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'Wie wir zu Bosnien kamen': Austro-German Nationalist Media Narratives & the Bosnian Annexation Crisis, 1908-1909

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Citation

Jager, S. (2024). *'Wie wir zu Bosnien kamen': Austro-German Nationalist Media Narratives & the Bosnian Annexation Crisis, 1908-1909*.

Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown)

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Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

‘Wie wir zu Bosnien kamen’:
Austro-German Nationalist Media Narratives &
the Bosnian Annexation Crisis, 1908-1909

By

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**Universiteit
Leiden**
The Netherlands

MA Thesis

Institute of History

Universiteit Leiden

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April 2024

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Introduction

Austrian novelist Stefan Zweig reminisced about early twentieth-century Vienna with profound nostalgia: “Alles in unser fast tausendjährigen österreichischen Monarchie schien auf Dauer gegründet und der Staat selbst der oberste Garant dieser Beständigkeit”, he wrote.¹ The collapse of the Habsburg Empire was to him like a rupture, a regrettable historical accident. This narrative of loss of identity and purpose, which can also be found in other post-Habsburg works, has been called ‘Habsburg nostalgia’.² Conversely, notorious nationalist firebrands like Georg von Schönerer decried the Habsburg Empire as a dysfunctional state, destined to be destroyed by the struggle between its many nationalities. Increasingly, scholarship has tended to side with Zweig on the issue. Gary Cohen, for example, emphasised the sense of civic loyalty which was felt by Habsburg citizens.³ Similarly, Peter Judson has argued that fanatical nationalism held little ideological appeal for the broader population of the Empire.⁴ What then, is the context for these divergent perspectives on the Habsburg legacy?

The Habsburg Empire changed tremendously during the second half of the nineteenth century. The neo-absolutist regime of Emperor Franz Joseph had from its inception in 1848 promoted Germanisation and centralisation, but was forced to reverse course after several catastrophic military defeats. In 1867, following the Hungarian *Ausgleich*, the unitary Austrian Empire was replaced with decentralised Austria-Hungary. These two halves of the Empire were separate to such an extent that Austria-Hungary can best be seen as two states with a shared army and foreign policy. The Austrian half of the Empire was initially dominated by German liberals: nationalists, be it in a civic sense. These liberals were largely anticlerical, opposing the influence of the Catholic Church on Austrian politics.⁵ Starting in the 1880s, their dominance was gradually broken through the extension of suffrage and political participation by national minorities. The result was a proliferation of mass movements, like Social Democracy, and importantly, popular nationalism.⁶ As popular national movements proliferated, they threatened to tear at the fabric of the Empire. The question of how to deal with the conflict between these minorities came to be known as the *Nationalitätenfrage*.

The decline of liberal nationalists created a vacuum and the emergence of other nationalist movements caused concern within German nationalist circles.⁷ Consequently, around the 1880s a new camp emerged within German nationalism: *völkisch* nationalism. It drew support from the recently enfranchised lower and lower-middle classes. It emphasised ethnic nationalism,

¹ “Everything in our almost thousand-year Austrian monarchy seemed to be built to last and the state itself seemed the ultimate guarantor of this stability”: S. Zweig, *Die Welt von Gestern: Erinnerungen eines Europäers*, (Stockholm 1942), p. 15.

² H. Schlipphacke, ‘The Temporalities of Habsburg Nostalgia’, *Journal of Austrian Studies*, 47:2 (2014), p. 1.

³ G. Cohen & J. Feichtinger, ‘Introduction’, in eds. J. Feichtinger & G. Cohen, *Understanding Multiculturalism: The Habsburg Central European Experience* (New York 2014), p. 8-9.

⁴ P. Judson, *The Habsburg Empire: A New History* (Cambridge MA 2016), p. 381.

⁵ N. Wingfield, ‘Emperor Joseph II in the Austrian Imagination up to 1914’, eds. L. Cole & D. Unowsky, *The Limits of Loyalty: Imperial Symbolism, Popular Allegiances, and State Patriotism in the Late Habsburg Monarchy*, (New York 2007), p. 69.

⁶ C. Schorske, *Fin-de-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture* (New York 1981), p. 118.

⁷ P. Pajakowski, ‘The Polish Club, Badeni, and the Austrian Parliamentary Crisis of 1897’, *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, 35:1 (1993), p. 115.

pledging its loyalty to the German Empire rather than the Habsburg Empire.⁸ As other nationalities struggled to attain equal status to the Germans, power dynamics were increasingly seen as a zero-sum game. The ultimate prize of this game was domination over the Habsburg Empire. Its population, institutions and laws served as chips. Any victory for another nationality was therefore perceived by the *völkisch* movement as a loss for the German nation. For example, when the Czech language was granted equal legal status in Bohemia in 1897, the *völkisch* movement reacted with outrage.⁹

These attitudes radicalised the movement, which became more xenophobic and antisemitic by the early twentieth century. Yet another split within the German nationalist camp occurred in the 1890s. Led by Karl Lueger, who would later become mayor of Vienna (1897-1910), the *Christlichsoziale Partei* (CSP) constituted a third faction within German nationalism. The CSP had a complicated relationship with liberal and *völkisch* nationalism. It shared the xenophobia and reactionary ideology of the *völkisch* movement.¹⁰ Lueger, for example, was notorious for his cynical use of antisemitic rhetoric to garner support amongst the Viennese petit bourgeoisie, shopkeepers who resented the rise of Jewish industrialists.¹¹ However, the CSP, dominated by the clergy and high nobility, remained loyal to the Habsburgs.

As these political developments were going on, the Bosnian Crisis broke out in October 1908. Bosnia had at that time unofficially been a part of the Habsburg Empire for some thirty years. In 1878, it was seized from the Ottoman Empire following regional instability caused by a revolt of the Christian population. Bosnia was assigned to Austria-Hungary by the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, but officially remained under Ottoman sovereignty until an official proclamation of sovereignty by Emperor Franz Joseph on 5 October 1908. Following the Young Turk Revolution in July 1908, the Ottoman Empire once again faced political instability. In the autumn of 1908, the Austro-Hungarian and Russian foreign ministers started secret talks to capitalise on this situation and increase their influence on the Balkans. The Russian foreign minister, however, had not properly communicated these talks with his government. Thus, when Austria-Hungary officially moved to annex Bosnia in October, the move was publicly decried as unilateral and illegal by the Russian government. Serbia too, who staked irredentist claims on Bosnia, protested, leading to a crisis which in hindsight bears remarkable similarity to the crisis leading to the First World War.¹² During the winter of 1908/1909, diplomatic escalation and détente, mobilisation and negotiation alternated as the other Great Powers got involved. In the spring of 1909, the Serbians and Russians conceded under diplomatic pressure from Germany, Britain and France. Thus, the crisis finally ended in April 1909, when, through international arbitration, Austro-Hungarian sovereignty over Bosnia was recognised by amending the Treaty of Berlin.

Domestically, the occupation of Bosnia in 1878 had been justified as a temporary *Kulturmission* to civilise the country. However, the 1908 annexation, which came somewhat as a surprise due to the secretive nature of the discussions between the Russian and Austro-Hungarian foreign ministers, meant that the inclusion of the non-German inhabitants of Bosnia was to become permanent. As any shift in the complex national make-up of the Empire was seen in the context

⁸ J. Vermeiren, 'Germany, Austria, and the Idea of the German Nation, 1871–1914', *History Compass*, 9:3 (2011), 205.

⁹ Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, p. 313.

¹⁰ J. W. Boyer, *Karl Lueger (1844-1910): Christlichsoziale Politik als Beruf* (Wien 2010), p. 255.

¹¹ Schorske, *Fin-de-Siècle Vienna*, p. 145.

¹² C.M. Clark, *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe went to War in 1914* (New York 2013), p. 33-38.

of the zero-sum game, the annexation was sure to stoke German nationalist fears.¹³ Thus, the 1908 Annexation Crisis also had major domestic ramifications.

Because of the salience of the *Nationalitätfrage*, it is hardly surprising that the historiographical debate surrounding the twentieth century Habsburg Empire mainly focused on its relationship to nationalism. Generally speaking, three strands of thinking have emerged on the issue. The traditional view is that the Habsburg Empire was a ‘prison of nations’. These accounts placed emphasis on perceived nationalist disturbances. For example, the total dysfunctionality of the Imperial Parliament in Vienna caused by various nationalist groups disrupting the sessions could be pointed at to prove the existence of nationalist struggle.¹⁴ The Habsburg Empire was conceptualised as similar to its neighbours, the autocratic Russian and Ottoman Empires. As many of these historians were from the successor states of the Habsburg Empire like Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, they had a vested interest in downplaying its viability. According to Judson, emphasis on the failings of the old Habsburg Empire served to legitimise these new states.¹⁵ The end of the Cold War brought with it renewed interest in Eastern European history and resulted in a shift in the narrative surrounding the Habsburg Empire, which started Alan Sked’s 1989 book. Although he rejected the teleological paradigm of decline, he still titled his book *The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire*.¹⁶

A more comprehensive reassessment emerged around the position that the Habsburgs managed to foster supranational loyalty, at least amongst elites. Prominent amongst these ‘supranationalist’ was historian István Deák, who argued that the main locus of loyalty of the Austro-Hungarian officer class was the dynasty, and that these officers formed a genuine attachment to the Habsburg Empire.¹⁷ This idea that loyalty to the Emperor, *Kaisertreue*, served as a powerful alternative to nationalism has remained strongly represented in current histories.¹⁸ Gary Cohen offered an alternative solution. He argued that the nineteenth century saw the transformation from “Untertan” to “Bürger” in the Habsburg Empire, because the Austrian state granted its subjects extensive legal rights as citizens.¹⁹ He further echoed the assertion by Karl Renner, future chancellor of Austria, that the nationalities struggled over the state, rather than against it. In Cohen’s view then, the struggle between nationalities was over the state’s resources, not over its legitimacy.²⁰

Besides the traditionalist and the supranationalists, there exists a third strand of historians arguing for the category of ‘national indifference’. Proponents like Tara Zahra have asserted that

¹³ C. Promitzer, ‘The South Slavs in the Austrian Imagination: Serbs and Slovenes in the Changing View from German Nationalism to National Socialism’, in: N. Wingfield, *Creating the Other: Ethnic Conflict & Nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe*, New York (2003), p. 190.

¹⁴ G. Ostermeyer, ‘Bilder aus der Obstruktionszeit des Wiener Reichsrats (1897-1909)’, *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 17:3 (1986), p. 442-443.

¹⁵ Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, p. 451.

¹⁶ A. Sked, *The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire 1815-1918* (London 1989).

¹⁷ I. Deák, *Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps, 1848-1918* (New York 1990).

¹⁸ A. Lindmayr-Brandl, ‘Vom patriotischen Volkslied zur nationalen Kaiserhymne: Formen der Repräsentation in Gott, erhalte Franz, den Kaiser’, in: eds. J. Rüdiger, S. Linsboth & R. Steblin, *Die Repräsentation der Habsburg-Lothringischen Dynastie in Musik, visuellen Medien und Architektur*, (Vienna 2017), p. 106.

¹⁹ G. Cohen, ‘Our Laws, our Taxes, and our Administration: Citizenship in Imperial Austria’, in: O. Bartov & E. Weitz, *Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands* (Bloomington 2013), p. 105.

²⁰ Cohen, ‘Our Laws, Our Taxes’, p. 106.

nineteenth-century Eastern Europeans were aware of what nationalism was, but did not seek to actively participate in it.²¹ Contemporaries and nationalist figures often framed this refusal as backwardness or a lack of modernity. Zahra argued that it rather was a pragmatic response to outside pressures.²² A classic example of this dynamic is the study by Jeremy King on national identity in the Bohemian town of *Budweis/Budějovice*, where the local population became nationalised through the pressure of consecutively Habsburg, Czech and Nazi state institutions to ‘pick’ a nationality.²³ More recently, Judson tried to synthesise these three historiographical stances. He argued that nationalist conflict was more of a ‘borderland’ phenomenon, with little relevancy to the average citizen of the more homogenous parts of the Empire. Rather, nationalist politicians in heterogeneous borderlands between nations would use the rhetoric of nationalist conflict to elicit support from their conationals in homogenous areas for their efforts to ‘nationalise’ the local population to their side, exemplified by the struggles between Czech and German nationalists in Bohemia.²⁴ These conflicts were not destructive in their own right, according to Judson, but they did create a political framework which could eventually be weaponised by nationalist politicians to create their own states during the breakdown of the Habsburg social contract in the First World War.²⁵

Discussion of the Bosnian Crisis itself largely steered clear of the domestic dimension of the annexation and focused on its international consequences. Christopher Clark’s 2013 book on the diplomatic prelude to the First World War, *Sleepwalkers*, is a seminal work in this regard. In it, Clark argued that the Bosnian Crisis was intertwined with the later Balkan wars and became one of the many diplomatic crises which set the template for the 1914 July Crisis.²⁶ In his view, the Bosnian Crisis is important because it focused Europe’s attention on the Balkans as the apple of discord. Conversely, research into the Habsburg occupation of Bosnia has been reluctant to engage with its cross-border dimensions of the Annexation Crisis. The reception of Habsburg rule by the population of Bosnia has been studied by Andrea Baotić-Rustanbegović, who argued that through the use of symbolism in art and public works, the Habsburg administration successfully managed to demarcate the “imperial space, even before Bosnia and Herzegovina was officially annexed to Austro-Hungary”.²⁷ Processes of exchange and transfer have also been analysed. Orientalism has been used as a framework for understanding Austrian conceptions of Bosnian otherness, what they conceived to be the Balkan Orient.²⁸ In her book *Imagining the Balkans*, Maria Todorova advanced the Orientalism-inspired theory of “Balkanism”.²⁹ Balkanism, she

²¹ T. Zahra, ‘Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis’, *Slavic Review*, 69:1 (2010), p. 93-119.

²² Zahra, ‘Imagined Noncommunities’, p. 119.

²³ J. King, *Budweisers in to Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948* (Princeton 2018), p. 189.

²⁴ P. Judson, ‘Marking National Space on the Habsburg Austrian Borderlands, 1880-1918’, in: eds. O. Bartov & E. Weitz, *Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands* (Bloomington 2013), p. 124-125.

²⁵ Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, p. 451-452.

²⁶ Clark, *Sleepwalkers*, p. 558-559.

²⁷ A. Baotić-Rustanbegović, ‘The Presentation of the Habsburg Dynasty in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the Austro-Hungarian Rule 1878-1918: the Case of Public Monuments’, in: eds. J. Rüdiger, S. Linsboth & R. Steblin, *Die Repräsentation der Habsburg-Lothringischen Dynastie in Musik, visuellen Medien und Architektur* (Vienna 2017), p. 182.

²⁸ J. Heiss & J. Feichtinger, ‘Distant Neighbors: Uses of Orientalism in the Late Nineteenth-Century Austro-Hungarian Empire’, in: eds. J. Hodkinson et al., *Deploying Orientalism in Culture and History* (Cambridge 2013), p. 148.

²⁹ M. Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (Oxford 1997), p. 9-10.

argued, reified the Balkans as a land defined by its in-betweenness, “constructed not as the other but as the incomplete self”.³⁰ What stands out in both the Orientalist and Balkanist narratives, is that 1908 is given little attention, implying that the Bosnian Crisis caused little change in attitudes towards Bosnia.

This relative lack of attention for the domestic reactions the Bosnian Crisis is somewhat surprising, given the salience of the issue. The annexation of Bosnia was sure to generate controversy, meaning that it would certainly be discussed domestically. Internationally, the Crisis created uncertainty about the future, as a failure to resolve the issue diplomatically risked dragging Austria-Hungary into a war with Russia and Serbia. When a nation is faced with such threats, the media will certainly be more explicit in announcing their support for the state in a ‘rally around the flag’-effect. Rallying around the flag here means reiterating identity; the media are literally flagging themselves as belonging to a certain group. Furthermore, nationalist rhetoric will be most pronounced in liminal spaces, when there is a sense that the boundaries of the nation are being tugged at. The international controversy already primed the debate into questions surrounding the benefits of annexation in the face of possible war. If there was ever a moment for the narrative of a zero-sum game to manifest itself, then it would be during this time of uncertainty and crisis. Because of this, the time period surrounding the Bosnian Crisis, running from October 1908 to April 1909, is ideal for research into the prevalence of nationalist thought in the Habsburg Empire and its relationship with the state.

Reflecting both the interesting nature of the German nationalist movement, its heterogeneity, dynamism and factionalism, which played such a pivotal role in shaping domestic and foreign policy, as well as the unique advantages the Bosnian Crisis brings in analysing nationalist rhetoric, this thesis aims to investigate Austro-German perceptions of the Bosnian Crisis through a discursive analysis of three German nationalist newspapers: the *Ostdeutsche Rundschau* (‘*Rundschau*’), the *Reichspost*, and the *Neue Freie Presse* (‘*NFP*’). The principle research question will be: to what extent was the nationalist lens used by the Austro-German nationalist press to present the Bosnian Annexation to its readership, from October 1908 to April 1909?

