Transnational voices: The capabilities and caveats of diaspora support in influencing resistance campaign success

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I. Introduction

Politics is a transnational phenomenon. As globalisation connects humans through trade, information and technology, nation-states cannot exist in isolation from one another (Beck, 2007, p. 17). Transnational actors, such as diasporas, have greater opportunities than before to stay connected to and be involved with home country politics. Examples of contentious activities that challenge the politics of one country but occur in another include the Woman, Life, Freedom movement in Iran. Sparked by the death of Mahsa Jina Amini in 2022, protests against the regime spread to cities across the world, from Seoul to New York (Wintour, 2022). Additionally, in Germany, the Kurdish diaspora protested against Türkiye's involvement in Syria in 2019 (Winter, 2019). In 2018, the Romanian diaspora travelled from across Europe to participate in anti-corruption protests in Romania itself (Paun, 2018). Recent years are rife with such examples and show that understanding the capabilities and caveats of diaspora support is vital. Therefore, is it possible for diasporas to influence change from abroad?

Despite the recognition of diasporas as political actors in migration studies, the field of contentious politics often disregards diasporas as non-state external actors (de Haas, Castles & Miller, 2020; Saleyhan, Gleditsch & Cunningham, 2011). When researchers do look beyond the nation-state and recognise that resistance campaigns transcend borders, there is a focus on motivations for diaspora support or the role of diasporas in sustaining insurgencies and promoting violence (Adamson, 2013; Biswas, 2001; Fair, 2005). With the exception of Moss (2022), there remains limited literature that investigates the relationship between diaspora support and resistance campaign success. Specifically, there is a lack of quantitative analysis.

In this paper, I argue that diaspora support can influence a resistance campaign's success due to the types of support that diasporas offer and their characteristics. Diasporas provide resistance campaigns with resources and geopolitical support that influence resistance

campaign success through effective broadcasting, representing, brokering, remitting, and volunteering on the frontlines (Moss, 2022). Additionally, diasporas can be considered internal and external actors whose support is more effective than foreign state support (Adamson, 2013, p. 63; Daub, 2023). These arguments can be applied to violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns.

I will first review the existing literature on diasporas, their support for resistance campaigns and resistance campaign success. Thereafter, I will present the theoretical framework to support my argument as well as the conceptualisation of my main variables. I briefly describe the Ukrainian Orange Revolution, which occurred from November 2004 to January 2005 to provide an anecdotal example. In the research design, I will justify the datasets and the estimation strategy used for my quantitative regression analysis and operationalise the main variables. Subsequently, I present the results and interpretations of my analysis. I find that diaspora support increases the likelihood of a resistance campaign's *partial success*, rather than its *full success*. Finally, I conclude with the academic and societal implications of my paper, its limitations, and avenues for future research.

II. Literature review

Traditionally, migration studies scholars have viewed migrants as incapable of influencing political change from abroad. Hirschman (1970) categorised 'voice' and 'exit' as mutually-exclusive actions available to discontented citizens. Dissidents can 'voice' their concerns within a regime, for example through protest, or they can 'exit' the regime, forfeiting their ability to engage in contentious actions. This is similar to the 'safety valve' argument, namely that governments will use migration as a tool to ensure regime stability (de Haas et al., 2020, p. 333). If discontented citizens threaten to overthrow the regime, migration alleviates this threat and can ensure the incumbent government's survival (p. 229).

However, in recent years, migration studies have moved away from these concepts and have recognised that migrants can dissent from abroad and influence change (de Haas et al., 2020; van Hear, 2003). For example, diasporas were key actors in Kosovan independence or the Tamil Tiger insurgency, often making governments conscious in controlling their diasporas (de Haas et al., 2020, p. 229). This may include attempts at transnational repression, for example through threats, surveillance or the punishment of relatives in home countries (Moss, 2016, p. 485). Although migration studies literature situates diasporas in the context of contentious politics, it offers limited empirical explanations on the impact that diasporas have on resistance campaigns, such as a campaign's success.

Consequently, attention should be shifted towards the strand of contentious politics literature, which offers extensive empirical analyses of resistance campaign success. The majority of scholars agree that organisational factors, such as the leadership structure, and environmental factors, such as the political context, determine the outcomes of a resistance campaign (Amenta, Caren, Chiarello & Su, 2010; Cress & Snow, 2000; Young, 2020). For example, diverse leaders or higher levels of democracy increase a resistance campaign's likelihood of success (Amenta et al., 2010). Nevertheless, these explanations assume that contentious politics happen in a vacuum and they fail to account for the role of external influences.

As an exception, other scholars have acknowledged the role of external state support in resistance campaigns (Karlén, 2022; Klein & Regan, 2018). For example, state decision-making can be affected by the threat of external interventions (Klein & Regan, 2018). Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) also find that foreign state sponsorship increases a nonviolent campaign's likelihood of success by three-times compared to violent campaigns. Nevertheless, limitations to the research on resistance campaign success persist due to a state-centric focus on external support (Salehyan, 2011). Non-state actors can influence external state support and need to be seen as independent supporters that change conflict dynamics (Cunningham,

Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2013; Meier, Pettersson, Karlén & Croicu, 2023; Salehyan, Gleditsch & Cunningham, 2011).

