeptical of the ability of guiding questions to be both universal and specific. The questions need to be relevant to specific cases but applicable to the wider universe of cases (Jankauskas et al., 2023). This research focuses on UN PKO tactics, which can be analyzed across cases regardless of whether they employ the same tactics. Secondly, Jankauskas et al. (2023) argued insights generated by case studies, as well as by structured-focused comparison, are not very generalizable. This limitation was mitigated as this research aimed to test the theories produced by large-N statistical analyses. Thereby, the findings do not need to be generalizable by themselves but rather can be used as an indication of whether UN PKO tactics impact democratization within and across specific cases. Therefore, this research recognizes and addresses the limitations of the method of structured-focused comparison.

Case Selection

A most similar systems design isolated the role of UN PKOs to examine how UN PKO tactics impacted democratization. A most similar systems designs call for cases that are similar in all aspects, except for the dependent variable of interest (George & Bennett, 2005). The dependent variable of interest is whether or not the state democratized, therefore the two cases had to differ in this outcome. The cases were similar in all aspects, including other explanatory variables for democratization (see Table 1). Thus, the most similar systems design isolated UN PKO tactics as the main reason for democratization.

The cases were selected using the Steinert & Grimm (2015) dataset. Steinert & Grimm (2015) provide direct insight into the relationship between UN PKOs and democratization, therefore, their database and explanatory variables were used for this research. In addition, the conceptualizations and methods of Steinert & Grimm (2015) and Blair et al. (2023) were very

compatible, therefore allowing for theoretically sound comparisons. The cases were similar in most explanatory variables for democratization. Steinert & Grimm (2015) find two variables to be statistically significant; oil dependence and victory. Firstly, the oil variable indicates whether the state is dependent on oil for export revenue (Steinert & Grimm, 2015). Secondly, the victory variable influences democratization depending on whether the government or insurgent group won control of the government (Steinert & Grimm, 2015). A state is more likely to democratize depending on whether the winning party wants to democratize or not (Steinert & Grimm, 2015). Further, Steinert & Grimm (2015) find other explanatory variables that are not statistically significant; for example, if a state has a democratic tradition, democratic neighbors, and if the conflict ended with a treaty. These other explanatory variables were taken into consideration to increase the similarities between the cases, and to examine if they may be more influential on a case-study level.

The most similar systems design approach yielded two cases, ONUMOZ and MINURCA, that were similar in most explanatory variables but differed in their democratization outcomes. Five years after the UN PKO, Mozambique democratized while the CAR did not. Thus, the UN PKO cases are ONUMOZ (1992-1994) and MINURCA (1998-2000). The cases differed in budget and troop size but these variables have not been found statistically significant in the literature (Steinert & Grimm, 2015), or to significantly impact the democratization outcomes (Zurcher et al., 2013). In addition, the cases differ in whether they had a democratic neighbor or the winning party was in favor of democratization. However, these two variables have not been found statistically significant in the literature (Steinert & Grimm, 2015).

Both Mozambique and CAR are countries in the sub-Saharan African region. The theories Blair et al. (2023) developed were based on sub-Saharan African countries and therefore

can be applied to ONUMOZ and MINURCA. Lastly, both cases have democracy-promoting

mandates. Moreover, certain assumptions and conceptualizations were adapted as the dataset

from Steinert & Grimm (2015) was used, namely the conceptualization of democratization and

violent conflict. The benchmark for violent conflict is set at 1000 battle deaths per year within

the boundaries of sovereign states, in which the government is one of the combatant parties

(Steinert & Grimm, 2015). Therefore, it is not required for the case to have experienced a civil

war before the UN PKO, but they are required to have experienced violent conflict.

Mozambique (ONUMOZ)

Mozambique suffered a 16-year-long violent civil war, which was fought mainly between

the Mozambican government, the rebel group the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO),

the Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO), and smaller opposition groups. The parties to the

conflict had greatly contrasting political ideologies and plans for the future of Mozambique.

Despite inherent ideological differences and violence, the civil war ended in 1992 when the

parties to the conflict created and signed the General Peace Agreement (GPA) (Berdal, 2014).