In order to analyse this question, this thesis will be divided into two parts, structured as follows. Part I will analyse the signalling of self-identification. How did the newspapers conceive of themselves and their readership, and how did they convey this? This part therefore centres around narratives of the self, the ‘we’. Part II, in contrast, will analyse narratives of the Bosnian ‘other’. How were Bosnians differentiated, and to what extent were they placed within the narrative of the zero-sum game? These two parts are further divided into three subject-based chapters, where each subject is discussed per newspaper. The order in which the newspapers are discussed is generally indicative of how much attention the newspaper gave to a particular subject, or how insightful their coverage was in disclosing their viewpoints.

Several methodological choices were made in order to allow for a more streamlined narrative and to focus the outcome of this research. Firstly, the newspapers were accessed through the digitalisation project of the Austrian National Library, ANNO. This digitalisation provides fully-scanned versions of Austrian newspapers. Through ANNO, all editions from 6 October 1908 to 31 April 1909 were investigated, because of the aforementioned expectation that a ‘rally around the flag’-effect occurred during this period. Within these editions, articles dealing with the Bosnian Crisis and identity were analysed. Using the search-functionality provided by ANNO,

³⁰ Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, p. 18.

emphasis was placed on those editions which featured most instances of search-terms like 'Bosnien' and 'Wir/Uns', search terms whose purpose will become more apparent in the following chapters. Although these search-terms informed which dates received focus, all editions were analysed for content relevant to the research.

To analyse the newspapers' discourse, several analytical frameworks were used. The three chapters focusing on 'we' seek to explain the construction of identity through nationalism and state loyalty. As such, the first chapter relies on Michael Billig's well-known theory of banal nationalism, which explained the construction of national identity as the result of unconscious, 'deictic' expressions of identity.³¹ The second chapter utilises a self-proposed dichotomy between 'Josephinist' and 'Herderian' modes thinking about the nation amongst Austro-Germans. Chapter 3 once again refers to existing scholarship by aiming to connect the narrative to existing research on *Kaisertreue*. Conversely, the three chapters on 'them' focus on the process of othering through several lenses. The first of these refers to Edward Saïd's famous theory of Orientalism.³² Chapter 5, meanwhile, takes inspiration from Todorova's concept of Balkanism, but does not directly apply it. Finally, Chapter 6 examines paranoia regarding Serbian and Russian interferences through their perceived role and influence within the Habsburg Empire. These analytical frameworks, their application, and their advantages will of course be discussed more extensively in their respective chapters.

The reason for choosing newspapers as an object of research is that they played a pivotal role in the dissemination of news in the nineteenth century. As they functioned as the 'gatekeepers' to knowledge, their opinions were formative in shaping the public debate.³³ Their biases and interests, which informed their coverage, as well as their specific backgrounds, filtered the information readers would have access to. There are, of course, limitations to using newspapers. One limitation is that they favour elite perspectives over popular attitudes. Historians have therefore criticised the top-down nature of using newspapers to analyse sentiment.³⁴ Others have focused on its preference of production over consumption.³⁵ Furthermore, newspapers operate in a somewhat limited space, as their coverage is necessarily filtered through what is permitted by law and what was socially acceptable to its audience. For example, although censorship had been largely abolished in the Habsburg Empire by the twentieth century, *Majestätsbeleidigung* was still heavily penalised in Austria.³⁶ This meant that newspapers hosting outright criticism of the Emperor personally or the Imperial family risked paying fines or even going to jail.

Despite these limitations, newspapers are still a worthwhile means of analysing nationalism in the Late Habsburg Empire. Firstly, it is instructive to keep in mind the relative popularity of the medium in Viennese society. Rather than it being an elite medium, it was widespread amongst the masses, with a large share population buying daily papers, which were shared within the household, making them highly visible within society and leading opinion makers.³⁷ Furthermore,

³¹ M. Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London 1995).

³² E.W. Saïd, *Orientalism* (New York 1979).

³³ T. P. Vos & T. Finneman, 'The early historical construction of journalism's gatekeeping role', *Journalism*, 18:3 (2017), p. 267

³⁴ M. Skey, 'The National in the everyday life: A critical engagement with Michael Billig's thesis of banal nationalism', *The Sociological Review*, 57:2 (2009), p. 337.

³⁵ J. Fox, 'The Edges of the Nation: A Research Agenda for uncovering the taken-for-granted foundations of everyday nationhood', *Nations and Nationalism*, 23:1 (2016), p. 30.

³⁶ P. Czech, *Der Kaiser ist ein Lump und Spitzbube: Majestätsbeleidigung unter Kaiser Franz Joseph* (Wien 2010), p. 111-112.

³⁷ D.M. Vyleta, *Crime, Jews, and News: Vienna 1890-1914* (New York 2007), p. 71

the newspapers were themselves a part of the fierce competition between the different branches of German nationalism. It can therefore be instructive to analyse the way these newspapers tried to sway the audience to 'their' branch within the broader nationalist ideology. For example, the foundation and spread of the *Reichspost* in 1894 both preceded and accompanied the rise of the Christian Social Movement it was associated with.³⁸

The choice for the three newspapers was made because they were broadly representative of, and in some regards leading organisations within, their respective strand of nationalism. Moreover comparison is simplified because the newspapers presented their coverage in similar ways. When they covered news items, they generally did not mention the authorship of their articles, similar to the present-day *Economist*. There were three exceptions to this rule. Firstly, when the author was either an important politician or a famous public figure, their name would be mentioned. Similarly, when the article contained controversial topics and was therefore clearly meant as an opinion piece, the person responsible for the opinion was named. For example, when the *NFP* hosted some controversial opinions on the Serbian government by academic Heinrich Friedjung, they did mention his authorship. Thirdly, although front page news items remained anonymous, the accompanying *Feuilleton* did often feature a named author. The newspapers also shared a matter-of-fact nomenclature for their articles. For example, even though the *Reichspost* ecstatically called the proclamation of sovereignty by Franz Joseph on its front page "eine große historische Handlung", which made "hunderttausende von Herzen in der Monarchie in patriotischer Freude höher schlagen", the title was simply "Das Manifest des Kaisers".³⁹ These aforementioned stylistic choices give the impression that the newspapers tried to present themselves as objective sources of information, rather than representing a niche interest. Comments from the redaction itself were therefore quite rare.

Of the three newspapers, the *Rundschau* was the most radical. Founded in 1890, it aligned itself closely with the *völkisch* movement. It was "especially fanatic in its praise of all things Teutonic", advocating for the retention and expansion of German privileges within the Empire.⁴⁰ It is hardly surprising that it was therefore sceptical of the Austro-Hungarian government and its efforts to expand Habsburg sovereignty of the Balkans, as it was this as a threat to German hegemony. Due to this, the *Rundschau* did not majorly shift its tone during the Bosnian Crisis, seemingly unperturbed by the international context. As a part of the *völkisch* media sphere, it experienced competition from a variety of other *völkisch*-oriented newspapers, like the *Deutsches Volksblatt*. According to historian Bruce Pauley, the *Rundschau* stood out for its high editorial quality compared to these other newspapers, despite its limited circulation. Its reach was therefore limited to a core of radical German nationalists in 1908.⁴¹ This meant that it should be considered more influential on *völkisch* media narratives than its competitors. Being a part of the *völkisch* media sphere, it was highly sceptical of the political establishment, and saw itself as representing outsider interests. This outsider perspective meant it was more openly sceptical

³⁸ C. O'Neill, 'Karl Lueger and the Reichspost: Construction of a Cult of Personality', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 68:3 (2022), p. 338.

³⁹ "a great historical deed" "hundreds of thousands of hearts in the monarchy beat with patriotic joy" "the manifest of the Emperor": 'Das Manifest des Kaisers: Die Einverleibung Bosniens vollzogen', *Reichspost* (06-10-1908), p. 1.

⁴⁰ D. L. Brodbeck, *Defining Deutschtum: political ideology, German identity, and music-critical discourse in liberal Vienna* (New York 2014), p. 238.

⁴¹ B.F Pauley, *From Prejudice to Persecution: A History of Austrian Anti-Semitism* (Chapel Hill 1992), p. 49.

of government policy. It was especially critical of the Empire's shift from German centralism to pluralism, declaring it to be a "Gleichberechtigungsschwindel" in an article from October 1908.⁴²

The *Neue Freie Presse*, in contrast, had a very different background. Its predecessor, *die Presse*, was first printed during the Revolutions of 1848, which meant its coverage came from a specifically liberal background. The *Neue Freie Presse* was founded after editorial differences within *die Presse*, which it eventually surpassed as the Empire's foremost liberal newspaper. The *NFP*'s redaction was the largest and most professional of the three newspapers in this thesis. Its coverage was seen as very trustworthy and held in high regard, the newspaper being respectfully referred to as "the Times of Austria".⁴³ Writing for the *NFP* was highly prestigious, something alluded to by Stefan Zweig in his memoirs.⁴⁴ The newspaper regularly hosted opinion pieces by professors, experts and government officials, like foreign minister Aehrenthal, who was directly responsible for foreign policy during the Bosnian Crisis. As the *NFP* was read and written by the Empire's elite, it maintained an establishment perspective, leading to a less critical attitude towards the government. Although the *NFP* did criticise government actions, these criticisms were largely legal in nature and not ideological. This generally pro-government attitude persisted during the Bosnian Crisis, although fears of Serbian interference in internal politics did eventually shift the *NFP*'s narrative towards a more bellicose stance, arguing that the government should do more to stand up for Austro-Hungarian interests.

Lastly, the *Reichspost* can best be understood as an extension of the larger Christian Social movement, as it was founded in 1894 by a largely aristocratic redaction. Its corporatist views on society were imbued with Christian populism, itself based on the 1891 papal encyclical *Rerum Novarum*.⁴⁵ Although its readership was the lower-middle class, its redaction was certainly not. If the *Rundschau* could be construed as working-class, the *NFP* as bourgeois, then the *Reichspost* was aristocratic. This seeming contradiction was present within the whole corporatist Christian Social movement. Historian Chris O'Neill argued that the newspaper's main function was as the "primary mouthpiece for the Christian Social Party."⁴⁶ Owing to this dynamic, it was more top-down oriented than the other newspapers. As a result the *Reichspost*'s coverage placed great value on the opinions of the movement's leadership, while emphasising the importance of church and Emperor. Amongst its elite readership were members of the extended royal family and even heir-apparent Franz Ferdinand, whose political views were similar to and informed those of the *Reichspost*.⁴⁷ This led to it being supportive of the annexation as it pertained to the Emperor's role, while being critical only of its implementation and those it considered antagonistic to the Christian Social movement.

By examining these newspapers' discourse, this thesis aims to add to existing historiographical debate a reassessment of existing views on the interactions between nationalism and state loyalty in early twentieth-century Vienna by providing an overview of how information on the Bosnian Crisis was relayed, and therefore how it would be *experienced*. How could a resident of 1908

⁴² "scam of equal treatment": F. Mach, 'Bis hierher und nicht weiter', *Ostdeutsche Rundschau* (15-10-1908), p.2.

⁴³ A. Wandruszka, 'NFP 1848-1939', in: ed. H.D. Fischer, *Deutsche Zeitungen des 17. bis 20. Jahrhunderts* (München 1972), p. 34.

⁴⁴ Zweig, *Die Welt von Gestern*, p. 123.

⁴⁵ M. H. Voegler, *Religion, liberalism and the social question in the Habsburg hinterland: the Catholic Church in Upper Austria, 1850-1914* (Diss. University of Columbia 2006), p. 300.

⁴⁶ O'Neill, 'Karl Lueger and the Reichspost', p. 339.

⁴⁷ A. Hannig, 'Archduke Franz Ferdinand: An Uncharming Prince?', in: eds. F.L. Müller & H. Mehrkens, *Royal Heirs and the Uses of Soft Power in Nineteenth Century Europe* (London 2016), p. 143.

Vienna have made sense of this unfolding political reality, based on the information provided to them by their newspaper of choice? This thesis further seeks to bridge the scholarly gap between perceptions of the national and the international, adding a more integrated perspective on the impact of the Bosnian Crisis on the Austro-German nationalist sphere. The case of the late Habsburg Empire is interesting precisely because of the divergent perspective surrounding its existence. On the one hand, it deviates from the normative view of history through the rise of the nation-state. On the other, its eventual fall can, and has been, used to argue for the exact opposite. By shedding a light on those living in the late Habsburg Empire and their experiences, the place of nationalism within this society can be more thoroughly understood.

Part I: 'Us'

Chapter 1: Who are 'We'?

Introduction

When discussing identity, 'we' is one of the most meaningful words to look for. It simultaneously defines an in-group and an out-group, creating a strong framework for discussing identity. Michael Billig famously championed looking for 'we' in the study of nationalism. He argued that, rather than flaring up only during outbursts of rabid nationalism, nationalism is present unconsciously all the time. The unconscious use of so-called deictic expressions, words such as 'we', whose meaning is derived from context, are the means by which nationalism is expressed most consistently.⁴⁸ If nationalism is engrained in the collective mind to such an extent that it no longer needs explicit mention, then it can be said that a society is nationalist. Thus, rather than concluding nationalism's presence on the basis of overt signs like nationalist violence, it was these seemingly innocuous words which like 'we' which showed the true extent of the penetration of nationalism within a society. In deciding which 'we' to clarify, and which 'we' does not warrant explanation, a lot can be gauged about national identification. Newspapers, accordingly, provide a clear, written medium to analyse these choices.

For Austro-Germans, identification along national lines brought with it some complexities. Before the proclamation of the German Empire in 1871, the so-called German Question was subject of intense debate in the German-speaking world. Should Germany unify, and if so, what territories should be included in this state?⁴⁹ 1871 had provided a geopolitical answer. However, being excluded from Germany did not mean that Austro-Germans immediately stopped self-identifying as German. In this sense, German unity had only exacerbated the German Question for Austro-Germans. There were several means of dealing with this. The first one was to embrace Austrian state identity, while maintaining German cultural identity. Historians have argued that this dynamic of alternating loyalties to the *Staatsnation*, the particular polity, and the larger *Kulturnation* has been a function of German identity for a long time. Helmut Walser Smith, for example, placed the origins of this dynamic with the Holy Roman Empire in the High Middle Ages.⁵⁰ Abigail Green famously argued that loyalty to these states persisted in Bavaria and Saxony after 1871.⁵¹ Consequently, claiming to be both a German nationalist and an Austrian patriot could be construed as a return to the old status quo.

More radically, other Austro-German nationalists argued against this distinction between state and nation, desiring to be part of a nation-state. The exact subversive quality of the *völkisch* nationalist movement had been that it argued for increased integration of the Austro-Germans into the German *Volksnation*, rather than the Habsburg state.⁵² The *völkisch* movement contended that the Austro-Germans and the *Reichsdeutsche* were a part of the same nation, and thus should be a part of the same state. The calls for unity increased as the *völkisch* movement increased in strength. For instance, the 1882 *Linzer Programm*, a foundational document for the

⁴⁸ Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, p. 102.

⁴⁹ H. W. Smith, *Germany: a Nation in its Time*, New York (2020), p. 229.

⁵⁰ Smith, *Germany*, p. 1-6.

⁵¹ A. Green, *Fatherlands: state-building and nationhood in nineteenth-century Germany* (New York 2001).

⁵² Vermeiren, 'Germany, Austria', p. 205

völkisch movement, argued for much closer ties with Germany.⁵³ Reversing the argument, other nationalists argued that now that Austria had not become a part of Germany, it should also become a separate nation.

It is important to keep in mind that the two aforementioned positions are to be understood as two dichotomous extremes. In reality there was considerable overlap between the two positions, both in its ideals and its advocates. Both positions still allowed its proponents to claim superiority of the in-group over the other nationalities of the Habsburg Empire, whichever way this in-group was conceptualised or actually called. They have been retroactively bifurcated because of their consequences and cultural memory. The influence *völkisch* movement and its emphasis on the nation-state ideologically primed Austria to unity with Nazi-Germany in 1938. After the Second World War, Austrian politicians played up and embraced those movements which seemed to have engendered a separate Austrian identity in order to distance the country from the Nazi-regime after the war.⁵⁴

Ostdeutsche Rundschau

The *Rundschau* was most unambiguous in identifying itself and its readership as German, referring to itself and its readers as “wir Deutsche” or “Deutschösterreicher”.⁵⁵ Politically, the *Rundschau* advocated increased integration with Germany. On a cultural level, the newspaper went even further. Rather than arguing for a common greater German identity, the newspaper argued for the subsumption Austro-German culture into what it perceived to be markers of *Reichsdeutsche* identity. For example, it argued that Austro-Germans should convert to Protestantism, as it was “die Religion der Deutschen”.⁵⁶ Catholicism, meanwhile, was derided as being more suitable to the superstitious Romance and Slavic peoples. As Catholicism was traditionally closely tied to Habsburg legitimacy, promoting conversion to Protestantism should be seen as a means of turning Austro-Germans away from the Habsburg state and towards Germany.⁵⁷ This equation of Protestantism and German identity went quite far, with the newspaper’s redaction even complaining that “die Stellung des Deutschtums” and “die Stellung des Protestantismus” were simultaneously threatened by Catholic proselytisation in Bosnia.⁵⁸ On a political level, the *Rundschau* was remarkably integrated into German political culture. On April 3rd 1909, the newspaper displayed its adoration of German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck by commemorating his birthday. On the cover, a large image of Bismarck was featured, an honour which the newspaper had not afforded Franz Joseph on the date of his 60-year jubilee in December 1908. The edition also featured the following poem dedicated to Bismarck:

⁵³ Consulted in: K. Berchtold, *Österreichische Parteiprogramme 1868-1966*, München (1967), p. 198-203.

