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Vries, Daan de

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# CSDP mission's effectiveness: An analysis of Georgia and Ukraine

Bachelor Thesis

Daan de Vries



Universiteit  
Leiden

External Relations of the European Union

Dr. K.M. Pomorska

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## **Abstract**

The EU is a leader on the international stage in peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and strengthening international security. An important tool used by the EU for this purpose are the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions. However, it is not clear whether these missions are effective since there is no consensus in the academic literature on this. The trend among most scholars is negative, but others argue that there are signs for optimism. These differences arise, among other things, from the different perspectives that can be held, namely that of the implementer or the receiver. In the academic literature there is more harmony when it comes to which factors influence the effectiveness of missions. Of these, The level of local ownership, sensitivity to unique local dynamics, the amount of budget, the unity of actors, and the level of human capacity stand out. The European Union Advisory Mission in Ukraine and the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia are two CSDP missions with a very different approach but with a comparable international context for the European Union. The former is focused on reforming the security sector, where the latter has been implemented with the aim of not allowing hostilities to recur. Both Ukraine and Georgia are active in the Eastern Partnership of the European Union and have a so-called Association Agreement with the EU. According to the literature, the latter can contribute as leverage to the success of a mission. In addition, both countries have a similar geostrategic position and have to deal with the same external threat, namely Russia. Based on the analysis of these two missions, it is not possible to give a generalised answer to the question of how effective CSDP missions are. However, it has emerged that the EUMM in Georgia was a considerable success and has proven to be more effective than the EUAM in Ukraine, which has not had major successes. These contradictory results show that CSDP missions should not be levelled out in advance when it comes to Effectiveness. The results of the analysis also show that the level of local ownership, sensitivity to unique local dynamics, and the unity of actors in particular influenced the degree of effectiveness of the missions. In addition, this analysis indicates that mission effectiveness and local perception of effectiveness are not related to the attitude of the local population towards the European Union. This may have implications for the academic literature that claims this is the case, but more research is needed to confirm this. In addition, this research has shown that both missions are unable to improve the level of democracy in the host states, which decreased significantly in both cases. This creates a practical implication for the European Union when implementing CSDP missions in the future.

## Introduction

The European Union is taking the lead on the international stage when it comes to peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and strengthening the international security. An important tool for the European Union in these areas are the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations (European External Action Service, 2023c). These CSDP activities contribute with military and civilian assets to the approach of the European Union towards crisis management. At the moment there are 24 active CSDP missions spread over the world (European External Action Service, 2023c). The European Union does not publicly share the total expenses of these missions. However, the missions are mainly financed out of the budget of the Common Security and Foreign Policy, which works with a budget of 2.68 billion euros over the period 2021-2027 (European Union, 2021, p. 26). Noting that these missions are a costly measure, positive results can be expected in exchange. Nevertheless, there is no consensus on the effectiveness of those missions in the academic literature. The tendency is mostly pessimistic but conclusions on the effectiveness are often contradictory and depend on the chosen perspective. Effectiveness of missions can be measured from out of an implementer or receiver perspective. Also, differences are found in the literature based on how narrow the effectivity is being mentioned. Depending on the point of view, the mission evaluation can vary greatly (Zupančič et al., 2018, p. 600). To add to this debate on effectiveness this research will try to answer the following question while taking both perspectives into account:

*RQ: How effective are the Common Security and Defence Policy missions?*

A lot has been written on the factors which cause the results of the missions. Many factors are found in analyses of different missions. Some of these are undisputed in the literature, this concerns: The level of local ownership, sensitivity to unique local dynamics, the amount of budget, the unity of actors, and the level of human capacity (Baciu & Friede, Friesendorf et al., 2023; 2020; Larivé, 2012; Mahr, 2018; Peters et al., 2022; Rieker & Blockmans, 2018; Zarembo, 2017; Zupančič et al., 2018). This research also dives into the causes of the found degree of effectiveness when answering the research question. These factors from the literature are used for this purpose.

## Theoretical Framework

As mentioned above, effectiveness can be measured from multiple points of view, such as the point of the implementer or the receiver. Following Zarembo (2017) the perceptions of effectiveness of CSDP missions differ from the European Union and the hosting countries (pp. 190-191). Traditionally scholars evaluate from the perspective of the implementer. The author states that perceptions of the subjects are also important for the determination of success (pp. 192-194). The local perspectives on the effectivity of a mission can be of importance to the implementer. Since this perception of the receiver has impact on the relationship between the mission and the local beneficiaries as well on the local ownership of the mission (p. 202). Peters et al. (2022) agree and state that local ownership can be crucial for the outcome of the mission and that local ownership is exactly the weakness of CSDP missions (p. 23). Zarembo (2017) found in her case study on Ukraine that missions are considered as effective by receivers when three requirements are met by the implementer. First, when the local counterparts are part of the mandate before the mission is launched. Second, when the mission adapts to the needs of the host state, the mission needs to be tailored to the specific situation to achieve this. Third, when the mission goes fast and is proactive while working together with the host state (p. 202). The author looked at two CSDP missions in Ukraine for her research, the European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) and the European Union Border Assistant Mission (EUBAM). The latter was more flexible due to its hybrid nature where the EUAM had a more political and traditional mechanism. According to the author it was easier to adapt to the unique dynamics of the country for the EUBAM thanks to its flexibility and thus was considered more effective (p. 202).