The GPA envisioned long-lasting peace in Mozambique and called upon the UN's assistance in

securing this peace (Hultman, 2009). The UN responded with the establishment and launching of

ONUMOZ, a PKO that was tasked with political, military, humanitarian, and electoral tasks, as

reflected in their mandate (Berdal, 2014). The mandate officially ended on the 9th of December,

1994 (*ONUMOZ*, n.d.). ONUMOZ is widely regarded as a successful case of UN PKO

concerning peacekeeping and democratization.

Central African Republic (MINURCA)

The CAR did not experience a civil war before the MINURCA operation. Rather, the

CAR faced a series of social, political, and military crises highlighted by three main rebellions in

1996 (Mbadinga, 2001). The rebellions were conducted by soldiers protesting their salary and

living conditions. The CAR government responded to these rebellions by initiating a conference

between the heads of states of Gabon, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Chad (Mbadinga, 2001). This

conference resulted in the Bangui Agreement, which similarly to the GPA, allocated a

peacekeeping role to the UN (Mbadinga, 2001). The MINURCA mandate focused on assisting

the implementation of the Bangui Agreements, allocating itself to political, military,

humanitarian, and electoral tasks (*MINURCA*, n.d.). The mission ended in 2000 and was

followed by the UN Peace-Building Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA).

In contrast to ONUMOZ, the MINURCA mission is not regarded as successful. Therefore,

MINURCA represents the case in which a UN PKO did not lead to democratization.

Table 1. Case Selection of Mozambique & Central African Republic

	Mozambique	Central African Republic
Conflict Start	1976	1996
Conflict End	1992	1997
UN PKO Start	1992	1998
UN PKO End	1994	2000
UN PKO	1	1
Oil	0	0
Democratic Neighbour	1	0
Victory	0	1
Democratic Tradition	0	0
Treaty	1	1

Democratization (FH)	1	0

Operationalization

Democratization

Democratization will be measured using the FHI, which ranges from two to 14 (Freedom House, n.d.). The FHI measures regimes by how they score on providing and securing political rights and civil liberties, providing a comprehensive framework for analyzing democratization. Democratization occurs when a state's FHI decreases, as the lower end of the scale indicates the most democratic regime. The FHI was chosen over other measures of democracy, such as V-Dem or Polity scores, as it offers a more comprehensive understanding of democracy. (Blair et al. 2013; Steinert & Grimm, 2015). This research was built on findings from Blair et al. (2023) who used V-DEM to measure the democratization outcome. However, this does not impact this research as Blair et al. (2023) recreated their findings using the Polity Score and FHI and found the results were not significantly affected. Therefore, the use of the FHI for democratization should yield findings that are comparable to findings from the literature.

The four UN PKO tactics are based on the PEMA database (Di Salvator, Lundgren, Oksamytna & Smidt, 2022). Blair et al. (2023) based their UN PKO tactics on the activities identified within the PEMA database. The PEMA dataset is based on 48 PKOs, including ONUMOZ and MINURCA (Di Salvator, et al., 2022). The UN PKO tactics were observed through the use of indicators. Each mission tactic was observed using three indicators similarly identified within the PEMA dataset.

Educating Voters

1) Indicator 1: Educating citizens on electoral rules and procedures

2) Indicator 2: Encouraging voting

3) Indicator 3: Developing mechanisms for communication of policy preferences

Training of Political Parties

1) Indicator 1: Supporting political parties in participating in electoral and political processes

2) Indicator 2: Creating opportunities for access to political processes

3) Indicator 3: Transforming former armed groups in political parties

Promoting Democratic Institutions

1) Indicator 1: Re-establishing and strengthening judicial systems

2) Indicator 2: Re-establishing and strengthening legal systems

3) Indicator 3: Advice or involvement in the lawmaking process

Election Assistance

1) Indicator 1: Planning an election (registration of voters)

2) Indicator 2: Executing an election (the conduct and supervision of an election)

3) Indicator 3: Verifying an election (verification of the election results)

