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## **The influence of colonial history on the acceptance of third-party mediation in civil wars: A quantitative analysis of conflicts from 1945 to 1999**

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**Universiteit  
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Bachelor Thesis

**The influence of colonial history on the acceptance of third-party mediation in civil  
wars**

A quantitative analysis of conflicts from 1945 to 1999

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BSc Political Science: International Relations and Organisations

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## **1. Introduction**

As more and more civil wars erupt in the world, ending conflict arises as a crucial challenge. The number of intrastate conflicts reached a peak in 2021 with 56 cases, raising serious concerns among the international community (Davies, Peterson & Öberg, 2022, p. 597). These past few years, one method of conflict resolution has been increasingly used: mediation by a third party (Bercovitch & Foulkes, 2012, p. 26). However, this method is contingent on the acceptance of mediation by the warring parties in the first place. While many scholars have studied the push and pull factors of mediations, a notable gap remains in the literature. It becomes particularly clear when looking at Greig's study, "When Do They Say Yes? An Analysis of the Willingness to Offer and Accept Mediation in Civil Wars" as it outlines the effect of factors on the offer and acceptance of mediation. Here, while the impact of colonialism was acknowledged, as colonial ties with the offering mediator are included as an explanatory factor, the study does not explore the full extent of the potential effect that colonial rule could exert on the acceptance of mediation. Other works exhibit the same gap and solely control for colonial ties. However, this limits those studies' explanatory power as it does not account for the effect that colonial experience as a whole can have on the warring parties' probability of accepting an offer of mediation (Melin & Svensson, 2009). Yet, it is an established fact that colonisation produces sovereignty-sensitive nations (Eze & Okeke, 2013, p. 163; Mohan, 2020, p. 96). In turn, that sovereignty often translates into an aversion towards external intervention (Shambaugh, 2020, p. 7). Since mediation during civil wars inherently consists of an external intervention into the internal affairs of a country, one could conceive that nations that have experienced colonisation would be wary of accepting mediation in civil wars. It is for this reason that limiting the impact of colonialism on colonial ties with the offering mediator fails to capture the entirety of the phenomenon. This paper proposes further analysis of this question through a quantitative analysis replicating Greig and Regan's work, looking at offers of mediation in civil wars from 1945 to 1999, but additionally controlling for colonial rule. It strives to answer the following research question: What is the effect of past colonial rule on the acceptance of mediation by warring

parties in civil wars? The results differ from the theoretical expectations outlined below: it seems that warring parties in countries that experienced colonial rule are more likely to accept mediation in civil wars.

This paper will begin by engaging with the existing literature addressing the acceptance of mediation in civil wars and will move on to review the state of the art regarding the effects of colonial rule on the norms of non-interference that a country may be shaped by. A theoretical focus will then be taken, conceptualizing key ideas and presenting the paper's hypotheses. Next, the research design of the study as well as the methods used to carry it out will be outlined. The results of the analysis will consequently be presented, closely followed by a discussion of the limitations and implications of the research. This paper will be concluded by suggestions for further research.

## **2. Literature review**

A review of the literature addressing the acceptance of mediation and the impact of colonialism on nations is provided below.

The literature addressing the offer and acceptance of mediation in civil wars remains rather scant. Although there has been a degree of consideration of this phenomenon, it was mostly spearheaded by Greig & Regan (2008), Melin & Svensson (2009) and seems slightly under-researched (Wallensteen & Svensson, 2014, p. 318). However, those two contributions brought about some essential findings. First, Melin and Svensson (2009) sought to understand the acceptance of mediation while distinguishing between interstate and intrastate civil wars. This analysis led them to find conditions within civil wars that make acceptance of mediation more likely. Their study is based on the theoretical expectation that governments in civil wars face a higher cost in accepting mediation than governments in interstate wars, as accepting international mediation legitimises their enemy and fragilizes their credibility as a government (2009, p. 254). The empirical analysis yields expected results: warring parties in civil wars accept mediation only when they find themselves in the most challenging circumstances, utterly unable to find a solution themselves (Melin & Svensson, 2009, p.

251). An additional finding lies in the discovery that historical ties, while increasing the chances of acceptance of mediation in interstate wars, seems to decrease those chances in intrastate conflicts (2009, p. 251). Thus, when former colonised countries find themselves at war with another country, they are more likely to accept an offer of mediation from their former coloniser than any other offering state. However, in the context of civil wars, formerly colonised states' warring parties are more likely to refuse an offer mediation if it comes from their former coloniser, forming a striking contrast.

Regarding the supply side of mediation; namely the dynamics undergirding mediation offers, Maundi, Hartman, Khadiagala & Nuamah (2006), argue that mediation offers are more likely to emanate from actors that have pre-existing interests in the conflict (p. 175). Greig & Regan (2008) also looked closely at this question and conducted a quantitative analysis containing numerous independent variables they believed might affect mediation offer and acceptance. Modelling the effect of “annual battle deaths”, “timing”, the “international reputation” and potential “major power status” of the offering actor, “trade dependence of a civil war state upon a third party offering mediation”, as well as whether an “economic” or “military intervention” occurred, and the degree to which the conflict was “ethnic” or “territorial” in nature, they uncover significant correlations affecting acceptance of mediation (Greig & Regan, 2008, pp. 772-773). Most notably, they find that acceptance of mediation seems to be contingent on the characteristics of the conflict. Their findings corroborate those of Melin & Svensson (2009) regarding the fact that historical links between potential mediators and disputants lower the chances of an offer of mediation being accepted. These observations are striking as they contrast with the conditions for successful settlement: Kydd (2003, p. 608) finds that mediators with previous links to the conflict at hand are the most successful at mediation. One could thus ask why warring parties choose to overlook potential mediators because of their past historical links. This requires looking deeper into those historical linkages.

In the case of Greig and Regan (2008), the historical links are operationalized as “former colonial relationship between the third party and civil war state” (p. 771). Melin and Svensson (2009)

conceptualize it in the same way but suffer the issue of only including this factor when looking at the supply side of mediation. Yet, since their findings show that colonial ties have a significant impact on the likelihood of acceptance of mediation, one could argue that those should be included in the explanatory model addressing acceptance of mediation as well. These studies thus highlight avenues for further research as colonial *ties* remains a rather limited variable: focused on the colonial relationships, they ignore the impacts of colonial rule on a people as a whole.

Yet, it has been proved that an experience of colonialism has a significant impact on the population, altering their views of the international system. This might introduce a bias towards external actors that could mediate during civil wars. For instance, Ari (2023) highlights the fact that some countries such as “India, Bangladesh and Myanmar” are typically reserved regarding the intervention of third-party mediators in their conflicts because of their sovereignty-sensitive nature (2023, p. 152). This sensitivity is explained by their experience with external intervention in the past: their colonial occupation resulted in the development of a wariness regarding external actors (Shambaugh, 2020, p. 4).