Peters et al. (2022) did look from the viewpoint of the implementing side of CSDP missions. Following the authors, all objectives of the CSDP missions originate from the European Union's Strategic Objectives that are set by the Treaty of Lisbon. They consist out of preserving peace, preventing conflict, and strengthening the international security (p. 5). While analysing three CSDP missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Mali the authors found that the missions had effect, but this was not sustainable (pp. 23-24). This was due to different factors that influenced the effectiveness of the missions. The factors form hard challenges for the European Union foreign policy and the authors conclude that these are reasons to be sober about the potential of the missions (pp. 27-28). Those challenges are present at different levels of CSDP mission analysis (p. 13). First, there are the policy preferences of EU member states and the level of coherent implementation. A mission can be successful if there is timely

provision of sufficient funding, trained personal, and required equipment. Across different missions the financial restrictions posed a problem and those stand or fall with the commitment of the EU member states (Peters et al., 2022, p. 14; Baciu & Friede, 2020, pp. 401-402). Second, the unity of actors is influencing the effectiveness of CSDP missions. Unity of actors is referring to the level of integration of all actors intervening in a state. The European Union is often not the only international actor intervening in a crisis situation. For example, the United Nations and NATO deploy their own missions too (Peters et al., 2022, pp. 15-16). A good example of the lack of unity of actors as described by the authors can be found in the research of Larivé (2012) on the CSDP mission in Afghanistan. Both NATO and the EU are active in Afghanistan with their own police training missions. However, the presence of both actors and the absence of formal agreements is causing problems for the CSDP mission of the EU, even putting the security of the mission personnel at risk (pp. 196-197). A third factor is the ambiguity of CSDP missions. There is an existing tension between political leadership of member states and the representation of the European Union as a whole. An example is the French presence in Mali which causes neo-colonial sentiments; this reflected on the image of the European Union too (Peters et al., 2022, p. 16). Another factor is the politicisation of the missions in the member states. This results in the domestic discourse of those member states spilling over to the policy (p. 16). As fifth there is the complexity of policymaking. This has two dimensions: The first one is the complexity of the multiple institutions of the European Union foreign policy and the coordination challenge that comes with it (pp. 17-18). The second dimension of complex policymaking is attached to the pragmatism on the ground. The different places where missions are implemented all have different political and societal premises. This means that the policy should be based on those premises and not solely on common ideas on security and defence policy to be effective (Peters et al., 2022, pp. 19-20). This overlaps with one of the three factors that influence the local perception of the effectiveness of the mission in the host state following Zarembo (2017, p. 202).

Friesendorf et al. (2023) state that the effectivity of CSDP missions remains debatable (p. 76). The authors researched the challenges of effective CSDP missions from the perspective of those at the forefront of implementation. This is because the authors consider mission members, the staff on the ground, as individual actors when it comes to implementation (p. 65). They found that the mission members mostly see technical challenges that influence the effectiveness of the missions. As a first example the level of control from Brussels is

mentioned as negatively influencing the effectivity (p. 76). Second, in-mission bureaucracy is regarded by mission members as a nuisance when trying to accomplish the objectives. For example, the handover procedures are often experienced as stifling (pp. 76-77). Another main challenge following forefront experts is related to staffing capable personnel (p. 77). This issue is not standing alone but is also found by Larivé (2012) in a case study on the CSDP police mission in Afghanistan. The author even stated that limited human capabilities are recurrent in CSDP missions (p. 198). Friesendorf et al. (2023) conclude their article with the statement that missions are not doomed to fail despite those challenges since the personnel learns to deal with them (p. 77).

This article of Friesendorf et al. (2023) is focusing on the micropolitics and can be better understood while looking at the relevant theories related to external interventions of the European Union (p. 64). The first and possibly most influential theory related to external interventions of the European Union is the capability-expectation gap of Hill. The gap between what the European Union is expected to deliver and what they can achieve due to limited resources, instruments, and divergent interests (p. 64). In recent years, the emphasis has been on this last factor. But following Rieker and Blockmans (2018) this is not the full story and there is the need of two more elements, especially when it comes to crisis response in external countries (p. 2). The first one is the intention-implementation gap. This gap exists when there is a lack in one of the implementation elements. Those are for example, translating objectives into decisions, deploying the necessary resources, and responding with one voice (p. 2). But the theory also focuses on how missions on the ground are carried out by different European Union institutions and its Member States, and on how other actors strengthen or undermine the European Union's activities (p. 2). Peters et al. (2022) is an example of research based on the theory of the intention-implementation gap, for example the earlier explained concept of "unity of actors" (pp. 15-16). Also, the research of Friesendorf et al. (2023) builds on this theory but is, as stated above, focussing on the very micropolitical side of implementation (p. 64). The second theory of Rieker and Blockmans (2018) is the implementation-perception gap. The theory is based on the idea that the capabilities to meet up with the expectations depend on the support of local authorities (p. 2). The earlier discussed research of Zarembo (2017) is using this theory to point out the importance of local ownership and local perceptions of effectivity for the effectivity for CSDP missions (p. 202). Rieker and Blockmans (2018), found in their analysis that the European Union succeeds in setting clear objectives and has the right institutional framework, decision-making capacities,

and legal framework to follow up on these (p. 16). So Rieker and Blockmans (2018) proved that the divergent interests are not the main cause of the capability-expectation gap. However, the limited resources and less-developed capacity to make use of existing knowledge make it hard to meet up with the expectations (p. 16). Larivé (2012) agrees that the limited financial capabilities are causing problems for the effectivity of CSDP missions (p. 198). But he does not fully agree with all findings. In his research focussing on the mission in Afghanistan, institutional failure and poorly formulated mandates emerge as causes for the failure of the mission (Larivé, 2012, p. 198). This is contradictory to the statement of Rieker and Blockmans (2018) who described the institutional framework and objectives as right and clear (p. 16). The authors furthermore state that the European Union is doing a good job in closing the intention-implementation gap. However, the implementation-perception gap remains due to a lack of deep understanding of various conflicts and their dynamics. While local ownership is regarded as important by the Union, it failed in achieving this goal (p. 16).

