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## **Red Laboratory: Municipal Socialism in Amsterdam in Comparative Perspective - 1914-1940**

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
Stam, T. (2023). *Red Laboratory: Municipal Socialism in Amsterdam in Comparative Perspective - 1914-1940*.

Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown)

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# Red Laboratory

Municipal Socialism in Amsterdam in Comparative  
Perspective – 1914-1940

Titus Stam



## **Red Laboratory**

### **Municipal Socialism in Amsterdam in Comparative Perspective (1914-1940)**

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Thesis Supervisor: Dr. D. Bos

Second Reader: Dr. D.E.J. Smit

Words: 24986

Pages: 105<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The coverpicture is an electoral poster of the SDAP Amsterdam in the 1931 Municipal Election. Its inscription reads: "We break [slums, red.] and we build [homes, red]. SDAP. Vote Miranda List 3." Nico Swaager, *Frederiksplein. Biljet van de SDAP; Kiest Miranda Lijst 3* [En. Frederikssquare. Poster of the SDAP. VOTE MIRANDA LIST 3] <https://archief.amsterdam/beeldbank/detail/e25533af-c55a-7f70-2694-e216293ccfb5> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

## Summary

Between 1914 and 1940, the SDAP dominated municipal politics in Amsterdam. Buoyed with the introduction of universal male suffrage in 1917 and the expansion of municipal tax powers in 1920, social democratic aldermen such as Wibaut and De Miranda sought to establish a welfare municipality in the capital. Through the municipalisation of basic necessities, housework, and social hygiene, and the provision of care for the sickly, elderly, needy, and unemployed, the alderman hoped to provide for the material welfare and mental well-being of the working-class. Municipal Socialism in Amsterdam was seen as a unique project in the Netherlands. However, the municipal socialist project in Amsterdam was inherently dependent on acquiescence of bourgeois parties in Amsterdam and the confessional national government in The Hague, not to speak of global developments and the world economy. Relativizing the uniqueness of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague concurrently pioneered different aspects of municipal socialism in the face of similar shortcomings. Amsterdam's greatest distinction was its incredibly effective advertisement of municipal socialism in publications throughout the interwar period, reinforced by the opposition it inspired in the national bourgeois press. Practically, while Amsterdam's spending and earnings in municipal socialist fields was generally above average, the capital did not spend or earn significantly more than other social democratic municipalities across all municipal socialist fields. Nor did the capital significantly outperform the two other major municipalities in municipal socialist fields. Thus, while the municipal socialist project in Amsterdam may have financially been above average in the Interwar period, it was not unique, nor significantly different. However, we cannot deny the political and ideational impact of the municipal socialist project in Amsterdam on interwar political thought and post-war public memory.

Keywords: Amsterdam, Interwar Period, Municipalism, Municipal Socialism, SDAP, Social Democracy

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**List of Abbreviations**

ARP	Anti-Revolutionaire Partij
ASP	Algemene Staatspartij
BHB	Bond van Handels- en Bedrijfsbelangen
BVL	Bond van Vrije-Liberalen
CBS	Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek
CDL	Centrale Dienst voor de Levensmiddelenvoorziening
CDP	Christelijk Democratische Partij
CDU	Christelijk Democratische Unie
CHU	Christelijk Historische Unie
CLB	Centrum voor Lokaal Bestuur
CPH	Communistische Partij Holland
CPH-CC	Communistische Partij Holland-Centraal Comité
DNPP	Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen
EB	Economische Bond
GDMH	Gemeentelijke Dienst voor Maatschappelijk Hulpbetoon
GEW	Gemeentelijke Energie Werken
GO	Georganiseerd Overleg
GV	Gemeentelijke Vleeschvoorziening
GWB	Gemeentelijke Woondienst
HABO	Haagsche Bouwmaatschappij
HGSP	Hervormd-Gereformeerde Staatspartij
IISG	Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis
LSP	Liberale Staatspartij “De Vrijheidsbond”
LU	Liberale Unie
MP	Middelstandspartij
NBAM	Neutraal Blok aller Middenstanders
NP	Neutrale Partij
NS	Nederlandse Spoorwegen
NSB	Nationaal Socialistische Beweging
NVV	Nederlandsche Verbond van Vakvereenigen
OZB	Onroerende Zaakbelasting
PB	Partijbestuur
PvdA	Partij van de Arbeid
RKSP	Rooms-Katholieke Staatspartij
RP	Rapaillepartij
RS(A)P	Revolutionair Socialistische (Arbeiders)partij
SB	Scheveningen Belangen
SDAP	Sociaal Democratische Arbeiderspartij
SGP	Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij
SP	Socialistische Partij
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
VDB	Vrijzinnig Democratische Bond
VIN	Volk in Nood
VNG	Vereeniging van Nederlandsche Gemeenten
VNH	Verbond Nationaal Herstel
VSDG	Vereniging van Sociaaldemocratische gemeenteraadsleden
WSBZ	Dienst der Wasch- en Schoonmaak, Bad- en Zweminrichtingen



## Introduction

### 1. The City of Tomorrow

“The government of Amsterdam tomorrow will be... the organ of the working class. The government of Amsterdam will be aimed at the material welfare and mental well-being of that great mass of workers.”  
– Floor Wibaut, *Morgen* [En. Tomorrow], 14 September 1925.<sup>2</sup>

On 14 September 1925 municipal officials and local notables joined the Prince-Consort of the Netherlands and Anti-Revolutionary Prime Minister Colijn for a state dinner in the grand *Burgerzaal* [En. Citizens’ Hall] in the Royal Palace on the Dam to celebrate Amsterdam’s 650 years of city rights. During a celebration marked by nostalgia, Floor Wibaut rose as penultimate speaker not to offer another retrospective of Amsterdam’s glorious past, but to offer a vision of the future, as “in the past lies the present. In today what will come.”<sup>3</sup> The social democratic alderman assured those present that “prosperity tomorrow no longer means the wealth of regent families”, but the “provision of all reasonable needs, material, mental, cultural, for the life of the great mass of the working class.”<sup>4</sup> For that tomorrow, socialist governments and municipalities across the globe, but “especially in Amsterdam” today, facilitated the development of the working class through education, municipalisation of the means of production, and collective welfare provisions.<sup>5</sup> Wibaut concluded by toasting the Anti-Revolutionary mayor Willem de Vlucht for his cooperation in bridging this today to this tomorrow. While the social democratic daily *Het Volk* [En. The People] and the liberal newspaper *Algemeen Handelsblad* [En. General Trade Newspaper] both reported “loud cheers” at Wibaut’s conclusion, the Catholic and orthodox Protestant press were outraged at the arrogance of “unfurling the red flag” in presence of Prince-Consort of the Netherlands and Prime Minister.<sup>6</sup> A satirist joked that host Wibaut had ruined dessert for his two hundred guests with too much – red – berry juice accompanying the ice cream.<sup>7</sup>

In spite of confessional press outrage, Wibaut’s position as alderman was never in doubt. With 34,2% of the vote in the municipality, Wibaut’s *Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiderspartij* [En. Social Democratic Workers’ Party, hereafter SDAP] was practically indispensable in the governance of the capital.<sup>8</sup> Thus Mayor De Vlucht simply thanked Wibaut for his kind words.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, the assembled dignitaries were generally untroubled by the speech.<sup>10</sup> Wibaut had only described the tenets and aims of municipal

<sup>2</sup> “Het 650-jarig bestaan van Amsterdam: De dag van het feest”, *Algemeen Handelsblad* [En. General Trade Newspaper], 15 September 1925. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010660181:mpeg21:p010> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> “Het 650 jarig bestaan van Amsterdam: De jubileumfeesten”, *Het Volk: Dagblad van de Arbeiderspartij* [En. The People: Daily Newspaper for the Workers’ Party], 15 September 1925

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:011083493:mpeg21:p011> [Accessed 1-12-2023]; “Het 650-jarig bestaan van Amsterdam”; “Morgen – nog eens morgen”, *De Amsterdammer: Christelijk Dagblad voor Nederland* [En. The Amsterdammer: Christian Daily Newspaper for the Netherlands], 17 September 1925.

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=MMKB19:000064217:mpeg21:a00002> [Accessed 1-12-2023]; “Brieven van Bijltje”, *De Standaard* [En The Standard], 19 September 1925.

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=MMKB23:001896070:mpeg21:a00093> [Accessed 1-12-2023]; “Koningen van het Land: Bilderijk en Wibaut”, *De Tijd: Godsdienstig-Staatkundig Dagblad* [En. The Times: Religious-Political Daily Newspaper], 19 September 1925. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010531747:mpeg21:a0003> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>7</sup> “Van Wijsneus: Bessensap”, *Algemeen Handelsblad* [En. General Trade Newspaper]. 19 September 1925. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010660188:mpeg21:a0040> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>8</sup> Harm Kaal, *Het hoofd van de stad: Amsterdam en zijn burgemeester tijdens het interbellum* [En. The head of the city: Amsterdam and his mayor during the Interwar period] (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Aksant, 2008), 61-69.

<sup>9</sup> “Het 650-jarig bestaan van Amsterdam: De dag van het feest”; Van Wijsneus: Bessensap”.

<sup>10</sup> “Van Wijsneus: Bessensap”; “Het 650-jarig bestaan van Amsterdam: De dag van het feest”.

socialism which he had set out and pursued as alderman in the capital since 1914. As the first social democratic alderman in a major municipality in the Netherlands, Wibaut had to simultaneously convince his bourgeois colleagues and detractors of the practical possibility of his socialist proposals, whilst proving to his own SDAP the political possibility of municipal socialism without a social democratic majority in the municipal council.<sup>11</sup> In this dual task, he would succeed, serving as alderman for some fifteen years between 1914 and his retirement in 1931.<sup>12</sup> During this time, Wibaut would acquire the moniker “*de Machtige*” [En. the Mighty] and become a symbol of successful municipal socialism and a staple of SDAP propaganda with rhyming campaign slogans such as “*Wie bouwt? Wibaut!*” [En. Who builds? Wibaut!].<sup>13</sup>

Although the slogan built upon Wibaut’s decisive role in the establishment of the *Gemeentelijke Woondienst* [En. Municipal Housing Service, hereafter GWD] and the start of municipal public housing projects for the working class in 1915, he did not oversee their construction.<sup>14</sup> Fellow SDAP alderman Monne de Miranda, successor of Wibaut at the department of Public Housing, actually oversaw the construction of most of these housing projects.<sup>15</sup> This illustrates the shared nature of the project of municipal socialism in Amsterdam. Wibaut and De Miranda would govern Amsterdam for twenty-two out of twenty-six years between 1914 and 1940, first together with Willem Vliegen, Ed. Polak and later succeeded by Emmanuel Boekman, Bernard Franke and Frank van Meurs. It was through this motley crew of social democratic aldermen that the SDAP embarked upon a project of building an Amsterdam of tomorrow, which served the “material welfare and mental well-being of that great mass of workers.”<sup>16</sup>

## 2. Historiography

Subsequent historiography generally stressed the unique nature of municipal socialism in Amsterdam. The earliest historiography from 1968, by municipal historian and social democratic mayor Gilles Borrie, stressed the achievements and pragmatism of Wibaut and De Miranda in improving the lot of the Amsterdam proletariat through public housing, education and municipalisation of the means of production.<sup>17</sup> This unique experiment in municipal socialism would fall victim to the restriction of municipal autonomy through the Financial Relationship Act, 1929 by the confessional Minister De Geer over the opposition of Wibaut.<sup>18</sup> The law made municipalities near completely dependent on unearmarked national government grants from a newly-established Municipal Fund. Now without the ability to raise their own municipal income, corporate and dividends taxes, Amsterdam and other municipal socialist municipalities were easy prey for unilateral cuts to the Municipal Fund by and the

<sup>11</sup> Eric Slot and Hans Moor, *Wibaut: Onderkoning van Amsterdam* [En. Wibaut: Viceroy of Amsterdam] (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Bert Bakker, 2009), 81-86.

<sup>12</sup> Wibaut twice resigned as Alderman from the *college van burgemeester en wethouders* [En. Municipal Executive, lit. college of mayor and aldermen] due to political differences. First, for two months in 1921 over a dispute between municipal workers and the executive. Second, for two years between 1927 and 1929 over the loss of a third social democratic alderman seat in the executive.

<sup>13</sup> The following newspaper contains an indirect reference to the slogan; “Engeland: Het woning- en stedenbouwcongres te Londen VI”, *De Maasbode* [En. The Meuse Messenger], 15 June 1920. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=MMKB04:000198515:mpeg21:a0050> [Accessed 1-12-2023]; Herman de Liagre Böhl, *Wibaut de Machtige: Een biografie* [En. Wibaut the Mighty: A biography] (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2013), 7-10.

<sup>14</sup> G.W.B. Borrie, *F.M. Wibaut – Mens en Magistraat: Ontstaan en ontwikkeling der socialistische gemeentepolitiek* [En. F.M. Wibaut – Man and Magistrate: Origin and Development of socialist municipal politics] (Assen: Van Gorcum & Comp. N.V., 1968), 109-110.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 324-325.

<sup>16</sup> “Het 650-jarig bestaan van Amsterdam: De dag van het feest”.

<sup>17</sup> Borrie, *F.M. Wibaut*, 224-226; G.W.B. Borrie, *Monne de Miranda: een biografie* [En. Monne de Miranda: a biography] (The Hague: Sdu Uitgeverij, 1993), 408-409.

<sup>18</sup> Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 408-409; Borrie, *F.M. Wibaut*, 224-226.



austerity politics of confessional-liberal national governments in the 1930s.<sup>19</sup> Borrie wrote his biography of Wibaut as a mayor of a small municipality in the immediate post war decades when Municipal Fund worked well. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Borrie faulted Wibaut for his inability to refute the arguments in favour of the Financial Relationship Act for smaller and poorer municipalities and look beyond his interests as Finance alderman of a wealthy metropolis.<sup>20</sup> Fifteen years later, when the confessional-liberal Cabinets-Van Agt I, III, and -Lubbers I again made large cuts to municipal welfare spending and the municipal funds, Tony Jansen and Jan Rogier positively reevaluated Wibaut's opposition in *Kunstbeleid in Amsterdam 1920-1940* [En. Art policy in Amsterdam 1920-1940] as a justified defence of local autonomy and social politics.<sup>21</sup>

By 1985, as deindustrialisation took shape and the “finished” national welfare state faced its first political challenges, P.F. Maas placed Amsterdam's municipal radicalism of the late 19<sup>th</sup> Century and municipal socialism of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century in a broader development of “welfare municipalities” towards the Dutch welfare state, due to pressures of industrialisation.<sup>22</sup> With Amsterdam's rapid growth during the Second Industrial Revolution and such seminal activist aldermen as the radical Treub and Wibaut, the capital enjoyed an exemplary role for other Dutch municipalities in addressing the avarices of industrialisation.<sup>23</sup> In breaking with Borrie, P.F. Maas argued that the truly experimental phase of Amsterdam municipal socialism ended early, with the failure of the municipalisation of milk provision in 1927 due to the political naïveté of Wibaut and Miranda.<sup>24</sup> The subsequent bourgeois coalition suspended several municipalisation projects and effectively ended SDAP's attempt at socialisation of the urban economy through municipal companies, centring remaining social democratic municipal efforts on the social care of the welfare municipality.

From the hard-fought 1990 Municipal Election onwards, Wibaut also re-emerged in public discourse.<sup>25</sup> Previously unassailable aldermen from the *Partij van de Arbeid* [En. Dutch Labour Party, hereafter PvdA], the post-war successor to the SDAP, now faced the real possibility of the end of social

<sup>19</sup> Tony Jansen and Jan Rogier, *Kunstbeleid in Amsterdam 1920-1940: Dr. E. Boekman en de socialistische gemeentepolitiek* [Art policy in Amsterdam 1920-1940: Dr. E. Boekman and the socialist municipal politics] (Nijmegen: SUN Socialistische Uitgeverij Nijmegen, 1983), 29-33.

<sup>20</sup> “Meer voor Gemeente”, *Algemeen Dagblad* [En. General Daily], 30 September 1966 <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=KBPER501:002834026:mpeg21:a00005> [Accessed 1-12-2023]; Borrie, *F.M. Wibaut*, 206-207.

<sup>21</sup> Jansen and Rogier, *Kunstbeleid in Amsterdam 1920-1940*, 30-33.

<sup>22</sup> “Brandbrief VNG over bezuinigingen welzijn”, *NRC Handelsblad* [En. NRC Trade Paper], 22 August 1986 <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=KBNRC01:000030111:mpeg21:a0039> [Accessed 1-12-2023]; P.F. Maas, *Sociaal-democratische gemeentepolitiek 1894-1929* [En. Social democratic municipal politics 1894-1929] (The Hague: Staatsuitgeverij, 1985), 7-8.

<sup>23</sup> P.F. Maas, *Sociaal-democratische gemeentepolitiek in Katholiek Nijmegen 1894-1929* [En. Social democratic municipal politics in Catholic Nijmegen 1894-1929] (Nijmegen: Drukkerij Gebr. Janssen, 1974), 10-11; Maas, *Sociaal-democratische gemeentepolitiek*, 9-13.

<sup>24</sup> Maas, *Sociaal-democratische gemeentepolitiek*, 59; 118-121.

<sup>25</sup> Before 1990, “wethouderssocialisme” did not appear at all in the *Delper* database. In 1990 alone, “wethouderssocialisme” was suddenly mentioned 27. Furthermore, a 1988 book about the municipal politics of the SDAP and PvdA by the scientific bureau of the PvdA, the *Wiardi Beckman Stichting* [En. Wiardi Beckman Foundation], *Socialisme en gemeenten: het communalisme van SDAP en PvdA* [En. Socialism and municipalities: the communalism of SDAP and PvdA] did not mention “wethouderssocialisme” at all. Nineteen years later, the same Wiardi Beckman Stichting published a book, *Lokale Politiek als Laboratorium* [En. Local Politics as Laboratory] referencing “wethouderssocialisme” 37 times; Ite Rümke and Hubert Smeets, “‘Nieuwe Wibauts’ zijn van hun sokkel gehaald” *NRC Handelsblad* [En. NRC Trade Paper], 22 March 1990. <https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/1990/03/22/nieuwe-wibauts-zijn-van-hun-sokkel-gehaald-6926119-a1139664> [Accessed 1-12-2023]; Marnix Krop, Martin Ros, Saskia Stuiveling and Bart Tromp (eds.), *Socialisme en gemeenten: het communalisme van SDAP en PvdA* [En. Socialism and municipalities: the communalism of SDAP and PvdA] (Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers, 1988); Frans Becker and Menno Hurenkamp (eds.), *Lokale politiek van als laboratorium: In voetsporen van Wibaut en Drees* [En. Local politics as laboratory: In the footsteps of Wibaut and Drees] (Doetinchem: Uitgeverij Fragment, 2009).

democratic dominance in large cities. A neological term *wethouderssocialisme* [En. aldermen's socialism] was introduced, which legitimised the pragmatic “second wave” PvdA aldermen such as Walter Etty in Amsterdam, Pim Vermeulen in Rotterdam and Adri Duivesteijn in The Hague as direct heirs to the similarly pragmatic “first wave” aldermen, first among them Wibaut.<sup>26</sup> However, where Wibaut championed an interventionist municipality with public housing for the working-class and municipal utilities, his professed successors preferred urban renewal of these same working-class neighbourhoods through public-private partnerships, and the privatisation of these same utilities.<sup>27</sup> While this public discourse was unable to prevent historic losses for the PvdA in the 1990 and 1994 municipal elections, it proved a safe rallying cry after election defeats for a party continuously torn between its Third Way and Neo-Keynesian heritages, most notably by Committee-Dijksma in 2009.<sup>28</sup> Indeed, Wibaut and the presumed *wethouderssocialisme* live on in a yearly *Wibautlezing* [En. Wibaut lecture] organised since 1995 by the successor to the SDAP's *Vereeniging van sociaaldemocratische gemeenteraadsleden* [En. Association of social democratic municipal councillors, hereafter VSDG], namely the *Centrum voor Lokaal Bestuur* [En. Centre for Local Government, hereafter CLB].<sup>29</sup>

As the “red” PvdA settled into its Third Way cooperation with the conservative liberal “blue” VVD and the social liberal D66 in the two “purple” Cabinets-Kok, the term *wethouderssocialisme* became increasingly commonplace in academic circles. Concurrently, in 2000, Herman de Liagre Bohll published his article “De Stad bestuurd”, which explicitly placed Wibaut and De Miranda's later success in a broader purple – combined liberal and social democratic – governing tradition in the capital.<sup>30</sup> Finally, in recent historiography, Harm Kaal's 2008 *Hoofd van de Stad* [En. Head of the City] and Stefan Couperus' 2009 *Machinerie van de Stad* [En. Machinery of the City], stresses the respective importance of the cooperative anti-revolutionary Mayor De Vlugt and the activist civil service of Amsterdam in facilitating the unique municipal interventionism of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>31</sup>

Two common threads emerge from the aforementioned pre-existing historiography and public discourse. Firstly, the uniqueness and experimentality of municipal socialism in Amsterdam in the interwar period, either as the result of pragmatic or ideological social democratic aldermen or the political consensus within the capital. Secondly, re-evaluation of interwar municipal socialism at the hand of political developments concurrent to writing of new historiography. Before positioning this thesis in the historiographical debate vis-à-vis the uniqueness of Amsterdam municipal socialism, the thesis provides an insight into its historiographical position on the usage of *wethouderssocialisme*.

<sup>26</sup> Wibaut's famous pragmatism referred to his willingness to serve in public office in bourgeois state as anti-ministerialist, while Etty, Vermeulen and Duivesteijn's pragmatism was in regards to market-based solution to societal problems; Rümke and Smeets, “‘Nieuwe Wibauts' zijn van hun sokkel gehaald”; Rik Reussing, “Sprakmakende Lokale Bestuurders En Grensverleggend Lokaal Bestuur”, *Bestuurswetenschappen* [En. Governance Sciences] 72 (2018): 2, 40–71.

<sup>27</sup> As Duivesteijn later lamented: “The ease with which we threw [Lit. flikkerden, red.] everything into the trash... Municipal works? Is no longer necessary. Public works? We don't need it anymore.”; Duco Hellema and Margriet van Lith, *Dat hadden we nooit moeten doen: De PvdA en de Neoliberale revolutie van de Jaren Negentig* [En. We should have never done that: The PvdA and the Neoliberal revolution of the Nineties] (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2020), 44–48.

<sup>28</sup> G. Voerman (ed.), *Jaarboek 1994 Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen* [En. Yearbook 1994 Documentation Centre Dutch Political Parties] (Groningen: DNPP, 1995), 14–16; Becker and Hurenkamp, *Lokale politiek van als laboratorium*, 133.

<sup>29</sup> Maaïke Grevelink, *Lof van de lezing. Gids voor de 154 meest prestigieuze lezingen* [En. Praise from the lecture. Guide to the 154 most prestigious lectures.] (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2010), 307–308.

<sup>30</sup> Herman de Liagre Böhl, “De Stad bestuurd: de paarse proeftuin. Radicalisering van het Amsterdamse gemeentebeleid rond 1900”, in *Amsterdam, in de tweede Gouden Eeuw* [En. Amsterdam, a second Golden Age], ed. Marta Bakker et al. (Bussum: Uitgeverij THOTH., 2000), 170–185.

<sup>31</sup> Kaal, *Het hoofd van de stad*, 7–19; 66–69; Stefan Couperus, *De Machinerie van de Stad: Stadsbestuur als idee en praktijk, Nederland en Amsterdam 1900–1940* [En. The Machinery of the City: City governance as idea and praxis, the Netherlands and Amsterdam 1900–1940] (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Askant, 2009), 148–152.

Finally, some insight into the political-historiographical context of the author and the thesis is provided as well.

While the usage of *wethouderssocialisme* has become prevalent in historiography, this thesis instead uses the term “municipal socialism” or in Dutch, “*sociaal democratische gemeentepolitiek*” [En. social democratic municipal politics], both terms familiar to and used by Wibaut and his contemporaries.<sup>32</sup> Especially for an anti-ministerialist as Wibaut, the implication in the name “*aldermen’s socialism*”, of participation in the municipal executive as a necessity for successful social democratic municipal politics, would be anathema.<sup>33</sup> Furthermore, while Wibaut and a Duivestijn are undeniably part of the same social democratic political tradition, it would be egregious to imply both aldermen subscribed to a shared politically consistent ideology, exclusive to their offices, in vastly different ideational contexts, as implied by the term “*wethouderssocialisme*”. In other words, while a Marxist social democratic alderman municipalised utilities in the interwar period, and a Third Way social democratic alderman privatised these same utilities in the final decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, both are undeniably part of the social democratic tradition, but can hardly be described as ideologically more similar to one another than to their respective contemporary counterparts in national or provincial government.

As mentioned before, the historiographical (re-)evaluation of interwar municipal socialism has been influenced by the political contexts of its authors. In the case of this author, his political work in the municipal council of Utrecht for the PvdA, the post-war successor to the SDAP, is reflected in the choice of subject matter and focus on the practical application of municipal politics. Furthermore, growing municipal (financial) responsibility for youth and social care after the decentralisation of the *Jeugdwet, 2015* [Youth Act, 2015] and the *Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning, 2015* [Social Support Act, 2015], combined with the large expected cuts in national government grant from the Municipal Fund after 2026, inform the positive re-evaluation of broad, independent municipal tax powers and Wibaut’s opposition to the Financial Relationship Act, 1929.<sup>34</sup>

The second common thread of the historiography is the supposed uniqueness and experimentality of municipal socialism in Amsterdam. While authors contribute this uniqueness and experimentality to different factors, namely the result of social democratic pragmatism, ideological socialist aldermen, or the political consensus within the capital, they agree on its existence. This thesis will place this supposed uniqueness and experimentality in a comparative perspective on three counts.

Firstly, to what extent this experimentality of municipal socialism in Amsterdam was dependent on outside actors and factors rather than social democrats. Through comparison between different fields of municipal socialist intervention, the thesis describes the importance of outside actors and factors in jointly shaping the success or failure of municipal socialist policies. Furthermore, the thesis intends to nuance the popular perception of Wibaut “the Powerful” as an extremely successful public housing provider, as is exemplified by *Andere Tijden* [En. Other times] documentary *Wie Bouwt? Wibaut!* [En. Who builds? Wibaut!] and other productions surrounding the *Wibautjaar* [En. Wibaut Year] in 2009.<sup>35</sup> Concurrently, the thesis aims to provide a short overview of the political developments between Wibaut’s election as alderman in 1914 to the culling of municipal autonomy by the Financial Relationship Act and Wibaut’s subsequent departure in 1931.

<sup>32</sup> Floor Wibaut, *Levensbouw* [En. Life] (Amsterdam: Querido’s Uitgeverij-maatschappij N.V., 1936), 247-249.

<sup>33</sup> Jan de Roos, *Besturen als Kunst: Lokale Sociaal-democraten 100 jaar verenigd* [En. Governing as Art: Local Social-democrats 100 years united] (Amsterdam: Centrum voor Lokaal Bestuur, 2002), 124-125.

<sup>34</sup> VNG, “COELO: grote structurele tekorten voor gemeenten vanaf 2026”, 30 June 2022.

<https://vng.nl/nieuws/coelo-grote-structurele-tekorten-voor-gemeenten-vanaf-2026> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>35</sup> *Wie bouwt? Wibaut!* [En. Who builds? Wibaut!]. Directed by Erik Willems. Andere Tijden. Hilversum: NPS, 2009. <https://anderetijden.nl/aflevering/266/Wie-bouwt-Wibaut> [Accessed 22-11-2023]; Fred van der Molen, “150 jaar Wibaut: Reeks van manifestaties ter ere van onderkoning van Amsterdam”, *NUL20* 7 (2009): 4, 26. <https://www.nul20.nl/sites/default/files/pdfeditie/NUL20%20nr%2045.pdf> [Accessed 24-11-2023]

Secondly, the thesis explores why the municipal socialism in Amsterdam was (deemed) different from similarly sized municipalities in the Netherlands, namely Rotterdam and The Hague, which too were governed by socialist aldermen for most of the Interwar period. This exploration intends to nuance the experimentality and exemplarity of the capital as contended by Borrie and Maas through the relative dominance of Amsterdam municipal councillors and aldermen in publications such as *De Gemeente: maandblad van de Vereeniging van Sociaaldemocratische Gemeenteraadsleden* [En. The Municipality: monthly of the Association of Social democratic Municipal councillors, hereafter *De Gemeente*].<sup>36</sup> Furthermore, this thesis will seek to link the extensive historiography on Amsterdam's municipal socialism with the far less extensive historiographies of municipal socialisms in The Hague and Rotterdam.<sup>37</sup>

Thirdly, to what extent income and expenditure policies of the municipal socialism in Amsterdam differed from the income and expenditure policies of other municipalities in the Netherlands. The thesis is Inspired by Jan-Inge Hanssen, Per Ant Pettersen and Johans Tveit Sandvin's quantitative analysis of welfare policy outcomes and their relation to social democratic power in Norwegian municipalities in 1920s in their paper *Welfare municipalities: economic resources or party politics?*. This thesis tests to what extent social democratic electoral performance and participation in the municipal executive is positively correlated with larger expenditure on public housing, public health and benefits for the needy, poor and unemployed and higher incomes from municipal taxes and municipal companies.<sup>38</sup> In essence, the thesis intends to test the assumption in the historiography that municipal socialism in Amsterdam spent, taxed and socialised more relative to its size and wealth to improve the material welfare and mental well-being of their working-class population than other municipalities.

### 3. Methodology, Sources & Validity

Before addressing the central question to the extent of historical uniqueness of municipal socialism in Amsterdam, the choices for the employed methodologies, the choice of sources and analysis of them, the choice of case studies must first be adequately explained. As the research heavily relies on differing comparative methodologies, the following paragraphs first expand upon the general use of comparative history, before specifying the exact methodologies, sources, and case studies per chapter.

In the pursuit of historical knowledge, general historical-comparative methodologies provide the benefit of balancing the particular developments within a single case against the background of common development within a larger number of cases. Central to such historical-comparative methodologies are Mill's logical methods of difference and concomitant variation.

In the first chapter, the method of difference is employed to describe the role of outside actors and factors in the relative success or failure of practical municipal socialism in different fields in Amsterdam. Through the method of difference, when a phenomenon occurs in one, but not both similar instances, "the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ" can be concluded to be "the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon."<sup>39</sup> Through a causal narrative approach built on hermeneutic source analysis and criticism, the dependencies of municipal socialism in the capital are explored from "within." As such, this chapter also allows for an ideographic – c.q. contextual,

<sup>36</sup> This thesis, when referring to Dutch words, will use the then prevalent spelling, in this case the Spelling De Vries en Te Winkel until 1934 and the Spelling Marchant after the spelling reform in 1934.

<sup>37</sup> Jelle Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder: Willem Drees 1886-1988, De Jaren 1886-1940* [En. The Red Alderman: Willem Drees 1886-1988, The Years 1886-1940] (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Balans, 2006); Chr. A. de Ruyter-de Zeeuw, *De eerste rode wethouder van Rotterdam* [The first red aldermen of Rotterdam] (Rotterdam: Stichting 'Historische Publicaties Roterodamum, 1987).

<sup>38</sup> J.-I. Hanssen, P.A. Pettersen, and J. Tveit Sandvin, "Welfare municipalities: economic resources or party politics? Norwegian local government social programs of the 1920s", *International Journal of Social Welfare*, 10 (2001): 1, 27-44. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2397.00150> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>39</sup> John Stuart Mill, *A System of Logic, Vol. 1* (London: John W. Parker, 1843), 455.

non-generalizable – explanation of causal determinants of the particular and common developments in the municipal socialist policies in Amsterdam.<sup>40</sup> In practice, through fields of particular importance to or prestigious for Amsterdam’s municipal socialists – public housing, municipal interventionism and municipal financial policy – the expediting or impeding effects of national governmental policies, local confessional or liberal support or opposition, and economic conditions on municipal socialist success is highlighted.

Furthermore, in the first chapter, the effect of outside actors and factors on success or failure of municipal socialist policies is chartered at the hand of the minutes of the municipal council and *college van burgemeester en wethouders* [En. Municipal Executive, lit. college of mayor and aldermen] of Amsterdam, held by the City Archives Amsterdam, articles with policy analysis on Amsterdam in the periodicals *De Gemeente* and *Gemeentebestuur* [En. Municipal Governance] both held by the IISG, and newspaper articles and contemporaneous publications on municipal policy, all digitally available on *Delpher*.

In the second chapter, the same method of difference is used to describe the presumed uniqueness of municipal socialism in Amsterdam versus the municipal socialism that developed in Netherlands’ two other major municipalities The Hague and Rotterdam. Again, when a phenomenon occurs in one, but not both similar instances, “the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ” can be concluded to be “the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon.”<sup>41</sup> Through a similar causal narrative approach built on hermeneutic source analysis and criticism, the three cases are explored from “within.” As such, this chapter also allows for an ideographic – c.q. contextual, non-generalizable – explanation of causal determinants of the particular and common developments in the three major municipalities and their municipal socialism.<sup>42</sup>

Furthermore, in the second chapter, the comparative experimentality and exemplarity of municipal socialism in each municipality is chartered at the hands of (a) practical policies pursued by SDAP aldermen, (b) the relative strength of the SDAP in the municipal council and the alderman portfolios in the executive, and (c) the transfer of ideas and policies to and from municipalities through booklets and periodicals, such as the *De Socialistische Gids* [En. The Socialist Guide] & *De Gemeente*. The sources necessary for this analysis include, but are not limited to the (1) shared municipal party programs digitized by the *Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen* [En. Documentation Centre Dutch Political Parties, hereafter DNPP], the (2) minutes and archives of the SDAP Federations of Amsterdam, The Hague and Rotterdam, all held and partially digitized by the *Internationaal Instituut van Sociale Geschiedenis* [En. Internationale Institute of Social History, hereafter IISG] in Amsterdam, (3) the minutes of the respective municipal councils and municipal executive held by the respective city archives, (4) the aforementioned periodicals *De Gemeente* and *Gemeentebestuur* [En. Municipal Governance] both held by the IISG, (5) newspapers and periodicals such as *Het Volk* and *De Socialistische Gids* and (6) publications by relevant aldermen. The aforementioned newspaper, periodicals, and publications are digitally available on *Delpher*.

Finally, the choice to limit the comparative study in the second chapter to Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague was made on the basis of population. The three municipalities were the largest by population, respectively 647.000, 547.000 and 355.000 inhabitants by 1920. The next largest municipality, Utrecht, was not even half the size of The Hague with 138.000 inhabitants. These three municipalities thereby more than qualified for the moniker *Großstad* [En. major city] defined by the International Statistical Institute in 1887 and were commonly treated as distinct from middling and small municipalities.<sup>43</sup> The

<sup>40</sup> Matthew Lange, *Comparative-Historical Methods* (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2012), 10-12.

<sup>41</sup> John Stuart Mill, *A System of Logic, Vol. 1* (London: John W. Parker, 1843), 455.

<sup>42</sup> Matthew Lange, *Comparative-Historical Methods* (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2012), 10-12.

<sup>43</sup> J. Rensen, “De belastingdruk in de groote steden”, *De Gemeente: Orgaan van de Vereeniging van Sociaal-Democratische Gemeenteraadsleden* [En. The Municipality: Organ of the Association of Social Democratic

aforementioned large populations were chiefly the result of stark population growth during the Second Industrial Revolution, amassing a large urban proletariat and the concurrent urban squalor within city limits which would form the basis of SDAP electoral strength and the necessity for municipal socialism in subsequent decades.<sup>44</sup> At the same time, these large populations afforded the aldermen an extensive source of income for socialist policies through the municipal income tax and contributions for municipal utilities. Thus, not only did the SDAP electorally dominate these three municipalities, its aldermen had the necessary capital to implement municipal socialism.

In the third chapter, through quantitative analysis, this thesis measures whether better SDAP electoral performance and SDAP participation in the municipal executive led to increased spending on policies traditionally associated with municipal socialism, namely, public housing, public health, municipal companies, and benefits for the needy, poor, and unemployed. Furthermore, the thesis will analyse whether municipalities with better SDAP electoral performance and SDAP participation in the municipal executive imposed higher municipal taxes on income and dividends, to test whether, in the words of Wibaut, “red is expensive.”<sup>45</sup>

For the measurement of SDAP electoral performance, the digitized electoral results of the *Kiesraad* [En. Electoral Council] will be used. While these digitized results only cover the Dutch General Elections of 1918, 1922, 1925 and 1929, the pillarized nature of Dutch politics means these results tended to closely reflect a consistent electoral strength in the municipality and the electoral performance of the SDAP in municipal elections.<sup>46</sup> For population size, income from municipal taxes and profits from municipal companies, expenditure on public housing, public health and benefits for the needy, poor and unemployed per municipality, the *Statistiek der Gemeentefinanciën* [En. Statistics of Municipal Finances] will be used. This yearly publication by the *Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek* [En. Central Agency for Statistics, hereafter CBS], catalogued all incomes and expenditures per municipality per year for all municipalities above 10.000 inhabitants between 1898 and 1929. After the Financial Relationship Law 1929 abolished most municipal taxes, the CBS ceased the individual rapports per municipality and only collected data on the cumulative expenditure of all municipalities, rendering quantitative analysis on the basis of local electoral strength impossible. Thus the analysis shall run from the 1920 budgets, the first municipal budget cycle for municipal councils elected by universal male suffrage in the 1919 Municipal Election, to 1929. The thesis hypothesizes a positive correlation between political strength of the SDAP, important municipal socialist expenditure measures, earning from municipal companies and average municipal income tax income, without Amsterdam being particularly exceptional in any of these cases.

Finally, this thesis employs a wide variety of primary sources, from council and parliamentary proceedings, campaign speeches, party programs, newspaper and periodical articles, memoirs, and letters. The employed methodology of source analysis and criticism is informed by Miriam Dobson's

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Municipal Councillors, hereafter *De Gemeente*] 18 (1925): 20, 340-343; J. Rensen, “De verkeersongevallen in de groote steden”, *De Gemeente* 19 (1925): 8, 115-119.

<sup>44</sup> De Liagre Böhl, “De Stad bestuurd: de paarse proeftuin”, 170-185; Jan van den Noort, *Pion of Pionier: Rotterdam – Gemeentelijke Bedrijvigheid in de negentiende eeuw* [Pawn or Pioneer: Rotterdam – Municipal Industriousness in the nineteenth century] (Rotterdam: Stichting ‘Historische Publicaties Roterodamum’, 1990), 8-9.

<sup>45</sup> De Liagre Böhl, *Wibaut de Machtige*, 340-349; Slot and Moor, *Wibaut: Onderkoning van Amsterdam*, 140-150.

<sup>46</sup> Indeed, the largest difference between the SDAP electoral result between a General and the closest Municipal Elections in the 1930s was 0.68%, a negligible difference when translated to a municipal council with only 45 seats; Friso Wielinga, *A History of the Netherlands: From the Sixteenth Century to the Present Day* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 201-205.



and Benjamin Ziemann's *Reading Primary Sources: The Interpretation of Text from Nineteenth and Twentieth Century History*.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Miriam Dobson and Benjamin Ziemann (ed.), *Reading Primary Sources: The Interpretation of Text from Nineteenth and Twentieth Century History* (Abingdon-upon-Thames: Routledge, 2008).

## I

***Hoofdstad:* Municipal Socialism in Amsterdam**

“Amsterdam trade and industry, the Amsterdam stock exchange, do not cease to be capitalist, even when there is a social-democratic majority in the council. ... Because with a social-democratic majority in the Council, a municipality does not become socialist.” – Floor Wibaut, “Wethouderszetels en machtsposities” [En. Alderman’s seats and positions of power], 1 November 1912.<sup>48</sup>

After a neighbouring municipality, Zaandam, elected its first social democratic aldermen without SDAP majority in October 1912, Amsterdam municipal councillor Floor Wibaut penned a critical article series, “Wethouderszetels en machtsposities”, in *Het Weekblad*. SDAP’s Amsterdam party leader sought to douse expectations of the party’s faithful for participation in the executive and of the liberal press for the end of SDAP’s self-imposed exile to the opposition benches in the *hoofdstad* [En. capital]. Thirteen years before his *Morgen*-speech as the proud social democratic alderman of Amsterdam in the *Burgerzaal* in de Dam Palace, Wibaut made abundantly clear Amsterdam would not become socialist overnight, nor would it provide a springboard for Fabian “municipal socialism.”<sup>49</sup> In a capitalist system, municipal collective services, the seeds of a future collectivist society, were dependent on the efficient and effective mobilisation and employment of capital by municipal socialists. Besides, in a bourgeois polity, the municipal autonomy, which empowered municipal socialists, depended on bourgeois national governments.<sup>50</sup> Finally, in a municipality without a municipal socialist majority, the municipal executive as a political instrument depended on cooperation with the bourgeoisie or otherwise remained forever out of reach for municipal socialists. As such, Wibaut argued, a Fabian, singularly “municipal path to socialism” was impossible without national and international socialism.<sup>51</sup>

Still, the conservative liberal *Algemeen Handelsblad* presciently noted that the SDAP in the capital could not “maintain this ostrich politics [Lit. *struisvogelpolitiek*]” by refusing to accept aldermanships.<sup>52</sup> Indeed, the famously antiministerialist Wibaut had set out some exceptional cases warranting social democratic participation in the executive. Calls to serve the common good would, indeed, in the end prevail. Despite the dependency on outside factors and actors, Wibaut would be elected as Alderman of Amsterdam not even two years after the article’s publication. In the next nineteen years, this critical anti-ministerialist even made a damascene conversion and came to see the “great value” of municipal socialism, despite its dependencies, “as a preparation for a state of mind among large groups of people, which is first required to eventually arrive at a constructive socialist development.”<sup>53</sup>

In this chapter, the extent of the actual dependence of municipal socialism in Amsterdam on outside actors and factors is further illustrated. This dependence, both through limitation and facilitation, is outlined through three particularly important fields for Amsterdam municipal socialism, namely public housing, municipal interventionism and municipal financial policy. At the same time, this chapter provides a broad introduction to the development of municipal politics in Amsterdam between 1913 and 1931.