Considering the fact that almost the entire world, except Western Europe, was an object of colonialism; and the undeniable, *longue durée* impact it had on the peoples it touched; one can consider its study necessary in the context of civil wars (Mahoney, 2010, p. 2; Gabbert, 2012, p. 269). More specifically, its impact on norms of sovereignty and non-interference becomes largely relevant in light of acceptance of mediation. Accepting the mediation of an internal conflict by a third party denotes a degree of consent to external intervention. And this degree of consent is precisely what colonialism historically affected in states. As Reus-Smit (2001) argues, the sovereignty principle is a concept that is born out of history (p. 527). Rationalists tend to associate it with the concepts of “mutual recognition, non-intervention, and self-determination”, arising out of anti-colonial struggles (Reus-Smit, 2001, p. 521). Eye and Okeke (2013) highlight the emphasis on the principle of non-external intervention for previously “colonised nations”: to them, self-determination is meaningless

if external penetration persists (p. 147, p. 163). Seeing as to the fact that self-determination is contingent on the absence of external intervention, one could believe that certain nations, having undergone colonisation, derive from it a higher consciousness of the right of non-interference (2013, p. 163).

This phenomenon can be seen in Asia, as Mohan (2020, p. 96) and Shambaugh (2020) argue. The regional identity in Southeast Asia was notably shaped by the struggle against colonial powers and external intervention (Shambaugh, 2020, p. 6). This had lingering effects that are still felt to this day: one can clearly perceive an aversion towards external intervention in ASEAN states' hedging strategies and grand strategy decisions (2020, p. 4, p. 6-7). Dunn (2010), also points out the effect of colonialism on the Bandung principles: on the eve of independence, scarred by external domination, the Bandung conference states made each and every principle they agreed on, "contingent on a commitment to non-interference" (Dunn, 2010, p. 297).

Since mediation inherently represents external interference, one could infer that governments in a civil war that have experienced colonialism may have a different attitude to it than governments in states that did not. But far from solely affecting decision-making at the state level, colonialism also had far-reaching effects on individuals, groups and institutions. Legacies of colonialism can be distinguished at the individual level as psychosocial factors were affected and had effects on subsequent generations. This can still be perceived in the attitudes of the Agulu-Aguinyi clan and the Ntuegbe-Nese clan in Nigeria today (Eyisi, Oloso & Aruomah, 2024). Eyisi, Oloso & Aruomah (2024) conducted ethnographic research in order to determine the effect of colonialism on attitudes towards tourism. They found that a part of the clans (notably the inhabitants that were not educated in a Western way and were not Christian) had negative views of tourism as they associated it with Western colonialism (2024, p. 160). Having seen the effects of Westernization and Christianity on their society, they were adamant that tourism would only exert negative impacts on their community (2024, p. 160). They cite the increase of the "use of hard drugs" and "stealing", which are contrary to



their local norms (2024, p. 160). As a result of the impacts of colonialism, they fear that tourism may erode their values in the same way. (2024, p. 160). Here, one can see that external intervention had a negative impact on a community, which therefore reacts in the same way to other forms of interference today. In a similar vein, blending methods from anthropology and social science, Young (2008) comes to the conclusion that colonialism deeply affected the tribe of Rashāyida Arabs in Sudan and Eritrea. A single tribe, they were divided in two by the establishment of the border between Eritrea and Sudan (2008). The influence of both the British and Italian colonisation thus had an impact on the cohesion of their tribe and on their freedom of movement (2008). The effect of colonial rule can also be seen in Peru, where the *mita* system imposed by Spanish conquistadors affected politics in the country and engendered sharp levels of inequality through the absence of property rights for indigenous people (Dell, 2010, p. 1899). Another example lies in colonial Congo: the Belgian state having furthered a “pattern of extractive economic institutions and political absolutism”, Congolese institutions remained flawed after independence in 1960 (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 90). This furthers the argument that the impact of colonialism seems long-lasting and present at multiple levels of analysis as well as affecting multiple dimensions of the societies that were victim to colonial rule.

By contrast, there is no evidence that colonialism did not have an impact on societies. While it may have contributed to the establishment of infrastructure and institutions in the case of Japanese colonialism in China and in Korea, this in no way contradicts the argument that colonialism left a long-lasting impact on societies, whether it is construed as positive or negative (Kohli, 2012, p. 27; Mattingly, 2017, p. 468-9).

Seeing as to the fact that mediation is rooted in external intervention and that colonialism affects attitudes towards external intervention, this thesis will ask the following question: What is the effect of colonial rule on the acceptance of mediation by warring parties in civil wars?

### 3. Theoretical framework

#### 3.1 Key concepts

##### Mediation

The process of mediation has been influentially defined by Bercovitch (2011), one of the leading scholars in the field. His most recent definition is the following: mediation is to be seen as “a reactive process of conflict management whereby parties involved in a conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group or organisation to change their behaviour, settle their conflict or resolve their problem without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law” (Bercovitch & Houston, 2011, p. 36). This conceptualization is widely accepted as Duursma (2017, p. 599), but also Aduda & Busmann (2019, p. 65) or Vukovic (2019, p. 76) all use it as their working definition. It will thus be used in this paper.

##### Colonial rule

Colonialism has a multiplicity of definitions and has long been intertwined with the term “imperialism”. Its definition is a contentious topic and no unique definition seems to have reached consensus across the literature. The Oxford Dictionary defines it as “the principle, policy, or practice of acquiring full or partial political control over another country and occupying it with settlers; the principle, policy, or practice of maintaining colonies” (Oxford Dictionary, “colonialism”). However, Ania Lomba (2015) critiques those widespread definitions of colonialism that do not mention the experience of the people outside of the colonisers (p. 20). Instead, she conceptualizes colonialism as “the conquest and control of other people’s land and goods” (2015, p. 20). She seems to follow in Van Niel’s (1990) footsteps as he defines colonialism as “domination by a strong state over a weaker state”, including the caveat introduced by Smith (1981, p. 6) that the colonial state does not control the population of the colony in the same way that it controls its own population (p. 109). Van Niel’s definition will be used in the subsequent analysis as it is broad enough to include all experiences of colonialism that may have had an impact on the populations of the states at stake. However, as I

consider Lomba's critic to be valuable, the definition I will thereafter use will be one that combines these two definitions. Colonial rule will thus be conceptualized as the domination of a state over another state, including the administrative rule of the latter, that results in the conquest and control of their land and goods (Van Niel, 1990, p. 109; Lomba, 2015, p. 20).