⁵⁴ R. Wodak et al., *The Discursive Construction of National Identity* (Edinburgh 2009), p. 2.

⁵⁵ Mach, ‘Bis hierher un nicht weiter’, p.1.

⁵⁶ “Protestantism, in all its appearances is just the religion of the Germans”: ‘Der Wahrheit die Ehr’, *Ostdeutsche Rundschau* (29-10-1908), p. 3.

⁵⁷ R. Okey, *The Habsburg Monarchy c. 1765-1918* (London 2001), p. 4.

⁵⁸ “Position of Germanness” “Position of Protestantism”: ‘Bosnien’, *Ostdeutsche Rundschau* (10-11-1908), p. 4.

*“Bismarck! That dear magic word,
It will urge us Germans,
To stand guard on the Danube,
To protect our forefathers’ heritage!*

*“Bismarck! Das hehre Zauberwort,
Es soll uns Deutsche mahnen,
Hochwacht zu halten im Donaureich
Zu schützen das Erbe der Ahnen!*

*Bismarck! That proud magic word,
It will enflame our pride,
That we belong to the German people,
Descending from the noblest tribe!*

*Bismarck! Das stolze Zauberwort,
Es soll uns den Stolz entflammen,
Daß wir zum deutschen Volke gehör’n,
Den edelsten Volke entstammen!*

*Bismarck! That powerful magic word,
It will drive us to act,
German power, German pride,
Will yet rule the world!*

*Bismarck! Das mächtige Zauberwort,
Es soll uns zur Tat begeistern,
Germanenkraft, Germanenstolz,
Wird noch die Welt bemeistern!*

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Bismarck is painted as a German hero, whose achievements were beneficial for the whole German nation. In the article accompanying the poem, Bismarck is even lauded as “der Begründer der deutschen Einheit”.⁶⁰ This is quite ironic, since it was Bismarck who led Prussia’s attempt to unify Germany without Austria. Although the poem does not necessarily reflect historical reality, it does reflect the fact that the *Rundschau* saw the relationship between Austro-Germans and Germany as fundamentally one in which the Austro-Germans would have to be incorporated into a *Reichsdeutsche* identity.

Similarly, the *Rundschau* used the Bosnian Crisis as a means for advocating closer ties with Germany and to blur the line between Austro-German and *Reichsdeutsche*, stopping short of calling for outright incorporation. It painted the image of two empires, each with their own destiny, but a common goal. This “Bündnis der beiden deutsche Kaiserreichen” was united in its common purpose of Germanising Central Europe.⁶¹ As the Habsburg Empire was on the southeastern periphery of the German-speaking world, it should aim to colonise these parts of Europe with Germans. It retraced the origins of the Austrian-Germans to a historical mission of defending and expanding the German nation, given to them by the “German” Emperor Charlemagne.⁶² The *Rundschau* argued that *Reichsdeutsche* colonists should therefore be invited to take part in the colonisation of Bosnia. These *Reichsdeutsche* could, once present within the Habsburg Empire,

⁵⁹ Delhelm, ‘Bismarck’, *Ostdeutsche Rundschau* (3-4-1909), p. 2.

⁶⁰ ‘Bismarck den Frieden verbürgendes Vermächtnis’, *Ostdeutsche Rundschau* (3-4-1909), p. 2.

⁶¹ “Alliance of two German Empires”: E. Bötticher, ‘Das Bündnis der beiden deutsche Kaiserreichen’ (3-4-1909), p. 2.

⁶² ‘In elfter Stunde!’, *Ostdeutsche Rundschau* (2-12-1908), p. 1.

facilitate a renewed focus on the Empire's original mission, which the Austro-Germans had lost sight of.⁶³

Reichspost

The Christian Social movement has long been considered a promotor of the idea of a separate Austrian identity.⁶⁴ However, this did not mean that the movement constantly strove for an Austrian nation-state. As the *Reichspost* recognised its readership to be German, it could not deny its German cultural background, nor could it fully disavow German nationalist rhetoric. The newspaper identified itself and its readership as “wir Völker Oesterreichs.”⁶⁵ At the same time, it reinforced its connection to the nationalist camp by calling upon its readers not to forget the “künftigen Stellung unseres deutsches Volkes in Oesterreich.”⁶⁶ This seeming contradiction led to a duality within the *Reichspost*'s larger narrative, split between its Austrian and German identity.

Its Austrian outlook followed from banal references to Austrian identity, but also from explicit discussions of the nature of Austrian identity. In this sense, the newspaper tried to be agenda-setting within the larger German nationalist camp, promoting its own definition of the in-group. The *Reichspost*'s ‘größösterreichische’ fatherland matched the Austrian half of Austria-Hungary.⁶⁷ The newspaper apparently found it difficult to define this identity outside of a territorial scope, as it asked its readership to participate in defining Austrian identity. In its 1908 Christmas edition, the *Reichspost* announced a prize question: “what do we Austrians need most?”⁶⁸ The respondent with the best answer would be given prizes. Interestingly, both the first and the second prize directly reinforced the connection between Austrian and German identity. The first prize being a volume of German poems called *Poetischer Hausschatz des deutschen Volkes* (‘Poetic home treasure of the German people’), and the second prize a book on the history of German literature. Relegated to the third prize was a book on Christian philosophy of life. In a seeming contradiction, the prize for defining Austrianness was rewarded with expressions of German identity.

On 17 January 1909 the winners were announced. Unsurprisingly, the Catholic newspaper selected answers which argued that Austria required a strong Catholic press. The second place winner, Josef Hartmann, wrote that each patriotic Austrian should, alongside his subscription to their own regional newspaper, subscribe to at least one other Viennese Christian newspaper.⁶⁹ Also present in the answers was the idea that Austrian patriotism should be encouraged. One winner wrote of the necessity of “zielbewusste und konsequente eiserne Energie staatsmännischer Tat im Dienste der Reichserhaltung.”⁷⁰ The fact that the *Reichspost* would

⁶³ ‘In elfter Stunde!’, p. 2.

⁶⁴ W. Spohn, ‘Austria: From Habsburg Empire to a Small Nation in Europe’, in: eds. W. Spohn & A. Ichijo, *Entangled Identities: Nations and Europe* (Abingdon 2005), p. 61.

⁶⁵ J. Wichner, ‘Feuilleton: Unser Kaiser und die Volksseele’, *Reichspost* (2-12-20), p. 1.

⁶⁶ “The future position of our German people in Austria”: ‘In den Delegationen’, *Reichspost* (8-10-1908), p. 8.

⁶⁷ Ebenhoch, ‘Unserem Kaiser’, *Reichspost* (2-12-1908), p. 1.

⁶⁸ ‘Unsere Preisfrage: Was tut uns Oesterreichern am meisten not?’, *Reichspost* (25-12-1908), p. 31.

⁶⁹ J. Hartmann in: ‘Die Preisfrage der “Reichspost”’: Die Preisgewinner’, *Reichspost* (17-1-1909), p. 7.

⁷⁰ “purposeful and consequent iron energy of a statesmanlike act in service of the preservation of the Empire”: A. Wildenauer in: ‘Die Preisfrage der “Reichspost”’: Die Preisgewinner’, *Reichspost* (17-1-1909), p. 7.

select these answers seems also to imply that it had to encourage this Austrian sentiment. Why else would the newspaper feel the need to so explicitly promote a sense of Austrian identity? The final element which can be ascertained from the selection of winning answers is antisemitism. What is striking is that, despite claims of looking past national or ethnic divides in the context of Christians, this courtesy was not extended towards the Jews of the Empire. The aforementioned Josef Hartmann, for example, argued that the 'Ungeheur' ('pest') of the Jewish press should be destroyed.⁷¹ Thus, while the *Reichspost* tried to act as if it embraced an inclusive supranational patriotism, it hardly practiced what it preached and used the antisemitism of its base to formulate the in-group, which was largely congruent with Austro-German identity. Although the *Reichspost* nominally promoted the idea of Austrian identity as an alternative to German national identity, it seems like the two overlapped to such an extent that they were largely synonymous.

However, the *Reichspost* outright rejected the idea of political integration and the *völkisch* notion of a greater German state, basing its claim on the existence of an Austrian historical mission. A good example of the propagation of this narrative within the *Reichspost* is an article published on 2 December 1908, in which Richard Kralik von Meyrswalden, a minor noble from Bohemia, discussed what he called "Oesterreichs Sendung". Besides focusing on the achievements of Franz Joseph's reign, he described the origins and development of Austria as a "historische Notwendigkeit".⁷² Its goal, he argued, was to unify the peoples surrounding the Danube. Similar to the *Rundschau*, he argued that Charlemagne had presented Austria with a historical mission aimed at the east. Von Meyrswalden, however, saw this mission as a proof of the distinctiveness of the Austrian state. He emphasised that repeated attempts at unification of the Danube basin had occurred, pointing to the desirability of the current state division between Austria and Germany. Thus, rather than placing the Austrian mission in the Danube region as an extension of German expansionism and colonisation, he contended that the Austrian mission was aimed at the establishment of a "organische Vereinigung von deutscher, slavischer, magyarischer und romanischer Kultur."⁷³

As the *Reichspost* opposed further integration of the Austro-Germans into the *Reich*, it generally portrayed pan-German political activity as treasonous to the Habsburg state, emphasising the differences between Austro-Germans and Germans. These differences were expressed largely in religious terms. On 27 November 1908, the *Reichspost* argued that a union between the Austro-Germans and Germans would be disastrous for the Austro-Germans, as annexation would mean a marginalisation of the Catholic faith and eventually forced conversion. Pan-German rhetoric was therefore called "Heuchelei der Abfallspastoren" by the *Reichspost*.⁷⁴ Similarly, symbolic differences were used to express the difference between virtuous Austro-Germans and pan-German troublemakers. For example, on 11 December 1908, the *Reichspost* castigated students of Austrian *Volkshochschule* for unnecessarily antagonising 'Christian' Germans by associating themselves with the *Reich*.⁷⁵ What had happened? Earlier in December, German students provoked Austrian society by wearing black-yellow-red armbands during a university ceremony celebrating Franz Joseph's Imperial Jubilee. These armbands caused an outrage, as these were in

⁷¹ Hartmann in: 'Die Preisfrage der "Reichspost"', *Reichspost*, p. 7.

⁷² R. Kralik von Meyrswalden, 'Kaiser Franz Josef I und Oesterreichs Sendung', *Reichspost* (2-12-1908), p. 2.

⁷³ Von Meyrswalden, 'Kaiser Franz Josef I', p. 2.

⁷⁴ "Hypocrisy of treasonous pastors": 'Streiflichter: Los von Oesterreich!', *Reichspost* (27-11-1908), p. 2.

⁷⁵ 'Streiflichter: An die Adresse der Hochschulvölkischen', *Reichspost* (11-12-1908), p. 3.

the colours of the German Empire. Rather than symbolising their disloyalty by wearing these colours, the *Reichspost* argued, the students should have worn black-yellow armbands, the Imperial colours, to prove their dedication to the Habsburg dynasty.

Neue Freie Presse

The *NFP*, meanwhile, held a more ambiguous position towards the question of identity. It shifted its conception of ‘we’ according to the topic discussed. When the newspaper covered foreign policy issues, ‘we’ was mostly predominantly used in the context of the whole of Austria-Hungary, or what the *NFP* called the *Gesamtmonarchie*.⁷⁶ On a domestic level, however, the ‘we’ decidedly shifted from a pan-Habsburg perspective towards a German perspective. Although it did not favour any nationality as openly as the other German nationalist newspapers, the *NFP*, as a German-language newspaper, naturally looked at issues through a German lens. For example, parliamentary speeches by German nationalist politicians were published in full, while nationalist expressions by politicians of other nationalities were side-lined or paraphrased. On a state level, the *NFP* advocated for a policy of rapprochement with Germany, seeing it as the primary ally of the Habsburg Empire. In this context, it spoke of the Habsburg and German Empires as the “Zwei verbündeten Reiche”.⁷⁷ Interestingly, however, the *NFP* did recognise the domestic risks of allying with its powerful neighbour. It noted that, as the Habsburg Empire’s Poles agitated against the alliance on the basis of German mistreatment of its Polish minority, any alliance with that same state would be unpopular amongst them.⁷⁸ Despite these, the *Reich* was still the strongest “Schutz des Friedens” the Habsburg Empire could hope for in the context of the Bosnian Crisis, according to the *NFP*, especially as war seemed a realistic possibility.⁷⁹

Conclusion

When comparing the three newspapers, two ‘axes’ appear. The first is a spectrum of self-identification ranging from completely German to arguing that Austro-Germans were in fact Austrian. On the surface, the *Reichspost* and the *Rundschau* seem to be most diametrically opposed on the issue, with the *NFP* less consciously taking a stance on the issue. This changes, however, when it is considered that there was virtually no distinction made between Austro-German and Austrian by the *Reichspost*. In essence, both newspapers regarded the same group of nationally conscious Germans to be their in-group. The *NFP*, meanwhile, despite skewing towards pan-Imperial deictic expressions of identity, also took an explicitly German point of view. The second axis is a range of opinions regarding the proposed relationship between the Habsburg and German Empires, with only the *Rundschau* arguing for anything other than an alliance.

⁷⁶ ‘Wien, 7. Oktober’, *Neue Freie Presse* (8-10-1908), p. 1.

⁷⁷ ‘Deutschland und Oesterreich-Ungarn’, *Neue Freie Presse* (4-1-1909), p. 6.

⁷⁸ ‘Die Polen gegen das Bündnis mit Deutschland’, *Neue Freie Presse* (11-10-1908), p. 3.

⁷⁹ ‘Die Polen gegen das Bündnis’, p. 3.

Chapter 2: Defining Austro-German Identity

Introduction

To analyse the newspapers' definition of Germanness, this thesis proposes two distinct conceptual frameworks, which can be characterised as traditions of thought dating back to the eighteenth century. These frameworks do not necessarily represent coherent ideologies or the beliefs of their namesakes, but rather represent an attempt at conceptualising two dichotomous modes of thinking about nationalism by contemporary German nationalists, conceived for the purposes of this research. The frameworks in question are Herderian and Josephinist thought. Johan Gottfried Herder, an eighteenth-century German philosopher who taught at several German universities, developed a specific view on nations and nationalism. He posited that a nation was a cultural entity which had existed as a discernible body since long before the creation of states.⁸⁰ Besides a descriptive quality, this theory held a normative element, prescribing the nation as the basis for states. The main implication of Herderian nationalism is the historical continuity of a *Volk*, which encourages attempts to historicise the nation, as it also implied the existence of certain inherent cultural characteristics attached to the nation. German Herderian nationalists would claim continuity with the perceived ancestors of the German nation, like the Germanic tribes of antiquity. One need, for example, only think of the statue of Hermann (Arminius) erected in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War, and its related cult of remembrance.⁸¹ Historical continuity would be most emphatically connected with a mythologised, premodern and preindustrial past. As has been argued before by Helmut Walser Smith, for Germans this entailed an especially strong connection with the landscape.⁸² Claiming historical continuity meant claiming ethnic continuity as well. For this reason, the normative frame implied by Herderian nationalism deeply influenced *völkisch* thought.

Josephinist thought, meanwhile, could be described as more explicitly 'Austrian'. Emperor Joseph II tried to rule as an Enlightened Despot during the latter half of the eighteenth century. Although he did not succeed in transforming Austria, his legacy cast a large shadow over the nineteenth century. Characteristic of Josephinist thought are narratives of modernisation; during his reign, Joseph tried to limit the influence of the Catholic Church and to rationalise and centralise the administration of the Habsburg realm. One of the most consequential efforts on Joseph's part was the decree designating German as the only allowed administrative language. As Natascha Wingfield argued, reflections on this act changed Joseph's image of a 'Reformer-Emperor' in the eighteenth century to the image of a German nationalist icon in the twentieth century.⁸³ Although it can be doubted whether Joseph truly saw his centralisation efforts as a tool for Germanisation, it was certainly seen that way by the early twentieth century. As such, this specifically modernist strand of thought, central to Austrian liberalism because of its opposition to the Church, was far from a politically neutral narrative. Josephinist thought serves to delineate the somewhat heterodox combination of ideals held by Austro-Germans seeking to both Germanise, as well as modernise and rationalise the Empire. It is important to emphasise that, unlike *völkisch*

⁸⁰ F. Barnard, *Herder on Nationality, Humanity, and History* (Montreal 2003), p. 119.