### 1. An Antiministerialist turned Alderman

The 1913 Municipal Election was an electoral breakthrough for the SDAP in the capital. With 42% of the vote, the party captured fifteen seats – exactly a third of the council – and outgrew the previously

<sup>48</sup> Floor Wibaut, “Wethouderszetels en machtsposities (I)”, *Het Weekblad* [En. The Weekly], 1 November 1912.

<sup>49</sup> Wibaut, “Wethouderszetels en machtsposities (I)”.

<sup>50</sup> Wibaut, *Levensbouw*, 247.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 250.

<sup>52</sup> “Zaandam een socialistischen Wethouder”, *Algemeen Handelsblad* [En. General Trade Paper], 16 October 1912. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010655439:mpeg21:a0002> [Accessed 27-11-2023].

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 159.

dominant *Liberale Unie* [En. Liberal Union, hereafter LU], which fell to thirteen seats.<sup>54</sup> However, it was not at all obvious that such an electoral landslide would translate into SDAP aldermen in the municipal executive. A year before, *fractievoorzitter* [En. party group chairman, lit. fraction chairman] Floor Wibaut had argued against the participation of social democrats in the municipal executive without an SDAP majority in the council, unless in exceptional circumstances, when:

“[a] solution to a major issue of social-democratic municipal politics ... is not accepted by one or more [sitting, non-social democratic, red.] aldermen, but the implementation of this decision would be reasonably assured by our acceptance of the aldermanship.”<sup>55</sup>

Wibaut's was very much the majority view in the first fifteen years of SDAP, with executive political offices in bourgeois society, such as aldermen, deemed as a transitional and exceptional measure.<sup>56</sup> The role of social democratic municipal councillors was primarily to oppose the bourgeois municipal executive and provide propaganda for the movement. In line with this view, the first and few SDAP aldermen were limited to the heartland of the party with municipal majorities; small, largely agrarian, Frisian municipalities, such as Schoterland from 1902 onwards and Leeuwarderadeel from 1906 onwards, and small textile towns like De Goor in Twente from 1906 onwards.<sup>57</sup> However, as the party grew and fell just short in more industrial towns, practical, rather than exceptional, political circumstances trumped ideological consistency. With social democrats in Abt Almelo in 1911 and Zaandam in 1912 accepting political office – the latter even further removed from an outright majority than the former – the “antiministerialist” Wibaut came to reconsider on account of a familiar major issue of social democratic municipal politics, public housing.<sup>58</sup>

In 1911, Wibaut, together with eight other SDAP councillors, proposed the municipal construction of 2000 working-class houses.<sup>59</sup> In previous decades, the population of Amsterdam had nearly doubled from 244.000 in 1860 to 573.000 in 1910.<sup>60</sup> The commencement of the slow industrialisation of the Netherlands and introduction of free trade in the Dutch East Indies saw demand for labour in Amsterdam expand and thousands a year leave the countryside in search for employment among the huddled masses in the capital.<sup>61</sup> With housing construction largely left to private initiative, Amsterdam struggled with

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<sup>54</sup> Before the introduction of universal male suffrage and proportional representation in 1917, a third of the forty-five member municipal council was elected in multi-member districts every two years for six year terms. As such, the SDAP was unable to translate the exceptional electoral result into the proportional nineteen seats and had to settle for a moderate increase of two seats from thirteen in 1911 to fifteen in 1913. After 1917, vote share proportionally translated into representation; “Gemeenteraadsverkiezingen: overzicht der stemming te Amsterdam”, *De Tribune* [En. The Tribune], 23 May 1919.

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010465125:mpeg21:a0044> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>55</sup> Floor Wibaut, “Wethouders zonder sociaal-democratische meerderheid”, *Het Weekblad* [En. The Weekly], 14 April 1911.

<sup>56</sup> De Roos, *Besturen als Kunst*, 124-125.

<sup>57</sup> While Karst de Jong holds the title of the first SDAP alderman with his election in Schoterland in 1902, the title of first socialist alderman goes to Willem Vrijburg in another agrarian Frisian municipality, Opsterland, from 1891 – three years before the establishment of the SDAP – to 1896; “Binnenland”, *Algemeen Handelsblad* [En. General Trade Newspaper], 31 July 1902. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010648670:mpeg21:a0009> [Accessed 1-12-2023]; De Roos, *Besturen als Kunst*, 125.

<sup>58</sup> In Ambt Almelo, the SDAP had just fallen short of a majority in 1911, with seven of fifteen seats. The *partijbestuur* [En. Party Board, hereafter PB] sent Jan Schaper to review the matter, who permitted the aldermanship candidacy of Gerrit Schotveld, on account of the support of the three left-liberal councillors of the *Vrijzinnig Democratische Bond* [En. Free-thinking Democratic League, hereafter VDB]. A year later, Zaandam followed, as Jan Duijs was elected alderman with a SDAP plurality of just seven of nineteen seats. Even with two VDB councillors, Duijs had to rely on four conservative-liberal councillors for a majority; Wibaut, *Levensbouw*, 149-150.

<sup>59</sup> Slot and Moor, *Wibaut: Onderkoning van Amsterdam*, 98-99.

<sup>60</sup> De Liagre Böhl, “De Stad bestuurd”, 171.

<sup>61</sup> Ali de Regt, *Arbeidersgezinnen en beschavingsarbeid: Ontwikkelingen in Nederland 1870-1940; een historisch-sociologische studie* [En. Working-class families and civilizing work: Developments in the

an overall shortage of working-class housing, with the poorest families at the whim of slumlords, living in cellar dwellings or hovels and paying as much as a fourth or a fifth of their income in rents.<sup>62</sup> With his proposal, Wibaut hoped to begin to address these abuses by building enough dwellings for the 8543 new arrivals to Amsterdam between April 1910 and April 1911.<sup>63</sup> Whilst the municipal executive did not reject the proposal outright, it delayed providing a preliminary advice, a necessity before the council could vote upon the matter. Two years later, the council had yet to receive preliminary advice from the municipal executive.

This prompted the SDAP to propose a sixth alderman expressly tasked with Public Housing in the budget debates in 1913, just weeks after the 1913 Municipal Election.<sup>64</sup> It would take until 25 March 1914, just weeks shy of the four year anniversary of the 2000 houses proposal, for former antiministerialist Floor Wibaut to be elected as Alderman of Public Housing in Amsterdam with thunderous applause from the assembled workers in the public gallery.<sup>65</sup> As such, Wibaut became alderman of Amsterdam, together with three liberal and one anti-revolutionary alderman, and the first social democratic alderman in a Dutch major city. Municipal socialism, in the words of Ed. Polak, “had, as it were, matured.”<sup>66</sup>

## 2. A Socialist alderman in First World War

Despite his best efforts, Wibaut’s public housing portfolio would largely be overshadowed by another portfolio, *Levensmiddelen* [En. Basic Necessities]. On 28 July, four months after Wibaut’s election, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia in response to the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, starting the First World War. While the Netherlands would remain neutral throughout the war, the country, and especially its major cities, would suffer from the British naval blockade and German unrestricted submarine warfare.<sup>67</sup> Already before the war, Wibaut had written about the necessity of municipal *Levensmiddelenpolitiek* [En. Basic necessities politics], proposing municipal stores and central market halls to lower prices, whilst also encouraging the catch and consumption of cheap fish from IJmuiden to improve working class diets.<sup>68</sup> In the same article series in *De Gemeente*, the newly-minted alderman warned his readers of the difficulties in implementation of these measures over opposition of private monopolies and small business.<sup>69</sup> Thus, when war provided a unique political opportunity for municipalisation, Wibaut seized it with both hands. Already on 1 August 1914, the day of the German declaration of war on Russia, Wibaut proposed the creation of a provisions committee to his colleagues in the municipal executive. Within two days, Wibaut presided over the first committee meeting, which would meet daily throughout the war to organise the distribution and price control of basic necessities.<sup>70</sup>

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Netherlands 1870-1940; a historical-sociological study] (Amsterdam: Boom, 1984), 25; De Liagre Böhl, “De Stad bestuurd”, 170-171; Van den Noort, *Pion of Pionier*, 8.

<sup>62</sup> J.A. Ankersmit, “Gemeentelijke Woningbouw I”, *De Gemeente* 8 (1915): 32, 753-754; J.A. Ankersmit, “Gemeentelijke Woningbouw II”, *De Gemeente* 8 (1915): 33, 762-764.

<sup>63</sup> Slot and Moor, *Wibaut: Onderkoning van Amsterdam*, 98-99.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 99.

<sup>65</sup> Borrie, *F.M. Wibaut*, 102-103.

<sup>66</sup> Ed. Polak, “De ontwikkeling onzer gemeentepolitiek”, in *Ir. J.W. Albarda; een kwart eeuw parlementaire werkzaamheid in dienst van de bevrijding der Nederlandse arbeidersklasse; en beeld van de groei der Nederlandse volksgemeenschap* [En. Ir. J.W. Albarda; a quarter century parliamentary work in service of the liberation of the Dutch working-class; and image of the growth of the Dutch people’s community], ed. Koos Vorrink (Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers, 1938), 114.

<sup>67</sup> Wibaut, *Levensbouw*, 195.

<sup>68</sup> Floor Wibaut, “Gemeentelijke zorg voor Levensmiddelen I”, *De Gemeente* 7 (1914): 6, 700-705; Floor Wibaut, “Gemeentelijke zorg voor Levensmiddelen II”, *De Gemeente* 7 (1914): 10, 722-724; Floor Wibaut, “Gemeentelijke zorg voor Levensmiddelen III”, *De Gemeente* 7 (1914): 11, 733-735.

<sup>69</sup> Wibaut, “Gemeentelijke zorg voor Levensmiddelen III”, 733-735.

<sup>70</sup> Borrie, *F.M. Wibaut*, 113.

Throughout the war, Wibaut would advise his fellow socialist aldermen with articles in *De Gemeente* and would campaign for the expansion and rationalisation of price control and distribution by the national government.<sup>71</sup> Furthermore, he would pioneer the sale and distribution of potatoes, bread, vegetables, rye, pork, rapeseed oil, rice, eggs, cheese, milk, butter, sugar, beef fat, fish, fuels, medicines, sausages, footwear and clothing below national regulated prices, sold in part in municipal stores and central market halls.<sup>72</sup> The SDAP lauded Wibaut's efforts, declaring that Amsterdam was the only city "where the provisioning went well."<sup>73</sup>

Nonetheless, as the war dragged on, Wibaut had to defend increasingly unpopular ration cuts. Working-class food staples like clay potatoes had to be rationed and later replaced with sand potatoes; bread could only be produced with unpopular plain wheat flour. When the provisions committee had to cut all potato rations completely, a delegation of five women from the working-class Eilanden neighbourhood visited Wibaut personally in City Hall. When Wibaut explained to the women that rice rations had increased to cover the potato shortfall, one woman replied: "if I serve rice to my man in the afternoon, I'll get an earful [Lit. krijg ik op mijn donder]."<sup>74</sup> The situation worsened in the spring of 1917, as food and fuel shortages brought the municipal council to concede to pressure from Wibaut and SDAP councillor Salomon "Monne" de Miranda to establish a central soup kitchen.<sup>75</sup> With the municipality covering the 7 to 10 cents difference with cost price per meal, meals could be sold for as low as 12 cents for supper and 15 cents for a heartier lunch.<sup>76</sup> Derisively called the *Trog van Wibaut* [En. Wibaut's Trough] by communists and anarchists, the Central Kitchen would provide 9.102.562 standard and 1.345.129 kosher meals between 1 May 1917 and 31 December 1918.<sup>77</sup>

In spite of these efforts, simmering working-class dissent spilled over into plundering and riots in late June 1917 as the provisions committee had to again suspend potato rations. After markets and food transports carrying potatoes were plundered in the Marnixstraat and the Eilanden, the present – liberal – alderman requested the army to intervene. In the subsequent days, the army brutally restored order by suppressing sympathy strikes with live fire. 9 people were killed and 114 more wounded in what would be called the *Aardappeloproer* [En. Potato Riot].<sup>78</sup> While anarchists and communists screamed bloody murder, Wibaut, who had been holidaying at the time of the riot, only expressed his regrets for the deaths and the violence in *Het Volk*.<sup>79</sup> While the means – live fire – had been deplorable, the aims of the municipal executive were justified in Wibaut's eyes, as there had not been a real food shortage; only half of the replacement rice rations had been consumed.<sup>80</sup> The SDAP joined their embattled alderman, arguing that anarchist and communist agitators had whipped up the proletariat to disturb law and order, damaging the working-class movement in a partially-socialist controlled city.<sup>81</sup> The dogmatic Marxist

<sup>71</sup> Floor Wibaut, "De taak der gemeente bij de levensmiddelenvoorziening", *De Gemeente* 8 (1915): 5, 775-778; Borrie, *F.M. Wibaut*, 113.

<sup>72</sup> Monne de Miranda, "Centrale Markthallen voor den Groothandel", *De Gemeente* 8 (1915): 7, 790-793; Wibaut, *Levensbouw*, 188; Borrie, *F.M. Wibaut*, 113.

<sup>73</sup> Borrie, *F.M. Wibaut*, 113.

<sup>74</sup> Wibaut, *Levensbouw*, 187.

<sup>75</sup> Unless otherwise mentioned, this paper will use the terms "cent" and "cents" to refer to one hundredth of a Dutch florin or guilder; Monne de Miranda, "Van een snoeppreisje I", *De Gemeente* 10 (1917): 4, 970-972; Wibaut, *Levensbouw*, 193-194.

<sup>76</sup> Marius de Smet, "De Trog van Wibaut – De Centrale Keuken: voedselvoorziening in de Eerste Wereldoorlog", *Ons Amsterdam* [En. Our Amsterdam] 47 (1995): 2. <https://onsamsterdam.nl/de-trog-van-wibaut> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> "Aardappeloproer", *Amsterdam Stadsarchief* [En. Amsterdam City Archive].

<https://www.amsterdam.nl/stadsarchief/stukken/oproer/aardappeloproer/> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>79</sup> Floor Wibaut, "Een vraag van democratisch Gemeentebestuur", *Het Volk* [En. The People], 10 July 1917. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010023795:mpeg21:a0055> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>80</sup> Wibaut, *Levensbouw*, 196-199.

<sup>81</sup> "Een anti-socialistische kracht", *Het Volk* [En. The People], 27 July 1917. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010023810:mpeg21:a0009> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

alderman and his party, erstwhile opposed to bourgeois state violence, now defended its application against the proletariat to restore order in their city.

### 3. The 1919 Municipal Election and the 1919 Gemeenteprogram

The shift from oppositional-propagandic to governmental-pragmatic municipal socialism was further marked by the adoption of a new municipal program ahead of the 1919 Municipal Election. At the first municipal elections with universal male suffrage and proportional representation, the SDAP hoped not only to expand its representation of 420 councillors in 156 municipalities, but also implement municipal socialism with more SDAP aldermen, who counted just 21 among them in 1917.<sup>82</sup> However, the *Gemeenteprogram* [En. Municipal Program], adopted in 1899, did not suffice as more than a set of demands for changes at both a municipal and a national level. Eighteen years prior, the SDAP had tasked a committee led by Groninger municipal councillor Jan Schaper with writing a municipal program to assist a growing number of socialist municipal councillors across the country. However, the committee could not rely on either the Second Internationale, which had yet to adopt any resolution with regards to local government, or the SDAP's usual ideological guide, the larger, older, and well-organised *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* [En. Social Democratic Party of Germany, hereafter SPD], which was effectively excluded from municipal politics through the highly restrictive Prussian three-tier franchise.<sup>83</sup> Schaper, in turn, had to draw upon "radicals, hygienists and practitioners", which dominated the municipal politics of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.<sup>84</sup> While the resultant program was undeniably influenced by the reformism of radicals, hygienists and practitioners, with demands for better conditions for the urban working-class, it offered little in way of definition of municipal socialism and left important questions over implementation, poor and elderly care, profits from municipal companies and municipal taxes unanswered.<sup>85</sup> As Schaper clarified at the Leeuwarden party congress in April 1899, the program was first and foremost a propaganda device, only afterwards a suggested practical program for SDAP municipal councillors.<sup>86</sup>

To address these shortcomings, Wibaut and *De Gemeente* editor Johan Ankersmit wrote a new *Gemeenteprogram* ahead of the 1919 Arnhem party congress. First and foremost, the writers defined the limits of social democratic municipal politics as its aim of was not:

"the establishment of socialism in some municipality. [For, red.] the establishment of socialism can only come about internationally and nationally on the basis of common ownership of land and means of production."<sup>87</sup>

Instead, social democratic municipal politics aimed to provide for the needs of the working-class in the provision of "housing, nutrition, education, development, family care, simplifying the work of the housewife, health care, etc., etc" and through this serve to "promote the Socialist idea and prepare for

<sup>82</sup> Borrie, F.M. Wibaut, 135.

<sup>83</sup> Uwe Kühl, *Der Munizipal Sozialismus in Europa – Le socialisme municipal en Europe* [En. Municipal Socialism in Europe] (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2001), 83-93; Friedrich Lenger, *European Cities in the Modern Era, 1850-1914*, (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 187; Paul Hirsch, *Das Kommunal-Program der Sozialdemokratie Preußens* [En. Municipal Program of Prussian Social Democracy] (Berlin: Vorwärts, 1911).

<sup>84</sup> P.L. Tak, "Gemeenteprogram", *De Nieuwe Tijd: sociaaldemokratisch maandschrift* [En. The New Times: social democratic monthly] 3 (1899): 543-553; 543-544

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=dts:14002:mpeg21:0544> [Accessed 1-12-2023]; Bart Tromp, *De loden bal van het socialisme* [En. The lead ball of the socialism] (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2012), 144.

<sup>85</sup> SDAP, "Gemeenteprogram", in *Politieke en Sociale Programma's, vierde deel* [En. Political and Social Programs, fourth part], ed. N. Oosterbaan (Utrecht: n.b., 1905). <http://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/id/eprint/11259> [Accessed 1-12-2023]; Borrie, F.M. Wibaut, 138.

<sup>86</sup> "Partijcongres", *De sociaaldemokraat* [En. The social-democrat], 1 April 1899. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=MMKB23:001531039:mpeg21:p00032> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>87</sup> SDAP, *Gemeenteprogram* [En. Municipal Program], (Arnhem: N.B., 1919). <https://dnpprepo.ub.rug.nl/11414/1/SDAP%20Gemeenteprogram%201919.pdf> [Accessed 1-12-2023]



the societal provision of collective needs.”<sup>88</sup> Besides resolving intraparty debates on municipal taxes with generous exemptions for lower incomes and “deductions for children, impecunious parents [pensioners, red.] and cohabiting relatives”, and corporate rates of municipal gas and water for working-class consumers, the program addressed previously untouched areas of municipal politics. Public housing through municipal housing construction and lending as well as the municipal provisions of necessities through municipal kitchens, eateries, milk providers and slaughterhouses joined the pre-existing commitment to the municipalisation of utilities and monopolies as further steps in municipal economic interventionism.<sup>89</sup> A commitment to the abolition of private poor boards and the establishment of municipal hospitals, maternity clinics, nurseries, swimming pools, baths, laundry houses, elderly homes, homeless shelters and orphanages was a further step in the municipalisation of care.<sup>90</sup> This detailed program with its careful consideration of implementation marked a shift from the oppositional-propagandic style of the 1899 *Gemeenteprogram*. At the same time, its authors could also confidently define their municipal socialism and its limits. Rather than borrow extensively from radicals, hygienists and practitioners, the authors broke new ground with their proposals for municipal intervention and municipal care. Dutch municipal socialism after 1919 would work to establish a *welvaartsgemeente* [En. welfare municipality], marked by economic interventionism and municipal care for the downtrodden, which, through its governmental effectiveness prepared society for the socialist idea.<sup>91</sup> In a further affirmation of the SDAP’s shift to a governmental approach in municipal politics, the Arnhem party congress would adopt the 1919 *Gemeenteprogram* without adjustments.<sup>92</sup>

The 1919 Municipal Election as a whole would be a success for the SDAP, as the party tripled its representation from 420 to 1217 municipal councillors across 421 councils, up from 156 councils four years ago. The number of aldermen nearly quadrupled from just 21 in 1917 to 83 after all negotiations were concluded in September 1919.<sup>93</sup> However, in Amsterdam, the social democrats suffered a painful loss. Neither the *Aardappeloproer* or the harsh rationing had been forgotten, as the vote share of the SDAP collapsed from 42% of the vote with census suffrage in 1914 to just 29.1% of the vote with universal male suffrage.<sup>94</sup> The party bled votes to a new party on the left, with *Communistische Partij Holland* [Communist Party Holland, hereafter CPH] entering the municipal council with 11.8% of the vote and six seats.<sup>95</sup> With a loss of 2 seats, the Amsterdam SDAP fell from fifteen to just thirteen seats and had been the only municipal SDAP to lose seats in the major municipalities, and worse, as a result, become the smallest SDAP council fraction of all three major municipalities.

Local party leaders blamed the loss on the demagoguery of the CPH-leader David Wijnkoop and “political illiterates” who had just won the vote. They disregarded a vocal minority, among whom party leader Troelstra, who blamed the participation in the municipal executive.<sup>96</sup> In spite of this painful loss, both the local Executive Committee and the Party General Assembly voted to continue the participation in the municipal executive. However, in these meetings, the critical minority demanded an SDAP-led centre-left coalition municipal executive composed of the SDAP, the LU, the left-liberal *Vrijzinnig Democratische Bond* [En. Free-thinking Democratic League, hereafter VDB], and conservative liberal *Bond der Vrije Liberalen* [En. League of Free Liberals, BVL] with an *urgentieprogram* [En. urgency program], a SDAP-composed governing agreement.<sup>97</sup> Neither of these demands could be met in the

<sup>88</sup> SDAP, *Gemeenteprogram*, 39; Floor Wibaut, *Het sociaaldemocratisch Gemeenteprogram toegelicht* [En. The social democratic municipal program explained] (Amsterdam: Ontwikkeling, 1919) 7. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=MMKB24:067398000> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>89</sup> SDAP, *Gemeenteprogram*, 40-41.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, 42.

<sup>91</sup> Maas, *Sociaal-democratische gemeentepolitiek*, 61-64; Borrie, *F.M. Wibaut*, 138-140.

<sup>92</sup> Borrie, *F.M. Wibaut*, 138.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 135.

<sup>94</sup> “Gemeenteraadsverkiezingen: overzicht der stemming te Amsterdam”


<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>96</sup> Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 110.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, 111.

aftermath of the election. Instead, an *afspiegelingscollege* [En. mirroring municipal executive], mirroring the broad political groups in the municipal council, was formed with two SDAP, one VDB, one LU alderman and two confessional aldermen, from the *Roomsch-Katholieke Staatspartij* [En. Roman Catholic State Party, hereafter RKSP] and *Anti-Revolutionaire Partij* [En. Anti-Revolutionary Party, hereafter ARP] respectively. Furthermore, the RKSP would only accept the *urgentieprogram* as an informal guide to the municipal executive, leaving room for the bourgeois aldermen to dissent.<sup>98</sup>

Still, the SDAP had cause for celebration, as even with fewer councillors, it could still frame municipal government around its *urgentieprogram* and claim three weighty departments in Basic Necessities, Public Housing and Finance. While Wibaut would return to Public Housing, he would exchange Basic Necessities for the all-important Finance department. At the same time, SDAP councillor Monne de Miranda would replace Willem Vliegen as the second SDAP alderman, since the latter had a rather ineffective stint as Alderman of Public Works between September 1914 and 1918 and Finance between 1918 and 1919 – both marked by portfolio disputes with Wibaut.<sup>99</sup> Instead, the Jewish working-class diamond worker and trade unionist De Miranda was elected as Alderman of Basic Necessities, a field with which he had experience as party spokesperson during the First World War.<sup>100</sup> Together, Wibaut and De Miranda would usher in the heyday of municipal interventionism and public housing construction in Amsterdam.



**Graph 1. Political Composition of the Municipal Council of Amsterdam between 1913 and 1940.<sup>101</sup>**

<sup>98</sup> Before the Dualisation of the Municipal Government in 2002, aldermen remained municipal councillors for their respective parties and as such could not be subject to the collective responsibility and collegiality which prevented public dissension within the national executive on policy issues. As such, aldermen could vote against a proposal backed by the rest of the municipal executive without need of resignation. Without collective responsibility, *afspiegelingscollege* were a common occurrence as diametrically opposed aldermen could pursue their political aims unimpeded by the other, except for the council vote. In turn, an *urgentieprogram* was a rudimentary means in such a system to force a certain collective responsibility for a political program, in this case of the SDAP. With the growth of the SDAP and its insistence on *urgentieprograms*, coalition executives started to be established as well.

<sup>99</sup> Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 111-113.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> All tables and graphs with colours have a black-and-white version in the appendix.

		1914	1915	1916	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940
Amsterdam																												
Mayor		A. Roël	J.W.C. Tellegen										W. de Vlugt															
Municipal Companies		L. Serrurier	S. de Vries Czn.										F.M. Wibaut										E.J. Abrahams		J. Rustige			
Finance																												
Provisions																												
Public Housing																												
Public Works																												
Education and Arts																												
Public Health																												
Social Affairs																												
Labour Affairs																												

Periods:	SDAP	VDB	LU	LSP	Liberal	RKSP	ARP	CHU
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Table 1. Municipal Executive of Amsterdam between 1914 and 1940.<sup>102</sup><sup>102</sup> All tables and graphs with colours have a black-and-white version in the appendix.

#### 4. Mecca for Public Housing

A continuing concern for the municipal executive throughout the interwar period was housing, as the population continued to grow and housing construction had collapsed during most of the First World War in the wake of resource shortages.<sup>103</sup> Already in 1914, Wibaut, as the newly elected alderman of Public Housing, asked his civil servants to investigate the housing shortage and the need for municipal housing construction. The subsequent official advice left little to the imagination as it reported that:

“very many families in our city spend an excessive part of their income on housing rent, often a fifth, often also a fourth, and they live in houses that do not meet the most stringent requirements of hygiene and decency.”<sup>104</sup>

Furthermore, with an unceasing influx of new residents and pitifully little private housing construction, “the worst slum dwellings in Amsterdam still regularly find occupants, and ... some of these dwellings are inhabited by more than one family.”<sup>105</sup> It concluded plainly that: “If, as we do, the perpetuation of such conditions is considered to be contrary to the interest of the municipality, then the time has come to get out of that situation through housing construction on the part of the municipality.”<sup>106</sup> The report went even further than the social-democratic proposal for the municipal construction of 2000 working-class dwellings, proposing the construction of no less than 3500 dwellings by the municipality’s newly-established *Gemeentelijke Woondienst* [En. Municipal Housing Service, GWD].<sup>107</sup> The municipal council approved the proposal 31 to 13 in early 1915. Yet resource shortages in the wake of the First World War delayed the proposal and shut down private construction. At the same time, total housing vacancy in the municipality had dropped to just 0.23%, 32 houses, most of which were expensive private housing.<sup>108</sup> The only solution left for Wibaut was the construction of 756 temporary wooden houses during the war, derided by communists as “lice villas.”<sup>109</sup> Still, the time had come; the municipality had built its first affordable housing and the first workers left their damp cellars homes to move into the *sinaasappelkistjes van Wibaut* [En. Wibaut’s small orange boxes].<sup>110</sup> Furthermore, as the war wound down in 1918, municipal construction began in earnest with 692 houses in Buiksloterham, 351 houses in the Transvaalbuurt and 328 houses in the Spaarndammerbuurt.<sup>111</sup>

The three years between the end of the First World War in 1918 and the recession of 1921 would become the pinnacle of public housing construction in Amsterdam. Here the municipality benefited from emergency government subsidies created in response to the worsening post-war housing shortage.<sup>112</sup> Before the war, the national government only provided *rijksvoorschotten* [En. government advances], low-interest government loans established by the Housing Act, 1901 to cover material, land, and overhead costs of new public housing construction, for *woningcorporaties* [En. housing associations].<sup>113</sup> High construction costs meant rents could no longer break even with the repayment of the

<sup>103</sup> Van Genabeek and Rietbergen, *De S.D.A.P. en de Volkshuisvesting*, 85.

<sup>104</sup> Arie Keppler and Floor Wibaut, *De Gemeente en de Volkshuisvesting* [En. The Municipality and Public Housing] (Amsterdam: N.V. Ontwikkeling, 1925), 161.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, 162.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>108</sup> Slot and Moor, *Wibaut: Onderkoning van Amsterdam*, 105-106; Van Genabeek and Rietbergen, *De S.D.A.P. en de Volkshuisvesting*, 51.

<sup>109</sup> Borrie, *F.M. Wibaut*, 126; Slot and Moor, *Wibaut: Onderkoning van Amsterdam*, 105-106.

<sup>110</sup> René Karsten and Sjoerd Karsten, “Ommekeer in 1921: Wibaut grijpt de macht bij annexatieverkiezingen”, *Ons Amsterdam* [En. Our Amsterdam] 73 (2021): 4. <https://onsamsterdam.nl/ommekeer-in-1921> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>111</sup> Borrie, *F.M. Wibaut*, 124.

<sup>112</sup> Jan van der Schaar, *Groei en bloei van het Nederlandse volkshuisvestingsbeleid: Volkshuisvesting in theorie en praktijk* [En. Growth and bloom of Dutch public housing policy; public housing in theory and practice] (Delft: Delft University Press, 1986), 83-85; Van Genabeek and Rietbergen, *De S.D.A.P. en de Volkshuisvesting*, 62-64.

<sup>113</sup> Van der Schaar, *Groei en bloei van het Nederlandse volkshuisvestingsbeleid*, 83-85.

*rijksvoorschotten* without growing beyond the means of working-class families, rendering economically viable public housing construction for the working-class impossible. To redress this issue, the national government stepped in with emergency subsidies to cover 45% of the annual repayment of their own advances, with the municipality mandated to cover another 15% of the repayment for construction by housing associations.<sup>114</sup> With these generous loans and subsidies, public housing construction would quintuple across the Netherlands from their war years' nadir, with municipalities and housing associations constructing 66.431 new public houses, just short of three-quarters of all new housing construction between 1918 and 1921.<sup>115</sup> In the same period, the municipality and housing associations in Amsterdam were even responsible for nearly four-fifths of total housing construction with 5.592 public houses.<sup>116</sup> Furthermore, socialist housing associations would build some of the capital's iconic working-class housing complexes like *Het Schip* [En. The Ship] and *De Dageraad* [En. The Morning] in the monumental brick-and-mortar *Amsterdamse School* [En. Amsterdam School] style of architecture.<sup>117</sup> The SDAP hoped these so-called "bulwarks of socialism" would, through their monumental style, inspire the class consciousness of their inhabitants, as the party increasingly advocated the complete socialisation of housing across the Netherlands.<sup>118</sup> It is in this environment that Amsterdam gained the reputation of "Mecca for Public Housing", as the vanguard of socialised housing in the Netherlands.<sup>119</sup>

Unsurprisingly, when an early municipal election was called for Amsterdam in 1921 after the annexation of various neighbouring municipalities, the SDAP confidently campaigned on their public housing record with the slogan: "Wie bouwt? Wibaut!" [En. Who builds? Wibaut!].<sup>120</sup> In the subsequent election – the first with universal suffrage – the party partially recovered from its 1919 loss, increasing its vote share with 1.5% to 30.5% and its seat total with one to fourteen. However, the greatest benefactor of the annexation of neighbouring agrarian municipalities were the confessional parties, as they grew from twelve to sixteen seats. In the subsequent negotiations, Wibaut attempted to form a municipal executive solely with the confessional parties, in an attempt to exclude the newly formed *Liberale Staatspartij* "*De Vrijheidsbond*" [En. Liberal State Party "The Freedom League", hereafter LSP].<sup>121</sup> This conservative liberal merger party of LU, BVL and various minor liberal parties, had moved markedly to the economic right from its LU predecessor and had been critical of municipal economic

<sup>114</sup> With the 1918 *Woningnoodwet* [En. Housing emergency law] the national government mandated that rents had to be 40% cost-effective (cover the costs of construction), with the other 60% of annuity payment paid for 75-25 by the national government and municipality. In effect, the national government thus covered 45% of housing construction cost, with the municipality mandated to cover another 15%; Van der Schaar, *Groei en bloei van het Nederlandse volkshuisvestingsbeleid*, 83-85.

<sup>115</sup> Van Genabeek and Rietbergen, *De S.D.A.P. en de Volkshuisvesting*, 65.

<sup>116</sup> N.B., *Amsterdam: Stadsontwikkeling, Volkshuisvesting* [En. Amsterdam, City Development, Public Housing] (Amsterdam: Stadsdrukkerij, 1925), 15. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=MMKB24:071061000:00067> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>117</sup> Donald I. Grinberg, *Housing in the Netherlands 1900-1940* (Delft: Delft University Press, 1977), 50-51.

<sup>118</sup> J.A. Ankersmit, "Op weg naar socialisatie", *De Gemeente* 16 (1923): 12, 90-91; Van Genabeek and Rietbergen, *De S.D.A.P. en de Volkshuisvesting*, 77-81.

<sup>119</sup> "Amsterdam, het 'Mekka der Volkshuisvesting': Het 'geheim' der Wibautsch woningpolitiek onthuld", *De Tribune* [En. The Tribune], 27 May 1922. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010467993:mpeg21:a0005> [Accessed 1-12-2023]; "Een woningbouw-excursie", *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant* [En. New Rotterdam Paper], 9 June 1923. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010026622:mpeg21:a0006> [Accessed 12-5-2023].

<sup>120</sup> Another election issue was the punishment of striking civil servants, which had led Wibaut and De Miranda to resign their aldermanships on a matter of principle three weeks prior to the election. However, they resumed their seats after a few weeks of negotiations without reversing the punishments; Karsten and Karsten, "Ommekeer in 1921".

<sup>121</sup> Whilst contemporary sources abbreviate the *Liberale Staatspartij* "*De Vrijheidsbond*" to VB until 1937, historiography generally uses the LSP abbreviation, to underline the continuity between the *Vrijheidsbond* founded as "the Netherlands' liberal state party" in 1921, and the party after the subsequent name changes to *Liberale Staatspartij* – "*De Vrijheidsbond*" in 1924 and again in 1937 to just *Liberale Staatspartij*. To prevent confusion, this thesis will refer to the party with the abbreviation LSP; Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 156-157.

interventionism.<sup>122</sup> Nevertheless, in return for a third SDAP alderman and a near monopoly on major departments, the social democrats accepted a heterogeneous municipal executive composed of three social democratic, one LSP, one RKSP and one *Christelijk-Historische Unie* [Christian-Historical Union, hereafter CHU] alderman. Subsequently, the major departments of Finance, Municipal Companies, Basic Necessities, Public Housing and Education were all controlled by social democrats.<sup>123</sup>

After the 1921 Municipal Election, De Miranda succeeded Wibaut as the new alderman of Public Housing, a position he would hold with two intervals until September 1939. A few days before, the centre-right Cabinet-Ruijs de Beerenbrouck I suspended the emergency subsidies and restricted the issue of *rijksvoorschotten* in the aftermath of an economic recession.<sup>124</sup> This was an attempt to drive down prices for bricks and wages of skilled workers such as plasters and brick layers that had ostensibly hampered private housing construction.<sup>125</sup> From June 1921 onwards, the national government would only provide a subsidy for replacement housing construction after slum clearance.<sup>126</sup> Furthermore, municipalities and housing associations could only apply for *rijksvoorschotten* if private initiative could not meet demand; otherwise these institutions had to try their luck with high-interest loans from capital markets.<sup>127</sup>

These two factors meant the newly minted alderman had to suppress costs which would otherwise translate into unpayable rents for the average worker. Advised by Arie Keppler, director of the GWD, De Miranda would focus on the construction of exurban *tuindorpen* [En. garden villages] in his fifteen-year tenure.<sup>128</sup> Among other projects, De Miranda would oversee the construction of Oostzaan, Watergraafmeer, Nieuwendam and Buiksloterham. While Keppler's advocacy of the construction of garden villages with fresh air, space for recreation and single-family homes for the working-class was ideologically motivated, the reason for its success was practical. The newly annexed fallow land of the former border municipalities was inexpensive, which drove down costs and thus rents, making garden villages the most viable form of public housing construction.<sup>129</sup>

More problematic for the socialist alderman and his director was that even with inexpensive land, an oligopoly of brick producers made brick-and-mortar construction restrictively expensive.<sup>130</sup> Already for the capital's second garden village, Watergraafmeer, the alderman and director could only viably commence construction with the inexpensive but politically unpopular concrete. In spite of their own misgivings, they had no alternative but to approve the usage of this "war invention."<sup>131</sup> Thus, Amsterdam had to abandon its name-sake monumental brick-and-mortar *Amsterdamse School* style, in favour of functionalist *Nieuwe Zakelijkheid* [En. New Objectivity]. This style of architecture, with its concrete exterior and prefabricated interiors had been pioneered by their socialist colleague Arie Heijkoop in Rotterdam.<sup>132</sup> Although *Betondorp* [En. Concrete village] was at first a derisive moniker of Watergraafmeer, it grew into a badge of honour for the inhabitants of this SDAP bulwark.<sup>133</sup> While De Miranda would continue to prefer *Amsterdamse School* or the later *Nieuwe Haagsche School* counterpart

<sup>122</sup> M.H. Klijnsma, *Om de democratie: de geschiedenis van de Vrijzinnig-Democratische Bond, 1901-1946* [En. Because of democracy: the history of the Free-thinking Democratic League, 1901-1946] (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2007), 257-259.

<sup>123</sup> Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 156-158.

<sup>124</sup> Van der Schaar, *Groei en bloei van het Nederlandse volkshuisvestingsbeleid*, 86-88.

<sup>125</sup> Van Genabeek and Rietbergen, *De S.D.A.P. en de Volkshuisvesting*, 85.

<sup>126</sup> As replacement housing hardly ever offered lower rents than slums, the government had to provide a subsidy to artificially lower rents. Otherwise the demand for slums-quality dwellings and their slum-level rents would remain; Van der Schaar, *Groei en bloei van het Nederlandse volkshuisvestingsbeleid*, 86-87.

<sup>127</sup> Van der Schaar, *Groei en bloei van het Nederlandse volkshuisvestingsbeleid*, 86-88.

<sup>128</sup> Van Genabeek and Rietbergen, *De S.D.A.P. en de Volkshuisvesting*, 97; Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 168-169.

<sup>129</sup> Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 168-170.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*, 170.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>132</sup> De Ruyter-de Zeeuw, *De eerste rode wethouder van Rotterdam*, 94-95.

<sup>133</sup> Van Genabeek and Rietbergen, *De S.D.A.P. en de Volkshuisvesting*, 100-101.



over functionalist concrete designs whenever possible, financial considerations trumped aesthetic desires in most municipalities.<sup>134</sup> As a German architecture journal observed, in public housing across the Netherlands, concrete had replaced brick: “*Amsterdamer Kitsch* had been replaced by *Rotterdamse Strenge*.”<sup>135</sup>

These policy decisions meant that public housing construction in Amsterdam could continue after the end of the emergency subsidies and the restriction of *rijksvoorschotten* in 1921. Furthermore, when Cabinet-Ruijs de Beerenbrouck II completely suspended regular *rijksvoorschotten* in 1925 in an attempt to further stimulate private housing construction, Amsterdam possessed a viable partially independent housing policy from the national government. De Miranda redoubled the subsidised municipal slum clearance efforts – with yearly slum removals tripling from 178 in 1924 to 472 in 1925 and ultimately reaching 2004 in 1928.<sup>136</sup> Concurrently, Wibaut attracted – foreign – capital for housing construction by the GWD and served as guarantor of capital market loans to the Amsterdam housing associations.<sup>137</sup> The social democratic aldermen enjoyed such broad support in the council that municipal housing policy, with its focus on garden villages and slum clearance, would remain unchanged when De Miranda was replaced as Alderman of Public Housing by the critical conservative-liberal LSP councillor Walrave Boissevain between 1927 and 1929 and again between 1933 and 1935.<sup>138</sup> However, private, not public, construction would now dominate the capital, with the public share of housing construction decreasing from nearly 80% between 1918 and 1921 to just 15,7% in 1927, even as yearly public housing construction reached record heights.<sup>139</sup> After a glimpse of a Mecca of socialised housing between 1918 and 1921, the SDAP had to settle a reality which fell far short of this lofty goal.

Thus, public housing in interwar Amsterdam was highly dependent on outside actors, such as the national government, and outside factors, such as skilled workers’ wages and material shortages. While Wibaut entered the municipal executive in 1914 to carry out his 1911 2000 houses plan, war-induced material shortages meant municipal public housing construction was restricted to temporary wooden housing. Only after 1918 did construction of public housing in the capital begin in earnest, thanks to the generous emergency government subsidies and advances between 1918 and 1921. This subsidy-induced boom and the monumental nature of the working-class housing meant the SDAP could confidently and successfully campaign on Wibaut’s public housing achievement in 1921. Furthermore, the party could leverage their electoral gains for control of most of the municipality’s major departments. However, outside the social democrats’ municipal control, the centre-right confessional Cabinet-Ruijs de Beerenbrouck I and II embarked on austerity measures to limit public housing construction and encourage private construction. Alderman De Miranda had to abandon most urban construction, save for subsidised slum clearance, in favour of exurban garden village construction. When brick-and-mortar village construction grew increasingly expensive, Amsterdam and most other municipalities further followed Rotterdam’s functionalist concrete example, abandoning the monumental *Amsterdamse School* in the process. Garden village construction – funded by loans – and slum clearance – funded by subsidy – would be the staples of municipal efforts until 1934, when the Great Depression and the new austerity measures from the national government greatly reduced what remained of municipal capital mobilisation abilities and autonomy in public housing construction.