Zupančič et al. (2018) analysed the CSDP mission in Kosovo, EULEX. The authors found three key elements of the mission. The first one is the observation that the European Union is not aware yet of the best moment to end the mission. This is shown by the finding that at the moment of analysing the majority of the population, local actors, and even personnel are questioning the duration of the mission (p. 610). Second, the effectivity of the mission is undermined by the uncoordinated involvement of internal and external actors (p. 600). This is again a finding that under stripes the intention-implementation gap. But the finding is contradictory to the conclusion of Rieker and Blockmans (2018) who stated that this gap was, at least partly, closed due to efforts of the European Union (p. 16). The third finding of Zupančič et al. (2018) is concerning the European Union's insufficient sensitivity to the unique dynamics of every mission and the receiving country (p. 600). Despite those deficiencies that were found in the analysis of EULEX the authors state that it was an overall meaningful contribution to preventing violence in the region (p. 609). Since the mission successfully achieved its politico-strategic goals it must be regarded as an effective effort in some areas from an implementation perspective (p. 609). Ewa Mahr (2018) also researched EULEX but with a focus on the local contestation, thus from the receiver perspective. The mission in Kosovo unexpectedly experienced dissatisfaction in the form of contestation from the local population (pp. 73-74). As also mentioned above in the article of Zupančič et al. (2018) this came with dispute about the length of the stay (p. 610). For this contestation the author found two main reasons. The first of which, was the local perception that the mission



violated the sovereignty of the country. This led to big protests and at times violent behaviour of the population (p. 88). The fact that the European Union did not expect any contestation and considered the mission as apolitical shows the European Union's underestimation of the local context (p. 89). This left EULEX insufficiently prepared which influenced the effectiveness of the mission. The second reason for public contestation against the mission, is the perceived ineffectiveness of the mission. This caused mainly public criticism in the country (p. 88). The link between effectivity and resistance has all to do with expectations. The high expectations at the implementation of the mission created legitimacy for the actions of the mission and resulted in the absence of resistance. However, the expectations turned out to be too high and the mission could not meet them. This evolved in perceived ineffectiveness and came with a lot of resistance (p. 89). The European Union contributed to the capability-expectation gap themselves in this case. By campaigning with great upcoming results in the fight against corruption while in reality these were not forthcoming (p. 86). This had to do with multiple factors which harmed the effectivity of the mission. The first was the lack of competence of the personnel and the transfer of knowledge for rapidly shifting positions (p. 86). These findings are consistent with those of Friesendorf et al (2023, pp. 76-77) which were mentioned earlier. Further, the closed top-down approach of the mission, where decisions are made on the highest level and then communicated to the rest, made that the local actors were not treated as equal partners and this harmed the effectiveness (Mahr, 2018, p. 86). This is in line with the implementation-perception gap theory of Rieker and Blockmans (2018, p. 2).

Where Mahr (2018) focused on the different perspectives from the local actors and population versus those of the mission personnel and the European Union in her article, Tartir and Ejodus (2018) have a slightly different focus. In their case study on the CSDP mission in Palestine they revealed a wide gap between the perspectives on effectiveness, with the European Union and local actors on one side and the Palestinian population on the other (Tartir & Ejodus, 2018, p. 159). Following the European Union, the mission was considered a success, since it effectively professionalised the police forces and rule of law with eye for local ownership (pp. 142-143). From a technocratic perspective, so following purely technical experts, the mission can be considered as effective (p. 159). However, the political reality is different, the mission created new insecurities for the ordinary citizens of Palestina. The mission did effectively professionalise a police force but there is still no sign of a democratic nor an independent state of Palestina. In fact, the police are under the authority of the Palestinian Authority (PA).

Following the authors the PA is in authoritarian decline (pp. 159-160). Without prospects for a democratic Palestinian state, the citizens are now exposed to a professional and politicised police force that cannot be held democratically accountable for their actions. This all with resources and legitimacy of the European Union (p. 160). The CSDP mission has effectively fulfilled the objectives of the mandate. Nevertheless, it resulted in the opposite of the values of the European Union's foreign policy, from which freedom and democracy are part (p. 160).

Herrberg (2021) writes about the activities of the EEAS on mediation, which also the CSDP missions are a part of. Following the author the efforts of the EEAS in Georgia can be considered as a success story, from the mediation resulting in a truce to effectively maintaining it. One of the key elements causing this success is the Association Agreement between Georgia and the European Union. This agreement has been used by the European Union as a positive incentive to make Georgia follow the path that the European Union set out for them (p. 143).

