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Empowering Nigeria: Discovering the effectiveness of aid

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Empowering Nigeria: Discovering the effectiveness of aid

External Relations of the European Union

Bachelor Thesis

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Abstract

There is a strong upward trend in the amounts spent on development aid. In 2022, the total amount of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) was five times higher than in 1960. The European Union is responsible for about two-thirds of humanitarian aid worldwide. However, it is questionable whether development aid is actually effective. A ‘least-likely case’ is Nigeria, it received 9 billion euros from the EU in the period of 2007-2024. Yet it has one of the worst development factors in Sub-Saharan Africa. This Thesis aims to find an answer to the question of whether European development aid was really effective in Nigeria, and whether the targets the European Union set itself were actually achieved. This is done by using the National Indicative Programme (NIP) that ran from 2014-2020. The analysis shows that despite achieving some of the objectives examined in the health care sector (Sector 1), the NIP has mostly failed to achieve the desired impact. Primarily, the high level of corruption ensured that few development objectives have been realized. Therefore, it can be concluded that European Development aid has not really been effective. For further research, it would be valuable to look at the Multi-Annual Indicative Programme (MIP) that runs from 2021-2027. Here, slightly different targets have been set that may give different results. In addition, it may be of added value to conduct a study of how Nigerian agencies report, since there are sometimes substantial differences between the observations of NGOs and these agencies, which can lead to different interpretations. This could possibly engender a different observation of aid effectiveness as well.

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Introduction

The European Union (EU) is a major player when it comes to the topic of international development. Recently, the EU has achieved a position where they are the largest provider of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) and where it provides two-thirds of humanitarian aid at the global level (VanHoonacker & Pomorska, 2023, p. 73). In addition, the total amount of all states spent on ODA has also increased dramatically. By 2022, the amount spent on ODA had increased fivefold from the year 1960 (OECD, 2024).

However, scholars in international relations do not agree upon the effectivity of development aid. A first example of this, is that it is still unclear what type of aid is most effective (Nowak-Lehmann & Gross, 2021, p. 191). For example, there are various types of aid and they can all have their own effect on the recipient country. Mavrotas (2005, p. 1021) mentions four categories of foreign aid: project aid, programme aid, technological assistance and food aid. Baldwin and Winters (2020, p. 161) divide on their part project aid into three categories: one where the donor's money goes directly to the domestic government (traditional aid), one where the donor gives the money to an NGO (bypass aid) and one where the domestic government gives the money to an NGO (outsourcing). The different forms in which foreign aid can exist makes it difficult to make a general statement about the effectiveness of aid. Secondly, the circumstances under which aid can be most effective are also debatable. Mavrotas (2005, p. 1021) argues that effectiveness is difficult to measure, because different countries receive amounts of money from a donor country. These amounts can vary each year and often have diverse conditionalities. Donor coordination can also be a problem, which can affect the needs and money coming to the developing country. Thirdly, it is still unclear whether there is a minimum amount of aid necessary to be effective and promote development (Nowak-Lehmann & Gross, 2021, p. 191). For example, in the second half of the 20th century, one trillion dollars were spent on developmental projects in Africa. Nevertheless, poverty increased and the Gross Domestic Product even decreased (Pomerantz, 2004, pp. 1-2).

Nigeria has the largest economy in the continent of Africa, has abundant natural reserves and is a major player in oil exports. The country is also strategically located when it comes to migration routes and is in an area of high political unrest, with coups that took place in Niger and Mali (European Union, 2014, p. 7). Nigeria therefore has a lot of strategic value to the European Union, which benefits from political stability and economic growth. Overall, Nigeria received a total of nearly 9 billion euros from the European Union in the period from 2007 to 2024. This amount was given to the country through the above categories (project aid, programme aid, technological assistance and food aid) (European Commission, 2024).

However, in 2014, about 60 percent of Nigeria's population lived below the poverty line of US\$1.25 per day and the country suffers from massive corruption, which occurs in political, institutional and economic sub-areas. In addition, basic necessities are often unavailable, a large proportion of young people are unemployed, and infant mortality rates are very high. Subsequently, Nigeria has one of the worst development factors in all of sub-Saharan Africa (European Union, 2014, p. 7). The country of Nigeria can therefore be seen as a 'least-likely' case when it comes to the effectiveness of aid: it receives a lot of development aid but barely develops.

The question whether aid is effective remains an important topic in the field of political science. Therefore, this study aims to find an answer to the following question:

'What was the effectiveness of European Developmental Aid on the development of Nigeria between 2014 and 2020?'

This study will begin by exploring the literature about the different factors that could possibly influence the effectiveness of development aid in the recipient country. These factors will result in assumptions, which will be used to formulate hypotheses about the effectiveness of aid in Nigeria. Subsequently, methodology, case selection and operationalization will be discussed in detail, after which an analysis will be presented. Finally, results and conclusions will be interpreted and recommendations for further research follow.

Effectiveness and aid in the literature

Factors influencing aid effectiveness

To gain a broader understanding the development process of Nigeria, an identification of possible general factors affecting the effectiveness of aid is needed. First, factors that influence aid effectiveness on the side of the donor, the European Union, will be described. Subsequently, factors on the side of the recipient country - Nigeria - will be identified. On this basis, a hypothesis will be developed, which will be tested later in this Thesis.