⁸¹ J. Tebbe, 'Revision and "Rebirth": Commemoration of the Battle of Nations in Leipzig', *German Studies Review*, 33:3 (2010), p. 625.

⁸² Smith, *Germany*. p. 212-217.

⁸³ Wingfield, 'Emperor Joseph II', p. 81.

nationalism, Josephinists did not see Germanness in an ethnic light, but as something to be 'learned'.⁸⁴

Ostdeutsche Rundschau

Analysing the nationalist newspapers, the *Rundschau* stands out for being the most Herderian in its outlook, although the Josephinist equation of Germanness with modernity was also featured. The newspaper put great emphasis on the historical continuity of the German peoples. For the *Rundschau*, historical continuity was specifically claimed with a mythologised, premodern and preindustrial past. These mythologised origins were made explicit in several articles. In one article, the newspaper traced the origins of the Austro-German *Volk* to the time of Charlemagne: "Deutsch war der Grundstock der heutigen Doppelmonarchie, den einst Karl der Große durch Schaffung der östlichen Mark als Bollwerk gegen das Vordringen der Avaren und Slaven festlegte."⁸⁵ This remark primarily aimed to convey a sense of the continuation of a national purpose whose origins stretched far into the Medieval past. The reference to Charlemagne and the "östliche Mark" were not coincidental; it evoked a mythologised Middle Ages in which martial values played an important part. The premodern and preindustrial further played an important part in the conception of Germanness, as the *Rundschau's* ideal Germans were "freier, deutscher, volkstreuer Bauern".⁸⁶ Reflecting a Herderian understanding of nationalism, these peasant farmers were seen as the carrier of the "true" and "original" national culture.

This Herderian conception of continuity was reinforced by a strong ethnic component. In the eyes of the *Rundschau*, the Germans of the Habsburg Empire formed a 'Volksstamm' (tribe), membership of which was determined largely along lines of descent. Reflecting an understanding of the *Nationalitätfrage* through the lens of the zero-sum game, the newspaper meticulously kept track of relative birth rates. The dangers of shifting ethnic proportions were seen as most acute within those areas which were most nationally diverse.⁸⁷ Winning the numbers game did not only entail keeping up the birth rate, but also making sure that the whole nation remained solidary. This is reflected in the coverage by the *Rundschau*. In December 1908, as the Bosnian Crisis was starting to heat up, one of main preoccupations of the newspaper remained the national struggle in Bohemia, when the *Rundschau* regretfully reported that another Bohemian city had been 'conquered' by the Czechs.⁸⁸

Furthermore, the *Rundschau* used national characteristics to define a stereotypical German, drawing from a strong normative, *völkisch* framework. As has been observed by historians before, language was one of the main ways of demarcating nationality within the Austro-Hungarian Empire.⁸⁹ The *Rundschau's* discourse confirms this view. At times, it used a positive definition to denote the German language, praising it for its beauty or defining it as the common language of all Germans within the Empire. More commonly, however, it used language in a negative sense, as

⁸⁴ Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, p. 208-209.

⁸⁵ "German was the basis of the present Dual Monarchy, which once was designed as a bastion against the incursions of the Avars and the Slavs by Charlemagne through the creation of the Eastern March": 'In elfter Stunde!', p. 1.

⁸⁶ "Free, German, nationally loyal farmers": 'Großgrundbesitz und Deutschtum', *Ostdeutsche Rundschau* (6-4-1909), p. 1.

⁸⁷ Judson, 'Marking National Space', p. 124.

⁸⁸ 'Sechzig Jahre Oesterreich', *Ostdeutsche Rundschau* (2-12-1908), p. 2.

⁸⁹ Okey, *The Habsburg Monarchy*, p. 109.

a means to separate Germans from other nationalities and to portray them as the other. This conscious depiction of Germans as separate stemmed from, and reinforced, pre-existing dynamics of us-versus-them which had taken a hold within German nationalist circles. Because of this, the German language was mostly mentioned in the context of either the amplification of differences with other nationalities, or to express a perceived loss of influence of the German nationality.

For example, in an article written by German nationalist journalist Franz Mach, titled 'Bis hierher und nicht weiter!' ('Until here and no further!') the *Rundschau* lamented that "Die Verluste des Deutschtums in Oesterreich in diesem Zeitabschnitte sind unabschätzbare."⁹⁰ This editorial, published just after the official annexation of Bosnia, detailed how a combination of nationalities had conspired to oppress the Germans. The suppression of the German language, "vor 50 Jahren noch die herrschende", was instrumental in achieving this, the *Rundschau* argued.⁹¹ The shift of the Austro-Hungarian administration from relying solely on German as the administrative language towards a multilingual system was thus interpreted as a plot to subdue the Germans. Whatever merit these arguments held, they did succeed in further estranging German nationalists from the Austro-Hungarian political system. It also served to encapsulate the German language within a larger narrative of conflict, rather than serving as an explicitly connecting factor. In the Bosnian case, the newspaper contrasted the present German settlers from their Slavic neighbours by their use of the typically Austro-German greeting "Grüß Gott".⁹² Thus, the German language was mostly used as a marker for identity of German identity in nationally contested areas.

Despite its mainly Herderian focus, it also incorporated the language of progress used by Josephinists, equating Germanness with progress and wealth in an industrial and commercial setting. It contended that it had been the Germans who had led to economic development within the Habsburg Empire, due to their productivity and high level of education. For example, the newspaper argued that it had been German capital and expertise in establishing commercial enterprises which had helped lift Bosnia from its most abject poverty in the preceding decades.⁹³ Here it is interesting that the *Rundschau* did not consider the simultaneous praise for the rural, nationally conscious German and the modern, wealthy and productive German to be contradictory.

Neue Freie Presse

The *NFP*, as the newspaper of the German liberals, was mostly committed to a Josephinist conception of Germanness, defining nationality primarily on the basis of a shared high culture. Owing to its upper-middle class background, it emanated the language of progress and reflected the historical mission of progress. It also generally praised high culture and arts, like poetry and philosophy, assuming its audience to be intimately familiar with it. For example, in an 24 October article, the *NFP* discussed the ideas of German philosopher Johannes Volkelt, analysing the

⁹⁰ "The losses of Germanness in this time frame have been overwhelming": Mach, 'Bis hierher und nicht weiter!', p. 1.

⁹¹ "Still paramount 50 years ago": Mach, 'Bis hierher und nicht weiter!', p. 1.

⁹² T. Wittig, 'Reisebilder aus Bosnien', *Ostdeutsche Rundschau* (10-4-1909), p. 1.

⁹³ 'Die Stellung der Deutschen in Bosnien und der Herzegowina', *Ostdeutsche Rundschau* (1-1-1909), p. 7.

relationship between his ideas and those of Kant.⁹⁴ It is therefore hardly surprising to find that the *NFP* at one point emphatically rejected both ethnicity as well as language as a means of identifying nationality. As an example, the newspaper took the French; despite the fact that they were descended from Germans and Celts, they spoke a Romance language. Thus, neither language nor ethnicity was instructive to define the French.⁹⁵ Similar to the *Reichspost*, the *NFP* mostly saw German identity in Austria through the lens of a common, Austrian mission. However, the two newspapers differed somewhat in the exact interpretation of this Austrian mission. Whereas the *Reichspost* saw Catholicism as a connecting factor for all Austrians, the *NFP* rejected the influence of the Catholic Church. In the context of Bosnia, for example, the newspaper argued that action should be taken to prevent Bosnia from becoming a Catholic mission area. Rather, it defined the mission on the basis of Austro-German political and economic advances. These advances were intertwined through the benefits of liberal reforms. The *NFP* explicitly framed the annexation as a means to bring political progress through liberalism and the rule of law, which would result in economic progress. It argued that “diese neuen Länder der Monarchie” would be “gekräftigt durch verfassungsmäßige Einrichtungen”.⁹⁶

At the same time, the *NFP* engaged more in Herderian rhetoric than would be expected of a liberal newspaper. Firstly, it advanced specifically folksy representations of German popular culture which the newspaper considered to be authentically German. For instance, the *NFP* explored the homely aspects of German culture during Christmas of 1908, when it made an effort to raise money for Austro-German soldiers posted on the Bosnian border. It highlighted the plight of these soldiers, which were so “fern von Heimat und Familie, in Feindesland”.⁹⁷ To make themselves at home, the newspaper wrote, these soldiers put up a Christmas tree with presents, drinking alcoholic beverages and singing German songs from their youth. This praise of German folk culture is reminiscent of the Herderian pursuit to categorise the nation around certain völkisch characteristics. Secondly, the *NFP*, contradicting its own stance on nationality, at times utilised a more ethnic conception of Germanness, describing the relationship between the different nationalities of the Habsburg Empire in a way that is reminiscent of the völkisch discourse of a zero-sum game between ethnicities. This was especially prevalent in the discussion of the political troubles in Bohemia. When discussing the year 1908, the *NFP* chose to highlight the struggles between German and Czech students at Bohemian universities. The jubilee year, the newspaper concluded, had not been as cheerful because of these disturbances, the blame for which the newspaper placed squarely with Czech students.⁹⁸ Thirdly, the *NFP*, despite reprimanding linguistic pride in some articles, it still recognised an intimate tie between the nation and language. For example, in one Feuilleton, the writer recalled a trip to foreign Bosnia, and how he felt a sense of reassurance when he heard soldiers speaking German, “die Sprache der Heimat”.⁹⁹

⁹⁴ C. Müllner, ‘Feuilleton: Johannes Volkelt. Zwischen Dichtung und Philosophie’, *Neue Freie Presse* (24-10-1908), p. 1.

⁹⁵ T. Gomperz, ‘Feuilleton: Reflexionen’, *Neue Freie Presse* (10-4-1909), p. 1.

⁹⁶ “These new lands of the Monarchy” “strengthened by constitutional institutions”: ‘Wien, 6. Oktober’, *Neue Freie Presse* (7-10-1908), p. 1.

⁹⁷ “far from home and family, in hostile territory”: ‘Kleine Chronik’, *Neue Freie Presse* (12-12-1908), p. 10.

⁹⁸ H. d’Elvert, ‘Weihnachtsbetrachtungen’, *Neue Freie Presse* (24-12-1908), p. 1.

⁹⁹ “The language of the homeland” P. Zifferer, ‘Feuilleton: In den neuen Reichslanden’, *Neue Freie Presse* (30-12-1908), p. 3.

Reichspost

More nuanced in its conception of Germanness was the *Reichspost*, which featured a mix of Herderian and Josephinist talking points during the Bosnian Crisis. As discussed before, the relationship between the German nationalism and the *Reichspost* is somewhat complicated by the fact that the newspaper explicitly referred to its readership as Austrian. This rhetoric meant an inherent discursive shift towards Josephinist thought. Despite this fact, the *Reichspost* did not avoid *völkisch* talking points. As the Christian Social movement was at its core a conservative nationalist movement, it espoused antisemitic rhetoric and its ideal 'Austrian' resembled the *völkisch* nationally conscious member of the German *Volksstamm*. The contradiction at the core of the *Reichspost*'s message, that Austrian identity was uplifting and inclusive, while at the same time emphasising Germanness and Catholicism as the normative standard, lay at the basis of the idiosyncratic coverage of the Bosnian Crisis from the perspective of German nationalist politics.

German culture and customs were described largely in *völkisch* and rural terms. Strong emphasis was placed on the landscape, nature, and agricultural products. For example, the 10 November issue of the *Reichspost* featured an article on the *Schilcher* of *Steiermark* (Styria).¹⁰⁰ *Schilcher*, a rosé typical of the region, was hailed as an exemplary regional product, and illustrative of the productivity of Austrian soil. Besides praising its horticultural virtues, the idyllic nature of the *Steiermark*, its people and the landscape were discussed. Especially the rural nature of the region, and its historicity, were emphasised. Summarising his trip, the *Reichspost*'s correspondent commented that "So haben wir denn alles beisammen, den Schilcher, die schnittreifen Trauben und das zerbröckelnde Schloß: Gegenwart, Zukunft und Vergangenheit".¹⁰¹ The castle, as a symbol of the Middle Ages, represented the past. The *Schilcher* represented the continuation of a long-held tradition into the present, with the ripe vines illustrating the continuation of this tradition into the future. Accordingly, these metaphors assigned an ambiguous, timeless quality to the region and its inhabitants. This description of the Styrian "Heimat" could thus be seen as an attempt to prove a historical continuity of rural settlement, thereby advancing a particularly Herderian argument on the nature Austro-German identity.

Furthermore, similar to the *Rundschau* and the *NFP*, the *Reichspost* participated in the discourse of shifting ethnic proportions endangering the position of Austro-Germans within the Empire. The trope of depicting Germans as the victims of nationalist violence by other nationalities was used to this extent. The *Reichspost* portrayed shifts in the ethnic makeup of territories and institutions as proof of a conspiracy by other nationalities, especially the Czechs, against the German nation. In these areas, it lauded initiatives by Austro-German associations to protect 'Volksgenossen' in areas where Germans were seen to be losing ground, issues which it put on its front page. Once again, the *Reichspost* especially targeted the Czechs in Bohemia in this regard.¹⁰² For example, in an article on 8 October 1908, the newspaper discussed the changing balance of nationalities within Austrian universities. It concluded that, unfortunately, the German share had been declining for some time, while the Czechs and Poles made up an increasing number of the

¹⁰⁰ 'Feuilleton: Steirischer Schilcher', *Reichspost* (10-11-1908), p. 1.

¹⁰¹ "Now we have everything together, the *Schilcher*, the harvest-ready grapes and the crumbling keep: present, future and past": 'Feuilleton: Steirischer Schilcher', p. 2.

¹⁰² J. Schlegel, 'Deutsche Schutzarbeit', *Reichspost* (18-4-1909), p. 1.

enrolees.¹⁰³ It used these types of incidents to blame other Austro-German nationalist movements for a lack of solidarity. Several German nationalist associations, the so-called *Schutzvereine*, had existed in Austria-Hungary to further the interest of Germans within the Empire. However, the *Reichspost* argued that these *Schutzvereine* had been unable to succeed because they were too partisan. In April 1909, after the Bosnian Crisis had been settled, the *Reichspost* discussed the creation of a new *Schutzverein*, which would be better suited to protect German interests than existing ones, so the newspaper argued.¹⁰⁴ The reason for supporting this *Schutzverein*, named 'Ostmark' becomes obvious when one considers the fact that the *Reichspost* explicitly mentioned that other newspapers berated the *Schutzverein* for being too clerical, meaning that Ostmark was probably connected in some way to the CSP.¹⁰⁵ While the *Reichspost* criticised other *Schutzvereine* for being too partisan, it supported a partisan association itself. Advancement of its own political goals, rather than Austro-German unity, was therefore likely this narrative's goal.

In contrast with the Herderian elements to its coverage, the *Reichspost* was also clearly inspired by specific aspects of Josephinist thought. Most prominent was the equation of everything Austrian with progress. The 2 December issue of the *Reichspost* was dedicated to the 60-year jubilee of Emperor Franz Joseph. The newspaper used the opportunity to reminisce about historical from the distant as well as the near past. The former it used to connect Franz Joseph to larger narrative around Austria's 'Sendung' ('vocation').¹⁰⁶ It argued that Franz Joseph was the culmination of a long historical process towards the unification of the peoples around the Danube, which had started with Charlemagne and continued with the Medieval kings of Bohemia and later the Habsburgs. This unification would bring peace, prosperity and civilisation to the region under Austrian supervision. Thus, rather than being the product of arbitrary historical circumstances, the *Reichspost* argued that the rise of Austria had been a 'historische Notwendigkeit' ('historical necessity').¹⁰⁷ The *Reichspost* similarly painted Austria's recent past as a development which aimed to bring prosperity to its subjects. It specifically compared Austria to the other Imperialist powers: where the Imperial powers of Great Britain and France were bringing civilisation to their colonies all over the world, Austria had to do this in the 'engen Raume' of the Balkans.¹⁰⁸ Of course, the idea that Austro-German identity entailed a historical mission was also present in the *Rundschau*, as was the specific historical reference to Charlemagne as the founder of Austrian nationhood. The main difference, however, was that rather than using the *Volk* as the lens to analyse history, the *Reichspost* centred its narrative around the historicity of a specifically Austrian state. The rise of the Austrian state was portrayed as historically significant, not the existence of the Austro-German people.

¹⁰³ 'Streiflichter: Das Deutschtum an den Universitäten', *Reichspost* (15-10-1908), p. 2.

¹⁰⁴ 'Eine nationale Tat: Ein Schutzverein der Deutschösterreicher: Volksbund "Ostmark"', *Reichspost* (9-4-1909), p. 3.

¹⁰⁵ J. Schlegel, 'Deutsche Schutzarbeit', *Reichspost* (18-4-1909), p. 1.

¹⁰⁶ R. Kralik von Meyrswalden, 'Kaiser Franz Josef I und Oesterreichs Sendung', *Reichspost* (2-12-1908), p. 2.

¹⁰⁷ Von Meyrswalden, 'Kaiser Franz Josef I und Oesterreichs Sendung', p. 2.

