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SHAPING OUR ENVIRONMENT: A CASE STUDY ON THE EFFECT OF LEADERS' AND POPULATIONS' AGENCY ON ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN ETHIOPIA

Guillaume, Adèle

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**SHAPING OUR ENVIRONMENT:
A CASE STUDY ON THE EFFECT OF LEADERS' AND POPULATIONS'
AGENCY ON ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN ETHIOPIA**

Adèle Guillaume

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A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'A. Guillaume', written over a horizontal line.

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Abstract

The concept of agency refers to the ability of agents to shape their environment. Most existing literature focuses on agency as a product of governmentality, which shapes the desires of the population towards promoting a pro-development environment. However, recent scholarly work has delved into the role of agency when utilised by leaders to stimulate economic development. There is ongoing debate regarding the extent to which economic performance is improved by the agency of leaders or populations. Through a case study of Ethiopia, this thesis demonstrates that Abiy Ahmed's agency has contributed to the country's economic performance, while the agency of the Ethiopian population has had no impact on the national economy. The findings suggest that under developmental patrimonialism, developmental leadership, and developmental financial and economic policy, leaders employ agency that positively influences national economic performance. However, the study indicates that the agency of the population does not lead to similar positive outcomes. This is attributed to limited governmentality and weak social ties within Ethiopia, which hinders the population's ability to drive the economy through agency. In conclusion, the case study contributes significantly to the ongoing debate about the effects of leaders' and populations' agency on economic performance.

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1. Introduction

Institutional factors relating to economic development have been identified for decades. States tend to perform poorly economically when they are predatory; they are faced with extractive economic and political institutions; or when there is path dependence from former colonial structures (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 72). These factors come from large, fixed organisations and structures in a society or a system (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 73). A series of institutional strategies - the creation of accountability mechanisms, the enhancement of representation, and the promotion of collective action - have been introduced to overcome these institutional obstacles to economic development. Unfortunately, a lot of these strategies are still failing. For instance, electoral accountability has no influence in explaining voter behaviour and solely relies on politicians considering citizens' will (Bowen & Mo, 2016, p. 6). Furthermore, social accountability's efficiency depends on the political context and whether the principal agent is corrupt (Matthew & Missingham, 2009, p. 12). Enhancing representation does not work in a society structurally built against it (Hessami & Lopes da Fonseca, 2020, p. 7). Finally, there is no solution to the collective action problem in a "bad" equilibrium situation, explaining the failures of collective action initiatives (Katyaini et al., 2021, p. 101).

These failures have led development studies scholars to look beyond institutions by investigating how agency boosts economic performance. Agency is the capacity of agents to shape their environment. Most of the literature focuses on agency as a result of governmentality, which shapes populations' desires into wanting a pro-development environment (Foucault, 2007, p. 111). Recently, scholars have investigated the role of agency when used by leaders to boost economic development (Leftwich, 2010, p. 93). The extent to which economic performance is increased by elites' use of agency to build coalitions remains highly debated. On the one hand, it has been argued that the claim focuses too much on the macro-level, ignoring micro-level practices; others have argued that the leaders' use of agency leads to the creation of developmental coalitions, which protects the economy from uncertainty and coercion (Huggins, 2016, p. 716; Booth & al, 2012, p. 4). This problem highlights the academic relevance of furthering the debate. Furthermore, investigating leaders' and populations' use of agency would shed light on the relevant actors of economic development, which could lead to a societal understanding that these actors' agencies need to be strengthened. This highlights the societal importance of providing an answer to the following question:

To what extent do leaders' and populations' use of agency affect national economic performance?

2. Theoretical Framework

a. Literature Review

Agency and Development

Structuralist approaches to development argue that macro-structures such as governments, cultures, or social class relations dominate (Fay, 1996, p. 68). These structures determine every act and make humans powerless actors who follow what is socially expected of them. This theory suggests that development agencies are not competent to enhance human agency. Garikipati and Olsen (2008, p. 330) criticise structuralism for several reasons: it ignores development agencies that strive for progressive change via the agency of the broad population, and it assumes that every act functions to reinforce and strengthen the structures which cannot respond to the question of how society changes. According to Leftwich and Lyne de Ver (2017, p. 286), agents; such as individuals, groups, organisations and coalitions, have some power and the capacity to change social structures. This argument contradicts Fay's (1996) vision of structure as fate. Instead, it builds on Archer's (1996, p. 186) claim on agency: "Agency is the capacity of any social actor to act; agents behave according to their internal composition and history, and their external relations".

Leftwich (2010) argues that researchers failed to think beyond institutions when looking for development strategies. He argues that the literature combining political science and development studies needs a much better analytical handle on the role of 2008 agency in the developmental process (Leftwich, 2010, p. 93). Garikipati and Olsen (2008) state that there are multiple ways to study the role of human agency in development. In the case of gender and development, the study of agency must recognise agents in relational terms at several levels: personal agents, households, intervening agencies or organisations, and states (Garikipati & Olsen, 2008, p. 331). In the case of autonomy, the study of agency needs to look at social formations and social institutions, not just personal or subjective views of individuals about individuals (Garikipati & Olsen, 2008, p. 332). The study of capabilities looks at human agency in moulding and creating the contexts of lived experience beyond the direct concerns of governments and development agencies (Garikipati & Olsen, 2008, p. 332). Research on agency and development shows the importance of looking at multiple levels of agency when investigating the causes of development. More specifically, this literature review focuses on the level of leaders and the level of populations.

Leaders' use of agency

Looking at the link between leaders' use of agency and development, Leftwich and Lyne De Ver (2017, p. 283) argue that leaders must use agency to build coalitions. Coalitions are not about the individual but their capability to connect and merge essential actors. Using Behuria's (2015, p. 81) argument that leaders use agency to build coalitions by controlling profit-making companies, hence protecting them from certain forms of competition and uncertainty, Leftwich and Lyne de Ver (2017, p. 283) introduce developmental transformational leadership, which is a political process that involves organising and mobilising people and resources in pursuit of sustainable and equitable growth, political stability, and inclusive social development. The authors argue that in order to build coalitions and create a shift from a coercing state to a developmental one, leaders need a political will for change (p. 283).

The literature on patrimonialism investigates the extent to which leaders' use of agency boosts economic performance. Neo-patrimonialism is a term often used to describe the state of governance of African nations (Francisco, 2010, p. 92). It signals a new form of ruling centralised around one person or strong group, strengthening this one through the vertical distribution of resources (Francisco, 2010, p. 92). There is a general assumption that neo-patrimonialism is hindering the economy. However, Kelsall et al. (2010, p. 83) use evidence from Asian countries that switched from being low-income to middle-income countries to show that Asian countries have not been less patrimonial and rent-seeking than African countries; instead, they have employed a different type of patrimonialism which centralised patronage, organised rent process and limited the damage of corruption. Using his work on patrimonialism in Asia, Kelsall (2011) investigates patrimonialism in four Middle African countries. His findings show that mechanisms exist to centralise economic rents and manage them with a view to the long term, proving that neo-patrimonialism can be harnessed for developmental ends (Kelsall, 2011, p. 86). This research introduces developmental patrimonialism, which is later defined as ruling elites who acquire an interest in and a capability for managing rents in a centralised way to enhance their incomes in the long run, rather than maximise them in the short run (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012, p. 4).

The conditions under which neo-patrimonialism becomes developmental patrimonialism are the conditions under which long-term rent centralisation becomes attractive and feasible (Booth & Golooba-Metubi, 2012, p. 389). These requirements are critical junctures, a personal leadership style which is visionary and ruthless, and a centralised political organisation which is well disciplined, member-funded, endowed with its own resources and

can use reserves of financial and human resources (Booth & Gooloba-Metubi, 2012, p. 389). Booth and Gooloba-Mutebi (2012) apply the developmental patrimonialism framework to the case of Rwanda. Their findings show that the genocide acted as a critical juncture (Booth & Gooloba-Mutebi, 2012, p. 401). Then, Kagame used agency to build a developmental coalition. This led Rwanda to achieve rapid development. This example highlights how leaders' macro-level practices boosted development. Another example is Malawi, which also had a better development performance than what would have been expected based on its location and natural resources (Booth et al., 2010, p. 4). This is due to its centralised, long-horizon rent utilisation and disciplined economic technocracy. They demonstrate that President Kamuzu Banda conforms to the concept of developmental patrimonialism and that following political regimes are consistent with this theory (Booth et al., 2010, p. 5). The literature reviewed does not claim that leaders' use of agency is the sole explanation for economic performance. However, none of their case studies explore other actors that could affect economic development.