Coherence

Literature shows that there are multiple factors that can be linked directly to the aid effectiveness of the European Union. Gstöhl and Schunz (2021, pp. 6-7) highlight that the greater the internal coherence of European Member States on a given issue, the greater the

effectiveness is. According to Rasch (2008, pp. 306-307), coherence and national interests are closely linked. He gives the example of the United Nations policy process on development in 2005, which voted to reform in the form of more seats. This meant that European countries would have relatively less say in the development policy area itself. Many countries thought differently about this, resulting in a reduction in overall coherence between the European Union Member States. So, it is important to keep in mind that European Member States can also vote in a politically strategic manner, rather than on the substance of issues, which can affect the internal coherence (Rasch, 2008, p. 306). In addition, Juncos (2023, p. 128) emphasizes the fact that agreement on foreign policy in the EU is particularly difficult, because decision-making is based on unanimity. This gives member states the right to veto some decisions that might threaten their national interests. In this light, the European Union is experiencing problems with previous matter on the topic of development aid. Carbone (2023, p. 250) argues that there are often clashes between the norms and values of the Union, and these of member states. Barry et al. (2010, p. 210) believe that international institutions and organizations should play a role in overcoming these coherence problems, by setting a long term vision for all member states that provides mutual benefits. Also, cooperative policies should be promoted more (2010, p. 210). However, given the colonial past of member states, it is also not a surprise that they often collide with these organisations. When looking at policies that touch upon the topic of development, such as trade or migration, member states tend to be reluctant in decision-making and rather follow their own interests. That makes it difficult to create 'one voice' when it comes to developmental policies. Internal coherence seems to be a challenge to the EU itself, but the EU sometimes clashes with other major global players as well. Thomas (2012, pp. 471-473) stresses that coherence might be important for the European Union when it wants to promote its interests abroad, but it is therefore often not enough to reach the goals.

According to the literature about coherence, the following assumption can be formulated:

A1: The EU has a lack of coherence, thus EU-aid will be less effective

In contrast with the previous assumption, Siitonen (2022) argues that coherence within the European Union has actually increased since the migration crisis of 2015. This is due to the fact that development policy has become more of an instrument of migration policy, rather than a policy area in its own right. This came about after the rise in concerns about European security issues. At first, the emphasis was put more on the moral aspect of supporting developing

countries, where member states differed in opinion. However, this perspective shifted recently to the negative consequences that poor implementation of development policy can have on migration towards Europe. This led to an increase in coherence between member states (Siitonen, 2022, pp. 12-13).

Strategies and tools

Second, Gstöhl and Schunz (2021, pp. 6-7) stress the importance of context in international relations. If an international actor plays a bigger role in a given problem, they are more likely to have a greater say in eventual solutions. To do so, it must fit well into a particular context.. The example of China was given during the Paris climate negotiations, where China, as one of the largest polluters, had a better negotiating position. Therefore, it fits better into the definition of a key player. Finally, the choice of which foreign policy strategies and tools are chosen can have a significant impact on the ultimate effectiveness, as well as the timing with which they are implemented. Juncos (2023, p. 129) highlights that the European Union has always had difficulty coming to an agreement on what kind of strategy, instruments and tools it uses in different situations when it comes to foreign policy. She names diverse policy areas such as development and trade, and argues that the complex nature of the European Union sometimes causes it to work against itself. As a result, there is by no means always a “common vision” and this affects effectiveness of actions and instruments. Next to that, Carbone (2023) argues that Brexit had a big impact on the financial abilities that the European Union had regarding development. Since the departure of the United Kingdom, the problems of financing has become bigger and combating issues like global poverty have become more difficult to achieve (pp. 255-256).

According to the issues that the EU has when applying well-fitting measures, strategies and tools, the following assumption can be formulated:

A2: The EU has an inability to implement the right strategies and tools, thus EU-aid will be less effective

External actors

Thirdly, the effectiveness of aid can also be influenced by external actors. For example, despite the fact that the European Union was the largest donor of aid in Sub-Saharan Africa (Carbone, 2013, p. 342), China is also slowly but surely expanding its influence across the continent (Che & Bodomo, 2023, p. 126). The EU is often only willing to provide financial support in return

for conditionalities that in many cases are difficult to implement. China is less coercive on this part, and actually places itself as an actor that does not want to promote normative values at all. To illustrate, there are no rule-of-law requirements, and climate change is not mentioned in the requirements to receive Chinese money (Haastrup et al., 2021, p. 550). This results in African countries preferring Chinese aid over European aid. Thereby comes the fact that China is often more willing to focus on trade and investments, than on aid itself. This is referred to as the concept of Chinese ‘developmental assistance’ and this is reflected in China's modus operandi, where they often provide long-term loans in consultation with African governments, rather than just ‘donating’ money (Che & Bodomo, 2023, 129). China is not the only actor that recently increased its role. The United States has acquired a prominent position on development aid as well, although a lot of money has been spent on military goals. This is due to the fact that the US believes that poverty can lead to international instability, threatening its own national interests (Carbone, 2015, p. 50). The presence of other actors in developmental areas can lead to a clash between interests, and might therefore reduce effectiveness on the short or long-term. Finally, it is important to mention that cooperation with many external actors may have negative consequences for the Nigerian government in the long run. Not only can it positively affect the public perception of these external factors, it can also expose deficiencies in the various policy areas by domestic authorities. This can be an incentive for the government to be less transparent precisely. This - as mentioned above - has a negative impact on accountability (Tichý et al, 2022, pp. 9-10; The African Forum and Network on Debt and Development, 2011, pp. 22-23).