¹⁰⁸ Lamasch, 'Die internationalen Beziehungen der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie 1848-1908', *Reichspost* (2-12-1908), p. 3.

Conclusion

Summing up, each newspaper was, to an extent, both Herderian as well as Josephinist in its outlook. Most Herderian was the *Rundschau*, which fully employed an ethnic conception of nationality, while historicising the nation. While it equated Austro-German influence with economic progress, it clung to the simple peasant as the national ideal. Similarly, the *Reichspost* incorporated the rhetoric of ethnic proportionality. It also historicised the Austro-German people and their homeland. However, as aforementioned, this historicisation took place through the lens of the state, rather than the *Volk*, pointing to the internalisation of a more Josephinist outlook. Finally, the *NFP* was more contradictory in its stance on ethnicity, sharing a Herderian emphasis on folksy culture, while intermittently rejecting the logic of ethnic identification and utilising the Josephinist language of progress and modernity.

Chapter 3: *Kaisertreue*

Introduction

This final chapter of Part I deals with the relationship between *Kaisertreue*, patriotism and nationalism. The term *Kaisertreue* can be used to describe both the general forms of popular royalism which persisted into the twentieth century, as well as a specifically Habsburg ideology. This popular royalism could consist of symbolic rituals involving the public, but also a more structural integration of the ruler into the *raison d'être* of the state.¹⁰⁹ A famous example of the former in the Habsburg context is the tradition of the Habsburg ruler washing the feet of the poor on Maundy Tuesday. This both symbolised the humility of the Emperor in front of his subjects, as well as serving to make humanise the Emperor and make him seem more approachable. In a more structural sense, *Kaisertreue* describes loyalty towards the Emperor as an ideology, through which the Habsburg dynasty aimed to legitimise its rule over the rather heterogeneous Habsburg Empire. Especially after the 50-year jubilee in 1898, there was conscious effort from the Habsburg ruling classes to distance the Emperor from “divisive government decisions” and nationalist struggle in order to promote a non-partisan image of the Emperor, and to connect his image to economic and cultural progress.¹¹⁰ The popularity of Franz Joseph was accentuated by his ageing, which gave him a fatherly image. Franz Joseph, who had in his long reign lost both his wife and son in highly publicised assassinations, began to serve as sort of “Christ-like” martyr in service of his country.¹¹¹

There are, however, arguments against applying the concept of *Kaisertreue*. Methodologically, it can be argued that *Kaisertreue* did not necessarily mean abjuring nationalist politics. As Ernst Bruckmüller argued, *Kaisertreue* could also mean the coopting of the Emperor into the national.¹¹² If the Emperor was seen to be favouring one nationality over the other, he would be seen as the

¹⁰⁹ M. Prutsch, ‘Monarchical Constitutionalism’ in Post-Napoleonic Europe: Concept and Practice’, in eds. K.L. Grotke & M.J. Prutsch, *Constitutionalism, Legitimacy and Power: Nineteenth-Century Experiences* (Oxford 2014), p. 83.

¹¹⁰ D. Unowsky, ‘Staging Habsburg Patriotism: Dynastic Loyalty and the 1898 Imperial Jubilee’, in: P. Judson & M. Rozenblits, *Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe* (New York 2004), p. 151-152.

¹¹¹ M. Rady, *The Habsburgs: To Rule the World* (New York 2020), p. 288.

¹¹² E. Bruckmüller, ‘Patriotic and National Myths: National Consciousness and Elementary School Education in Imperial Austria’, in: eds. L. Cole & D. Unowsky, *The Limits of Loyalty: Imperial Symbolism, Popular Allegiances, and State Patriotism in the Late Habsburg Monarchy* (New York 2007), p. 29.

Emperor of this nation, rather than a unifying figure. Notoriously, this happened to Joseph II, who, owing to his centralisation policies, came to be regarded specifically as a German Emperor.¹¹³ Furthermore, as this form of legitimacy was highly contingent on the figure of Franz Joseph himself, it has justifiably been argued by historians that this form of *Kaisertrüe* could hardly form an alternative, structural form of legitimacy to effective constitutional rule or nationalism.¹¹⁴ Franz Ferdinand, the reclusive heir to the Habsburg throne in 1908, certainly did not try to foster *Kaisertrüe* through his personal image.¹¹⁵ Taking these arguments into consideration, this part will centre around the following three questions. Firstly, how was the Emperor conceived of within the newspapers? Did the newspapers take the idea of Austrian patriotism as an alternative to nationalism seriously? And finally, was *Kaisertrüe* seen in terms of pan-imperial loyalty, or as a means of coopting the Emperor into the national?

Ostdeutsche Rundschau

The *Rundschau* spoke of the Imperial dynasty in rather frosty terms. On 2 December, the day on which Franz Joseph was crowned in 1848, the *Rundschau* dedicated an issue to the Emperor. Although there was little outright criticism, the newspaper did take a few jabs at the Emperor. The front page of the 2 December issue featured an article highlighting the plight of a German mother and her son who was stationed as a soldier at the Montenegrin border. “Warum mußte ihr der Kaiser den einzigen, überdies kränklichen Sohn nehmen?” the newspaper wondered. “Ach, der Kaiser weiß ja nichts von all dem Jammer, der im Jubeljahre Millionen Herzen der Feststimmung verschließt” the newspaper sardonically concluded.¹¹⁶ This passage did not describe a caring emperor, but a distant ruler who was indifferent to the problems of his German subjects. While he was celebrating the anniversary of his rule, the bureaucratic state apparatus at whose head he stood spoiled the festive mood of this family, the *Rundschau* tried to argue. It is interesting that parenthood as a virtue is inverted here, compared to the other newspapers; the Emperor is not the father-like figure but a barrier between a mother and her son. Further on in the 2 December issue, the difficult relationship between Franz Joseph and constitutional rule was highlighted, emphasising the Emperor’s original difficulty in accepting the limits to his power.¹¹⁷ Thereby, the Emperor was explicitly politicised in a manner uncommon in the other newspapers. Once again, the difference in depiction of German statesman Bismarck and Emperor Franz Joseph in the *Rundschau* is revealing.

Unsurprisingly, the idea that an Austrian Imperial identity could serve to replace nationalism as a means of unifying peoples was squarely rejected by the *Rundschau*. Interestingly, this did not mean that the newspaper rejected any integrative effect that an emperor might have. Actually, the *Rundschau* praised German Emperor Wilhelm for doing exactly that.¹¹⁸ What the newspaper did

¹¹³ Wingfield, ‘Emperor Joseph II’, p. 62.

¹¹⁴ C. Wolf, ‘Representing Constitutional Monarchy in Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth-century Britain, Germany and Austria’, in eds. L. Cole & D. Unowsky, *The Limits of Loyalty: Imperial Symbolism, Popular Allegiances, and State Patriotism in the Late Habsburg Monarchy* (New York 2007), p. 210.

¹¹⁵ Hannig, ‘Archduke Franz Ferdinand’, p. 143.

¹¹⁶ “Why did the Emperor have to take from her her only, sickly son?” “Oh well, the Emperor knows nothing of the misery which ruins the festive moods in millions of hearts during the Jubilee year”: ‘Vedette’, *Ostdeutsche Rundschau* (2-12-1908), p. 1.

¹¹⁷ ‘Sechzig Jahre kaiserlichen Schutzes’, *Ostdeutsche Rundschau* (2-12-1908), p. 5.

¹¹⁸ ‘Die außerpolitische Lage Oesterreichs zu Beginn des Jahres 1909’, *Ostdeutsche Rundschau* (27-1-1909), p. 1.

contest, was that Franz Joseph was an integrative element to the German nation in Austria. It argued that the Germans had always been the most *Kaisertreu* of all the peoples in the Habsburg Empire. However, despite their loyalty, the Germans had received little, while other nationalities, mostly the Czechs, had unfairly benefitted greatly from the Emperor's favour. The *Rundschau* concluded that "Für uns in Oesterreich ist es wichtig festzustellen, daß die Interessen der habsburgischen Dynastie andere sind."¹¹⁹ In this reasoning, one can recognise the argument that different nations within the Empire tried to coopt the Emperor into their national narrative. However, rather than arguing that Franz Joseph was 'their' Emperor, the *Rundschau* turned this dynamic around by arguing that was the Emperor of other nationalities. Seemingly, the inability to coopt the Emperor into the German nationalist narrative, led to the newspaper rejecting him as a unifying figure and *Kaisertreue* as a valuable alternative to nationalism.

Reichspost

Looking at the *Reichspost*, a rather intimate and flattering picture emerges of Franz Joseph. It followed the trend of depicting the Emperor as a father-like figure, intensely devoted to his subjects. The newspaper emphasised that the Emperor took good care of his soldiers by visiting them when they were wounded.¹²⁰ In one article, the Emperor is described in his capacity as a *Gutsherr* (landlord) over his estates. The Emperor is not a stereotypical lord, the newspaper argued. He takes good care of his workers after they stopped working for him, even allowing them to live out their retirement on his estates.¹²¹ This image of Franz Joseph as a landlord is a deeply depoliticised one; it emphasised his rule in a context outside state government.

Owing to this depoliticised image, the *Reichspost* promoted *Kaisertreue* in the form of Austrian identity with the veneer of imperial legitimacy as an alternative to politics based on nationalism, using the malleable and unproblematic image of the Emperor the newspaper itself propagated. It contended that, whereas national politics led to strife and conflict, Austrian identity would serve as a strong basis for social harmony. The newspaper actively tried to substantiate this claim through its coverage of the annexation of Bosnia. According to the *Reichspost*, the reaction of the population of Bosnia had been a "Gewaltiger Sinfonie [...] Anhänglichkeit für die Monarchie", which proved that "das Habsburgerreich seine Anziehungskraft als Völkergemeinschaft auch heute noch in vollem Maße besitzt, eine Anziehungskraft, die stärker ist als das Schlagwort von der nationalen Staatenbildung, das nur von Theoretikern erfunden wurde."¹²² In other words, it had been specifically the attractiveness of the Habsburg model as embodied by the Dynasty which had created support for the state in Bosnia.

There are two important aspects to this excerpt. Firstly, it shows an affection for the monarchy which appears to have been genuine, as this sentiment was repeated often by the *Reichspost*. It fits within the broader narrative of portraying the Monarchy as a unifying force, and certainly confirms the idea that popular royalism as such formed an alternative to nationality-based

¹¹⁹ "For us in Austria it is important to note that the interests of the Habsburg dynasty are different [from ours]": Dr. Wießner, 'Dynastie, Staat, Volk', *Ostdeutsche Rundschau* (2-12-1908), p. 3.

¹²⁰ J. Wichner, 'Feuilleton: Unser Kaiser und die Volksseele', *Reichspost* (2-12-20), p. 1.

¹²¹ 'Feuilleton: Unser Kaiser als Gutsherr', *Reichspost* (24-10-1908), p. 1.

¹²² "The affection for the Monarchy" "The Habsburg Empire to this day retains its attractiveness as a union of peoples in full measure, an attractiveness which is stronger than the motto of national state building which was only invented by theorists": 'Die Rechtfertigung der Annexion', *Reichspost* (13-10-1908), p. 2.

politics to the readers of the *Reichspost*. Secondly, it is important to stress that the *Reichspost* explicitly posited *Kaisertreue* as an alternative to nationalism. Despite trying to argue that nationalism had been ‘invented’ and artificial, it could not ignore the reality of nationalism. Thus, the *Reichspost* was relegated to proving that *Kaisertreue* was better than nationalism. However, as discussed before, the *Reichspost* also based its conception of Austrian identity on markers of German identity. This led to a somewhat idiosyncratic blend of simultaneously decrying nationalism in favour of *Kaisertreue* and promoting Austrian values based on a national frame. Of course, this begs the question whether the *Reichspost* itself was really convinced of the power of *Kaisertreue* to serve as a reliable alternative to nationalism, especially since the Emperor himself was seen as separate from any policy. It must therefore be noted that, while the Emperor was used by the *Reichspost* as an a-national figure representing pan-imperial loyalty, the Monarchy was still coopted into the *Reichspost*’s image of Austrian identity. An identity which was ambiguously tied to the national itself.

Neue Freie Presse

During the Bosnian Crisis, the *NFP* portrayed Franz Joseph as a personification of Austria-Hungary and the modernising influence of the state. This meant that the overall coverage of the Emperor was rather impersonal and focused on official business. Rather than praising the Emperor for being specifically caring or involved as a ruler, the efficiency and accomplishments of his rule were the focus of the *NFP*-narrative, as the actions taken by the Austro-Hungarian state were usually ascribed to the Emperor. This meant that, despite its positive tone, the *NFP* was quite formal. Its coverage of the Bosnian Crisis reflected this best. The 6 October issue almost exclusively dealt with the legal aspects of the annexation; how international law could be instrumentalised to justify the annexation, but also how it would alter the present constitutional arrangements of the Dual Monarchy.¹²³ According to the *NFP*, the Emperor, as embodiment of the state, played a vital role in the transfer of the sovereignty of Bosnia from the Ottomans to the Habsburgs, as it was his proclamation on 5 October which had legally altered the situation. Moreover, this depersonalised image of the Emperor was connected to key liberal and modernising aspects of the state. The *NFP* explicitly connected the influence of the Emperor to constitutionalism and the establishment of universal suffrage, making him a liberal icon.¹²⁴ Similarly, the newspaper saw in the development of the Austrian economy and the growth of its population the modernising influence of Franz Joseph. For example, his regime had eradicated many widespread disease during the nineteenth century.¹²⁵ Consequently, the *NFP* employed a rather utilitarian conception of *Kaisertreue* as a means to underpin a common Austrian identity. Rather than focusing on the ‘emotional’ aspects of the Emperor, as the *Reichspost* was more inclined to do, the *NFP* described loyalty to the Emperor as a rational choice for the population of the Empire. It was “in der Person der Souveräns, welcher den Staatswillen repräsentiert” that suffrage had been expanded in Austria and now a constitution in Bosnia would be promulgated.¹²⁶

¹²³ ‘Wien, 5. Oktober’, *Neue Freie Presse* (6-10-1908), p. 1.

¹²⁴ R. H. Bartsch, ‘Der Eindruck des Kaisers auf die jüngere Generation’, *Neue Freie Presse* (2-12-1908), p. 2.

¹²⁵ Juraschek, ‘Die Wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Oesterreichs seit 1848’, *Neue Freie Presse* (2-12-1908), p. 18.

¹²⁶ “In the person of the sovereign, who represents the will of the state”: ‘Die völkerrechtliche Stellung in Bosnien’, *Neue Freie Presse* (6-10-1908), p. 7.

The *NFP*-narrative was thus not too dissimilar from Gary Cohen's of the *Rechtsstaat*. It promulgated the idea that the core from which the Habsburg Empire derived its legitimacy was that it protected and promoted the rights of its citizens.¹²⁷ As much of the discussions of the Emperor's influence was within the context of Bosnia, it can be discerned that the *NFP* explicitly saw *Kaisertreue* as an ideology which fostered pan-imperial loyalty.

Conclusion

Again, the clearest dividing line is between the *Reichspost* and *NFP* on the one hand, and the *Rundschau* on the other. Both the *Reichspost* and the *NFP* nominally conceptualised *Kaisertreue* as a viable alternative to nationalism. There were, however, two key differences. Firstly, while the *NFP* took a more impersonal perspective, depicting the Emperor as a law-giving representative of the state, the *Reichspost* leaned more into the image of a father-figure. Secondly, while the *NFP* saw *Kaisertreue* as a means of promoting pan-Imperial loyalty, the *Reichspost* tried to 'nationalise' the Emperor as a specifically *Austrian* Emperor. Interestingly, the *Rundschau* also tried to nationalise the Emperor in an effort to prove that he was not the Emperor of the Austro-German nation.

¹²⁷ Cohen, 'Our Laws, Our Taxes', p. 110.

Part II: 'Them'

Chapter 4: The Oriental Other

Introduction

Orientalism as an analytical framework was first proposed by historian Edward Saïd. In his eponymous book, Saïd described Orientalism as a "a style of thought based upon ontological and epistemological distinction made between "the Orient" and (most of the time) "the Occident"". ¹²⁸ Nineteenth-century western scholars created an eastern other, which could act as a foil to western civilisation. In this pursuit, vastly different cultures were amalgamated and essentialised into the 'Oriental'. As Johann Heiss and Johannes Feichtinger have argued, the Orientalising of the Balkans served two purposes for Austria-Hungary. The first of these was legitimising the colonisation of Bosnia by painting it as a place "ripe for mission work lying on Europe's noncivilized edge". The second purpose was to show the superiority of the Habsburg multinational project, state nationalism, over South Slavic cultural nationalism, as state nationalism had an integrative effect, while cultural nationalism was thought of as driving the Bosnians into the arms of Serbia. ¹²⁹

To investigate the use of Orientalism by the three newspapers, the concept will be broken down into three aspects. First, the mental-physical placement of Bosnia will be discussed. In a recent study, Maureen Healy used travel diaries to argue that travelling to Bosnia was experienced as crossing the border into a vastly different place. ¹³⁰ By similarly focusing on the concept of border-crossing, the mental distancing can be expressed in concrete terms. Second is the use of Orientalist tropes. To the nineteenth-century European, the Orient conjured up images of violent and barbarous men and mysterious and seductive women, jealously guarded from the outside world in vast harems. The Austrian imagination was primed in a similar way towards Bosnia, which was referred to as a "Halb-Asien". ¹³¹ Thirdly, the reification of Bosnian identity will be investigated. Although it was physically located in Europa, it was seen as culturally closer Asia and, despite the fact that roughly 60% of Bosnians at the time were Christian, Bosnia was conceptualised as an Islamic country. ¹³² In order to examine this process by which this occurred, the use of physical markers to reify Bosnian identity will be analysed.