Populations' use of agency

Huggins (2016, p. 716) reviewed the literature on leaders' use of agency and developmental patrimonialism and argues that it focuses on the macroeconomic level and ignores micro-level practices. He states that non-elites are essential in implementing development strategies (p. 716). Using a Foucauldian approach, Huggins investigates the micro-level politics of pyrethrum production in Rwanda, which a military-owned company manages. His findings show that companies with links to the ruling party and local administration create 'spaces of governance' which shape citizens' desires to shape their environment (p. 728). Foucault's (2007) theory on governmentality argues that populations' psychological desires can be guided and moulded to create subjects of development who do not need to be coerced. He conceptualises governmentality as the 'conduct of conduct': the putting in place of schemes, ideologies and systems that facilitate the development of certain kinds of conduct (Foucault, 2007, p. 111). This approach contrasts with the developmental patrimonialism approach, which argues that coercion of companies and individuals will lead to development.

Another study arguing that the reason for development is the empowerment of communities is the case of Indonesia in 'The Will to Improve' by Li (2007). She explains that the will to improve is the attempt to secure the "welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, etc" and has been operative in

Indonesia for almost two centuries (p. 41). It has been made through the empowerment of people. A key concept in her work is government through community, which comprises automated and responsabilised communities (p. 171). Newman and Dale (2005) consider social capital an enhancer of sustainable development. They argue that actor agency allows individuals and groups to overcome barriers and solve problems (p. 479). They introduce ‘bonding’ social capital as a strategy that hinders innovation as it reinforces social norms and provides trust (p. 479). On the other hand, ‘bridging’ social capital is a strategy that enhances development as it allows actors to offer social changes (p. 481). It connects a network to the outside world and provides needed information unavailable within the local group or community (p. 481).

Flores (n. d.) makes a general statement from Huggins’s (2016) argument. He argues that micro-level analysis of power is always relevant in development work. Many intermediary organisations implement their actions at the local level. The frameworks and tools leaders use at the macro level are adapted for the micro level. His research concluded that macro determinants are essential but should not undermine micro levels of power (p. 12). Studying the effect of intermediary organisations gives a better understanding of barriers to development. This research inscribes itself in the theory of governmentality as it highlights that intermediary organisations are the ones giving communities a desire to become subjects of development.

b. Conceptualisation

Leaders’ use of agency

The literature review demonstrated that when leaders use agency, they build coalitions, which connect and merge important actors (Leftwich & Van der Lyne, 2017, p. 279). The extent to which leaders’ use of agency in building coalitions leads to higher national economic performance can be explained using the concept of developmental leadership (Leftwich & Van der Lyne, 2017, p. 279). According to this, developmental leadership is shaped by several factors: the institutional conditions, formal and informal, which shape but are not determinative of behaviour; the distribution of de jure and de facto power; the room for manoeuvre in a political space characterised by structural and institutional constraints; contingent internal or external threats, challenges, and critical junctures; and the emerging normative and strategic consensus on developmental priorities. (pp. 279-282). When the right balance is reached between constraints and opportunities, in a mix of formal and informal

institutional contexts of authority, legitimacy, and power; all the conditions are met for developmental leadership to occur.

Developmental patrimonialism is another critical concept which can be used to assess the extent to which leaders' use of agency for building coalitions leads to higher national economic performance. This concept looks at the type of leadership, whether it is visionary and ruthless, and whether it creates or sustains strong and centralised political institutions (Booth & Golooba-Metubi, 2012, p. 379). It also looks at leaders' interests and whether they are long-term due to reasons such as wanting to enhance their incomes in the long term or seeing their country go through a critical juncture, such as independence or genocide (Booth & Golooba-Metubi, 2012, p. 379). A right balance between leadership style and leaders' interests leads to the expectation that developmental patrimonialism is met.

A third concept to assess the extent to which leaders' use of agency in building coalitions leads to higher national economic performance is development rent utilisation. This concept examines whether the regime finances domestic investment in a way that leads to positive externalities for other investors, controls and protects profit-making companies, and moderates corruption with a long-term goal of growing the economy (Kelsall, 2011, p. 79). Five steps compose developmental rent management: organised clientelism, rents used centrally to finance politics, anti-corruption at least partly entrenched, essential public goods provided, including venture, and finally, solid economic performance (Kelsall, 2011, p. 84). The ratio between the degree to which the process for creating and allocating economic rents was centralised and the degree to which it was oriented to the long term can assess efficient rent utilisation.

Figure 1: The effect of leaders' use of agency on economic performance



This conceptualisation leads to the expectation that leaders using their agency through developmental leadership, developmental patrimonialism, and developmental rent utilisation enhance economic performance. Hence, leaders' use of agency leads to higher economic

performance. If those conditions are not respected, then leaders' agency has no effect on economic performance.

Populations' use of agency


The literature review demonstrated that in the case where agency is used by populations, they become agents of development because their interests and desires were moulded by institutions (Foucault, 2007, p. 112). The extent to which populations' use of agency in building coalitions leads to higher national economic performance can be explained using the theory of governmentality (Foucault, 2007, p. 112). First, governmentality allows for identifying whether mechanisms for organising smallholder labour are in accord or opposition to the state's ideology. A pro-market, entrepreneur-driven economic development promoted by the state that is applied to smallholder labour is based on a governmental framework (Huggins, 2016, p. 716). Governmentality also allows for the creation of particular spaces of governance by intermediary organisations, such as disciplinary technologies, which control particular spaces, schedules, quotas and other forms of demands upon labour (p. 717). The presence of local development mechanisms in accord with the state and of particular spaces of governance leads to the expectation that there is governmentality.

Bridging and bonding social capital are two key concepts in assessing the extent to which populations' use of agency leads to economic growth. Bridging social capital depends on the level of agency that actors possess and the degree of openness the group has to outsiders (Newman & Dale, 2005, p. 479). Assessing agency in bridging social capital can be done by looking at whether agents make intentional actions and have the ability to make choices (p. 480). Bonding social capital can be assessed by investigating the reinforcement of social norms and the trust provided by the population to institutions (p. 480). Individual agency stimulates a diverse mix of bonding and bridging ties, provides new information sources, creates linkages between various groups, and facilitates vertical links to various levels of government (pp. 479-481)

Another concept to investigate the extent to which populations' use of agency leads to economic development is "government through community", introduced by Li (2007). Government through community creates autonomised and responsabilised communities that emerge under multiple conditions: the participation of communities in decision-making, an allocation of funds towards identified development projects, the presence of capacity-building projects for populations, the presence of accountability mechanisms to provide constructive feedback on local development initiatives, and finally the long-term vision of

local development projects (Li, 2007, p. 171). All the conditions being met lead to the assumption that there is a government through community approach.

Figure 2: The effect of populations’ use of agency on economic performance



This conceptualisation leads to the expectation that populations using their agency through a governmentality approach, a balance between bonding and bridging ties, and government through community, enhances economic performance. Hence, populations’ use of agency leads to higher economic performance. If those conditions are not respected, then populations’ agency has no effect on economic performance.