In summary, there are multiple points of view, differing perspectives can vary the mission evaluation (Zupančič et al., 2018, p. 600). Researchers can approach CSDP missions from the implementer or from the receiver. But the implementing and receiving side are not in all cases the same. The local actors can be implementing partners of the mission, for example in the case of Palestine, but can also be left out and part of the receivers, as in the case of Kosovo (Mahr, 2018; Tartir & Ejodus, 2018). When researchers approach CSDP missions from the receiver's perspective, the level of local ownership is considered as crucial, just as the sensitivity to the unique dynamics of every case (Mahr, 2018; Zarembo, 2017). Even from the implementing perspective these are being mentioned by multiple studies as greatly affecting the effectiveness (Peters et al. 2022; Rieker & Blockmans, 2018; Zupančič et al. 2018). In the literature which approaches the missions from the implementing perspective there is a wide variety of factors which influence the effectiveness of the CSDP missions. Almost all these factors can be summarised in three theories on the effectivity of CSDP missions. The capability-expectation gap, the intention-implementation gap, and the implementation-perception gap (Rieker & Blockmans, 2018). To find those factors the authors analysed different missions. Friesendorf et al. (2023) were right when he stated that the effectivity remains debatable (p. 76). Peters et al. (2022) consider the level of effectiveness in their researched cases as negative. Just like Mahr (2018) states about the mission in Kosovo from a receiving perspective, this while Zupančič et al. (2018) regard the same mission as very effective in some areas from the implementer point of view. Herrberg (2021) even claimed the

mission in Georgia as a success proving the point of Friesendorf et al. (2023) that CSDP missions are not doomed to fail. The best example of the disagreement in the literature is given by Tartir and Ejodus (2018) who state that the mission in Palestina has been very effective in a technocratic way but not when considered from a receiver perspective. Concluding, in the literature there is consensus on several factors which influence the effectiveness of CSDP missions, even from different perspectives. The factors for which considerable agreement was found in the literature have been added to Table 1. The discussed literature does not provide a clear answer to the question of how effective the missions are despite these challenges. This results in the following research question:

*RQ: How effective are the Common Security and Defence Policy missions?*

**Table 1. Factors which influence the level of effectiveness and the relation.**

Factor of influence	Relation between factor and effectiveness
Level of local ownership (Mahr, 2018; Peters et al., 2022; Zarembo, 2017).	Positive
Level of sensitivity to unique local dynamics (Mahr, 2018; Peters et al., 2022; Rieker & Blockmans, 2018; Zarembo, 2017; Zupančič et al., 2018).	Positive
Amount of Budget (Baciu & Friede, 2020; Peters et al., 2022; Rieker & Blockmans, 2018)	Positive
Unity of actors (Larivé, 2012; Peters et al., 2022; Rieker & Blockmans, 2018; Zupančič et al., 2018)	Positive
Level of human capacity (Friesendorf et al., 2023; Larivé, 2012; Mahr, 2018)	Positive

## Expectations

As stated above there is no consensus in the academic literature on the effectiveness of CSDP missions. To overcome this, more in-depth research on the effectivity is necessary. Therefore, this research will not be testing hypotheses based on the literature but will be exploratory in nature, the focus is on better understanding CSDP missions. This will be done by analysing two cases that are different in nature but take place in a similar context. Based on the literature it is possible for both cases to formulate expectations, regardless of the absence of hypotheses. Expectations for a mission will be set relative to the other case. Based on the literature, the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia has a better chance on being effective than the European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) in Ukraine. This is due to multiple factors: First, Zarembo (2017) defined the EUAM in Ukraine as a political mission with a traditional mechanism which made it inflexible. Thus, it was hard for the mission to adapt to the unique character and dynamics of the receiving country (p. 202). As seen in Table 1 the level of sensitivity to unique local dynamics has a positive relation with the level of effectiveness. Noting that the sensitivity was low at the EUAM this could be an indicator for a low level of effectiveness, this indicator cannot be found in academic literature on the mission in Georgia. Second, as stated earlier, Peters et al. (2022) concluded that the CSDP missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Mali had no sustainable effect. This is because of different factors but most importantly a lack of local ownership (pp. 23-24). They also stated that this finding is not case specific but of general validity, which could be an indicator of a low level of effectiveness of the mission in Ukraine (p. 24). This, because the European Union Advisory Mission in Ukraine had similar goals as the European Union Advisory Mission in Iraq, which was analysed by Peters et al. (2022). Both missions had a focus on advising the security sector in the country (European External Action Service, 2023c). In addition to this general claim, Zarembo (2017) also emphasises the lack of local ownership in the specific case of the EUAM in Ukraine. Because the local beneficiaries were not included in the writing of the mandate, not all the beneficiaries were aware of being beneficiary while other Ukrainian institutions were under the impression they were beneficiaries but were not in reality (p. 199). This resulted in a low level of local ownership which is, as seen in table 1, related to a low level of effectiveness. Again, this cannot be found in the literature for the case of Georgia.