## 5. Municipalisation of Basic Necessities

While Wibaut and De Miranda would radically expand the areas and extent of municipal interventionism in the capital, its origins lay in the works of new municipal officials – practical politicians, hygienists,

<sup>134</sup> Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 204-205.

<sup>135</sup> Jansen and Rogier, *Kunstbeleid in Amsterdam 1920-1940*, 25.

<sup>136</sup> Van Genabeek and Rietbergen, *De S.D.A.P. en de Volkshuisvesting*, 90.

<sup>137</sup> Slot and Moor, *Wibaut: Onderkoning van Amsterdam, 196-198*; Van Genabeek and Rietbergen, *De S.D.A.P. en de Volkshuisvesting*, 88.

<sup>138</sup> Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 223-228.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, 203.

and radicals – in the latter half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Empowered by the *Gemeentewet*, 1851 [En. Municipal Act, 1851], municipal governance became politicised as patricians were replaced with lawyers, doctors and other members of a new professional class.<sup>140</sup> With regular elections and limited suffrage, these new aldermen and councillors were more responsive to popular influence than their oligarchic predecessors.<sup>141</sup> Combined with the consequences of the massive growth of their municipalities, aldermen in all three Dutch major cities would abandon laissez-faire governance and embark on municipal interventionism in natural monopolies.

The port city of Rotterdam pioneered municipal expansion and exploitation of utilities and infrastructure in the Netherlands in a practical response to rapid industrial and population growth, increased shipping traffic and a cholera outbreak in 1866, with the provision of municipal gas for new industries, a new municipal port and clean water and sewers for its inhabitant.<sup>142</sup> A coalition of hygienists in The Hague followed example of Rotterdam with municipalised water and gas, establishing the *Duinwaterleiding van 's-Gravenhage* [En. Dune water pipe of The Hague] in 1874 and the *Gemeentelijke Gasfabriek* [En. Municipal Gas Factory] in 1875.<sup>143</sup> At the same time, the municipal executive of Amsterdam, dominated by the classical liberal electoral club *Burgerpligt* [En. Civic duty], limited municipal investment to only the necessary infrastructure and education.<sup>144</sup> The highly profitable monopolies of gas and water were left in private hands in the capital.

In the subsequent decades, the municipal government came under increasing criticism from left-liberals, among them the journalist P.L. Tak, who derisively observed: “the municipal executive only did what it could not ignore!”<sup>145</sup> After an abortive take-over attempt, these left-liberals abandoned *Burgerpligt* to form their own radical electoral club *Amsterdam* in 1888.<sup>146</sup> A Central figure for the electoral club was its ideological leader Wim Treub. As a professor at the Municipal University, Treub had been a proponent of the Historical School, a trend critical of both scientific socialism and the increasingly dogmatic laissez-faire attitude of the Classical School and classical liberalism. Treub argued competition and risk, two central tenets of classical economics, did not affect natural monopolies such as water and gas, thereby rendering natural market forces and incentives ineffective. When *Amsterdam* won 8 seats in the 1893 municipal election, Treub was elected as Alderman of Finance.<sup>147</sup> In a textbook example of the dialectics of the lead, in three short years Treub was able not only to bring Amsterdam in line with other major municipalities by implementing municipal gas and water, he also pioneered municipal ownership of tram and telephone.<sup>148</sup> In this effort, he was supported by P.L. Tak, who had founded the national newspaper *De Telegraaf* [En. The Telegraph] in 1893, which opposed the anti-municipalisation national newspaper *Algemeen Handelsblad* in public discourse.<sup>149</sup> The fact that a municipal issue was fought out on the pages of national newspapers further contributed to equation of Amsterdam with

<sup>140</sup> Stefan Couperus, Christianne Smit and Dirk Jan Wolffram, “Introduction: Local Elites and Urban Politics; A conceptual framework”, in *In Control of the City: Local Politics and the Dynamics of Urban Politics, 1800-1960*, ed. Stefan Couperus, Christianne Smit and Dirk Jan Wolffram (Leuven: Peeters, 2007), xii; De Liagre Böhl, “De Stad bestuurd”, 170; De Regt, *Arbeidersgezinnen en beschavingsarbeid*, 31-32.

<sup>141</sup> Couperus, Smit and Wolffram, “Introduction: Local Elites and Urban Politics; A conceptual framework”, xii.

<sup>142</sup> Van den Noort, *Pion of Pionier*, 40; 81-82; 113-115; 121.

<sup>143</sup> Stichting Haags Industrieel Erfgoed, *Duinwaterleiding 's Gravenhage (DWL) (1874 – heden)* [En. Dune water pipe of The Hague (DWL) (1874-present)] <https://shie.nl/bedrijven/duinwaterleiding-s-gravenhage-dwl-1874-heden/> [Accessed 1-12-2023]; Stichting Haags Industrieel Erfgoed, *Gasfabriek (1844 – 1967)* [En. Gas Factory (1844-1967)] <https://shie.nl/bedrijven/gasfabriek-1844-1967/> [Accessed 1-12-2023].

<sup>144</sup> De Liagre Böhl, “De Stad bestuurd”, 173-175.

<sup>145</sup> Maas, *Sociaal-democratische gemeentepolitiek 1894-1929*, 14.

<sup>146</sup> De Liagre Böhl, “De Stad bestuurd”, 175; Maas, *Sociaal-democratische gemeentepolitiek 1894-1929*, 11-14.

<sup>147</sup> De Liagre Böhl, “De Stad bestuurd”, 177-178.

<sup>148</sup> Maas, *Sociaal-democratische gemeentepolitiek 1894-1929*, 15.

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, 22.

municipal interventionism and so-called gas and water socialism, in spite of its laggard past.<sup>150</sup> Although no new municipalisation efforts were made in Amsterdam after the resurgence of classical liberals and disappearance from the municipal political stage of Treub and *Amsterdam* in 1896, the liberal council majority ultimately accepted the new municipal ownership of natural monopolies.<sup>151</sup>

While the heyday of liberal municipal interventionism had ended with the municipalisation of natural monopolies, the SDAP developed a broader view of municipalisation. Not merely necessary for natural monopolies, “a municipal enterprise” became “a precursor of socialised enterprise, a transition form from capitalist enterprise to socialised enterprise ... currently possible in capitalism.”<sup>152</sup> Furthermore, the SDAP claimed, the war had proved horizontally and vertically integrated public enterprises were far more efficient than the decentralised “capitalistic distribution system.”<sup>153</sup> Municipalisation would mean the end of the last decentralised, unscientific link of the industrial chain, the middle men. Their inefficiencies, “spoilage, competition, cheating of customers, advertising, non-payment, storage costs, unnecessary freight, loss of interest”, would be removed to lower prices by “tens of percentage points.”<sup>154</sup> Lower prices meant an end to the indirect subsidy of the working-class of over-employed, inefficient, rent-seeking “trading middle classes.”<sup>155</sup> Furthermore, the now-public profits from these municipal companies could subsequently be reinvested in the municipal budget, either in lower tax rates or company rates for low-income households, or new inherently unprofitable social provisions such as municipal hospitals, maternity clinics, nurseries, elderly homes, and orphanages. In effect, the SDAP promised to embark on the most extensive project of municipalisation since Wim Treub – in a field as of 1913 largely untouched by municipal intervention: Basic Necessities.

**Table 2. Average prices for basic necessities in the Netherlands in 1913 and 1922.**<sup>156</sup>

Product	Amount	Price in 1913	Price in 1922	Price increase
Potatoes	1000 g	f 0.04	f 0.11	175%
Bread	1 white bread	f 0.13	f 0.22	69%
Pork chops	1000 g	f 0.81	f 2.23	175%
Cheese	1000 g Gouda	f 0.62	f 1.72	177%
Eggs	1 medium-sized egg	f 0.04	f 0.11	175%
Coffee	500 g	f 0.46	f 0.88	91%
Margarine	500 g	f 0.33	f 0.64	94%
Milk	1 L full milk	f 0.09	f 0.18	100%
Flank steak	1000 g	f 0.82	f 2.18	167%
Rice	1000 g white rice	f 0.15	f 0.40	157%
Dairy butter	250 g	f 0.35	f 0.64	83%
Sugar	1000 g	f 0.42	f 0.60	43%
Tea	80 g English tea	f 0.09	f 0.20	122%

<sup>150</sup> Canon van Amsterdam, *Gas- en Watersocialisme* [En. Gas- and Water Socialism], <https://www.canonvannederland.nl/nl/noord-holland/amsterdam/gas--en-watersocialisme> [Accessed 1-12-2023]; Maas, *Sociaal-democratische gemeentepolitiek 1894-1929*, 37-39.

<sup>151</sup> Maas, *Sociaal-democratische gemeentepolitiek 1894-1929*, 24.

<sup>152</sup> “Notulen van de jaarvergadering van de Vereniging van soc. Dem. gemeenteraadsleden”, *De Gemeente* 18 (1925): 1, 3.

<sup>153</sup> Monne de Miranda, *De Gemeente en haar nieuwe taak* [En. The municipality and her new task] (Amsterdam: N.V. Ontwikkeling, 1925), 9.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid.

<sup>156</sup> CBS, *Consumentenprijzen; gemiddelde prijzenvoedingsmiddelen, 1800-2018* [En. Consumer Prizes; average price foodstuffs, 1800-2018]. <https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/CBS/nl/dataset/80345ned/table?ts=1691161713121> [Accessed 1-12-2023].

Even before the First World War, in a period of relative price stability and increasing wages, Wibaut and other social democrats had argued for (municipal) intervention in basic necessities to redress the blatant inefficiencies and high prices in a sector which consumed 30% of the gross domestic product.<sup>157</sup> With the war, the subsequent inflation, stagnant wages, global depression and the doubling, even tripling of prices for working class dietary staples, the social democrats were further strengthened in their belief in the necessity of intervention. However, the centre-right national government would largely dismantle the wartime provisioning measures between 1918 and 1921 in an ultimately mistaken belief that market forces would return prices to or near pre-war levels.<sup>158</sup> At a local level, liberal aldermen, such as Droogleever Fortuyn in The Hague, and confessional alderman, such as Stulemeijer and Nirvard in Rotterdam, followed suit and dismantled their – unpopular – provisions departments, despite the opposition of the SDAP in municipal councils and executives.<sup>159</sup> As one of the few social democratic aldermen of basic necessities, Wibaut maintained his Basic Necessities department in Amsterdam.

Thus, after the disastrous 1919 Municipal Election, the unenviable task fell on Monne de Miranda, as successor of Wibaut at Basic Necessities, to reform the controversial wartime provision politics for peace time and implement the party's ambitious program of municipalisation. This short Jewish social democrat had distinguished himself as SDAP councillor and spokesperson on matters of provision politics during the First World War. Together with Wibaut and representatives of the labour movement, De Miranda had travelled to Cologne and Hamburg to investigate the systems of municipal kitchens and centralised food provision for the increasingly suffering working class.<sup>160</sup> In an article series in *De Gemeente*, De Miranda provided an extensive account of the direct *Kriegshilfe* [En. war relief] of Cologne's industrial-scale central soup kitchens, with their "technically and scientifically excellent cooking."<sup>161</sup> However, he was far more impressed with the indirect war relief through municipal interventionism. "Large numbers of municipal [retail and food, red.] shops" competed with profiteering retail middle classes to drive down inflated prices; a "well-organised municipal company" provided direct delivery for goods and pre-cooked meals in an attempt to rationalise and relieve women's housework.<sup>162</sup> Unlike ever unpopular rationing and increasingly unpopular central soup provision, the municipal shops and the municipal company could possibly survive in peace time, De Miranda informed his readers. However, the new alderman would have to rely on votes of the VDB and the RKSP for the implementation of the program.

From the onset, De Miranda distanced post-war basic necessities politics from its origins in the First World War, without disavowing the work of his predecessor Wibaut. This careful balancing act becomes visible in the introduction to his booklet *De Gemeente en haar nieuwe taak* [En. The municipality and her new task] to popularise municipal interventionism and post-war basic necessities politics:

<sup>157</sup> Thomas Piketty, *Capital in the Twenty-First Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017), 135-136; Merijn Knibbe, "De hoofdelijke beschikbaarheid van voedsel en de levensstandaard in Nederland, 1807-1913" *Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis* [En. Periodical for Social and Economic History] 4 (2007): 4, 71-107; 92.

<sup>158</sup> "De Opheffing der Crisis-instellingen: De afdeling volksvoeding verdwijnt", *De Courant* [En. The Newspaper], 10 January 1921. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=MMKB19:000962007:mpeg21:a00043> [Accessed 1-12-2023].

<sup>159</sup> "Haagsch Nieuws – Een ongelukkige beslissing", *Het Volk* [En. The People], 12 November 1919. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010024507:mpeg21:a0053> [Accessed 1-12-2023]; "Uit den Haagschen Raad", *De Telegraaf* [En. The Telegraph], 27 November 1919. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010552498:mpeg21:a0176> [Accessed 1-12-2023]; "De prijs van het brood te Amsterdam en Rotterdam", *Het Volk* [En. The People], 29 January 1921. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:011081865:mpeg21:a0023> [Accessed 1-12-2023]; Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 286.

<sup>160</sup> Monne de Miranda, "Van een snoeppreisje I".

<sup>161</sup> De Miranda even found these technically and scientifically excellent meals "tasty" even if the food always had to be liquid; Monne de Miranda, "Van een snoeppreisje I".

<sup>162</sup> Monne de Miranda, "Van een snoeppreisje III", *De Gemeente* 10 (1917): 6, 985.

“the measures then applied by the municipalities at that time [First World War, red.] can give little or no instruction. All in all, it is war-economy and therefore hardly appropriate to serve as a guideline for the new task which awaits the municipalities, under the impetus, under the leadership of the Social-Democrats. Measures aimed at an equitable distribution of an in themselves insufficient amount of food, which brought fire and light to the whole population according to established rules in modest quantities according to need, which further tried to prevent a too rapid decline in the level of public health, may, *no matter how instructive* from a historical point of view, never form the foundations for the Social-Democratic Municipal Politics of the future.”<sup>163</sup> [Emphasis added, red.]

No, new provision politics would not maintain “emergency measures” now the “fires of war” had been permanently extinguished.<sup>164</sup> Instead the aim of new provision politics were “drastic measures in the field of production and distribution of basic necessities, or the creation of institutions and companies that make life easier for citizens, as well as those that can ease the difficult and burdensome task of women.”<sup>165</sup> Effectively, this meant (1) indirect price control through competition by municipal stores, (2) direct price and quality control through municipal monopoly and (3) rationalisation of work through centralised municipal services.

In an attempt to maintain indirect price control, De Miranda, in his first act as alderman in September 1919, proposed to continue the municipal import of clay potatoes, fish, shoes, stockings and piece goods and to make these goods available for sale in municipal stores with the express aim driving down retail prices. With the Potato Riot and the food shortages of the previous years still in memory, there was widespread support in the council for municipal intervention.<sup>166</sup> This support meant a RKSP councillor even interrupted the maiden speech of SDAP councillor Carry Pothuis-Smit to dispute her claim that the measures were explicitly socialist.<sup>167</sup> The opposition to the proposal, led by the *Neutraal Blok aller Middenstanders* [En. Neutral Bloc of all Middle Classes, hereafter NBAM], BVL and CHU, could muster only 9 votes in “defence of the trades people [Lit. *winkelstand*] which has had to endure so many attacks here”, with 29 votes in favour of De Miranda’s proposal.<sup>168</sup> In the aftermath of the decision, De Miranda could report a price decrease of 2 cents per kilogram of potatoes in Amsterdam.<sup>169</sup>

Despite the resounding legislative victory for the new alderman, the bourgeois opposition would continue to grow as the memories of the wartime shortages became an increasingly distant memory and the policies became increasingly identified with De Miranda and socialisation. Already in February 1920, when De Miranda proposed to unite the wartime provision committee, the regulatory service of retail, markets and slaughterhouses and the control of all municipal shops in a *Centrale Dienst voor de Levensmiddelenvoorziening* [En. Central Service for the provision of Basic necessities, hereafter CDL], did opposition by erstwhile partners, the RKSP, VDB, and ARP, come to a fore.<sup>170</sup> De Miranda had not helped himself by arguing that “there was a nobility that had to disappear and so it will be with the middle classes.”<sup>171</sup> Not only did the alderman have to walk back his comments in the *Algemeen Handelsblad*, he had to accede to an amendment by the VDB that the establishment of the CDL in no means meant the authorization of unlimited municipal intervention in the basic necessities sector.<sup>172</sup> The economically conservative RKSP party chair Von Frijtag Drabbe even voted together with the bourgeois opposition against the proposal in a sign of the troubles to come. Furthermore, the VDB and RKSP would, despite of De Miranda’s opposition, join the bourgeois efforts to stop the establishment of new

<sup>163</sup> De Miranda, *De Gemeente en haar nieuwe taak*, 5.

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>166</sup> Couperus, *De Machinerie van de Stad*, 236.

<sup>167</sup> *Verslag van de vergaderingen van de gemeenteraad van Amsterdam* [En. Report of the meetings of the municipal council of Amsterdam, hereafter *Verslag gemeenteraad Amsterdam*] 1919, 1960.

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid.*, 1975.

<sup>169</sup> Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 140.

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.*, 141-143.

<sup>171</sup> *Verslag gemeenteraad Amsterdam* 1919, 3367.

<sup>172</sup> Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 143-144.

municipal fish stores, in spite of their profitability, and close the unprofitable municipal shoe store.<sup>173</sup> Although the municipal store could restart as electrical goods store of the *Gemeentelijke Energie Werken* [Municipal Energy Works, hereafter GEW], it showed the political limits of municipal stores and underlined the continued reliance of the SDAP on bourgeois parties for the implementation of municipal socialism.<sup>174</sup>

With the CDL established, De Miranda could embark on the most extensive project of municipalisation since Wim Treub, with the monopolisation of the acquisition and distribution of milk, frozen meat, and flour. Although De Miranda already proposed a municipal milk company in June 1920, delay tactics by the VDB and the RKSP, together with the bourgeois opposition meant the less controversial meat monopoly was the first to receive approval in February 1921.<sup>175</sup> Before monopolisation, there was widespread evidence of butchers treating foreign frozen meat unhygienically and selling it as more expensive fresh meat.<sup>176</sup> Although the Municipal Act allowed the municipality to regulate the sale of meat in the interest of public health, enforcement had proved difficult in the past three years.<sup>177</sup> While Rotterdam and The Hague would opt to restrict sale of frozen meat to a few special butcheries, the municipal council in Amsterdam preferred the high availability of a cheap alternative to fresh meat.<sup>178</sup> With support from the council and broad interpretation of the public health clauses of the Municipal Act, De Miranda established a municipal monopoly on the import and distribution of frozen meat, banning all private alternatives, to ensure municipal quality standards were met.<sup>179</sup> In the new system, the municipality would purchase some 100.000 kilograms of frozen meat per week from Argentine agricultural trusts.<sup>180</sup> Once the meat had arrived in port, it was stored in municipal cold stores, until hygienically qualified butchers requested delivery for direct sale to the public.<sup>181</sup>

With a staff of just four people, the *Gemeentelijke Vleeschvoorziening* [En. Municipal Meat Provision, hereafter GV] within the CDL, ensured quality control, cut out the trading middle classes, ran a modest profit and serviced a city of over 680.000 people with a yearly frozen meat consumption of over 5 million kg.<sup>182</sup> Although the effect on households' books of working class families is difficult to measure, auxiliary data provides some insight. Firstly, meat consumption in Amsterdam increased by a quarter from 20,7 kg per person in 1913 to 26,3 kg per person in 1923.<sup>183</sup> Secondly, frozen meat remained a cheaper alternative to fresh meat, with frozen meat prices in 1924 around 37 cents per 1000 gram, less than half the price of fresh meat at around 88 cents per 1000 gram.<sup>184</sup> Lastly, a inhabitant from Amsterdam consumed on average 7,3 kg of frozen meat per year to just 2,5 kg for the rest of the Netherlands.<sup>185</sup> At the very least, this proves the frozen meat of the GV was readily consumed by the capital's inhabitants and formed a substantial part of the city's meat diet. Furthermore, frozen meat in

<sup>173</sup> Couperus, *De Machinerie van de Stad*, 234-235; Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 144.

<sup>174</sup> Couperus, *De Machinerie van de Stad*, 235.

<sup>175</sup> Monne de Miranda, *De Gemeente als Koopvrouw of de ware geschiedenis van het Amsterdamsche vleeschmonoplie* [En. The Municipality as Merchant or the True History of the Amsterdam Meat Monopoly] (Amsterdam: N.V. De Ontwikkeling, 1924), 5. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=MMKB02:000124298> [Accessed 1-12-2023]; Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 147.

<sup>176</sup> De Miranda, *De Gemeente als Koopvrouw*, 9-10.

<sup>177</sup> Ibid.

<sup>178</sup> De Miranda, *De Gemeente en haar nieuwe taak*, 38-45; De Miranda, *De Gemeente als Koopvrouw*, 9-10.

<sup>179</sup> De Miranda, *De Gemeente als Koopvrouw*, 6-7.

<sup>180</sup> Before the Great Depression, large Argentine meat trusts dominated the global frozen meat market and practically set prices, therefore the monopoly only needed to cover the import of Argentine frozen meat; De Miranda, *De Gemeente als Koopvrouw*, 8.

<sup>181</sup> De Miranda, *De Gemeente als Koopvrouw*, 11.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>183</sup> Ibid., 16.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid.

<sup>185</sup> Ibid. 15.



Amsterdam was most likely more affordable and available than fresh *and* frozen meat in other municipalities.

Still, the Amsterdam meat import lobby repeatedly launched court challenges and attacks in the right-wing press.<sup>186</sup> De Miranda increasingly played the role of boogymen in this national press campaign, with reference to his Jewish heritage or his previous remarks on the abolition of the middle classes becoming increasingly commonplace in newspapers as far south as North Brabant.<sup>187</sup> In 1924, as the campaign against the monopoly reached its apex, the municipal council debated a petition by the meat lobby to abolish the monopoly. This time led by the RKSP leader Von Frijtag Drabbe, the bourgeois opposition proposed the abolition of the monopoly. However, the VDB and the left-wing or *arbeidersvleugel* [En. workers' wing] of the RKSP, led by alderman Ferdinand Wierdels, joined the SDAP and CPH in voting to maintain the GV.<sup>188</sup> With most of the right-wing of the RKSP abstaining to prevent a public split between the alderman and the municipal fraction, the proposal-Von Frijtag Drabbe was rejected 21 to 14.<sup>189</sup> The GV continued to import frozen meat even after a bourgeois minority municipal executive controlled Amsterdam between 1927 and 1929. Ultimately, outside economic factors, rather than local political decision making, would overtake the municipal meat monopoly. The Great Depression led to a collapse of fresh meat prices in the Netherlands, thereby making more popular fresh Dutch meat readily available to the working-class.<sup>190</sup> Demand for municipally imported and distributed Argentinian frozen meat decreased rapidly and the GV was abolished in 1933.

Buoyed by the preservation of the meat monopoly and strengthened by victory of the SDAP in 1923 Municipal Election, De Miranda continued his attempts to municipalize the purchase and distribution of flour and milk over liberal and right-wing confessional opposition.<sup>191</sup> With 16 social democratic, 4 communist, the alderman needed either the support of the four VDB councillors or three councillors of workers' wing of the RKSP to pass his proposals.

Rising European flour prices and stagnation of wages in Amsterdam in the summer of 1924 provided De Miranda the perfect opportunity for flour municipalisation.<sup>192</sup> With bread representing between 10.86% of the food expenditure of white-collar and 15.35% of the food expenditure of blue collar families, even the smallest change in the price of bread would have an outsize impact on living standards.<sup>193</sup> With the support of the SDAP, CPH, VDB and the left-wing RKSP councillors, De Miranda's flour municipalisation proposal passed the council in October 1924.<sup>194</sup> Again, right-wing RKSP councillors abstained to prevent a public split within the party. Now, the CDL was able to buy flour in bulk in the inland United States – which noted lower prices than the New York agricultural market rates – and distribute flour among the bakeries, maintaining the price of the working class staple

<sup>186</sup> “Het bevroren vleesmonopolie te Amsterdam: De prijzenpolitiek der Vleeschvoorziening”, *De Telegraaf* [En. The Telegraph], 1 October 1924. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:110562795:mpeg21:a0115> [Accessed 1-12-2023]; Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 187.

<sup>187</sup> “De Gemeente als Koopvrouw; De Middenstand als Voddenjood”, *Bredasche Courant* [En. The Breda Newspaper], 12 December 1924. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=MMSAB03:000063911:mpeg21:a0003> [Accessed 1-12-2023].

<sup>188</sup> “Het vleeschmonopolie van de gemeente”, *Het Volk* [En. The People], 21 October 1922. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:011082609:mpeg21:a0048> [Accessed 1-12-2023]; Monne de Miranda, “Amsterdamsche Vleeschmonopolie: Het laatste bedrijf”, *De Gemeente* 18 (1925): 11, 167-168; Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 187.

<sup>189</sup> Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 187.

<sup>190</sup> CBS, *Consumentenprijzen; gemiddelde prijzenvoedingsmiddelen*; “Vleeschpolitiek ongewijzigd: Voor de Amsterdamsche vleeschvoorziening is contingentteering van beperkte beteekenis”, *Het Volk* [En. The People], 10 February 1932. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:011116687:mpeg21:a0053> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>191</sup> Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 177

<sup>192</sup> J. Reitsma, “De Gemeentelijke Meelvoorziening in Amsterdam”, *Gemeentebestuur* [En. Municipal Governance] 6 (1925): 1, 29-36; 30.

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid.*, 34.

<sup>194</sup> Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 188.

white water bread to 20 cent per 800 gram, in spite of rising flour prices.<sup>195</sup> With this decision, the economically-right wing *Neutraal Blok aller Middenstanders* [En. Neutral Bloc of all Middle Classes, hereafter NBAM] declared: “Socialism is now going to reign supreme in the Amsterdam municipal council, we are now marching towards socialisation.”<sup>196</sup>

In spite of these momentous legislative victories in 1924, January 1925 would already prove the end of the heyday of socialist municipalisation. After five years in limbo, the proposal of the municipal milk company could finally be rescheduled for debate on 28 January 1925. Consumers faced similar problems with milk as with frozen meat. Salesmen defrauded consumers, diluted milk with water and treated milk unhygienically, which led to several typhoid-outbreaks.<sup>197</sup> To redress these abuses, a *Gemeentelijk Melkbedrijf* [En. Municipal Milk Company] would purchase milk in bulk, pasteurise the product, maintain quality through protein and fat content standards, and distribute milk bottles to licensed retailers and directly to consumers.<sup>198</sup> While no party in the municipal council disputed the abuses in the milk trade and the hygienic benefits of the proposal, De Miranda observed that: “[the proposal, red.] will run aground on political resistance ... Here fighting typhus coincides with putting a new company in the hands of the community.”<sup>199</sup>

The bourgeois majority in the council would not swallow another municipalisation of basic necessities, in spite of De Miranda’s public health arguments and his denial that milk municipalisation was not in fact a form of socialisation. The VDB, which had voted for the delay in 1920, opposed the municipalisation of milk as child typhoid deaths had markedly decreased over the years. The party would therefore vote against “unnecessary” socialisation of another industry.<sup>200</sup> Again the RKSP was internally divided, as alderman Wierdels publicly supported the proposal, with most of the council party privately opposed. However, this time, Von Frijtag-Drabbe convinced five of his seven colleagues to support his compromise proposal recognising the necessity of improved milk provision in Amsterdam, but declaring a socialised milk company “not yet” necessary.<sup>201</sup> Without either the VDB or a third councillor from the RKSP voting with the social democrats and communists, the proposal-Von Frijtag-Drabbe would delay De Miranda’s milk company for years to come, effectively scuttling the executive’s proposal. After fourteen days of debate, in which De Miranda spoke for some nine hours, the council finally voted 23 to 22 for the Von Frijtag-Drabbe motion.<sup>202</sup> Besides the SDAP and the CPH, the two most important representatives of the RKSP’s workers’ wing, councillor Van Lingen and alderman Wierdels, voted against the Von Frijtag-Drabbe motion. With the council effectively voting against a majority proposal from the municipal executive, the six aldermen had no choice but to resign in the ensuing political fallout.

While the SDAP aldermen Wibaut and Polak were easily re-elected in a reconstituted municipal executive, De Miranda could only return as alderman after he publicly abandoned his designs for the

<sup>195</sup> Reitsma, “De Gemeentelijke Meelvoorziening”, 32.

<sup>196</sup> Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 188.

<sup>197</sup> Dilution of milk was a long running problem in the Netherlands. It even contributed to modern foundations of Dutch criminal law, through the historic 1915 *Melk en water-arrest* [En. Milk and Water-decision]. A servant, the so-called actual perpetrator, had committed the crime of selling diluted milk as whole milk. His employer, a cattle farmer had, unbeknownst to the farm hand, diluted milk with water and had directed his servant to sell the milk. Due to the so-called absence of all guilt, the servant was found not guilty, whilst the farmer, the *middelijke dader* [En. principle in the second degree] could still be found guilty and fined; Borrie, *F.M. Wibaut*, 150-151.

<sup>198</sup> Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 189.

<sup>199</sup> *Ibid.*, 188.

<sup>200</sup> “Amsterdam – Gemeenteraadszitting”, *De Maasbode* [En. The Meuse Messenger], 11 February 1925.

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=MMKB04:000194122:mpeg21:a0057> [Accessed 1-12-2023]; Couperus, *De Machinerie van de Stad*, 235-236.

<sup>201</sup> Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 189.

<sup>202</sup> J. Bosmans, *Romme, Biografie 1896-1946* [En. Romme, Biography, 1896-1946] (Utrecht: Het Spectrum, 1991), 133; Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 191.

municipal milk company, the flagship of basic necessities municipalisation.<sup>203</sup> However, the greatest political victim of the “*melkoorlog*” [En. Milk War] was Ferdinand Wierdels.<sup>204</sup> Derisively called the “errand boy” of the SDAP, the RKSP alderman would not return in the municipal executive.<sup>205</sup> The conservative Von Frijtag-Drabbe was elected as his replacement to prevent another painful split between the Roman Catholic council party and their alderman.<sup>206</sup> To add insult to injury, his RKSP colleagues passed the experienced alderman over as party group chair in favour of the 28-year-old Carl Romme.<sup>207</sup> With Von Frijtag-Drabbe as alderman and Romme as party group chair, the RKSP increasingly pursued oppositional politics against the social democratic alderman in the municipal executive and the municipal council.<sup>208</sup> As the RKSP alderman now voted together with the bourgeois mayor and aldermen, the three SDAP aldermen could only bring proposals for municipalisation with minority executive support to the council. Together with Romme enforcing party discipline against the workers’ wing of the RKSP, this effectively closed the window for the municipalisation of basic necessities until the SDAP and communists controlled a majority.<sup>209</sup>

Although the *Algemeen Handelsblad* and the right-wing press celebrated the end of a “*gemeentelijk Luilekkerland*” [En. Municipal Land of Cockaigne; lit. Municipal Lazy-tasty land] with the defeat of municipal milk, municipal interventionism in basic necessities did not completely cease.<sup>210</sup> The final plank of socialist municipal interventionism was the rationalisation of work through centralised municipal services. In the case of basic necessities, this meant the establishment of a central wholesale market, to discard the role of inefficient and expensive middle men and economise the distribution of foodstuffs throughout Amsterdam, as Wibaut and De Miranda had argued since in the municipal council and *De Gemeente* since 1912.<sup>211</sup> In July 1926, after more than four years of arduous preparation, the municipal executive finally proposed the construction of the *Centrale Markt* [En. Central Market] complex in Amsterdam West.<sup>212</sup> In an example of the RKSP increasingly oppositional attitude, Romme had coordinated with the entire bourgeois opposition to delay the proposal until after the election in an attempt to further curtail De Miranda.<sup>213</sup> Ironically, alderman Von Frijtag-Drabbe, together with Wierdels and Van Lingem, joined the SDAP and the CPH to defeat the proposal to delay.<sup>214</sup> After Romme’s designs had failed, the RKSP, VDB and ARP voted in favour of the *Centrale Markt*, with De Miranda’s proposal passing with a comfortable majority of 34 to 8.<sup>215</sup> This led the bourgeois NBAM councillor to quip that “It has become apparent – it is already in the newspapers (laughter) – that the reins have slipped from Mr Romme, and Mr Wierdels is now in charge.”<sup>216</sup> Eight years later, De Miranda could open the central market at the Jan van Galenstraat, a complex of 400.000 square metres, with

<sup>203</sup> Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 194-195.

<sup>204</sup> Couperus, *De Machinerie van de Stad*, 236.

<sup>205</sup> Bosmans, *Romme*, 133.

<sup>206</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>207</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>208</sup> *Ibid.*, 135-138.

<sup>209</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>210</sup> “Amsterdamsche Gemeenteraad – De Melkvoorziening der Hoofdstad”, *Algemeen Handelsblad* [En. General Trade Newspaper], 28 July 1927. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010659562:mpeg21:a0092> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>211</sup> Slot and Moor, *Wibaut: Onderkoning van Amsterdam*, 207; Wibaut, “Gemeentelijke zorg voor Levensmiddelen I”, 700-705; De Miranda, “Centrale Markthallen voor den Groothandel”, 790-793.

<sup>212</sup> “Gemeenteraad van Amsterdam – De Marktplanen”, *De Tribune* [En. The Tribune], 25 October 1926. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010468640:mpeg21:a0042> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>213</sup> Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 209.

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>215</sup> “Gemeenteraad van Amsterdam – De Marktplanen”.

<sup>216</sup> “Amsterdam – Gemeenteraadszitting”, *De Maasbode* [En. The Meuse Messenger], 23 October 1923. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=MMKB04:000196857:mpeg21:a0042> [Accessed 1-12-2023].

warehouses, cold stores, train connections, and 10 separate offloading harbours, centralising the trade in foodstuffs for wholesale traders, regulating and rationalising prices across the city.<sup>217</sup>

## 6. Municipalisation of Housework & Social Hygiene

Concurrent with his attempts at municipalisation of basic necessities, De Miranda proved far more successful in the municipalisation of housework and social hygiene washing in Amsterdam. In 1920, on the same day as the council debate on the controversial CDL, the council unanimously approved the establishment of the *Dienst der Wasch- en Schoonmaak, Bad- en Zweminrichtingen* [En. Service of Washing and Cleaning, Bathing and Swimming Facilities, hereafter WSBZ].<sup>218</sup> Through the establishment and exploitation of municipal bathing and washing facilities and municipal pools, De Miranda sought to “to simplify the work of the housewife, to lighten her heavy burden, to make domestic life more pleasant and to promote the health of the individual through cleanliness.”<sup>219</sup> Betraying some electoral considerations, De Miranda declared “a woman who has the right to vote should not stand at the washtub.”<sup>220</sup>

The washing service of the WSBZ operated a centralised laundry service with home collection and delivery and two public washhouses. The laundry service washed some 1 million kilograms of laundry per year, largely for the lower middle classes and well-earning working classes able to afford the 28 cents per kilogram, and another 60.438 kilograms laundry without costs for midwives and families on benefits.<sup>221</sup> The public washhouses provided a popular and more affordable alternative, charging 12 cents per kilogram, with access to a washing machine and washboard with free soap and bleaching powder for hand wash.<sup>222</sup> With these appliances, housewives could wash some 15 kilograms in two hours, as a woman declared: “I used to do this hard work [washing for a family of six adult men, red.] all week and now it only takes two hours. You don't know what that means!”<sup>223</sup> At the same time, the bathing service of the WSBZ built and acquired some 16 bath houses and five specialised child bath houses.<sup>224</sup> The WSBZ provided propaganda and education for adults and children with social hygiene, while the bath houses provided some 1.4 million baths per year – a tenfold increase from before municipalisation – for 5 cents per bath.<sup>225</sup> Finally, the WSBZ exploited public swimming pools, where children were taught how to swim. After pollution in Amstel rendered the four public river baths unusable, De Miranda acquired the funds and approval and the WSBZ constructed – as crowning achievement – the Amstelparkbad in 1932, later renamed the De Mirandabad, as the first covered and closed swimming pool in the capital.<sup>226</sup> While De Miranda attempted and only partially succeeded in municipally intervening in basic necessities, his interventions with the WSBZ passed unanimously and with little debate through the council.<sup>227</sup> De Miranda believed the reason to be the broad support among

<sup>217</sup> “De Marktplanen”, *De Amstelbode* [En. The Amstel Messenger], 11 October 1926.

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=MMSAA06:165630009:mpeg21:a00017> [Accessed 1-12-2023]; Slot and Moor, *Wibaut: Onderkoning van Amsterdam*, 207.

<sup>218</sup> “Overzicht uit den Amsterdamsche Gemeenteraad”, *De Tribune* [En. The Tribune], 27 February 1920. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=KBDDD02:000203969:mpeg21:a0004> [Accessed 1-12-2023].

<sup>219</sup> De Miranda, *De Gemeente en haar nieuwe taak*, 74.

<sup>220</sup> There was a fear within the SDAP that the introduction of women's suffrage would result in losses for the party in the next elections, because women would vote more confessional than men. That is why much attention was paid to propaganda specifically aimed at women, and a number of typical “women's issues” were included in the new municipal programme; Ulla Jansz, “Gemeentelijk koken en wassen in Amsterdam. 1915-1939”, *Amsterdams Sociologisch Tijdschrift* [En. Amsterdam Sociological Periodical] 7 (1980), 4, 501-523; 505-506; De Miranda, *De Gemeente en haar nieuwe taak*, 75.

<sup>221</sup> Monne de Miranda, “Het Amsterdamsche Waschbedrijf - II”, *De Gemeente* 17 (1924): 2, 17-20; 20.

<sup>222</sup> L. Tilanus, “Het gemeentelijk waschhuis”, *De Gemeente* 19 (1926): 3, 33-40; 35.

<sup>223</sup> *Ibid.*, 37.

<sup>224</sup> De Miranda, *De Gemeente en haar nieuwe taak*, 98; Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 147.

<sup>225</sup> De Miranda, *De Gemeente en haar nieuwe taak*, 89; 96; Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 148.

<sup>226</sup> Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 204.

<sup>227</sup> “Overzicht uit den Amsterdamsche Gemeenteraad”; Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 198; 208.



female voters and female representatives of the bourgeois parties for the proposals on hygienic grounds.<sup>228</sup> Indeed, Amsterdam was neither the first or the only municipality to municipalize of social hygiene, even if it did so in greater volume, with both major and minor municipalities establishing public baths, bathhouses and accompanying municipal services.<sup>229</sup>

Thus, De Miranda presided over one of the most extensive projects of municipalisation in the Netherlands since Wim Treub. Where most municipalities abolished their unpopular war time basic necessities departments, De Miranda sought to bring about indirect price control through competition by municipal stores, direct price and quality control through municipal monopoly and rationalisation of work through centralised municipal services. However, without an outright or social democratic-communist majority in the municipal council, the SDAP had to rely on bourgeois partners, especially the RKSP and the VDB, for support in its municipalisation efforts. As the memory of the First World War and food shortages faded and suspicion of socialisation and De Miranda increased, municipalisation of basic necessities faced increased opposition from bourgeois parties. With the defeat of municipal milk and the departure of Wierdels from the municipal executive, the window for large-scale municipalisation had closed. Thus, municipalisation of basic necessities by the SDAP in Amsterdam proved largely impermanent. Of the three aims of municipalisation only rationalisation of commerce through centralised servicing of demand in the Central Market remained by 1940. Indirect price control through competition by municipal stores only remained in the electrical goods and appliances market through the stores of the GEW. Direct price and quality control through municipal monopoly ended in 1933. The municipal milk company had been defeated in 1925 and officially buried in 1927. The municipal flour monopoly would end in 1927 with the establishment of the right-wing minority municipal executive and the return of lower flour prices.<sup>230</sup> The municipal frozen meat monopoly was abolished by another right-wing minority municipal executive after the collapse of fresh meat prices in 1933. On the other hand, municipalisation of housework and social hygiene proved uncontroversial in the council, popular with (female) voters and therefore lasting in Amsterdam and fit for application outside Amsterdam. Indeed, the last municipal washhouse in Amsterdam closed as late as 1975; the municipality still operates its own swimming pools – including the De Mirandabad – and a single bath house.<sup>231</sup>

## 7. The 1927 Municipal Election and the First Aldermanless Period

After two years of increasingly acrimonious opposition to the executive, Romme made the objective of the RKSP for the 1927 Municipal Election abundantly clear: the rectification of the “mistake of 1921”, c.q. the removal of the third social democratic alderman.<sup>232</sup> Through its three out of a total of six aldermen, the SDAP controlled all major departments, with the exception of Public Works – whose director was a party member and brother-in-law to Wibaut – and dominated the politics of the capital. This commanding position was as much the result of social democratic electoral performance as the relatively strong VDB and communist presence in Amsterdam.<sup>233</sup> With this nominal left-wing majority,

<sup>228</sup> De Miranda, *De Gemeente en haar nieuwe taak*, 74-75.

<sup>229</sup> Monne de Miranda, “De Rotterdamsche Badhuizen”, *De Gemeente* 19 (1926): 20, 368-373; CBS, *Statistiek der Gemeentefinanciën, 1927* [En. Statistics of Municipal Finances, 1927] (Alphen aan den Rijn: N. Samsom, 1927), 16-17.

<sup>230</sup> Stadsarchief Amsterdam, *Archief van de Centrale Voorzieningsdienst en rechtsvoorganger*. [En. Archive of the Central Provision Service and legal predecessor] <https://archief.amsterdam/inventarissen/details/5246/keywords/Gemeentelijke%20Vleesvoorziening> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>231</sup> Monumenten en Archeologie, *Erfgoed van de Week | Amsterdamse badhuizen, een sprong in het diepe!*. [En. Heritage of the Week | Amsterdam bathhouses, a leap of faith!] <https://www.amsterdam.nl/kunst-cultuur/monumenten/erfgoed-week/amsterdamse-badhuizen/> [Accessed 3-8-2023]

<sup>232</sup> Bosmans, *Romme*, 135.