3. Methodology

a. Research design

Qualitative research, consisting of a single case-study analysis of Ethiopia, is employed to answer the research question. This single-case study does not aim to test theories on leaders and populations’ use of agency, as the plausibility of a theory can only be tested on a large number of countries (Halperin and Heath, 2020, p. 235). Instead, a single-case study allows testing whether a theory from one context still holds in another context (p. 235). It will reveal whether theories and concepts on leaders’ and populations’ use of agency travel to a new case, demonstrating whether they can explain and affect economic performance. To answer the research question, a quantitative content analysis is thought to be the best fit, as it investigates whether there is an effect between populations’ and leaders’ use of agency and economic performance.

b. Case selection

Ethiopia was selected as the case for this research using a typical case selection technique since it belongs to the universe of cases to which the aforementioned concepts apply: it is a state which surpassed expectations regarding economic performance, it has a patrimonial model and has local population development projects (Gearing, 2008). The time frame for

this research will be 2018 to 2024 because, as highlighted by Xinhua (2024), its economy has recorded rapid economic growth in the past five years and is expected to grow by 7.9% this year. Furthermore, it has been a strong patrimonial state since with a strong leader, Abiy Ahmed, since 2018 (Matfess, 2020). A high number of local development projects also emerged since the 1990s (Mekonnen, 2023).

c. Method of data collection and operationalisation

Data sources were selected based on availability, historical time frame, and an established link to leaders' and populations' use of agency. For leaders' use of agency, these documents are newspaper articles, UN and NGO reports of government performance, and Ethiopian political institutions' websites. For the population's use of agency, the documents are UN and NGO project reports and websites, local company initiatives, research projects, public surveys, and reports of experience in the field. In order to minimise selection bias, the analysis also includes documents that do not necessarily refer to either of those but mention causes of economic performance in Ethiopia. This ought to enhance the validity of the interpretation of the analysis since it allows for contextualisation and nuance of findings (Halperin & Heath, 2020, p. 344).

d. Methods of Data Analysis

To make this research valid and reliable, it is necessary to justify the validity and the reliability of the results (Halperin and Heath, 2020, p. 384). Therefore, the following explanation justifies how the choice of analysis was made. Since the goal is to study whether there is an effect between populations' and leaders' use of agency and economic performance, a qualitative content analysis is used. More specifically, a directed content analysis is made, allowing this paper to validate and extend the conceptual framework (Zhang & Wildemuth, n. d.). Indeed, initial coding starts with the concepts that emerged from the conceptual framework. During the data analysis, the goal is to see themes emerge from the data. Such a method enables a complete analysis of the variables. Individual themes are used as the unit of analysis, as they allow for assigning a code to a text of any size (Minichiello et al., 1990).

Four trustworthiness criteria must be tested before analysing interpretative research work (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). A quantitative content analysis of a single case is credible as its coding process is transparent (see coding scheme). The transferability, or whether the hypothesis can be applied to another context, has to be assessed by other researchers. Still, this research aims to provide as rich and precise descriptions as possible to facilitate judgments on transferability (Zhang & Wildemuth, n. d.). The choice of conducting a directed content analysis method accounts for changing conditions in the phenomena, proving the

research's dependability (Bradley, 1993, p. 437). Finally, the analysis of the results validates the confirmability of the research, as the research product has high internal coherence.

e. Timeframe

To begin, data sources were selected, and the data was analysed using the categories and indicators provided in the codebook. From this, new indicators emerged, which were added to the codebook. From the data, new indicators emerged and were added to the codebook. The data provided for certain patterns, and these have been discussed in the analysis of the results. Finally, the research question is answered, and the strengths and limitations of the study are discussed.

Figure 3: Coding Manual

Categories	Indicators	Source
Developmental leadership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -formal and informal institutional configurations that shape but do not determine behavior; -the distribution of de jure and de facto power; -room for maneuver in a political space within structural and institutional constraints; -contingent internal or external threats, challenges, and critical junctures; - the emerging normative and strategic consensus about developmental priorities 	Leftwich & Van der Lyne, 2017
Developmental patrimonialism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -visionary and ruthless leadership -leaders create or sustain strong and -centralised political institutions -long-term interests of leaders -leaders want to enhance their incomes in the long term -leaders saw their country go through a critical juncture, such as independence or genocide, which changed interests from long-term to short-term 	Booth & Gooloba-Mutebi, 2012

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - disciplined, member-funded, endowed with its own resources, using reserves of financial and human resources, political institutions 	
Developmental rent utilisation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - organised clientelism - rent used centrally to finance politics - anti-corruption at least partly enhanced - key public goods provided, including venture capital - growth above potential 	Booth, Cammack & Kelsall, 2010
Governmentality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - smallholder labour or in accord to the ideology of the state. - intermediary organisations, such as disciplinary technologies, which control particular spaces, schedules, quotas and other forms of demands upon labour 	Foucault, 2007 Huggins, 2016
Bridging and bonding ties	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - agents make intentional actions and have the ability to make choices - reinforcement of social norms and providing trust - providing new information sources and creating linkages between various groups, - facilitating vertical links to various levels of government 	Newman & Dale, 2005
Government through community	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - community participation - empowerment and capacity building - resource allocation and utilisation - social cohesion and inclusivity - policy implementation and impact - feedback mechanisms and accountability - sustainability and long-term viability 	Li, 2007

4. Presentation and Analysis of the Results

a. Leaders' use of agency

Developmental leadership

Overall, findings on developmental leadership underline an emerging normative and strategic consensus about developmental priorities and the presence of contingent internal threats. Formal and informal institutional configurations shape but do not determine behaviour, and there is room for manoeuvring in a political space within institutional constraints. No evidence was found on the distribution of de jure and de facto power, as the transparency of governmental processes is very low. Therefore, it can be inferred that developmental leadership is partly present under Ahmed's presidency in Ethiopia.

The data shows that, since in power, Abiy Ahmed has prioritised informal policymaking. He created several ad hoc commissions and committees, such as the National Reconciliation Commission and the National Dialogue Commission (Teshome, 2023). His most significant policy decisions were implemented using informal and ad hoc mechanisms, excluding wider government stakeholders (Fisher, 2019). Ahmed's "Chaka Project", which is supposed to be the most expensive public project Ethiopia has ever made, is "informally controlled by his office, with no input and accountability to the Parliament" (González, 2022). These instances show that there are formal and informal institutional configurations that do not determine behaviour. They also show room for manoeuvre in a political space for the prime minister. However, these institutions should at least shape behaviour to have developmental leadership, and Ahmed should move within structural and institutional constraints. Abiy's political party's program states the importance of "dealing with differences between members of the government while staying within democratic boundaries" (PP program, 2018, p. 6). This information was shared by Ahmed's government, making it necessary to look at outside sources examining Ahmed's behaviour. A few articles from local newspapers argue that Abiy Ahmed "does as he pleases and does not move within structural and institutional constraints" (Teshome, 2023). However, no fact supports their argument, making it difficult to conclude that institutional configurations do not shape Ahmed's behaviour. This could be due to the lack of transparency in political processes. Still, based on the evidence available, it can be concluded that Abiy Ahmed moves within structural and institutional constraints.

Abiy Ahmed and his party mention development as a priority. The Prosperity Party puts social development as a central point of its program, leading to prosperity (PP website, n. d.). Another main point of the program is building an inclusive economy that ensures developmental and equitable access (PP website, n. d.). More specifically, the program offers

to establish “an economic system built by both private actors and by the government” (PP program, 2018, p. 6). According to the program, the purpose of the party is to realise a prosperous Ethiopia (p. 6). These examples introduce the idea of a normative and strategic consensus about developmental priorities. This consensus is further developed throughout their political program. Their strategy is to build an economic system based on farmers, pastoralists, youth, women and low-income urban residents (PP program, 2018, p. 21). In 2023, Ahmed stated that their efforts for promoting agriculture were consistent and that there were promising results (Ahmed, 2023). In 2020, Ahmed launched the GTP II, a development program that aims to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of public finance utilisation and focus on budget optimisation (GTP II, 2020, p. 109). The IMF reports efforts to transition to a more flexible exchange rate regime (IMF country report, 2020, p. 12). These examples further prove the priority accorded to development by Abiy Ahmed and his party. This priority led to the emergence of development projects. The section on financial and economic policy develops on those projects' actual implementation and efficiency.

In 2020, Ahmed declared war on the Tigray region in northern Ethiopia (Teshome, 2023). Perpetuating the idea of a challenge to his leadership, Ahmed meets another condition of developmental leadership: a contingent internal threat. This acts as a critical juncture, allowing for structural change in current structures, leading to a more developmental model.