Lomba (2015) finds that one cannot conceptualize colonialism without distinguishing between its various forms such as "settler colonialism" (including plantation colonialism) and "administrative colonialism" (p. 23). The latter involved the people of the metropolitan country way less as very little movement was required from their part, the colony being governed through the existing power structures (2015, p. 23). A small number of colonisers ruled over the territory through the existing institutions and local authorities, without disturbing the existing hierarchies (2015, p. 23). This is more broadly referred to as indirect rule, as opposed to direct rule, which involves the restructuring of hierarchies and a much more hands-on mode of governance. It is this aspect of increased contact with the colonised people that pushes this study to distinguish between the two types of colonial rule as they might result in different impacts on populations. These two concepts also simplify the various categories colonies have been put into and thus are more suited to statistical analysis.

#### *Direct vs. indirect rule*

Müller-Crepon (2020) makes a useful distinction between direct and indirect rule along an axis of integration of "pre-existing institutions at all administrative levels below the central government" (2020, p. 710). This provides a simple yet effective criteria which I use to code my data. Direct rule is seen as a system within which the metropolitan state shapes institutions that affect their subjects directly, while indirect rule indicates a case where the colonial state merely uses pre-existing institutions and relies on local governance (2020, p. 710). This is operationalized using the levels of "colonial power's administrative effort" and "local traditional institutions' power", with the former indicator being low and the latter one being high for indirect rule (2020, p. 724).

McNamee (2019) focuses on the same indicators while following Lange's (2009, p. 28) definition of indirect rule as "domination via collaborative relations between a dominant colonial center and several regionally based indigenous institutions" (2019, p. 143). He conceptualises direct rule as involving the destruction of past political structures and the creation of colonial centralized institutions, as opposed to the reliance on "indigenous institutions" emphasized in indirect rule (2019, p. 143).

Doyle (1986) takes a broader definition as he states that direct rule prevails when "only the lowest levels of the colonial administration are run by locals while the remaining positions are run by colonial officials", without mentioning the destruction of previously existing institutions (p. 28). This study will make use of such a definition as it is more widely accepted across the literature. The specific criteria that will be used is Müller-Crepon's direct rule integration of "pre-existing institutions at all administrative levels below the central government".

This distinction is useful in this study as one could infer that direct rule would have a deeper effect on the population regarding perceptions of the outside world. For instance, populations in indirectly ruled areas of India may have been oblivious to the British as this tale demonstrates: "When an Indian politician in the course of his electioneering campaign in a rural area claimed that his party had driven out the British and achieved independence for India, a lowly peasant innocently asked: 'But when did the British come to India?' (Rajan, 1969, p. 89). This shows an absence of any kind of influence that indirect colonial rule could have had on the Indian people's perceptions of external interference. Given that this phenomenon is bound to happen in some colonies that were indirectly ruled, it is relevant to control for the type of rule for each country examined in this research. In case of the presence of elements of both types of rule, the case is coded as direct rule. I conjecture that as long as elements of direct rule are present and thus increased contact occurred, the population is likely to have been more affected than those who lived under indirect rule. This is also why I code a country as directly ruled if their colonial rule was first indirect and then turned direct, or the opposite. As long

as there has been a substantial amount of time (multiple years) under direct rule in its history, the state is coded as directly ruled.

### 3.2 Hypotheses

Given the extensive effects that colonial experience exerts on a people, there is good reason to think that either governments or warring parties in a civil war might be influenced by the presence or absence of colonial experience in their history. More specifically, looking at its effect on the norms of non-interference, one could expect the populations of those countries affected by colonialism to be less likely to accept mediation in internal conflicts, as it represents a clear interference in their internal affairs. This leads to the following hypothesis:

*H1: Warring parties in states that have not undergone colonial rule are more likely to accept mediation in civil wars.*

However, solely controlling for whether or not countries have experienced colonialism seems quite reductive. For instance, colonial experiences differ in duration and one could infer that a longer experience of colonisation may increase the degree to which colonial experience influences a people's norms. Therefore, this analysis will control for the duration of colonial experience, in order to find out if longer periods of colonisation result in increased levels of non-interference norms and thus in a lower likelihood to accept mediation. This leads to the following hypothesis.

*H2: Longer experiences of colonial rule decrease the likelihood of warring parties accepting mediation in civil wars.*

Finally, colonial experiences differ in kind. As seen above, countries are here divided in two categories: indirectly ruled and directly ruled colonies. Considering the fact that direct rule translates into increased levels of interaction of the colonisers with the colonised, one could infer that the experience of indirect colonial rule increases the likelihood of acceptance of mediation compared to direct colonial rule.

*H3: Warring parties in states that have endured direct colonial rule are less likely to accept mediation in civil wars.*

## **4. Methodology**

### *4.1 Research design and data*

In order to answer the research question, this study will replicate and extend the large-N statistical analysis carried out by Greig and Regan (2008). The data used is thus theirs, with the addition of a few variables manually coded, detailed below. The dataset is structured around “civil war third-party dyad years” and records 153 intrastate conflicts (Greig & Regan, 2008, p. 770). The data spans a period of time going from 1944 to 1999. It indexes the interactions between each state engulfed in a civil conflict and each state and several international organizations in the international system in order to code the offers of mediation, resulting in the computation of “186,965 civil war third-party dyad years” (2008, p. 770). In total, 320 offers of mediation are identified, and 280 of those are accepted by the warring parties (2008, p. 770). It also includes a number of control variables such as “annual battle deaths”, “timing”, “the international reputation” and “potential major power status” of the offering actor, “trade dependence of a civil war state upon a third party offering mediation”, as well as whether an “economic” or “military intervention” occurred, and the degree to which the conflict was “ethnic” or “territorial” in nature (Greig & Regan, 2008, p. 772-773). Other variables are also included in a different model, looking specifically at offers of mediation. This thesis strives to examine the acceptance of mediation and will thus only look at the second model with the variables listed above.

In addition to those, I manually coded the variables of *colonial experience*, *duration of colonial experience*, and *type of colonial experience*. These further refine the analysis by allowing a test of the effects of colonial experience on the acceptance of mediation but also the isolation of the effects of shorter or longer rule and of direct or indirect rule. Those variables were coded manually using secondary sources, namely historical accounts of colonialism in each specific state at stake. The

analysis carried out will be a Heckman regression, in order to account for the fact that third parties are more likely to offer mediation if they have interests in the conflict, resulting in a non-randomly selected sample of cases (Greig and Regan, 2008, p. 770).

## 4.2 Operationalisation

### *Colonial rule*

The definition used to determine whether a country experienced colonialism is the one retained above: the domination of a state over another state, including the administrative rule of the latter, that results in the conquest and control of their land and goods (Van Niel, 1990, p. 109; Lomba, 2015, p. 20). It will be operationalized in the following way: if a state has been colonised, the variable will be coded as 1. If it was never colonised, the value for that specific country will be 0. It is a binary variable. The information needed to code that variable was taken from secondary sources listed in the appendix. This variable is thus a categorical nominal variable and will be named *colonial rule*.