<sup>233</sup> While particularly strong in Amsterdam, the mainstream CPH and its council parties had split in 1927 over the expulsion of three members of the party for their opposition to the party's Komintern membership. The *Communistische Partij Holland – Centraal Comité* [En. Communist Party Holland – Central Committee,

the Amsterdam SDAP was practically indispensable for stable governance, while their colleagues in The Hague and Rotterdam, with their similar or better electoral performance, had to accede to just two aldermen in the face of bourgeois majorities. Only by maintaining lock-step cooperation of all bourgeois parties – including the VDB – would Romme be able to achieve his objective and replicate The Hague and Rotterdam.

During the election, the social democrats campaigned on familiar themes, construction of new homes, destruction of slums, the introduction of municipal milk, and their opposition to the recent repeal of the national rent laws.<sup>234</sup> Concurrently, the bourgeois parties campaigned vigorously against a municipal income tax hike proposed by Wibaut, with chants like “Workers, watch your pennies. Wibaut is a thief!”<sup>235</sup> The RKSP further made equalisation of municipal financing for public and religious schools and the “protection of the *Roomsche* [En. Roman Catholic; lit. Roman] child” a central part of their campaign.<sup>236</sup> In spite of these strong words and a hard-fought campaign, the nominal left-wing majority remained, with council composition changing only lightly. The SDAP garnered a total of fifteen seats, losing a single seat to the new revolutionary socialist *Arbeiderscomité* [En. Workers’ Committee], one of the forebearers of the future *Revolutionair Socialistische Arbeiderspartij* [En. Revolutionary Socialist Workers’ Party, hereafter RSAP]. The RKSP also lost a seat, winning seven, with the LSP profiting and growing to five seats. In spite of the largely unchanged political constellation, Romme proposed a municipal executive with just two social democrats and one each for the VDB, LSP, RKSP and CHU.

Romme offered the close SDAP ally VDB entry into the municipal executive, six years after they had lost their aldermanship to the SDAP, on the condition that it broke ranks with the nominal left-wing majority.<sup>237</sup> With the freethinking-democrat Abrahams eyeing a return to the municipal executive, he joined the twenty-one other bourgeois councillors with his two VDB colleagues. The SDAP had been presented with a *fait accompli*. Although the RKSP, CHU, VDB and LSP only controlled nineteen seats, neither the ARP or the NBAM preferred the social democrats over the liberal-confessional coalition and helped them to a shaky majority. In spite of this, the SDAP held their ground: either “three or nothing.”<sup>238</sup> Twice Wibaut and De Miranda were elected as aldermen, twice they refused their election. Instead, their aldermanships were “temporarily” held by the conservative liberal Boissevain and the freethinking-democrat Ketelaar.<sup>239</sup> As Wibaut, De Miranda and Polak were hounded from their seats behind the green mayoral table and swore revenge in a tumultuous party congress in the *Concertgebouw*, the “first aldermanless period” had commenced.<sup>240</sup>

In line with their promises in the *Concertgebouw* to “destroy the pernicious bourgeois bloc” – dixit Polak – and defeat the “pimp” Romme and his “prostitutes” in the VDB – dixit De Miranda, the SDAP would pursue incredibly acrimonious opposition against the new municipal executive.<sup>241</sup> Even worse for the bourgeois bloc, the executive proved largely ineffective, with both friend and foe questioning the competence of the aldermen.<sup>242</sup> Indeed, the Anti-Revolutionary Mayor Willem de Vlugt opined to a

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hereafter CPH-CC] won seats in Amsterdam and Rotterdam in the 1927 Municipal Election. The Amsterdam CPH-CC council fraction, led by David Wijnkoop, would rejoin the CPH in 1930.

<sup>234</sup> “Nieuws uit de hoofdstad”, *Deli Courant* [En. Deli Newspaper], 16 June 1927.

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=MMKB15:000087060:mpeg21:a00033> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>235</sup> “Roomsche opvoeding”, *Het Volk* [En. The People], 25 May 1927.

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:011114087:mpeg21:a0118> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>236</sup> “Amsterdam – De aanstaande raadsverkiezing”, *De Tijd: Godsdiensig-Staatkundig Dagblad* [En. The Times: Religious-Political Daily Newspaper], 19 May 1927.

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010531953:mpeg21:a0111> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>237</sup> Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 214; Bosmans, *Romme*, 143.

<sup>238</sup> Kaal, *Het hoofd van de stad*, 63; Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 213-214; Bosmans, *Romme*, 144.

<sup>239</sup> Bosmans, *Romme*, 143.

<sup>240</sup> Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 215.

<sup>241</sup> Bosmans, *Romme*, 144; Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 216.

<sup>242</sup> Kaal, *Het hoofd van de stad*, 63-64; Bosmans, *Romme*, 143-144.



friend: “Boissevain does nothing. Ter Haar can’t do anything. Rutgers is weak.”<sup>243</sup> The executive was “weak and divided among themselves and the opposition of the powerful Social Democratic Workers Party in the council. It won’t be long before the executive falls apart.”<sup>244</sup> Only through a lockstep agreement could the municipal executive implement policy. Thus, the aldermen were only able to bury the proposed municipal milk monopoly and end the municipal flour monopoly in response to decreasing flour prices. The equalisation of municipal financing for public and religious schools, a key priority of the confessional parties, remained as politically taboo with the new LSP-VDB executive majority as with their SDAP-LSP predecessors.<sup>245</sup> When the executive finally fell over a proposed lowering of municipal electricity rates, the indispensability of the SDAP in the governance of the municipality had become clear to the bourgeois bloc.<sup>246</sup> After two years in opposition, the SDAP could have their revenge. The new municipal executive would be the most left-wing to date. Not only did all three social democratic aldermen return, they could finally eject the conservative liberal LSP and “aristocratic” CHU from the executive and replace them with their natural ally, the VDB, and the more “democratic” ARP councillor Jan Douwes.<sup>247</sup> Furthermore, for the first time, all parties accepted and countersigned a binding SDAP-composed urgency program for the municipality.<sup>248</sup> Romme’s political masterstroke had paved the way for hitherto unseen social democratic dominance in the Dutch capital. However, it also proved the powerful SDAP could be defied, as it would be again four years later after a stock market crash in New York and the “worst law of all time” from The Hague reared their heads in Amsterdam.<sup>249</sup>

## 8. Wibaut, Municipal Finances, and the Financial Relationship Act, 1929

With the advent of municipal interventionism from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century onwards, municipal expenditure per capita had grown exponentially, from just f 4.59 per capita in Amsterdam in 1875 to f 41.08 per capita in 1919.<sup>250</sup> At the same time municipalities increasingly turned to surtaxes on national taxes and municipal poll taxes to cover their expenditure, as the previously dominant municipal excise taxes had been abolished in 1865.<sup>251</sup> Municipal tax receipts in the Netherlands grew steadily from f 16.7 million in 1870 to f 24.6 million in 1900 and f 227.2 million in 1920.<sup>252</sup> However, tax avoidance by wealthy commuters, the regressive nature of the sur- and poll taxes, and the perennial inability of existing taxes to cover growing municipal expenditure prompted successive national governments to attempt reform. In 1897, both a commuter income tax and a small, fixed government subsidy per inhabitant were introduced and the national income surtax was expanded.<sup>253</sup> By 1900, a progressive footing of the

<sup>243</sup> Kaal, *Het hoofd van de stad*, 64.

<sup>244</sup> Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 231.

<sup>245</sup> Bosmans, *Romme*, 144.

<sup>246</sup> Indeed, the VDB, ARP and CHU publically abandoned their opposition to a Social Democratic majority in the municipal executive, leaving the RKSP’s position significantly weakened; Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 231; Bosmans, *Romme*, 156-157.

<sup>247</sup> Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 231.

<sup>248</sup> “Ons program van hervormingen aanvaard”, *Het Volk* [En. The People], 17 September 1929.

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:011115503:mpeg21:a0131> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>249</sup> Wibaut, *Levensbouw*, 331-332.

<sup>250</sup> N.A. de Vries. *Het stelsel der gemeentelijke belastingen* [En. The System of Municipal Taxes] (Amsterdam: Ontwikkeling, 1924), 13. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=MMKB02:000118182:00017> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>251</sup> Before the Financial Relationship Act, 1865, local excise taxes had been the staple of Dutch local finance, with such taxation contributing large parts of urban budgets since the Middle Ages; S.M.H. Dusarduijn, “De fiscale geschiedenis van Nederland in vogelvlucht”, in *Inleiding belastingheffing ondernemingen en particulieren* [En. Introduction taxation of companies and private individuals] ed. A. C. Rijkers (Amersfoort: Sdu Fiscale & Financiële Uitgevers, 2012), 10-13.

<sup>252</sup> P.M.M. Klep, A. Lansink and W. van Mulken, “De kohieren van de gemeentelijke hoofdelijke omslag, 1851-1922”, in *Broncommentaren I* [En. Source commentaries I], ed. M. Duijghuisen (Arnhem: Nederlands Instituut voor Geschiedenis, 1982), 7.

<sup>253</sup> From 1897 onwards, a commuter paid municipal taxes of the municipality of his work over two-thirds of his total income, with the remaining third subject to taxes of his residence municipality. The national income surtax meant municipalities could add 40 *opcenten* or 40% on inhabitants’ national income tax bill to fund the

municipal income tax was partially introduced. By 1920 all remaining bars for municipal progressive income tax were removed and municipal tax powers were expanded to cover capital in the form of dividends and *tantièmes* and business through corporate, tourists- and insurance taxes.<sup>254</sup> However, even the expanded tax base and the fixed subsidy were unable to resolve the growing gap between municipal ends and means, a matter which would only be politically resolved by the “worst law of all time”, Financial Relationship Act, 1929, over the opposition of Floor Wibaut.

Before the 1929 Act, Floor Wibaut had gained a reputation for sound, efficient *and* social democratic financial management among his contemporaries as Alderman of Finance of the capital, a position he held from 1919 to 1927 and again from 1929 to 1931 – even if posterity remembers him most for his work as Alderman of Public Housing.<sup>255</sup> In his speech-turned-booklet *Gemeentebeheer* [En. Municipal Governance], Wibaut explained his policies as (1) a balanced budget, paid for through the capstones of a municipal progressive income tax, (2) a clear delineation between “normal” expenditure on everyday services, financed through taxes, and capital expenditure on all long-term investments, financed by loans, and (3) efficient expenditure and business operations, monitored by municipal efficiency inspectors.<sup>256</sup> These represented significant breaks with contemporary economic orthodoxy.<sup>257</sup> Following his first dictate, Wibaut both lowered working-class taxes and explicitly replaced civil servants’ salaries and workmen’s wages as the traditionally preferred capstone for municipal budgets, instead regulating wages through collective bargaining between the executive and its employees.<sup>258</sup> By his second dictate, Wibaut argued that all long-term “societally useful” investments, irrespective of their profitability, should be financed by loans, with the accompanying interest and instalments covered by profits from municipal enterprises.<sup>259</sup> Economic orthodoxy and directives from the national governments still held loans were only viable if the return on investment in direct savings or profits after the first year of completion covered the interest and instalments of the loan.<sup>260</sup> Unprofitable investments such as parks, hospitals, schools, harbours and infrastructure projects were still to be financed through “normal” revenue, to the detriment of societal investment or higher tax burdens.<sup>261</sup> Finally, in his third dictate, Wibaut provided an alternative to the austerity politics from the confessional national governments, “which does not achieve effectiveness”, through efficiency as “a saving in the sense of effectiveness in expenditure of all time and at all times.”<sup>262</sup> With these policies, Wibaut was able to fund Amsterdam’s welfare municipality and maintain spending and investment in public housing, education, public health, public enterprises and social assistance with a surplus, in spite of national cuts between 1919 and 1927.

Still, Amsterdam, with its large and relatively prosperous tax base, stable access to low-interest capital and political support for or at least acquiescence of high municipal taxes, was an exception. Less populous and poorer municipalities found it difficult to cover government-mandated expenses for

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municipal government. Furthermore, municipalities received a fixed subsidy between *f* 1.45 (Emmen) and *f* 4.93 (Ferwarderadeel) per inhabitant. However, by 1920, inflation and municipal interventionism had rendered this subsidy negligible to the broader municipal budget; Floor Wibaut, *De Financiële Verhouding tussen Rijk en gemeenten* [En. The Financial Relationship between National government and municipalities] (Amsterdam: Ontwikkeling, 1928), 6. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=MMKB24:065667000:00019> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>254</sup> A *tantième* is (a part of) corporate profit paid out to company owners, unlike dividends no relation to shares is necessary; Klep, Lansink and Van Mulken, “De kohieren”, 7-9; Borrie, *Wibaut*, 153.

<sup>255</sup> Willem Drees, “Financieel Gemeentebeheer”, *De Gemeente* 19 (1926): 16, 241; Kaal, *Het hoofd van de stad*, 64.

<sup>256</sup> Floor Wibaut, *Gemeentebeheer – Financieel beheer; bedrijfsbeheer* [En. Municipal Governance – Financial governance; business governance] (Amsterdam: Ontwikkeling, 1926), 16-21. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=MMKB24:065667000> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>257</sup> Borrie, *Wibaut*, 157-159.

<sup>258</sup> Wibaut, *Gemeentebeheer*, 14-15.

<sup>259</sup> *Ibid.*, 24.

<sup>260</sup> Drees, “Financieel Gemeentebeheer”, 245.

<sup>261</sup> Wibaut, *Gemeentebeheer*, 14-15; Drees, “Financieel Gemeentebeheer”, 245.

<sup>262</sup> Wibaut, *Gemeentebeheer*, 20-21.

education, social assistance, public health and safety, and maintain necessary expenditure in “autonomous” areas, such as infrastructure and municipal services.<sup>263</sup> After six years of deliberation, in late 1927, a cross-party royal commission tasked with finding “the most effective financial relationship between the national government and municipalities” proposed a system of supplementary national government grants for government-mandated expenses and other expenses incurred on behalf of the national government.<sup>264</sup> At the same time, the royal commission rejected a single municipal fund grant and maintained municipal tax prerogatives. The royal commission defended their proposal as the only viable alternative to redress the inherent inequalities of the 1897 law, without fundamentally and “unjustly” disrupting local democracy by removing the power of the purse.<sup>265</sup>

Yet, the Christian-Historical Minister of Finance, Dirk-Jan de Geer, rejected the report out of hand and designed his own proposal, the Financial Relationship Act, 1929.<sup>266</sup> In the accompanying white paper, the Minister explained that psychological identification of inhabitants with their municipalities had rapidly decreased as a result of industrialisation and improved transportation.<sup>267</sup> At the same time, the excesses of industrialisation had implored large, industrialising “central” municipalities to take on new responsibilities and increase progressive taxes.<sup>268</sup> Inversely, wealthy commuter municipalities with few collective responsibilities and continued poll taxes became tax havens.<sup>269</sup> Thus, Amsterdam collected 10.8% tax on the highest income brackets, while a commuter municipality such as Baarn only collected a 4% poll tax.<sup>270</sup> In the eyes of De Geer, the Netherlands had become a highly-differentiated patchwork of income tax regimes, with inhabitants, and especially commuters, only aware of the reality come tax day.<sup>271</sup> Instead, the Minister proposed a central *Gemeentefonds* [En. Municipal Fund] paid for through a single, universal surtax on the national income tax. Through a complicated formula, municipalities would receive their income through unearmarked and earmarked grants based on population size and relative wealth, while their tax powers were reduced to a few minor regressive taxes.<sup>272</sup> Where a municipality would receive around four-fifths of their earnings from municipal taxes, they would now rely for four-fifths on these national grants. In return for a yearly f 80 million grant, which the Minister promised would remain untouched for at least five years, the power of the local purse would move from a thousand city halls to the Ministry of Finance in The Hague.

In the following months, Wibaut tried in vain to organise opposition to De Geer’s proposal, both in his party and in the cross-party *Vereeniging van Nederlandsche Gemeenten* [En. Association of Netherlands Municipalities, hereafter VNG] with meetings, resolutions, and articles in publications like *Het Volk*, *De Socialistische Gids*, *De Gemeente* and books such as *De Financiële Verhouding tussen Rijk en gemeenten* [En. The Financial relationship between State and Municipalities] and *Per expresstrein...*

<sup>263</sup> Meindert van der Kaaij, *Een eenzaam staatsman: Dirk de Geer 1870-1960* [En. A lonely statesman: Dirk de Geer 1870-1960] (Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2012), 223-226; F.A.C. van Lynden van Sandenburg et al., *Verslag van de Staatscommissie in zake de financiële verhouding tusschen het rijk en de gemeenten* [En. Report of the State Commission on the financial relationship between the government and the municipalities] (The Hague: Algemeene Landsdrukkerij, 1927), 18-21.

<sup>264</sup> Van Lynden van Sandenburg et al., *Verslag van de Staatscommissie*, 85-91.

<sup>265</sup> *Ibid.*, 47.

<sup>266</sup> Van der Kaaij, *Een eenzaam staatsman*, 226.

<sup>267</sup> Dirk-Jan de Geer, *Herziening van de financiële verhouding tusschen Rijk en gemeenten en wijziging van eenige bepalingen der Gemeentewet* [En. Revision of the financial relationship between the government and municipalities and amendment of some provisions of the Municipalities Act], 29 April 1929, 5.

[https://repository.overheid.nl/frbr/sgd/19281929/0000292397/1/pdf/SGD\\_19281929\\_0000701.pdf](https://repository.overheid.nl/frbr/sgd/19281929/0000292397/1/pdf/SGD_19281929_0000701.pdf) [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>268</sup> *Ibid.*, 5-6.

<sup>269</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>270</sup> De Liagre Böhl, *Wibaut de Machtige*, 346.

<sup>271</sup> De Geer, *Herziening van de financiële verhouding*, 6-7.

<sup>272</sup> This included such minor taxes as the street tax, predecessor to the current *Onroerende Zaken Belasting* [En. Real Estate Tax, hereafter OZB] and a tax on dogs; De Geer, *Herziening van de financiële verhouding*, 12.

*acheruit!* [En. With Expresstrain... backwards!].<sup>273</sup> He warned that municipal autonomy, municipal socialism, would be made impossible with this law, as the capstone of municipal finance, the municipal progressive income tax, was removed.<sup>274</sup> Furthermore, a minister opposed to government intervention could forcibly cull municipal interventionism, either generally, every five years with the recalibration of the Municipal Fund, or whenever a municipality was confronted with unexpected costs and required subjective aid, where it otherwise would have raised taxes.<sup>275</sup> In spite of these efforts and two negatively worded resolutions passing the VSDG and VNG, the House of Representatives – including the SDAP – approved the law unanimously without a vote.<sup>276</sup> In his 1936 autobiography, Wibaut explained the vote as motivated by simple maths – for most municipalities the grant was larger than income tax receipts – rather than principle, in the case of Wibaut, the belief in municipal autonomy and socialism.<sup>277</sup> Yet, the now-sickly grand old man could also conclude his cassandraic warnings had proven correct, as the Municipal Fund had become a continual victim of the austerity of the crisis cabinets of the 1930s.<sup>278</sup>

## 9. Conclusion: The Zenith of Municipal Socialism in Amsterdam, 1914-1931

The 72 year old Wibaut would not return as alderman or councillor after the 1931 Municipal Election. His age made another four year term as alderman unlikely and his fellow social democratic aldermen advised against a return as councillor.<sup>279</sup> With some emotion and ample praise from friend and foe, Wibaut retired after nearly twenty-five years as councillor, of which sixteen years as alderman. Mayor De Vlucht awarded his long-time colleague the highest decoration of the city, the Golden Medal of Amsterdam, for his great merits and services as alderman.<sup>280</sup> The SDAP organised an hour-long procession past his house. A grand goodbye for the grand old man of the party, since the death of Troelstra in 1930.<sup>281</sup> He was succeeded as local *lijsttrekker* [En. party leader; lit. list puller] by De Miranda, as the party expanded its plurality in 1931 Election, winning 16 seats, or one more than 1927. Furthermore, even with the introduction of the Municipal Fund and the financial headwinds from across the Atlantic, Wibaut had been able to maintain balanced budgets for his last three years in office, through the large financial reserves built up through municipal tax earnings from the previous decade.<sup>282</sup> Wibaut would leave at the zenith of Municipal Socialism in Amsterdam and would experience none of the dark days of his long-time colleague Ed. Polak, his successor at the Finance Department.

Even between 1914 and 1931, retrospectively marked by unparalleled municipal (financial) autonomy and strong social democratic electoral performance, the municipal socialist project of the SDAP Amsterdam was still thoroughly dependent on outside actors and factors. At the hand of three themes, public housing, municipalisation and municipal finances, the social democratic dependence on uncontrollable outside factors, namely global developments and the world economy, and influenceable outside actors, bourgeois political forces in the capital and the confessional national governments of the interwar period, were explored. In public housing, Wibaut and De Miranda were limited by war-induced good shortages and profiteering in the construction sector, whilst national government grants first

<sup>273</sup> Borrie, *Wibaut*, 194-203; Wibaut, *De Financiële Verhouding*; Floor Wibaut, *Per expresstrein... acheruit!* [En. With Expresstrain... backwards!] (Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers, 1929).

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=MMKB18A:015218000:00007> [Accessed 1-12-2023].

<sup>274</sup> Wibaut, *De Financiële Verhouding*, 19-21; De Liagre Böhl, *Wibaut de Machtige*, 408-409.

<sup>275</sup> Ibid.

<sup>276</sup> Borrie, *Wibaut*, 200-203.

<sup>277</sup> Wibaut, *Levensbouw*, 333-334.

<sup>278</sup> De Liagre Böhl, *Wibaut de Machtige*, 410-411.

<sup>279</sup> Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 243.

<sup>280</sup> “Amsterdamsche Brieven – Het Afscheid van wethouder Dr. Wibaut”, *De Sumatra post* [En. The Sumatra post], 15 September 1931. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010970993:mpeg21:a0113> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>281</sup> “De Burgemeester huldigt Dr. Wibaut”, *Algemeen Handelsblad* [En. General Trade Paper], 29 August 1931. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010661972:mpeg21:a0159> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>282</sup> Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 243.

empowered and later constrained municipal housing construction. However, with broad support from the municipal council, the aldermen were still able to construct thousands of homes for the working-class through compromises with these outside factors and actors. By constructing temporary wooden houses, by employing concrete construction, by building garden cities in fallow land and destroying slums with government grants. With municipalisation of basic necessities, housework and social hygiene, the importance of political support of or acquiescence by bourgeois parties in the municipal council, particularly the VDB and RKSP, in lieu of an outright proletarian majority, has been clearly displayed. The increasingly wavering bourgeois political support for municipalisation of basic necessities meant its ultimate failure, the inverse continued support for municipalisation of housework and social hygiene meant its enduring success. The Financial Relationship Act, 1929 demonstrated the limits of social democratic municipal governance in a centralised nation-state with predominantly confessional national governments. Without adequate opposition in the Dutch parliament to this restriction of municipal autonomy, the national government could implement such a restrictive financial framework for Amsterdam's municipal project. Ultimately, while social democratic participation in the Amsterdam municipal executive enabled municipal socialist projects, it placed the SDAP aldermen in a network of interdependence with uncontrollable outside factors, namely global developments and the world economy, and influenceable outside actors, bourgeois political forces in the capital and the confessional national governments in The Hague.

## II

### *Hofstad & Havenstad*: Municipal Socialism in The Hague and Rotterdam

“A pale, now bloodless liberalism had left the cities to decay, the villages to languish. We found backward conditions even in the most enlightened parts of the country. In Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, a large number of working-class people lived in wretched slums, poorly educated, insufficiently fed, without beauty or joy of life. ... We have tackled and changed all that.” – Ed. Polak, “Veertig jaren sociaal-democratische gemeentepolitiek” in *De Gemeente*, October 1934.<sup>283</sup>

Forty years after the founding of the SDAP, chief editor Ed. Polak of the *De Gemeente*, the bimonthly periodical for socialist aldermen and municipal councillors, offered this clear retrospective on the party's activities in Dutch municipalities. Not only had his party demolished the hovels, educated the children, fed the poor and beautified the cities in the past forty years, these socialist reforms had “attracted attention in Europe and far beyond.”<sup>284</sup> All the while, according to the former Amsterdam alderman, “Dutch social-democratic municipal politics had to be conjured up out of the blue [Lit. out of nothing; *uit het niets*, red.]” with the election of SDAP municipal councillors from 1897 onwards.<sup>285</sup> Saliently, as Polak wrote this retrospective on Dutch municipal socialism, the SDAP had been excluded from the municipal executives in all his three example cities, Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague since at least September 1933. Despite their achievements, the SDAP aldermen in the Netherlands' three largest cities were still subject to the ruthless vicissitudes of municipal politics. Indeed, the SDAP representation in these municipalities rarely exceeded 16 seats, or one-third of the municipal council. When a part of the municipal executive, the party had to share political office with other, confessional, and liberal, aldermen. For example, while SDAP alderman Wibaut experimented with public housing in Amsterdam, liberal aldermen ran Social Affairs and Education in the capital in 1919, whilst the social democratic aldermen Drees and Albarda respectively led and experimented with Social Affairs and Education in The Hague and left public housing to the liberals. Thus, while Polak could justifiably boast that socialist aldermen experimented “in the field of public housing and land politics, public health, public education and upbringing, the care of the unemployed and the poor, road construction and canal construction, taking care of urban beauty and urban planning”, the municipal SDAPs of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague could generally boast only of experiments in and serve as example for a few fields.<sup>286</sup>

Therefore, in this chapter, the experimentality and exemplarity of municipal socialism in Rotterdam and The Hague are compared with Amsterdam and chartered at the hands (a) the practical policies pursued by SDAP aldermen, (b) the relative strength of the SDAP in the municipal council and the alderman portfolios in the executive, and (c) the transfer of ideas and policies to and from municipalities through booklets and periodicals. At the same time, this chapter provides a brief overview to the development of municipal politics in The Hague and Rotterdam between 1917 and 1931 and the development in the three major cities between the Great Depression and the capitulation of the Netherlands in May 1940.

#### 1. *Hofstad*: Royal Residence and Consumption City

In September 1917, The Hague became the second major city with a social democratic alderman. In the biennial municipal election in May of the same year, the SDAP had won another three seats, growing to eleven councillors.<sup>287</sup> While unable to dislodge the Liberal Union as the largest party in the council, the social democrats were now asked by the centre-left LU to partake in the municipal executive of the *Hofstad* [En. Residency; lit. court city]. The future SDAP party leader, Willem Albarda, was elected as

<sup>283</sup> Ed. Polak, “Veertig jaren sociaal-democratische gemeente politiek”, *De Gemeente* 27 (1934): 17, 257-260; 259.

<sup>284</sup> Ibid.

<sup>285</sup> Ibid., 257.

<sup>286</sup> Ibid., 259.

<sup>287</sup> Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 192.



alderman of Education after a reshuffle of municipal executive.<sup>288</sup> There he joined three LU aldermen and one RKSP alderman as executives of the Netherlands wealthiest major city.

Like Amsterdam and Rotterdam, The Hague had experienced meteoric population growth in the previous decades, nearly tripling from 72.000 in 1850 to 206.000 in 1900. However, the residency's economic development differed significantly from Rotterdam and Amsterdam. Whereas the liberal aldermen in Rotterdam and to a lesser extent Amsterdam invested in infrastructure to enable industrialisation, their colleagues in The Hague sought to maintain residential wealth and a luxury-based "consumption" city, rather than transform the municipality into a modern trade and industry-based "production" city.<sup>289</sup> Proposals for the construction of a large transit harbour in Scheveningen and other major municipal works were rejected in favour of urban embellishment and luxurious expansions, in an ultimately successful attempt to attract wealthy pensioners, rentiers and aristocrats from the Dutch East Indies and the countryside.<sup>290</sup> The Hague's wealthier electorate severely limited the electoral potential of the SDAP and its communist competitors, even after the implementation of universal suffrage in 1919. The SDAP therefore did not control the terms of debate as extensively as their Amsterdam counterparts and had to pragmatically cooperate with the large confessional and liberal groups in the council, a role the newly elected social democratic councillor Willem Drees would particularly excel in and Albarda would have to discover at the Education Department.<sup>291</sup>

After the 1878 Education Act, Municipal education policy had become highly politicised as a result of the *Schoolstrijd* [En. school struggle] between mainly liberal and social democratic supporters of non-denominational public schools and the confessional supporters of publicly-funded religious schools.<sup>292</sup> At the same time, the education department offered safe testing grounds for SDAP aldermen in bourgeoisie councils, as the Pacification of 1917 and the 1920 Lower Education Act severely restricted the responsibility of these new aldermen to "just the bricks of school buildings".<sup>293</sup> Due to the new law, municipalities were no longer able to deny applications and funds for religious schools with municipal education expenditure increasing by around 73% to cover these new costs.<sup>294</sup> Still, social democratic aldermen would regularly test the limits of their portfolio and dispute the implications of equalisation with confessional councillors.<sup>295</sup> Albarda in The Hague, later followed by De Zeeuw in Rotterdam as well as Vliegen, Polak, and Boekman in Amsterdam, worked to improve public schools in an attempt to uplift proletarian children. Their policy could be summarised as the construction of new public schools, hiring more teachers, and improving their pay, restricting class sizes to 30, providing school food and clothes, and offering gymnasium and *Hoger Burgerschool* [En. Higher Civic School] scholarships to children from poor families.<sup>296</sup> However, in most cases these policies represented an extension of, rather than a break with, the policies of their liberal predecessors and the liberal municipal program.<sup>297</sup> The

<sup>288</sup> Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 192.

<sup>289</sup> Jan Hein Furnée, "Between resentment and emancipation. The rise of a shopkeepers and artisan 'elite' in The Hague, 1850-1890", in *In Control of the City: Local Politics and the Dynamics of Urban Politics, 1800-1960*, ed. Stefan Couperus, Christianne Smit and Dirk Jan Wolfram (Leuven: Peeters, 2007), 32.

<sup>290</sup> Ibid, 31.

<sup>291</sup> Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 233-237.

<sup>292</sup> Bosmans, *Romme*, 138.

<sup>293</sup> Polak, "De ontwikkeling onzer gemeentepolitiek", 117.


<sup>294</sup> Maas, *Sociaal-democratische gemeentepolitiek*, 140.

<sup>295</sup> Bosmans, *Romme*, 138.

<sup>296</sup> De Ruyter-de Zeeuw, *De eerste rode wethouder van Rotterdam*, 85-86; Polak, "De ontwikkeling onzer gemeentepolitiek", 117; ", Willem Drees, "Albarda als gemeentebestuurder" in *Ir. J.W. Albarda; een kwart eeuw parlementaire werkzaamheid in dienst van de bevrijding der Nederlandse arbeidersklasse; en beeld van de groei der Nederlandse volksgemeenschap* [En. Ir. J.W. Albarda; a quarter century parliamentary work in service of the liberation of the Dutch working-class; and image of the growth of the Dutch people's community], ed. Koos Vorrink (Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers, 1938), 21-23.

<sup>297</sup> Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 190-193.

greatest break between liberal municipalism and social democratic municipalism would come two years later, with the election of Willem Drees as alderman of Social Affairs in 1919.



**Graph 2. Political Composition of the Municipal Council of The Hague between 1917 and 1940**

## 2. Municipal Care for the Sick, Elderly, Needy and Unemployed

In the first election with universal male suffrage in 1919, the SDAP increased their representation to fourteen seats – nearly a third of the council – and became the largest party as the LU collapsed from twelve to just five councillors. A second alderman for the social democrats, the experienced party group chairman Willem Drees, seemed an obvious possibility. Still, a large confessional presence with sixteen seats and only a small VDB and CPH presence required the local SDAP to temper the demands by the national party leadership for a countersigned urgency program and to put forward two pragmatic, “none too principled” aldermen like Albarda and Drees.<sup>298</sup> Especially Drees had to closely cooperate with the council, after he traded the Municipal Companies department for the politically challenging Social Affairs department with RKSP alderman Van Vuuren. Van Vuuren ruled out a return to his previous department, as besides municipal health, elderly care and poor relief, labour conditions of municipal employees fell under its purview – a politically difficult portfolio, especially for social democrats or confessionals from the workers’ wings. As a friend of Drees’ observed, the social affairs alderman was “far from an enviable position ... Amsterdam [Wibaut, red.] had taught us there lay many traps there.”<sup>299</sup>

<sup>298</sup> Ibid., 233-235.

<sup>299</sup> The friend is referring to Wibaut’s time at Amsterdam’s Labour Affairs Department between 1914-1919, which had been politically difficult for the left-wing of the party; Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 208.

The Hague	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	
Mayor	H.A. van Kamebeek	J.A.N. Palijs																							
Municipal Companies	H.J. Romeijn	A.C.A. van Vuuren		J.A. de Wilde		J.A. de Wilde		J.A. de Wilde		J.A. de Wilde		J.A. de Wilde		J.A. de Wilde		J.A. de Wilde		J.A. de Wilde		J.A. de Wilde		J.A. de Wilde		J.A. de Wilde	
Finance	P. Droogleevers Fortuyn	P. Droogleevers Fortuyn		P. Droogleevers Fortuyn		P. Droogleevers Fortuyn		P. Droogleevers Fortuyn		P. Droogleevers Fortuyn		P. Droogleevers Fortuyn		P. Droogleevers Fortuyn		P. Droogleevers Fortuyn		P. Droogleevers Fortuyn		P. Droogleevers Fortuyn		P. Droogleevers Fortuyn		P. Droogleevers Fortuyn	
Public Works	J. Juriaan Kok	P. Droogleevers Fortuyn		P. Droogleevers Fortuyn		P. Droogleevers Fortuyn		P. Droogleevers Fortuyn		P. Droogleevers Fortuyn		P. Droogleevers Fortuyn		P. Droogleevers Fortuyn		P. Droogleevers Fortuyn		P. Droogleevers Fortuyn		P. Droogleevers Fortuyn		P. Droogleevers Fortuyn		P. Droogleevers Fortuyn	
Public Housing	M. Vrijenhoek																								
Education	J.W. Albarda		W.W. van der Meulen		W.W. van der Meulen		W.W. van der Meulen		W.W. van der Meulen		W.W. van der Meulen		W.W. van der Meulen		W.W. van der Meulen		W.W. van der Meulen		W.W. van der Meulen		W.W. van der Meulen		W.W. van der Meulen		
Social Affairs	A.C.A. van Vuuren	W. Drees		W. Drees		W. Drees		W. Drees		W. Drees		W. Drees		W. Drees		W. Drees		W. Drees		W. Drees		W. Drees		W. Drees	

Table 3. Municipal Executive of The Hague between 1917 and 1940

Employment conditions were a controversial part of municipal politics, especially for the social democratic *workers'* party, and a returning reason for the resignation of the SDAP from municipal executives in the Interwar period.<sup>300</sup> Caught between either rejecting employees' union demands for better pay or fewer hours or cutting in expenditure, social democratic aldermen tended their resignation, with examples including Amsterdam in 1921 and 1933 and Rotterdam in 1932.<sup>301</sup> Still, as Drees later explained: "dealing with municipal staff, although difficult, was a task that offered good opportunities to help achieve something for thousands."<sup>302</sup> To resolve and depoliticise union demands, Drees was inspired by his Amsterdam counterpart, Wibaut, who had established a *Georganiseerd Overleg* [En. Organised Consultation, hereafter GO] between unions and the municipal executive in the capital in 1916.<sup>303</sup> As The Hague's new social affairs alderman, Drees formalized workers' rights in separate workmen's and civil servants' regulation, which included the GO structure with official roles for workmen's and civil servants' unions.<sup>304</sup> In a sign of the weaker position of Drees and the The Hague SDAP compared to Amsterdam, the residency's GO's agreement was non-binding and could be rejected by the municipal council – a compromise with the vocal bourgeois majority. Yet, in practice, union approval meant GO agreements served as binding proposals.<sup>305</sup> In an example of cross-contamination, Amsterdam would still replicate Drees' formal civil servants' regulations in 1925.<sup>306</sup> However, further attempts by Drees to coordinate negotiations between the municipal executives of the four major cities and their respective GOs, a precursor to the modern collective bargaining agreement for all Dutch municipalities, failed over opposition from Amsterdam and Rotterdam.<sup>307</sup> Instead his largest impact and national reputation would come from the other side of his department – unemployment, social care and health care. "A very important area of work and attractive opportunities for a socialist", as he described it.<sup>308</sup>

Since the Poor Act, 1854, care for the needy – the sick, elderly, unemployed or otherwise poor persons – fell on charity of private persons and institutions, especially church diaconates or private poor boards.<sup>309</sup> Only if absolutely unavoidable, did municipal governments provide aid to prevent "social disruption" – a responsibility inherited from the cities of the Dutch Republic.<sup>310</sup> However, the higher standards for private poor assistance set by Poor Act, 1912, combined with a world war-induced mass unemployment and economic recession, inadvertently accelerated the erosion of private initiative in poor relief.<sup>311</sup> By 1916, the liberal Cabinet-Cort van der Linden expanded the purview of municipal poor relief and introduced emergency subsidies for unemployment insurance to supplement failing private initiatives and address growing social unrest in major cities.<sup>312</sup> These emergency subsidies, paid for by

<sup>300</sup> Couperus, *De Machinerie van de Stad*, 211.

<sup>301</sup> Borrie, *Wibaut*, 131.

<sup>302</sup> Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 239.

<sup>303</sup> Couperus, *De Machinerie van de Stad*, 211.

<sup>304</sup> The distinction between *werklieden* [En. workmen] and *ambtenaren* [En. civil servants] was an inheritance from early 19th century and 20th century class society and one generally not recognised today. Workmen were blue-collar workers and received weekly *loon* [En. wage]; civil servants were white-collar and received monthly *salaris* [En. salary]; Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 246-247.

<sup>305</sup> Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 247; 255.

<sup>306</sup> Couperus, *De Machinerie van de Stad*, 211-213.

<sup>307</sup> Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 246; 306-307; 311.

<sup>308</sup> *Ibid.*, 239.

<sup>309</sup> Lammert de Hoop and Arno Bornebroek, *De Rode Dominee: A.S. Talma* [En. The Red Vicar: A.S. Talma], (Amsterdam: Boom, 2010), 36-37; Piet de Rooy, *Werklozenzorg en werkloosheidsbestrijding 1917-1940: Landelijk en Amsterdams beleid* [En. Unemployment care and unemployment control 1917-1940: National and Amsterdam policies] (Amsterdam: Van Gennep, 1979), 10-11.

<sup>310</sup> De Rooy, *Werklozenzorg en werkloosheidsbestrijding*, 10.

<sup>311</sup> Marco van Leeuwen, "Armenzorg 1912-1965: van centrum naar periferie", in *Studies over zekerheidsarrangementen. Risico's, risicobestrijding en verzekering in Nederland vanaf de Middeleeuwen* [En. Studies on security arrangements. Risks, risk management and insurance in the Netherlands from the Middle Ages], eds. J. van Gerwen and M.H.D. van Leeuwen (Amsterdam: NEHA, 1998), 520-569; 528-529

<sup>312</sup> De Rooy, *Werklozenzorg en werkloosheidsbestrijding*, 23-24.

both the national government and the municipality, were the first of its kind in the Netherlands. Organised workers could receive thirteen weeks of unemployment insurance pay, paid for half-on-half by the national government and municipality.<sup>313</sup> The far more numerous unorganised or uninsured workers had to directly rely on municipal poor relief – paid for entirely by the municipality. As the wartime economic disruption gave way to an economic depression from late 1920 to 1923 and ravaged the sectors of fishing, cigar and furniture making, the confessional Cabinet-Ruijs de Beerenbrouck I was pressured by trade unions to provide another thirteen weeks of redundancy pay for insured workers in these sectors.<sup>314</sup> Still, Minister Ruijs de Beerenbrouck of the Interior, true to the reigning economic orthodoxy, worked to decrease and dismantle these emergency subsidies in an attempt to drive down wages and restore economic equilibrium.<sup>315</sup>

In this political environment, Drees broke with economic and governmental orthodoxy. Where the Roman Catholic Minister Ruijs de Beerenbrouck argued that these emergency subsidies were a temporary favour to some deserving workers, the social democratic alderman argued insured unemployment benefits were a right for all workers.<sup>316</sup> Thus, after the national government refused to expand the subsidy to all economic sectors in 1921, The Hague became the first municipality to establish a municipal unemployment benefit for all unemployed workers in May 1921.<sup>317</sup> Other – primarily predominantly social democratic – municipalities, from Amsterdam to Opsterland, followed suit in the following months.<sup>318</sup> What followed was a continuous struggle between the national government and municipalities over unemployment benefits. In early 1922, the national government unilaterally lowered all benefits for married men by ten percent from *f* 15 to *f* 13.50 per week. In response, The Hague raised benefits back to *f* 15 at their own expense.<sup>319</sup> The Minister replied by forcing the municipality to repeal the raise. Undeterred, the municipality raised rent- and fuel benefits to compensate the affected married men, which the ministry finally accepted as *fait accompli*. When Ruijs de Beerenbrouck again attempted to forcibly lower benefits in the four largest municipalities in 1923, Drees and his colleagues organised joint opposition to prevent benefits from falling below subsistence level.<sup>320</sup> Ultimately, the four municipalities and the national government reached an agreement on benefits: *f* 13.50 per week plus *f* 1.50 per child, with the caveats that benefits may not exceed 65% of normal wages and total benefits could not exceed *f* 22.50.<sup>321</sup> While this settlement maintained benefit levels in the larger municipalities, the ministry ceased subsidies to all municipalities and legally destroyed all benefits schemes in smaller municipalities, such as Opsterland in 1924.<sup>322</sup>

At the same time, Drees organised local work relief programs and cooperated with national work relief programs. In one of the worst-affected economic sectors, the Scheveningen fisheries, Drees subsidised loss-making trawling to redress the seasonal unemployment, after the end of herring fishing.<sup>323</sup> He further commissioned a report into fisheries, which played a pivotal role in the motorisation of the

<sup>313</sup> Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 263.