## **Research design**

The main question of this research is: *How effective are the Common Security and Defence Policy missions?* In this question the independent variable is the mission. The mission refers to all activities carried out under the name of the mission in question. The missions used in this qualitative case study are the European Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia and the European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) in Ukraine. The independent variables are the factors which influence the effectivity. These were found in the theoretical framework earlier. The dependent variable is effectivity. In the first part of the analysis this research will determine whether the missions are effective or not. This will be done by analysing the mission on three levels based on the literature. First, the extent to which the mission has achieved its own set goals, which is regarded as the implementer perspective on effectivity. Second, the extent to which the local population considered the mission as effective, this will show the receiver perspective. Afterwards, when the degree of effectiveness for the missions has been determined, the research will try to explain which factors, found in the literature, caused the level of effectiveness for the specific cases. This will be done by analysing evaluation reports of the missions and case specific academic research.

## **Methodology**

The selected cases for this research are the CSDP missions in Georgia and Ukraine which form the so-called Association Trio with Moldova (Dobrescu, 2023, p. 540). All three countries form interesting case studies since they all engage in the European Union's Eastern Partnership and have an association agreement with the European Union (Herrberg, 2021, p. 143). As stated earlier, Herrberg (2021) found in the case of Georgia that the association agreement could function as leverage and increase the effectivity (p. 143). This finding creates the presumption that this could also be the case in other countries with a similar agreement. Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova are, as stated above, part of the Eastern Partnership of the European Union. This initiative aims on a transformation in the region of eastern Europe from the current situation to an environment of desecuritisation of conflicts, cooperation, and stability (Christou, 2008, pp. 207-208). In the same year as the start of the Partnership, 2008, the conflict between Georgia and Russia erupted and the CSDP mission was instituted based on those armed hostilities later the same year. This caused a lot of concern about the conflict preventive abilities of the European Union (pp. 207-208). However, according to the article of Christou (2008) there are positive transformations due to

the Partnership and initiatives in the area have potential although it was for him still too early to evaluate the effectivity (pp. 224-225). Besides that, all countries share a similar geostrategic environment and common security threats. Those threats translate to the Russo-Ukraine war, the de-facto territorial occupation of 20% of Georgia's territory by Russia, and the Russian support for the separatist region Transnistria in Moldova (Dobrescu, 2023, p. 540). However, there has been decided to only conduct research on the cases of Ukraine and Georgia and not on Moldova, even though there is an active CSDP mission in the last-named state. This mission was established on the 24<sup>th</sup> of April 2023, so at this moment there is still a lack of data on the effectivity of the mission and is it too soon to evaluate the mission (European External Action Service, 2023a). The cases which are selected have very different goals and have been implemented due to various causes. The cases are selected because the implemented missions are very different in their nature but taking place in a comparable geostrategic region. In this way, the evaluation is best suited to determine the effectiveness of CSDP missions in general, rather than missions with a specific purpose.

The European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia was the biggest CSDP monitoring mission at the moment of implementation (Herrberg, 2021, p. 143). The mission deployed in 2008 is a self-proclaimed success story (European External Action Service, 2019). The European Union Advisory Mission in Ukraine was established in 2014, just as the association agreement between Ukraine and the European Union. For the latter, it is important that the starting point used will be 2014, the year of the implementation. The evaluation will be done up to and including 2021, since the mandate of the EUAM has changed on a large scale since the beginning of the Russian invasion in Ukraine in February 2022. The European Council concluded on the 13<sup>th</sup> of April 2022 that the ongoing conflict after the Russian invasion created a situation that could deteriorate and impede the achievements of the CSDP mission (European Union, 2022). Furthermore, the Council concluded that the EUAM should assist Ukraine in the investigation of international crimes, something very different than the earlier implemented mission mandate (European Union, 2022). For Georgia the evaluation will be done from the year of implementation till current times since the mission is active until the 14<sup>th</sup> of December 2024 without substantial changes in the mandate.

## **Operationalisation**

The European Union's Strategic Objectives are inappropriate as research standards, since they are hardly ever met by international interventions and cannot be used to evaluate certain policy (Peters et al., 2022, pp. 5-6). Therefore, there are intermediate objectives, those are defined in the mandates of CSDP missions. The intermediate objectives represent the indispensable conditions for a sustainable impact of the CSDP mission. The "intermediate" in the intermediate objectives refers to the transition from strategy to operationalisation. That is where the third type of objectives come in, the operational objectives. This one is also defined in the mission mandate. Following Peters et al. (2022) this is the part of the objectives which form the centre for policy evaluation. For example, in the operational objectives the intended number of trained police officers or the intended institutional reforms are mentioned (pp. 5-6).

To evaluate the effectiveness of the CSDP missions, Peters et al. (2022) combine the objectives from the mission mandate with relevant indexes. This research will handle the same design with different cases and corresponding operationalisation in the form of indexes of the objectives that are written down in the mandate of those cases.

The EUMM in Georgia is aiming on no return to hostilities, the facilitation of the resumption to safe and normal life for civilians on both sides, confidence building between conflict parties, and informing EU policy in the region. This all is in full compliance with the Six-Point Agreement that ended the conflict between Georgia and Russia. The EUMM in Georgia has the goal to contribute to long-term stability in Georgia and its region, and the short-term stabilisation with reduced risk on the return of hostilities (European Union, 2023). These goals will be part of the analysis in the form of an index, but there are more operational objectives of this mission. Following an assessment of the Folke Bernadotte Academy, the Swedish government agency for peace, security, and development, the mandate of the mission is meant to monitor and contribute to the following aspects: Freedom of movement, compliance with human rights, rule of law, effective law enforcement structures, and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees (Åhlin & Olsson, 2014, p. 18). These factors will be used as indicators for the analysis of the mission.