### *Colonial duration*

Colonial duration is operationalized by calculating the amount of time a country experienced colonial rule, namely by subtracting the year of the beginning of the colonisation of a state from the year of independence of that state. Those dates were determined using secondary sources and the calculations made by hand when manually coding the data. This variable is thus a discrete interval-ratio variable and will be named *duration of colonial rule*.

### *Types of colonial experience*

The definitions used for coding this variable were outlined above. The coding was carried out through the detailed analysis of colonial administrations using secondary sources in order to determine the degree of direct or indirect rule exerted on the colonies. This resulted in the variable *type of colonial rule*, coded as such: 0 for the countries that did not undergo colonial rule, 1 for those

who experienced direct colonial rule and 2 for states that experienced indirect colonial rule. This variable was then used to code two dichotomous variables for easier interpretation of the results.

#### *a. Direct rule*

This variable is dichotomous: a value of 0 means the state at hand either did not undergo colonial rule or underwent indirect colonial rule, and a value of 1 means the country experienced direct colonial rule. This variable is thereafter referred to as *direct rule*.

Note: In order to make sure the isolation of direct rule is the most accurate it can be, I also coded a version of this dummy variable that excludes from the variable the cases in which the country did not undergo colonial rule, solely including the cases of indirect colonial rule in the 0. The variable is named *binary direct rule*.

#### *b. Indirect rule*

This variable is also dichotomous with 0 meaning the absence of colonial rule or direct colonial rule and a 1 translating into the experience of indirect rule. This variable is named *indirect rule*.

Note: In order to make sure the isolation of indirect rule is the most accurate it can be, I also made a version of this dummy variable that excludes from the variable the cases in which the country did not undergo colonial rule, solely including the cases of direct colonial rule in the 0. The variable is named *binary indirect rule*.

#### *Mediation acceptance*

The dependent variable bears the same operationalization as in Greig and Regan's (2008) article. It is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 when an offer of mediation is accepted by both disputants in the conflict and as 0 if the offer of mediation is not accepted by disputants (2008, p. 769).



The control variables are those delineated below:

**Table. 1 Control variables**

Variable name	Operationalisation	Source
<i>Annual battle deaths</i>	“Log transformed data of the number of annual battle deaths in the current year.” The range of values is from 0 to 12.79 (Greig and Regan, 2008, p. 772).	Lacina and Gleditsch (2005) and Regan and Aydin (2006)
<i>Timing</i>	The number of months since the onset of the war (Greig and Regan, 2008, p. 772). A squared version is also used in order to control for curvilinear effects.	Regan (2002)
<i>International reputation</i>	The proportion of all internal conflicts mediated by the mediator at hand that ended in a full settlement (Greig and Regan, 2008, p. 772).	Regan, Frank, and Aydin, 2009
<i>Major power status</i>	Operationalised following Small and Singer’s (1982) COW definition (Greig and Regan, 2008, p. 773). <i>-I am still looking for it as the book is not available online-</i>	Small & Singer, 1982
<i>Third-party trade leverage</i>	The degree of trade dependence a civil war state has upon a potential mediator (Greig and Regan, 2008, p. 773). Calculated through “the proportion of the civil war state’s total imports and exports traded with the third party” (2008, p. 773). The range of values goes from 0 to 0.81.	Gleditsch’s (2002) Expanded Trade and GDP data, version 4.1.
<i>Economic intervention</i>	"Various forms of economic aid, economic sanctions or embargoes" (Regan, 2000, p. 25).	Regan, 2000, p. 25
<i>Military intervention</i>	“Supply or transfer of troops, hardware, intelligence, air or naval support and logistical support to the parties in conflict” (Regan, 2000, p. 25).	Regan, 2000, p. 25
<i>Ethnic conflict</i>	Binary variable taking on the value of 1 if the conflict is ethnically based (Greig & Regan, 2008, p. 773).	Regan & Aydin, 2006
<i>Territorial conflict</i>	Binary variable taking on the value of 1 if the conflict is of an irredentist or secessionist (Greig & Regan, 2008, p. 773)	Regan, 2002

## 5. Analysis

A Heckman model was run in order to account for the selection bias in the sample introduced by the necessity of the existence of an offer of mediation for acceptance to take place. This results in a probit model, outlining the factors determining the acceptance of mediation; and a selection model looking at the offer of mediation. All of the independent variables used by Greig and Regan (2008, p. 772-773) were included in the first model. Using their syntax and the same statistical software, I first replicated their research, which yielded identical results, bar standard errors.

Considering the potential relevance of colonial rule, their analysis was then extended with the addition of the three variables mentioned above, namely *colonial rule*, *duration of colonial rule*, and *type of colonial rule*. All assumptions undergirding the model were met and no outliers were found. Several versions of the regression were run in order to test different combinations of variables and different ways of coding some variables. The most relevant ones will be addressed below. The results for the selection model analysing mediation offers corroborate Greig and Regan's (2008) results but are not the focus of this paper and will thus not be outlined in detail here. On another note, the variables linked to colonial rule were not included in the selection model because of their relevance to the conflict states rather than to the third-party states.

The first model analysed here consists of all of the variables included in the replication data and the variables *colonial rule*, *duration of colonial rule*, and *type of colonial rule*; with the latter coded into dummy variables, respectively *direct rule* and *indirect rule*. The results are outlined in the table 2 below. In terms of model significance, one can notice that both the probit and selection models represent a significant improvement from the base model as the respective Prob > chi2 values are 0.0014 and 0.0031. This model features a significant association between the predictor variables and the outcome variables (Wald  $X^2(17) = 37.26$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). The probit model, looking at acceptance of mediation, reiterates Greig and Regan's (2008) findings.

**Table 2. Heckman regression on offer and acceptance of mediation.**

	<i>Mediation offer</i>	<i>Mediation acceptance</i>
Annual battle deaths		-0.001 (0.232)
Timing (years)		0.074 (0.0317)**
Timing squared		-0.002 (0.000)**
Ethnic conflict		0.550 (0.228)
Territorial conflict		-0.177 (0.219)
International reputation		3.299 (1.265)**
Military intervention		0.996 (0.436)*
Economic intervention		-0.133 (0.477)
Third-party trade leverage		-1.658 (1.281)
Third-party trade leverage dummy		-0.105 (0.232)
Major power		0.176 (0.246)
Duration of colonial rule		-0.000 (0.001)
Colonial rule		-0.005 (0.620)
Direct rule		0.387 (0.421)
Indirect rule		0.391 (0.437)
Historic linkage	0.713 (0.101)**	-0.784 (0.276)**
Third-party trade interest	-2.889 (1.233)**	
Third-party trade interest dummy	0.328 (0.076)**	
Defense pact	0.327 (0.076)**	
Geographic proximity	-0.1000 (0.088)**	
Geographic proximity dummy	0.894 (0.101)**	
No. of previous mediations	0.277 (0.061)**	0.294 (0.272)
Mediated last year	1.452 (0.138)**	
Other party mediation last year	0.385 (0.050)**	
Previous military intervention	0.259 (0.124)**	
Previous economic intervention	-0.007 (0.204)	
Constant	-2.516 (0.072)**	1.790 (0.788)
Rho	-0.612623	
Log-likelihood	-1751.706	
Wald Chi-squared (17)	37.26	
Significance	$p < 0.0031$	
Observations	189,965	
Uncensored observations		320

Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

\*Significant at 5%. \*\* Significant at 1%.