<sup>314</sup> De Rooy, *Werklozenzorg en werkloosheidsbestrijding*, 30-31.

<sup>315</sup> Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 263; 328.

<sup>316</sup> De Rooy, *Werklozenzorg en werkloosheidsbestrijding*, 30; Willem Drees, “Werkelozensteun”, *Gemeentebestuur* [En. Municipal Governance] 5 (1924): 4, 309-320; Willem Drees, “Maatschappelijk Hulpbetoon”, in *Schriftelijke Cursus in Gemeentepolitiek onder leiding van Ed. Polak* [En. Correspondence Course in Municipal Politics led by Ed. Polak], ed. Ed. Polak, (Amsterdam: N.V. Ontwikkeling, 1929), 394.

<sup>317</sup> De Rooy, *Werklozenzorg en werkloosheidsbestrijding*, 30-31; Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 263-264.

<sup>318</sup> Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 264; De Rooy, *Werklozenzorg en werkloosheidsbestrijding*, 34.

<sup>319</sup> Willem Drees, *Drees aan het woord* [En. Drees speaks], Ed. K. Voskuil (Amsterdam: De Arbeiderspers, 1952), 23-24; Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 263.

<sup>320</sup> Drees, *Drees aan het woord*, 23-24; Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 263.

<sup>321</sup> The average wage of a worker in The Hague hovered around *f* 30 per week; De Rooy, *Werklozenzorg en werkloosheidsbestrijding*, 33.

<sup>322</sup> *Ibid.*, 34.

<sup>323</sup> Willem Drees, “Haagsche Werkeloosheids Rapporten”, *Gemeentebestuur* [En. Municipal Governance] 11 (1930): 2, 41-56, 42-47; Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 264.

Scheveningen fleet, which turned structural underemployment into labour shortages as the herring fishing season was expanded and trawling was made profitable.<sup>324</sup> Finally, with the establishment of the municipal *Haagsche Bouwmaatschappij* [En. Hague Construction Company, hereafter HABO] and the expansion of the Zuiderpark, Drees provided work relief for construction workers and stimulated housing construction and urban embellishment.<sup>325</sup> Thus, Drees was able to establish local work relief programs with acceptable working conditions and local benefits scheme for the unemployed, even without national support. Although his struggles with the austerity politics of the confessional Cabinets-Ruijs de Beerenbrouck would be a prescient harbinger of the struggle of his fellow aldermen with the national government during the mass unemployment of the Great Depression.

In social care for the needy and elderly and health care for the sickly and disabled persons, Drees also served as a pioneer. The Hague became the first municipality to rename the unpopular *Burgerlijk Armbestuur* [En. Civic Poor Board] to the *Gemeentelijke Dienst voor Maatschappelijk Hulpbetoon* [En. Municipal Social Assistance Service, hereafter GDMH]. The renaming embodied a symptomatic change of a service, where, in Drees' words, "alms were replaced by a right to assistance in an emergency and to protection against force majeure", which found replication across Dutch municipalities.<sup>326</sup> The new GDMH constructed the first elderly home with private rooms and professional care – later renamed after Drees, established care for the blind and invalid person and expanded homeless care, municipal hospitals, sanatoriums, orphanages, maternity care and crèches.<sup>327</sup> All these efforts underlined Drees' principle described in a correspondence course for social democratic councillors "that no one who needs nursing or care for financial reasons is deprived of it."<sup>328</sup>

All in all, with the GDMH, work relief and unemployment benefits, Drees built a welfare municipality in The Hague in his twelve-year tenure as Social Affairs alderman. While De Miranda and Wibaut's feats in Amsterdam centred around the municipalisation of economic life and contributed to the expansion of municipal interventionism, Drees pioneered the social aspects of the welfare municipality.

### 3. Land politics and *Erfpacht*

While Drees served continuously as Social Affairs alderman between 1919 and 1931, his party colleague Albarda would resign from the municipal executive after the 1923 Municipal Election. The former alderman of Education publicly motivated his decision to focus completely on his work as representative in the *Tweede Kamer* [En. House of Representatives, lit. Second Chamber]. Privately, a difficult working relationship with the *regenteske* [En. authoritarian] conservative liberal mayor Patijn contributed to his departure.<sup>329</sup> The 1923 Municipal Election itself proved relatively fruitful for the social democrats, although the SDAP lost a seat to the VDB, the confessional parties were denied an overall majority – a distinct possibility with to the introduction of universal suffrage.<sup>330</sup> In the new municipal executive, the architect Machiel Vrijenhoek was elected together with Drees as the SDAP's second alderman and The Hague's first alderman of City Development and Public Housing.

Vrijenhoek proved to be an effective, yet not particularly remarkable social democratic alderman of Public Housing.<sup>331</sup> Like most of his party colleagues, he focused on slum clearance and the replacement

<sup>324</sup> Drees, "Haagsche Werkeloosheids Rapporten", 42-47.

<sup>325</sup> Drees, *Drees aan het woord*, 23; Willem Drees, "De werkloozenzorg en de werkverruiming in stedelijke gemeenten", in *Schriftelijke Cursus in Gemeentepolitiek onder leiding van Ed. Polak* [En. Correspondence Course in Municipal Politics led by Ed. Polak], ed. Ed. Polak, (Amsterdam: N.V. Ontwikkeling, 1929), 49-60.

<sup>326</sup> Drees, "Maatschappelijk Hulpbetoon", 385-386; 389-390; Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 256; 327.

<sup>327</sup> Drees, "Maatschappelijk Hulpbetoon", 393; 401-412.

<sup>328</sup> *Ibid.*, 394.

<sup>329</sup> *Ibid.*, 241.

<sup>330</sup> Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 267-269.

<sup>331</sup> J. de Leeuwe, "Machiel Vrijenhoek. Wethouder in oorlogstijd" in *Wethouders in Oorlogstijd* [En. Aldermen in Wartime], eds. R. Kleinegris, & M. Oostdam, (Den Haag: Geschiedkundige Vereniging Die Haghe, 2002), 61-93; 61-62.



construction of public housing, as well as the acquisition of ground positions to facilitate these efforts. Most of the clearance efforts centred around Oud Scheveningen, which accounted for 595 out of 851 slums cleared in The Hague between 1923 and 1931, and saw the construction of a new sanitised neighbourhood.<sup>332</sup> In total, the municipality and housing associations built some 3885 working class homes between 1923 and 1930.<sup>333</sup> Despite this uncontroversial success, public housing and especially the municipality's ground positions would cause a protracted conflict between a disparate coalition of conservative liberals and confessionals and an alliance of bourgeois dissidents, social democratic, social liberal, and communist councillors.

The stumbling stone for the conservative coalition was the land held in *erfpacht* [En. emphyteusis] by the municipality through its municipal *Grondbedrijf* [En. Ground company]. *Erfpacht* was first introduced in the Netherlands in 1896 by Wim Treub as a Radical alderman in Amsterdam.<sup>334</sup> By leasing, rather than selling municipal land for development, the municipality would benefit from land value appreciation by development through yearly rents, maintain greater influence on the use of the land, allowing for example the promotion workers' housing construction by less wealthy builders, and even allowed the municipality to regain the now developed land after the fixed lease term expired without financial reimbursement.<sup>335</sup> Emphyteusis, particularly a model without reversion of ownership, called perpetual emphyteusis, was quickly introduced by other municipalities as means of control against land speculation during a period of rapid urban expansion.<sup>336</sup> The Hague was one of the early adopters, with Treub, now as councillor in the residency, assisting LU aldermen Jurriaan Kok and Droogleever Fortuyn in establishing "emphyteusis of land as the norm, sale the exception" in 1911.<sup>337</sup>

Shortly after the 1927 Municipal Election, which had otherwise seen little change, the same Droogleever Fortuyn, now councillor for the conservative liberal LSP, left The Hague to become Mayor of Rotterdam.<sup>338</sup> With him, the last major proponent of the emphyteusis within the liberal conservative fraction departed. More LSP councillors came to view emphyteusis as inherently socialist, rather than a liberal inoculation against the land nationalisation movement as originally intended.<sup>339</sup> A conservative alliance surrounded itself around the new LSP councillor Van Beresteijn, with the express aim of ending emphyteusis, increasing sale of municipal land and either directly or indirectly forcing Vrijenhoek and Drees from the executive.<sup>340</sup> In 1929, two years of tension came to the fore, as a motion to reverse land policy to sale as norm, emphyteusis as exception, was introduced by Van Berensteyn. In spite of four dissensions in favour of Vrijenhoek – two from the ARP and two from the LSP, the motion was carried 24 to 21.<sup>341</sup> The conservative coalition was surprised to find not only Vrijenhoek and Drees, but also the dissenting LSP alderman Van der Meulen and ARP alderman De Wilde resigning in protest of such adversarial party politics. Unable to form a stable coalition without the long-serving De Wilde and the ARP, RKSP quickly reneged their support for motion-Van Berensteyn and all aldermen were re-elected in a quid pro quo sale of some municipal land. Still, the mood in the up until then relatively cooperative council of The Hague had soured considerably. With the Great Depression reaching Dutch shores in the

<sup>332</sup> Drees, *Drees aan het woord*, 24; "Saneering van Oud-Scheveningen – een belangrijk besluit", *Het Volk* [En. The People], 7 October 1930. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:011113586:mpeg21:a0147> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>333</sup> Drees, *Drees aan het woord*, 23.

<sup>334</sup> P.C.J. Nelisse, *Stedelijke erfpacht* [En. Urban emphyteusis] (Doentichem: Reed Business, 2008), 54-55.

<sup>335</sup> *Ibid.*, 55-56.

<sup>336</sup> Amsterdam would also reform its temporary emphyteusis into a similar, but distinct form of *eeuwigdurende erfpacht* [En. perpetual emphyteusis], namely *voortdurende erfpacht* [En. continuous emphyteusis]; Nelisse, *Stedelijke Erfpacht*, 59-60.

<sup>337</sup> Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 344.

<sup>338</sup> *Ibid.*, 345.

<sup>339</sup> Nelisse, *Stedelijke erfpacht*, 55.

<sup>340</sup> Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 345.

<sup>341</sup> *Ibid.*, 349.

following years, the stage was set for another crisis in The Hague, the first to force the social democrats into opposition in the residency.

#### 4. *Havenstad*: A port city transformed

While Amsterdam and The Hague elected their first social democratic aldermen during the First World War, the SDAP Rotterdam had to wait until the first municipal election with universal male suffrage. In the May 1919 election, the SDAP Rotterdam outperformed its municipal counterparts by winning nineteen of the 45 seats in the bustling, industrial *havenstad* [En. port city]. Again, the liberal LU and BVL suffered most from the extended franchise, falling from ten and five seats to just two and one respectively. Together with two CPH councillors and one VDB councillor, the SDAP was even a seat shy of a majority. In an ironic and stunning reversal of the restless November days the previous year, Arie de Zeeuw and Arie Heijkoop were respectively elected as aldermen for Education and Public Housing in November 1919.

De Zeeuw and Heijkoop now governed a city that had been transformed in the previous decades. With an industrial boom in the Ruhr valley and the opening of the Nieuwe Waterweg in 1872, the total tonnage shipped from Rotterdam harbour had grown from just half a million tons in 1860, comparable to the tonnage shipped in Amsterdam, to 6.2 million tons in 1900. The tonnage in 1900 was more than three times Amsterdam's tonnage and just behind the largest ports of Continental Europe – Hamburg and Antwerp.<sup>342</sup> At the same time, thousands had left the countryside of North Brabant and Zeeland in search of a job among the huddled masses in the port city.<sup>343</sup> Rotterdam more than tripled in population from 91.000 in 1849 to 318.500 in 1900.<sup>344</sup> Rapid industrial and population growth, increased shipping traffic and a cholera outbreak in 1866, forced the hand of Rotterdam's municipal executive. Confronted with a lack of private capital and initiative and a myriad of social and economic problems, the municipality pioneered the provision of municipal gas for new industries, a new municipal port and clean water and sewers for its inhabitants.<sup>345</sup> In spite of its meteoric economic growth, Rotterdam remained easily affected by changes in the business cycle and disruptions in the supply cycle between the Ruhr hinterland and overseas sales markets. In the words of Johan Brautigam, a trade union leader in the harbour, Rotterdam was “an extremely vulnerable port, dependent on the recipient, the carrier and the shipper.”<sup>346</sup> Disruptions in the world economy, such as the First World War or the Great Depression, deeply affected Rotterdam and its working class, in turn twice placed the SDAP Rotterdam at a crossroads, in 1918 and 1932.

#### 5. The Origins of Troelstra's Mistake

In the final weeks of the First World War in 1918, as the November Revolution took hold of a starved, defeated, and demoralised Germany, the spectre of revolution spread to the Netherlands. With conscripted soldiers rioting over poor rations and conditions, social unrest rife in the empty harbour and another harrowing winter with food distribution nearing, revolution haunted the mind of Mayor Alfred Zimmerman of Rotterdam.<sup>347</sup> As a conservative liberal regent and committed anti-socialist, he had long opposed the socialist presence in the city and the municipal council.<sup>348</sup> However, on Saturday 9 November, the day social democrat Philip Scheidemann proclaimed the German Republic, Zimmerman

<sup>342</sup> Van den Noort, *Pion of Pionier*, 120.

<sup>343</sup> De Regt, *Arbeidersgezinnen en beschavingsarbeid: Ontwikkelingen in Nederland 1870-1940*, 25; De Liagre Böhl, “De Stad bestuurd”, 170-171; Van den Noort, *Pion of Pionier*, 8.

<sup>344</sup> Van den Noort, *Pion of Pionier*, 8; 123.

<sup>345</sup> Ibid., 40; 81-82; 113-115; 121.

<sup>346</sup> J. van Tilburg “Uit het leven van Johan Brautigam”, in *Rotterdams Jaarboek 1963* [En. Rotterdam Year book 1963], ed. R.A.D. Renting (Rotterdam: Stichting ‘Historische Publicaties Roterodamum’, 1963), 185.

<sup>347</sup> J. Bosmans, “Zimmerman, Alfred Rudolph (1869-1939)”, in *Biografisch Woordenboek van Nederland* [En. Biographical Dictionary of the Netherlands] URL:<http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/bwn1880-2000/lemmata/bwn1/zimmerman> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>348</sup> Ibid.

telephoned the SDAP councillors and the leaders of the Central Union of Transport Workers, Arie Heijkoop and Johan Brautigam, to invite them for a private conversation in the city hall.<sup>349</sup> The SDAP had already won 43.36% of the vote in the port city five months before, with minor socialist and communist parties garnering a further 4.24%. If the revolution was at hand, Zimmerman wanted to arrange a peaceful transfer of power in his city with the leaders of the proletariat.<sup>350</sup>

The next day, Sunday 10 November, together with Arie De Zeeuw, the leader of the Rotterdam Federation of the SDAP, Heijkoop and Brautigam visited party leader Pieter Jelles Troelstra to inform him of these curious developments in Rotterdam.<sup>351</sup> Troelstra had already been deeply impressed with the sudden abdication and flight of the German Emperor a day prior.<sup>352</sup> Together with the news from Rotterdam, Troelstra was convinced the collapse of the old world was nigh. The delegation from Rotterdam agreed with Troelstra: the SDAP should fulfil its historical task in its bulwark Rotterdam, with its strong modern trade union movement, rather than allow anarchists and communists in Amsterdam to seize the initiative.<sup>353</sup> The same evening, the party board of the SDAP and the leadership of the *Nederlandsche Verbond van Vakveerenigen* [En. Dutch Association of Trade Unions, hereafter NVV] met in Rotterdam to discuss a course of action. De Zeeuw, as presiding officer of the meeting, immediately set the tone with a radical manifesto and plans to march on city hall the next day.<sup>354</sup> The aldermen from Amsterdam, Wibaut and Vliegen, and the NVV leader Oudgeest opposed revolutionary action.<sup>355</sup> In spite of De Zeeuw and Troelstra's efforts, the meeting scrapped the march in favour of a meeting. Moreover, Oudgeest would rewrite and moderate De Zeeuw's manifesto, to be published on Monday 11 November in *Het Volk*.<sup>356</sup>

While the revolution, in the words of De Zeeuw, was "talked to death" by party and trade union leadership, Troelstra, De Zeeuw, and Heijkoop would take matters into their own hands. Heijkoop and De Zeeuw, derisively remembered as revolutionaries by Vliegen, convinced Troelstra to still speak at the meeting in Rotterdam.<sup>357</sup> At the meeting, the "revolutionaries" were swept up by revolutionary fervour. Heijkoop rhetorically queried whether his listeners were ready to "establish a dictatorship of the proletariat", which was greeted with a standing ovation.<sup>358</sup> Troelstra subsequently broke the party line and avowedly preached revolution, albeit without violence or anarchy.<sup>359</sup> A day later, Troelstra would again preach revolution, this time in the House of Representatives, while his fellow SDAP representatives looked on in horror.<sup>360</sup> However, the "revolutionaries" had mistaken the mood of the country, as there did not exist a revolutionary situation and the government quickly restored order after small disturbances between communist demonstrators and the police in Amsterdam.<sup>361</sup> Already on November 12, Troelstra had to publicly disavow his calls for a seizure of power in the House of Representatives. The revolutionary threat had passed and four days later, at a special party congress, it was buried as Troelstra admitted his perception of power relations had proven to be "not entirely correct."<sup>362</sup>

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<sup>349</sup> De Ruyter-de Zeeuw, *De eerste rode wethouders van Rotterdam*, 59.

<sup>350</sup> Ibid., 59-60.

<sup>351</sup> Ibid., 61.

<sup>352</sup> Ibid.

<sup>353</sup> Ibid., 60.

<sup>354</sup> Ibid., 61.

<sup>355</sup> Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 219.

<sup>356</sup> Rob Hartmans, *De Revolutie die niet doorging* [En. The Revolution that was not followed through] (Utrecht: Uitgeverij Omniboek, 2018), 90-97; Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 219-220.

<sup>357</sup> De Ruyter-de Zeeuw, *De eerste rode wethouders van Rotterdam*, 62.

<sup>358</sup> Ibid.


<sup>359</sup> Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 219-220.

<sup>360</sup> De Ruyter-de Zeeuw, *De eerste rode wethouders van Rotterdam*, 62; Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 219-220.

<sup>361</sup> Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 222-223.

<sup>362</sup> Ibid., 223.

While in the immediate aftermath, the confessional Cabinet-Ruijs de Beerenbrouck I announced improved rations and concessions on female suffrage and the eight hour work day, Troelstra's so-called mistake ultimately contributed to the political ostracization of the SDAP at a national level in the interwar period. Where local RKSP fractions increasingly cooperated with social democrats in municipalities and municipal executives, the national RKSP proved unwilling to cooperate with the SDAP until "utmost necessity". A return of Colijn as prime minister without parliamentary approval finally brought the SDAP into national government for the first time in 1939.<sup>363</sup> The isolation at a national level contributed to a positive re-evaluation of municipal socialism and expanded self-government for municipalities in SDAP during much of the interwar period. This was not so much an end in itself, as Wibaut would have preferred, but a means to power for a party banished to the political wilderness.<sup>364</sup> In Rotterdam, after a vicious council debate in late November 1918, the erstwhile revolutionaries De Zeeuw and Heijkoop could participate more or less normally in council proceedings. Furthermore, after the crushing victory in the 1919 Municipal Election – again 43% of the vote and 19 seats – had decimated the liberal bloc, De Zeeuw and Heijkoop were respectively elected as alderman of Education and Public Housing in a confessional-social liberal-social democratic municipal executive with a countersigned *werkplan* [En. coalition agreement].<sup>365</sup> However, the memories of the revolution and the role of both aldermen would not be easily forgotten and would cause the first true social democratic alderman's crisis in the three major municipalities.



**Graph 3. Political Composition of Municipal Council of Rotterdam between 1917 and 1940**

<sup>363</sup> Bart Tromp, *Het sociaal-democratisch programma. De beginselprogramma's van de SDB, SDAP en PvdA 1878-1977* [En. The social democratic programme. The principle programs of the SDB, SDAP and PvdA 1878-1977], (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2002), 236; Van der Kaaij, *Een eenzaam staatsman*, 303-304.

<sup>364</sup> Borrie, F.W. *Wibaut*, 82; As Troelstra already explained at the turn of the 20th century: "Expanded self-government [for municipalities, red.] is not an end, but a means ... If we are strong in the municipality, then we are for municipal autonomy, if we are strong in the House [of Representatives, red.], then we are against."

<sup>365</sup> De Ruyter-de Zeeuw, *De eerste rode wethouders van Rotterdam*, 76-77.

		1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940											
Rotterdam	Mayor	A.R. Zimmerman				J. Wytema				P. Droogleever Fortuyn												P.J. Oud											
	Municipal Companies	S.J. van Aalten				A. van der Hoeven		J. Schouten		A.B. de Zeeuw				A. Hanemeijer				A.B. de Zeeuw															
Finance		S.J. van Aalten				A. van der Hoeven		J. Schouten		A.B. de Zeeuw				A. Hanemeijer				A.B. de Zeeuw															
Education		A.B. de Zeeuw	T. de Meester		A.B. de Zeeuw				L. de Groot		F.L.D. Nivard				J. Ratté		L. de Groot																
Public Health		H. Stulmeijer		F.L.D. Nivard				F.L.D. Nivard				R.J. Dijk				F.L.D. Nivard																	
Social Affairs		H. Stulmeijer		F.L.D. Nivard				F.L.D. Nivard				J. Brautligem		J.A. Donner																			
Public Housing		A.W. Heijkoop	A. van der Hoeven		A.W. Heijkoop				J. ter Laan		A.H.S. Stemingding				J. Brautigam																		
Public Works		A. de Jong				A. de Jong				A. de Jong				A. de Jong				J. Brautigam															
Parties:		SDAP				VDB				LU				LSP				Liberal				RKSP				ARP				CHU			

Table 4. Municipal Executive of Rotterdam between 1919 and 1940

## 6. Governing after a Revolution

As a social democratic alderman of Education, De Zeeuw would pursue policies akin to Albarda in The Hague and Polak in Amsterdam. The alderman introduced a mandatory seventh year of primary education, a maximum of 36 children per class, as well as progressive school fees. Furthermore, De Zeeuw expanded education for the deaf, dumb and mentally retarded and also expanded industrial education. Finally, Rotterdam would construct new libraries, reading rooms, museums, facilities for mature youth, holiday colonies, and buildings for concerts, conferences, and exhibitions in the following decade.<sup>366</sup> Concurrently, as mentioned before, Heijkoop, as alderman of Public Housing, introduced concrete construction and working-class gallery flats to efficiently address the rampant housing shortage in the harbour city. Within five months after council approval, the municipality was able to construct its own *Betondorp* [En. Concrete village] of 238 houses in Bloemhof with concrete construction.<sup>367</sup> At the same time, in Spangen, Heijkoop financed the construction of the Justus van Effen-complex, a functionalist gallery flat, with central heating, special garbage disposal ducts, small built-in kitchen buffets in the houses and shared gardens, washing and bathing houses.<sup>368</sup> In a few short years, Arie Heijkoop earned the moniker “Arie Beton” [En. Arie Concrete] for his efforts in public housing.

The nickname “Arie Beton” could just as well refer to Heijkoop’s lack of patience with the bourgeois opposition in the municipal council, a trait he shared with fellow social climbers De Miranda and De Zeeuw. When a motion by LSP councillor De Meester implored the alderman to negotiate with a project developer of alcove housing, Heijkoop flatly refused and informed the council he would resign if it passed.<sup>369</sup> Alcove housing – niches without windows – met Rotterdam housing code, but were an unacceptably step back from social democratic housing standards for Heijkoop. Still, with an enormous housing shortage, confessional and social liberal fellow aldermen pressed Heijkoop to at least talk to the developer to dismantle the political crisis. Again Heijkoop flatly refused.<sup>370</sup> Ultimately, the confessional and conservative liberal councillors joined together to vote through the motion 23 to 21.<sup>371</sup> Heijkoop had unnecessarily provoked the opposition, while the opposition granted no quarter to an otherwise effective alderman, who had yet to be forgiven for his role in the revolution. Heijkoop and De Zeeuw moved from word to deed and resigned.<sup>372</sup>

Throughout the Alcoves crisis, mayor Zimmerman failed to play a de-escalating role as presiding officer of the municipal council, as mayor De Vlucht would regularly do in his nineteen year-long service in Amsterdam. Where the anti-revolutionary mayor De Vlucht would, from time to time, convince his party’s councillors to vote with social democrats to resolve political crises and prevent unnecessary polarisation, liberal conservative mayor Zimmerman publicly disagreed with his social democratic aldermen in the municipal council and supported opposition proposals.<sup>373</sup> Similar to Patijn, his colleague in The Hague, Zimmerman was a *regenteske* [En. authoritarian] mayor in the mould of a disappearing liberal oligarchy from before the introduction of universal male suffrage.<sup>374</sup> As the Ministry of the Interior, with only the rarest exception, refused to appoint social democratic mayors after Troelstra’s

<sup>366</sup> S., “Het plan-De Zeeuw”, *De Gemeente* 13 (1920): 5, 35-36; De Ruyter-de Zeeuw, *De eerste rode wethouders van Rotterdam*, 79.

<sup>367</sup> De Ruyter-de Zeeuw, *De eerste rode wethouders van Rotterdam*, 94.

<sup>368</sup> E.O.H.M. Ruempol (ed.), *Gedenkboek Rotterdam 1328-1928: Uitgegeven ter gelegenheid van het 600-jarig bestaan van de stad Rotterdam* [En. Memorial book Rotterdam 1328-1928: Published on the occasion of the 600th anniversary of the city of Rotterdam] (Rotterdam: M. Wyt & Zonen, 1928), 61; De Ruyter-de Zeeuw, *De eerste rode wethouders van Rotterdam*, 94-95.

<sup>369</sup> Arie De Zeeuw, “Woningbouw in de Rotterdamsche Raad”, *De Gemeente* 14 (1921): 18, 137-138.

<sup>370</sup> De Zeeuw, “Woningbouw in de Rotterdamsche Raad”, 137-138; De Ruyter-de Zeeuw, *De eerste rode wethouders van Rotterdam*, 97-102.

<sup>371</sup> De Zeeuw, “Woningbouw in de Rotterdamsche Raad”, 137-138.

<sup>372</sup> De Ruyter-de Zeeuw, *De eerste rode wethouders van Rotterdam*, 97-102.

<sup>373</sup> De Ruyter-de Zeeuw, *De eerste rode wethouders van Rotterdam*, 92-93; Kaal, *Het hoofd van de stad*, 63-66.

<sup>374</sup> Kaal, *Het hoofd van de stad*, 68-69.



mistake, bourgeois mayors in the major municipalities needed a new approach to politics and council.<sup>375</sup> The ability to cooperate with the social democratic plurality and maintain order in councils with anarchists, communists and national socialists practically became requirements for successful mayoralities in the major municipalities in the interwar years. In 1923, aged just 54, Zimmerman would retire as mayor to become a General Commissioner of the League of Nations in Austria.<sup>376</sup> He would be succeeded by the liberal mayor Johan Wytema. As mayor of Dordrecht, Wytema had worked well with SDAP alderman Theodoor Stoop and the SDAP council party. However, he would prove unable to maintain order in Rotterdam's rowdy municipal council, which had worsened with the entry of the anarchist *Rapaillepartij* [En. Riff-Raff party, hereafter RP] in 1923.<sup>377</sup> Wytema's eventual successor Droogleever Fortuyn, and Patijn's successors in The Hague, Bosch van Rosenthal and De Monchy, would finally meet the "modern" requirements.<sup>378</sup>

While the 1923 Municipal Election saw the SDAP lose three seats and fall from 19 to 16, to the benefit of the VDB and anarchist RP, a return to the mayoral table seemed likely for Heijkoop and De Zeeuw. Heijkoop's successor at Public Housing, LSP alderman De Meester, had proven far less effective in tackling the housing shortage than the social democrat.<sup>379</sup> Furthermore, although the revolution had not been forgiven, it had lost relevance.<sup>380</sup> The confessional bloc now preferred a return to the cooperation on the broad base with the SDAP over a minimal majority with the LSP. In return, the SDAP dropped their demands for a renewed coalition agreement. Back at the Public Housing department, Heijkoop saw the amount of municipally-built public housing grow to 6430 in the next four years.<sup>381</sup> At the same time, De Zeeuw continued to pursue his Plan-de Zeeuw at the Education Department. After the 1927 Municipal Election saw the LSP win one seat from the RP, LSP councillor De Groot was offered the Education department, whilst De Zeeuw moved to the all-important Finance and Municipal Companies Department. As such De Zeeuw could boast the municipalisation of the Rotterdamsche *Electrische Tramweg Maatschappij* [En. Rotterdam Electric Tramway Company, RETM], later rechristened the *Rotterdamsche Electrische Tram* [En. Rotterdam Electric Tram, RET], in his second month in office.<sup>382</sup> However, the SDAP Rotterdam would experience two setbacks in 1929, although the full implications of the former would only become clear in the following years. In October 1929, the New York Stock Exchange [Hereafter NYSE] crashed. An extremely vulnerable world port, the effects of the stock market crash on Rotterdam were difficult to discern immediately. A month later, in November 1929, Arie Heijkoop died in office. Already in poor health upon his return as Alderman in 1923, he had continued to work until the very last. Now the sole leader of SDAP Rotterdam, De Zeeuw would have to navigate the port city and his party through the worst economic depression yet.

## 7. The Great Depression

The NYSE crash on Black Tuesday, 24 October 1929, for many Dutch commentators seemed a "undisturbing" course correction of the speculative boom that had taken hold of the exchange since early

<sup>375</sup> Indeed in 1930, of the 970 mayors only five were social democrats, all on the right flank of the SDAP. The Ministry argued that as Mayors were responsible for maintaining public order, social democrats would be unreliable in case of revolution; De Roos, *Besturen als Kunst*, 198-201.

<sup>376</sup> His relatively young age is notable as both of his two successors, Wytema and Droogleever Fortuyn died in office, respectively aged 57 and 70; Bosmans, "Zimmerman, Alfred Rudolph (1869-1939)".

<sup>377</sup> Kaal, *Het hoofd van de stad*, 68-69.

<sup>378</sup> Kaal, *Het hoofd van de stad*, 68-69; Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 366-368; 375-377; 394-395; 484-488; De Leeuwe, "Machiel Vrijenhoek. Wethouder in oorlogstijd", 67-75.

<sup>379</sup> De Ruyter-de Zeeuw, *De eerste rode wethouders van Rotterdam*, 103-106.

<sup>380</sup> Ibid.

<sup>381</sup> Ruempol (ed.), *Gedenkboek Rotterdam 1328-1928*, 59.

<sup>382</sup> Amsterdam had already municipalised the *Gemeentetram Amsterdam* [En. Municipal Tram Amsterdam, GTA] in 1900. The Hague municipalised two-thirds of the *Haagsche Tramweg-Maatschappij* [En. The Hague Tramway Company, HTM] on 1 January 1927; De Ruyter-de Zeeuw, *De eerste rode wethouders van Rotterdam*, 114.

1928.<sup>383</sup> While the Amsterdam Stock Exchange did experience a 13% negative course correction in the following month, it remained stable for most of early 1930 and even rallied in April 1930 after positive dividends reports. After all, unemployment decreased and consumption investment increased throughout early 1930.<sup>384</sup> However, the first signs of trouble appeared in the structurally weak agriculture sector and the perennially cycle-susceptible shipping sector.<sup>385</sup> The withdrawal of cheap American capital from global markets intensified deflationary conditions. Combined with global overproduction of agricultural goods, a continued price decline of agrarian staple goods, especially Dutch staples, such as sugar beet, grain and potatoes, worsened the pre-existing struggles in the large, overemployed, under-mechanised Dutch agrarian sector.<sup>386</sup> Unemployment more than tripled from 40.000 in October 1929 to 136.000 in December 1930.<sup>387</sup>

Decreased purchasing power in the Netherlands' largest trading partners, the United Kingdom and Germany, also slowed the highly export-reliant Dutch industry and brought the Dutch merchant fleet – fully operational at the end of 1929 – to a near standstill.<sup>388</sup> The position of Dutch industrial goods was further worsened by the abandonment of the gold standard by the British Government in 1931 and subsequent devaluation of pound sterling by more than 20%. Even as 14 other countries left the gold standard and devalued their currency, the Dutch national government refused to leave the gold standard and devalue the guilder. As such, Dutch industrial goods became highly uncompetitive in the global market and by January 1932, three months after the British devaluation, only a third of total Dutch shipping tonnage was still in use.<sup>389</sup> This crisis was worsened by a wave of protectionist measures which had commenced with the United States' passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1929 and culminated in the British Commonwealth's embrace of imperial preference in 1932.<sup>390</sup> While the Dutch confessional national governments would introduce protectionist and financial aid measures for the agriculture sector between 1931 and 1933, it maintained its *laissez-faire*, free trade policy vis-à-vis industry.<sup>391</sup> The government refused to devalue the expensive Dutch guilder, instead embracing austerity to drive down labour costs and return competitiveness to Dutch industry.

After the 1924 settlement between Minister Ruijs de Beerenbrouck and alderman Drees, municipalities were fully financially responsible for the unemployment benefits and poor relief. As such, the largest municipalities could do little but provide benefits to the fast growing number of unemployed. By 1930, Rotterdam, Amsterdam and The Hague spent 25.2%, 16.8% and 9.3% respectively of their budgets on benefits, support and work relief for the unemployed.<sup>392</sup> Across municipalities, a similar picture emerged, with some economic “monocultural” municipalities spending as much as 77.4% of their budget on benefits, support, and work relief for the unemployed.<sup>393</sup> Without a recourse to increase municipal taxes, De Miranda noted in a white paper on unemployment benefits:

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<sup>383</sup> F.A.G. Keesing, *De Conjuncturele ontwikkeling van Nederland en de evolutie van de economische overheidspolitiek 1918-1939* [En. The cyclical development of the Netherlands and the evolution of economic government policy 1918-1939] (Nijmegen: Socialistische Uitgeverij Nijmegen, 1978), 94-95; De Rooy, *Werklozenzorg en werkloosheidsbestrijding*, 67; 79; Borrie, *Wibaut*, 244.

<sup>384</sup> Rob Hartmans, *Schaduwjaren: de Jaren Dertig in Nederland* [En. Shadow Years: the Thirties in the Netherlands] (Utrecht: Uitgeverij Omniboek, 2018) xx; Keesing, *De Conjuncturele ontwikkeling van Nederland*, 104-106.

<sup>385</sup> Keesing, *De Conjuncturele ontwikkeling van Nederland*, 93.

<sup>386</sup> *Ibid.*, 105.

<sup>387</sup> Hartmans, *Schaduwjaren*, Keesing, *De Conjuncturele ontwikkeling van Nederland*, 106.

<sup>388</sup> Keesing, *De Conjuncturele ontwikkeling van Nederland*, 105

<sup>389</sup> *Ibid.*, 101-102.

<sup>390</sup> *Ibid.*, 102-103.

<sup>391</sup> De Rooy, *Werklozenzorg en werkloosheidsbestrijding*, 67-69;

<sup>392</sup> Monne De Miranda, “Preadvies door S. Rodrigues de Miranda, Wethouder van Amsterdam”, *Gemeentebestuur* [En. Municipal Governance] 13 (1932): 4, 167-208; 190.

<sup>393</sup> *Ibid.*

“Municipalities with significant income from [municipal, red] businesses, etc., can continue to survive for some time, even if this is done by suspending, downsizing or not carrying out works of public interest, or what is even worse, limiting social activities; for the rest, if the crisis does not subside soon, the future will be dark as night.”<sup>394</sup>

The Financial Relationship Act, 1929 had removed the capstone of social democratic municipal finances, just as these municipal taxes were most necessary to prevent deprivation, social strife and maintain economic consumption. Despite these difficulties, the SDAP Finance aldermen in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague – Wibaut, De Zeeuw and Drees respectively – had been able provide benefits to the large number of new unemployed without cutting in social activities or traditional capstone of municipal finances – employees’ wages. As such, the 1931 Municipal Election saw a mostly stable SDAP return to the municipal executive in all three cities, with the SDAP councillor Polak replacing a retiring Wibaut at the Finance Department.<sup>395</sup> However, unemployment continued to increase, as it reached 246.000 persons by December 1931.<sup>396</sup>

As an “an extremely vulnerable port, dependent on the recipient, the carrier and the shipper”, Rotterdam would already be hit hard by the Great Depression by late 1931. Where Finance Alderman De Zeeuw originally budgeted f8.5 million guilders for Social Assistance in 1931, actual expenditure would exceed f12.5 million guilders with the new masses of unemployed.<sup>397</sup> Furthermore, Minister De Geer of Finance announced an unilateral cut of 3% to the Municipal Fund grants from 1931 onwards in an attempt to drive down municipal wages.<sup>398</sup> Without immediate subjective aid to cover the f4 million guilders shortage, Alderman De Zeeuw could not present a legally mandated balanced budget for 1932 to the Province. Minister De Geer of Finance demanded immediate cuts to municipal employees’ wages and increases in the remaining municipal taxes, in return for subjective aid.<sup>399</sup> Otherwise confronted with imminent insolvency, De Zeeuw presented a budget with a 50% increase in the street tax, 10% increase in personal tax, and, responsible for a majority of the savings, a *proposal* to be sent to the Rotterdam GO to decrease municipal labour costs by 3%.<sup>400</sup> Whilst communists and revolutionary socialists accused De Zeeuw of selling out the Rotterdam proletariat as the “MacDonald of Rotterdam”, bourgeois councillors demanded clearer commitments to labour cost cuts.<sup>401</sup> The bourgeois councillors feared the responsible alderman, Johan Brautigam, a fellow SDAP member and trade unionist, would simply drag his feet in negotiations with the GO.<sup>402</sup> De Zeeuw and Brautigam could not provide the assurance to the bourgeois councillors, for the SDAP was internally divided over the necessity of *any* cuts in wages.<sup>403</sup> The SDAP council party would only vote in favour if its councillors were not bound by the results of the GO negotiations. De Zeeuw’s tax proposals were rejected 26 to 16 and a new minority confessional

<sup>394</sup> De Miranda, “Preadvies door S. Rodrigues de Miranda”, 193.

<sup>395</sup> SDAP The Hague remained stable at 14 seats. SDAP Rotterdam lost 1 seat to arrive at 15. SDAP Amsterdam won 1 seat to arrive at 16.

<sup>396</sup> De Rooy, *Werklozenzorg en werkloosheidsbestrijding*, 70.

<sup>397</sup> De Ruyter-de Zeeuw, *De eerste rode wethouders van Rotterdam*, 121.

<sup>398</sup> De Rooy, *Werklozenzorg en werkloosheidsbestrijding*, 76.

<sup>399</sup> *Ibid.*, 77.

<sup>400</sup> The street and personal tax were precursors to the modern OZB. Street tax was calculated based on the width of each façade measured along the ground and on the taxable yield of the plot. The personal tax was a tax on the rental value of a building, similar to the Belgian cadastral income tax; De Ruyter-de Zeeuw, *De eerste rode wethouders van Rotterdam*, 122.

<sup>401</sup> Ramsay MacDonald was the first Labour Prime Minister of the United Kingdom in 1924 and again from 1929 to 1931. As most Labour Party ministers and MPs were opposed to cuts, MacDonald resigned as Prime Minister in August 1931 and subsequently formed a national government with Conservatives, Liberals and a rump of “National Labour” MPs. MacDonald was expelled from the Labour Party, which viciously attacked him for the rest of his life for his betrayal. He remained Prime Minister until 1935, after which he was replaced by the Conservative Stanley Baldwin; De Ruyter-de Zeeuw, *De eerste rode wethouders van Rotterdam*, 121.

<sup>402</sup> De Ruyter-de Zeeuw, *De eerste rode wethouders van Rotterdam*, 125-127.

<sup>403</sup> *Ibid.*

municipal executive with LSP support was formed in January 1932.<sup>404</sup> After eight years in the executive, the SDAP Rotterdam found itself again exiled to the opposition benches.

In the same year, unemployment in the Netherlands would grow to a staggering 350.800 persons in December 1932, as the confessional government maintained austerity politics and the Gold Standard.<sup>405</sup> In Amsterdam, the SDAP aldermen and a minority of SDAP councillors were privately convinced of the inevitability of the 3% cut in labour costs, following De Geer's unilateral cut to the Municipal Fund.<sup>406</sup> However, as in Rotterdam, the local party leadership and rank-and-file were strongly opposed. After three SDAP councillors helped create a majority for a motion in favour of the 3% cut, the Federation Amsterdam forced them to resign.<sup>407</sup> Loyal to the Federation's decision to oppose all labour cost savings, the social democratic aldermen ignored the motion and proposed budgets without cuts in wages.<sup>408</sup> The 1932 and 1933 Budgets were balanced by increasing the few remaining taxes, draining the financial reserves and large cuts in public works, arts, and other municipal interventions.<sup>409</sup> However, with the Ministry of Finance announcing another 11% or f 20.2 million in cuts to the Municipal Fund in 1934, bourgeois support in the Amsterdam council for maintaining labour standards disappeared.<sup>410</sup> Where the SDAP proposed raising electricity and water rates, the mayor and bourgeois aldermen, together forming a majority in the executive, proposed a budget with cuts in labour costs.<sup>411</sup> De Miranda announced the SDAP would not cooperate with "destructive measures" and the three SDAP aldermen resigned in August 1933.<sup>412</sup>

As seasonal labour drove down unemployment to just 274.900 persons in September 1933 the only social democratic aldermen in the major municipalities still in office were Willem Drees and Machiel Vrijenhoek in The Hague.<sup>413</sup> Through a constitutional feat, Drees and Vrijenhoek had *opposed* the labour cost cuts in 1932 as aldermen and councillors, but remained in office after the bourgeois majority in the executive and council approved the cuts.<sup>414</sup> Drees managed to convince The Hague Federation that their continued service in the executive was a necessary evil to prevent a bourgeois executive doing worse. Concurrently, The Hague's relatively wealthy tax base allowed the municipality to maintain the burden of f 10.8 million in Social Assistance with only f 460.000 in crisis aid from the national government.<sup>415</sup> The large-scale sale of municipal land held in emphyteusis by alderman Vrijenhoek further covered remaining municipal deficits.<sup>416</sup> In spite of the relatively fortuitous position of the municipality and the SDAP, The Hague too would have its Aldermanless period.