Developmental patrimonialism

Findings on developmental patrimonialism demonstrate that Ahmed uses visionary and ruthless leadership. His international influence strengthened his leadership. Ahmed’s interests seem oriented toward the long term, but insufficient evidence has supported that conclusion. Most institutions seem to become more centralised. Still, a lot became decentralised. Finally, no data was found on whether political institutions are disciplined, member-funded, endowed with their own resources, and using reserves of financial and human resources. Therefore, it can be concluded that developmental patrimonialism is partly present.

Abiy Ahmed’s leadership style was assessed through multiple means: his speeches, his political program, and the vision of the people found in local newspapers. His leadership is described as a “big man rule” (Mistir Sew, 2021). Abiy Ahmed is described as a “ruthless populist”, a “Messiah of the country”, a “visionary leader”, and a “grandiose narcissistic leader” (Mistir Sew, 2021). Abiy Ahmed’s introductory speech at the summit of the African Union mentions the need to boost the African economy based on his vision (African Union website, 2024). Finally, Ahmed is the leader of a government that promotes visionary

economic reforms, such as privatisation and reallocation of goods, people, and money (Mitsui & Co. Global Strategic Studies Institute Monthly Report, 2019, p. 12). Therefore, Abiy Ahmed fits the visionary and ruthless leadership criteria of developmental patrimonialism. The data shows that Abiy Ahmed's interests are long-term. During his inaugural address in 2018, he said that there is a need for long-term financing of infrastructure, health, and education (p. 4). He also states the necessity to make his country's development sustainable (p. 8). The extent to which the statement of his interests can be trusted remains to be seen. Indeed, Ethiopia did not go through a critical juncture such as independence or genocide right before Ahmed acceded to power, which would have changed his interests from short-term to long-term.

Abiy Ahmed and his government declared wanting to create solid and centralised political institutions. The Prosperity Party's website wants to build a strong, democratic, and acceptable lasting state (n. d.). They emphasised the importance of the government in ensuring productivity and fair use in the country, implying the importance of a strong government. Evidence shows that Abiy Ahmed made significant efforts to transform the country from a decentralised ethnic federal system to a more centralised national republic (Jenkins, 2023). This statement is supported by the Prosperity Party's statement that Ethiopia should return to classic centralisation. One example that contradicts these examples is a quote from the Prosperity Party's political program, which defends a need to implement a decentralised institutional reform (PP program, 2018, p. 18). Therefore, although Abiy Ahmed and his government created strong and centralised political institutions, there are some contradictions on the necessity of those reforms. A last condition to have developmental patrimonialism is the presence of a disciplined, member-funded, endowed with their own resources, using reserves of financial and human resources and political institutions. The data analysed did not allow to make any conclusion on this category. Data on the funding and internal functioning of Ethiopian institutions would require transparency from the government, which is not the case, and limits the scope of this research. This hinders the capacity to conclude whether there is developmental patrimonialism.

A new category of developmental patrimonialism emerged from the data: international influence of the leader. Abiy Ahmed acted as a mitigator of eastern African conflicts in South Sudan (Speech African Union, 2024). He also introduced the 2024 African Union summit and promoted the need to boost the African economy. He also pushed for increasing the share of export earnings in GDP (GTP II, 2020, p. 102). Finally, Ahmed received significant support from international organisations, western countries, and NGOs and won the Nobel Peace

Prize in 2019. This shows a capacity to influence, enhancing his leadership and the efficiency of his policymaking.

Developmental economic and financial policy

Based on the data, the developmental rent utilisation category became broader, as much evidence showed that the utilisation of financial and economic resources other than rent emerged. This allowed for a conclusion on using those economic and financial resources to emerge: the Ethiopian government has made developmental economic and financial policies. Furthermore, the process of developmental rent utilisation did not appear in the data. Instead, evidence from different parts of it was found independently. There were no findings on organised clientelism, as state institutions are not transparent on their clientelist policies, and no outside organisation has studied the issue. Anti-corruption mechanisms flourished since Ahmed got into power. The government also initiated a large number of local development projects and facilitated public-private partnerships. Whether these projects were implemented remains to be seen.

Most findings of this category concern corruption. The Prosperity Party's program (2018) emphasises the prevention of theft of national resources (p. 5). It also argues that the current Ethiopian system fuels corruption, which hinders prosperity (p. 12). In his inaugural address of 2018, Abiy Ahmed announced a strategy to combat corruption beyond simply creating anti-corruption organisations and by "incentivising individuals against it". He normatively argues to be against stealing in Ethiopia. A section of his speech on corruption concludes with fighting organised corruption. His GTP II initiative also focuses on fighting corruption, transmitting his words into actions. In 2020, were introduced new bank notes, which have additional design and security features, making the production of counterfeits difficult (Freedom House score, n. d.). An argument that strengthened Ahmed's motivation to fight corruption was that he turned public attention to his fight against corruption to avoid backlash from his war declaration on the Tigray ethnic group. For instance, he built a national Anti-corruption committee, which led to the firing of corrupt officials (Jenkins, 2023). In a speech to the parliament, Ahmed denounced the judiciary, law enforcement and other state institutions riddled by corruption (Jenkins, 2023). Ahmed also declared to investigate some officials' foreign bank accounts (Dibaba, 2023).

Abiy Ahmed and his political party assert an aim to fight rent-seeking institutions and servants (GTP II, 2020, p. 79). However, they do not formally claim to want to organise rent centrally. On the other hand, Ahmed declares wanting to provide key public goods. He argues

that providing essential public goods will enable the people to become active and a part of the country's fight against corruption and key development actors. For instance, urban development programs to make cities livable were implemented (PP website, n. d.). The government wants to enhance the participation of the private sector and support it financially (PP program, 2018, p. 21). The GTP II have a program to facilitate the financing of SMEs and lower regulations for new businesses, as well as opening to international businesses and opening public and private partnerships. The Homegrown Economic Reform Plan is an example of those policies (IMF Country Report, 2020, p. 12). The government is not acting as a partner but as a private-sector supporter. This shows a strategy of little government control of the private sector. The list of economic programs introduced by the government is extensive. However, the actual implementation of those reforms is deceiving. Criticism has been made that Abiy Ahmed is more about words than actions (Freedom House Score, n. d.).

The analysis of leaders' use of agency revealed that developmental leadership and developmental patrimonialism are partly present in Ethiopia. No evidence of the process of developmental rent utilisation was found. Instead, considerable data on the government's developmental economic and fiscal policy was analysed. This leads to the conclusion that Abiy Ahmed's agency has some effect on economic performance.

b. Populations' use of agency

Governmentality

Findings show little presence of governmentality. There are intermediary organisations, but no evidence that they create spaces of governance. Smallholder labour is not in accord with the state in all regions.

The data revealed the presence of multiple intermediary organisations between the state and smallholder labour, most of them being NGOs, IOs, and local governments. International organisations implemented national development programs at the local level (WB, 2020, p. 4). The World Bank hired an implementing agency, which gave expert support to program implementation (WB, 2020, p. 4). The NGO Habitat Ethiopia declared it would “work hand in hand with local governments and form a Community Committee which identifies the needs of the local population” (Habitat Ethiopia website, n.d.). Furthermore, many local NGOs took initiatives to promote the local development of communities. These examples highlight the presence of intermediary organisations between the state and the population. However, these

organisations do not control particular spaces, schedules, quotas and other forms of demands upon labour. There is no evidence that they create spaces of governance for the population.

According to the data, there is a link between smallholder labour and the ideology of the state. They are on the same page thanks to the participation of intermediary organisations. The World Bank's strategy for Ethiopia had one rationale: being aligned with the Ethiopian Urban Development Strategy (WB, 2021, p. 2). One of its projects directly contributed to the GTP II and the Ethiopian Cities Sustainable Goal (WB, 2021, p. 2). The World Bank also supported the government's efforts in decentralisation and urban policy (WB, 2020, p. 4). According to them, the results of these initiatives were highly successful, making smallholder labour in accord with the opposition of the state (WB, 2021, p. 2). The Ethiopian government has also successfully managed to "benefit 5 million smallholder farmers, thanks to their agricultural commercialisation program" (The Reporter, 2019). It reached its goal of having one million daily labourers, showing a positive relationship between the state's development strategy and smallholder labour. On the other hand, it is essential to note that Ethiopia is divided into multiple regions and ethnic groups. In 2020, Abiy Ahmed declared war on the Tigray region, which had relatively successful farming, due to a conflict of interests (Teshome, 2023). This shows that smallholder labour is not in accord with the government in the entire country.