According to the findings that external actors can be of crucial importance when it comes to aid effectiveness, the following assumption can be formulated:

A3: There has been an increase in the activity of external actors, thus EU-aid will be less effective

In addition to the general factors listed above that can affect the effectiveness of development aid provided by the European Union (donor), there are also factors in the recipient country that can determine whether or not development aid is effective.

Accountability

Firstly, the concept of accountability may be a factor in the ultimate effectiveness of aid. Abdaless et al. (2015, p. 103) argue that accountability is important not only because it ensures constant evaluation of public policies, thereby optimizing effectiveness, but also because it

legitimizes government actions concerning the provision of goods and the spending of money. Abdaless et al. (2015, pp. 95-96) also argue that there are two types of accountability: horizontal accountability and vertical accountability. Horizontal accountability is referred to as the capacity of an institution such as the legal system, parliament or other autonomous powers to sanction an unethical act by an official or a group of officials. Vertical accountability refers to the capacity of citizens, the media or civil society to exert influence on public officials if they do not act ethically right. Furthermore, according to Abdaless et al. (2015, p. 96), the process of accountability consists of two distinct stages. In the first stage, answerability is especially important. This means that governments and other official institutions inform their citizens about the actions and decisions taken. In the second stage, enforcement is a determining factor in whether accountability is achieved. This refers to the concept that citizens have the ability and means to impose a sanction on an official who does not act ethically.

Not only accountability in the recipient country seems to be a determining factor, the relationship between the recipient country and the donor is also important. A research done by the Canadian Municipalities (2010, pp. 146-147) argue that it is important for local governments to be involved in the development aid process as much as possible, because it enhances the legitimacy of a project, and because the local government can be held accountable. Also, local governments often know best what the essential needs are in areas such as healthcare, welfare and housing. Allen et al. (2024) show that in many cases every effort is made by donors to bypass the government, and mainly non-governmental organizations are given a say in a project. Knack (2013, p. 327) states that the trust of donors in recipient governments is usually very low, because voters in donor countries are often sceptical about aid, which leaves the donor to micro-manage projects to produce visible outcomes, to minimize the risk of reputation loss or fiduciary losses.

The African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (2011) argues that domestic accountability in the country of Nigeria is often incredibly weak, because it lacks institutions to hold managers of aid accountable for what happens to aid. Key factors in the accountability process such as the Nigerian parliament and Civil Society Organisations are unable to inform citizens about how much aid Nigeria receives. Additionally, the European Union likes to be in control itself, due to distrust of monitoring and evaluating by the local government. This not only creates a lack of clarity about who exactly is in charge of which development project, but also leads to a great lack of mutual accountability, which can be an important factor in the effectiveness of aid (pp. 22-23). This lack of transparency prevents citizens from sanctioning their own government because they do not know what is happening. In addition, this access for

public agencies is also often limited, and it is also difficult for these agencies to test whether ethical conduct is being done correctly (pp. 22-23). In conclusion, there is a lack of both horizontal and vertical accountability.

According to the weak institutions regarding transparency and accountability in Nigeria, the following assumption can be formulated:

A4: Nigeria's accountability mechanisms are very weak, thus EU-aid will be less effective

Corruption

Secondly, to what extent corruption exists may play a role in the ultimate effectiveness of development aid. Quibria (2017, p. 11) gives the example of bid rigging, in which companies in the recipient country agree among themselves who will submit what bid to lead development projects. In this way, they ensure the least possible competition. This is often followed by fraudulent actions to re-earn the money spent. Corrupt government officials can also start their own NGOs to pocket a share of the development aid themselves. Because corruption can take multiple forms, it is often difficult to identify and therefore difficult to fight. Kosack (2003, p. 11) argues that development aid works much better when it is sent to democracies because they are more effective in allocating the money to different sectors, visibly improving living standards. In autocracies, development aid can even have a detrimental effect. Wright (2010, pp. 753-755) shares this view and shows that the degree of personalism in the recipient country's political system also affects the degree of effectiveness. Developing countries with a political system that is very much centred around one person are more susceptible to corrupt initiatives with the development aid obtained, as the money often goes to their own constituency, rather than to the sectors it is actually intended for.

The Nigerian political system has autocratic and personalist characteristics. Yaqub (2023) argues that colonial powers created autocratic initiatives in the past that make it difficult for democratic initiatives to work today. For example, the constitution gave northern provinces as much as half the number of seats in parliament. While most people lived here, this also ensured that decisions often negatively affected residents in the western, southern or eastern parts of the country (p. 330). Yakub (2023) also cites the example of the “warrant-chief system,” in which in non-centralized regions, under colonial pressure from the British, power was centralized around one person. This person promoted interests of colonial power and suppressed democratic processes in order to exercise power more easily. This system is still visible in local elections today, where local leaders try to ensure that constitutions are modified to stay in office

as long as possible. (pp. 330-331). Lastly, Smith (2010, pp. 228-231) argues that corruption does not only exist on the national scale, but is also embedded everywhere in society. The benefits that being corrupt brings create large-scale patronage networks, with citizens using corruption to survive for themselves. Smith (2010, p. 230) gives the examples of bribery by police, businessmen using scams to make money and doctors prescribing extra expensive drugs, among others. Corruption seems to be a variable that affects every facet of life in Nigeria. Anti-corruption efforts and attempts to establish democratic institutions or other forms of development are ineffective for this reason (Smith, 2010, p. 225).