After Drees was elected to the House of Representatives and announced his resignation as alderman in The Hague, the SDAP The Hague nominated councillor Agnes de Vries-Bruin as successor.<sup>417</sup> Female

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<sup>404</sup> De Ruyter-de Zeeuw, *De eerste rode wethouders van Rotterdam*, 125-127.

<sup>405</sup> Keesing, *De Conjuncturele ontwikkeling van Nederland*, 112.

<sup>406</sup> Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 258-259.

<sup>407</sup> Ibid., 261.

<sup>408</sup> Ibid., 266.

<sup>409</sup> While the SDAP alderman, Ed Polak of Finance should have presented the budget in 1932, he had taken sick leave under pressure from the large cuts and unemployment – his colleague De Miranda took over his responsibility. Polak did present the budget in 1933; De Rooy, *Werklozenzorg en werkloosheidsbestrijding*, 81; Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 266.

<sup>410</sup> Ed. Polak, "Dies Atri", *De Gemeente* 26 (1933): 22, 349-352; "De Rijksbegrooting voor 1935", *De Volkskrant* [En. The People's Paper], 19 September 1934

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=MMKB12:000151016:mpeg21:a00065> [Accessed 1-12-2023]; Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 268.

<sup>411</sup> Ibid., 268-270.

<sup>412</sup> Ibid., 270.

<sup>413</sup> Keesing, *De Conjuncturele ontwikkeling van Nederland*, 112.

<sup>414</sup> Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 378.

<sup>415</sup> Ibid., 393.

<sup>416</sup> Ibid., 352-353.

<sup>417</sup> Ibid., 401.

councillors like 59-year-old De Bruin-Vries were far and few between in the Netherlands. Among thousands of councillors, 97 women were elected in 1919, growing to 142 in 1923, with SDAP providing a large plurality of female councillors.<sup>418</sup> Still, a small number of female councillors were elected as alderwomen, even as early as 1919, before women had been enfranchised. Like the physician and widow De Vries-Bruin, these alderwomen tended to be older, widowed, professionally schooled and/or a member of the higher classes.<sup>419</sup> However, these alderwomen were elected in minor municipalities, with the RKSP and liberals electing their first alderwomen in 1919 in Valkenburg and Oostzaan, respectively, and the SDAP following in 1923 in Gasselte.<sup>420</sup> Only the orthodox protestant parties, such as the ARP and CHU, principally rejected alderwomen.

This principled opposition of the ARP to alderwomen would form the basis of a new political design by LSP councillor Berensteyn to remove the SDAP from office after his futile attempts in the emphyteusis crisis in 1929 and again in 1931. Without the votes of the ARP, pro-emphyteusis parties lacked a majority to elect De Vries-Bruin, whilst Vrijenhoek would certainly resign if no social democrat was elected to replace Drees. While the ARP voted for Drees in the first round to demonstrate their support for a municipal executive including the SDAP, in the inevitable second round they either abstained or voted for the male opponent.<sup>421</sup> This male opponent was the anti-emphyteusis RKSP councillor Faber. In turn for LSP votes, the RKSP would support the candidacy of Berensteyn in the vacancy created after Vrijenhoek's resignation.<sup>422</sup> However, the vacancy-Vrijenhoek would be filled by CHU councillor Snoeck-Henkelmans, as the fourteen SDAP councillors voted for the CHU councillor to prevent Berensteyn's election. Moreover, Faber proved a disappointment for Berensteyn and other opponents of emphyteusis, as the sale of land by the municipality actually decreased under the RKSP alderman.<sup>423</sup> Still, with the resignation of Vrijenhoek, the last SDAP alderman in a Dutch major municipality had been expelled. Furthermore, it would take until Groningen's appointment of SDAP councillor Leida Aarsen-Jansen as alderwoman in October 1945 for a woman to fulfil the position in a large municipality.<sup>424</sup>

## 8. A Final Return to Office

While their exile to the opposition benches was difficult, it allowed the SDAP to recover from internal party struggles, impossible decisions and electoral defeats ahead of the 1935 Municipal Election. Before their expulsions, the SDAP's outlook for the 1935 Municipal Election was increasingly grim. In Amsterdam, the party had fallen from 39,5% of the vote in the 1929 General Election to just 31.8% in the 1933 General Election, with the CPH and RSP together nearly doubling from 8.41% to 15.45%. The former aldermen could and would now embark on strong opposition to the bourgeois executives. De Zeeuw held rousing speeches against wage cuts and Rotterdam's reactionary executive in the council

<sup>418</sup> Margit van der Steen, "De vrouwen van 1923. Vrouwen, gekozen in Nederlandse gemeenteraden, ná de invoering van het algemeen kiesrecht", *Historica* 25 (2020): 1, 3-9; 11.

<sup>419</sup> Jan de Roos, "Erens, Anna Maria Christina", in: *Digitaal Vrouwenlexicon van Nederland* [En. Digital Women's Lexicon of the Netherlands]. URL:

<https://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/vrouwenlexicon/lemmata/data/Erens> [Accessed 1-12-2023]; Jan de Roos, "Poot, Wilhelmina Anna," in: *Digitaal Vrouwenlexicon van Nederland* [En. Digital Women's Lexicon of the Netherlands]. URL: <https://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/vrouwenlexicon/lemmata/data/Poot> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>420</sup> De Roos, *Besturen als Kunst*, 92; De Roos, "Erens, Anna Maria Christina"; Jan de Roos, "Poot, Wilhelmina Anna".

<sup>421</sup> "Twee wethouder tegelijk", *De Locomotief* [En. The Locomotive], 30 September 1933.

<https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=MMKB23:001747055:mpeg21:a00280> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>422</sup> "Twee wethouder tegelijk"; Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 378.

<sup>423</sup> Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 403.

<sup>424</sup> The Hague would finally elect its first alderwomen with Lien Vos-van Gortel of the *Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie* [En. People's Party for Freedom and Democracy, hereafter VVD] in 1974. Rotterdam beat The Hague by nearly twenty years with the election of Nancy Zeelenberg (PvdA) in 1956. Amsterdam would be the last major municipality to elect a female alderman, with Irene Vorrink (PvdA) in 1978.

and in meetings across the municipality.<sup>425</sup> Inspired by the Plan of Labour by Belgian socialist Hendrik De Man and Keynesian economics, the Amsterdam SDAP launched Plan-De Miranda in February 1934.<sup>426</sup> With f 35 million in work relief, 10.000 people would be employed in the construction of urban infrastructure, parks and 5.000 new working-class homes.<sup>427</sup> At the same time, SDAP in municipalities across the country embarked on a campaign in favour of *welvaartspolitiek* [En. welfare politics] with work relief projects and humane unemployment benefits in the 1935 Municipal Election.

The subsequent Municipal Election would be a landslide victory for the SDAP. The SDAP went from 16 to 17 seats in Amsterdam, 14 to 17 seats in The Hague and 15 to 20 seats in Rotterdam. In all three municipalities, the formerly-exiled social democratic aldermen returned to office. While in The Hague, Vrijenhoek and Buurman chose to focus on Public Housing and Social Assistance, the two other local SDAP filled the Public Works department responsible for work relief. In Rotterdam, after the bourgeois bloc refused an SDAP offer of a mirroring executive, the SDAP even formed its first municipal executive composed solely of social democrats in a major municipality. De Miranda in Amsterdam and Brautigam in Rotterdam would be preside over the Public Works department in its Herculean task of work relief. While confessional-liberal Cabinet-Colijn II had, under pressure from Christian trade unions, established a national Work Fund in 1934 to provide work relief and assist municipalities in their own programs, it had not abandoned either austerity politics or the Gold Standard. While other European economies slowly recovered, the situation in the Netherlands worsened as unemployment reached 471.900 in December 1935.<sup>428</sup>

Despite their plans and promises, the social democratic aldermen could no longer mobilise the amount of capital necessary to truly relieve the unemployed masses in their municipalities without subjective aid from the national government. Rotterdam was only able to provide unemployment benefits for around 47.000 men and their families with a f 22 million grant from the national government.<sup>429</sup> While alderman Brautigam could launch several work relief programs such as the construction of the Maastunnel, the replacement of the Blijdorp Zoo and the construction of a new city boulevard in Hoek van Holland, his colleague De Zeeuw could only finance these projects with financial aid from the national government's Work Fund.<sup>430</sup> Still, the Cabinets-Colijn remained suspicious of socialist executive and appointed former VDB Minister of Finance, Pieter Oud, as Mayor of Rotterdam in 1938 to control the social democratic executive and ensure steady repayment of its outstanding f 52 million debt.<sup>431</sup>

In Amsterdam, the municipal socialist project had been effectively dismantled by the bourgeois executive between 1932. Most subsidies and municipal interventions had been ceased, 3.000 municipal workers had been fired and the remaining 20.000 experienced a wage cut between 20 and 30%.<sup>432</sup> Nevertheless, the remaining financial independence allowed Amsterdam to muster capital for Plan-De Miranda. Still, the capital fell far short of De Miranda's 1936 aim of f 100 million in public works projects between 1936 and 1942. Immediately after the election, De Miranda was able to muster some f 5 million for four projects, with another f 4 million provided by the Work Fund – well short of yearly

<sup>425</sup> Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 128.

<sup>426</sup> "Plan tot inperking der werkloosheid", *Het Volk*, 21 February 1934.

<sup>427</sup> <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=MMKB15:000902028:mpeg21:p00013> [Accessed 1-12-2023]; Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 289; Jansen and Rogier, *Kunstbeleid in Amsterdam 1920-1940*, 52.

<sup>428</sup> "Plan tot inperking der werkloosheid", *Het Volk*; Jansen and Rogier, *Kunstbeleid in Amsterdam 1920-1940*, 52.

<sup>429</sup> Keesing, *De Conjuncturele ontwikkeling van Nederland*, 175.

<sup>430</sup> De Zeeuw, "In het Regeringsnet", *De Gemeente* 29 (1936): 3, 54-55.

<sup>431</sup> Van Tilburg "Uit het leven van Johan Brautigam", 186-187; De Ruyter-de Zeeuw, *De eerste rode wethouders van Rotterdam*, 133.

<sup>432</sup> De Ruyter-de Zeeuw, *De eerste rode wethouders van Rotterdam*, 133.

<sup>433</sup> Jansen and Rogier, *Kunstbeleid in Amsterdam 1920-1940*, 45-46.



aim of f 15.5 million.<sup>433</sup> These projects included administrative work for unemployed intellectuals, construction of swimming pools, youth and sporting clubs for unemployed youth and the completion of the *Bosplan* [En. Forrest Plan]. Started under his liberal predecessor, the project included the digging of a 2200 metre long, 65 metre and 2 metre deep rowing course in miserable conditions by often malnourished unemployed people with and without experience with manual labour.<sup>434</sup> With poor labour conditions and worse pay, municipal, but especially national, manual work relief programs such as the *Bosplan* became increasingly unpopular among the working-class. The greatest proper work relief was provided by the *Nederlandse Spoorwegen* [Dutch Railways, hereafter NS]. The NS had decided to dramatically restructure the rail network in the capital without level crossings, with tunnelling and overhead bridges, the removal of Weesperspoor station and the construction of the Amstel and Muiderpoort stations. In total, this project would cost some f32 million and provide work between 1934 and 1940. All in all, excluding the NS project, by 1939, f 13.9 million in projects had been completed and some f 31.8 million in projects were still carried out which employed some 8.000 persons.<sup>435</sup>

Ultimately, unemployment would slowly decrease after the Netherlands finally left the Gold Standard in September 1936, following the earlier departure of France and Switzerland, which rendered the guider financially indefensible.<sup>436</sup> With the subsequent depreciation of the guilder and a broader, if moderate, global economic revival, unemployment slowly decreased from 375.700 in June 1936 to 191.300 unemployed persons in August 1939.<sup>437</sup> Still the Dutch economy had far from recovered and seasonal unemployment could still reach over 400.000 persons in the winter months. The municipalities, burdened by the costs of unemployment benefits, by cuts to the municipal fund and by work relief projects, could not truly provide necessary economic intervention to revive the Dutch economy, nor provide truly dignified work through work relief. At the same time, the national government sought to enforce austerity on nearly bankrupt municipalities through highly restrictive conditions on subjective aid. Only the relatively financially independent municipalities, as De Miranda predicted in 1932, could maintain a semblance of autonomy. After Amsterdam was finally forced to accept financial comptrollership by the national government in return for an immediate f21 million subsidy in late 1939, the last of the financially independent municipalities had been brought to heel.<sup>438</sup>

## 9. Advertisers and Pioneers of Municipal Socialism

Despite the nadir of municipal socialism in the Great Depression, the social democratic aldermen of the major municipalities remained the object of national support and derision they had been since the election of Wibaut in Amsterdam in 1914. Social democrats and confessionals would cite Wibaut to defend their positions on municipal finances or labour affairs in the municipal council of Nijmegen.<sup>439</sup> De Miranda played the role of Jewish socialist boogymen in newspapers as far south as North Brabant.<sup>440</sup> The RKSP Mayor of Culemborg warned in articles of the Monthly for Catholic Municipal Politics in 1928 of the danger of the “Amsterdam example” of municipalisation being replicated “not because of principle, but because of the benefits.”<sup>441</sup> Not merely pioneers of municipal socialism in their own municipalities, these aldermen played an active role in the transfer of municipal socialism through

<sup>433</sup> Jansen and Rogier, *Kunstbeleid in Amsterdam 1920-1940*, 51-53.

<sup>434</sup> De Rooy, *Werklozenzorg en werkloosheidsbestrijding*, 200; Jansen and Rogier, *Kunstbeleid in Amsterdam 1920-1940*, 52-54.

<sup>435</sup> Jansen and Rogier, *Kunstbeleid in Amsterdam 1920-1940*, 55; De Rooy, *Werklozenzorg en werkloosheidsbestrijding*, 274.

<sup>436</sup> Keesing, *De Conjuncturele ontwikkeling van Nederland*, 248.

<sup>437</sup> Ibid., 250.

<sup>438</sup> De Rooy, *Werklozenzorg en werkloosheidsbestrijding*, 207.

<sup>439</sup> Maas, *Sociaal-democratische gemeentepolitiek in Katholiek Nijmegen*, 257; 278

<sup>440</sup> “De Gemeente als Koopvrouw; De Middenstand als Voddenjood”, *Bredasche Courant*.

<sup>441</sup> A. “Voordeelige en onvoordeelige beginselen”, *De Gemeente* 21 (1928): 15, 225-227.

the advertisement of policies with simple brochures for the working-class electorate and extensive white papers for fellow magistrates.

Central to the elite “advertisement” or transfer of municipal socialist policy alternatives were the social democratic periodical *De Gemeente* [En. The Municipality], books written by the aldermen, and to a lesser extent the politically neutral *Gemeentebestuur* [En. Municipal Governance]. *De Gemeente* was especially influential among social democratic councillors, with at least 550 of the 1069 SDAP councillors subscribed after the 1923 Municipal Election.<sup>442</sup> This small bimonthly publication provided practical advice for councillors, policy ideas for social democratic themes and local municipal developments from across the country.<sup>443</sup> Since its founding in 1907 until 1940, *De Gemeente* was invariably edited by Amsterdam SDAP members, with Wibaut and Polak serving as editors between 1907 and 1924 and 1928 and 1940 respectively. The periodical was regularly accused of overrepresentation of policy analysis of large municipalities.<sup>444</sup> This bias may reflect the large number of articles written by aldermen of Amsterdam between 1914 and 1940. As all aldermen generally wrote on their own policies, the Amsterdam aldermen proved far more successful as national advertisers of their own municipal socialism in *De Gemeente* than the aldermen from other major municipalities, especially Rotterdam.

**Table 5. Publications by Aldermen about municipal politics or policies between 1914-1940**

	Articles in <i>De Gemeente</i>	Articles in <i>Gemeentebestuur</i>	Books
<b>Amsterdam</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>14</b>
Emmanuel Boekman	5	–	1
Monne de Miranda	21	1	7
Ed. Polak	29	–	2
Floor Wibaut	20	2	4
<b>Rotterdam</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
Arie de Zeeuw	4	–	–
<b>The Hague</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>0</b>
Willem Albarda	2	–	–
Willem Drees	8	6	–

Further contributing to overrepresentation of Amsterdam in elite advertisement were the fourteen books published by Amsterdam aldermen between 1914 and 1940. De Miranda mostly reissued article series from *De Gemeente* on the municipalisation of basic necessity or social hygiene in booklet form. Boekman’s only contribution was a single doctoral thesis on art policy in the Netherlands between 1920 and 1940.<sup>445</sup> Polak and Wibaut would publish mostly original work, with Wibaut publishing a book on municipal public housing with his brother-in-law in *De Gemeente en de Volkshuisvesting* [En. The Municipality and Public Housing] and a philippic against the Financial Relationship Act, 1929 with *Per expresstrein ... achteruit!* [En. By Express train ... backwards!].<sup>446</sup> Wibaut further published his speech on municipal financial governance in *Gemeentebeheer*. Polak too would publish two books on municipal autonomy, however, his most influential work would his work as editor of the correspondences courses in municipal politics. Again written mostly by fellow SDAP aldermen and members from Amsterdam, these booklets provided further education and assignments for social democratic councillors on municipal socialism.<sup>447</sup>

<sup>442</sup> De Roos, *Besturen als Kunst*, 73.

<sup>443</sup> Ibid., 68.

<sup>444</sup> Ibid., 71.

<sup>445</sup> Emanuel Boekman, *Overheid en kunst in Nederland* [En. Government and Art in the Netherlands] (Amsterdam, Van Gennep, 1988).

<sup>446</sup> Keppler and Wibaut, *De Gemeente en de Volkshuisvesting*; Wibaut, *Per expresstrein... achteruit!*.

<sup>447</sup> Ed Polak (ed.), *Schriftelijke Cursus in Gemeentepolitiek onder leiding van Ed. Polak* [En. Correspondence Course in Municipal Politics led by Ed. Polak], Amsterdam: N.V. Ontwikkeling, 1929.

The publications by Amsterdam aldermen strengthened the popular perception of municipal socialist achievements in the capital, sometimes at the cost of other municipalities. As De Miranda noted after a publication on municipal baths in Amsterdam:

“It turns out to me afterwards that I treated Rotterdam stepmotherly [in his book, *De Gemeente en haar Nieuwe Taak*, red.]. Because, in my opinion, Rotterdam does not give sufficient publicity to its efforts, the sources I have drawn from contain ... insufficient data on their social and hygienic interventions.”<sup>448</sup>

However, while the “elite” publications by Rotterdam aldermen remained limited to four articles in *De Gemeente* by De Zeeuw in 26 years, the Rotterdam SDAP did innovate in popular “advertisement” of municipal socialism through election brochures and local newspapers *Voorwaarts*. Inspired by the British press, *Voorwaarts* simplified its layout, wrote catchy, sensational articles, and became, in the words of Rotterdam MP Suze Groenweg: “vulgar.”<sup>449</sup> Still, *Voorwaarts* journalism proved popular among its target audience, working-class families, and would outcompete the national social democratic paper *Het Volk* in the shared The Hague market.<sup>450</sup> Ultimately, it forced *Het Volk* to adapt its style and contents.<sup>451</sup> These techniques were used to strengthen local municipal socialism through *Voorwaarts* and, in turn, was further adapted into SDAP electoral brochures, exemplified by the 1939 brochure “Struggling Upwards” with its slogans “Rotterdam builds again” and “Rotterdam World city.”<sup>452</sup>

Beside popular textual advertisement, nicknames, rhymes and songs provided powerful oral advertisement. Arie “Beton” and “Wie bouwt? Wibaut!” are good examples of the former two categories, integrating policy achievements with their respective aldermen. A similar case is a song from the 1931 Amsterdam Municipal Election referring to the swimming pool construction by De Miranda: “Wil je baaje? Wil je swemme? / Dan moet je De Miranda stemme!” [En. Do you want to bathe? Do you want to swim? Vote De Miranda!].<sup>453</sup> In the same 1931 Municipal Election in The Hague, the SDAP also used song to attack their principle opponents in the emphyteusis crisis: “Als je grondzwendel wilt / Stem dan Van der Bilt / Of dat andere zwijn / Van Berensteyn!” [En. “If you want land scam / Vote Van der Bilt / Or that other pig / Van Berensteyn!”].<sup>454</sup> These oral advertisements provide some indication of the popular mobilising ability of municipal politics in these major cities during the Interwar period.

Finally, the contributions by social democratic aldermen to the neutral *Gemeentebestuur* remained limited to expert analyses by its parttime editor, Drees, and the well-known aldermen from Amsterdam, Wibaut and De Miranda. Wibaut and De Miranda wrote well-researched papers as experts in the fields of municipal companies and unemployment insurance ahead of VNG congresses, with confessional aldermen providing an opposing analysis. As *Gemeentebestuur* guidelines expressly forbade opinionated analysis, the propagandic value of these pieces was limited.<sup>455</sup> Drees generally limited his contribution to analysis of unemployment reports from Amsterdam and The Hague, only very indirectly offering policy advice to the reader. However, Drees’ final contribution to the *Gemeentebestuur* in 1939 unmistakably proved the changing times of municipal politics and the dark days ahead: “Air protection

<sup>448</sup> Monne de Miranda, “De Rotterdamsche Badhuizen”.

<sup>449</sup> Marlite Halbertsma and Patricia van Ulzen, *Interbellum Rotterdam: kunst en cultuur 1918-1940* [En. Interwar Rotterdam: art and culture 1918-1940] (Rotterdam: Stichting NAI Uitgevers, 2001), 142.

<sup>450</sup> H. van Kuilenburg “Dagblad Voorwaarts uit het Volk geboren”, in *Rotterdams Jaarboek 1974* [En. Rotterdam Year book 1974], ed. R.A.D. Renting (Rotterdam: Stichting ‘Historische Publicaties Roterodamum’, 1974), 224-225.

<sup>451</sup> Ibid., 225-226.

<sup>452</sup> De Ruyter-de Zeeuw, *De eerste rode wethouders van Rotterdam*, 133; Van Kuilenburg “Dagblad Voorwaarts uit het Volk geboren”, 233.

<sup>453</sup> Borrie, *Monne de Miranda*, 242.

<sup>454</sup> Gaemers, *De Rode Wethouder*, 365.

<sup>455</sup> De Miranda, “Preadvies door S. Rodrigues de Miranda”, 193.

and air defence: Cost division between the government and the municipality for the provision of air shelters and air defence.”<sup>456</sup>

## 10. Conclusion: Dies Atri

The 1939 Municipal Election would be the final free election in the Netherlands before the start of the Second World War. Most of the seats won in the 1935 landslide election were lost in the three major cities, with only Rotterdam able to somewhat maintaining the losses to just two seats to remain at 18 seats. With war looming, bourgeois parties and the SDAP quickly resumed cooperation in new municipal executives. Despite promises to build cities “beautiful in design, rich in work and great in justice towards the underprivileged” in the next term, the inability to tackle the crisis in previous four years had already amply shown the limits of municipal socialism and the welfare municipality, restricted by a hostile national government and factors outside its control.<sup>457</sup> In a telling sign, De Miranda would not return as alderman in 1939, after false corruption accusations tainted by antisemitism were made by *De Telegraaf*.<sup>458</sup>

Still, with dark days ahead, Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague had been experiments in municipal socialism and examples for their fellow social democratic aldermen and councillors across the country. While SDAPs in Rotterdam and Amsterdam were arguably the most electorally successful, both were hampered by political polarisation and twice had to return to the opposition benches. The SDAP The Hague, because of its pragmatic aldermen, was able to maintain itself in the municipal executive for most of the interwar period. However, its experimentality and exemplarity limited itself to Social Assistance, where longevity and pragmatism provided Willem Drees ample opportunity to build a social welfare municipality. The fortunes of the SDAP Rotterdam were intricately linked to conditions in the Rotterdam harbour, with social unrest and insecure regents in 1918 mistakenly unleashing an abortive revolution. While De Zeeuw improved education with Plan-De Zeeuw and Heijkoop experimented with functionalism and concrete construction in mass public housing projects after their election in 1919, the municipal executive could not resolve the underlying weakness of the city. As the Great Depression brought Dutch shipping to a standstill, the municipality was barely able to provide unemployment benefits to the huddled unemployed masses, let alone alleviate conditions through Keynesian interventionism. Even after a landslide victory in 1935, the Rotterdam SDAP could not but accept the harsh demands of the national government for the necessary subjective aid. Finally, Amsterdam thoroughly experimented with the municipalisation of basic necessities, housework and social hygiene, implementing the economic aspects of a welfare municipality. However, changing political fortunes rendered the unique municipalisation of basic necessities largely impermanent. Still, the capital innovated in labour relations with the first GO and dramatically expanded public housing construction under social democratic aldermen.

Whilst all three municipalities pioneered municipal socialist policies in their own way, Amsterdam most effectively promoted its policies in books and *De Gemeente*. Like Treub before them, aldermen in Amsterdam continuously received national attention, which together sealed their reputations as exemplars and pioneers of municipal socialism.

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<sup>456</sup> Willem Drees, “Luchtbescherming en Luchtverdediging: Kostenverdeling tussen Rijk en gemeente voor verstrekking luchtschuilplekken en luchtverdediging”, *Gemeentebestuur* [En. Municipal Governance] 20 (1939): n.b.

<sup>457</sup> De Ruyter-de Zeeuw, *De eerste rode wethouders van Rotterdam*, 133.

<sup>458</sup> S. Rodrigues de Miranda, *Pro domo: verklaard en toegelicht door Gilles Borrie, Frans Heddema en Geert Mak* [En. Pro domo: explained by Gilles Borrie, Frans Heddema and Geert Mak] (Amsterdam: Arbeiderspers, 1997) 7-20.

### III

#### Is Red Expensive?: Quantitative Analysis of Municipal Socialism

“As Alderman for Finance of Amsterdam, I have never apologised for the accusation: ‘Red [Social democracy, red.] is expensive’. ... I have always admitted that in a municipality with a strong working-class population and a strong population of small entrepreneurs in trade and industry, a democratic management, can never be anything other than supposedly expensive. In such a municipality, the urge for collective expenditure will continue to increase for several years to come.” – Floor Wibaut, in *Levensbouw*, 1936.<sup>459</sup>

With the introduction of universal male suffrage in 1917 and the expansion of municipal tax powers in 1920, social democratic aldermen in the Netherlands had never been in a stronger position. With social democratic aldermen and SDAP pluralities in municipal councils newly elected under universal male suffrage across the country, municipalities decided to invest in public housing, public health, public works, and municipal companies through credit, while financing education and social assistance through “normal revenue”. Concurrently, municipalities had the opportunity to cover the interest and new normal expenditure with progressive taxation on income, capital, and business. In turn, bourgeois newspapers such as the orthodox Protestant *De Standaard* [En. The Standard] and the conservative liberal *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant* [En. New Rotterdam Paper] attacked these impending red policies as prohibitively expensive.<sup>460</sup> In this war of words, Amsterdam’s Finance Alderman Wibaut conceded that while “red” social democracy may be expensive for the capitalist, “it is cheap and good” for the working class.<sup>461</sup> Collective expenditure for and investment in the common good, to raise the material welfare and mental well-being of the municipality’s inhabitants, was simply the aim of municipal socialism.

However, the extent to which predominantly social democratic municipalities or social democratic aldermen truly pursued different financial policies in comparison to their confessional and liberal counterparts is difficult to establish qualitatively. Similarly problematic is any attempt to qualitatively prove the supposed unicity of Amsterdam as social democratic bulwark and model municipality with significantly more “social” policies. At the same time, the period between the first municipal budget cycle under universal male suffrage in 1920 and the abolition of municipal income, dividends and corporate taxes with introduction of the Financial Relationship Act in 1929 marked the zenith of social democratic practical power in the Netherlands in the interwar period. As such, a different method to assess the practical impact of municipal socialism on municipal policies and more “social” financial policies had to be found

Inspired by Hanssen, Pettersen and Tveit Sandvin’s quantitative analysis of municipal welfare policies and their relation to social democratic power in Norwegian municipalities in 1920s in their aforementioned paper *Welfare municipalities: economic resources or party politics*, this chapter will seek to provide a quantitative analysis of the contentions that “red” truly was expensive and that a municipality as Amsterdam differed significantly from other – social democratic – municipalities.<sup>462</sup> The quantitative analysis will be achieved through the analysis of ten independent variables, one of which is demographic, three are political and six are financial in nature. The selected variables are in order (1) population size of the municipality, (2) percentage vote of the SDAP in the municipality, (3) percentage vote of the RKSP in the municipality, (4) participation of the SDAP in the municipal executive, (5) municipal public housing expenditure per capita, (6) municipal public health expenditure per capita, (7) municipal poor relief expenditure per capita, (8) municipal companies expenditure per capita, (9) municipal companies income per capita, and (10) municipal income taxes income per capita. The demographic variable has chosen to establish whether population correlated with more social

<sup>459</sup> Wibaut, *Levensbouw*, 217.

<sup>460</sup> Slot and Moor, *Wibaut: Onderkoning van Amsterdam*, 147.

<sup>461</sup> Ibid.

<sup>462</sup> Hanssen, Pettersen, and Tveit Sandvin, “Welfare municipalities”, 27-44.

financial policies, irrespective of politics. The political variables serve to establish whether either SDAP electoral performance or participation in the municipal executive correlated with more social financial patterns. At the same time, the percentual vote of RKSP serves as counterfactual control as the main competing party in Dutch municipalities. The financial variables have been chosen for their characteristics as important municipal socialist themes in documents such as the SDAP Municipal Program and practice in major cities.<sup>463</sup> The expenditure per capita has been added to compare relative spending and control for undue overperformance by large municipalities with greater absolute spending and earnings.

The extent to which independent variables are linearly correlated with one another will be established through the Pearson correlation coefficient, with a result between  $-1.00$  and  $1.00$ .<sup>464</sup> Following the Hanssen, Pettersen and Tveit Sandvin's framework, a coefficient between  $\pm 0.70$  and  $\pm 1.00$  represents a very strong correlation, a coefficient between  $\pm 0.50$  and  $\pm 0.69$  represents a strong correlation, a coefficient between  $\pm 0.30$  and  $\pm 0.49$  represents a moderate correlation, and a coefficient between  $\pm 0.09$  and  $\pm 0.29$  represents a weak correlation.<sup>465</sup> A negative coefficient means a negative correlation between variables, while a positive coefficient means a positive correlation between variables. Contrary to the *Welfare municipalities* paper, an additional tobit analysis has not been conducted, as the sample size of Dutch municipalities is limited by sources.<sup>466</sup> Combined with a large standard deviation ( $\sigma$ ), a tobit analysis would be rendered ineffective.<sup>467</sup> In addition to the correlation analysis, a comparison is made between the expenditure and income per capita of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague with the mean ( $\mu$ ) plus one standard deviation per financial independent variable of all municipalities with SDAP participation in the municipal executive. Expenditure or income per capita equal or larger than  $\mu + \sigma$  would mean a more "social" financial policy than 84% of all SDAP municipalities in a normal distribution.

The independent variables have been collected through a variety of sources. For the measurement of SDAP and RKSP electoral performance, the digitised electoral results of the *Kiesraad* [En. Electoral Council] were used.<sup>468</sup> While these digitised results only cover the Dutch General Elections of 1918, 1922, 1925 and 1929, the pillarized nature of Dutch politics means these results tended to closely reflect a consistent electoral strength in the municipality and the electoral performance of the SDAP in municipal elections.<sup>469</sup> SDAP participation in the municipal executive was catalogued by the public announcement of the election of new aldermen in newspapers. For population size, income from municipal taxes and profits from municipal companies, expenditure on public housing, public health,

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<sup>463</sup> SDAP, *Gemeenteprogram*; For practice in major cities, see Chapter I.

<sup>464</sup> In the case for the correlation with the binary variable SDAP participation in the municipal executive and the other, continuous, independent variables, a specific form of the Pearson's correlation coefficient will be established, the point-biserial coefficient. The same methodology and analysis still apply; Zack Cernovsky, "A Frequent Misunderstanding Associated with Point Biserial and Phi Coefficients", *Psychological Reports* 90 (1): 65-66. [10.2466/pr0.2002.90.1.65](https://doi.org/10.2466/pr0.2002.90.1.65) [Accessed 1-12-2023]; James H. Stock and Mark W. Watson, *Introduction to Econometrics* (London: Pearson Education Limited, 2019), 127-130.

<sup>465</sup> Hanssen, Pettersen, and Tveit Sandvin, "Welfare municipalities", 29; 31; 33-34 37; 44; Stock and W. Watson, *Introduction to Econometrics*, 127-130.

<sup>466</sup> Hanssen, Pettersen, and Tveit Sandvin, "Welfare municipalities", 37.

<sup>467</sup> Stock and W. Watson, *Introduction to Econometrics*, 424.

<sup>468</sup> Kiesraad, *Tweede Kamerverkiezingen, 2 juli 1918* [En. House of Representatives election, 2 July 1918]; <https://verkiezingsuitslagen.nl/verkiezingen/detail/TK19180702> [Accessed 1-12-2023]; Kiesraad, *Tweede Kamerverkiezingen, 5 juli 1922* [En. House of Representatives election, 5 July 1922]; <https://verkiezingsuitslagen.nl/verkiezingen/detail/TK19220705> [Accessed 1-12-2023]; Kiesraad, *Tweede Kamerverkiezingen, 1 juli 1925* [En. House of Representatives election, 1 July 1925]; <https://verkiezingsuitslagen.nl/verkiezingen/detail/TK19250701> [Accessed 1-12-2023]; Kiesraad, *Tweede Kamerverkiezingen, 3 juli 1929* [En. House of Representatives election, 3 July 1929]; <https://verkiezingsuitslagen.nl/verkiezingen/detail/TK19290703> [Accessed 1-12-2023]

<sup>469</sup> Indeed, the largest difference between the SDAP electoral result between a General and the closest Municipal Elections in the 1930s was 0.68%, a negligible difference when translated to a municipal council with only 45 seats; Wielinga, *A History of the Netherlands*, 201-205.



and benefits for the needy, poor, and unemployed per municipality, the *Statistiek der Gemeentefinanciën* [En. Statistics of Municipal Finances] was used.<sup>470</sup> As the publishing agency, the CBS sometimes changed formats, methodology, and definitions of these variables, therefore not all variables can be cross temporally referenced for all nine years. In the case of population, the number of inhabitants in 1920-1921 and 1922-1923, are the same as the CBS tallied only once every two years on the 31<sup>st</sup> December of 1920 and 1922 respectively. In the case of expenditure for public housing and municipal companies and income from municipal companies, the capital “services”– loans, investments – for all municipalities were only available in 1920, 1924 and 1926. As capital services form a major part of all earning and expenditure in these fields, analysis of partially available years would have created a distorted image. Finally, a choice by the Ministry to focus on municipal taxes between 1921 and 1923, after the expansion of municipal tax powers, means expenditure on poor relief and public health is only available in the years 1920 and 1924 to 1928.<sup>471</sup> Municipal tax income is available for all nine years.<sup>472</sup>

The thesis hypothesises a positive correlation between electoral performance of and participation in the municipal executive by the SDAP and all important municipal socialist financial measures – per capita expenditure on public housing, health, poor relief, municipal companies and per capita earnings from municipal companies and municipal taxes – without Amsterdam being particularly exceptional in any of these cases. Concurrently, electoral performance of the RKSP is expected to negatively correlate with electoral performance of and participation in the municipal executive by the SDAP. Informed by returning hesitancy of the RKSP to embark upon municipal interventionism, the hypothesis further holds a negative correlation between the party’s electoral performance and the important municipal socialist financial measures – per capita expenditure on public housing, health, poor relief, municipal companies and per capita earnings from municipal companies and municipal taxes. Finally, despite using relative expenditure, our hypothesis is that population positively correlates with all financial independent variables, as largest municipalities are influenced by economies of scale, allowing for greater wealth extraction through municipal taxes and municipal company rates and easier access to financial credit.

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<sup>470</sup> CBS, *Statistiek der Gemeentelijke en Provinciale Financiën over het jaar 1920* [En. Statistics of Municipal and Provincial Finances over the year 1920] (The Hague: N.V. Drukkerij Trio, 1923); CBS, *Verruiming Gemeentelijk Belastinggebied en Provinciale Financiën 1921-1923* [En. Expansion of Municipal Tax Area and Provincial Finances 1921-1923] (The Hague: N.V. Drukkerij Trio, 1924); CBS, *Gemeentebegrotingen 1924-1925* [En. Municipal Budgets 1924-1925] (The Hague: N.V. Drukkerij Trio, 1926); CBS, *Statistiek der Gemeentefinanciën 1924-1926* [En. Statistics of Municipal Finances 1924-1926] (The Hague: N.V. Drukkerij Trio, 1927); CBS, *Statistiek der Gemeentefinanciën 1926-1928* [En. Statistics of Municipal Finances 1924-1926] (The Hague: N.V. Drukkerij Trio, 1929); CBS, *Statistiek der Gemeentefinanciën 1929* [En. Statistics of Municipal Finances 1929] (The Hague: N.V. Drukkerij Trio, 1934).

<sup>471</sup> CBS, *Verruiming Gemeentelijk Belastinggebied en Provinciale Financiën 1921-1923*, ii.

<sup>472</sup> Tables with all independent variables will be provided in the appendix.

**Table 6. Correlation (Pearson's  $r$ ) between independent variables**

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	Population	1.00	.24*	-.15*	.24*	.08	.28*	.58*	.26*	.28*	.44*
2	% Vote SDAP	–	1.00	-.56*	.53*	.11	.15*	.31*	.10	.09	.38*
3	% Vote RKSP	–	–	1.00	-.37*	.05	-.16*	-.29*	.00	.00	-.23*
4	SDAP in Municipal Executive	–	–	–	1.00	.15*	.19*	.35*	.23*	.19*	.32*
5	Public Housing exp.	–	–	–	–	1.00	.27*	.28*	.52*	.50*	.20
6	Public Health exp	–	–	–	–	–	1.00	.34*	.15*	.17*	.34*
7	Poor Relief exp	–	–	–	–	–	–	1.00	.11	.11	.57*
8	Municipal Companies exp.	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1.00	.90*	.29*
9	Municipal Companies inc.	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1.00	.28*
10	Municipal Taxes inc.	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1.00

Abbreviations: exp. : expenditure per capita | inc. : income per capita | \* : Statistically significant ( $\alpha = .05$ )

First of all, population size has weak, but statistically significant correlations with the political variables. Population size has a slight positive correlation with SDAP electoral performance (.24) and SDAP participation in the municipal executive (.24). There is a slight negative correlation between RKSP electoral performance and population size (–.15). The latter correlation can be explained by the overrepresentation of municipalities from the more urbanised predominantly Protestant north of the Netherlands and the relatively small size of municipalities from the predominantly Catholic south of the Netherlands. With the financial variables, public housing expenditure per capita has no statistically significant correlation with our political variables, save for a weak positive correlation with SDAP participation in the municipal executive (.15). Per capita expenditure on public health has a weak positively correlation with population size (.28), which can partially be attributed to the increased presence of specialised care in the form of municipal hospitals, elderly homes and asylums. Municipal companies also weakly positively correlate with population size (.28), which can partially be attributed to the increased economic viability of municipal gas and the increased value of land, which greatly increase capital movements of municipal land companies.

Noteworthy is the strong positive correlation between population size and poor relief (.58). This can partially be explained by the national government's reluctance to allow generous poor relief programs in smaller municipalities, beside the more generous benefits in larger municipalities such as Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Together with Arnhem, Dordrecht and Zaandam, Amsterdam and Rotterdam consistently noted the nation's largest expenditure per capita in poor relief. Otherwise noteworthy is the reasonable correlation between population size and municipal tax income (.44), which indicates some benefits of economies of scale affecting larger municipalities. For example, the large and wealthy municipalities of Amsterdam, The Hague and Hilversum received on average  $f$  67.04,  $f$  63.97, and  $f$  61.99 per capita in municipal taxes per year between 1920 and 1929, nearly double the average of  $f$  35.89. Our hypotheses that the municipal population positively correlates with per capita expenditure on public health, poor relief, municipal companies and per capita earnings from municipal companies and municipal taxes can be maintained. Our hypothesis with regards to per capita expenditure on public housing must be rejected.

Unsurprisingly, RKSP electoral performance is negatively correlated with SDAP electoral performance (–.56) and SDAP participation in the municipal executive (–.37). Furthermore, RKSP electoral performance is weakly negatively correlated with public health expenditure per capita (–.16), poor relief expenditure per capita (–.29), and municipal tax earnings per capita (–.23). There seems to be no significant discernible correlation between either municipal companies income or expenditure per capita

and RKSP electoral performance, indicating highly differing approaches on municipal companies in Roman Catholic municipal politics, with cities such as 's-Hertogenbosch investing heavily in municipal companies (f 120.89 per capita in 1926) and Kerkrade investing relatively little (f 9.08 per capita in 1926) compared to the national average of f 58.31 per capita in 1926. Furthermore, there seems to be no significant, discernible correlation between RKSP electoral performance and public housing expenditure per capita. Our contention that RKSP electoral performance negatively correlates with per capita expenditure on public health, poor relief, and per capita earnings from municipal taxes can be maintained. Our hypothesis with regards to per capita expenditure on public housing and municipal companies and per capita earnings from municipal companies must be rejected.