Bridging and bonding ties

Bridging and bonding ties are limited, creating an imbalance between both. Some of the population became agents of development, but practices leading them to become independent in their choice are still limited. However, There is a noticeable improvement in the provision of new information sources, creating linkages between various groups.

World Banks' reports, NGO websites, and local newspapers all show that the population has been able to take intentional actions and have the ability to make choices. For instance, the NGO ECD managed to strengthen people's capacities, enabling them to negotiate for decent work, which is a necessary skill to make choices (ECD website, n. d.). The World Bank provided training and support to local communities in the field of urban local development (WB, 2021, p. 7). This led local workers in urban development to take intentional actions independently of outside organisations. The World Bank also included community members in identifying, prioritising, and selecting infrastructure projects (WB, 2021, p. 8). This initiative led to households becoming food secure, being able to pay for utilities, saving and investing in business (WB, 2021, p. 8). The World Bank also made a

project to “enable women and men in pastoral communities to identify, prioritise, design, and implement micro-projects” (WB, 2020, p. 8). This creates a necessary baseline for making choices. Even though those findings are promising concerning agents’ capability to make intentional actions and choices, a lot of evidence on local development projects remains focused on giving populations basic needs, not on allowing them to become agents of development themselves. For instance, the ECD mostly prevented girls from dropping out of school and supplied sanitary materials and school facilities (ECD website, n. d.). Even though these initiatives provide basic needs to each agent, they do not give them the capacity to make choices.

No evidence was found concerning the second condition for a balance between bonding and bridging ties: the reinforcement of social norms and providing trust. However, there is considerable evidence that new information sources were provided, creating linkages between various groups. One of Abiy Ahmed’s main initiatives is the digitalisation of the country, leading farmers to learn from each other and enhancing agricultural productivity (The Reporter, 2019). Furthermore, the World Bank participated in “enhancing the connectivity and road safety to allow different communities to be better connected” (WB, 2021, p. 7). The ATA started a clustered approach on farmland, which led to 1.3 million farmers being organised into 30000 clusters (The Reporter, 2019). The NGO ICDA-Ethiopia used a networking approach to development, encouraging bonds between smallholders (ICDA-Ethiopia website, n. d.). Finally, vertical links to local governments were also facilitated. Local and regional governments worked hand in hand with international organisations and NGOs to build development projects. These non-state actors facilitated links between the populations and regional and local governments by creating committees to understand the needs of citizens, and implemented national development programs to the local level (BBBC report, 2022, p. 6). However, no evidence was found on direct links between the population and the national government.

Government through community

The presence of government through community in Ethiopia is by far the most prominent of all three categories of populations’ use of agency. There is significant community participation. The capacity building of individuals is not so strong, but it still exists. Resources are not allocated to individuals but to institutions; still, those institutions are local and work on building individual capacity. There are extensive feedback mechanisms and

accountability from all actors involved in development. Finally, the data shows a long-term orientation of projects.

There is significant evidence of efforts of community participation by the government and non-state actors. For instance, the World Bank urban local development project hired local task team leader and team members (WB, 2021, p. 7). The average score for participation of citizens “increased from 76 percent to 99 percent between the first and second phase of the project” (WB, 2020, p. 8). More specifically, community members were involved in identifying, prioritising, and selecting infrastructure projects, giving them significant responsibilities (WB, 2020, p. 8). In all 16 cities where this project took place, community members were also involved in the handover of the completed structures (WB, 2020, p. 8). A Coca-Cola project initiative made in 2018 is now only run by local staff. The NGO Habitat Ethiopia promotes an inclusive development approach involving communities (Habitat Ethiopia website, n. d.). Another World Bank report states that it managed to help communities develop modest local development plans, involving them in the process (WB report, 2020, p. 8).

Populations have also been largely empowered in the past five years. The primary indicator used to assess populations’ empowerment is capacity building. Every governmental, private, and charity project that was analysed aimed to build capacity. The BBBC NGO provided capacity-building training on education, health, and nutrition to the population (BBBC report, 2022, p. 6). It also taught entrepreneurship and leadership skills (BBC report, 2022, p. 6). The EDC NGO also used a similar approach by providing teacher training, which empowered the community (ECD website, n. d.). These examples highlight how populations act as agents that play a direct role in development. Other instances, such as Phase I and Phase II of the World Bank’s urban development project, which managed to build the capacity of local, regional, and national levels of government, had a different effect (WB, 2021, p. 4). The project enhanced both their institutional performance and their ability to mobilise their own revenue to invest in more infrastructure (WB, 2021, p. 5). It appears that “more than 80% of the World Bank’s budget for urban local development projects was used to build capacity of local governments” (WB, 2021, p. 7). The government also promoted institutional capacity building of regional and local governments (WB, 2020, p. 1). From these examples, it can be inferred that the World Bank's actions, which are more extensive than local NGO actions, focus on building institutional capacity, which does not act directly on agents. Significant government resources are allocated to local and regional governments, which are used to enhance their institutional capacity and invest in development projects,

such as infrastructure. Anti-corruption mechanisms are put in place to utilise those resources efficiently. For instance, the World Bank's Fraud and Anti-Corruption system hires one person in each structure to handle complaints related to fraud and corruption, as well as take care of follow-up measures (WB, 2020, p. 8). This highlights efficient resource allocation and utilisation at the local level. However, it is necessary to point out that resource utilisation still falls solely under the hands of institutions, not individuals.

Data from local NGOs' actions show a goal to promote social cohesion and inclusivity. For instance, Habitat Ethiopia employed an inclusive approach aimed at improving individual and communal relations, which led to upgraded neighbourhoods (Habitat Ethiopia Website, n. d.). The extent to which this case is generalisable to the entire country remains to be seen, as this was implemented at a very small scale. An article in a local newspaper shares that "digital tools provided to farmers gave them access to financial services, increasing financial inclusion" (The Reporter, 2021). Even though this was implemented in a national case, financial inclusion is not the only type of inclusion necessary to give agency to the population. NGOs, international organisations, and local governments all mention developing their projects in a sustainable way. Whether this is actually the case in practice could not be assessed. However, since all projects built personal and institutional capacity, it can be inferred that they have long-term viability. Another indicator of government through community that was highly visible in the data is feedback mechanisms and accountability. Regional agencies conduct audits to improve the transparency of the process of their projects, strengthening accountability (WB, 2021, p. 5). Each city needs to fulfil the Fraud and Anti-Corruption system (WB, 2020, p. 8). Evidence from local NGOs also shows the presence of accountability mechanisms. For instance, the ECD describes accountability as its "core implementation strategy" (ECD website, n. d.). ICDA-Ethiopia also states that being accountable to the community and the government is their core value (ICDA-Ethiopia website, n. d.).

The analysis of populations' use of agency revealed that the presence of governmentality is limited. There is no balance between bonding and bridging ties since none are strongly present. Government through community is prominent in Ethiopia. This leads to the conclusion that the Ethiopian population's use of agency has little effect on economic performance.

5. Conclusion and Discussion

Under developmental patrimonialism, developmental leadership and developmental financial and economic policy, leaders use agency that contributes to the national economic performance. The findings on populations' use of agency do not allow for a similar conclusion. There is little governmentality and little bonding and bridging of ties in Ethiopia, which hinders populations' capacity to become agents of development. Therefore, using agency, the Ethiopian population does not contribute positively to the national economy.