It indicates that the duration of conflicts (both in its normal and squared form) has a significant effect on the acceptance of mediation ( $p < 0.01$ ): a one month increase in the duration of civil war leads to the multiplication of the odds of accepting mediation by 1.077 ( $\exp(0.074) = 1.077$ ).

The model also implies that the number of civil wars successfully settled by the third-party state significantly influences the decision of warring parties to accept mediation: a one unit increase in the variable *international reputation* multiplies the chance of accepting mediation by a staggering 27, showcasing a rather considerable influence on the dependent variable ( $\exp(3.299) = 27.092$ ).

Colonial ties between the state undergoing a civil war and the third-party state are also significant in the decision of warring parties to accept an offer of mediation in that each one unit increase in this variable *reduces* the likelihood of accepting mediation by 0.45 ( $\exp(-0.784) = 0.456$ ). On the other hand, a military intervention by a third-party in a conflict enhances the chances of the warring parties accepting mediation from that actor: a one unit increase in *military intervention* leads to the multiplication of the odds of accepting mediation by almost 3 times ( $\exp(0.996) = 2.707$ ).

The coefficient of colonial rule cannot be interpreted due to a lack of significance ( $p = 0.993$ ). However, this may be linked to the fact that only a number of states in the dataset have not been colonised.

Let us turn to the variable *duration colonial rule* that might better explain the effect of colonial rule. The conclusion one would draw from it would be that each additional year under colonial rule decreases the chances of accepting mediation. However, this finding is not significant either ( $p = 0.849$ ).

Diving into the specific types of colonial rule, one also finds non-significant coefficients, with  $p = 0.358$  for *direct rule* and  $p = 0.371$  for *indirect rule*. It seems that the type of colonial rule exerts no significant influence on the acceptance of mediation by warring parties in civil wars. Overall, very little evidence is found to support the hypotheses advanced above.

In order to better isolate the effect of the additional variables, several other regressions were run. Although it is sensible to control for all of the factors that might have an impact on the dependent variable at once, it is valuable to look at the differences between the models including and excluding some variables. However, this is not done at random. Several independent variables, namely *third-party trade leverage*, *third-party trade leverage dummy*, *number of previous mediations*, *international reputation*, *historic linkage*, *military intervention*, *economic intervention* and *major power*, are variables linked either to the mediation offering state, the international organisation offering mediation, or their interaction with the conflict state; rather than about the nature of the conflict. By contrast, the remaining variables are focused on the very characteristics of the conflict, which are critical but not necessary to examine the relationship at hand. Therefore, a model was run solely including the variables outlined above and the additional variables I devised, albeit without the variable *historic* as it is believed it might overshadow the effect of the variable *colonial rule*: colonial ties are by definition already included in the variable *colonial rule*. It is thus removed from both models in order to spot if any difference is expressed in the results.

Here, while the variables related to colonial rule are not significant, one can notice that the variables *international reputation*, *military intervention*, *ethnic conflict*, *timing* and *squared timing* keep their significance, strengthening the claim that these factors have an influence on the acceptance of mediation. This model is significant at the 0.05 level (Wald  $X^2(16) = 29.53$ ; Prob > chi 2 = 0.020). Although the log likelihood (-2LL = -1777.652) of this model is higher than any of the previously run models, even outperforming those with a higher number of predictor variables; it did not yield any new significant findings (Wald  $X^2(16) = 29.53$ ;  $p < 0.975$ ).

Another analysis with all of the independent variables was performed while removing the dummy variables and instead including the variable *type of colonial rule*, which encompasses the dichotomous variables in one variable coded with the values of 0, 1 and 2. These results are presented in table 3. Whilst this variable did not seem to exert a significant influence on the outcome variable,

it made way for the variable *colonial rule* to become significant. The regression including the variables *duration of colonial rule*, *colonial rule* and *type of colonial rule*, excluding the variable *historic linkage* in the acceptance model, yields a significant result for the variable *colonial rule*, at the  $p < 0.05$  level. Its interpretation leads to the surprising conclusion that countries that have experienced colonial rule seem to be 2.9 times more likely to accept mediation ( $\exp(1.096) = 2.974$ ;  $p < 0.05$ ). The variables *international reputation*, *military intervention*, *ethnic conflict*, *timing* and *squared timing* keep their significance. The model also represents a significant improvement from the base model (Prob chi2  $> 0.05$ ). However, removing the variable *historic linkage* from the selection model leads to the loss of significance of the variable *colonial rule*.

**Table 3. Heckman regression of offer and acceptance of mediation.**

	<i>Mediation offer</i>	<i>Mediation acceptance</i>
Annual battle deaths		-0.032 (0.061)
Timing (years)		0.081 (0.036)
Timing squared		-0.002 (0.000)*
Ethnic conflict		0.649 (0.256)*
Territorial conflict		-0.126 (0.232)
International reputation		3.574 (1.499)*
Military intervention		1.428(0.586)*
Economic intervention		-0.375 (0.586)
Third-party trade leverage		-1.993 (1.447)
Third-party trade leverage dummy		-0.002 (0.264)
Major power		-0.019 (0.276)
Duration of colonial rule		-0.000 (0.001)
Type of colonial rule		-0.061 (0.199)
Colonial rule		1.096 (0.536)*
Third-party trade interest	-2.891 (1.233)*	
Third-party trade interest dummy	0.322 (0.089)**	
Defense pact	0.327 (0.077)**	
Geographic proximity	-0.099 (0.008)**	
Geographic proximity dummy	0.904 (0.101)**	
No. of previous mediations	0.277 (0.061)**	0.575 (0.370)
Mediated last year	1.449 (0.139)**	
Other party mediation last year	0.388 (0.050)**	
Previous military intervention	0.260 (0.124)*	
Previous economic intervention	0.004 (0.204)	
Constant	-2.517 (0.073)**	0.682 (1.014)*
Rho	-0.363	
Log-likelihood	-1752.601	
Wald Chi-squared (15)	26.63	
Significance	$p < 0.05$	
Observations		189,965
Uncensored observations		320

Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

\*Significant at 5%. \*\* Significant at 1%.