Some researchers have advanced the literature on external diaspora support by focusing on their reasons and motivations (Biswas, 2004; Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau, Brannan, 2001; Moss, 2020). Diasporas engage in politics because they want to maintain their identity and their personal connections towards their home country (Biswas, 2004, p. 271; Byman et al., 2001, p. 55; Shain, 2002, p. 128). Politics affect kinship groups, making diasporas act for ideological and communal reasons as well as feelings of guilt (Byman et al., 2001, pp. 55-56). Additionally, politics affect the future of the home country, evoking interest for diaspora members wanting to return (Biswas, 2004, p. 271; Shain & Barth, 2003, p. 455). As organisations, diasporas have further motivations to support resistance campaigns. For example, providing support gives diaspora organisations a focal point of activity and can guarantee its survival due to prestige and funding opportunities (Biswas, 2004, p. 271; Shain, 2022, pp. 132-133; Shain & Barth, 2003, p. 456).

Moreover, a diaspora's motivation to support campaigns can be influenced by external and internal factors. External factors are determined by the environment where the diaspora is situated, including campaign needs, geopolitical support, access to the front lines and repression (Moss, 2016; Moss, 2020). Internal factors are determined by the organisational characteristics of the diaspora, including the degree of a diaspora's integration in their host country, female combatant participation and a diaspora's amount of resources (Bird, 2022; Manekin & Wood, 2020; Moss, 2020). Although it is clear why diasporas may support a resistance campaign in their home country and which factors influence this, this research fails to analyse the influence of diaspora support on a resistance campaign's success.

When diaspora support and campaign success are linked, there is an overwhelming body of research focusing on civil wars and insurgencies. Insurgencies, such as the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) or the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), often rely upon diaspora support as they are transnational actors (Fair, 2005, p. 139; Salehyan et al., 2011, p. 719). Fair (2005) and Adamson (2013) have extensively analysed how diasporas offer material and non-material support to the LTTE and PKK. Furthermore, Byman et al. (2001) linked diaspora support for insurgencies with its impact on fulfilling insurgent requirements vital for success. These findings have motivated scholars to compile datasets, which examine non-state actors in the context of armed conflicts (Cunningham et al., 2013; Meier et al., 2023).

Regarding the effect of diasporas, most scholars agree that diaspora support leads to negative and violent outcomes (Biswas, 2004; Brouwer & Van Wijk, 2013; Salehyan, 2011). Diasporas can increase the chance of conflict repetition and prevent conflict termination, risking an increase in higher fatalities and conflict escalation (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Daub, 2023, p. 204; Salehyan et al., p. 710; Sawyer, Cunningham & Reed, 2017). Other scholars offer more nuanced understandings of the impact of diasporas by considering their role in peace-making and conflict resolution (Shain, 2002; Smith & Stares, 2007). However, by focusing on civil wars and insurgencies, the findings are biased and cannot account for diaspora support for nonviolent campaigns (Petrova, 2019, p. 2156). When analysing processes of contentious politics, scholars call upon the consideration of violent and nonviolent campaigns (Moss, 2022; Petrova, 2019; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008).

Some literature has rectified these shortcomings. For example, Petrova (2019) offers a quantitative analysis that considers the impact of diaspora support on violent and nonviolent tactics. However, the author does not draw a direct link to campaign success. Moss' (2022) research is one of the only studies that directly links diaspora support and a resistance campaign's success. Moss (2022) contributes to the existing literature by using interviews,

ethnographic participant observations and secondary data on the Arab Spring uprisings to argue that diasporas can influence a resistance campaign's success from abroad. Despite the author's extensive analysis of the mechanisms that lead to diaspora support and the conditions which determine 'impactful interventions', there remains the need for a quantitative analysis that considers both nonviolent and violent resistance campaigns across the world. Therefore, this paper will aim to answer the following research question.

What is the effect of diaspora support on a resistance campaign's success?

III. Theoretical discussion

The concept of a diaspora is contested and has changed throughout history (Grossman, 2019, p. 1264). The majority of scholars agree that diaspora members have been dispersed to various destinations outside of their own or their ancestor's home country, and have a shared identity (Bruneau, 2010, p. 36; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2021, p. 16; Cohen, 2022, p. 1; Grossman, 2019, p. 1267). Whilst traditional definitions argue that diaspora populations are forcibly dispersed, this paper also considers diasporas who voluntarily emigrated (Bruneau, 2010, p. 36; Grossman, 2019, p. 1267). Additionally, diasporas maintain ties to and identify with their home countries, whether real or symbolic (Biswas, 2004, p. 269; Salehyan, 2011, p. 33; Shain & Barth, 2003, p. 452). Consequently, diasporas are often politically engaged, mobilise for or against home country policies and participate in home country elections (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2021; Cohen, 2022; Salehyan, 2011, p. 33-34; Grossman, 2019, p. 1273). Moss (2022, p. 139) identifies five different types of diaspora support in resistance campaigns: broadcasting, representing, brokering, remitting and volunteering on the front lines.