The EUAM in Ukraine focused on assisting Ukraine in reforming the civilian security sector of the country through strategic advice and practical support (European Union Advisory Mission Ukraine, n.d.-a). The mission's mandate was established by means of a council decision in which the following operational objectives can be found: Delivering the rule of

law, increased public confidence and trust in the police and rule of law, increased human rights conditions, and increased accountability over security sector (European Union, 2014, pp. 43-44). Those will all be analysed in the form of indexes in this research. However, it is difficult to collect data that can function as an indicator for the security sector specifically. That is why it was decided to include accountability as an indicator, but for the entire government. In order to do justice to the mission's approach, the presence of corruption will also be included as an indicator. Considering the EUAM states that corruption is perhaps the biggest obstacle on the road to reform, the mission therefore aims to contribute to the anti-corruption capabilities of the security sector (European Union Advisory Mission Ukraine, n.d.-b). While data and indicators were not specifically available for accountability of the security sector, public confidence in the rule of law is too broad an indicator for the available data. Therefore, the public trust in the rule of law will be analysed by taking the indicators of public trust in courts and the police, as relevant institutions. The latter because, according to the EUAM itself, it is particularly important for the police to reestablish trust with the people (European Union Advisory Mission Ukraine, n.d.-c).

As stated earlier the operational objectives of the missions form the inspiration for the indexes to be evaluated. However, the goals of both missions are not completely similar, as set out above. Apart from these goals that drive the specific missions, there are common objectives that all activities of the European Union foreign policy aim for. These have been recorded in article 21 of the Treaty on the European Union. Those will also be operationalised into indexes. This is to prevent a mission from being labelled as effective when it successfully fulfils the objectives of the mandate with an eye for local ownership, but at the same time pass over the values of the European Union's foreign policy, as Tartir and Ejodus (2018) found in the case of the mission in Palestine.

Treaty on the European Union, Article 21, paragraph 1:

*The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.*

(European Union, 2016, p. 28)



The analysis will also include the following indicators, derived from this article, for both cases: a level of democracy index, an index for the level of rule of law, an index for the human rights conditions, and an index for the level of freedom. As can be seen in the article above, there are more than these four relevant factors, but they are very difficult to capture in indexes, so only these will be included in the analysis.

Because there is no possibility of conducting interviews or any other form of field research given the time and resources for this thesis, another approach has been chosen. There will be used a relevant available index to give an indication of the local perceptions. The indicator will be an index concerning the support of the European Union in the receiving country. Declining trends in this level of support may indicate problems related to the local perspective on the mission.

## Analysis

**Table 2. Indicators for the effectiveness of the EUMM in Georgia with corresponding indexes from the start and end of the timespan.**

	<b>Indicator</b>	<b>At start of mission</b>	<b>At end of mission</b>
<b>Stability and no return of violence</b>	Worldwide Governance Indicators: Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism. Percentile Rank.	2008: 16,83 (World Bank, n.d.-c).	2022: 28,77 (World Bank, n.d.-c).
<b>Freedom of movement</b>	The Human Freedom Index 2023: movement. Scale 1-10.	2008: 8,0 (Vásquez et al., 2023, p. 165)	2023: 8,2 (Vásquez et al., 2023, p. 164)
<b>The return of internally displaced persons</b>	Internally displaced people. Total number.	2009: 240.000 (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, n.d.).	2023: 311.000 (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, n.d.).
<b>Effective law enforcement structures</b>	Worldwide Governance Indicators: Government effectiveness. Percentile rank.	2008: 63,59 (World Bank, n.d.-c).	2022: 72,64 (World Bank, n.d.-c).
<b>Democracy</b>	Democracy score. Scale 1-7.	2008: 4,79 (Freedom House, 2011, p. 215).	2023: 3,04 (Freedom House, 2023, p. 28).
<b>Human rights</b>	Human rights index. Scale 0-1.	2008: 0,72 (Our World in Data, n.d.).	2023: 0,87 (Our World in Data, n.d.).

<b>Rule of law</b>	Rule of law: percentile rank.	2008: 48 (World Bank, n.d.-a).	2023: 57 (World Bank, n.d.-a)
<b>Freedom</b>	The Human Freedom Index 2023: human freedom. Scale 1-10.	2008: 7,34 (Vásquez et al., 2023, p. 165)	2023: 7,80 (Vásquez et al., 2023, p. 164)
<b>Support for the European Union</b>	Trust the European Union. Percentage of Population.	2009: 54 (The Caucasus Research Resource Centers, 2009).	2021: 51 (The Caucasus Research Resource Centers, 2021).

Looking at the goals for the mission, the mission seems to be a predominantly success. Progress has been made in terms of the absence of violence. Not only when considering the war between Georgia and Russia, which remained a frozen conflict from the moment the mission began (Herrberg, 2021, pp. 142-143). But also, when considering the level of violence before the Russian invasion. Freedom of movement in Georgia has also increased slightly compared to the situation before the mission while the effectiveness of the government in Georgia has improved greatly over the duration of the mission. However, the number of displaced people has also increased, so the mission failed to ensure that more of these people returned than were displaced during the time it was active. A predominantly success is also visible when looking at the core values of the European Union's foreign policy. For example, scores for the status of Human Rights, the rule of law and overall freedom in Georgia all increased over the duration of the mission. Only for the level of democracy was a mutual pattern visible; the level of democracy in Georgia decreased during the period in which the mission took place. Finally, table 2 shows that the extent to which the Georgian population trusts the European Union decreased very slightly during the mission.