The last modification done to the regression was the inclusion of the recoded versions of the dichotomous variables *direct rule* and *indirect rule*. While in the latter, the 0 contained both the countries that had never experienced colonialism and those who had experienced the other type of rule, the new dummy variables exclude all states which did not experience colonial rule at all. This results in collinearity with the variable *colonial rule*, but is valuable to the analysis as it accurately isolates the effect of direct and indirect rule. It turns out that the models ran with these new variables instead of their former counterparts result in similar coefficients and levels of significance. The newly recoded dummy variables do not add much explanatory power to the model: the log likelihood of the model containing them and the variable *duration of colonial rule* is 1706.549 whereas the same model including the original dummy variables instead of the newly recoded ones (so with the same number of predictor variables), has a log likelihood value of 1751.706. In fact, the models with the best model fit are those that solely include *colonial rule* and *duration of colonial rule* as additional independent variables, and that exclude the variable *historic* ( $-2LL = 1754.06$ ).

Overall, the added variables do not seem to add much explanatory power to the existing variables used by Greig and Regan (2008). The notable exception lies in the high intensity of the effect that the variable *colonial rule* seems to have on *acceptance of mediation*. This surprising finding is discussed thereafter.

## 6. Discussion

While the statistical analysis yielded some significant results, they do not converge with the hypotheses outlined above. On the one hand, the dichotomous variable *colonial rule* showcased a meaningful relationship that is negative, which provides evidence against hypothesis 1. This hypothesis consisted in expecting that *Warring parties in states that have not undergone colonial rule are more likely to accept mediation in civil wars*. Here, the results of the analysis, and particularly those linked to the variable *colonial rule*, seem to indicate proof of a relationship between colonial rule and the acceptance of mediation in civil wars in the opposite direction, meaning that warring



parties in states that have experienced colonial rule seem to be more likely to accept mediation in comparison to warring parties in states that did not experience colonial rule.

The data did not support the second hypothesis either as the variable *duration of colonial rule* did not uncover any significant relationship between the number of years a country has been under colonial rule and the likelihood of accepting mediation. Therefore, one cannot state *that the longer a country has been under colonial rule, the less likely are its warring parties to accept mediation within a civil war.*

As to hypothesis 3, *Warring parties in states that have endured direct colonial rule are less likely to accept mediation in civil wars;* it cannot be confirmed nor denied as the variables used to test for it did not deliver any significant results.

These results might be linked to the limited number of cases within the dataset as only 280 offers of mediation were accepted within the time span covered. On another note, these findings might push one to look at the possible opposite effect: what if some countries' populations actually internalized the normalcy of having their affairs dealt with by outside actors? There is a possibility that while they might harbor resentment towards their former coloniser, as the significance of the variable *historical linkage* showcases, they might also welcome interference if it does not come from their former coloniser. It seems that there is evidence regarding Southeast Asia that negates this possibility for that particular region, but no other region in the world has as much clear-cut evidence against this hypothesis. Southeast Asia is also a rather unified and coherent entity compared to other regions of the world, where the attitudes towards interference might vary more from country to country. This possibility should thus not be disregarded, especially in light of the results of this study.

Moreover, when looking more precisely at the accepted offers of mediation, one can distinguish a potential regional pattern. An abnormal amount of offers of mediation were accepted in African countries, compared to countries located in either Asia, Europe or South America. One could debunk this by rightfully pointing out that Africa is a continent that was home to more civil wars than any other continent in that timeframe and still is to this day. However, this effect holds even when

controlling for offers of mediation and thus civil wars. Put in another way, when presented with offers of mediation in civil wars, African countries are more likely than other countries to accept them. For instance, in multiple instances in Africa, warring parties accepted more than 15 offers of mediation while most countries in Asia accepted less than 10 offers of mediation per civil war. The descriptive statistics I based those results on can be found in Appendix B. Overall, while the literature seems to point in the opposite direction, doubt arises when looking at the statistical results of this paper.

## **7. Conclusion**

This research sought to investigate the effect of colonial rule on warring parties when they are faced with an offer of mediation in civil wars. Given that the research wished to take on a world scale and encompass a substantial period of time, a statistical analysis was used. A Heckman regression was run in order to control for mediation offers and a significant positive relationship was found between colonial rule and the acceptance of mediation. This contradicts the hypotheses laid out in this paper but constitutes a first step towards examining the effect of colonial rule on not only the acceptance of mediation, but on foreign policy decisions overall. After looking at the effects of colonial rule on the people of a country, this seems necessary. Wherever colonial rule occurred, the entire country was affected. Whether looking at elites, groups or individuals, one can see a deep imprint of the colonial past. Shaping attitudes and institutions, and most importantly norms of sovereignty and non-interference, it is bound to influence the decisions of warring parties in civil wars when looking at interference from third-parties. This study wished to engage with this pressing topic and yielded policy implications that are outlined below. However, it is not without its limitations, which are also mentioned hereafter, followed by avenues for further research.

### *7.1 Policy implications*

This research, although partly inconclusive, should shed light on the potential dynamics that the experience of colonialism can have on a people. I believe that colonial rule might have an impact not only on the acceptance of mediation but also on its workings. This is a matter that should be

studied further in order to potentially uncover some sensitivities that mediators should keep in mind when operating with warring parties from formerly colonised states. Knowing that colonial ties to a country decreases the chances of the warring parties of a state to accept mediation from that state should be enough to warrant attention to that issue. My paper serves to highlight that it might be a topic to dig deeper in, looking not only at colonial ties but also at colonial experience overall.

Were further evidence to be found in its favor, the opposite direction of my hypotheses also harbors some promising implications for policymakers as it draws a distinction between the attitude some countries might have towards their former colonisers compared to the attitude they might have towards other outside actors wishing to interfere. This knowledge can apply to any kind of third-party interference and would be useful to incorporate in decision-making processes resulting in any kind of intervention. The difference between the specific attitudes that some countries may have towards their former colonisers compared with the attitude they might have towards other countries wishing to interfere seems to be highly relevant knowledge.. For instance, it would be critical information for a policymaker deciding whether or not to launch a military intervention in a civil war whose warring parties abhor interference overall, regardless of which actor it comes from.