Stephan and Chenoweth's (2008) research on resistance campaign success offers valuable definitions. A resistance campaign is "a series of observable, continuous tactics in pursuit of a political objective" (p. 16). A campaign is successful when it has had a discernible effect on

the achievement of its stated objective (p. 17). Partial success, for example through achieving significant concessions or representation, and failure are other potential outcomes (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008, p. 17; Amenta et al., 2010, p. 290; Cress & Snow, 2000, p. 1066). Resistance campaigns can have direct and indirect outcomes (Young, 2020, p. 900; Cress & Snow, 2000, p. 1065). However, this paper will focus on the direct outcomes, which are defined as the "goals, claims and demands of a movement or known as intended consequences" (Young, 2020, p. 900), as they are measurable and in line with the definition of a campaign's success.

I will begin my argument by explaining how diasporas mobilise. Some forms of diaspora support, such as financial contributions, can stem from the individual resources of diaspora members and do not rely upon diaspora mobilisation. Other forms, such as garnering geopolitical support or protesting, depend on the collective resources of multiple members or the diaspora organization. This requires diasporas to overcome the collective action problem. According to the theory of quotidian disruption, diaspora groups are incentivised to come together when changes to the everyday lives of their families and friends in the home country occur (Moss, 2022). This alters their own cost-benefit analysis, which previously associated expressing dissent with high costs, such as risking peoples' livelihoods (p. 95). However, the presence of a resistance campaign lowers the cost of speaking out because activists and protesters are already at risk (p. 95).

Furthermore, witnessing home country activists partake in a resistance campaign influences diaspora mobilization. These activists can be considered as 'first movers' who invoke diasporas' desire to express their moral identity through multiple identity-based mechanisms (Pearlman, 2016). Diasporas exhibit dissent to increase their self-respect and agency, being motivated by their identities and values as well as the perception of courageous 'first movers'. Additionally, the sense of obligation to act can be particularly strong among a diaspora, as they are protected by their geographical position outside the home country. These mechanisms also

refer to emotions of obligation, nationalism, and kinship, which resistance campaigns themselves use as a tool for framing (Adamson, 2013, p. 70). Framing is "an active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614), helping resistance campaigns to overcome the collective action problem. Framing can be particularly effective among diasporas, as members often perceive themselves as being excluded by their host country, seeking a sense of belonging elsewhere (Adamson, 2013, p. 77).

An important addition is that the presence of home country conflicts is likely to lead to political and identity divisions within the diaspora (Moss, 2022, p. 95). How diasporas resolve this issue depends on the tactics of the resistance campaign. In nonviolent campaigns, diasporas unite due to the effects of quotidian disruption, finding common ground in protecting the livelihoods of their friends and families, who may face violence and repression (p. 95). In contrast, violent campaigns engage in ethnic outbidding (Adamson, 2013, p. 70). These campaigns use violence to suppress competing groups and claim themselves as the singular representative of the diaspora identity to obtain diaspora support (pp. 71, 80).

Once the collective action problem is overcome, diasporas contribute to the success of nonviolent and violent resistance campaigns through resources and geopolitical support (Moss, 2022; Adamson, 2013). Resources can take various interconnected forms, including transnational network ties, which increase the size of the campaign's network and connect them with other campaigns and organisations (Moss, 2022, p. 176; Adamson, 2013, p. 85). Networks can also decrease the costs of broadcasting information for dissidents, for example by sending files to diasporas that disseminate the information (Moss, 2022, p. 176). Diaspora-led media initiatives aid a campaign's success by sharing core messages, such as the notion of Khalistan as the Sikh homeland (Byman et al., 2001, p. 45; Daub, 2023, p. 209; Fair, 2005, p. 133). For the PKK, information centres across Europe help to engage more people in dissident activities

(Adamson, 2013, p. 85). Examples of media channels include the US Radio Martí station opposing the Castro regime in Cuba and members of the Iranian diaspora that have created more than eight opposition media channels (Salehyan, 2011, p. 36).

Moreover, transnational network ties are needed to create channels for remittances (Moss, 2022, p. 177, 188). This is the main form of material capital that diasporas offer due to their higher relative wealth (Brouwer & van Wijk, 2013, p. 845; Fair, 2005, p. 132; Salehyan, 2011, p. 36). Financial resources can also be garnered through other means, such as fundraising or diaspora investments in business, real estate or products that are linked to the resistance campaign or its members (Byman et al., 2001, p. 49; Daub, 2023, p. 208; Fair, 2005, p. 132). For violent resistance campaigns, financial resources are vital to provide arms and recruits (Adamson, 2013; Byman et al., 2001; Daub, 2023). They may use extortion and coercion, which encompasses the provision of protection money, people smuggling and the corruption of diaspora members' asylum process, whereby external state support for asylum seekers is forcibly redirected to finance campaigns (Adamson, 2013, p. 83; Byman et al., 2001, p. 49; Daub, 2023, p. 208).

Beyond money, material capital includes the recruitment of fighters, doctors or lawyers to aid the movement (Moss, 2022, pp.183-184, 187). In addition, forms of social capital, such as sharing skills and experiences that professionalise the campaign are also provided as resources (Daub, 2023, p. 204; Moss, 2022, p. 197). For example, diasporas can report on events or act as translators (Moss, 2022, p. 204). In nonviolent campaigns, diasporas are more likely to provide technical assistance and training, knowledge on tactics, medicine or communication (Moss, 2022, pp. 185-186; Petrova, 2019, p. 2163). For these campaigns, the dissemination of information and engagement of the media is a valuable form of assistance (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2021, p. 58). Overall, as resource mobilisation theories suggest, larger amounts of

resources, whether material or social capital, increase a campaign's chance of success (Young, 2020, p. 901).