This case study reveals that, in Ethiopia, leaders' agency has a more significant effect on the economy than the population's agency, which adds significant insights to the debate on the effect of leaders' and populations' agency on economic performance. Conducting a directed content analysis allowed for a new category to emerge, revealing that focusing solely on developmental rent utilisation when assessing leaders' agency leads to missing essential information. This strengthens the dependability of the research. On the other hand, this thesis has some limitations. A single case study heavily relies on the availability of the data. The small amount of official government reports and the language barrier are likely why no data was found for some indicators, which hinders the strength of the case study. Furthermore, the lack of transparency in political processes in Ethiopia leads to doubts about the extent to which the sources can be trusted. Even though the study was conducted on a small scale, it looked at the population as a single unit. However, Ethiopia is made up of multiple regions and ethnic groups. Their differences were highlighted with the example of the war against the Tigray region. This weakens the strength of the conclusion on the population's use of agency in Ethiopia.

Since there is a positive effect between leaders' use of agency and economic performance in Ethiopia, future research should look at the underlying mechanisms behind leaders' use of agency and economic performance. This could be done using a process tracing approach. Other countries with charismatic leaders, such as Côte d'Ivoire in the 1960s, should also be studied to add more insights into the debate. Finally, quantitative research on the effect of leaders' and populations' agency on economic performance should be conducted to test theory instead of investigating whether a theory from one context applies to another. This would allow for a possible generalisation of this case study's findings and generalise findings of cases such as Rwanda or Malawi.

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Appendix A and Primary Sources Bibliography

Figure 1: Codebook

Variable	Concepts	Indicators	Data
Leaders' use of agency	Developmental leadership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -formal and informal institutional configurations that shape but do not determine behavior; -the distribution of de jure and de facto power; -room for maneuver in a political space within structural and institutional constraints; -contingent internal or external threats, challenges, and critical junctures; - the emerging normative and strategic consensus about developmental priorities 	<p>“Building a country which has a strong government, democracy and acceptance” (PP website, n. d.)</p> <p>“Ensuring social development that promotes bilateral prosperity.” (PP website, n. d.)</p> <p>“Building an inclusive economic that ensures developmental and equitable access.” (PP website, n. d.)</p> <p>“necessary to establish an economic system that increases productivity and is built by private investors and the government.” (PP program, 2018, p. 6)</p> <p>“The purpose of our party package is to realize a prosperous Ethiopia.” (PP program, 2018, p. 9)</p> <p>“building an inclusive economic system centered on farmers, pastoralists, youth, women and low-income urban residents.” (PP program, 2018, p. 21)</p> <p>“such differences are inevitable and can be dealt with democratically and are useful and constructive. However, he understands that the negative impact of bitter disagreements that question our national existence and national unity and undermine the acceptance of the state is high. Therefore, the Prosperity Party works to develop a broad and strong national consensus on the most</p>

			<p>basic issues that are crucial for the acceptance of the country.” (PP program, 2018, p. 14)</p> <p>“In Ethiopia, we have been working diligently to enhance agricultural productivity in the past four years. These efforts are showing promising results.” (Speech Abiy Ahmed AU 2023, p. 3)</p> <p>“In addition, due attention will be given to increasing efficiency and effectiveness of public finance utilization, ensuring transparency and accountability, avoiding wastage and focusing on budget optimization.” (GTP II, 2020, p. 109)</p> <p>“eliminating the real overvaluation over the program period, while transitioning to a more flexible exchange rate regime” (IMF country report, 2020, p. 12)</p> <p>“Some of his most significant policy decisions were made without reference to wider government stakeholders and were implemented through informal or ad hoc mechanisms.” (Jonathan Fisher, 2019)</p> <p>“During his tenure, Abiy has created several ad hoc commissions and committees, including the National Reconciliation Commission, Border and Identity Affairs Commission, and</p>
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			<p>the National Dialogue Commission.” Article Modes Zewde Teshome, 2023 “the ‘Chaka Project’ may cost some ETB500bn (USD9bn), which would make it Ethiopia’s largest-ever public project. However, parliament has had no oversight role in the project, which is one of several now being controlled informally through the prime minister’s office.” (Oxford Analytica, 2023)</p>
	Developmental patrimonialism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -visionary and ruthless leadership -leaders create or sustain strong and centralised political institutions -long-term interests of leaders -leaders want to enhance their incomes in the long term -leaders saw their country go through a critical juncture, such as independence or genocide, which changed interests from short-term to long-term - disciplined, member-funded, endowed with its own resources, using reserves of financial and human resources, political institutions 	<p>“Building a strong, democratic and acceptable lasting state” (PP website, n. d.)</p> <p>“necessary to build an independent, independent and competency-based national institutional organization that will protect the people from direct existential threats and fulfill their needs for development” (PP program, 2018, p. 13)</p> <p>RED “In order to strengthen the state and to ensure that the institutions properly fulfill the public trust and responsibilities assigned to them, our party will implement a decentralized institutional reform” (PP program, 2018, p. 18)</p> <p>“Our party believes that the government is an important capacity and tool to ensure productivity and fair use in our country” (PP program, 2018, p. 21)</p>