## *7.2 Limitations*

However, this research presents a number of limitations that restrict the reliability and external validity of this paper. First, this dataset spans a substantial amount of years but ends in 1999, 25 years ago. It thus does not take into account many recent civil wars, which might result in biased conclusions, especially accounting for the fact that there has been an increase in civil wars over the last 20 years (Davies, Peterson & Öberg, 2022, p. 597). This fact limits the current external validity of the study. The fact that only 320 offers of mediation were extended, and 280 accepted, also somehow limits the generalizability of this study. Although it is above the threshold of 100, which allows one to make claims applicable outside of the realm of the study, it is not as large a number as it could be if the study included more recent internal conflicts. In addition, 78 countries are at play

here but only 6 countries have not been colonised at all, which might skew the data and lead to incomplete results. On another note, the period analysed corresponds to the setting of the Cold War, with only 9 years of the dataset situated outside of that geopolitical situation. Given the preponderance of the bipolar competition during that time, often trumping other political considerations, one could assume that it had an impact both on the offer and acceptance of mediation (Tarling, 1998, p. 266). This could skew the results as it was not controlled for. Another limitation to be aware of consists of the possible bias induced by the fact that I manually coded the data on my own. Additionally, looking at the justification for studying colonial rule in the framework of acceptance of mediation, one could oppose the fact that war occupation also has an impact on populations and could influence norms that lead to higher chances of refusal of mediation (Cathcart & Kraus, 2008).

The quantitative nature of the research also represents a limitation in the understanding of the formation of the norms of sovereignty and in the extent of their prevalence in the decision-making processes of warring parties in civil wars. Numbers cannot explain mechanisms or understand nuances in norms and feelings, yet this is what research must engage with on this topic. The fact that only a small number of countries in the dataset did not experience colonial rule is also indicative of the necessity to move away from quantitative analysis towards if not qualitative methods, at least mixed methods. This is reinforced by the fact that there is no obvious solution to the fact it skews the analysis as we are dealing with historical facts.

### *7.3 Further research*

Therefore, I would recommend further research to focus on the development of norms of non-sovereignty among the people of previously colonised states compared to the social norms among the population of states that have never been colonised. This was not undertaken in this paper because of time constraints and the impossibility of conducting interviews in the relevant countries. Additional attention could also be devoted to the presence of those norms in warring parties' preoccupations when taking decisions pertaining to outside actors. This can only be done through qualitative research

and field work. However, it would shed light on an important component of the theory undergirding this research. It could take the form of comparative analysis or process tracing of cases of acceptance or refusal of mediation, provided data on decision-making processes is available.

As to quantitative research, it could also be carried out using a more recent dataset, thus including the numerous civil wars that have happened since and avoiding any skewed data. This would also remove the potential bias that the Cold War introduces in the current dataset.

Another direction that could prove fruitful is the addition of the experience of war occupation to a similar analysis as the one undertaken above. Overall, further research on the effect of colonial rule on any kind of third-party interventions appears relevant.

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## 9. Appendices

### 9.1 Appendix A: Operationalisation

Variable name	Operationalisation	Source
<i>Annual battle deaths</i>	“Log transformed data of the number of annual battle deaths in the current year.” The range of values is from 0 to 12.79 (Greig and Regan, 2008, p. 772).	Lacina and Gleditsch (2005) and Regan and Aydin (2006)
<i>Timing</i>	The number of months since the onset of the war (Greig and Regan, 2008, p. 772). A squared version is also used in order to control for curvilinear effects.	Regan (2002)
<i>International reputation</i>	The proportion of all internal conflicts mediated by the mediator at hand that ended in a full settlement (Greig and Regan, 2008, p. 772).	Regan, Frank, and Aydin, 2009
<i>Major power status</i>	Operationalised following Small and Singer’s (1982) COW definition (Greig and Regan, 2008, p. 773). <i>-I am still looking for it as the book is not available online-</i>	Small & Singer, 1982
<i>Third-party trade leverage</i>	The degree of trade dependence a civil war state has upon a potential mediator (Greig and Regan, 2008, p. 773). Calculated through “the proportion of the civil war state’s total imports and exports traded with the third party” (2008, p. 773). The range of values goes from 0 to 0.81.	Gleditsch’s (2002) Expanded Trade and GDP data, version 4.1.
<i>Economic intervention</i>	“Various forms of economic aid, economic sanctions or embargoes” (Regan, 2000, p. 25).	Regan, 2000, p. 25
<i>Military intervention</i>	“Supply or transfer of troops, hardware, intelligence, air or naval support and logistical support to the parties in conflict” (Regan, 2000, p. 25).	Regan, 2000, p. 25
<i>Ethnic conflict</i>	Binary variable taking on the value of 1 if the conflict is ethnically based (Greig & Regan, 2008, p. 773).	Regan & Aydin, 2006
<i>Territorial conflict</i>	Binary variable taking on the value of 1 if the conflict is of an irredentist or secessionist (Greig & Regan, 2008, p. 773)	Regan, 2002

## 9.2 Appendix B: Statistical analysis

### Assumptions testing

The errors are independent as no geographical or time clustering occurs in the data.

We assume that the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variable is linear.

The variable that influences sample selection but not the outcome directly is the variable *offer of mediation*.

### *Outliers graph:*



*Frequencies of accepted offers (accepted = 1)*

<b>newacceptedoffers</b>					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	,00	40	,0	12,5	12,5
	42,00	2	,0	,6	13,1
	90,00	11	,0	3,4	16,6
	92,00	7	,0	2,2	18,8
	93,00	6	,0	1,9	20,6
	94,00	4	,0	1,3	21,9
	100,00	1	,0	,3	22,2
	150,00	1	,0	,3	22,5
	200,00	3	,0	,9	23,4
	230,00	1	,0	,3	23,8
	345,00	11	,0	3,4	27,2
	346,00	13	,0	4,1	31,3
	350,00	1	,0	,3	31,6
	352,00	6	,0	1,9	33,4
	359,00	6	,0	1,9	35,3
	372,00	4	,0	1,3	36,6
	450,00	12	,0	3,8	40,3
	475,00	4	,0	1,3	41,6
	483,00	4	,0	1,3	42,8
	484,00	4	,0	1,3	44,1
	490,00	8	,0	2,5	46,6
	500,00	2	,0	,6	47,2
	516,00	3	,0	,9	48,1
	517,00	10	,0	3,1	51,2
	520,00	13	,0	4,1	55,3
	530,00	9	,0	2,8	58,1
	540,00	5	,0	1,6	59,7
	541,00	16	,0	5,0	64,7
	552,00	12	,0	3,8	68,4
	560,00	2	,0	,6	69,1
	600,00	1	,0	,3	69,4
	615,00	3	,0	,9	70,3
	625,00	20	,0	6,3	76,6
	640,00	1	,0	,3	76,9
	660,00	9	,0	2,8	79,7
	663,00	2	,0	,6	80,3
	678,00	6	,0	1,9	82,2
	679,00	2	,0	,6	82,8
	698,00	1	,0	,3	83,1
	700,00	15	,0	4,7	87,8
	702,00	10	,0	3,1	90,9
710,00	1	,0	,3	91,3	
775,00	1	,0	,3	91,6	
780,00	7	,0	2,2	93,8	
811,00	4	,0	1,3	95,0	
812,00	4	,0	1,3	96,3	
840,00	8	,0	2,5	98,8	
850,00	2	,0	,6	99,4	
910,00	2	,0	,6	100,0	
	Total	320	,2	100,0	
Missing	System	186645	99,8		
Total		186965	100,0		