Nevertheless, although resources from diasporas can contribute to a campaign's success, diasporas do not operate on a silo, independently from other actors (Moss, 2022, p. 202). Diasporas engage geopolitical support from states, media, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and multilateral bodies, such as the United Nations (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Moss, 2022). Foreign state support is vital for a campaign's success as they often have higher capacities and act as gatekeepers to diasporas' abilities to remit and volunteer (Moss, 2022, p. 202; Salehyan et al., 2011). If states are unwilling to offer external support, NGOs can apply political pressure through the 'boomerang effect' (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Many diasporas, such as the Kurdish diaspora in Europe or the Sri Lankan diaspora in Canada, engage in lobbying in their country of residence (Adamson, 2013; Fair, 2005). They aim to influence the state's foreign policy in support of the resistance campaign by meeting with politicians or signing petitions (Adamson, 2013, p. 85; Daub, 2023, p. 208; Salehyan, 2011, p. 36). Increasing a campaign's legitimacy and international recognition is another consequence of diaspora lobbying, which creates an identity-based issue (Byman et al., 2001, p. 47; Daub, 2023, p. 209).

Moving beyond the types of diaspora support, I argue that diasporas are also conducive to a resistance campaign's success due to their unique characteristic as external and internal actors (Adamson, 2013, p. 63). This distinguishes them from actors who operate within one state and decreases their costs of dissent, such as repression (Asal, Legault, Szekely & Wilkenfeld, 2013, p. 310). Diasporas benefit from being "beyond any state's legal, political, and coercive reach" (Salehyan, 2011, p. 34). Nation-states face higher costs and constraints to their repression or surveillance (Asal et al., 2013, p. 310; Salehyan, 2011, pp. 20, 35-36). If diasporas face costly transnational repression during a resistance campaign, violence against family and friends, a sense of obligation and threats without action fail to deter their support (Moss, 2016, p. 480).

Shain and Barth (2003) reflect this sentiment by stating that diasporas are "geographically outside the state, but identity-wise perceived (by themselves, the homeland, or others) as 'inside the people'" (p. 451). This echoes the concept of an 'imagined political community' that reaches beyond borders and across territories (Anderson, 2006).

Furthermore, due to the fundamental differences of diaspora support compared to foreign state support, diasporas are more influential and more likely to contribute to a campaign's success (Petrova, 2019). These differences can be broadly attributed to their organisational and spatial characteristics, whereby diasporas are deterritorialised networks and states are territorialised institutions (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007, p. 497). Nevertheless, both actors share similarities because they have an interest in the resistance campaign's success and offer resources, including legitimacy (Petrova, 2019, pp. 2156, 2159). Daub (2023) proposes an insightful framework for the differences between diasporas and states.

States are motivated by their strategic self-interest, concerned with threats to the international order or their sphere of influence (Daub, 2023, p. 205; Petrova, 2019, p. 2161). In contrast, diaspora motivations are less strategic (Daub, 2023, p. 205). They are driven by their personal connections to resistance campaigns, drawing upon feelings of identity, sympathy and guilt. Their differences in motivations make diasporas a more reliable and less risky external supporter because states are more likely to change their degree of support depending on geopolitical shifts or changes in priorities (Byman et al., 2001, p. 102; Daub, 2005, p. 205). Motivations can be connected to another difference, namely states' focus on short-term solutions and diaspora's focus on long-term solutions (Daub, 2005, p. 205). Short-term solutions, tend to sacrifice civilians, create distressing environments and decrease chances of success (Daub, 2023, p. 205; Petrova, 2019, p. 2162). However, long-term solutions are important due to a diaspora's interest in returning or the wellbeing of their family and friends, contributing to a campaign's success (Daub, 2023, p. 205; Petrova, 2019, pp. 2162-2163).

Moreover, states and diasporas tend to offer different types of support. Whilst states often offer direct military support, diasporas are more likely to offer financial support or manpower (Daub, 2023, p. 205). Importantly, if diaspora-supported campaigns fight against actors with foreign state support, they are also less likely to succeed (Byman et al., 2001, pp. 59-60). Nonetheless, whilst the provision of resources such as safe havens or weapons is important, specifically for violent resistance campaigns, financial support can be used to provide these resources (Adamson, 2013; Byman et al., 2001; Daub, 2023). In addition, diasporas can provide technical assistance and knowledge as well as geopolitical support, which increases the campaign's capabilities of utilising provided resources for violent and nonviolent purposes (Daub, 2023, p. 205; Petrova, 2019, p. 2163).