Neue Freie Presse

The *NFP* reinforced preexisting notions of physical separation between Bosnia and the rest of the Monarchy, despite its modest distance. It mostly placed stories discussing Bosnia in its Feuilleton, a section normally reserved for fiction and literary discussion. To a large extent, the Feuilleton genre structured the depiction of Bosnia. As the reference point of the story was mostly that of the journalist, leading to a subjective, 'eye-witness' style of journalism which starkly contrasted with the 'objective' coverage news in the other parts of the newspaper. This lent itself quite well to a Orientalist narrative of border-crossings, as the reporter would document his

¹²⁸ Saïd, *Orientalism*, p. 2-3.

¹²⁹ Heiss, & Feichtinger, 'Distant Neighbors', p. 155.

¹³⁰ M. Healy, 'Europe on the Sava: Austrian Encounters with the "Turks" in Bosnia', *Austrian History Yearbook*, 51 (2020), p. 78.

¹³¹ "Semi-Asia": Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, p. 321.

¹³² Healy, 'Europe on the Sava', p. 73.

travels to another place. The 30 December Feuilleton, in which journalist and journalist Paul Zifferer narrated his trip to Bosnia, is a good example of such border-crossing narratives. “Orient! Warme, zitternde Töne, die ineinanderfließen zu einem weichen, buntgewirkten Teppich!”, he commenced. Not only had Zifferer crossed a physical border, but also a civilisational one. He remarked that his mood was instantly affected by this foreign land; the Orient, “Wie eine Fata Morgana” took a hold of him.¹³³ The hot and colourful, surroundings combined with “Schwulen Düfte” dulled his senses. Entering Bosnia meant exchanging the usual for the exotic; a land whose very air was different from Austria. The “Zitternde Töne” reminds one of a desert landscape, despite the fact that the Bosnian climate was largely similar to the surrounding regions.¹³⁴

Several explicitly Orientalist tropes were employed by the *NFP*. Most explicitly, the newspaper reinforced the idea that the Orient was a place stuck in time, unable to keep up with the west and modernise. The function of religion, specifically Islam, was highlighted. To the liberal *NFP*, deep religiosity was not seen as a positive characteristic. “Der Islam ist ein Fanatismus” Zifferer remarked, pointing to the irrationality of Bosnian religious practices.¹³⁵ The fact that in Bosnia faith was still the basis of identity, rather than nationality or citizenship, baffled him. The *NFP*, however, did not focus solely on backwardness. Modernity could be brought to Bosnia as its backwardness was not inherent. After hundreds of years of “Barbarei und der Knechtung” under Turkish rule, Bosnia had finally been conquered by European civilisation.¹³⁶ The *NFP* reproduced reified cultural attributes to create the stereotypical Muslim Bosnian. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the *NFP* used ethnic markers to this end. The faces of the Bosnian Muslims, the newspaper argued, resembled the angular ‘Oriental type’.¹³⁷ Similarly, clothing, like the fez and turbans, were strongly correlated with Oriental identity. Most prominently, the Ottoman fez was used to this effect. In the early nineteenth century, the goal of the fez had been to symbolise modernisation attempts by the Turkish state. However, by the start of the twentieth century, it had become a symbol of Ottomans failure to do so, being more generally associated with Muslimness.¹³⁸ Thus, when describing the entrance of the Bosnian delegation to the Imperial capital in the autumn of 1908, the *NFP* emphasised that the whole delegation wore the stereotypical Oriental fezzes.¹³⁹ It is important to note that the *NFP* did not necessarily ‘invent’ these cultural attributes, but rather employed pre-existing stereotypes to further its narrative of Bosnia and its inhabitants as Oriental.

Reichspost

Owing to its strong anti-Magyar attitudes, the *Reichspost* tried to further solutions to the Bosnian Annexation Crisis which would do most to weaken the Hungarians. To achieve this, it was imperative to align Bosnia with the Austrian half of the Empire. Therefore, the *Reichspost* embraced a Trialist stance. Proponents of Trialism argued for further federalisation of Austria-Hungary by restructuring the Empire into three, rather than two kingdoms. A common proposal for this to be a South Slav kingdom, made up of the Empire’s Balkan territories, which were largely

¹³³ “Orient! Warm, trembling notes in the air, flowing together into a soft, colourfully woven tapestry!” “Like a Fata Morgana”: P. Zifferer, ‘Feuilleton: In den neuen Reichslanden’, *Neue Freie Presse* (30-12-1908), p. 1

¹³⁴ “Sultry scents” “trembling air”: Zifferer, ‘Feuilleton’, p. 1.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹³⁶ ‘Wien, 6. Oktober’, *Neue Freie Presse* (7-10-1908), p. 1.

¹³⁷ ‘Die Ankunft der Deputation aus Bosnien und der Herzegowina’, *Neue Freie Presse* (7-11-1908), p. 10.

¹³⁸ J. Seal, *A fez of the heart: travels around Turkey in search of a hat* (London 1996), p. 64-65.

¹³⁹ ‘Die Ankunft der Deputation aus Bosnien und der Herzegowina’, *Neue Freie Presse* (7-11-1908), p. 10.

Hungarian-owned by 1908.¹⁴⁰ The Christian Social Movement specifically advocated for the unification of Croatia, under Hungarian rule at the time, with Bosnia into one kingdom.¹⁴¹ Due to Hungarian-Croatian antagonism, this kingdom would naturally be aligned with Austria. To promote this Pan-Slavism, the *Reichspost* tried to decrease the mental and physical distance between its readers and Bosnia. For example, it argued that it was “immer wieder hindernd in den Weg tretenden magyarischen Egoismus”, not Bosnian backwardness, which was the greatest obstacle to the country’s development.¹⁴²

However, the *Reichspost* still went quite far in using Orientalist imagery to paint a negative picture of Islam, which is to be expected of a Christian newspaper. For example, the *Reichspost* examined Bosnian attitudes towards women and justice. In one Feuilleton, sardonically called “Türkische Liebe”, the reporter recalled an encounter with ‘Turkish’ culture in Bosnia. In it, he detailed the prevalent backwards attitudes towards women, and the harsh sense of justice of Bosnians. The story was relayed as follows. The *Reichspost*’s reporter in Bosnia, Georg Terknlja went on a trip to a local Muslim village. Upon entering the village gate, Terknlja saw a farmer carriage passing by. As they were passing by, the horses started bolting and panicking. In the ensuing panic, Terknlja jumped on the cart to help calm the horses. As he was doing this, he noticed that one of the passengers was a beautiful young woman without her veil on. Quickly, he jumped off, as he realised the gravity of the situation. However, the damage had been done. The villagers, who had gathered round, decided to kill the woman for having brought shame to herself and to her village. Despite drawing his pistol, Terknlja could not stop the mob, because “der Mohammedaner fürchtet den Tod [...] nicht im geringsten”, certainly not here, where “eine Uebertretung des Korans auf so schreckliche Weise gerächt wird”.¹⁴³ The reporter is only able to save the life of the woman and his own after intervention by the authorities and after having sworn that he forgot the face of the woman. In this story, several Orientalist tropes serve to negatively depict Bosnians.

Firstly, the trope of backwardness and irrationality features quite heavily within the story. The irrationality of Muslim customary law is emphasised, as a small offense in the eyes of western society seemingly carried such an unjustly high penalty. Correspondingly, it highlighted the seeming backwardness of Islamic attitudes towards women, jealously protected and treated almost as property. Once again, the Feuilleton-genre aided in establishing a narrative othering. As the protagonist is able to prevail against overwhelming odds, the Bosnian antagonists become stooges, stereotypes rather than characters unto themselves. The reification of Bosnian identity was, in contrast with the depiction of the qualities of Bosnian culture, rather subdued. Similar to the *NFP*, the *Reichspost* used clothing to delineate Bosnian identity. The fez also played an important role in contrasting Muslim society with European civilisation. Moreover, the *Reichspost* similarly saw an ethnic component to the difference between Bosnians and Austrians, with Terknlja noting that there were “türkisch-mongolischen Einsprengungen” in the Bosnian heritage.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁰ I, Ivašković, ‘How Littoral Slovenians Viewed the Idea of a South Slavic Unit in the Habsburg Monarchy’, *Journal of Modern European History*, 21:1 (2023), p. 53-54.

¹⁴¹ A. Fuchs, *Geistige Strömungen in Österreich, 1867-1918* (Wien 1949), p. 61-62.

¹⁴² L. Grenneville, ‘Nach der Annexion’, *Reichspost* (1-1-1909), p. 3.

¹⁴³ “The Mohammedan does not fear dead, [...] not in the slightest” “a transgression against the Quran is avenged in such a terrible fashion”: G. Terknlja, ‘Feuilleton: Türkische Liebe’, *Reichspost* (17-4-1909), p. 2.

¹⁴⁴ G. Terknlja, ‘Feuilleton: Bosnische Volkspoeseie’, *Reichspost* (18-10-1908), p. 1.

Ostdeutsche Rundschau

The *Rundschau*, meanwhile, was rather summary in relating Bosnians to the Orient. It is perhaps surprising that the *Rundschau*, as a proudly xenophobic newspaper, did not use Orientalist arguments to condemn the inclusion of Bosnia into the Empire. On one occasion only during the Bosnian Crisis did the *Rundschau* publish travelogues of a reporter to Bosnia. This reporter noted the minarets and the small, eastern houses. More noteworthy to the reporter, however, was the penetration of German civilisation in Bosnia, noting the presence of German hotels and inns.¹⁴⁵ The probable reason for this lack of Orientalist tropes is the fact that the main focus of national anxiety of the newspaper were the Slavic components of the Empire. For instance, on 15 October the *Rundschau* complained that the annexation of Bosnia added more Croats and Serbs to the Empire, with little attention paid to the 'Turkish element'.¹⁴⁶

Conclusion

Comparing the newspapers, it becomes clear that each of the Orientalised Bosnia differently, and to a different extent. Firstly, on a physical level, the *NFP* was the only newspaper to physically place Bosnia in a 'semi-Orient'. The *Reichspost* placed Bosnia squarely within Austria, in order to further the Christian Social agenda of strengthening the Austrian half of the Empire against the Hungarians. The *Rundschau*, meanwhile, emphasised German settlement of the region in this context. Secondly, Orientalist tropes played a role in all three papers, although the *Reichspost* and the *NFP* utilised them more, largely because of Feuilleton genre shaping the subject. The conception of Islam as a barbaric, fanatical faith featured heavily in these newspapers, as it was connected to the perceived backwards aspects of Bosnian society. Finally, all three newspapers reified Bosnian identity by using the fez and ethnic markers as stand-ins. In this regard, it is noteworthy that Mongolian and Turkish heritage was specifically seen as an important part of what made Bosnians semi-Oriental, rather than western.

Chapter 5: The Balkan Other

Introduction

While Muslim were Orientalised largely based on their religion, Christian Bosnians were seen as different on the basis of their nationality. The latter half of the nineteenth century saw emancipation of Slavs within the Empire, largely the result of a tacit understanding that a policy of Germanisation might no longer be feasible.¹⁴⁷ This compromise, however, did not bring ease of mind to German nationalists. As statistics became more accessible, the perceived demographic threat of the Slavs became more pronounced.¹⁴⁸ As will be discussed, each newspapers interpreted the threat of the integration of a new Slavic population in the Empire differently. To analyse these interpretations, three issues will be discussed: the characterisation of Slavic Bosnians, the issue of the feasibility and desirability of assimilation, and the extent to which the zero-sum game narrative was utilised. One could call these prejudices 'Balkanist' as the origins

¹⁴⁵ T. Wittig, 'Reisebilder aus Bosnien', *Ostdeutsche Rundschau* (10-4-1909), p. 1.

¹⁴⁶ Mach, 'Bis hierher und nicht weiter!', p. 1.

¹⁴⁷ Thum 'Megalomania and Angst: The Nineteenth-Century Mythicization of Germany's Eastern Borderlands', in: eds. O. Bartov & E. Weitz, *Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands* (Bloomington 2013), p. 51.

¹⁴⁸ Promitzer, 'The South Slavs in the Austrian Imagination', p. 190

of this conceptualisation were present in their embryonic form by 1908. However, Balkanism in the sense of Todorova's theory began developing only by the 1910s, as a reaction to the Balkan Wars and the First World War.¹⁴⁹

Ostdeutsche Rundschau

The narrative of the *Rundschau* was based on strong anti-Slavic prejudice. The newspaper described Slavic peoples as inherently inferior to Germans. It argued that they lacked the capacity to run their own states, as their 'national characteristics' precluded them from developing a functioning state. Usually the *Rundschau* treated all Slavic groups as interchangeable, categorising as one antagonistic force against Austro-Germans. For example, it spoke of Bosnia as a "Brei slavischer Völker".¹⁵⁰ However, in order to advance its arguments of Bosnians backwardness, it highlighted the ways in which Bosnians fared worse than their fellow Slavs. For example, it argued that the Czech was the "intelligenteste und kultivierteste Slave" because of their closeness to Germany, while still arguing that they were incapable of maintain a state and high culture.¹⁵¹ The Bosnians Slavs were more specifically chided for lacking discipline, self-reliance, and a sense of responsibility. As the *Rundschau* held Bosnians in even lower regard than other Slavic groups, it argued that they were uniquely incapable of ruling themselves.¹⁵² Whereas the relationship with, for example, the Czechs, was characterised by a fear of replacement, the relationship with the Bosnians was characterised as an unnecessary burden. As the Bosnians were unable to govern themselves, they would have to rely on outside help, meaning that the burden of governance would fall on the German taxpayer.¹⁵³

This translated into a bifurcated discourse on assimilation. On the one hand, the *Rundschau* argued that any effort to assimilate the Bosnians was wasted effort. There was little economic value to be extracted from the land, as the economy of Bosnia was mostly rural at the time. The only to be gained, the newspaper contended, quoting a member of parliament, was the "Erweiterung der habsburgischen Souveränität um 2 ½ Millionen Hammeldiebe".¹⁵⁴ Philanthropic arguments were also rejected. The newspaper acknowledged the uplifting effect of Austrian influence, contending that Austrian Slavs had a higher standard of living than their countrymen in Serbia.¹⁵⁵ However, it argued that the Bosnians did not deserve a continuation of this policy, as they had been very ungrateful of its benefits. Why then, the newspaper asked its readers, are our soldiers guarding "slavische Felsenhausen", when its inhabitants are filled with "glühendem Deutschenhaß"?¹⁵⁶ On the other hand, the *Rundschau* argued for a return to the policy of *Deutschzentrismus*, which entailed the "Germanisierung des Ostens".¹⁵⁷ It connected this argument specifically to the narrative of the zero-sum game. The end of Germanisation policies

¹⁴⁹ Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, p. 20.

¹⁵⁰ "Blend of Slavic peoples": 'Reisebilder aus Bosnien', p. 1.

¹⁵¹ "The most intelligent and cultivated Slav": 'Was uns Deutschösterreichern fehlt', *Ostdeutsche Rundschau* (5-1-1909), p.1.

¹⁵² Was uns Deutschösterreichern fehlt', *Ostdeutsche Rundschau* (5-1-1909), p.1.

¹⁵³ 'Entweder – oder!', *Ostdeutsche Rundschau* (24-2-1909), p. 1.

¹⁵⁴ "Extension of Habsburg sovereignty over 2,5 million cattle thieves": K. H. Wolf, cited in: 'Abgeordneter Wolf in Chemnitz', *Ostdeutsche Rundschau* (8-1-1909), p. 1.

¹⁵⁵ E.B., 'Was Serbien frommt', *Ostdeutsche Rundschau* (18-2-1909), p. 1.

¹⁵⁶ "Slavic rock-dwellings" "glowing hatred of Germans": 'In elfter Stunde!', p. 1.

¹⁵⁷ Mach, 'Bis hierher und nicht weiter!', p. 1.

were, according to the newspaper, a conspiracy by the other nationalities to marginalise the German nation.