		<p>NEW: international influence</p>	<p>“we need to build infrastructures, assure food security, strengthen our health and education systems and create jobs. All of these require long-term financing” (Abiy Ahmed Inaugural address, 2018)</p> <p>“The crux of the matter is to catapult our country to a higher level of development and move forward while ensuring that its unity is secured on a sustainable basis.” (Abiy Ahmed Inaugural address, 2018)</p> <p>Introductory speech in summit of African Union on the need of boosting african economy based on Abiy Ahmed’s vision (2024).</p> <p>“Structural change of the economy is envisaged to be measured through two main indicators: (i) increasing the share of manufacturing industry in GDP; and (ii) increasing the share of export earnings in GDP” (GTP II, 2020, p. 102)</p> <p>“Prime Minister Abiy is promoting the economic measures of privatizing state-owned companies, a hot bed of inefficiency, while reallocating people, goods, and money to the manufacturing industry, where further growth potential is expected.” (Mitsui & Co. Global Strategic Studies Institute Monthly Report, 2019, p. 12)</p>
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			<p>“a major shift in leadership style” article Jonathan Fisher, 2019</p> <p>“Abiy appears to have increasingly retreated into a highly personalized approach to government” (Jonathan Fisher, 2019)</p> <p>“Under his leadership, Ethiopia has transitioned from a repressive party-state system to big man rule.” (Jonathan Fisher, 2019)</p> <p>“He is a ruthless populist who portrays himself as the only person that can save Ethiopia.” (Jonathan Fisher, 2019)</p> <p>“Abiy’s only agenda has been presenting himself as the Messiah of the country, a reformist, and visionary leader to save Ethiopia.” (Jonathan Fisher, 2019)</p> <p>“The grandiose narcissistic leader, as it perfectly fits Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.” Article Mistir Sew 2021</p> <p>“Prime Minister Abiy’s incremental democratic adjustments and economic restructuring led by a strong federal state” (Jon Abbik, 2019)</p> <p>“his efforts to transform the country from a decentralised ethnic federal system to a more centralised national republic” (Matthew Jenkins, 2023)</p> <p>“PP’s return to classic centralisation” (Aimé González, 2022)</p>
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	<p>Developmental financial and economic policy</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -organised clientelism -rent used centrally to finance politics -anti-corruption at least partly enhanced -key public goods provided, including venture capital -growth above potential <p>NEW: state support of companies, banks</p>	<p>“preventing the wastage and theft of national resources caused by the government's deficit” (PP program, 2018, p. 5)</p> <p>“A system that fails to ensure freedom creates an economic environment that makes citizens inactive and productive, kills wealth creation and generally hinders the journey of prosperity, while on the other hand it creates a political atmosphere that fuels discord and corruption, undermines communication and reigns in fear” (PP program, 2018, p. 12)</p> <p>“the government's participation in the economic system follows the market principle, creates wealth in a strategic manner, enhances the participation of the private sector and other economic actors in a stable macroeconomic management framework, and increases productivity at a higher level and continuously.” (PP program, 2018, p. 21)</p> <p>“Our party designs and implements an integrated urban development program to make cities clean, livable and green.” (PP program, 2018, p. 28)</p> <p>“Corruption is one of the main reasons that have galvanized the grievances of our people in recent years. We have come to learn that it is impossible to combat corruption by merely</p>
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			<p>establishing anti-corruption institutions.</p> <p>I politely ask all of us to do all we can to ensure that Ethiopia won't become a country where one works hard and the other simply snatches it away.” (Abiy Ahmed inaugural address, 2018)</p> <p>“Ethiopia will not become one in which one thinks, let alone be obliged, to steal from another.” (Abiy Ahmed inaugural address, 2018)</p> <p>“we shall work tirelessly day in and day out to combat robbery, wastage of wealth, and fight organized corruption in a manner that will enable all our people to participate.” (Abiy Ahmed inaugural address, 2018)</p> <p>“Facilitating access to finance for small and medium size enterprises; Easing regulations to start business and improving the policy environment (institutional reforms, commercial and investment codes, and other business regulations); Making the private sector an integral part of the economy and opening it to international business (sale of minority shares of state-owned enterprises and reallocation of public expenditure); Encouraging Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs).” (GTPII, 2020)</p> <p>“However, the public investment-driven growth model has reached its limits. The authorities have announced</p>
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			<p>a Homegrown Economic Reform Plan, consisting of a mix of macroeconomic, structural and sectoral policies, to address vulnerabilities and tackle structural bottlenecks inhibiting private sector activity.” (IMF country report, 2020)</p> <p>“In GTP II, due emphasis will be given to the promotion of domestic private sector development in the manufacturing industry. This initiative will be enhanced and supported through engaging the private sector in continuous dialogue with the government, providing predictable incentive packages such as guidance and provision of institutional and regulatory support, access to credit, etc.” (GTP II, 2020, p. 79)</p> <p>“While undertaking the above mentioned tasks during the plan period, transforming currently dominant rent seeking political economy to ensure the hegemony of developmental political economy is a top priority. In this regard, on the one hand, through providing quality supports to strengthening developmental attitudes, and on the other hand, by draining the root sources of rent seeking, controlling corruption and lack of good governance; the supremacy of developmental political economy will</p>
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			<p>be ascertained. To realize this, organised, informed and direct participation of the public will be mobilised. In addition, enabling environment will be created to ensure society's involvement with a sense of ownership, in activities that concern strengthening developmental mind-set." (GTP II, 2020, p. 80)</p> <p>"Increase the productive capacity and efficiency to reach the economy's production possibility frontier through concurrently improving quality, productivity and competitiveness of productive sectors (agriculture and manufacturing industries)" (GTP II, 2020, p. 81)</p> <p>"In addition, support will be provided to private banks and financial institutions to improve the coverage and quality of the financial services that they provide and help them to minimize non- performing loans and improve their profitability." (GPT II, 2020, p. 110)</p> <p>"The authorities' Homegrown Economic Reform Plan, is tailored to meeting critical challenges. The main objectives of the program are to address external imbalances, including the elimination of the real exchange rate overvaluation, reduce debt vulnerabilities by undertaking</p>
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			<p>consolidation of the broader public sector while increasing social spending, tighten monetary conditions to reduce inflation, and implement structural reforms to encourage private sector-led growth.” (IMF country report, 2020, p. 12)</p> <p>“gradually increase the scale of the government’s market-based domestic financing, which will support wider development of the financial sector and private investment” (IMF country report, 2020, p. 12)</p> <p>“The most notable safeguard introduced against corruption in 2020 was the introduction of new bank notes in September. The government announced that all old bank notes were being withdrawn from circulation within three months to fight corruption, embezzlement, and contraband. The new notes have additional design and security features that makes the production of counterfeits very difficult.” (Freedom house score, n. d.)</p> <p>“With the recent cessation of hostilities agreement brokered with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front in November 2022, Abiy has immediately turned his attention to curbing corruption in the country, which he has castigated as a “pest” eating away at the country. A newly established National Anti-</p>
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			<p>Corruption Committee has already launched a crackdown on government officials alleged to be implicated in corrupt schemes.”(Matthew Jenkins, 2023)</p> <p>“Abiy has placed great emphasis on anti-corruption as being a core policy priority. In a recent speech to parliament, he castigated many of country’s institutions as being riddled by corruption, including the judiciary, law enforcement and state auditors.” (Matthew Jenkins, 2023)</p> <p>“the new National Anti-Corruption Committee has been established at ministerial level, with sweeping powers. However, its remit vis-à-vis existing anti-corruption bodies remains unclear, and there are concerns it may be used to target political opponents.” (Matthew Jenkins, 2023)</p> <p>“Ethiopia Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has reiterated his stance on financial transparency in a meeting with top government appointees including members of cabinet.” (Shaban, 2019)</p> <p>“The state-affiliated Fana Broadcasting Corporate reported that the premier disclosed at the meeting that his administration was not going to entertain any issues relating to corruption adding that it was currently investigating foreign bank accounts of</p>
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			<p>some officials.” (Solomon Dibaba, n. d.)</p> <p>“The government launched a home grown national economic plan with is geared towards the social-economic development of the country over the next ten years.” Solomon Dibaba n. d.</p> <p>“Various economic programs including the production of huge amount of wheat through lowland irrigation is being conducted as part of import substitution strategy and food security program of the country.” (Solomon Dibaba, n. d.)</p>
Populations’ use of agency	Governmentality	<p>-smallholder labour or in accord or in opposition to the ideology of the state.</p> <p>- intermediary organisations, such as disciplinary technologies, which control particular spaces, schedules, quotas and other forms of demands upon labour</p>	<p>“rationale: alignment with Urban Development Strategy” (WB, 2021, p. 2)</p> <p>“The PDO was relevant and directly contributed to the government's urban development objectives presented in its Second Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP I, 2015-2020) and the Ethiopian Cities Sustainable Prosperity Goal (2015-2025).” (WB, 2021, p. 2)</p> <p>“The World Bank has supported the government's efforts in decentralization and urban policy since 2000.” (WB 2021, p. 2)</p> <p>“The implementing agency had a team of experts to support program implementation and similar arrangements had been made at the four regions.” (WB, 2020, p. 4)</p>

			<p>“Amhara Region seeks one million daily laborers” (Berhane, 2022)</p> <p>“Agricultural commercialization cluster by government will benefit 5 million Ethiopian smallholder farmers” (The reporter, 2019)</p> <p>Presence of NGOs</p> <p>“Working together, the local government and Habitat Ethiopia have formed a Community Committee to identify the needs of the heavily congested area where residents live in houses built of mud and sheet metal.” (Habitat Ethiopia, n. d.)</p>
	Bridging and bonding ties	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - agents make intentional actions and have the ability to make choices - reinforcement of social norms and providing trust - providing new information sources and creating linkages between various groups, - facilitating vertical links to various levels of government 	<p>“better connectivity, enhanced road safety, created jobs, enhanced incomes, improved road safety.” (WB, 2021, p. 7)</p> <p>“Community members were involved in identifying, prioritizing, and selecting infrastructure projects.” (WB, 2021, p. 8)</p> <p>“participants indicated that as a result of increased business opportunities and jobs, their households were food secure, they were able to pay for their utilities, had accumulated household assets, and had saved and invested in business.” (WB, 2021, p. 8)</p> <p>“The team at the federal level provided support for provision of manuals/guidelines, classroom training and on the job training during field</p>