Noting that the results of the mission are achieving the goals in most of the areas, it is surprising that the trust in the European Union has decreased in Georgia, instead of increased. The latter is more in line with expectations, as Ewa Mahr (2018) stated that the local perception of the effectiveness of the mission has an important influence on the attitude of the people towards the presence of the European Union (p. 88). This could indicate two things. Firstly, that the local perception of the effectiveness of the mission differs from the actual

effectiveness. Second, it may be the case that the extent to which the population of Georgia trusts the European Union does not depend on the perceived effectiveness of the mission, which would have implications for the generalisation of Mahr's (2018) findings. For the first option there are several possible causes that have previously been found in the literature. The most important of these boil down to a low degree of local ownership and insensitivity to local dynamics (Mahr, 2018; Peters et al., 2022; Rieker & Blockmans, 2018; Zarembo, 2017; Zupančič et al., 2018). However, no signs of this that can be found in evaluation reports. On the contrary, the success of the mission is building on the cooperation of local actors in the mission's confidence-building mechanisms. The most important example is the hotline between the authorities of conflicting parties which is managed by the EUMM. The hotline is being used over 2000 times a year and shows the involvement of local authorities (European External Action Service, 2022, p. 36; European External Action Service, 2023b, p. 26). Besides that, the European External Action Service (2022) notes in its own evaluation of the EUMM that the mission is working in close cooperation with civil society and other relevant actors (p. 37).

Besides the cooperation with local actors and the community another factor can be found in the evaluation reports of the EEAS that overlaps with what was previously observed in the academic literature. These are the signs of coordinated cooperation with other international actors in Georgia. Specifically, the relations of the EUMM with the OSCE are seen as complementing by the EEAS. Several policies and initiatives such as the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) meetings are the result of well-coordinated cooperation (European External Action Service, 2022, pp. 35-36). Also, the EUMM in Georgia functions as the main information source for member states of the European Union and for several other international actors active in the region (European External Action Service, 2023b, p. 27). These observations of the EEAS are underlined by the article by Herrberg (2021). He states in his article that the European Union is cooperating together with the United Nations and the OSCE in facilitating talks between the conflicting parties, as well via the Georgia International Discussion in Geneva as via the aforementioned IPRM meetings. The European Union even funded a Confidence Building Measure Fund which was managed by the United Nations (pp. 142-143). All these findings indicate the presence of the unity of actors, which is one of the influential factors for effectiveness of a CSDP mission according to the previously discussed literature (Larivé, 2012; Peters et al., 2022; Rieker & Blockmans, 2018; Zupančič et al., 2018).

**Table 3. Indicators for the effectiveness of the EUAM in Ukraine with corresponding indexes from the start and end of the timespan.**

	<b>Indicator</b>	<b>At start mission</b>	<b>At end of mission</b>
<b>Public confidence and trust in the rule of law</b>	Trust in Police. percentage of population.	2014: 31,6 (Integrated Values Survey, 2022).	2022: 35,9 (Integrated Values Survey, 2022).
	Trust in Justice system. percentage of population.	2014: 25,2 (Integrated Values Survey, 2022).	2022: 18,8 (Integrated Values Survey, 2022).
<b>Accountability government</b>	Constraints on Government Powers. Scale 0-1.	2015: 0,45 (World Justice Project, n.d.-b).	2021: 0,47 (World Justice Project, n.d.-b)
<b>Corruption</b>	Absence of Corruption. Scale 0-1.	2015: 0,34 (World Justice Project, n.d.-a).	2021: 0,33 (World Justice Project, n.d.-a).
<b>Democracy</b>	Democracy score. Scale 1-7.	2014: 4,93 (Freedom House, 2014, p. 11).	2021: 3,36 (Freedom House, 2021, p. 26).
<b>Human rights</b>	Human rights index. Scale 0-1.	2014: 0,61 (Our World in Data, n.d.)	2021: 0,76 (Our World in Data, n.d.)
<b>Rule of law</b>	Rule of law: percentile rank.	2014: 21 (World Bank, n.d.-b)	2021: 26 (World Bank, n.d.-b)
<b>Freedom</b>	The Human Freedom Index 2023: human freedom. Scale 1-10.	2014: 6,44 (Vásquez et al., 2023, p. 164).	2021: 6.72 (Vásquez et al., 2023, p. 164).

<b>Support for the European Union</b>	Favourable opinion of the European Union. Percentage of population.	2014: 63 (Pew Research Center, 2019, p. 53).	2019: 79 (Pew Research Center, 2019, p. 53).
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Regarding the operational objectives of the EUAM in Ukraine, Table 3 shows that no major successes have been achieved in this area. The degree of confidence in the rule of law, the level of accountability of the government, and the presence of corruption do not show any noteworthy changes. On two objectives of the mission, which are also among the core values of the European Union's foreign policy, there is progress visible during the mission. This concerns the status of human rights conditions and the rule of law in Ukraine, even if the difference in the latter is small. A small improvement is also visible when it comes to the degree of freedom in Ukraine compared to the start of the mission. However, the EUAM has not succeeded in preventing the status of democracy in the country from deteriorating significantly. Despite the results of the mission mentioned above, the percentage of the Ukrainian population that has a positive opinion of the European Union has increased significantly.