Reichspost

Generally, the *Reichspost* was more favourable towards Bosnians. It seemed more inclined to recognise the distinctiveness of different Slavic groups, rather than describing as one ‘other’. Yet, it also emphasised the rural nature of the Bosnian economy, and the fact that most Bosnians were still “ärmliche Pächter”.¹⁵⁸ The *Reichspost*’s coverage showed remarkable similarity to the trope of the noble savage, the wild man who is uncorrupted by society, a trope commonly used in nineteenth-century European colonialist discourse.¹⁵⁹ Categorising Bosnians this way meant downplaying negative elements associated with backwardness, like the fanaticism the *Reichspost* associated with Islam. At the same time, the ‘positive’ aspects of backwardness enabled colonialist narratives; as the Bosnians were not used to civilisation, they could be educated to become Austrian. A good example of this trope is the story of the farmer Franjo. Although the veracity of the story is dubious, it does show how the newspaper aimed to depict Bosnians. The story of Franjo, as relayed by the *Reichspost*, is the story of an “einfacher bosnischer Bauer”, who is loyal, honest and strong as an ox. Somewhat naively, he has come from his forest homeland to Vienna to pay homage to the Emperor.¹⁶⁰ This “einfachen Natursohn” rejoiced at seeing the old and the young Emperor.¹⁶¹ The *Reichspost* pointed out that, as he was unaware of the rules of succession, he meant the Emperor and the heir to the throne. The *Reichspost* continued, describing how Franjo could not believe that the *Stephansdom* could have been built by man. The story incorporated the trope of the noble savage by depicting Franjo as a simple man, hailing from nature and unaware of civilisation and its complexities, yet friendly and loyal. It is also notable how the Catholic *Reichspost* closely explored the Christianity of Bosnia. Bosnian Christianity was othered to a significant extent, described as unorthodox and heretical. This notion of Balkan Christianity being inherently different and uncivilised than western Christianity has been observed before.¹⁶² The *Reichspost* traced these peculiarities all the way back to the ninth century. These peculiarities included superstitions so great that “in ihren Halluzinationen sahen die Leute überall den Teufel”.¹⁶³

As argued before, the *Reichspost* aimed to lessen the distance to Bosnia in order to integrate them better into the Austrian half of the Empire. This was reflected in its discussion of non-Muslim Bosnians as well. To this end, the *Reichspost* played up the loyalty of the Bosnians towards Austria. It argued that they were largely enthusiastic about the annexation. The newspaper’s assertion that “Kroaten, Mohammedaner, Serbische Bauern” together formed “einer gewaltiger Sinfonie rührender Vaterlandsliebe und Anhänglichkeit für die Monarchie zusammen” can be seen in this context as an explicit argument for aligning Bosnia with the Austrian half of the

¹⁵⁸ “Poor tenant farmers”: ‘Die Rechtfertigung der Annexion’, *Reichspost* (13-10-1908), p. 2.

¹⁵⁹ M. Křížová, ‘Noble and Ignoble Savages and Their Scientific “Colonization” in the Making of the Nation’, in eds. M. Křížová & J. Malečková, *Central Europe and the Non-European World in the Long nineteenth Century*, p. 149.

¹⁶⁰ “Simple Bosnian farmer”: ‘Streiflichter: Ein Bosnier über Wien’, *Reichspost* (17-12-1908), p. 2.

¹⁶¹ “Simple son of nature”: ‘Streiflichter: Ein Bosnier über Wien’, p. 2.

¹⁶² Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, p. 20.

¹⁶³ “In their hallucinations, the people saw the Devil everywhere” A. Gamerra, ‘Feuilleton: die Bogumilen’, *Reichspost* (15-10-1908), p. 1.

Empire.¹⁶⁴ The *Reichspost* did not translate this sentiment into an argument for an assimilation policy. Rather, it seemed genuinely committed to Austria as a multinational state. This led the *Reichspost* to reject zero-sum game narratives in the Bosnian context, and to poke fun at *Völkisch* concerns over the threat posed by the incorporation of Bosnia. In late October 1908 *Völkisch* representative Lecher noted that the annexation had taken place because of dynastic interests, not national interests. This provoked him into arguing that the German ought to reconsider their loyalty towards the Habsburg State, because, according to Lecher, “Staaten vergehen, Völker bestehen”. The *Reichspost* reacted to Lecher’s statement with sardonic incredulity. How, the newspaper reasoned, does Lecher reassure Germans that they have nothing to fear, while at the same time dreading the thought of two million Bosnians joining the Empire? Not only did the statement seem nonsensical to the *Reichspost*, it also argued that it constructed an artificial divide between the dynasty and the German people.¹⁶⁵

Neue Freie Presse

The *NFP* seemed somewhat undecided on the issue of characterisation. On the one hand, it made little effort to distinguish the Bosnians from other Slavic group within the Empire. Like the *Rundschau*, the *NFP* held a rather dichotomous view of the national situation in Austria; Austria was divided between an Austro-German and a Slavic element. At times, it emphasised the connection between Bosnians and Slavic groups within the Empire. For example, the *NFP* argued that the origin of civic unrest in Prague in the autumn of 1908 lay with Czech nationalist agitation over the proceedings of the Bosnian annexation.¹⁶⁶ On the other hand, it did recognise the diversity of Bosnian society. In one article, detailing the mood in Bosnia, it described its different ethnic groups, noting that Croats, Serbians and Muslims were living side-by-side. More importantly, it recognised that each group had differing reasons for either supporting or opposing the annexation, thereby refuting the narrative that the Empire’s Slavs were one homogeneous political force.¹⁶⁷

Similarly, the zero-sum game narrative played an ambiguous role. The *NFP* expressed its concern that the Slavs of the Empire would try to turn the annexation negotiations purely into a victory for Pan-Slavism. For example, it compared the current situation with that of 1878 in October 1908. In 1878, the *NFP* argued, refusal by German parties to acquiesce to the takeover of Bosnia had cost them much political influence. In this instance, the Bosnian question was explicitly framed as a part of the zero-sum game.¹⁶⁸ The narrative of power politics, however, was contained to the impact Bosnia had on the situation in Bohemia, and how German-Czech relations would be affected. The demography of Bosnia received little further attention from the newspaper. For example, unlike the *Rundschau*, the *NFP* did not actively support German colonists within Bosnia. It noted their existence, but it neither agitated for increased support for their colonisation efforts nor did it pay special attention to them. Rather, they were relegated to a footnote on page 10.¹⁶⁹ An explanation for this dual appreciation of the role of the nationalities conflict can be found in

¹⁶⁴ “Croats, Mohammedans, Serbian farmers” “a great symphony of moving love of the fatherland and affection for the monarchy”: ‘Die Rechtfertigung der Annexion’, *Reichspost* (13-10-1908), p. 2.

¹⁶⁵ ‘Ein deutschfreisinniger Führer Gegen die Einverleibung’, *Reichspost* (13-10-1908), p. 4.

¹⁶⁶ J. Maly, ‘Die czechischen Straßenpolitik’, *Neue Freie Presse* (31-10-1908), p. 2.

¹⁶⁷ ‘Die Stimmung in Bosnien’, *Neue Freie Presse* (25-3-1909), p. 9.

¹⁶⁸ ‘Die Delegationssession’, *Neue Freie Presse* (8-10-1908), p. 6.

¹⁶⁹ ‘Deutsche Kolonisten aus Bosnien im Parlament’, *Neue Freie Presse* (29-10-1908), p. 10.

the 13 March issue. The issue's Feuilleton was dedicated to the *Kremsierer Reichstag*, the failed popular parliament of the 1848 revolution, and its legacy. The *NFP* lamented that *Kremsier* had represented an opportunity to solve the nationalities conflict. The *Kremsierer Reichstag* had proposed federalising the Habsburg Empire on the basis of nationality, which would have, according to the writer, laid the groundwork for a "mächtigen Völkerstaat".¹⁷⁰ Thus, the *NFP* could emphasise the zero-sum game when dealing with the issue of internal division of power between Czechs and Germans in Bohemia, while deemphasising it when it was implied to threaten the cohesion of the Empire when it came to Bosnia's connection to the Empire. This sentiment echoes Renner's adage, that the nationalities struggled over control of the state rather than against it.

On the issue of assimilation, the *NFP* remained committed to its pan-Habsburg perspective. It argued that, because it was impossible for Austria to once again become a national state, it should aspire to spread Austrian, western civilisation in order to uplift the peoples of the Empire. Bosnia was, according to this narrative, a model colony to show the positive influence of Austria. This positive influence could be discerned in two ways. Firstly, the *NFP* argued that the Bosnian economy had modernised under the Habsburgs, going from a rural economy to a burgeoning industrial economy.¹⁷¹ Secondly, it contended that Austrian political institutions furthered Bosnian political development. Echoing its Josephinist aspirations and equation of the state with progress, it framed the assimilation of Bosnia mostly from the perspective of the spread of Austrian, western institutions. Because the assimilationist rhetoric of the *NFP* was explicitly based on a Habsburg, anational understanding of integration, it served a relatively inclusive message. In essence, it argued that Bosnians could be accepted as long as they became more western, while not necessarily requiring them to become more German.

Conclusion

When the three newspaper are put together on the issue, several contrasts emerge. On the issue of characterisation, the *Rundschau* and the *Reichpost* held similarly disparaging views of the Bosnians. However, the desired effect differed. The *Rundschau* used its negative characterisation to argue the threat posed by the inclusion of Bosnia. The *Reichpost*, meanwhile, seemingly tried to downplay this perceived threat by portraying the Bosnians in a paternalistic fashion. Although all three newspapers argued for assimilation to some extent, their motives and desired results were different. The *Rundschau* singularly argued for Germanisation. The *NFP*, although arguing for integration, did so from a pan-Habsburg, civilisational perspective. The *Reichpost*, meanwhile, seemed most interested in sticking it to the Hungarians. The extent to which the zero-sum game was highlighted differed, reflecting each newspapers' agenda.

¹⁷⁰ R. Chernay, 'Feuilleton: Der Kremsierer Reichstag', *Neue Freie Presse* (13-3-1909), p. 4.

¹⁷¹ 'Sozialpolitische Verfügungen für Bosnien', *Neue Freie Presse* (7-1-1909), p. 3.

Chapter 6: The Serbian & Russian Threat

Introduction

Finally, the role of Serbia and Russia complicates the narrative somewhat. Serbia held a special place in the Austrian conception of geopolitics. Initially, Austrians were quite sympathetic towards the fledgling Serbian Kingdom, having helped the Serbs achieve their independence from the Ottomans. However, the deposition and assassination of the country's pro-Habsburg dynasty in favour of the Russian-aligned Karađorđević-dynasty in 1903 greatly soured the relationship between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Since Serbia was now considered to be in the sphere of geopolitical rival Russia, antipathy towards Serbia was coupled with fears of Russian encroachment.¹⁷² Furthermore, Serbian irredentist claims on Bosnia and the other South-Slavic lands of the Monarchy gave cause to paranoia surrounding Serbia's intentions. When the annexation of Bosnia was announced, Serbia and Russia protested. This, of course, was fuel to the fire of anti-Serbian sentiments. In this charged atmosphere, the *NFP* published an article written by Heinrich Friedjung on 25 March 1909. Friedjung, an Austro-German historian and journalist associated with ultranationalist publications, accused several Serbo-Croat politicians of high treason by conspiring with the Serbian government, resulting in several arrests. As Friedjung had (unwittingly) based his accusations on falsified evidence, the resulting trial was later characterised as fraudulent, and a major breach of the Austrian *Rechtsstaat*.¹⁷³ Although the resulting trials fall beyond the scope of this research, the direct context constitutes the final puzzle piece in answering the question the Bosnians were othered by the three newspaper. Therefore, two subjects will be broached in this chapter. Firstly, the extent to which fears of Serbian irredentism through the accusations by Friedjung informed the idea of treason within the population of Bosnia. Secondly, how the international context, specifically the influence of Russia, was related to Bosnia.

Neue Freie Presse

The article written by Friedjung was first published by the *NFP*. As such, an analysis of the implications of the accusation made by Friedjung fit best in the context of the wider coverage of Austro-Serbian relations by the *NFP*. In essence, Friedjung accused several Serbo-Croat politicians of covertly conspiring with the Serbian government. The Serbian government, he accused of deliberately influencing these politicians to stoke nationalist unrest in order to eventually take over the Empire's southern provinces. Stating his case, Friedjung wrote: "Beispiellos in der neueren Geschichte Europa ist die Sprache und das Auftreten Serbiens gegen die Donaumonarchie."¹⁷⁴ Friedjung's presupposition, and by extent that of many Austrians, was that the Serbian government was inherently untrustworthy and pursued its irredentist goals without regard for Austrian interests. An assumption which, perhaps, was not entirely unfounded.¹⁷⁵ He argued that Serbian advocacy was a "cynischer Vorwand" to continue anti-

¹⁷² Sked, *The Decline and Fall*, p. 259.

¹⁷³ M. Cornwall, 'Treason in an Era of Regime Change: The Case of the Habsburg Monarchy', *Austrian History Yearbook*, 50 (2019), p. 127.

¹⁷⁴ "Without comparison in the newest history of Europa are the language and acts of Serbia against the Danube Monarchy": H. Friedjung, 'Oesterreich-Ungarn und Serbien', *Neue Freie Presse* (25-3-1909), p. 2.

¹⁷⁵ Walker, *Sleepwalkers*, p. 94-95.

Austrian policy rather than genuine concern.¹⁷⁶ Friedjung framed this disingenuity as endemic to the plotting Karađorđević-dynasty, who had come to power “durch Verschwörungen, durch Dynamit, und Dolch”.¹⁷⁷ Having found their excuse, Friedjung continued, the Belgrade government funded the Serbo-Croat party to agitate for South-Slav independence. What made this accusation so shocking at the time, was that this party currently formed the Croatian government, suggesting that a fifth column of Serbian agitators was present within the Habsburg government. Moreover, he claimed to have evidence that Serbo-Croat students and even media were in on the plot.

These were, of course, hefty accusations. Their veracity are, in this context, of little importance. What is important, is that they were certainly instrumental in creating a conspiratorial atmosphere. Thus, in one key way the Friedjung-article presented a break with earlier *NFP*-discourse. Initially, the *NFP* was quite deliberately distinguishing between Serbians living within Austria-Hungary, and those living in Serbia. Many Serbians living within the borders of Austria-Hungary had, as the newspaper asserted, already proven their loyalty and bravery through their service within the Austro-Hungarian army.¹⁷⁸ Furthermore, it argued that Austria-Hungary could become the centre of South-Slav culture, rather than Serbia.¹⁷⁹ At its core, the Friedjung-article meant that a conceptual barrier had been broken down, the distinction between the Empire’s Serbian subjects and those Serbians in Serbia. In other key ways, however, the *NFP*’s stance remained unchanged after Friedjung. For example, it maintained that it was the influence of the Serbian government which was malicious. The population itself, in contrast, was not necessarily treasonous, nor did was support for Serbian irredentism endemic in Bosnia. For example, in a 13 April travelogue, the *NFP*-correspondent wrote that there were still orthodox priests who refused to support Serbian nationalist agitation.¹⁸⁰

The *NFP* therefore placed blame for any tensions surrounding the Bosnian Annexation with Serbia, enabled by Russia. Russia was reproached for insincerely demanding autonomy for Bosnia as a part of the ongoing diplomatic escalation, only doing so because it would put Serbia in a better position to expand its influence over the area. The newspaper noted that Russian opposition towards the annexation of Bosnia was hypocritical at best. In January 1909 it pointed out that members of the Russian government had already pronounced their support for an official annexation in 1878, when Austria-Hungary had gained de facto control over Bosnia.¹⁸¹ Later, in April, it presented further evidence in the form of secret compact between Russia, Austria-Hungary and Turkey. During secret negotiations, it was revealed, the three powers had already agreed to terms surrounding the annexation. All this served to paint the picture of the nefarious nature of Russian meddling and to vindicate the image of Austria-Hungary as victim of geopolitical games. In all this, the Bosnian Annexation was seen as an excuse, rather than a true cause.

¹⁷⁶ “Cynical excuses”: Friedjung, ‘Oesterreich-Ungarn’, p. 2.

¹⁷⁷ “Through conspiracy, through dynamite and dagger”: Ibid, p. 2.

¹⁷⁸ ‘Wien, 8. Oktober’, *Neue Freie Presse* (9-10-1908), p. 1.

¹⁷⁹ ‘Oesterreichische Delegation: Erklärung des Vertreters der Slovenen und Kroaten’, *Neue Freie Presse* (10-10-1908), p. 7.

¹⁸⁰ ‘Feuilleton: Von Sarajewo nach Mostar’, *Neue Freie Presse* (13-4-1908), p. 2.

¹⁸¹ E. Wertheimer, ‘Graf Peter Schuwalow für die Annexion Bosniens und der Herzegowina’, *Neue Freie Presse* (14-1-1909), p. 1.