Findings and Analysis

Table 2

The Results for Criteria 1: Educating Voters

Indicator	Educating citizens on electoral rules and procedures	Encouraging voting	Developing mechanisms for communication of policy preferences
Outcome	Was not observed for ONUMOZ, but was observed for MINURCA	Was not observed for ONUMOZ, but was observed for MINURCA	Was not observed for ONUMOZ or MINURCA

ONUMOZ and MINURCA differed in the extent to which they educated voters. ONUMOZ was not directly involved in the voter education process and thus the indicators of voter education could not be met. Firstly, the role of ONUMOZ in the Civic Education Program (CEP) was limited. The CEP was created by the National Elections Commission (CNE) to educate voters and encourage voting (Thompson, 1994). However, the CNE did not want the direct involvement of ONUMOZ in the CEP, thus, ONUMOZ only assisted in the coordination of the CEP (Thompson, 1994). The CEP was successful in encouraging and educating voters through its poster campaigns and voter education workshops (Thompson, 1994) as well as radio and television programs (Sygne, 1997). On the other hand, MINURCA did meet the two criteria of voter education and encouragement. MINURCA accomplished this through press conferences and radio MINURCA in which voters were informed of the electoral process, and their role

within this process, and were encouraged to vote ("Second Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic," 1998). In addition, MINURCA stated to the CAR press on the evening of the elections asking voters to exercise their democratic responsibility calmly and responsibly ("Eighth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic," 1999). Thus, ONUMOZ did not directly educate and encourage voters, while MINURCA did. In addition, it was not observed that either ONUMOZ or MINURCA met the last indicator of developing mechanisms for the communication of policy preferences. Overall, ONUMOZ and MINURCA focused their efforts on educating citizens and encouraging them to vote.

Table 3

The Results for Criteria 2: Training of Political Parties

Indicator	Supporting political parties in electoral and political processes	Creating opportunities for access to political processes	Transforming former armed groups into political parties
Outcome	Observed for ONUMOZ and MINURCA	Observed for ONUMOZ and MINURCA	Observed for ONUMOZ, but not observed for MINURCA

ONUMOZ and MINURCA met the first two indicators of training political parties; supporting political parties in participating in electoral and political processes and creating

opportunities for access to the political process. Firstly, ONUMOZ supported and created

opportunities for political parties by maintaining contact between the main parties in

government, ensuring they all had an equal chance for participation and representation

(*ONUMOZ*, n.d.-b). In addition, ONUMOZ monitored the proper conduct of electoral campaigns

ensuring the rights of individuals, political parties, and political organizations were respected. In

addition, ONUMOZ created a voluntary trust fund to ensure parties had the resources to

participate in elections (*ONUMOZ*, n.d.-b). Furthermore, ONUMOZ campaigned for the creation

of a legal framework in which all officially registered parties had equal access to the media for

their campaigns (Alden, 2002). Secondly, MINURCA mostly assisted in creating and supporting

open dialogue between the government and opposition parties ("Fifth Report of the

Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic," 1999). In

addition, MINURCA ensured that all competing candidates were given access to the state media

for campaigning activities ("Eighth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations

Mission in the Central African Republic," 1999).

In regards to creating opportunities to access the political process, MINURCA appealed

to the president to allow all registered parties representation on the electoral commission

("Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African

Republic," 1998). Therefore, ONUMOZ and MINURCA were both able to support political

parties in getting access to and participating in the electoral and political processes. Lastly,

ONUMOZ was able to transform former armed groups into political parties. ONUMOZ was able

to transform the former insurgent group of RENAMO into a political party (Dobbins, Jones &

Crane, 2001).

Overall, ONUMOZ met all three indicators, whereas MINURCA only met one. In addition, both missions placed a strong focus on the demobilization and reintegration of former armed combatants (*ONUMOZ*, n.d.; *MINURCA*, n.d.). While the demobilization of armed combatants aids in peacekeeping, it does not qualify as transforming former armed groups into political parties. Rather, it exemplifies how UN PKOs have approached the demobilization of former armed combatants in post-conflict states. Thus, the missions employed similar tactics. In regards to the indicators for training political parties, both ONUMOZ and MINURCA met the first two indicators, and ONUMOZ also met the third indicator.