Regarding the high level of corruption and autocracy in the country of Nigeria, the following assumption can be formulated:

A5: Corruption is very much present in society, thus EU-aid will be less effective

Hypothesis

Instead of testing all the individual assumptions, they have built up to a general hypothesis which will be tested in this Thesis. The assumptions A1-A5 can be classified into two categories. A1-A3 underline mainly factors that influence the donor-side. They argue that due to a lack of coherence within the EU, the inability to deploy the right strategies and tools, and the presence of external factors possibly hindering the EU, aid is expected to be less effective than intended. A4 and A5 underline major problems on the recipient side. Because of problems with corruption and weak accountability mechanisms in Nigeria, aid is not expected to be effective. The assumptions can be summarised in the following hypothesis:

Table A: Assumptions and Hypotheses

<i>Assumptions</i>	<i>Hypothesis</i>
A1: The lack of coherence makes aid less effective	<i>H1: The EU-aid provided to Nigeria in the period of 2014-2020 was not effective</i>
A2: The inability to deploy the right strategies and tools make aid less effective	
A3: More external actors make aid less effective	
A4: Weak accountability mechanisms make aid less effective	
A5: High level of corruption makes aid less effective	

Methodology

Definition of effectiveness

In this Thesis, the definition of effectiveness of Thomas (2012) will be used as it fits the research method of evaluating the NIP in Nigeria. This means that if an objective that the EU set itself in the NIP was realized, aid is considered effective. Thomas (2012) states that ‘effectiveness’ in relation to the European Union can best be described as: “The Union’s ability to shape world affairs in accordance with the objectives it adopts on particular issues” (pp. 460-461). He emphasizes that the complexity of the EU as a whole - an actor composed of different bodies and various sovereign states - makes it difficult to define collective interests (p. 460).

One should not confuse effectiveness with efficiency. As Jorgensen et al. (2011, pp. 602-603) state, the distinction between effectiveness and efficiency is of utmost importance. Where effectiveness is about achieving the goals set, efficiency is about the relationship between what has been achieved and the costs incurred to do so. Although a relatively big amount of money is spent by the EU on development aid, as also mentioned in the introduction (VanHoonacker & Pomorska, 2023, p. 73), the focus of this Thesis is on the achievement of objectives and thus on effectiveness rather than efficiency.

National indicative programme 2014-2020 (NIP)

The country of Nigeria was specifically chosen as a case to measure the effectiveness of development aid. As stated in the introduction, the country has the largest economy in Africa, and is a major international player in oil (European Union, 2014, p. 7). In addition, it received 9 billion euros of aid from the European Union in 18 years to develop. Yet, it has one of the worst development factors in the entire sub-Saharan region (European Union, p. 7). This is counterintuitive and makes Nigeria a ‘least-likely case’.

To test whether European Union’s development aid to Nigeria was effective or not, and thereby operationalize the formed hypothesis, this Thesis will look at the National Indicative Programme (NIP), which was in effect from 2014 to 2020. Prior to this project, the European Union set itself goals to be achieved by the end of the process. The entire project involves a total of 512 million euros (European Union, 2014, p. 7). The program is divided into three sectors that the European Union considers crucial to Nigeria's further development. The first sector concerns "Health, Nutrition and Resilience." The goal is to significantly reduce local poverty by supporting immunization programs, facilitating access to health care and providing economic assistance to the most vulnerable households in this regard (European Union, 2014,

pp. 7-8). In total, the European Union set aside 240 million euros for this part of the project (European Union, 2014, p. 36).

The second sector includes "Sustainable Energy and Access to Electricity". It states that the lack of electricity is a major problem for Nigeria's continued development. There is also a great disparity in access to electricity between regions and provinces. The European Union states that with development aid it can improve this sector by building infrastructure, liberalizing the energy sector and investing in more sustainable forms of energy (European Union, 2014, p. 8) A total of 150 million euros was planned for this component (European Union, 2014, p. 36).

The third sector is about "Rule of law, governance and democracy." The European Union stresses that Nigeria is still a very fragile democracy with a legal system that is ineffective and that it is a country that faces terrorism and other forms of instability that undermine democratization. By investing in capacity of local and national judicial process, and applying economic governance assistance, the European Union believes that democratization will be more consolidated (European Union, 2014, p. 14-15). The EU is making 90 million euros available for this purpose (European Union, 2014, p. 36). The exact amounts allocated to the three sectors can be found in Table 1 in Appendix A.

For this study, it was chosen to use the National Indicative Programme (NIP), which ran from 2014-2020, rather than the more recent Multi-Annual Indicative Programme (MIP), which runs from 2021 to 2027. This is mainly for two reasons. First, the NIP project has already been completed. This makes it more feasible for this study to measure the impact it had and analyse factors that may have influenced it. Second, the coronavirus has affected the development situation in many developing countries. Van der Haer (2020, pp. 3-4) gives several explanations on why the COVID-19 crisis had such a big impact on Africa. She mentions that existing social inequalities got even bigger, which resulted in more urban violence. Also, democratic processes amongst the continent got disrupted, because of postponing elections and governments expanded their influence, in order to be able to handle the crisis easier. Lastly, the rising economies collapsed. To minimise the impact that corona may have had on European Union development aid, an analysis of the NIP was chosen.

Methods of data collection and analysis

In order to stay as close to the definition of EU effectiveness of Thomas (2012) as possible, an analysis of the EU's precise objectives was initially chosen in the time frame of 2014-2020. However, not all the indicators were available, which made it difficult to use this form of

research. Secondly, an attempt was made to obtain an evaluation through a report or other suitable document. After correspondence with the Embassy of the Netherlands in Abuja, Nigeria, it appeared that they were not in possession of relevant documents or evaluation reports. This also applied to the European Union which could not tell more about this project and referred to Eurostat, where the information was unavailable as well. For this reason, a descriptive analysis was chosen. For each of the above sectors, descriptive statistical observations will act as an indicator of what the effectiveness of European development aid has been in the period from 2014 to 2020. This will be supported by an NGO report where possible.