Again unsurprisingly, there is a strong correlation between SDAP electoral performance and eventual participation in the municipal executive (.53). Furthermore, SDAP electoral performance is weakly correlated with public health expenditure per capita (.15) and reasonably correlated with both municipal tax earnings (.38) and poor relief expenditure per capita (.31). The former might thus lead some credence to the suggestion that "red" is indeed expensive with the added caveat that the municipal tax earning variable reflects only *earnings*, rather than municipal tax rates. As such, a wealthier municipality with a lower tax rate may very well earn more in municipal taxes than a poorer municipality with higher tax rates. Indeed, The Hague had lower tax rates than Rotterdam, but consistently collected more per capita than its counterpart, on average f 63.97 per capita between 1920 and 1929, vis-à-vis just f 44.59 per capita.

The reasonable positive correlation between per capita poor relief expenditure and SDAP electoral performance and SDAP participation in the municipal executive strongly reflects the wholly distinct approach of the SDAP to unemployment and poor relief in comparison to its bourgeois counterparts. Societal assistance, rather than poor relief, was a right for all workers, rather than a favour to only the most deserving, in the eyes of the social democrats. Furthermore, attempts to decrease or dismantle poor relief in an attempt to drive down wages and restore economic equilibrium could count on little sympathy from the workers' party.

It must be noted that because of the relatively small sample size of 124 data points, SDAP electoral performance correlations with public housing expenditure per capita, municipal companies expenditure per capita, and municipal companies earnings per capita, are not statistically significant.

At the same time, the correlations between SDAP participation in the municipal executive and the financial variables are all statistically significant. Indeed, SDAP participation in the municipal executive weakly, positively correlates with per capita public housing expenditure (.15), per capita public health expenditure (.19), and per capita municipal companies earning (.19). Furthermore, SDAP participation in the municipal executive moderately, positively correlates with per capita poor relief expenditure (.35), per capita municipal companies earnings (.23), and per municipal taxes earnings (.32). With the exception of per capita municipal tax earnings, the correlations between SDAP participation in the municipal executive and the financial variables are slightly stronger than the correlation between SDAP electoral performance and the financial variables.

This may point to the possibility that a SDAP aldermanship amplified social democratic influence on municipal budgets and subsequently financial choices. While the term *wethouderssocialisme* [En. lit. alderman socialism] may be too presumptuous to apply here, as it glosses over the role of social democratic council parties and small sample size, social democratic aldermanships may indeed impact municipal financial policies. Enfin, we can conclude that there is indeed a positive correlation between electoral performance of and participation in the municipal executive by the SDAP. Participation in the municipal executive by the SDAP has significant, positive correlations with all important municipal socialist financial measures, whilst SDAP electoral performance only has statistically significant positive correlations with per capita public health expenditure, per capita municipal tax earnings, and per capita poor relief expenditure.

Finally, we shall compare the expenditure and earnings per capita of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague with the mean plus one standard deviation ( $\mu+\sigma$ ) per financial independent variable for municipalities with SDAP participation in the municipal executive. Higher expenditure or earning than the  $\mu+\sigma$  would indicate a more “social” financial policy than 84% of all SDAP municipalities in a normal distribution and may reflect a presupposed unicity of these municipalities. The data is visualized through tables below – an asterisk beside the number means that particular variable is statistically significant.

**Table 7. Public Housing expenditure per capita**

Municipality	1920	1924	1926
Amsterdam	<i>f</i> 21.35	<i>f</i> 59.37	<i>f</i> 46.64
Rotterdam	<i>f</i> 22.59	<i>f</i> 70.06*	<i>f</i> 36.37
The Hague	<i>f</i> 18.57	<i>f</i> 43.76	<i>f</i> 53.68
$\mu$	<i>f</i> 27.37	<i>f</i> 47.89	<i>f</i> 54.64
$\sigma$	<i>f</i> 14.61	<i>f</i> 21.19	<i>f</i> 35.43
$\mu+\sigma$	<i>f</i> 41.98	<i>f</i> 69.08	<i>f</i> 90.07

**Table 8. Public Health expenditure per capita**

Municipality	1920	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928
Amsterdam	<i>f</i> 3.24*	<i>f</i> 3.85*	<i>f</i> 3.74	<i>f</i> 3.99*	<i>f</i> 4.11*	<i>f</i> 4.15*
Rotterdam	<i>f</i> 1.11	<i>f</i> 2.13	<i>f</i> 1.87	<i>f</i> 1.25	<i>f</i> 1.27	<i>f</i> 1.29
The Hague	<i>f</i> 1.83	<i>f</i> 2.53	<i>f</i> 2.55	<i>f</i> 3.33	<i>f</i> 2.38	<i>f</i> 2.61
$\mu$	<i>f</i> 1.09	<i>f</i> 1.68	<i>f</i> 1.83	<i>f</i> 2.02	<i>f</i> 2.01	<i>f</i> 1.99
$\sigma$	<i>f</i> 0.85	<i>f</i> 1.77	<i>f</i> 1.93	<i>f</i> 1.90	<i>f</i> 1.85	<i>f</i> 1.88
$\mu+\sigma$	<i>f</i> 1.94	<i>f</i> 3.46	<i>f</i> 3.76	<i>f</i> 3.92	<i>f</i> 3.86	<i>f</i> 3.87

**Table 9. Poor Relief expenditure per capita**

Municipality	1920	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928
Amsterdam	<i>f</i> 20.98*	<i>f</i> 27.06*	<i>f</i> 25.01*	<i>f</i> 25.33*	<i>f</i> 25.67*	<i>f</i> 25.61*
Rotterdam	<i>f</i> 11.62	<i>f</i> 24.77*	<i>f</i> 16.71	<i>f</i> 17.67*	<i>f</i> 18.71*	<i>f</i> 18.66*
The Hague	<i>f</i> 7.26	<i>f</i> 12.63	<i>f</i> 13.04	<i>f</i> 17.20	<i>f</i> 16.88*	<i>f</i> 17.05*
$\mu$	<i>f</i> 6.75	<i>f</i> 15.72	<i>f</i> 12.20	<i>f</i> 11.21	<i>f</i> 10.14	<i>f</i> 9.96
$\sigma$	<i>f</i> 5.16	<i>f</i> 7.33	<i>f</i> 6.32	<i>f</i> 6.38	<i>f</i> 5.11	<i>f</i> 4.89
$\mu+\sigma$	<i>f</i> 11.91	<i>f</i> 23.05	<i>f</i> 18.52	<i>f</i> 17.60	<i>f</i> 15.25	<i>f</i> 14.85

**Table 10. Municipal Companies expenditure per capita**

Municipality	1920	1924	1926
Amsterdam	<i>f</i> 47.18	<i>f</i> 87.42	<i>f</i> 95.00
Rotterdam	<i>f</i> 27.93	<i>f</i> 73.63	<i>f</i> 40.76
The Hague	<i>f</i> 86.23*	<i>f</i> 135.66*	<i>f</i> 162.28*
$\mu$	<i>f</i> 39.54	<i>f</i> 62.68	<i>f</i> 72.00
$\sigma$	<i>f</i> 27.98	<i>f</i> 42.75	<i>f</i> 56.39
$\mu+\sigma$	<i>f</i> 67.52	<i>f</i> 105.44	<i>f</i> 128.39

**Table 11. Municipal Companies income per capita**

Municipality	1920	1924	1926
Amsterdam	<i>f</i> 26.30	<i>f</i> 101.17*	<i>f</i> 88.87
Rotterdam	<i>f</i> 30.70	<i>f</i> 64.89	<i>f</i> 41.39
The Hague	<i>f</i> 70.52	<i>f</i> 114.58*	<i>f</i> 173.61*
$\mu$	<i>f</i> 31.94	<i>f</i> 53.65	<i>f</i> 65.25
$\sigma$	<i>f</i> 26.31	<i>f</i> 40.18	<i>f</i> 56.98
$\mu+\sigma$	<i>f</i> 58.26	<i>f</i> 93.83	<i>f</i> 122.22

**Table 12. Municipal tax income per capita**

Municipality	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929
Amsterdam	<i>f</i> 76.17*	<i>f</i> 114.04*	<i>f</i> 78.04*	<i>f</i> 59.82*	<i>f</i> 55.80*	<i>f</i> 51.68*	<i>f</i> 53.08*	<i>f</i> 57.40*	<i>f</i> 61.10*	<i>f</i> 63.27*
Rotterdam	<i>f</i> 47.84	<i>f</i> 44.88	<i>f</i> 47.90	<i>f</i> 47.42	<i>f</i> 38.43	<i>f</i> 49.60	<i>f</i> 41.87	<i>f</i> 41.40	<i>f</i> 43.09	<i>f</i> 43.42
The Hague	<i>f</i> 78.23*	<i>f</i> 80.64*	<i>f</i> 78.36*	<i>f</i> 63.66*	<i>f</i> 62.77*	<i>f</i> 50.39*	<i>f</i> 47.91*	<i>f</i> 58.85*	<i>f</i> 59.66*	<i>f</i> 59.21*
$\mu$	<i>f</i> 44.76	<i>f</i> 50.41	<i>f</i> 48.78	<i>f</i> 39.54	<i>f</i> 40.06	<i>f</i> 35.56	<i>f</i> 35.41	<i>f</i> 39.83	<i>f</i> 39.15	<i>f</i> 41.00
$\sigma$	<i>f</i> 18.57	<i>f</i> 23.64	<i>f</i> 20.57	<i>f</i> 11.72	<i>f</i> 10.76	<i>f</i> 9.64	<i>f</i> 8.42	<i>f</i> 9.41	<i>f</i> 9.09	<i>f</i> 10.13
$\mu+\sigma$	<i>f</i> 63.34	<i>f</i> 74.04	<i>f</i> 69.35	<i>f</i> 51.26	<i>f</i> 50.82	<i>f</i> 45.21	<i>f</i> 43.82	<i>f</i> 49.24	<i>f</i> 48.24	<i>f</i> 51.13

The results of the comparison offer a nuanced picture. First of all, none of the three municipalities significantly outperforms the others as more “social” in their financial policy. Furthermore, the major municipalities did not necessarily spend significantly more across *all* municipal socialist fields compared to other social democratic municipalities. However, the major municipalities tended to perform above average in the municipal socialist field and rarely performed below the average of social democratic municipalities. While Amsterdam did consistently spend significantly more on public health than most of its counterparts, it greatly underperformed Groningen, which, on average, spent *f* 8.83 per capita between 1924 and 1928, compared to Amsterdam’s *f* 3.97 per capita. Similarly, while The Hague consistently spent and earned significantly more than most on municipal companies, it did not outperform the social democratic municipalities of Schiedam, Zaandam and Haarlem in 1920, 1924 and 1926 respectively. Only on per capita poor relief expenditure did all three major municipalities nearly always spend significantly more per capita than other social democratic municipalities. Again, unsurprising due to the national government’s subsidisation of poor relief in major municipalities. However, the municipalities were still joined at the top with Arnhem and Zaandam – both municipalities with social democratic aldermen. Finally, it must be noted that Amsterdam and The Hague consistently collected significantly more per capita earning from municipal taxes than the average social democratic municipality, on average *f* 67.04 and *f* 63.97 per capita between 1920 and 1929. Although this may demonstrate our tentative hypothesis that “red” – municipal socialism – may indeed be more expensive, the caveat with regards to wealthy municipalities must be remembered and in this case, combined with the economies of scale – reflected in the higher standard of living – of two of the most populous municipalities of the Netherlands. Indeed, the third top earner was the municipality of Hilversum, a large, wealthy commuter municipality with near continuous SDAP participation in the municipal executive, which collected on average *f* 61.99 per capita between 1920 and 1929.

In conclusion, there is indeed a statistically significant positive correlation between participation in the municipal executive by the SDAP, and important municipal socialist financial measures – per capita expenditure on health, poor relief, municipal companies and per capita earnings from municipal companies and municipal taxes. This significant positive correlation also holds for SDAP electoral performance with per capita public health expenditure, per capita municipal tax earnings, and per capita poor relief expenditure. This is not the case for the positive, but not statistically significant, correlations between SDAP electoral performance and public housing expenditure per capita, municipal companies expenditure per capita, and municipal companies earnings per capita. In these cases, the lack of statistical significance points to the limits of historical statistical analysis of the *Statistiek der Gemeentefinanciën*, which, although highly specific and useful source, does not consistently provide all valuable data throughout its years of publication, contributing in some instances to a detrimentally small sample size.

In regards to our counterfactual, RKSP electoral performance indeed negatively correlates with poor relief and public health expenditure. No such correlation can be established with RKSP electoral performance and public housing and municipal companies. Finally, municipal population positively correlates with poor relief, public health, municipal companies expenditure and tax income, whilst no such correlation could be established with public housing expenditure.

Through the comparison between Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague and all other social democratic municipalities, follows the conclusion that although these major cities spent and earned above average of on the municipal socialist financial measures, they did not necessarily significantly out-spend and out-earned their fellow social democratic municipalities across municipal socialist fields. As the three major municipalities only consistently significantly spent more on poor relief, we cannot any sweeping conclusions in favour of the unicity of municipal socialism in these major cities. Finally, the reasonably positive correlation between SDAP electoral performance and SDAP participation in the municipal executive with per capita municipal tax earnings, may serve as evidence that “red” – municipal socialism – may indeed be more expensive than for example, Roman Catholic municipal politics, with the added caveats that, firstly, per capita municipal tax earnings do not necessarily reflect higher tax rates, but also reflect greater wealth and possible higher standards of living in major municipalities and, secondly, further analysis is needed to unmistakably prove this hundred year old accusation.



## Conclusion

### The Abandonment of Municipal Socialism

“It has been of great significance in many cases that municipalities have given the impetus to what eventually turns out to develop into regulations across the country, and that local experience has been gained before decisions of a general nature are taken.”<sup>473</sup>

As the Association of Dutch Municipalities celebrated the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Municipal Act, 1851, the Prime Minister of the Netherlands delivered some congratulatory remarks. After more than a hundred years of confessionals or liberals, a social democrat rose to speak. Willem Drees, the former alderman of The Hague, arrived at the lectern. The Prime Minister hailed the decades of significant experienced provided by “large scale of municipal interventionism” enabled by the letter and spirit of the law.<sup>474</sup> This experience, the Prime Minister argued, had provided the necessary impetus towards the natural development towards national interventionism. Unemployment care, employment mediation, culture, and health care, had by 1951 all increasingly become national tasks.<sup>475</sup> Even municipal utilities, telephone, electricity and gas, were “increasingly seen as links in a system of supplying needs across the country.”<sup>476</sup> Furthermore, even the that staple of municipal socialism, public housing development, was thoroughly dependent on the national government. As the Netherlands rebuilt after the most destructive war in its history, the national government had even imposed further restrictions on municipal autonomy, something, the former alderman believed, the municipal authorities would understand as “[t]he restrictions that they see imposed on themselves at this time as only the result of dire necessity.”<sup>477</sup>

The Second World War brought a halt in the municipal socialist project. De Miranda and Boekman had become victims of national socialism.<sup>478</sup> After the war, De Zeeuw and Vrijenhoek were ostracised by their party for their continued service as alderman until 1942, even though they had been forced to stay on by German authorities.<sup>479</sup> Drees had been held hostage throughout the war in Sint-Michielsgestel, where intellectuals from all major political parties imagined a new future for the Netherlands.<sup>480</sup> After the war, the SDAP, VDB and social-Christian CDU founded the *Partij van de Arbeid*. Neither a revolutionary or workers’ party, this social democratic peoples’ party would no longer be ostracized at the national level.<sup>481</sup> Together with the *Katholieke Volkspartij* [En. Catholic People’s Party, hereafter KVP], the successor to the RKSP, the PvdA would preside over the reconstruction of the Netherlands and the establishment of a national welfare state, with the former alderman Drees as Prime Minister.

By 1951, the era of municipal socialism had truly passed, all aspects of the welfare municipality were increasingly overtaken by an emerging welfare state. Furthermore, a social democrat, a former alderman no less, was willing to restrict municipal autonomy for the good of “the state.” In post-war Netherlands, Amsterdam would not become Wibaut’s city of tomorrow providing for the “material welfare and mental well-being of that great mass of workers.” It is debatable to what extent Amsterdam could have ever achieved this aim. Even during the zenith of the municipal socialist project, Wibaut, De Miranda and Polak were thoroughly dependent on bourgeois parties such as the RKSP and VDB in the capital, and the confessional national government in The Hague, not to speak of the unforgiving global

<sup>473</sup> Drees, *Drees aan het woord*, 181.

<sup>474</sup> Ibid., 180.

<sup>475</sup> Ibid.

<sup>476</sup> Ibid.

<sup>477</sup> Ibid., 182.

<sup>478</sup> De Miranda was killed in Camp Amersfoort; Boekman died by suicide after he and his wife had been unable to escape to England from IJmuiden in the May days 1940.

<sup>479</sup> De Ruyter-de Zeeuw, *De eerste rode wethouders van Rotterdam*, 180-185; De Leeuwe, “Machiel Vrijenhoek. Wethouder in oorlogstijd”, 86-92.

<sup>480</sup> Wielinga, *A History of the Netherlands*, 230-231.

<sup>481</sup> Ibid.

developments and the world economy. Nor did it seem more likely to achieve this lofty goal than its direct sisters, Rotterdam and The Hague. All three municipalities pioneered differing aspects of municipal socialism, but were subject to similar forces and shortcomings. Amsterdam's greatest distinction was its incredibly effective advertisement of municipal socialism in publications throughout the interwar period reinforced by the opposition it inspired in the bourgeois press. Practically, while Amsterdam generally spent and earned more in municipal socialist fields than the average social democratic municipality, it did not do spend or earn significantly more than all other social democratic municipalities across municipal socialist fields. Moreover, various other social democratic municipalities significantly out-spend and earned the other municipalities in municipal socialist metrics, such as Groningen in Public Health or Zaandam in Municipal Companies expenditure. Nor did the capital significantly outperform the two other major municipalities in the metrics. Thus, while the municipal socialist project in Amsterdam may have been above average in the Interwar period, it was not unique. However, we cannot deny the political and ideational impact of the municipal socialist project in Amsterdam on interwar political thought and post-war public memory. Its uniqueness may simply lay in the fact that it was *primus inter pares*, first among equals.

## Acknowledgements

I want to thank Julia Stam for her proof reading and her thorough feedback on my meandering writing style. I want to thank Jonna van Mourik for all her support throughout this process, including her assistances with the graphs and tables. I further have to acknowledge her and Lard Montesano Montessori's great assistance in the third chapter. As a novice in statistics, I would have undoubtedly gotten lost in the world of statistics, were it not for their clarifying advice. I also have to thank the PvdA Utrecht for their patience with a cluttered mind and cluttered desk in the party room. Their practical work and intrepid idealism serve as an example of modern day municipal socialism. Of course, all faults in the thesis remain mine and mine alone.

Titus Stam, Utrecht  
December 2023

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## Appendix

### 1. Municipal Councils of Amsterdam (1914-1940), The Hague (1917-1940), & Rotterdam (1917-1940)

#### Municipal Council of Amsterdam (1914-1940)

Amsterdam	1913	1919	1921	1923	1927	1931	1935	1939
RP	–	–	2	–	–	–	–	–
CPH	–	6	3	4	2	4	7	7
CPH-CC	–	–	–	–	2	–	–	–
RSAP	–	–	–	–	1	1	1	1
SDAP	15	13	14	16	15	16	17	14
CDU	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–
CDP	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	–
SP	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–
VDB	5	4	2	3	3	2	1	2
LU	13	3	–	–	–	–	–	–
LSP	–	–	5	4	5	4	3	3
BVL	4	3	–	–	–	–	–	–
NBAM	–	1	–	3	3	3	1	–
NP	–	1	1	–	–	–	–	–
List den Hartog	–	–	1	–	–	1	1	1
EB	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	–
RKSP	3	7	8	8	7	7	7	8
ARP	4	3	4	3	3	3	2	3
CHU	1	2	4	4	4	4	3	3
VNH	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–
NSB	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	3

#### Municipal Council of The Hague (1917-1940)

Party	1917	1919	1923	1927	1931	1935	1939
CPH	–	3	1	1	2	1	2
SDAP	11	15	14	14	14	17	16
VDB	3	1	2	2	3	1	3
LU	12	5	–	–	–	–	–
LSP	–	–	6	7	7	4	4
BVL	5	1	–	–	–	–	–
MP	–	1	–	–	–	–	–
BHB	–	–	1	1	–	–	–
EB	–	1	–	–	–	–	–
NP	–	1	–	–	–	–	–
SB	–	1	–	–	–	–	–
RKSP	6	9	10	10	9	9	10
ARP	4	5	5	4	5	4	5
CHU	4	2	4	4	4	4	4
HGSP	–	–	2	2	1	1	0
VIH	–	–	–	–	–	–	1
VNH	–	–	–	–	–	4	–

<b>Municipal Council of Rotterdam (1917-1940)</b>							
Party	1917	1919	1923	1927	1931	1935	1939
RP	–	–	1	–	–	–	–
CPH	–	2	2	–	1	2	1
CPH-CC	–	–	–	2	–	–	–
RSAP	–	–	–	–	2	1	2
SDAP	12	19	16	16	15	20	18
VDB	2	1	3	2	1	–	1
LU	5	1	–	–	–	–	–
LSP	–	–	4	5	7	3	4
BVL	10	2	–	–	–	–	–
MP	–	1	–	–	–	–	–
ASP	–	1	–	–	–	–	–
EB	–	1	–	–	–	–	–
RKSP	4	7	8	8	8	7	8
ARP	6	6	7	7	6	5	6
CHU	6	4	4	4	4	3	3
SGP	–	–	–	1	1	1	1
List Burink	–	–	–	–	–	2	1
VNH	–	–	–	–	–	1	–

## 2. Aldermen and their portfolio's in Amsterdam, (1914-1940), The Hague & Rotterdam (1917-1940)

### Aldermen and their portfolio's in Amsterdam between March 1914 and May 1940

Office	Party	Entered	Left
<b>Mayor</b>			
A. Roëll	Liberal	–	March 1915
J.W.C. Tellegen	VDB	March 1915	April 1921
W. De Vlugt	ARP	June 1921	–
<b>Finance</b>			
L. Serrurier	Liberal	–	September 1914
S. de Vries Czn.	ARP	September 1914	October 1918
W.H. Vliegen	SDAP	October 1918	September 1919
F.M. Wibaut	SDAP	September 1919	April 1921
<i>vacant</i>		<i>April 1921</i>	<i>June 1921</i>
F.M. Wibaut	SDAP	June 1921	September 1927
J.H.A.L. von Frijtag-Drabbe	RKSP	September 1927	September 1929
F.M. Wibaut	SDAP	September 1929	September 1931
E. Polak	SDAP	September 1931	September 1933
E.J. Abrahams	VDB	September 1933	September 1935
J. Rustige	CHU	September 1935	–
<b>Municipal Companies</b>			
L. Serrurier	Liberal	–	September 1914
S. de Vries Czn.	ARP	September 1914	October 1918
W.H. Vliegen	SDAP	October 1918	September 1919
F.J.A.M. Wierdels	RKSP	September 1919	June 1921
F.M. Wibaut	SDAP	June 1921	September 1927
J. ter Haar	CHU	September 1927	September 1929
F.M. Wibaut	SDAP	September 1929	September 1931
E.J. Abrahams	VDB	September 1931	September 1933
J. Rustige	CHU	September 1933	–
<b>Basic Necessities</b>			
F.M. Wibaut	SDAP	March 1914	September 1919
S.R. de Miranda	SDAP	September 1919	April 1921
<i>vacant</i>		<i>April 1921</i>	<i>June 1921</i>
S.R. de Miranda	SDAP	June 1921	September 1927
W. Boissevain	LSP	September 1927	September 1929
S.R. de Miranda	SDAP	September 1929	September 1931
Ed. Polak	SDAP	September 1931	September 1933
G.C.J.D. Kropman	RKSP	September 1933	September 1935
F. van Meurs	SDAP	September 1935	–
<b>Public Housing</b>			
F.M. Wibaut	SDAP	March 1914	April 1921
<i>vacant</i>		<i>April 1921</i>	<i>June 1921</i>
S.R. de Miranda	SDAP	June 1921	September 1927
W. Boissevain	LSP	September 1927	September 1929
S.R. de Miranda	SDAP	September 1929	September 1933
W. Boissevain	LSP	September 1933	September 1935
S.R. de Miranda	SDAP	September 1933	September 1939
B.C. Franke	SDAP	September 1939	–

Continues below

<b>Public Works</b>			
Th.F.A. Delprat	LU	–	September 1914
W.H. Vliegen	SDAP	September 1914	October 1918
W. de Vlucht	ARP	October 1919	June 1921
J. ter Haar	CHU	June 1921	September 1927
E.J. Abrahams	VDB	September 1927	September 1931
S.R. de Miranda	SDAP	September 1931	September 1933
W. Boissevain	LSP	September 1933	September 1935
S.R. de Miranda	SDAP	September 1933	September 1939
W. Boissevain	LSP	September 1939	–
<b>Education and Arts</b>			
S. de Vries Czn.	ARP	–	September 1914
H.J. den Hartog	Liberal	September 1914	June 1921
W.H. Vliegen	SDAP	June 1921	September 1923
E. Polak	SDAP	September 1923	September 1927
Th.M. Ketelaar	VDB	September 1927	September 1929
E. Polak	SDAP	September 1929	September 1931
E. Boekman	SDAP	September 1931	September 1933
I.H.J. Vos	LSP	September 1933	September 1935
E. Boekman	SDAP	September 1935	May 1940
<b>Public Health</b>			
N.M. Josephus Jitta	Liberal	–	September 1917
H.J.C. van Tienen	Liberal	September 1917	September 1919
E.J. Abrahams	VDB	September 1919	June 1921
I.H.J. Vos	LSP	June 1921	October 1928
J. Rutgers	LSP	October 1928	September 1929
J. Douwes	ARP	September 1929	September 1933
G. Baas	ARP	September 1933	September 1939
B.C. Franke	SDAP	September 1939	–
<b>Social Assistance</b>			
N.M. Josephus Jitta	Liberal	–	September 1917
H.J.C. van Tienen	Liberal	September 1917	September 1919
E.J. Abrahams	VDB	September 1919	June 1921
I.H.J. Vos	LSP	June 1921	October 1928
J. Rutgers	LSP	October 1928	September 1929
J. Douwes	ARP	September 1929	September 1933
G. Baas	ARP	September 1933	September 1935
F. van Meurs	SDAP	September 1935	–
<b>Labour Affairs</b>			
F.M. Wibaut	SDAP	March 1914	April 1921
<i>vacant</i>		<i>April 1921</i>	<i>June 1921</i>
F.J.A.M. Wierdels	RKSP	June 1921	April 1925
J.H.A.L. von Frijtag-Drabbe	RKSP	April 1925	November 1929
G.C.J.D. Kropman	RKSP	November 1929	–



**Aldermen and their portfolio's in The Hague between September 1917 and May 1940**

Office	Party	Entered	Left
<b>Mayor</b>			
H.A. van Karnebeek	Liberal	–	September 1918
J.A.N. Patijn	Liberal	September 1918	October 1930
L.H.N. Bosch van Rosenthal	CHU	October 1930	July 1934
S.J.R. de Monchy	Liberal	July 1934	–
<b>Finance</b>			
P. Droogleevers Fortuyn	LU	–	October 1919
J.A. de Wilde	ARP	October 1919	September 1931
W. Drees	SDAP	September 1931	September 1933
J.R. Snoeck Henkemans	CHU	September 1933	September 1935
L.J.M. Feber	RKSP	September 1935	–
<b>Municipal Companies</b>			
H.J. Romein	LU	–	October 1919
A.C.A van Vuuren	RKSP	October 1919	July 1923
M. Vrijenhoek	SDAP	July 1923	October 1923
J.A. de Wilde	ARP	October 1923	September 1931
F.N.V. Quant	RKSP	September 1931	September 1935
S. de Vries Czn.	ARP	September 1935	–
<b>Urban Development and Public Housing</b>			
M. Vrijenhoek	SDAP	October 1923	September 1933
L.J.M. Feber	RKSP	September 1933	September 1935
M. Vrijenhoek	SDAP	September 1935	–
<b>Public Works</b>			
J. Jurriaan Kok	LU	–	October 1919
P. Droogleevers Fortuyn	LU	October 1919	July 1923
A.C.A van Vuuren	RKSP	July 1923	October 1923
F.N.V. Quant	RKSP	October 1923	October 1931
W. Drees	SDAP	October 1931	September 1933
L.J.M. Feber	RKSP	September 1933	–
<b>Education</b>			
J.W. Albarda	SDAP	September 1917	July 1923
W.W. van der Meulen	LSP	July 1923	September 1931
H.P. Marchant	VDB	September 1931	May 1933
C.L. van der Bilt	LSP	May 1933	–
<b>Social Assistance</b>			
A.C.A van Vuuren	RKSP	–	October 1919
W. Drees	SDAP	October 1919	September 1931
S. de Vries Czn.	ARP	September 1931	September 1935
L. Buurman	SDAP	September 1935	–

**Aldermen and their portfolio's in Rotterdam between November 1919 and May 1940**

Office	Party	Entered	Left
<b>Mayor</b>			
A.R. Zimmerman	Liberal	–	September 1923
J. Wytema	Liberal	September 1923	July 1928
P. Droogleeve Fortuyn	LSP	July 1928	September 1938
P.J. Oud	VDB	September 1938	–
<b>Finance</b>			
S.J. van Aalten	VDB	–	September 1923
A. van der Hoeven	CHU	September 1923	April 1925
J. Schouten	ARP	April 1925	August 1927
A.B. de Zeeuw	SDAP	August 1927	February 1932
A. Hanemeijer	LSP	February 1932	September 1935
A.B. de Zeeuw	SDAP	September 1935	–
<b>Municipal Companies</b>			
S.J. van Aalten	VDB	–	September 1923
A. van der Hoeven	CHU	September 1923	April 1925
J. Schouten	ARP	April 1925	August 1927
A.B. de Zeeuw	SDAP	August 1927	February 1932
A. Hanemeijer	LSP	February 1932	September 1935
A.B. de Zeeuw	SDAP	September 1935	–
<b>Public Housing</b>			
A.W. Heijkoop	SDAP	November 1919	September 1921
A. van der Hoeven	CHU	September 1921	September 1923
A.W. Heijkoop	SDAP	September 1923	November 1929
J. ter Laan	SDAP	November 1929	September 1931
J. Brautigam	SDAP	September 1931	February 1932
A.H.S. Stermerding	CHU	February 1932	September 1935
J. Brautigam	SDAP	September 1935	–
<b>Public Works</b>			
A. de Jong	ARP	–	September 1935
J. Brautigam	SDAP	September 1935	–
<b>Education</b>			
A.B. de Zeeuw	SDAP	November 1919	September 1921
T. de Meester	LSP	September 1921	September 1923
A.B. de Zeeuw	SDAP	September 1923	September 1927
L. de Groot	LSP	September 1927	September 1931
F.L.D. Nivard	RKSP	September 1931	September 1935
J. Ratté	SDAP	September 1935	September 1939
L. de Groot	LSP	September 1939	–
<b>Public Health</b>			
H. Stulemeijer	RKSP	–	December 1920
F.L.D. Nivard	RKSP	December 1920	September 1935
R.J. Dijk	SDAP	September 1935	September 1939
F.L.D. Nivard	RKSP	September 1939	–
<b>Social Assistance</b>			
H. Stulemeijer	RKSP	–	December 1920
F.L.D. Nivard	RKSP	December 1920	September 1931
J. Brautigam	SDAP	September 1931	February 1932
A.H.S. Stermerding	CHU	February 1932	September 1935
J. Brautigam	SDAP	September 1935	–

**3. Population of Dutch municipalities with 20.000 or more inhabitants (1920-1929)**

Municipality	1920	1922	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928
Alkmaar	24236	25267	25819	26472	27093	27304	27509
Almelo	24558	25472	26024	26676	27677	28743	29525
Amersfoort	31130	33098	34156	34944	35266	35959	36637
Amsterdam	647427	696484	706194	712222	718046	726527	734884
Apeldoorn	47995	51388	53012	54632	55471	56597	57266
Arnhem	71599	73176	74382	74635	75443	76303	76619
Breda	29869	30534	30400	30449	30627	30670	43418
Delft	39415	47819	48311	48730	48831	49300	49407
Den Helder	28912	29554	30461	30786	30506	29897	29192
Deventer	32248	33164	33462	33700	34230	34580	34956
Dordrecht	54093	55195	55108	54911	55116	54820	55008
Ede	22265	24214	25008	25843	27031	27854	28571
Eindhoven	47946	52516	55313	59168	63870	65888	68695
Emmen	41043	42657	44383	44862	43159	42245	41243
Enschede	41488	43069	43838	44532	45637	46748	49498
Gouda	26472	26989	27153	27229	27532	27847	28090
Groningen	90778	94092	95065	96659	97920	99587	101310
Haarlem	77327	80136	80552	80454	80554	80502	113304
Haarlemmermeer	23341	24086	24666	24997	25526	25686	25868
Heerlen	32263	34029	36317	38318	39437	40719	42225
Hengelo	26303	27286	27816	28335	29054	29897	31232
Hilversum	38998	29216	43306	44570	45795	47510	49261
Kampen	20634	20602	20212	19919	19889	19755	19968
Kerkrade	25494	26445	27788	28990	30517	32401	35553
Leeuwarden	43127	45051	45001	46038	46437	46676	47298
Leiden	65694	67160	68162	68740	68886	69718	69851
Lonneker	21524	21927	22197	22331	22913	23718	24641
Maastricht	54328	56392	56925	57295	57986	58829	59353
Nijmegen	66911	69797	71514	73244	74832	76069	77580
Rheden	20700	21346	21800	22177	22420	22745	23225
Rotterdam	516271	531896	536838	543694	552347	562991	571842
s-Gravenhage	354987	366336	382581	391369	398416	408634	416179
s-Hertogenbosch	38446	39963	40998	41182	41371	41273	41632
Schiedam	40469	42159	43250	43653	43568	43263	43281
Tilburg	63111	66081	67738	69659	70834	71387	72548
Utrecht	140309	146441	148610	149808	149819	151055	151660
Velsen	28003	29216	30008	31111	32139	34215	36096
Venlo	20841	21524	21588	21909	22180	22422	22889
Vlaardingen	25447	26481	26747	26986	27199	27236	27507
Vlissingen	22511	22419	22440	21800	21601	21745	21588
Zaandam	28828	29180	29550	29925	30530	31035	31392
Zwolle	35743	38861	37842	38441	38599	39004	39844

**4. Electoral Performance of the SDAP and RKSP (1918, 1922, 1925, 1929)**

	1918 General Election		1923 General Election		1925 General Election		1929 General Election	
Municipality	SDAP	RKSP	SDAP	RKSP	SDAP	RKSP	SDAP	RKSP
Alkmaar	17.06%	32.86%	21.74%	32.33%	28.28%	29.63%	30.26%	30.70%
Almelo	31.71%	19.96%	28.76%	19.90%	31.05%	16.87%	35.90%	17.58%
Amersfoort	26.77%	24.04%	23.03%	28.57%	27.21%	23.32%	28.14%	25.20%
Amsterdam	27.01%	15.40%	30.01%	16.52%	37.18%	15.24%	39.50%	15.60%
Apeldoorn	29.11%	10.37%	16.76%	11.25%	24.49%	10.29%	22.98%	12.03%
Arnhem	32.38%	24.49%	27.59%	27.21%	32.37%	25.47%	29.76%	27.82%
Breda	26.42%	53.07%			21.44%	58.49%	20.03%	62.79%
Delft	35.29%	29.77%	26.19%	31.46%	29.77%	29.89%	29.75%	31.43%
Den Helder	33.12%	10.26%	27.75%	12.25%	37.07%	11.32%	39.36%	12.76%
Deventer	28.77%	16.17%	25.39%	16.62%	28.03%	16.48%	36.60%	15.83%
Dordrecht	35.74%	10.95%	27.59%	10.53%	32.19%	11.99%	31.63%	10.47%
Ede	12.03%	1.83%	7.80%	2.87%	12.95%	4.17%	13.11%	5.14%
Eindhoven	8.69%	75.33%	14.21%	75.65%	14.43%	73.86%	16.79%	68.83%
Emmen	30.55%	13.74%	25.90%	14.47%	34.07%	12.50%	30.48%	13.70%
Enschede	38.92%	20.74%	37.92%	20.48%	39.56%	17.25%	39.10%	18.76%
Gouda	26.84%	22.45%					29.92%	24.25%
Groningen	33.32%	8.77%	26.11%	12.22%	33.48%	8.76%	34.29%	8.27%
Haarlem	30.03%	28.10%						
Haarlemmermeer	10.30%	24.61%	14.32%	23.62%	17.83%	23.37%	17.46%	23.07%
Heerlen	22.95%	62.50%	21.37%	63.50%	26.57%	61.16%	18.93%	66.97%
Hengelo	33.69%	31.89%	34.77%	32.54%	37.54%	30.64%	38.84%	31.52%
Hilversum	20.00%	26.45%	18.86%	24.39%	21.80%	21.47%	24.80%	21.75%
Kampen	18.03%	11.02%	11.74%	11.49%	13.46%	10.51%	16.55%	10.15%
Kerkrade	7.09%	60.11%	20.23%	66.15%	26.40%	59.49%	16.64%	69.79%
Leeuwarden	44.17%	10.40%	36.22%	11.55%	41.57%	9.98%	41.57%	10.64%
Leiden	29.21%	18.51%	23.31%	20.34%			29.00%	21.23%
Lonneker	35.83%	20.82%	37.02%	20.21%	39.96%	18.02%	39.97%	19.21%
Maastricht	37.00%	49.80%	24.59%	63.94%	28.65%	60.35%	27.02%	64.33%
Nijmegen	21.77%	54.96%	20.11%	58.84%	22.18%	52.56%	19.02%	58.60%
Rheden	30.25%	13.07%	20.39%	14.79%	23.73%	14.66%	28.19%	15.01%
Rotterdam	43.36%	15.12%	33.62%	16.96%	38.01%	15.62%	38.46%	16.13%
s-Gravenhage	31.59%	19.68%	25.03%	21.33%	29.06%	20.23%	28.03%	20.14%
s-Hertogenbosch	7.86%	71.98%	11.34%	70.98%	15.38%	70.22%	13.21%	74.73%
Schiedam	26.07%	29.93%	26.84%	31.90%	27.64%	28.79%	30.19%	29.61%
Tilburg	13.74%	81.16%	7.49%	49.86%	10.90%	61.44%	8.76%	67.58%
Utrecht	28.42%	26.41%	28.04%	27.08%	31.16%	21.90%	29.38%	25.83%
Velsen	25.88%	26.55%						
Venlo	7.80%	78.80%	8.81%	81.32%	14.74%	79.95%	11.73%	81.43%
Vlaardingen	33.55%	9.50%	22.48%	9.92%			25.81%	9.61%
Vlissingen	17.58%	10.59%			21.60%	10.00%	31.61%	10.67%
Zaandam	36.42%	12.60%	43.73%	17.54%	45.72%	11.89%	41.47%	11.97%
Zwolle	34.21%	19.48%	30.31%	20.70%	33.68%	14.83%	34.67%	16.03%
μ (Average)	26.68%	28.67%	23.98%	29.49%	28.28%	29.63%	27.97%	29.43%
σ (Standard Deviation)	9.82%	21.23%	8.65%	21.21%	8.88%	21.69%	9.11%	22.42%

<b>5. Participation of the SDAP in the Municipal Executive (1920-1929)</b>										
Municipality	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929
Alkmaar	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Almelo	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Amersfoort	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Amsterdam	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1
Apeldoorn	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Arnhem	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Breda	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Delft	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Den Helder	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Deventer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Dordrecht	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Ede	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eindhoven	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Emmen	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enschede	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Gouda	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Groningen	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Haarlem	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Haarlemmermeer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heerlen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hengelo	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Hilversum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Kampen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kerkrade	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Leeuwarden	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
Leiden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lonneker	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Maastricht	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nijmegen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Rheden	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Rotterdam	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
s-Gravenhage	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
s-Hertogenbosch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Schiedam	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Tilburg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Utrecht	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Velsen	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Venlo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vlaardingen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vlissingen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Zaandam	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Zwolle	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Total	15	17	16	17	18	19	19	20	20	20
Percentage	35.71%	40.48%	38.10%	40.48%	42.86%	45.24%	45.24%	47.62%	47.62%	47.62%