These wavering results can be due to several factors. Given the literature previously discussed, the following options emerge. Zarembo (2017) stated that the characteristics of the EUAM in Ukraine are traditional and political in nature. Therefore, it is difficult for the mission to adapt to the unique dynamics of the situation (p. 202). As described earlier, this low level of sensitivity to the local dynamics is widely considered in the literature as causing a lack of effectiveness (Mahr, 2018; Peters et al., 2022; Rieker & Blockmans, 2018; Zarembo, 2017; Zupančič et al., 2018). Following Zarembo (2017) the low degree of adaptation of a mission to the host state is also contributing to the local population's feeling of ineffectiveness (p. 202). As aforementioned, the perception of effectiveness of a mission contributes to the attitude towards the presence of the European Union (Mahr, 2018). However, this result cannot be witnessed in Table 3, just as was the case for the EUMM in Georgia. On the contrary, the favourable opinions on the European Union have increased.

Another possible factor which created a lack of effectivity for the EUAM is the level of local ownership. Zarembo (2017) found a low level of local ownership in the case of the mission in Ukraine. This was especially visible in the drafting of the mandate, which did not involve local actors (p. 199). While analysing the evaluation reports of the EEAS (2022) there are more indicators pointing to a low level of local ownership. The report observes how the mission tried to expand the activities to cover more regions, for example the region of the city of Mariupol. Until 2020, so in the first six years of the mission's mandate, this region with its local agencies and community was completely isolated from the reforms (pp. 38-39).

## **Conclusion and Discussion**

The aim of this research was to gather more information about the effectiveness of the Common Security and Defence Policy missions by answering the question: How effective are CSDP missions? This has been attempted by the means of an analysis of the EUMM in Georgia and the EUAM in Ukraine. Before the analysis was conducted, expectations were established based on the existing literature. The core of the expectations was that the mission in Georgia was more likely to be effective than the mission in Ukraine. This turned out to be true. During the EUMM's time in Georgia, progress was made in almost all areas. Only when it comes to the number of displaced people and the level of democracy has the situation in the country deteriorated. Fewer areas with progress can be observed at the EUAM in Ukraine, the status quo dominates.

In both researched cases there was progress visible in the areas of human rights, the rule of law, and in levels of freedom. All three are part of the values which all activities of the European Union's foreign policy should contribute to. However, there is one more, the democracy. In both cases there was a decline visible in the level of democracy. There was no apparent reason for these decreases in the analysis of the missions, so this requires further research, and the strengthening of the democracy may also require more attention in future CSDP missions.

As stated earlier, there is some consensus in the literature on which factors influence the effectiveness of CSDP missions. This research found indications for the presence of three of them in the analysed cases. The level of local ownership, of sensitivity to local dynamics, and the degree of unity of actors. There is no consensus in the academic literature on the level of effectiveness of CSDP missions. This research under stripes this based on the different outcomes of effectiveness for two different missions taking place in a similar context. Therefore, it is not possible to give an unambiguous answer on the research question. Still did this research add to the existing literature. The fact that the results of the effectiveness of both cases differ in a comparable context also means something for the generalisability of the findings of different authors. For example, the study by Peters et al. (2022) which claims that all findings are generally applicable, while they only found negative results from the missions. The analysis of Georgia proves the opposite. More specifically, the finding of Herrberg (2021), who stated that the Association Agreement functioned as leverage and caused the success of the European Union activities in Georgia (p. 143). This research shows that the



finding cannot be generalised to all hosting states with an Association Agreement with the European Union.

Another important result of this research has implications too for existing literature. Namely for the literature on the relation between perceived effectiveness and the local feeling towards the European Union. For as well the EUMM in Georgia as the EUAM in Ukraine the expected relation was not found. Based on findings of Zarembo (2017) the host state's perceived effectiveness of the missions is depending on local ownership and the sensitivity to the local dynamics. Following Mahr (2018) the perceived effectiveness influences the attitude of the people towards the presence of the European Union. In the case of Georgia high levels of local ownership and sensitivity to local dynamics did not lead to a positive effect on the attitude of the people towards the European Union. Just as for Ukraine low levels of local ownership and insensitivity to local dynamics did not lead to a negative effect on the attitude of people towards the European Union. This means that either the level of local ownership and sensitivity to local dynamics did not shape the perception of effectiveness of the local population in the researched cases, or that the local perception of effectiveness did not influence the attitudes of the local population towards the European Union in the researched cases. Further research is needed to find out which of these options is true.

This research also has its limitations. The most influential limitation on this study are the indicators used for the analysis of the effectiveness of the mission. Even though all Indicators have been selected with the utmost care they are there to give an indication on the effectiveness but cannot show all complete results of the objectives and are not always projecting the whole reality. Other factors than the CSDP mission can influence the indicators as well, but by using indicators it is not possible to control for those factors, nor to measure the effect of the mission on the results. A second limitation has to do with the evaluation reports used for the analysis. The evaluation reports on the CSDP missions are created by the EEAS, which is also the responsible body. This means that there is self-evaluation, so it is important to check whether this is done critically enough. This could explain the fact that there are no indicators found which point to a possible lack of sufficient budget or human capacities, which make an important part of the literature on factors influencing the effectiveness of CSDP missions. Since the EEAS may consciously choose not to publicly criticise their personnel or the bodies of the European Union which collectively decide on the budget.

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