The National Indicative Programme was in effect during the period 2014-2020. Nevertheless, a slightly different period was chosen for some objectives. This is for a variety of reasons. For some indicators, this was chosen because a year before or after the NIP period showed a remarkable trend in the data that was relevant for interpreting effectiveness. Indicators where this was conducted are Reduction in under 5 mortality rate, Immunization Coverage and Access to electricity. Another reason concerns the unavailability of the desired period. This is the case with the Freedom House Index, which only showed data from 2017 on. Nevertheless, this indicator was included because it was deemed highly appropriate. A final reason is that the NGO report that explains the trend in the data is from the year 2023. This is the case with the CPI and the Rule of Law index.

Operationalization

In order to operationalize, it was chosen to test a total of seven NIP objectives, divided among the three different sectors. Some objectives were split in half in order to operationalize in a better way. Also is shown which NGO reports and/or which indicators were used. These are placed below in the Table.

Table B: Sectors, objectives, NGO reports and indicators

<i>Sectors of the NIP</i>	<i>Objective(s) tested</i>	<i>NGO report used and indicators</i>
Sector 1: Health, Nutrition and Resilience	1.2) Maternal and child mortality and morbidity rates are reduced	Under 5- Mortality rate (World Bank) Maternal Mortality ratio (World Bank)
	1.1) Improved quality primary health care delivery systems at LGA and State level especially	Measles Immunization Coverage (FMOH) - Measles Immunization Coverage per State (FMOH)

	in the northern states of Nigeria	
Sector 2: Sustainable Energy and Access to Electricity	3.2) Improved provision of electricity particularly from renewable sources	Access to electricity population (World Bank) Access to electricity urban areas (World Bank) Access to electricity rural areas (World Bank)
	3.2) Improved provision of electricity particularly from renewable sources	Share of renewables in energy consumption (International Energy Agency)
Sector 3: Rule of law, governance and democracy	2.1) Credible, fair and transparent elections organised at national, state and local government level.	Freedom House Index
	2.3) More popular participation in the conduct of peaceful elections and in the entire democratic process, from political party to national election levels.	Voter Turnout national Elections (International Idea)
	1.1) Improved rule of law and access to justice though more independent, effective, responsive and transparent justice sector	Rule of Law Index (World Justice Project) Corruption and anticorruption efforts in Nigeria (Transparency International)
	1.2) Reduce corruption in order to improve accountability and strengthen capacity CSO's, media and communities	Corruption Perception Index Corruption and anticorruption efforts in Nigeria (Oldfield)

Analysis

Sector 1: Health, Nutrition and Resilience


Reduction in under 5-mortality rate and maternal mortality ratio

As mentioned earlier, a total of €240 million has been released for Sector 1. The European Union stated in the NIP that a total of 1.3 million children under the age of 5 in Nigeria are at risk of malnutrition (2014, p. 11). The European Union gave a few explanations for this. Northern Nigeria is prone to many factors affecting this. For instance, it experiences the negative effects of climate change, such as drought, and external influences such as political

instability and violence are a problem for many households. There are also huge differences in the healthcare system between the North and the South, resulting, especially in the North, in few immunization campaigns, a lack of medical technology, medicines and access to healthcare (European Union, 2014, pp. 11-12). With the money made available, the European Union hopes to address these problems.

The under 5 mortality rate (Table 1.1) and the maternal mortality ratio are shown in a table below. World Bank data (2024) has been used for displaying these graphs. Important to mention is that maternal mortality was measured using *ratio* and not *rate*. The difference between these is that the ratio includes the number of mothers who died during pregnancy (WHO, 2024). The maternal mortality ratio (Table 1.2) was chosen because the maternal mortality rate was not available among the proposed means of verifications by the European Union (2014, p. 28). Here, the goal for the European Union is to improve several facets of the healthcare sector, which should also lead to a decrease in the maternal mortality ratio (2014, p. 11). The under 5 mortality rate is shown from the year 2014 to the year 2021. The maternal mortality ratio is shown from the year 2014 to the year 2020. In the case of the under 5 mortality rate, a decrease can be observed. Whereas in 2014 the number was still 128 per 1,000 births, by 2021 it had fallen to 111 deaths per 1,000 births. The number also decreased in all years in the period 2014-2020 compared to the previous years. The European Union's objective of a reduction in the under-5 mortality rate was thereby achieved.


Table 1.1 Change in under 5 mortality rate per 1000 births (World Bank, 2024)



When looking at Table 1.2, the case of maternal mortality ratio, there is not a huge reduction in the period 2014-2019. It is only in the year 2020 that a substantial reduction can be seen.

However, the set target of the European Union has been met, as a decrease has been achieved, which corresponds to the objective.

Table 1.2 Change in maternal mortality ratio per 100.000 births (World Bank, 2024)




Immunization Coverage

The European Union emphasizes that low immunization rates are one of four major problems in the Nigerian Health System. Immunization and other forms of primary health services are needed to prevent dangerous diseases (European Union, 2014, p. 12).