			<p>visits. The team also provided critical support in reviewing and providing advice on important documents such as the CIPs, AMPs and REPs. The regional mobile teams provided capacity building support to the host region, and also provided capacity building support to the ULGs in the respective regions.” (WB, 2020, p. 9)</p> <p>“The ATA has spent the last two years testing and ramping up the clustering approach on farmland throughout the country. There are now 1.3 million farmers organized in 30,000 clusters across Ethiopia.” (The reporter, 2019)</p> <p>“It succeeded in preventing girls from dropping out of school due to higher rate of repetition, for lack of income, supply of sanitary materials, or insufficient or ineffective basic facilities in schools, physical and emotional abuses, lack of opportunity and space for after school study and life skills etc.” (ECD website, n. d.)</p> <p>“It was able to improve the livelihood of desperately poor parents through facilitation of access to income generation and training opportunities.” (ECD website, n. d.)</p> <p>“Strengthened the capacities of unemployed and underemployed young people, in particular women and enabled them to negotiate for and</p>
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			<p>demand for decent work.” (ECD website, n. d.)</p> <p>“Networking – ICDA-Ethiopia appreciates and encourages a strong bond among development partners. It tries to create networking in a transparent manner with all stakeholders.” (ICDA-Ethiopia website, n. d.)</p> <p>“enable women and men in pastoral communities to identify, prioritize, design, and implement micro-projects.” (WB report, 2020)</p>
	Government through community	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - community participation - empowerment and capacity building - resource allocation and utilisation - social cohesion and inclusivity - policy implementation and impact - feedback mechanisms and accountability - sustainability and long-term viability 	<p>“Phase I focused on building the capacity of 19 ULGs (including the capital Addis Ababa)” (WB, 2020, p. 4)</p> <p>“Phase II focused capacity building needs not just at two but at all three levels of government, 44 local, 4 regional, and one federal agency.” (WB, 2021, p. 4)</p> <p>“The participating ULGs were provided fiscal incentives and technical support to build their capacity and enhance institutional performance to improve the provision of infrastructure investments and related service delivery.” (WB, 2021, p. 5)</p> <p>“In addition, the federal entity implementing the program also provided support in capacity building planning and budgeting to both lower level government entities, i.e., the</p>

			<p>region and the local governments, to boost local government performance. These capacity inputs allowed the local governments to arrive at outputs such as mobilizing own source revenues and increase their investments in infrastructure for their constituents.” (WB, 2021, p. 5)</p> <p>“During implementation, the Regional Procurement Agency would conduct periodic audits of ULG procurement to improve the transparency of the process. The regions carrying out these audits would strengthen the accountability and oversight systems.” (WB, 2021, p. 5)</p> <p>“According to Annex 7 of the ICR, all four regions executed the capacity building plans and obtained full allocations. This output was associated with DLI 4, where regional government capacity building and support teams were in place and support to urban service delivery was undertaken.” (WB, 2021, p. 7)</p> <p>“Regional Procurement Agency audited ULG procurement to enhance transparency in procurement.” (WB, 2021, p. 7)</p> <p>“At the local level, 37 of the participating ULGs implemented at least 80 percent of the budget presented in their respective annual capacity</p>
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			<p>building plans (baseline 0, original target 40, target exceeded)” (WB, 2021, p. 7)</p> <p>“The Task Team Leader and most task team members were based in Addis Ababa” (WB, 2021, p. 11)</p> <p>“the objective was stated simply and offered that enhanced local capacity would deliver improved infrastructure investments” (WB, 2021, p. 12)</p> <p>“Participant ULGs used the M&E products to improve their own performance and informed the implementing agency where capacity gaps needed to be filled.” (WB, 2021, p. 13)</p> <p>“The Government of Ethiopia (GoE) recognizes the institutional and capacity challenges across Ethiopia’s ULGs as well as the importance of ULGs for the country’s growth and development. GOE issued its first Urban Development Policy Note in 2005. In addition, the second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) for 2010/11–2014/15 both emphasized the importance of urban development for the country’s economic growth. Collectively, these documents focused on building the institutional capacity of urban local governments to promote</p>
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			<p>livable urban centers and stimulate overall development.” (WB, 2020, p. 1)</p> <p>“Strengthened accountability and oversight systems. The complaint handling and Fraud and Anti-corruption system is embedded in the program. This is one of the minimum conditions that each city should fulfill each year. The system requires: (i) a legal base; (ii) permanent structure with at least a person in each structure to handle complaints related to the core areas (fraud and corruption, procurement and grievance related to environment and social impact); (iii) recording complaints received and the follow-up measures undertaken; (iv) consolidated reporting on the complaint cases and measures taken.” (WB, 2020, p. 8)</p> <p>“Enhanced Citizen Participation. The culture and system of citizen participation in planning and budgeting was reinforced and improved under ULGDP II. The average score for participation of citizens increased from 76 percent in FY16 to 99 percent in FY19. As a program requirement, community members were involved in the identification, prioritization and selection of infrastructure projects. This had far-reaching impacts including building a sense of community</p>
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			<p>ownership of the established infrastructures to which they provided services such as food for infrastructure builders, space and security for building equipment. Community involvement was also seen as a reflection of good governance at the ULG level. As noted in the Borrower ICR, all the sixteen cities visited during the beneficiary assessment did not only involve community members in the planning, identification, prioritization and selection of projects to be implemented, but also invited community members to witness the handover of the completed infrastructures.” (WB, 2020, p. 8)</p> <p>“Youth, women and persons with disabilities that participated in the construction of cobblestone roads acquired lifetime skills like chiseling and paving. For some, the knowledge and skills obtained laid the foundation for their transition to entrepreneurs or proprietors of MSEs that would independently bid for works.” (WB, 2020, p. 12)</p> <p>“Capacity-building efforts were made to raise awareness and develop capacities of countries and regional institutions on statistical tools for estimating progress made against SDG-2 indicators.” (The reporter, 2020)</p>
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			<p>“empower women to reduce the gender gap” (The reporter, 2020)</p> <p>Home Grown Economy Reform: “Eyob underscored that the government would appropriate finance to the private sector and enhance their participation in the economy while the government maintains its economic role in sectors the private sector avoids.” (Abdu, 2021)</p> <p>“Digital tools provide farmers with direct access to new markets, both locally and globally, as well as to financial services, such as banking and loan facilities, increasing financial inclusion.” (The reporter, 2021)</p> <p>Coca Cola “In Ethiopia, we built a factory, literally in the middle of nowhere, but once other companies saw what we had done, they started looking for investment opportunities themselves. Today, the plant is run by local staff, all of whom are under the age of 30.” (The reporter, 2018)</p> <p>“local suppliers benefit, jobs are created in the community,” (The reporter, 2018)</p> <p>“BBBC in order to attain its strategic objective of reducing prevalence of diseases and malnutrition (Improve Health and Nutrition of the target community) provide capacity building training on health and nutrition, create</p>
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			<p>awareness on health and nutrition and directly provide food for malnourish children and provide access for medical service for the poor sponsored children” (BBBC report, 2022, p. 6)</p> <p>“Thus in the year completed i.e. 2022 BBBC provide capacity building training for 460 on teaching methodology for ECCE teachers, entrepreneurship skill for vocational students, importance of skilled delivery for traditional birth attendants, group leadership for SHG leaders and Apex CBO leaders, ECCE management for ECCE management committee, BEMONC training for mid wives, and on other topics.” (BBBC report, 2022, p. 6)</p> <p>“Training given for 56 elementary teachers on how they can help children towards reading fluency with easy and enjoyable activities, the technique on applying child friendly teaching methodology and successful reading (EGRA)” (BBBC report, 2022, p. 10)</p> <p>“Accountability is the core of the implementation strategy of ECD.” (ECD website, n. d.)</p> <p>“It empowered the community (parents, influential community & religious leaders) to ensure stable abandonment of early marriage.” (ECD website, n. d.)</p>
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			<p>“So many people, particularly the young, have been trained and now have jobs because of Habitat,” (Habitat Ethiopia, n. d.)</p> <p>“Habitat’s inclusive approach is key. Working with the local government and beneficiaries in developing a community makes the difference. And, when you add in culturally sensitive advisory services aimed at improving individual and communal relations, the outcome are villages in Debre Berhan and upgraded neighborhoods like Woreda 8.” (Habitat Ethiopia, n. d.)</p> <p>“Accountability – ICDA-Ethiopia is accountable to the community, government, donors and other partners.” ICDA-Ethiopia website</p> <p>“19 women have been trained in IGA (Income Generation Activities).” (ICDA-Ethiopia website, n. d.)</p> <p>“improve livelihoods and employment opportunities for Eritrean refugees (in and out of camp) and their host communities in Afar.” (CTR report, 2020)</p> <p>“help communities develop modest local development plans” (WB report, 2020)</p>
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