Table 4

The Results for Criteria 3: Promoting Democratic Institutions

Indicator	Re-establishing and strengthening judicial systems	Re-establishing and strengthening legal systems	Advice or involvement in the lawmaking process
Outcome	Not observed for ONUMOZ or MINURCA	Not observed for ONUMOZ or MINURCA	Observed for ONUMOZ and MINURCA

ONUMOZ and MINURCA only met one of the indicators for promoting democratic institutions; providing advice on and being involved in the law-making process. Firstly, ONUMOZ assisted in creating and passing the electoral law which led to the CNE and therefore the national elections (Sygne, 1997). Secondly, MINURCA aided in the creation of electoral law focusing on laws regarding the restructuring of defense and security forces. MINURCA was

involved in these processes in December 1998 ("Third Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic," 1998), January 1999 ("Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic," 1999), and April 1999 ("Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic," 1999). The criteria for promoting democratic institutions only focused on the legislative and judiciary branches of government. Therefore, the extensive police training programs both ONUMOZ (*ONUMOZ*, n.d.-b) and MINURCA (*MINURCA*, n.d.) created and developed cannot be taken into consideration. These programs focused on monitoring the police activities in the country, ensuring the police respect the citizens and their civil liberties, monitoring the process of reorganization, and training police officers to act as monitors of legislative elections. The police cannot be considered part of the judiciary or legislative branches, but are rather part of the executive branch (Moller, 2007). Thus, ONUMUZ and MINURCA were not observed to have restructured or strengthened judicial or legal systems but they had assisted in the law-making process.

Table 5

The Results for Criteria 4: Election Assistance

Indicator	Planning elections	Execution of elections (conduct and supervision)	Verification of the election
Outcome	Observed for ONUMOZ and	Observed for ONUMOZ and	Observed for ONUMOZ and

MINURCA	MINURCA	MINURCA

ONUMOZ and MINURCA were both heavily involved in and successful in providing election assistance. The three indicators of election assistance, the planning, execution, and verification of elections, were observed in ONUMOZ and MINURCA. Both PKOs were heavily involved in the planning and execution of elections. ONUMOZ assisted the CNE in the registration of voters. Following this, ONUMOZ provided logistical support to the elections in addition to monitoring and verifying the entire election process ("Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique," 1994). The monitoring of the elections was conducted by UN volunteers and staff, ONUMOZ staff, and the CIVPOL group ("ONUMOZ", 1994). Similarly, MINURCA provided advice and technical assistance to the CAR government in the organization of elections. MINURCA also provided the necessary supplies to the polling stations, such as ballot papers ("Eighth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic," 1999). Concerning election monitoring and verification, MINURCA deployed electoral observers and successfully monitored and verified the whole election ("Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic," 1999). The monitoring of elections was similarly conducted by UN volunteers and staff, MINURCA staff, and the CIVPOL unit of the MINURCA mission. Both missions are widely regarded by the UN to have been an integral part of hosting the state's first free and fair elections. In both cases, these elections were the first multi-party elections in the country and the states relied on advice and support from the UN PKOs to successfully conduct those elections and initiate the democratization effort.

Overall, ONUMOZ, and MINUCA employed very similar mission tactics. The most striking difference was that MINURCA was more involved in educating voters and encouraging voting than ONUMOZ was, despite the ONUMUZ operation impacting the democratization effort more. However, this difference can be attributed to how much the government allowed the UN PKO to intervene. In the case of ONUMOZ, the Mozambican government restricted the extent to which ONUMOZ could aid in the voter education campaigns. In addition, it is notable that neither UN PKO met the indicators of re-establishing or strengthening judicial or legal systems. Thus, the mission tactics were exceedingly similar and cannot be considered the sole explanation for democratization.

Discussion

The analysis suggested that UN PKO tactics are not the main explanatory variable for democratization in post-conflict states, based on the analysis of ONUMOZ and MINURCA. This was in contrast to the hypothesis that a UN PKO that met all four tactics would increase the chances of democratization. Therefore, alternative theories are consulted to account for the difference between what the theory predicted and the findings the analysis produced.