<b>6. Public Housing Expenditure (in f)</b>						
	Absolute Public Housing Expenditure			Public Housing Expenditure per capita		
Municipality	1920	1924	1926	1920	1924	1926
Alkmaar	1,100,268.00	1,009,651.00	833,393.00	45.40	39.10	30.76
Almelo	1,401,788.00	4,144,140.00	2,484,287.00	57.08	159.24	89.76
Amersfoort	694,042.00	803,072.00	3,533,450.00	22.29	23.51	100.19
Amsterdam	13,822,126.00	41,928,540.00	33,487,640.00	21.35	59.37	46.64
Apeldoorn	619,368.00	411,457.00	503,213.00	12.90	7.76	9.07
Arnhem	3,510,789.00	1,193,342.00	3,365,835.00	49.03	16.04	44.61
Breda	705,503.00	530,224.00	402,228.00	23.62	17.44	13.13
Delft	1,124,746.00	3,261,211.00	1,955,645.00	28.54	67.50	40.05
Den Helder	414,444.00	487,497.00	402,883.00	14.33	16.00	13.21
Deventer	962,420.00	897,719.00	1,716,390.00	29.84	26.83	50.14
Dordrecht	1,413,473.00	1,821,371.00	2,116,753.00	26.13	33.05	38.41
Ede	517,768.00	306,017.00	835,447.00	23.25	12.24	30.91
Eindhoven		3,441,214.00	5,250,660.00		62.21	82.21
Emmen	1,000,373.00	116,699.00	282,879.00	24.37	2.63	6.55
Enschede	1,897,900.00	3,801,134.00	3,544,325.00	45.75	86.71	77.66
Gouda	1,028,675.00	525,831.00	402,663.00	38.86	19.37	14.63
Groningen	3,706,905.00	6,545,993.00	4,969,011.00	40.83	68.86	50.75
Haarlem	2,844,496.00	5,168,974.00	12,911,784.00	36.79	64.17	160.29
Haarlemmermeer	1,719.00	117,603.00	211,567.00	0.07	4.77	8.29
Heerlen	2,642,150.00	1,830,639.00	1,717,398.00	81.89	50.41	43.55
Hengelo	1,945,510.00	1,325,869.00	1,585,192.00	73.97	47.67	54.56
Hilversum	1,456,830.00	2,134,232.00	3,963,694.00	37.36	49.28	86.55
Kampen	618,570.00	290,054.00	620,621.00	29.98	14.35	31.20
Kerkrade	1,490,007.00	972,546.00	418,721.00	58.45	35.00	13.72
Leeuwarden	809,750.00	1,099,208.00	935,478.00	18.78	24.43	20.15
Leiden	1,757,508.00	3,250,835.00	3,569,961.00	26.75	47.69	51.82
Lonneker	2,492.00	178,891.00	58,365.00	0.12	8.06	2.55
Maastricht	2,153,472.00	1,298,080.00	907,091.00	39.64	22.80	15.64
Nijmegen	1,927,349.00	1,760,548.00	4,710,639.00	28.80	24.62	62.95
Rheden	347,453.00	963,122.00	2,248,576.00	16.79	44.18	100.29
Rotterdam	11,663,877.00	37,610,530.00	20,089,619.00	22.59	70.06	36.37
s-Gravenhage	6,590,768.00	16,740,413.00	21,385,458.00	18.57	43.76	53.68
s-Hertogenbosch	288,879.00	1,207,402.00	2,130,386.00	7.51	29.45	51.49
Schiedam	718,422.00	2,917,460.00	3,761,690.00	17.75	67.46	86.34
Tilburg	1,447,149.00	3,723,491.00	4,453,598.00	22.93	54.97	62.87
Utrecht	6,212,054.00	7,503,849.00	16,928,169.00	44.27	50.49	112.99
Velsen	216,029.00	1,147,216.00	2,583,831.00	7.71	38.23	80.40
Venlo	726,531.00	207,012.00	397,567.00	34.86	9.59	17.92
Vlaardingen	845,812.00	516,318.00	372,642.00	33.24	19.30	13.70
Vlissingen	164,125.00	512,536.00	512,682.00	7.29	22.84	23.73
Zaandam	955,463.00	1,578,939.00	1,665,066.00	33.14	53.43	54.54
Zwolle	1,567,633.00	1,325,930.00	1,759,830.00	43.86	35.04	45.59
$\mu$	2,032,064.29	3,966,828.79	4,190,150.64	30.41	39.28	48.33
$\sigma$				17.78	28.47	34.21
$\mu + \sigma$				48.19	67.75	82.54



<b>7. Public Health Expenditure</b>						
<b>Absolute Public Health Expenditure (in f)</b>						
Municipality	1920	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928
Alkmaar	7,142.00	10,711.00	12,734.00	14,899.00	13,934.00	17,841.00
Almelo	11,211.00	91,328.00	88,272.00	96,948.00	89,656.00	90,894.00
Amersfoort	12,481.00	36,948.00	41,423.00	40,538.00	41,710.00	46,296.00
Amsterdam	2,097,204.00	2,717,531.00	2,666,052.00	2,866,119.00	2,984,387.00	3,049,140.00
Apeldoorn	21,648.00	30,381.00	44,362.00	34,605.00	35,595.00	17,341.00
Arnhem	137,238.00	42,621.00	40,701.00	194,599.00	145,920.00	193,845.00
Breda	10,852.00	2,041.00	3,092.00	16,433.00	26,827.00	29,000.00
Delft	20,347.00	51,385.00	52,324.00	52,074.00	53,943.00	53,446.00
Den Helder	20,828.00	23,492.00	25,597.00	25,930.00	26,044.00	29,473.00
Deventer	40,687.00	169,786.00	166,300.00	123,181.00	131,192.00	130,189.00
Dordrecht	109,730.00	59,253.00	68,612.00	61,293.00	62,988.00	63,421.00
Ede	2,573.00	12,187.00	13,651.00	13,901.00	15,635.00	16,908.00
Eindhoven		7,926.00	6,111.00	25,244.00	22,557.00	28,423.00
Emmen	3,969.00	26,353.00	31,923.00	29,738.00	26,155.00	26,610.00
Enschede	34,922.00	16,548.00	23,010.00	26,949.00	32,340.00	42,900.00
Gouda	116,176.00	40,216.00	37,883.00	36,454.00	36,716.00	37,473.00
Groningen	47,627.00	756,477.00	886,075.00	874,359.00	895,805.00	923,641.00
Haarlem	116,680.00	114,351.00	115,351.00	202,208.00	224,437.00	235,883.00
Haarlemmermeer	8,805.00	6,082.00	8,177.00	15,906.00	18,122.00	17,591.00
Heerlen	5,978.00	55,961.00	88,305.00	91,306.00	85,180.00	88,875.00
Hengelo	16,353.00	34,877.00	43,539.00	55,759.00	64,804.00	59,853.00
Hilversum	107,513.00	115,041.00	111,290.00	131,191.00	132,785.00	144,460.00
Kampen	6,352.00	19,144.00	19,344.00	34,630.00	34,651.00	37,717.00
Kerkrade	5,192.00	17,737.00	19,400.00	21,979.00	20,975.00	22,310.00
Leeuwarden	11,416.00	51,338.00	85,971.00	75,556.00	84,762.00	79,628.00
Leiden	41,335.00	85,741.00	102,339.00	102,236.00	136,310.00	137,124.00
Lonneker	7,480.00	15,259.00	13,309.00	14,635.00	16,050.00	16,404.00
Maastricht	34,786.00	120,245.00	109,165.00	119,542.00	122,085.00	124,365.00
Nijmegen	80,852.00	36,194.00	39,404.00	52,399.00	48,192.00	62,028.00
Rheden	25,104.00	20,522.00	30,384.00	26,977.00	30,996.00	30,754.00
Rotterdam	572,952.00	1,141,459.00	1,017,363.00	692,149.00	714,212.00	738,221.00
s-Gravenhage	650,250.00	967,204.00	999,800.00	1,328,049.00	972,040.00	1,087,585.00
s-Hertogenbosch	18,610.00	31,223.00	24,966.00	27,856.00	32,675.00	32,432.00
Schiedam	18,281.00	42,037.00	45,862.00	50,575.00	48,914.00	51,740.00
Tilburg	128,109.00	173,296.00	234,002.00	139,042.00	137,182.00	146,438.00
Utrecht	101,119.00	136,983.00	145,719.00	139,143.00	134,791.00	126,427.00
Velsen	33,972.00	31,405.00	44,541.00	58,017.00	78,081.00	67,151.00
Venlo	2,766.00	67,661.00	27,973.00	26,599.00	33,303.00	35,104.00
Vlaardingen	10,719.00	19,310.00	17,795.00	18,653.00	16,840.00	18,411.00
Vlissingen	4,872.00	17,212.00	17,109.00	17,306.00	17,498.00	18,278.00
Zaandam	57,154.00	31,914.00	42,251.00	38,835.00	42,289.00	41,833.00
Zwolle	34,976.00	55,533.00	57,193.00	58,540.00	60,664.00	61,200.00
μ	116,981.98	178,640.79	182,587.48	192,198.86	189,267.67	197,110.79

<b>7. Public Health Expenditure</b>						
<b>Public Health Expenditure per capita (in f)</b>						
Municipality	1920	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928
Alkmaar	0.29	0.41	0.48	0.55	0.51	0.65
Almelo	0.46	3.51	3.31	3.50	3.12	3.08
Amersfoort	0.40	1.08	1.19	1.15	1.16	1.26
Amsterdam	3.24	3.85	3.74	3.99	4.11	4.15
Apeldoorn	0.45	0.57	0.81	0.62	0.63	0.30
Arnhem	1.92	0.57	0.55	2.58	1.91	2.53
Breda	0.36	0.07	0.10	0.54	0.87	0.67
Delft	0.52	1.06	1.07	1.07	1.09	1.08
Den Helder	0.72	0.77	0.83	0.85	0.87	1.01
Deventer	1.26	5.07	4.93	3.60	3.79	3.72
Dordrecht	2.03	1.08	1.25	1.11	1.15	1.15
Ede	0.12	0.49	0.53	0.51	0.56	0.59
Eindhoven		0.14	0.10	0.40	0.34	0.41
Emmen	0.10	0.59	0.71	0.69	0.62	0.65
Enschede	0.84	0.38	0.52	0.59	0.69	0.87
Gouda	4.39	1.48	1.39	1.32	1.32	1.33
Groningen	0.52	7.96	9.17	8.93	9.00	9.12
Haarlem	1.51	1.42	1.43	2.51	2.79	2.08
Haarlemmermeer	0.38	0.25	0.33	0.62	0.71	0.68
Heerlen	0.19	1.54	2.30	2.32	2.09	2.10
Hengelo	0.62	1.25	1.54	1.92	2.17	1.92
Hilversum	2.76	2.66	2.50	2.86	2.79	2.93
Kampen	0.31	0.95	0.97	1.74	1.75	1.89
Kerkrade	0.20	0.64	0.67	0.72	0.65	0.63
Leeuwarden	0.26	1.14	1.87	1.63	1.82	1.68
Leiden	0.63	1.26	1.49	1.48	1.96	1.96
Lonneker	0.35	0.69	0.60	0.64	0.68	0.67
Maastricht	0.64	2.11	1.91	2.06	2.08	2.10
Nijmegen	1.21	0.51	0.54	0.70	0.63	0.80
Rheden	1.21	0.94	1.37	1.20	1.36	1.32
Rotterdam	1.11	2.13	1.87	1.25	1.27	1.29
s-Gravenhage	1.83	2.53	2.55	3.33	2.38	2.61
s-Hertogenbosch	0.48	0.76	0.61	0.67	0.79	0.78
Schiedam	0.45	0.97	1.05	1.16	1.13	1.20
Tilburg	2.03	2.56	3.36	1.96	1.92	2.02
Utrecht	0.72	0.92	0.97	0.93	0.89	0.83
Velsen	1.21	1.05	1.43	1.81	2.28	1.86
Venlo	0.13	3.13	1.28	1.20	1.49	1.53
Vlaardingen	0.42	0.72	0.66	0.69	0.62	0.67
Vlissingen	0.22	0.77	0.78	0.80	0.80	0.85
Zaandam	1.98	1.08	1.41	1.27	1.36	1.33
Zwolle	0.98	1.47	1.49	1.52	1.56	1.54
$\mu$	0.96	1.49	1.56	1.64	1.66	1.66
$\sigma$	0.93	1.48	1.57	1.49	1.47	1.48
$\mu + \sigma$	1.89	2.97	3.14	3.13	3.13	3.14

<b>8. Poor Relief Expenditure</b>						
<b>Absolute Poor Relief Expenditure (in f)</b>						
Municipality	1920	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928
Alkmaar	170,755.00	364,983.00	368,006.00	326,225.00	330,404.00	319,137.00
Almelo	140,095.00	497,462.00	173,592.00	159,336.00	157,965.00	162,715.00
Amersfoort	137,703.00	197,791.00	205,224.00	189,261.00	180,743.00	168,091.00
Amsterdam	13,582,405.00	19,107,625.00	17,809,180.00	18,190,033.00	18,652,907.00	18,822,127.00
Apeldoorn	159,893.00			497,460.00	517,047.00	552,885.00
Arnhem	963,375.00	2,006,228.00	1,660,447.00	1,280,919.00	1,266,243.00	1,233,977.00
Breda	94,614.00	197,228.00	142,516.00	157,545.00	156,668.00	218,335.00
Delft	247,449.00	536,601.00	549,756.00	394,796.00	408,439.00	359,647.00
Den Helder	195,392.00	300,035.00	272,175.00	253,708.00	239,905.00	237,440.00
Deventer	562,157.00	806,273.00	436,969.00	461,408.00	485,791.00	439,576.00
Dordrecht	978,318.00	1,215,389.00	951,527.00	869,712.00	797,095.00	819,814.00
Ede	40,711.00	96,169.00	75,856.00	77,807.00	87,231.00	100,484.00
Eindhoven		262,331.00	154,705.00	270,323.00	321,156.00	318,253.00
Emmen	109,516.00	193,889.00	166,165.00	194,425.00	151,582.00	283,084.00
Enschede	83,780.00	1,053,026.00	361,670.00	142,843.00	129,414.00	169,752.00
Gouda	381,675.00	414,544.00	388,462.00	265,354.00	241,919.00	240,894.00
Groningen	564,962.00	1,142,775.00	1,002,710.00	961,138.00	1,048,546.00	1,037,972.00
Haarlem	699,339.00	1,293,815.00	1,142,540.00	1,339,454.00	1,135,201.00	1,475,975.00
Haarlemmermeer	82,459.00	138,410.00	132,213.00	123,472.00	136,385.00	143,482.00
Heerlen	53,609.00	145,293.00	86,235.00	109,626.00	106,371.00	138,945.00
Hengelo	40,164.00	136,157.00	69,800.00	53,123.00	53,722.00	59,569.00
Hilversum	273,566.00	522,871.00	445,780.00	555,099.00	542,516.00	484,544.00
Kampen	115,131.00	174,342.00	162,963.00	125,882.00	128,739.00	124,387.00
Kerkrade	47,778.00	149,584.00	59,665.00	66,078.00	78,627.00	78,256.00
Leeuwarden	241,544.00	355,921.00	368,013.00	382,250.00	391,175.00	341,860.00
Leiden	250,633.00	861,781.00	838,944.00	648,286.00	730,478.00	663,443.00
Lonneker	113,606.00	226,673.00	84,667.00	79,569.00	86,434.00	96,474.00
Maastricht	342,853.00	665,930.00	390,475.00	463,941.00	482,548.00	505,889.00
Nijmegen	202,751.00	585,888.00	706,351.00	680,307.00	792,733.00	841,079.00
Rheden	43,906.00	180,230.00	135,433.00	166,749.00	180,515.00	161,423.00
Rotterdam	5,998,602.00	13,296,815.00	9,082,461.00	9,759,667.00	10,533,099.00	10,669,375.00
s-Gravenhage	2,578,708.00	4,831,766.00	5,102,527.00	6,853,110.00	6,896,839.00	7,094,574.00
s-Hertogenbosch	56,107.00	335,627.00	223,317.00	175,622.00	231,662.00	312,698.00
Schiedam	153,821.00	872,511.00	825,976.00	588,736.00	343,038.00	380,879.00
Tilburg	226,867.00	582,390.00	663,615.00	435,139.00	449,630.00	463,072.00
Utrecht	1,108,137.00	2,257,317.00	1,903,223.00	2,046,096.00	1,895,469.00	1,819,324.00
Velsen	67,619.00	182,395.00	137,899.00	132,553.00	135,350.00	187,213.00
Venlo	49,311.00	184,118.00	202,518.00	92,860.00	87,366.00	96,729.00
Vlaardingen	121,676.00	107,366.00	105,119.00	139,464.00	147,197.00	146,288.00
Vlissingen	114,436.00	147,893.00	138,391.00	177,926.00	182,308.00	188,125.00
Zaandam	204,693.00	605,957.00	465,637.00	513,610.00	500,987.00	499,403.00
Zwolle	104,882.00	253,290.00	229,846.00	204,645.00	188,280.00	192,454.00
μ	773,292.63	1,402,114.37	1,181,038.24	1,204,894.21	1,228,802.95	1,253,562.93

<b>8. Poor Relief Expenditure</b>						
<b>Poor Relief Expenditure per capita (in f)</b>						
Municipality	1920	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928
Alkmaar	7.05	14.14	13.90	12.04	12.10	11.60
Almelo	5.70	19.12	6.51	5.76	5.50	5.51
Amersfoort	4.42	5.79	5.87	5.37	5.03	4.59
Amsterdam	20.98	27.06	25.01	25.33	25.67	25.61
Apeldoorn	3.33			8.97	9.14	9.65
Arnhem	13.46	26.97	22.25	16.98	16.59	16.11
Breda	3.17	6.49	4.68	5.14	5.11	5.03
Delft	6.28	11.11	11.28	8.08	8.28	7.28
Den Helder	6.76	9.85	8.84	8.32	8.02	8.13
Deventer	17.43	24.10	12.97	13.48	14.05	12.58
Dordrecht	18.09	22.05	17.33	15.78	14.54	14.90
Ede	1.83	3.85	2.94	2.88	3.13	3.52
Eindhoven		4.74	2.61	4.23	4.87	4.63
Emmen	2.67	4.37	3.70	4.50	3.59	6.86
Enschede	2.02	24.02	8.12	3.13	2.77	3.43
Gouda	14.42	15.27	14.27	9.64	8.69	8.58
Groningen	6.22	12.02	10.37	9.82	10.53	10.25
Haarlem	9.04	16.06	14.20	16.63	14.10	13.03
Haarlemmermeer	3.53	5.61	5.29	4.84	5.31	5.55
Heerlen	1.66	4.00	2.25	2.78	2.61	3.29
Hengelo	1.53	4.89	2.46	1.83	1.80	1.91
Hilversum	7.01	12.07	10.00	12.12	11.42	9.84
Kampen	5.58	8.63	8.18	6.33	6.52	6.23
Kerkrade	1.87	5.38	2.06	2.17	2.43	2.20
Leeuwarden	5.60	7.91	7.99	8.23	8.38	7.23
Leiden	3.82	12.64	12.20	9.41	10.48	9.50
Lonneker	5.28	10.21	3.79	3.47	3.64	3.92
Maastricht	6.31	11.70	6.82	8.00	8.20	8.52
Nijmegen	3.03	8.19	9.64	9.09	10.42	10.84
Rheden	2.12	8.27	6.11	7.44	7.94	6.95
Rotterdam	11.62	24.77	16.71	17.67	18.71	18.66
s-Gravenhage	7.26	12.63	13.04	17.20	16.88	17.05
s-Hertogenbosch	1.46	8.19	5.42	4.25	5.61	7.51
Schiedam	3.80	20.17	18.92	13.51	7.93	8.80
Tilburg	3.59	8.60	9.53	6.14	6.30	6.38
Utrecht	7.90	15.19	12.70	13.66	12.55	12.00
Velsen	2.41	6.08	4.43	4.12	3.96	5.19
Venlo	2.37	8.53	9.24	4.19	3.90	4.23
Vlaardingen	4.78	4.01	3.90	5.13	5.40	5.32
Vlissingen	5.08	6.59	6.35	8.24	8.38	8.71
Zaandam	7.10	20.51	15.56	16.82	16.14	15.91
Zwolle	2.93	6.69	5.98	5.30	4.83	4.83
$\mu$	6.11	11.91	9.35	8.76	8.61	8.62
$\sigma$	4.74	6.97	5.59	5.36	5.19	4.96
$\mu + \sigma$	10.85	18.88	14.94	14.12	13.80	13.57

<b>9. Municipal Companies Expenditure (in f)</b>						
	Absolute Municipal Companies Expenditure			Municipal Companies Expenditure per capita		
Municipality	1920	1924	1926	1920	1924	1926
Alkmaar	304,038.00	905,907.00	1,383,766.00	12.54	35.09	51.07
Almelo	1,532,536.00	853,709.00	958,312.00	62.40	32.80	34.62
Amersfoort	139,015.00	804,514.00	3,571,906.00	4.47	23.55	101.28
Amsterdam	30,547,822.00	61,736,187.00	68,216,467.00	47.18	87.42	95.00
Apeldoorn	1,330,465.00	7,849,780.00	4,378,874.00	27.72	148.08	78.94
Arnhem	2,792,792.00	5,173,721.00	6,164,217.00	39.01	69.56	81.71
Breda	664,212.00	1,152,783.00	974,252.00	22.24	37.92	31.81
Delft	1,539,379.00	2,282,022.00	3,481,379.00	39.06	47.24	71.29
Den Helder	579,569.00	683,493.00	904,100.00	20.05	22.44	29.64
Deventer	2,787,240.00	1,454,330.00	3,472,716.00	86.43	43.46	101.45
Dordrecht	1,758,322.00	3,417,006.00	3,658,701.00	32.51	62.01	66.38
Ede	463,993.00	406,878.00	134,684.00	20.84	16.27	4.98
Eindhoven		3,138,330.00	6,408,786.00		56.74	100.34
Emmen	133,482.00	0.00	0.00	3.25	0.00	0.00
Enschede	129,585.00	2,648,656.00	2,029,845.00	3.12	60.42	44.48
Gouda	465,801.00	809,904.00	728,287.00	17.60	29.83	26.45
Groningen	8,056,151.00	4,665,090.00	2,424,319.00	88.75	49.07	24.76
Haarlem	6,690,124.00	8,124,567.00	19,823,211.00	86.52	100.86	246.09
Haarlemmermeer	1,322,752.00	235,688.00	350,498.00	56.67	9.56	13.73
Heerlen	3,578,593.00	1,842,841.00	1,521,101.00	110.92	50.74	38.57
Hengelo	599,363.00	1,260,035.00	1,048,226.00	22.79	45.30	36.08
Hilversum	1,841,442.00	1,525,438.00	3,584,213.00	47.22	35.22	78.27
Kampen	804,230.00	381,569.00	947,258.00	38.98	18.88	47.63
Kerkrade	1,639,727.00	725,264.00	584,181.00	64.32	26.10	19.14
Leeuwarden	907,988.00	1,039,018.00	1,408,291.00	21.05	23.09	30.33
Leiden	613,832.00	191,977.00	4,050,759.00	9.34	2.82	58.80
Lonneker	0.00	64,514.00	85,833.00	0.00	2.91	3.75
Maastricht	351,375.00	220,113.00	264,566.00	6.47	3.87	4.56
Nijmegen	6,633,447.00	3,708,566.00	7,228,150.00	99.14	51.86	96.59
Rheden	490,548.00	182,806.00	1,227,505.00	23.70	8.39	54.75
Rotterdam	14,417,026.00	39,529,462.00	22,515,563.00	27.93	73.63	40.76
s-Gravenhage	30,610,376.00	51,901,123.00	64,654,844.00	86.23	135.66	162.28
s-Hertogenbosch	569,684.00	2,102,779.00	3,010,931.00	14.82	51.29	72.78
Schiedam	3,921,170.00	4,317,158.00	4,269,038.00	96.89	99.82	97.99
Tilburg	1,125,556.00	1,965,386.00	2,918,580.00	17.83	29.01	41.20
Utrecht	3,501,904.00	15,539,232.00	22,718,274.00	24.96	104.56	151.64
Velsen	1,108,404.00	336,784.00	1,178,405.00	39.58	11.22	36.67
Venlo	281,912.00	387,299.00	1,088,207.00	13.53	17.94	49.06
Vlaardingen	86,097.00	323,399.00	511,145.00	3.38	12.09	18.79
Vlissingen	93,037.00	99,113.00	95,042.00	4.13	4.42	4.40
Zaandam	1,994,868.00	4,826,229.00	3,378,336.00	69.20	163.32	110.66
Zwolle	696,280.00	1,762,963.00	3,378,336.00	19.48	46.59	87.52
$\mu$	3,344,003.34	5,727,991.26	6,684,073.90	37.37	46.45	60.63
$\sigma$				31.22	39.85	48.73
$\mu + \sigma$				68.59	86.31	109.35

<b>10. Municipal Companies Income (in f)</b>						
	Absolute Municipal Companies Income			Municipal Companies Income per capita		
Municipality	1920	1924	1926	1920	1924	1926
Alkmaar	254,631.00	789,985.00	1,363,124.00	10.51	30.60	50.31
Almelo	674,903.00	1,109,708.00	982,890.00	27.48	42.64	35.51
Amersfoort	1,838,229.00	717,978.00	3,460,701.00	59.05	21.02	98.13
Amsterdam	17,027,076.00	71,447,043.00	63,811,955.00	26.30	101.17	88.87
Apeldoorn	282,750.00	5,440,149.00	2,839,027.00	5.89	102.62	51.18
Arnhem	1,031,233.00	5,123,209.00	5,921,649.00	14.40	68.88	78.49
Breda	311,882.00	1,113,971.00	1,160,002.00	10.44	36.64	37.88
Delft	670,492.00	2,576,890.00	3,508,787.00	17.01	53.34	71.86
Den Helder	322,044.00	614,484.00	971,298.00	11.14	20.17	31.84
Deventer	2,559,980.00	1,527,839.00	3,586,072.00	79.38	45.66	104.76
Dordrecht	1,276,712.00	3,381,331.00	3,381,340.00	23.60	61.36	61.35
Ede	441,119.00	444,099.00	213,539.00	19.81	17.76	7.90
Eindhoven		2,632,162.00	5,336,962.00		47.59	83.56
Emmen	9,742.00	0.00	0.00	0.24	0.00	0.00
Enschede	282,136.00	2,197,575.00	1,493,128.00	6.80	50.13	32.72
Gouda	189,659.00	852,957.00	743,057.00	7.16	31.41	26.99
Groningen	8,505,058.00	2,049,794.00	2,653,367.00	93.69	21.56	27.10
Haarlem	3,009,349.00	2,923,727.00	18,952,368.00	38.92	36.30	235.28
Haarlemmermeer	102,300.00	167,069.00	295,308.00	4.38	6.77	11.57
Heerlen	186,888.00	1,780,510.00	1,448,934.00	5.79	49.03	36.74
Hengelo	538,427.00	1,175,435.00	764,907.00	20.47	42.26	26.33
Hilversum	1,419,590.00	1,564,767.00	3,649,017.00	36.40	36.13	79.68
Kampen	591,630.00	701,116.00	1,385,228.00	28.67	34.69	69.65
Kerkrade	652,646.00	540,493.00	277,137.00	25.60	19.45	9.08
Leeuwarden	864,852.00	1,018,350.00	1,163,939.00	20.05	22.63	25.06
Leiden	892,050.00	2,339,284.00	4,181,859.00	13.58	34.32	60.71
Lonneker	0.00	51,661.00	72,964.00	0.00	2.33	3.18
Maastricht	232,168.00	611,081.00	847,967.00	4.27	10.73	14.62
Nijmegen	6,445,985.00	3,780,386.00	7,709,063.00	96.34	52.86	103.02
Rheden	89,049.00	177,675.00	1,191,453.00	4.30	8.15	53.14
Rotterdam	15,849,616.00	34,832,828.00	22,863,444.00	30.70	64.89	41.39
s-Gravenhage	25,034,671.00	43,834,583.00	69,168,540.00	70.52	114.58	173.61
s-Hertogenbosch	304,397.00	3,409,421.00	5,001,346.00	7.92	83.16	120.89
Schiedam	3,221,780.00	3,285,413.00	3,768,396.00	79.61	75.96	86.49
Tilburg	712,543.00	2,202,956.00	3,335,918.00	11.29	32.52	47.09
Utrecht	2,923,625.00	12,912,131.00	20,534,097.00	20.84	86.89	137.06
Velsen	1,007,325.00	264,762.00	939,742.00	35.97	8.82	29.24
Venlo	147,664.00	367,088.00	984,394.00	7.09	17.00	44.38
Vlaardingen	234,281.00	318,889.00	584,798.00	9.21	11.92	21.50
Vlissingen	57,783.00	56,460.00	53,233.00	2.57	2.52	2.46
Zaandam	2,098,757.00	4,686,496.00	3,206,447.00	72.80	158.60	105.03
Zwolle	392,087.00	1,340,256.00	896,991.00	10.97	35.42	23.24
$\mu$	2,504,563.63	5,389,571.69	6,540,580.67	26.13	42.87	58.31
$\sigma$				26.64	33.92	48.35
$\mu + \sigma$				52.76	76.79	106.66



<b>11. Municipal Tax Income</b>					
	Absolute Municipal Tax Income (1920-1924) (in f)				
Municipality	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924
Alkmaar	1,007,778.00	1,060,778.00	1,181,903.00	879,770.00	967,553.00
Almelo	1,409,941.00	1,444,629.00	1,395,269.00	1,337,394.00	982,117.00
Amersfoort	959,632.00	1,081,718.00	1,251,956.00	1,281,550.00	1,193,360.00
Amsterdam	49,314,670.00	73,834,301.00	54,356,326.00	41,665,200.00	39,403,560.00
Apeldoorn	1,292,392.00	1,490,330.00	1,772,274.00	1,382,708.00	1,612,130.00
Arnhem	4,284,385.00	5,127,371.00	5,432,084.00	3,464,656.00	3,803,481.00
Breda	943,781.00	1,236,937.00	945,467.00	683,160.00	839,983.00
Delft	1,654,089.00	2,436,503.00	2,704,564.00	1,705,139.00	1,698,751.00
Den Helder	894,671.00	1,202,178.00	848,945.00	992,800.00	820,784.00
Deventer	1,138,936.00	2,333,808.00	1,352,314.00	1,439,420.00	2,347,063.00
Dordrecht	2,520,094.00	2,533,291.00	2,533,009.00	2,204,640.00	1,991,853.00
Ede	451,691.00	416,668.00	424,752.00	325,209.00	443,789.00
Eindhoven	1,454,839.00	1,441,096.00	1,422,798.00	1,082,551.00	1,227,137.00
Emmen	476,960.00	512,641.00	416,492.00	412,500.00	472,037.00
Enschede	2,762,370.00	3,966,843.00	2,579,209.00	2,312,230.00	2,288,962.00
Gouda	919,983.00	1,179,707.00	1,118,224.00	899,880.00	822,068.00
Groningen	3,341,757.00	4,301,090.00	4,649,633.00	3,630,451.00	3,762,562.00
Haarlem	3,443,964.00	4,373,323.00	4,118,006.00	3,588,046.00	3,723,538.00
Haarlemmermeer	288,183.00	332,930.00	348,097.00	303,902.00	451,780.00
Heerlen	668,553.00	1,451,003.00	1,234,613.00	1,094,555.00	1,118,530.00
Hengelo	806,397.00	1,270,469.00	964,836.00	688,900.00	771,400.00
Hilversum	2,656,123.00	3,004,242.00	2,569,594.00	2,119,025.00	2,900,948.00
Kampen	311,405.00	345,922.00	314,323.00	260,064.00	248,036.00
Kerkrade	262,820.00	602,035.00	399,656.00	355,955.00	604,080.00
Leeuwarden	2,269,425.00	2,123,729.00	2,041,419.00	1,602,400.00	1,487,006.00
Leiden	3,092,095.00	2,868,839.00	3,273,457.00	2,616,773.00	2,570,527.00
Lonneker	562,585.00	652,332.00	561,476.00	504,300.00	712,501.00
Maastricht	1,249,268.00	1,688,743.00	1,622,527.00	1,085,500.00	1,442,606.00
Nijmegen	2,865,711.00	3,583,473.00	2,884,272.00	2,493,465.00	2,329,465.00
Rheden	644,655.00	706,101.00	885,005.00	757,127.00	685,846.00
Rotterdam	24,698,538.00	23,171,886.00	25,477,920.00	25,220,020.00	20,628,227.00
s-Gravenhage	27,769,397.00	28,625,658.00	28,706,026.00	23,322,200.00	24,014,570.00
s-Hertogenbosch	1,260,552.00	1,114,244.00	864,663.00	893,515.00	1,114,136.00
Schiedam	1,410,970.00	1,645,720.00	1,139,265.00	1,138,365.00	1,095,583.00
Tilburg	2,760,167.00	1,925,305.00	2,945,355.00	1,092,525.00	1,993,492.00
Utrecht	7,552,732.00	8,040,692.00	8,095,768.00	6,073,700.00	5,402,039.00
Velsen	834,988.00	972,374.00	888,018.00	931,766.00	889,833.00
Venlo	486,480.00	680,727.00	786,242.00	411,302.00	460,272.00
Vlaardingen	756,274.00	814,584.00	825,556.00	978,934.00	867,686.00
Vlissingen	669,006.00	847,403.00	1,072,112.00	758,020.00	672,610.00
Zaandam	1,253,370.00	1,368,980.00	2,183,810.00	1,371,310.00	1,524,680.00
Zwolle	1,316,331.00	1,548,033.00	1,659,352.00	1,203,624.00	1,439,992.00
μ	3,921,856.14	4,746,634.19	4,291,585.40	3,489,632.17	3,424,442.21

<b>11. Municipal Tax Income</b>					
	Absolute Municipal Tax Income (1925-1929) (in f)				
Municipality	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929
Alkmaar	813,815.00	850,505.00	1,072,124.00	1,275,110.00	1,283,020.00
Almelo	1,093,268.00	864,356.00	1,192,970.00	1,065,232.00	1,124,883.00
Amersfoort	1,061,417.00	1,217,047.00	1,362,190.00	1,299,170.00	1,379,170.00
Amsterdam	36,807,221.00	38,116,395.00	41,702,189.00	44,903,500.00	46,493,500.00
Apeldoorn	1,631,580.00	1,587,705.00	1,753,063.00	1,949,100.00	1,978,363.00
Arnhem	3,502,191.00	3,476,550.00	3,788,918.00	4,272,489.00	4,272,533.00
Breda	882,548.00	779,770.00	1,198,119.00	1,112,000.00	1,230,800.00
Delft	1,425,400.00	1,401,700.00	1,702,142.00	1,626,750.00	1,613,600.00
Den Helder	949,678.00	942,787.00	1,256,582.00	1,223,418.00	1,150,950.00
Deventer	1,369,586.00	1,295,566.00	1,539,997.00	1,535,288.00	1,523,985.00
Dordrecht	2,020,700.00	1,937,600.00	2,181,410.00	2,147,200.00	2,150,500.00
Ede	367,158.00	422,504.00	504,430.00	556,604.00	640,901.00
Eindhoven	1,318,190.00	1,292,250.00	1,662,283.00	1,740,502.00	1,953,872.00
Emmen	466,447.00	513,302.00	386,829.00	482,700.00	438,718.00
Enschede	1,599,240.00	1,736,590.00	2,268,502.00	2,148,740.00	2,237,050.00
Gouda	798,941.00	734,300.00	770,088.00	895,522.00	932,178.00
Groningen	3,343,077.00	3,260,032.00	3,744,167.00	3,633,700.00	4,204,000.00
Haarlem	3,616,295.00	3,663,651.00	4,264,021.00	4,744,300.00	4,844,500.00
Haarlemmermeer	396,569.00	459,269.00	449,318.00	539,917.00	521,587.00
Heerlen	1,118,780.00	1,439,155.00	1,354,901.00	1,324,745.00	1,396,740.00
Hengelo	702,350.00	788,605.00	939,929.00	847,900.00	986,400.00
Hilversum	2,097,300.00	2,102,300.00	2,524,965.00	2,439,200.00	2,543,200.00
Kampen	173,534.00	185,728.00	237,709.00	209,530.00	198,981.00
Kerkrade	559,255.00	529,575.00	462,125.00	465,200.00	563,725.00
Leeuwarden	1,551,700.00	1,727,835.00	1,906,557.00	1,864,500.00	1,793,700.00
Leiden	2,305,840.00	2,238,228.00	2,418,556.00	2,471,117.00	2,420,710.00
Lonneker	425,121.00	577,452.00	680,117.00	725,520.00	724,180.00
Maastricht	1,208,460.00	1,379,555.00	1,309,074.00	1,708,505.00	1,853,675.00
Nijmegen	2,282,570.00	2,018,640.00	2,366,749.00	2,570,703.00	2,525,810.00
Rheden	661,555.00	716,040.00	824,838.00	746,915.00	743,744.00
Rotterdam	26,968,910.00	23,128,550.00	23,305,584.00	24,641,700.00	24,830,500.00
s-Gravenhage	19,720,944.00	19,086,854.00	24,048,119.00	24,830,550.00	24,641,700.00
s-Hertogenbosch	1,183,938.00	1,226,585.00	1,229,317.00	1,193,877.00	1,195,975.00
Schiedam	1,249,451.00	1,206,572.00	1,240,934.00	1,191,431.00	1,238,808.00
Tilburg	1,828,068.00	1,891,985.00	2,056,356.00	2,145,995.00	1,958,302.00
Utrecht	5,671,750.00	5,906,950.00	5,669,890.00	6,647,900.00	6,134,983.00
Velsen	848,343.00	894,634.00	1,066,755.00	1,068,735.00	1,171,042.00
Venlo	403,160.00	429,007.00	463,368.00	464,925.00	476,260.00
Vlaardingen	1,065,935.00	802,761.00	757,978.00	882,680.00	831,136.00
Vlissingen	643,560.00	651,300.00	736,875.00	788,100.00	791,180.00
Zaandam	1,324,792.00	1,245,392.00	1,364,950.00	1,413,400.00	1,444,597.00
Zwolle	1,075,251.00	1,049,824.00	1,082,294.00	1,045,440.00	1,099,735.00
μ	3,298,425.90	3,232,747.76	3,591,601.95	3,781,900.24	3,846,171.26

<b>11. Municipal Tax Income</b>										
Municipal Tax income per capita (in f)										
Municipality	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	30.74	31.39	39.27	46.35	46.64
Alkmaar	41.58	43.77	46.78	34.82	37.47	40.98	31.23	41.50	36.08	38.10
Almelo	57.41	58.83	54.78	52.50	37.74	30.37	34.51	37.88	35.46	37.64
Amersfoort	30.83	34.75	37.83	38.72	34.94	51.68	53.08	57.40	61.10	63.27
Amsterdam	76.17	114.04	78.04	59.82	55.80	29.86	28.62	30.97	34.04	34.55
Apeldoorn	26.93	31.05	34.49	26.91	30.41	46.92	46.08	49.66	55.76	55.76
Arnhem	59.84	71.61	74.23	47.35	51.13	28.98	25.46	39.06	25.61	28.35
Breda	31.60	41.41	30.96	22.37	27.63	29.25	28.71	34.53	32.93	32.66
Delft	41.97	61.82	56.56	35.66	35.16	30.85	30.90	42.03	41.91	39.43
Den Helder	30.94	41.58	28.73	33.59	26.95	40.64	37.85	44.53	43.92	43.60
Deventer	35.32	72.37	40.78	43.40	70.14	36.80	35.15	39.79	39.03	39.09
Dordrecht	46.59	46.83	45.89	39.94	36.14	14.21	15.63	18.11	19.48	22.43
Ede	20.29	18.71	17.54	13.43	17.75	22.28	20.23	25.23	25.34	28.44
Eindhoven	30.34	30.06	27.09	20.61	22.19	10.40	11.89	9.16	11.70	10.64
Emmen	11.62	12.49	9.76	9.67	10.64	35.91	38.05	48.53	43.41	45.19
Enschede	66.58	95.61	59.89	53.69	52.21	29.34	26.67	27.65	31.88	33.19
Gouda	34.75	44.56	41.43	33.34	30.28	34.59	33.29	37.60	35.87	41.50
Groningen	36.81	47.38	49.42	38.58	39.58	44.95	45.48	52.97	41.87	42.76
Haarlem	44.54	56.56	51.39	44.77	46.23	15.86	17.99	17.49	20.87	20.16
Haarlemmermeer	12.35	14.26	14.45	12.62	18.32	29.20	36.49	33.27	31.37	33.08
Heerlen	20.72	44.97	36.28	32.17	30.80	24.79	27.14	31.44	27.15	31.58
Hengelo	30.66	48.30	35.36	25.25	27.73	47.06	45.91	53.15	49.52	51.63
Hilversum	68.11	77.04	87.95	72.53	66.99	8.71	9.34	12.03	10.49	9.96
Kampen	15.09	16.76	15.26	12.62	12.27	19.29	17.35	14.26	13.08	15.86
Kerkrade	10.31	23.61	15.11	13.46	21.74	33.70	37.21	40.85	39.42	37.92
Leeuwarden	52.62	49.24	45.31	35.57	33.04	33.54	32.49	34.69	35.38	34.66
Leiden	47.07	43.67	48.74	38.96	37.71	19.04	25.20	28.68	29.44	29.39
Lonneker	26.14	30.31	25.61	23.00	32.10	21.09	23.79	22.25	28.79	31.23
Maastricht	22.99	31.08	28.77	19.25	25.34	31.16	26.98	31.11	33.14	32.56
Nijmegen	42.83	53.56	41.32	35.72	32.57	29.83	31.94	36.26	32.16	32.02
Rheden	31.14	34.11	41.46	35.47	31.46	49.60	41.87	41.40	43.09	43.42
Rotterdam	47.84	44.88	47.90	47.42	38.43	50.39	47.91	58.85	59.66	59.21
s-Gravenhage	78.23	80.64	78.36	63.66	62.77	28.75	29.65	29.79	28.68	28.73
s-Hertogenbosch	32.79	28.98	21.64	22.36	27.18	28.62	27.69	28.68	27.53	28.62
Schiedam	34.87	40.67	27.02	27.00	25.33	26.24	26.71	28.81	29.58	26.99
Tilburg	43.74	30.51	44.57	16.53	29.43	37.86	39.43	37.54	43.83	40.45
Utrecht	53.83	57.31	55.28	41.48	36.35	27.27	27.84	31.18	29.61	32.44
Velsen	29.82	34.72	30.39	31.89	29.65	18.40	19.34	20.67	20.31	20.81
Venlo	23.34	32.66	36.53	19.11	21.32	39.50	29.51	27.83	32.09	30.22
Vlaardingen	29.72	32.01	31.18	36.97	32.44	29.52	30.15	33.89	36.51	36.65
Vlissingen	29.72	37.64	47.82	33.81	29.97	44.27	40.79	43.98	45.02	46.02
Zaandam	43.48	47.49	74.84	46.99	51.60	27.97	27.20	27.75	26.24	27.60
Zwolle	36.83	43.31	42.70	30.97	38.05	31.20	30.81	34.33	34.16	34.87
$\mu$	37.82	45.27	41.89	33.90	34.64	10.58	9.67	11.65	11.51	11.43
$\sigma$	16.42	20.92	18.42	14.42	13.34	41.78	40.48	45.98	45.67	46.30
$\mu + \sigma$	54.23	66.19	60.31	48.33	47.98	30.74	31.39	39.27	46.35	46.64