Table 1.3 shows immunization rates for measles based on data from the Federal Ministry of Health (FMOH, 2024). These rates have been calculated by several organisations, and are shown for the World Health Organisation, World Bank and the National Health Management Information System (NHMIS, national actor) in the Table for the period 2013-2020. The first aspect that stands out is that the rates given by the NHMIS are each quite different from those calculated by the WHO and the World Bank. Example is the year 2013, where the percentage by the NHMIS is 15,2%, while the WHO and the World Bank assign a value of 43%. In 2017, this difference is also noticeable when the NHMIS states that 82,7% of the population has been vaccinated against measles, while WHO and the World Bank argue that the rate is 54%.


Table 1.3 Change in Measles Immunization Coverage (FMOH, 2024)



Although different actors show different results, the period from 2013 to 2020 does show a clear increase in immunization coverage. At the NHMIS, it increased from 15.2% in 2013 to 71.7% in 2020, at WHO from 43% in 2013 to 60% in 2020 and at the World Bank from 43% in 2013 to 59% in 2020. It can be concluded from these results that the European Union has achieved the goal of improving primary healthcare (1.1). However, care must be taken when drawing this conclusion, because immunization campaigns are only a part of total primary healthcare, and other indicators are not examined in this thesis.

In Sector 1, objective 1.1 mainly states that an improvement of healthcare in northern regions is important for the European Union (2014, p. 28). Table 1.4 shows immunization rates for measles in the northern states of Katsina, Sokoto and Jigawa, based on data from the Federal Ministry of Health (FMOH, 2024). A few interesting findings can also be highlighted here. First, it is notable that for the state of Jigawa, in 2014, the immunization rate for measles increased from 0.04% to 94.7% .This is a remarkably large increase. Secondly, it is notable that for Jigawa state, an immunization rate above 100% was recorded in 2017. The FMOH gives no clear explanation for this. Lastly, one can note a significant increase for each of the three states. Based on data provided by the FMOH, one can conclude that the European Union has achieved the objective of improving immunization campaigns.

Table 1.4 Change in Measles Immunization Coverage in Northern States (FMOH, 2024)




Sector 2: Sustainable Energy and Access to Electricity

Access to electricity

In the National Indicative Programme, the European Union mentions that in 2014, only half the Nigerian population had access to electricity (2014, p. 13). This is a big difference from the 66% target for West African countries. Reasons for the failing energy network in Nigeria include the lack of maintenance of these networks, fluctuating prices set by the government, and the lack of use of innovative technologies (European Union, 2014, p. 13). Lastly, the European Union emphasizes the importance of a working energy sector, because the absence of it can have negative spillovers for healthcare and education (2014, p. 13). That is why the European Union allocated a total of 150 million euros to sector 2 (see Appendix A).

Table 2.1 shows data on access to electricity based on World Bank data (2024). Two things stand out here. First, the difference in access between urban regions and rural areas is enormous. For example, the percentage of urban areas is often around 85%, while in rural areas the percentage barely exceeds 30%. Secondly, it is noticeable that there is an actual decline in access for rural areas and the total population in 2017. This is the year when a total of 70 million went to this sector (see Appendix A).

Table 2.1 Change in access to electricity (World bank, 2024)




The European Union has basically achieved its objective in this regard. The percentage of the population that has access to electricity increased from 54.2% to 59.5%. However, there are some comments to be made. For example, the number of people in rural areas that had access to electricity even decreased in the period 2014-2021. The report also mentions that the target for the population in West African countries having access to electricity is 66% (European Union, 2014, p. 13). This has not at all been the case during the 2014-2021 period.

Share of renewable sources in energy consumption

The NIP emphasizes the importance of renewable energy sources. In the North of Nigeria, due to lack of public supply of energy and electricity, commercial, industrial companies generate energy themselves in a polluting way. This has a negative impact on the environment (European Union, 2014, p. 13). In Table 2.2, the percentage of Nigeria’s renewable energy sources in the final energy consumption is shown based on data from the International Energy Agency (2024).

Table 2.2 Change in share of modern renewables in final energy consumption (IEA, 2024)



There is no change in the percentage of renewables over the 2014-2020 period. The percentage remained 6% during this entire period. Therefore, we can conclude that the European Union failed to realize this objective.


Sector 3: Rule of law, governance and democracy

Democracy

A part of the 90 million that was reserved for sector 3 was allocated to the fostering of democratic institutions in Nigeria. According to the NIP, the European Union expected results like ‘credible, fair elections and transparent elections at the national and local government level’, and ‘more popular participation in elections’ (European Union, 2014, p. 33).

For the measurement of the ‘credible, fair and transparent elections’ expectation, the Freedom House Index (2024) can be used. It assesses the quality of political rights and civil liberties and combines this figure. For political rights, a country can score a maximum of 40 points. This pillar consists of three sub-components: political pluralism, quality of the electoral process and functioning of government. For Civil Rights, a country can score a maximum of 60 points. This pillar consists of four sub-components: freedom of expression and belief, rule of law, organizational and associational rights and personal autonomy and individual rights. Combined, 100 is the maximum score (Freedom House, 2024). The scores of Nigeria in the period of 2017-2023 are presented in Table 3.1. It is important to note that the maximum score is 100, and not 60, as is displayed. This choice has been maybe so that the slight changes are more visible.

Table 3.1 Change of Freedom House scores (Freedom House, 2024)



When it comes to democracy, the desired improvement of the European Union has not been achieved. Both scores regarding political rights and civil liberties decreased over time.

When it comes to the expectation that there is more popular participation in election, it is unfortunately not possible to obtain data from local elections. However, based on national elections data (International Idea, 2024) presented in Table 3.2, we can see that during the NIP there was a significant drop in turnout in national elections. There was an 11.51% drop in 2019 compared to 2015 regarding voter turnout. This is not consistent with the European Union's expectation of more people showing up in elections due to the development assistance provided in the NIP.