Budget and mission size

The literature has not found budget, duration, or mission size to significantly influence the success of a PKO in promoting democratization in post-conflict states (Sambanis, 2008; Steinert & Grimm, 2015). ONUMOZ and MINURCA both lasted about two years, however, the budget and troop size largely differed between the missions. Firstly, ONUMOZ had a budget of 492.6 million USD (ONUMOZ, n.d.-c), while MINURCA had a budget of 41.1 million USD (MINURCA, n.d.-b). The difference in the budget is noteworthy as both missions had the same duration and were engaged in similar activities. The lower budget of MINURCA could have limited their ability and resources to engage in mission tactics that promote democratization.

Secondly, ONUMOZ had 9,378 people involved (ONUMOZ, n.d.-c), while MINURCA had 1,611 people involved (MINURCA, n.d.-b). The difference in budget and mission size did not influence the mission's ability to meet the mission tactics, as both ONUMOZ and MINURCA had similar tactics. However, restricted budgets and mission size could have influenced the extent to which the mission tactics were conducted. For example, both missions monitored elections, but MINURCA could have better capacity to do so if it had more staff and resources to invest in election monitoring. Overall, the differing budget and mission size could have

influenced the ability of the UN PKOs to promote democratization, thus limiting the observable impact of UN PKO tactics on democratization.

Civilian Personnel

Blair et al. (2023) investigate the impact of civilian personnel on democratization. Blair et al. (2023) find that as the number of civilian personnel increases, so does the likelihood of democratization. Therefore, the difference in the success of the missions could be explained by the difference in the amount of civilian personnel. ONUMOZ had 506 civilian personnel (ONUMOZ, n.d.-c), while MINURCA had 225 civilian personnel (MINURCA, n.d.-b). Nonetheless, the contribution of civilian personnel could be examined more thoroughly, for example, how does the type of work or amount of work done by the civilian personnel influence the democratization outcome? Blair et al. (2023) argue civilian personnel are crucial to the maintenance of democratic institutions after UN PKO withdrawal. Civilian personnel embody the democratization effort of the UN PKO and can promote democratization within their states. Thus, the amount of civilian personnel could account for the difference in the democratization outcome between ONUMOZ and MINURCA.

Conflict Resurgence

Perhaps the most distinguishing feature between the two cases is the resurgence of conflict. The Mozambican government created and implemented the GPA and was able to avoid the recurrence of major conflict, as they only experienced occasional periods of violence (UCDP, n.d.-b). In contrast, the CAR experienced an attempted military coup and intrastate armed conflict in 2001, shortly after the withdrawal of MINURCA (UCPD, n.d.). The recurrence of violence could be attributed to MINURCA's inability to address the hostilities remaining

between the army and the presidential guard (*Central African Republic Chronology of Events :*
Security Council Report, n.d.). In addition, MINURCA struggled to strengthen civilian police
and was limited in its ability to demobilize and reintegrate soldiers (*Central African Republic*
Chronology of Events : Security Council Report, n.d.). More specifically, MINURCA was unable
to demobilize military forces before the elections were held (Dobbins et al., 2001). Furthermore,
the MINURCA mission was criticized as it stockpiled weapons, instead of destroying them
(Dobbins et al., 2001). Thus, the democratization effort in CAR was weakened by the remaining
hostilities and the challenges MINURCA faced in suppressing these hostilities.

The difference in democratization outcomes cannot solely be explained by UN PKO
tactics. Thus, other theories were consulted to provide alternative explanations for the impact of
ONUMOZ and MINURCA on democratization. These theories highlight three main factors that
could account for the difference in democratization outcome, the budget and size of the mission,
the involvement of civilian personnel, and the recurrence of violence.

Implications & significance

This research yields theoretical and practical implications in the field of UN PKOs and
democratization. The theoretical implications consist of two main considerations. Firstly, this
research contextualizes the findings from Blair et al. (2023) by finding that UN PKO tactics do
not always lead to democratization. Rather, the theory posited by Blair et al. (2023) can be
observed under certain conditions. For example, the UN PKO tactics did lead to democratization
in a state that did not experience violent conflict after mission withdrawal. Secondly, this
research challenges the universalist school of democratization and provides support for the
preconditions theory of democratization. The findings illustrate how democratization can be

hindered by the conditions within a state, despite the mission tactics of the UN PKO. Overall, the findings specify the conditions under which UN mission tactics aid democratization and provide overall support for the universalist theory of democratization.