Reichspost

The *Reichspost* greeted the print of the Friedjung-article with an elated condescension. The newspaper argued that it had long before warned of the threat posed by Serbia, only to be ignored: “[U]nsere Enthüllungen wurden seinerzeit von der gesamten liberalen Presse ignoriert und totgeschwiegen.”¹⁸² It reprinted parts of the article, mainly to prove its point. The contention that the Friedjung-article reflected a discourse prevalent within the *Reichspost* for a longer period was not without merit. As the newspaper brought up in their article, by this time the *Reichspost* was involved in a defamation lawsuit filed by the Serbo-Croat coalition. Anti-Serb coverage had been common in the *Reichspost* since the start of the Annexation Crisis. There was little effort to maintain a careful distinction between Serbs within and without, and between popular and government action. Both the Serbian people and their government, the newspaper observed, were hostile towards Austria-Hungary, and prepared to take up arms against it. It was noted that this seemed to be the result of a deliberate strategy propagated by all levels of the Serbian government. On the highest level, the Serbian government distributed arms to aggravated peasants, who used them to attack Austro-Hungarian border guards.¹⁸³ The newspaper also repeated rumours that the heir apparent of Serbia was involved in an incident in Syrmia, in which a school teacher had taught school children to regard the king of Serbia as their king, rather than Franz Joseph.¹⁸⁴

Conversely, as discussed before, the *Reichspost* was more proactive in signalling the differences between nationalities in Bosnia. It seems like the *Reichspost* used its differentiation to mark a specific part of the Bosnians population as treasonous: what it called Serbians. The loyal elements of the Bosnian population were equivocated with Croatianness, but, interestingly, not necessarily Catholicism. For example, on one occasion the newspaper noted with some satisfaction that Croats had formed a “Nationallegion” to combat the invasions by roving bands of Serbians.¹⁸⁵ Russian participation in the Crisis was, interestingly, not framed as a result of Russian policy. It denied Russian foreign policy agency in steering the conflict. Rather, the *Reichspost* seemed to argue that it was the Serbians who were pulling the strings in Saint-Petersburg. “[Ö]sterreichfeindlichen Strömungen” originating from Belgrade were poisoning the discourse in Russia, and pushing the country into a harsh stance, which was not necessarily in its own interest.¹⁸⁶ This is an interesting reversal of the usual narrative; rather than Serbia being a puppet to Russian interests, it was Russia which was being coaxed into acting by Serbia.

¹⁸² “Our revelations at the time were ignored and hushed up by the whole liberal press”: ‘Die großserbischen Verschwörer. Dr. Friedjung bestätigt die Enthüllungen der “Reichspost”’, *Reichspost* (27-3-1909), p. 6.

¹⁸³ ‘Die Lage in Serbien: Bosnische Gendarmen von serbischen Freischärlern überfallen’, *Reichspost* (29-12-1908), p. 4.

¹⁸⁴ ‘Telegramme: Die großserbische Bewegung’, *Reichspost* (25-10-1908), p. 5.

¹⁸⁵ ‘Bildung einer kroatischen Nationallegion gegen serbische Bandeneinfälle nach Bosnien’, *Reichspost* (6-11-1908), p. 3.

¹⁸⁶ ‘Die Aufrollung der Orientfrage. Die internationale Lage: Kaiser Wilhelm in Wien’, *Reichspost* (6-11-1908), p. 2.

Ostdeutsche Rundschau

Interestingly, the *Rundschau* was quite unbothered by the threat posed by the Serbs. Whereas the demographic threat of Slavic groups within the Empire was greatly emphasised by the newspaper, the political threat from Belgrade was downplayed, as was the internal threat of possible treason. Assessing the external threat, the *Rundschau* was outright contemptuous of the capacity of the Serbian Kingdom to threaten Austria-Hungary, contending that both its government and its people were too corrupt and inherently incapable of running a state.¹⁸⁷ Attempts by the Serbian government and its people to harm Austria-Hungary were therefore portrayed as childlike attempts, with little chance of actually succeeding. Instead, the Serbian “Enfant Terrible” had to rely on the international community, especially Russia, to do its bidding.¹⁸⁸ On the issue of the internal threat, the *Rundschau* commented that “südslavischen Konquistadoren” had tried to plunge Austria-Hungary into war.¹⁸⁹ However, it had been by the efforts of the German parties in government that peace had been kept and the threat averted, according to the German nationalist politician who had written the piece for the *Rundschau*. It might seem curious that the *Rundschau* seemed rather unimpressed by concrete threats to the state, while vague notions of replacement by slow, non-violent means provoked such emotion. The most likely explanation for this incongruity is that one was directed at the state, and the other at the nation. For a newspaper which so greatly emphasised the nation, such threats to the state might be more easily trivialised.

Conclusion

Three important remarks should be made regarding the othering of Bosnians on the basis of their supposed connection to Serbia. Firstly, none of the newspaper truly saw the Bosnians as treasonous. Although the *NFP*, and especially the *Reichspost*, blamed Serbs for conspiring with the Serbian government, this suspicion did not extend to other nationalities within Bosnia. Secondly, the Friedjung-narrative was largely accepted by the three newspapers. Although the *Rundschau* rejected the idea that Serbia posed a real threat, the intent was acknowledged. A point of contention was the extent to which a distinction should be made between Serbs and the Serbian government, with the *Reichspost* most vocally arguing that they were intimately connected. Fears of Serbian irredentism were not projected on the Bosnians themselves; they were projected on Serbs within and without Bosnia, within and without the Empire. Thus, the issue of Serb irredentism was framed as something instigated by a foreign power, whereby domestic elements supporting Serbia were also reduced to foreignness.

¹⁸⁷ E.B., ‘Was Serbien frommt’, *Ostdeutsche Rundschau* (18-2-1909), p. 1.

¹⁸⁸ ‘Auslands-Rundschau’, *Ostdeutsche Rundschau* (8-1-1909), p. 2.

¹⁸⁹ R. Sommer, ‘Ausklang’, *Ostdeutsche Rundschau* (11-4-1909), p. 1.

Final Conclusion

How then, would a resident of 1908 Vienna have understood the Bosnian Crisis based on their choice of newspaper? In what manner did the newspapers present this crisis to their readership, and, more importantly, how should this be understood? Firstly, on the issue of self-identification, it is important to recognise that several narratives on the self were intertwined. The Bosnian Annexation Crisis incited the three newspapers to tackle the question who 'we' was, sometimes literally.¹⁹⁰ Questions of identity, however, can never yield a singular answer, as identities intertwine and affect each other. Even if the newspapers' redactions tried to project one identity to the exclusion of all others, they could not escape their multifaceted identities either. This thesis has tried to analyse the centrality of the nation as an aspect of identity, resulting in a multilayered answer.

Of the three newspapers, the *NFP* was most inclined to make a distinction between loyalty to the nation and loyalty to the state, separating the two to a large extent. It held an Austro-German bias, which can be expected from a German-language newspaper. However, it went further in assuming that its readership hailed from a specifically German cultural background, taking familiarity with expressions of German intellectual traditions. In relying on high culture more than on popular culture, it stands out from the other two newspapers. This did not entail dismissing expressions of popular culture in its entirety, but focussing its German identity on a specific aspect on the cultural spectrum, as their use of Josephinist language attests to. Conversely, it did pay homage to a certain form of Imperial identity, which was separate from, but not necessarily opposed to, national identity. The *NFP's* concept of Imperial identity demonstrates its deep adherence to liberalism, as it used Franz Joseph as a specifically liberal symbol of a liberal empire.¹⁹¹ By maintain this distinction between the nation and the state, the *NFP* most closely represented the pre-unification intellectual tradition of German nationalist thought.

Conversely, the *Rundschau* reflects a more traditional understanding of the role of the Austro-Hungarian nationalist movement within the Habsburg Empire. Reading it, one cannot be faulted for believing that the Habsburg Empire truly was a prison of nations. Of all the newspapers, the *Rundschau* presented the most simple narrative on national identity; that state and nation should always coincide. Although the *Rundschau's* views are traditionally seen as representative of the way nationalism was conceptualised, its coverage actually presents a break with standard contemporary attitudes. This idea, that state and nation ought to coincide, was relatively unconventional, as the *Rundschau's* place on the political fringes further attests to. For the *Rundschau*, loyalty to the nation trumped all other loyalties. Existence within a multinational state, whose legitimacy relied did not directly proceed from nationalism, was both undesirable and, according to the newspaper, impossible, unless the explicit goal of this state was to assimilate or replace the other nationalities.¹⁹² To justify their narrative of supremacy of the nation over the state, the newspaper made ample use of Herderian narratives. Because the Habsburg

¹⁹⁰ 'Was tut uns Oesterreichern am meisten not?', p. 31.

¹⁹¹ 'Der Eindruck des Kaisers auf die jüngere Generation', p. 2.

¹⁹² Mach, 'Bis hierher und nicht weiter!', p. 1.

state did not comply to this world view, the Habsburgs were branded as either traitors to the nation, or not part of the nation at all.

Finally, the *Reichspost* is perhaps most interesting in this regard. As it was, in essence, in the process of nationalising the Imperial. It identified itself and its readership as Austrian based on its connection to the Habsburg dynasty. Although this 'Austrianness' was largely congruent with Austro-German identity, the newspaper did not necessarily rule out other bases for a common Austrian identity. The centrality of Catholicism and adherence to the Imperial principle might have replaced Austro-German nationalism if the multinational Empire had continued to exist for a longer period. In this sense, it lends credence to the 'supranationalist' idea that genuine attachment to the Habsburg dynasty could have superseded nationalist loyalties if given the time.¹⁹³ Proof of the transitional quality of turning the Imperial into the national can be seen in the way Herderian rhetoric was used by the *Reichspost*. Rather than using the rhetoric to prove the existence of a primordial nation, it was used to justify a historical Austrian mission, fusing Austro-German nationalism with state identity and loyalty to the Habsburg dynasty.

Some differences emerge between the three newspapers' narratives and their consequences. The discursive coalescence of nation and state 'streamlined' the *Rundschau's* coverage of the Bosnian Crisis into a singularly negative narrative on the Habsburg state. As the annexation of Bosnia continued a pivot away from German centralism, it specifically hurt the interests of the German nation. German soldiers would have to man the borders of Bosnia, German taxpayers would have to front the costs of the occupation, and the result would only be to lessen the German character of the state. The *NFP*, meanwhile, separated national and state loyalty, and could therefore strip the Annexation Crisis of its nationalist element. Rather than rallying around the flag of German nationalism, the statist *NFP* rallied to the flag of the Dual Monarchy against its foreign enemies. The *Reichspost* struggled somewhat in this regard. It had to go along with *völkisch* narratives of victimhood of the German nation to maintain its standing within the nationalist sphere.¹⁹⁴ , This can be ascertained, for example, from its insistence on associating itself with *Schutzvereine*. Yet, as the newspapers represented elite interests and the Christian Social movement, it could not disavow the Habsburg state in its handling of the crisis. Despite these differences, a clear consensus on the centrality of German nationalism emerges between the three newspapers from their coverage of the Bosnian Crisis. Each newspapers utilised nationalist rhetoric in one form or another to flag itself and its audience, leading to a shared 'we', even if in the case of the *Reichspost*, this flagging was done mostly in an effort to wrest superiority over the nationalist (media) sphere.

Secondly, on the issue of representing the population of Bosnia, it is important to note that the newspapers did not see one 'other'; rather, they differentiated between what they saw as different groups inhabiting the same space, each of which was seen in a different relationship to the Austro-Germans. Their disposition and their merits were also judged differently. In the domestic context, the *NFP* disregarded the direct threat of the Bosnians to the nation. Although concerns were voiced of the possibility of Bosnians being roped into the conflict by others, notably the Czechs, the Bosnians themselves were seen as harmless. They were chips in the zero-sum game,

¹⁹³ Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*.

¹⁹⁴ J. W. Boyer, *Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna: Origins of the Christian Social Movement 1848-1897* (Chicago 1981), p. 90-95.

not players. The international context was framed similarly, with the Bosnians serving a passive rather than an active role in the Serbian conspiracy against the Habsburg Empire. Perhaps surprisingly, of all the newspapers, the *NFP* was most pronounced in its use of Orientalist rhetoric. Although this might seem curious for the least fiercely nationalist newspaper, there is some logic to this, as the stereotypical image of the irrational and lawless Orient is antithetical to the self-image of the consciously liberal *NFP*.¹⁹⁵

It is perhaps ironic that the usually xenophobic showed an unusual penchant for differentiating between different out-groups. The demographic threat the Bosnians presented to Austro-German dominance within the Empire was highlighted to a great extent, both as a singular group, as well as in combination with the other Slavic nations of the Empire, like the Czechs. At the same time, the Serbian and Russian threat was seen as of little concern to the newspaper, despite the fact that they were physically more threatening during the Annexation Crisis. The reason for this incongruity, as has been alluded to, is the fact that while Serbia and Russia threatened the state, the Bosnians threatened the nation. Similarly, the Orient held little interest for the *Rundschau*; better to have the Ottomans front the cost of occupying the region and dealing with its population. Thus, the logic of zero-sum national relationship was totally internalised in the narrative of the *Rundschau*. Conversely, to the *Reichspost*, Bosnia seems to have presented more of an opportunity to prove the superiority of its own ideals; a mix of moderate German chauvinism combined with Catholic conservatism and *Kaisertreue*. Hence, the *Reichspost* reversed the *Rundschau*'s reasoning. As the threat of Serbia and Russia represented the largest danger to the integration of Bosnia into the Habsburg Empire, foreign influence was given most consideration. Furthermore, to prove the feasibility of the Habsburg system, the newspaper argued that Bosnians themselves were quite positive about the impending integration. Thus, foreign influence on the Empire, rather than Bosnian influence, was maligned. This, however, did not mean that the *Reichspost* held Bosnians in high regard. Just like the *NFP* and the *Rundschau*, the Bosnians were demeaned through a mix of Balkanist and Orientalist rhetoric, depicting the Bosnians as less developed in comparison with Austro-Germans.

Concluding, what can be inferred about the extent to which the nationalist lens was used by these three Austro-German newspapers by looking at their discourse during the Bosnian Crisis? Seemingly, the three newspaper had quite similar starting points from which their appreciation of the facts of the matter arose; Austro-German identity featured as a core tenet of their identity, with nationality being a determining factor in differentiating the in-group from the out-group, Austro-Germans from Bosnians. However, key ideological differences and interests led them to draw very distinct conclusions from the Bosnian Crisis, despite their similar background. In the end, the *Reichspost* and the *NFP* saw in the annexation proof of the feasibility of the Habsburg model of social organisation, functioning alongside nationalism, even if the relationship between the two was tense. The Bosnian Crisis was therefore not presented as disruptive to the existing social relationships within the Empire. Rather, foreign interference, not domestic issues, were seen as potentially dangerous to the Empire. In contrast, the *Rundschau* did see the annexation as subversive to the existing social order. The internalisation of the zero sum-narrative meant that the newspaper could not but conclude that the annexation served to weaken the Austro-German nation, since it did not directly benefit from it. Consequently, because the *Rundschau* put so

¹⁹⁵ Saïd, *Orientalism*, p. 40.

much emphasis on the primacy of nationalism over all other forms of state legitimacy, that its narrative soured on the future prospects of the Habsburg state.

As the *Reichspost*, *Rundschau*, and *NFP* were major newspapers and therefore important actors in setting media narratives, their discourse could transform narrative into reality. This is how liberal and *völkisch* nationalists alike could see in the Habsburg state proof of their ideological relationship with state legitimacy. It stands out that, in the end, two of the three major Austro-German nationalist camps, the Christian Socialists and the liberal nationalists, saw Habsburg social organisation as successful, or at least did not anticipate its eventual downfall in the aftermath of the First World War, even during the international upheaval of the Bosnian Crisis. In relationship with earlier research, the representations of these camps within the *NFP* and the *Reichspost* support the supranationalist argument. However, history is fickle. The Habsburg Empire did succumb to nationalist pressures and a truly 'post-national' state was never reached. If one is to believe the *völkisch* discourse of the *Rundschau*, the breakup of the Empire into nation-states was a necessary result of the trajectory of history. The origins of this more traditional historiographical narrative, focussing on the corrosive effects of nationalism on Austria-Hungary, can be found within the *Rundschau*. Conversely, the theory of national indifference seems inapplicable in the context of the coverage of the Bosnian Crisis by these three newspapers, as each newspaper was aware of their nationality and utilised nationalist rhetoric. This, of course, explicitly was the reasoning behind choosing to research the period surrounding the Bosnian Crisis and was therefore expected. However, the newspapers' attempts attention for the German nation in nationally contested areas, like the *NFP*'s coverage of German universities in Bohemia, does reflect Judson's argument that the rhetoric of nationalist conflict in borderlands were central to nationalist politician's efforts to elicit support from their conationals.¹⁹⁶

In the end, perspective played a key role in forming the legacy of the Habsburg Empire. It was through perspective and narrative that liberals like Stefan Zweig could see in the Habsburg Empire a tentatively successful alternative to nationalism, while *völkisch* nationalists like Georg von Schönerer could decry its failings as proof of the supremacy of nationalism. The Bosnian Crisis should not be seen as the genesis of these perspectives, or as a seminal breaking point in shifting popular opinions. Rather, it should be viewed as a thermometer for existing contemporary attitudes, an event on which the *Neue Freie Presse*, the *Reichspost* and the *Ostdeutsche Rundschau* could project their ideals and their preconceived ideas about the condition of their society in 1908.

¹⁹⁶Judson, 'Marking National Space', p. 124.

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