To illustrate my theoretical argument, I will use the example of the Ukrainian Orange Revolution from November 2004 to January 2005. In November 2004, Viktor Yanukovych was declared President despite undemocratic elections (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2021, p. 24). The Ukrainian diaspora lobbied the US Congress and NGOs, spread information via Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty and decreased the costs of broadcasting for dissidents by publishing information and sending it to Ukraine (Koinova, 2009, p. 51). They garnered international support, which was vital, given Russia's support of the incumbent government (p. 54). Additionally, diaspora members raised money for the independence campaign and acted as election monitors and protesters (Koinova, 2009, p. 56; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2021, p. 26, 28). Following mass dissent and support from the Ukrainian diaspora, another round of voting took place in December 2004 under domestic and international monitoring (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2021, p. 24). Consequently, Viktor Yushchenko was democratically voted as the Ukrainian President (p. 24). These events contribute to my argument that diasporas can influence resistance campaign success through material and social capital resources whilst engaging geopolitical support. Although the Orange Revolution is an example of a nonviolent

resistance campaign, my argument pertains to both nonviolent and violent campaigns. I acknowledge that the type of campaign determines its requirements, suggesting that success is influenced through different mechanisms. The differences relating to diaspora mobilisation and the provision of resources were explained above. Therefore, the following hypothesis can be formulated.

H_1: Diaspora support increases the likelihood of a resistance campaign's success.

IV. Research design

To test the above hypothesis, I will use a large-N quantitative regression analysis. The Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) data project 2.1 provides the main variables for my analysis (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019). NAVCO 2 contains data on "384 nonviolent and violent mass movements for regime change, anti-occupation, and secession from 1945 to 2013" (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019, p. 2). Variables on the influence of external actors, specifically of diaspora groups, which are not available from other datasets or from NAVCO 1 and 3, are also included.

To measure a resistance campaign's success, I differentiate between the two dependent variables (DV) of *full success* and *partial success.* NAVCO 2.1 uses its 'success' variable to describe "whether the campaign achieved at least one stated, maximalist goal within 1 calendar year of its end date" (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019, p. 26). It is a binary variable, with campaign success coded as 1 and other outcomes coded as 0. This variable will be used as the DV of *full success*. Nonetheless, Amenta et al. (2010) argue that this operationalisation of success is biased towards campaigns with a single political goal and excludes other political achievements. For example, Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) differentiate between success, failure and limited success, which includes concessions, to create a more comprehensive DV.

The categorical 'progress' variable of NAVCO 2.1 captures this nuance by describing "whether the campaign achieved some or all of its stated overall political objectives" (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019, p. 26). Tactical and operational progress are excluded from this definition and five categories of progress are created. The variable is coded as 0 if the 'status quo' is upheld. 'Visible gains short of concessions' are coded as 1 and describe regime changes that indirectly affect campaigns, such as increasing political openness. 'Limited concessions' describe instances when the regime makes verbal concessions towards the campaign without taking further action, which is coded as 2. If there are "policy changes, the removal of state leaders or the instigation of negotiations with the opposition" (p. 26), these are considered 'significant concessions' and are coded as 3. This differs from 'complete success', which is coded as 4 and matches the 'success' variable. Finally, campaign 'failure' is coded as 5. With the 'progress' variable, I create a new binary variable named *partial success*. I code 1 to include the categories of 'complete success' and 'significant concessions'. I do not consider 'limited concessions' as a successful outcome, because this change lacks any real implementation. Consequently, cases of 'limited concessions', 'status quo', 'visible gains short of concessions' and 'failure' are coded as 0.

For my independent variable (IV) of *diaspora support*, I use the variable of 'dias_support', which describes "whether or not the campaign has support from diaspora communities living in countries other than the location country" (Chenoweth & Shay, 2019, p. 24). This is a binary variable, with campaigns that receive diaspora support taking the value of 1 and campaigns without diaspora support taking the value of 0. Unknown cases are coded as -99, which are recoded into system-missing values. Diasporas are defined in line with my conceptualisation, namely groups with a shared identity that do not live in their home country. It should be noted that this variable only measures material support provided by diasporas. Nevertheless, this

should not be problematic, as my theoretical expectation predicts that the provision of material capital compared to social capital does not lead to a divergent outcome.

Furthermore, I include multiple control variables that may affect the success of a resistance campaign. Firstly, I use the binary variable of 'prim_method' to control for *campaign tactics.* This codes primarily violent campaigns as 0 and nonviolent campaigns as 1. Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) argue that using nonviolent tactics increases the likelihood of a campaign's success compared to using violent tactics. Secondly, the *number of participants (in millions)* uses the 'total_part' variable to measure the number of campaign participants over one year. Due to the large size of this variable, I divide it by 1,000,000, which increases the ability to interpret the regression coefficients. This control could influence a campaign's outcome, as resource mobilisation theorists explain that participants are an important form of resources (Young, 2020, p. 901).

For the other control variables, I introduce the V-Dem v14 dataset, which measures levels of democracy as well as other characteristics across countries from 1789 to 2023 (Coppedge et al., 2019). Many scholars argue that democracy levels determine the political context of resistance campaigns and – although not necessarily linear – different levels of democracy determine the costs and benefits of repression and concession (Amenta et al., 2010, p. 290; Davenport, 2007, p. 11; Young, 2020, p. 902). Therefore, I will measure the *level of democracy* using V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index, 'v2x_polyarchy'. This is a continuous measure between 0 and 1, that compiles democracy indices, with higher values representing higher levels of democracy. Moreover, 'e_gdppc' and 'e_pop' measure the *GDP per capita* and *population size* of the country where the resistance campaign takes place. These variables are included as they can influence the external conditions of resistance campaigns (Petrova, 2019, p. 2172). However, due to their skewed distribution, I re-code these variables using a log

transformation. Finally, the analysis will use fixed effects to control for variations across campaigns and time.