## Coding of the variables

Country code	Country name	Duration of colonial rule	Independence date	Type of colonial rule	Source
40	Cuba	102	1902	1	Staten, C. L. (2015). <i>The history of Cuba</i> (Second edition.). Greenwood.
42	Dominican Republic	47	1865	1	Roorda, Eric., Derby, L. Hutchinson., & González, Raymundo. (2014). <i>The Dominican Republic reader : history, culture, politics</i> . Duke University Press.
55	Grenada	174	1974	1	shie-Nikoi, E. (2007). <i>Beating the pen on the drum: A socio-cultural history of Carriacou, Grenada, 1750–1920</i> . ProQuest Dissertations Publishing.
70	Mexico	21	1821	1	Hamnett, B. R. (2019). <i>A concise history of Mexico</i> (Third edition.). Cambridge University Press.
90	Guatemala	47	1847	1	Robinson, D. J. (Ed.). (1990). <i>Migration in Colonial Spanish America</i> . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
92	El Salvador	21	1821	2	Mahoney, J. (2010). <i>Colonialism and postcolonial development : Spanish America in comparative perspective</i> (1st ed., pp. xvii–xvii). Cambridge University Press.
93	Nicaragua	21	1821	2	Burns, E. B. (1991). <i>Patriarch and Folk: The Emergence of Nicaragua, 1798-1858</i> (1st ed.). Harvard University Press.
94	Costa Rica	21	1821	2	Chant, S. (2004). <i>The Costa Rica reader : history, culture, politics</i> (S. P. Palmer & I. Molina Jiménez, Eds.). Duke University Press.
100	Colombia	19	1819	1	McFarlane, A. (1993). <i>Colombia before independence : economy, society, and politics under Bourbon rule</i> . Cambridge University Press.
130	Ecuador	22	1822	1	Bethell, L. (Ed.). (1987). <i>Colonial Spanish America</i> . CUP Archive.
135	Peru	24	1824	1	Burns, E. B. (1991). <i>Patriarch and Folk: The Emergence of Nicaragua, 1798-1858</i> (1st ed.). Harvard University Press. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674731608">https://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674731608</a> , Hamnett, B. R. (2017). ; <i>The End of Iberian Rule on the American Continent, 1770–1830</i> (1st ed.). Cambridge University Press.
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150	Paraguay	11	1811	1	Bethell, L. (Ed.). (1987). <i>Colonial Spanish America</i> . CUP Archive.
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698	Oman	0		0	Jones, J., & Ridout, N. (2015). <i>A History of Modern Oman</i> . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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775	Myanmar	62	1948	1	Thant Myint-U. (2001). <i>The making of modern Burma</i> (1st ed.). Cambridge University Press.
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800	Thailand	0		0	Baker, C. J., & Pasuk Phongpaichit. (2022). <i>A history of Thailand</i> (Fourth edition.). Cambridge University Press.
811	Cambodia	90	1953	1	David Chandler. (2008). <i>A History of Cambodia: Vol. 4th ed</i> . Routledge.
812	Laos	52	1945	1	Stuart-Fox, M. (1995). The French in Laos, 1887–1945. <i>Modern Asian Studies</i> , 29(1), 111–139.
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**Table 2. Heckman regression on offer and acceptance of mediation.**

	<i>Mediation offer</i>	<i>Mediation acceptance</i>
Annual battle deaths		-0.001 (0.232)
Timing (years)		0.074 (0.0317)**
Timing squared		-0.002 (0.000)**
Ethnic conflict		0.550 (0.228)
Territorial conflict		-0.177 (0.219)
International reputation		3.299 (1.265)**
Military intervention		0.996 (0.436)*
Economic intervention		-0.133 (0.477)
Third-party trade leverage		-1.658 (1.281)
Third-party trade leverage dummy		-0.105 (0.232)
Major power		0.176 (0.246)
Duration of colonial rule		-0.000 (0.001)
Colonial rule		-0.005 (0.620)
Direct rule		0.387 (0.421)
Indirect rule		0.391 (0.437)
Historic linkage	0.713 (0.101)**	-0.784 (0.276)**
Third-party trade interest	-2.889 (1.233)**	
Third-party trade interest dummy	0.328 (0.076)**	
Defense pact	0.327 (0.076)**	
Geographic proximity	-0.1000 (0.088)**	
Geographic proximity dummy	0.894 (0.101)**	
No. of previous mediations	0.277 (0.061)**	0.294 (0.272)
Mediated last year	1.452 (0.138)**	
Other party mediation last year	0.385 (0.050)**	
Previous military intervention	0.259 (0.124)**	
Previous economic intervention	-0.007 (0.204)	
Constant	-2.516 (0.072)**	1.790 (0.788)
Rho	-0.612623	
Log-likelihood	-1751.706	
Wald Chi-squared (17)	37.26	
Significance	$p < 0.0031$	
Observations	189,965	
Uncensored observations		320

Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

\*Significant at 5%. \*\* Significant at 1%.

**Table 3. Heckman regression of offer and acceptance of mediation.**

	<i>Mediation offer</i>	<i>Mediation acceptance</i>
Annual battle deaths		-0.032 (0.061)
Timing (years)		0.081 (0.036)
Timing squared		-0.002 (0.000)*
Ethnic conflict		0.649 (0.256)*
Territorial conflict		-0.126 (0.232)
International reputation		3.574 (1.499)*
Military intervention		1.428(0.586)*
Economic intervention		-0.375 (0.586)
Third-party trade leverage		-1.993 (1.447)
Third-party trade leverage dummy		-0.002 (0.264)
Major power		-0.019 (0.276)
Duration of colonial rule		-0.000 (0.001)
Type of colonial rule		-0.061 (0.199)
Colonial rule		1.096 (0.536)*
Third-party trade interest	-2.891 (1.233)*	
Third-party trade interest dummy	0.322 (0.089)**	
Defense pact	0.327 (0.077)**	
Geographic proximity	-0.099 (0.008)**	
Geographic proximity dummy	0.904 (0.101)**	
No. of previous mediations	0.277 (0.061)**	0.575 (0.370)
Mediated last year	1.449 (0.139)**	
Other party mediation last year	0.388 (0.050)**	
Previous military intervention	0.260 (0.124)*	
Previous economic intervention	0.004 (0.204)	
Constant	-2.517 (0.073)**	0.682 (1.014)*
Rho	-0.363	
Log-likelihood	-1752.601	
Wald Chi-squared (15)	26.63	
Significance	$p < 0.05$	
Observations		189,965
Uncensored observations		320

Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

\*Significant at 5%. \*\* Significant at 1%.