Table 3.2 Voter turnout Nigerian National Elections (International Idea, 2024)


	2015	2019
Voter turnout National Elections	43,65%	32,14%

Rule of law

The European Union (2014) wrote in the NIP that the money sent to this sector, should result in an improvement of the rule of law. A more independent, transparent and more responsive judiciary would have a positive effect on accountability, and public sector mismanagement (p. 23). However, the Rule of Law-index shows no significant improvement in the score awarded by the World Justice Project each year in their index of the rule of law. This is measured by

variables as limitations in government power, the degree of civil justice and criminal justice, and the enforcement of the law. This score is measured from 0 to 1. The higher a country scores, the better the quality of the rule of law. The scores of Nigeria from 2015-2023 are displayed in Table 3.3. A score of only 0.41 was assigned to Nigeria in 2015. This then accounted for 96th place out of only 102 countries. In 2020, Nigeria scored 0.43. This resulted in a 108th place out of 120 countries. Within this period of time, Nigeria's score also did not change remarkably.

Table 3.3 Change in Rule of law (World Justice Project, 2023)



Oldfield (2023) conducted research on behalf of Transparency International and the Anti-Corruption Resource Centre and argues that the factor of corruption within the judicial system is the most important determinant why the rule of law did not improve. He states that it is very common that bribes are paid to guarantee a good outcome for citizens, or to progress cases faster than they should. Besides, funding for the judiciary is constitutionally guaranteed and federal systems are responsible for these payments. However, federal and state government bodies have been accused several times because they refused to pay lawyers or judges, to influence judicial decisions. Lastly, politicians remain considerably powerful because they have the right to appoint or dismiss new judges. This influenced judicial independence negatively (pp. 10-11). The finding that corruption influenced the rule of law is in line with assumption A5.


Corruption

In the NIP, the European Union states that a reduction in corruption can improve accountability and can result in a strengthening of the capacity of local communities, Civil Society Organisations (CSO's) and media (2014, p. 32). Yet, Oldfield (2023, pp. 3-4) on behalf of the Anti-Corruption Resource Centre shows that it never achieved the desired reduction in corruption. He argues, based on World Bank data, that there was an increase in control over corruption between 2011 and 2015, but that between 2015 and 2021, there was another significant drop in this control. This is remarkable because it was precisely during these years that the NIP was in place.

These findings are supported by the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). This index assesses the extent of corruption in a country based on several factors. Some sub-factors include bribery, the ability of a government to fight corruption in the public sector, and the legal protection for whistleblowers who report corruption to anti-corruption agencies (Transparency International, 2023). The lower the index-score, the more corruption exists within the country.

Table 3.4 shows that the EU has failed to achieve a significant reduction in corruption. In the years 2014-2020, one cannot see a sharp increase in the CPI, indicating that the share of corruption in Nigerian society has not really declined. In 2014, a score of 27 was awarded, ranking Nigeria 136th out of 175 countries. In 2020, it even dropped to 149th place. No major change is visible between these years either. Based on these results, one could even argue that existing corruption has even slightly increased.

Table 3.4 Change in CPI (Transparency International, 2023)



Oldfield (2023, pp. 6-9) offers two explanations for the rise in corruption during this time period. First, he names the neo-patrimonialism dominant in Nigerian institutions. Neo-patrimonialism refers to a system where power within institutions is built around one person. This is maintained by huge patronage networks that allow Nigerian elites to exploit the system and earn money. This happens at both local and national levels (p. 6). This is consistent with the previously stated assumption A5, that corruption runs deep in society, making aid less effective. The second explanation given is the “resource curse”. Nigeria is an oil-rich country and this has had disadvantages for development. Oldfield (2023, p. 7) argues that external actors in the region such as Multinational enterprises (MNEs) like Shell and ENI have used corruption to gain local advantages. This not only creates an unfair competitive advantage for MNEs over national companies, but also reinforces the corrupt nature of Nigeria's society. The negative influence these external actors apparently have is consistent with assumption A3, that external actors can have a negative impact on the effectiveness of aid.

Conclusion

This Bachelor Thesis sought to measure the effectiveness of development aid to Nigeria using the National Indicative Programme (NIP), which was in action from 2014 to 2020.

In Sector 1 (Health, Nutrition and Resilience), a decrease in child mortality under 5 years of age has been achieved. Also, the maternal mortality ratio decreased slightly compared to the starting year 2014. It can be said that these objectives have therefore been achieved. The objective of expanded immunization campaigns was also achieved. A substantial increase was realized at the national level when looking at measles vaccinations during 2014-2020. In addition, this increase was also visible specifically in northern regions. In the researched regions for Katsina, Sokoto and Jigawa, more than half of the population had been vaccinated for measles by 2020.

In Sector 2 (Sustainable Energy and Access to Electricity), the EU's stated objective of improving access to electricity for citizens was met, although the regional target of 66% of the population having access to electricity was not met. In addition, the stated goal of increasing the share of renewable energy sources in total energy consumption was also not met.