The unit of analysis is campaign-year because diaspora support is conditional on the specific campaign, and this support can change over time (Cunningham et al., 2013; Fair, 2005; Karlén, 2022; Meieret al., 2023). Existing literature has shown that external support, whether from the state or from diasporas can vary, for example, Sri Lankan Tamil diasporas decreased support for the Tamil Eelam movements, specifically after 9/11 (Fair, 2005, p. 146). Reasons for this change could be attributed to different leadership, gaining territories, organisational characteristics, or signs that support is not having its intended effects (Cunningham et al., 2013, p. 524; Karlén, 2022, p. 74).

This paper uses Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression as its main estimation strategy. I acknowledge that the DV is binary, which suggests the use of a logistic regression. However, Angrist and Pischke (2009) explain that non-linear probability models, such as logistic regressions, make assumptions about the distribution of data, whilst linear probability models, such as OLS, make assumptions about the distribution of residuals. Whilst non-linear models may increase the conditional expectation function (CEF) fit for binary DVs, this is not necessary, because the estimates need to be converted into marginal effects for interpretation. Marginal effects do not need to fit the CEF and face complexities that can increase the likelihood of bias. The authors argue that linear models are robust and can be used for causal analysis regardless of the DV. Nevertheless, I include the results of a logistic regression in Appendix A as a robustness check. In line with Angrist and Pischke's (2009) argument, these results do not yield any significant differences with my main findings.

V. Results analysis

Table 1. OLS regression on the effect of diaspora support on a resistance campaign's success

	without fixed effects		with fixed effects	
	full success	partial success	full success	partial success
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**
(Constant)	0.144***	0.226***	0.468	1.874*
	(0.025)	(0.036)	(0.560)	(0.863)
Diaspora support (Ref. = No support)				
Support	-0.008	0.011	-0.016	0.098**
	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.034)
Number of participants (in millions)	0.016*	0.035***	0.009	0.041***
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Campaign tactics (Ref. = Violent)				
Nonviolent	0.162***	0.228***	0.026	0.037
	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.029)	(0.044)
Level of democracy	0.048	0.023	0.009	-0.081
	(0.027)	(0.039)	(0.051)	(0.079)
GDP per capita (logged)	-0.014*	-0.015	-0.133***	-0.120*
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.032)	(0.049)
Population size (logged)	-0.015***	-0.018***	-0.144	-0.231*
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.075)	(0.115)
R^2	0.092	0.092	0.568	0.519
Adj. R^2	0.090	0.089	0.460	0.398
N	2047	2047	2047	2047

*Note: OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in brackets. ***p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, *p < 0.05*

Table 1 presents the results of my estimation strategy, which is divided into four models. Model 1 includes the DV of *full success* as well as the IV of *diaspora support* and the control variables. In Model 2, the DV is *partial success* whilst the other variables are the same as in Model 1. Models 3 and 4 replicate the first two models with the addition of fixed effects. Therefore, *full success* is the DV in Model 3 and *partial success* is the DV in Model 4. Control variables are found in both models. In Appendix B, I present the descriptive statistics for the variables included in the regression and histograms for *full success, partial success* and *diaspora support.*

Regarding the OLS assumptions, all models are homoscedastic and have independent errors. In all models, the assumption of linearity is violated, however, this violation can be attributed to the binary DV (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). In addition, all models violate the assumption of normality, which is also considered unproblematic due to the large sample size of the regression. Models 1 and 3 have < 5% outliers and no influential cases, as Cook's distance is < 1. In contrast, Model 2 has > 5% outliers and Cook's distance is > 1, which I recognize as a potential source of bias. In Model 3, > 5% of the cases are outliers but Cook's distance is < 1, indicating that the outliers are not influential cases. Moreover, in Models 1 and 2, multicollinearity is not an issue, because Tolerance is > 0.2 and VIF is < 5. In Models 3 and 4, multicollinearity is present in some variables. Nevertheless, this violation is considered unproblematic, as it is likely due to the fixed effects dummies and the main IV of *diaspora support* does not have multicollinearity issues.

In Model 1, the presence of diaspora support leads to a -0.008 decrease in a resistance campaign's success when holding all other variables constant. However, this effect is statistically insignificant using a 95% significance test ($t = -0.813$, $p = 0.416$). Therefore, Model 1 fails to reject the null hypothesis that diaspora support has no effect on the likelihood of a resistance campaign's success. The model offers low explanatory power, explaining 9% of the variance among resistance campaign success (Adj. $R^2 = 0.090$). Model 2 shows that diaspora

support increases a resistance campaign's success by 0.011. Whilst the direction of the effect is different from Model 1, the estimated coefficient is also statistically insignificant (t = 0.774, p = 0.439). Model 2 fails to reject the null hypothesis and offers limited explanatory power, explaining 8.9% of the variation in a resistance campaign's success (Adj. $R^2 = 0.089$). Similarly to Model 1, Model 3 shows that diaspora support leads to a -0.016 decrease in a resistance campaign's success. This effect is statistically insignificant (t = -0.719, p = 0.472). Consequently, this model fails to reject the null hypothesis. Model 3 explains 46% of the variance among resistance campaign success, which means that by including fixed effects and *full success* as the DV, this model has the highest explanatory power (Adj. $R^2 = 0.46$). In contrast to the other models, Model 4 supports my hypothesis. The presence of diaspora support leads to a 0.098 increase in a resistance campaign's success, which is statistically significant using a 95% significance test (t = 2.931, p = 0.003). Model 4 offers a higher explanatory power than Models 1 and 2, whilst it is slightly lower than Model 3, explaining 39.8% of the variation in a resistance campaign's success (Adj. $R^2 = 0.398$).