The research yields considerations for the UN during UN PKO design and implementation. Firstly, the findings reiterate that educating voters, supporting political parties, promoting democratic institutions, and assisting elections are vital components of UN PKOs aimed at democratization. However, the findings also caution UN PKOs to actively identify hostilities between groups, and aim at suppressing the chances for the recurrence of violence after withdrawal. Secondly, strengthening judicial and legal systems was not observed in the cases of ONUMOZ and MINURCA. UN PKOs could consider including these tactics in their mission design to observe their impact on democratization. Overall, this research highlights the importance of UN PKOs in addressing hostilities and the recurrence of violence between states and strengthening judicial and legal systems.

Limitations

This research had three limitations. Firstly, the use of most-similar systems design limited the amount of cases eligible for the research. Therefore, the analysis could only be conducted on the cases of ONUMOZ and MINURCA, in turn, limiting the number of cases that could have been used, and the generalizability of the findings. Secondly, this research made use of case studies which limited the generalizability of findings. However, the research aimed to conduct theory testing within specific cases. Thus, the findings do not necessarily have to be generalizable. In addition, the framework used can be applied to other cases, increasing its usability within the field. Lastly, the research relied on secondary sources on the ONUMOZ and

MINURCA operations. The UN reports for ONUMOZ were limited in number and access, therefore, academic articles were consulted for ONUMOZ mission activities. The research could have benefited from first-hand accounts from the citizens of Mozambique or CAR, those involved in MINURCA and ONUMOZ on the civilian level and UN level. However, this was not possible due to resource constraints but does provide avenues for further research. Overall, the research faced limitations in its use of the most similar systems design, case studies, and secondary sources.

Conclusion

Based on the analysis of ONUMOZ and MINURCA, UN PKO tactics cannot be considered the sole determinant for democratization in post-conflict states. The analysis revealed that the mission tactics of ONUMOZ and MINURCA were very similar and thus mission tactics could not be considered the sole explanation for the difference in democratization outcomes. Therefore, alternative theories are consulted to account for the differences in democratization outcomes. The most prominent differences between the cases include the difference in budget and mission size, the involvement of civilian personnel, and the resurgence of violence in the CAR.

Based on the insights, conclusions, and limitations of this study, three recommendations for further research are provided. Firstly, future research could benefit from analyzing more than four mission tactics to broaden the perspective on how mission tactics impact democratization. The PEMA dataset can be consulted, as it identifies 41 different mission tactics that UN PKOs have used. Secondly, future research on UN PKO tactics could address the limited number of case studies the most similar systems design yielded, by using a most different systems design. This approach would examine cases of UN PKOs using different mission tactics but all resulted in democratization, providing another perspective on which UN PKO tactics could influence democratization. Lastly, the research could benefit from detailed case studies on the historic roots of violence and how UN PKOs could address these to increase the chances of democratization. Thus, future research would benefit from analyzing more mission tactics, using a most different systems design, and considering the influence of violent conflict on democratization before and after the UN PKO intervention.

This research has resulted in theoretical and practical implications. Firstly, the research contributed to a new line of research on UN PKO tactics and democratization and highlighted the need for research on more mission tactics. Additionally, the research contributes to the general literature and debate on how UN PKOs impact democratization. Secondly, the research yields implications to the UN for the design and conduct of PKOs regarding the mission tactics to include, and highlighting the contributions of civilian personnel and mitigating conflict recurrence. The research provides insight into a novel relationship between UN PKO tactics and their impact on democratization, as observed through the cases of ONUMOZ and MINURCA. Overall, the mission tactics of educating voters, training political parties, promoting democratic institutions, and assisting with elections can lead to democratization and the likelihood of democratization can be increased when the mission includes civilian personnel and addresses tensions and violence in the state.

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