In Sector 3 (Rule of law, governance and democracy), none of the set objectives were achieved. Motivating citizens to participate politically did not succeed. In addition, strengthening and improving the judiciary system also did not prove significant. Finally, the European Union's objective of using development aid to fight corruption has also not been realised. No significant improvement has been demonstrated based on the Corruption

Perception Index. Based on the analysis, it can be concluded that aid has not had the desired effectiveness on most parts, and that *H1: The EU-aid provided to Nigeria in the period of 2014-2020 was not effective* can be accepted. The Research Question '*What was the effectiveness of European Developmental Aid on the development of Nigeria between 2014 and 2020?*' can therefore be answered with the observation that it had limited effect. An overview of the objectives tested above and the assessment, can be found in Appendix B.

Another observation is that it is very remarkable for a large organisation like the European Union that an evaluation report on a project where 512 million euros was spent either does not exist or is very difficult to find. Despite transparency being one of the key principles of the European Union and it is even mentioned in article 11 of the Treaty of the European Union (EUR-Lex, 2012, p. 21), it lacks transparency in this case. Here lies an area for improvement for the EU itself.

It has to be noted that this research also has its limitations. At first, this Thesis sought to evaluate the most important indicators of the NIP. Unfortunately, there was no possibility of displaying an evaluation of all the indicators of the NIP. This limitation had both word-related reasons due to the qualitative approach, and reasons that some indicators were unavailable. However, it is possible that some goals were in fact achieved, which has implications for interpreting the effectiveness of the NIP. Second, it is important to note that the above results are not automatically caused by the development aid provided by the European Union. As mentioned in the literature review, there are many actors in the field of development in Nigeria, all contributing different forms of aid. Also, context, strategies and tools can affect the ultimate effectiveness of development assistance. Therefore, it is far too easy to state that European development aid and effectiveness have a cause-and-effect relationship.

Due to these research restraints, it is valuable to conduct some more research on the topic of aid effectiveness. The European Union funded another development project in 2021: the Multi-Annual Indicative Programme (MIP). This project is very similar to the National Indicative Programme (NIP), but has slightly different policy objectives that the EU says are more in line with "future challenges" and make "the most of the EU-Nigeria partnership" (European Union, 2021, p. 2). It could be an interesting topic for follow-up research, as it could be investigated whether lessons from the NIP are learned and improvements are visible in the MIP. In addition, this Thesis has mainly focused on the effectiveness of development aid in the form of money. However, it has been argued that there are multiple forms of development aid such as education. These forms have not been discussed but could indeed influence the ultimate effectiveness of development aid. It could therefore be valuable to do further research on this.

Second, researching the reporting method of Nigerian agencies can be of added value. For some objectives, the European Union chose to verify them only with Nigerian agencies such as the Federal Ministry of Health, or the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission (European Union, 2014, p. 30-32). However, the Table 1.3 and 1.4 on immunization for Measles show interesting results. For example, vaccination rates are above 100%. An investigation into how this is possible and how this could be improved could possibly might lead to better insights in the future when it comes to aid effectiveness. Finally, it can be valuable to measure the effectiveness of development assistance from external actors. For example, as argued in the theoretical framework, Chinese development aid has fewer conditionalities than European development funds. This could possibly lead to a different outcome of effectiveness. Further research into this topic might lead to new insights as well.

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Appendix A: National Indicative Programme (European Union, 2014, p. 36)

Table 4.1: Allocation of money to sectors in the National Indicative Program (2014-2020)

	Indicative allocation	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Sector 1: Health	240 million euros	10 million euros	12 million euros	120 million euros	60 million euros	38 million euros	-	-
Sector 2: Energy	150 million euros	-	-	70 million euros	50 million euros	30 million euros	-	-
Sector 3: Good governance	90 million euros	15 million euros	-	35 million euros	25 million euros	15 million euros	-	-
Other measures	15 million euros	-	-	15 million euros	-	-	-	-
Support measures	17 million euros	3 million euros	8 million euros	5,5 million euros	-	-	-	-
Total spending	512 million euros	28 million euros	20 million euros	245,5 million euros	135 million euros	83 million euros	-	-

Appendix B: overview of indicators and assessment

Table 4.2: Indicators used per objective and assessment

<i>Sectors of the NIP</i>	<i>Objective(s) tested</i>	<i>NGO report used and indicators</i>	<i>Assessment</i>
Sector 1: Health, Nutrition and Resilience	1.2) Maternal and child mortality and morbidity rates are reduced	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Humanitarian Situation Report (UNICEF) - Mortality rate (World Bank) 	Succeeded
	1.1) Improved quality primary health care delivery systems at LGA and State level especially in the northern states of Nigeria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Measles Immunization Coverage (FMOH) 	Succeeded
Sector 2: Sustainable Energy and Access to Electricity	3.2) Improved provision of electricity particularly from renewable sources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Access to electricity population (World Bank) - Access to electricity urban areas (World Bank) - Access to electricity (rural areas) 	Succeeded, however, West-African objective not met
	3.2) Improved provision of electricity particularly from renewable sources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Share of renewables in energy consumption (International Energy Agency) 	Failed
Sector 3: Rule of law, governance and democracy	2.1) Credible, fair and transparent elections organised at national, state and local government level.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Freedom House Index 	Failed
	2.3) More popular participation in the conduct of peaceful elections and in the entire democratic process, from political party to	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Voter Turnout national Elections (International Idea) 	Failed

	national election levels.		
	1.1) Improved rule of law and access to justice though more independent, effective, responsive and transparent justice sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rule of Law Index (World Justice Project) - Corruption and anticorruption efforts in Nigeria (Transparency International) 	Failed
	1.2) Reduce corruption in order to improve accountability and strengthen capacity CSO's, media and communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Corruption and anticorruption efforts in Nigeria (Transparency International) - Corruption Perception Index 	Failed