Thus the analysis yields two major findings. First, the inclusion of fixed effects increases a model's explanatory power drastically. Therefore, the effect of diaspora support varies across time and campaigns. For example, over time, generational differences can emerge within diasporas. Research argues that second-generation members are more likely to face difficulties that prevent the provision of support to resistance campaigns due to fewer ties and relations with the campaign compared to first-generation members (Byman et al., 2001, p. 101). Another example, regarding changes across time, which was previously mentioned, explains how the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora significantly changed their support post-9/11 (Fair, 2005, p. 146). Moreover, campaigns differ across many dimensions, which can determine how diaspora support is effectively implemented (Fair, 2005). Some campaigns, such as the Karen National

Union (KNU), have minority member diasporas that are constrained in their support compared to majority member diasporas (Brouwer & van Wijk, 2013).

Second, the differentiation between *full success* and *partial success* is influential in estimating the effect of diaspora support on the likelihood of a resistance campaign's success. On the one hand, the results of Models 1, 2 and 3 are not consistent with my theoretical expectations. The provision of diaspora support in the forms of resources and geopolitical support does not have an effect on a resistance campaign's *full success*. If diasporas are not an effective actor in contentious politics, this still calls into question the negative and violent influence often attributed to diasporas by previous scholars. On the other hand, the results show that diaspora support can increase the likelihood of a resistance campaign's *partial success*, which is considered consistent with my theoretical expectations. Diasporas can influence the achievement of significant concessions, resulting from their focus on long-term solutions (Daub, 2023, p. 205). Compared to achieving full success, which may seem unlikely or impossible, diasporas may strive for policy change or the removal of politicians as a more realistic way to influence change. Significant concessions can pave the way for *full success* and are better than failure or a lack of change.

Turning to the control variables, Model 4 suggests that an increase in the *number of participants (in millions)* increases a campaign's success by 0.041, which is a statistically significant finding ($t = 3.850$, $p < 0.001$). This finding is similar across Models 1 and 2. An increase in *GDP per capita* leads to a -0.120 decrease in a campaign's success. This effect is statistically significant ($t = -2.467$, $p = 0.014$). Only Model 2 does not find a statistically significant effect. Higher *population size* decreases a campaign's success by -0.231, which is statistically significant ($t = -1.999$, $p = 0.046$). In this case, only Model 3 does not find a statistically significant effect. Interestingly, all coefficients in Model 3 are statistically insignificant, except for *GDP per capita*, which leads to a statistically significant decrease in a campaign's success by -0.133 (t

= -4.195, $p < 0.001$). Moreover, the results find that the *level of democracy* does not have an effect on a resistance campaign's success. In Models 1 and 2, which do not use fixed effects, the use of nonviolent *campaign tactics* increases a resistance campaign's success (Model 1: $t = 12.194$, $p = 0.015$; Model 2: $t = 11.797$, $p < 0.001$). However, in Models 3 and 4, which use fixed effects, *campaign tactics* do not have an effect on a campaign's success (Model 3: $t = 0.896$, $p = 0.371$; Model 4: $t = 0.828$, $p = 0.408$).

VI. Conclusion

This paper demonstrates that diasporas can be influential actors in contentious politics. Despite examples of diaspora support for resistance campaigns, the influence of their support remained unclear within previous literature. The empirical analysis' results confirm my hypothesis that diaspora support increases the likelihood of a resistance campaign's success. Nevertheless, the findings point to important caveats, showing that diaspora support positively influences the achievement of *partial success*, but does not have an effect on *full success*. Additionally, the impact of diaspora support depends on the time and the campaign. These findings have multiple implications for academics and societal actors.

Firstly, scholars of contentious politics need to adopt a transnational perspective on processes of mobilisation and repression (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Moss, 2022). As transnational actors, diasporas are a product of globalisation. Therefore, the incorporation of diasporas not only reveals insights for their role but also illustrates the influence of globalisation on politics. This could lead to new findings in other areas of political science. Moreover, researchers should be wary of the concept of diasporas as promoters of war or peace (Moss, 2022; Petrova, 2019). This black-and-white categorisation limits a nuanced understanding of diaspora activities that influence more than a resistance campaign's use of tactics (Smith & Stares, 2007, p. 13).

Secondly, activists should increase collaboration with diaspora members and organisations to form a mutual and symbiotic relationship. Importantly, this means that the primary actors of resistance campaigns remain the home country activists who should determine the extent of external involvement (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2021, p. 81; Smith & Stares, 2007, p. 13). From the information that diasporas receive to their expertise on their home country, foreign states, NGOs and resistance campaigns can increase their understanding of the situation and increase the effectiveness of their own actions through diasporas. For example, Petrova (2019, p. 2173) suggests that diasporas can engage in conflict management, which can benefit foreign states with international stability or prevent humanitarian crises for NGOs. To draw upon these benefits, policy makers need to reduce barriers to diaspora support, for example by securing remittance and information channels or ensuring mobility. However, if diasporas become increasingly involved in home country politics, host countries should be aware of the threats that may emerge (Moss, 2022, p. 226). Home countries may view diaspora support as threats and find possibilities to enhance their capability of transnational repression (p. 226).

Despite the relevant implications of this paper, there are multiple limitations that should be addressed. Previous research warns that resistance campaigns that are perceived to have higher chances of success attract higher levels of external support, which could suggest that the findings on diaspora support are biased (Byman et al., 2001, p. 89). Additionally, this paper does not consider how the host country of a diaspora could impact a diaspora's capabilities to contribute to a campaign's success (Moss, 2022, p. 232). Specific diasporas may be framed as security threats and face high barriers to their support or the standing of the host country in the global order could affect the ability to draw on geopolitical support (pp. 202, 232).

The main limitation of this paper stems from data availability regarding the IV of *diaspora support*. The variable is binary, which means that it cannot differentiate between the effects of high and low levels of support. One could speculate that low levels of support can affect *partial*

success whilst having no effect on *full success*. In turn, higher levels could be more likely to affect *full success*. Whether the measurement of the IV biased the findings remains unclear. Furthermore, whilst the fixed effects models control for differences between campaigns, scholars have called upon a disaggregation within and between diaspora movements (Daub, 2023). Factors such as the migration process, repression in the home country, or political opposition, lead to differences in diaspora support (Adamson, 2013, p. 68). In addition, diaspora members and diaspora organisations could have contradictory roles (Moss, 2019, p. 1689; Smith & Stares, 2007, p. 10). Hierarchies and inequalities could influence the ability of specific actors to influence a resistance campaign's success without broader support from the diaspora group.

Consequently, research should encourage extensive data collection on diaspora support in contentious politics in the future. This includes creating continuous variables and disaggregating between host countries of the diaspora, sources of support within the diaspora and organisational characteristics. As a result, researchers could analyse how these factors influence the impact of diaspora support on resistance campaign success. Furthermore, by collecting data on various types of support, such as technical or symbolic support, rather than only material support, conclusions could be drawn on which types of diaspora support are the most effective in influencing success (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2021, p. 84). Further future avenues of research include the interaction between diaspora support and other variables, such as repression or campaign goals, and the effect they may have on a resistance campaign's success (p. 84).

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Appendix A: Robustness check

Table 2. Logistic regression analysis on the effect of diaspora support on a resistance campaign's success

	without fixed effects		with fixed effects	
	full success **Model 1**	partial success **Model 2**	full success **Model 3**	partial success **Model 4**
(Constant)	-1.225*	-0.991**	317.691	-13.261
	(0.510)	(0.345)	(396250.132)	(72306.566)
Diaspora support (Ref. = No support)				
Support	-0.215	0.095	-27.424	2.190***
	(0.215)	(0.142)	(2953.989)	(0.650)
Number of participants (in millions)	0.158*	0.182**	6.359	0.629***
	(0.070)	(0.069)	(2890.331)	(0.193)
Campaign tactics (Ref. = Violent)				
Nonviolent	2.241***	1.632***	8.150	-0.670
	(0.227)	(0.157)	(8197.230)	(0.765)
Level of democracy	0.248	-0.038	56.704	-1.439
	(0.574)	(0.388)	(15095.905)	-1.706
GDP per capita (logged)	-0.245*	-0.133	-378.260	-2.346*
	(0.125)	(0.085)	(29713.174)	-1.047
Population size (logged)	-0.290***	-0.169**	-168.408	-6.703
	(0.067)	(0.345)	(67139.283)	-3.453
-2LL	725.771	1401.156	0.000	560.856
Cox and Snell's R2	0.070	0.074	0.348	0.386
Nagelkerke's R2	0.201	0.139	1.000	0.724
N	2047	2047	2047	2047

*Note: binary logistic regression coefficients with standards errors in brackets. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01. *p < 0.05*

Appendix B: Descriptive statistics

Table 3a. Descriptive statistics of variables included in the regression

		Full success	Partial success	Diaspora support	Number of participants (in millions)	Campaign tactics
N	Valid	2717	2717	2581	2288	2717
	Missing	0	0	136	429	0
Mean		0.05	0.13	0.43	0.10	0.19
Std. Deviation		0.23	0.34	0.49	0.71	0.39
Minimum		0	0	0	0	0
Maximum		1	1	1	22	1

Table 3b. Descriptive statistics of variables included in the regression

		Level of democracy	GDP per capita (logged)	Population size (logged)
N	Valid	2619	2553	2553
	Missing	98	164	164
Mean		0.32	1.07	7.97
Std. Deviation		0.23	0.91	1.79
Minimum		0.01	-1.25	3.47
Maximum		0.89	3.87	11.79

Figure 1. Histogram of *full success*



Figure 2. Histogram of *partial success*



Figure 3. Histogram of *diaspora support*