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**The EU, The BRICS, and the spaces in between: Mapping South
Africa's Manoeuvring Room Between a Formal and an Informal
IGO.**

Master Thesis

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Abstract:

This thesis examines the influence the BRICS and the EU have on South African foreign policy, specifically between 2010 and 2023. South Africa and the world have witnessed much change during those 13 years, between the several conflicts that erupted involving some BRICS member-states, revolutions in Africa, and the work that led up to the expansion of the BRICS into the BRICS+ format in 2024. Including a discussion on formal and informal IGOs, this study uses a constructivist theoretical framework and discourse analysis to examine South African foreign policy annual reports, BRICS joint statements, EU-AU joint declarations, and EU-South Africa joint declarations. It finds that South Africa's foreign policy is influenced by the BRICS and the EU through two main pillars of its foreign policy, but in different manners, yet relating to the central theme of the multilateral system, particularly the UN.

Keywords: *South Africa, foreign policy, BRICS, EU, cooperation, African identity, human rights.*

1. Introduction

Despite South Africa's position as a permanent member of the BRICS, its role as an important global player is still outshined by its partners (Shaw, 2015). The rise of a world order dominated by Western-led institutions and intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) is at the heart of the post-1945 system (Ikenberry, 2018; Lawson, 2016; Ravndal, 2016). IGOs have since then had a profound impact on international politics, be it through trade, security, or regional cooperation in other areas such as health and promoting environmental policies (Ertürk, 2015; Tosun & Peters, 2018). In light of the impact that these organisations can have in the world, it is also important to consider the bilateral agreements Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) often have with countries that are not members of said organizations, strengthening the potential cooperation in some areas. The EU, for example, has undertaken efforts to create bilateral ties with some BRICS members through the "strategic partnership" programme. One such partner is South Africa, a democratic BRICS member-state with a strong commitment to both increasing South-South cooperation with its BRICS partners and strengthening human rights and democracy (Borer & Mills, 2011), which are typically more EU-aligned values (Manners, 2006) In line with the literature on formal IGOs, Soko and Quobo (2017) note that the EU and South Africa have a codified relationship, defined by EU-centric norms and currency goals in mind, in addition to cooperation reaching other more practical policy areas than only trade, hence making South Africa a perfect candidate to study the dichotomy between the impact formal and informal IGOs can have on a country's foreign policy.

This example of the EU Strategic Partnership programme, which aims to promote the rule of law, prevent organised crime, and protect fundamental rights, among other policy goals more relevant to South Africa (European Commission, 2010), shows the formality of the relationship through the codification of given norms, contrasting with the BRICS. The differences in IGOs however extends beyond their respective geographical centres and general policy goals, for instance Vabulas and Snidal (2011) note that the difference regarding their formality is an important consideration to understand them both from within and in relation to their partners effectively. They particularly emphasise the formality aspects, where the EU is considered throughout the literature as a formal IGO and the BRICS often don the informal classification (Bengoetxea, 2011; Parlar Dal & Dipama, 2022; Armijo & Roberts, 2014; Lagutina, 2019). As a result, understanding the complexities of the relationship between formal and informal IGOs and their roles within the broader geopolitical context is paramount for countries that seek bilateral agreements with these large potential partners. Since IGOs also vary in locality, one can argue that the relationship states entertain with them are not only dependent on the nature of their agreements, but also on the role the IGO plays in the international order. Vabulas and Snidal (2020) for example propose the idea of informal IGOs such as the BRICS upholding more of a mediation role in the international order, a possibility that remained open to them because of their informal status, ensuring that they are not bound by legal obligations as more formal IGOs are. Consequently, understanding the manoeuvring space between formal and informal IGOs is paramount for countries that carry out relationships or are members of more than one organization. As a result, the question: “*How is South African foreign policy shaped by its commitments towards the BRICS and the EU?*” remains unanswered.

To answer the research question, this thesis uses the following structure. A literature review detailing foreign policy in the general sense before looking at South African foreign policy in more detail. Then, the literature on the role of the BRICS and the EU is examined. Then, the constructivist theoretical framework and conceptualization are proposed, where hypotheses and expectations are presented. Fourth, the methodology section details the chosen methods of analysis, the dataset, and the operationalization of the key variables. Fifth, the analysis of the dataset is conducted, and the findings are discussed in the sixth section. This research then ends with a conclusion, discussing the strengths, weaknesses, and potential further research avenues on the topic.

2. Literature review

a. Foreign policy goals and issue-areas

Foreign policy dimensions are numerous and can vary between countries based on their history and interests (Bjereld & Ekengren, 1999). Bjereld and Ekengren (1999) note that the literature on the number of dimensions is not formally agreed upon in the literature, to which Gede Wahyu Wicksana (2016) adds that the main theories used to analyse foreign policy in a specific context limit the studied dimensions. This is particularly important since every case is different, and hence focus put into a certain dimension of foreign policy will be different based on this distinction. Important to the overall discussion on foreign policy however, is the concept of issue-areas, which has had several definitions over the years (Qayum Sher, 1977; Dahl, 1961; Rosenau, 1971) but can broadly be defined as the values over which political actors disagree, hence why they engage in specific behavioural patterns to gather support for the fulfilment of said values (Rosenau, 1971, as cited in Qayum Sher, 1977). Potter (1980) contends that the comparison of issue-areas through the relationship of actors and not only considering the policy's substance can help predict future foreign policy decisions (p. 413). Consequently, the identification of issue-areas remains case-specific, as it has with policy goals, and while broad strokes at identifying major issue-areas were attempted, this thesis focuses on the more specific nature of issue-areas in light of South African foreign policy. Importantly, foreign policy goals and issue-areas are also responsive to exogenous events (Wood & Peake, 1998), and as such, are affected both by changes in the dominant ideology of a country's government and the shift in priorities (Hermann, 1990). As a result, foreign policy encompasses several issue-areas harbouring varying degrees of importance based on each case and the individual agreements states have with each other and different IGOs. Therefore, the following section examines South Africa's main foreign policy goals and issue-areas, while the analysis uses issue-areas and goals as variables to answer the research question.

b. South African foreign policy overview

South Africa's history of apartheid and as a pariah state provided a great incentive for the country to completely reinvent itself post-1994, which it did with relative success (Alden, & Le Pere, 2004). Nevertheless, the country's foreign policy has been seen as both a disunified affair (Hendricks & Majazi, 2021; Alden & Schoeman, 2013; Nathan, 2005), as well as a leader on the African continent (Alden & Le Pere, 2009; Alden & Schoeman, 2013). These two contrasting views are the central idea behind the discussion on South African foreign policy until the 2010s (Alden & Le Pere, 2009), yet Hendricks (2021) states that the foreign policy goals of the country

have not changed over the years, with its leadership role still not as cemented as it is with other countries. Thus, since South African foreign policy is split between both its regional leader qualities, and its global perception of an emerging nation favouring quiet South-South cooperation and good relationships with its northern partners through a respect of human rights (Alden & Schoeman, 2013). Gray and Gills (2015) define *South-South cooperation* (emphasis added) as the vision that the relatively poorer countries of the global South, often old colonies, stand to gain from mutually beneficial cooperation with other countries in a similar situation. This is therefore an important foreign policy pillar for South African foreign policy, as it directly links to the country's African identity (Le Pere, 2017). Le Pere (2017) argues that South African foreign policy is Afro-centric in nature, seeking an African renewal and the negation of negative effects brought about by colonialism and its aftermath; its history pre-1994 plays an important role in this perception and branding (Le Pere, 2017). As such, a distinct issue-area for South African foreign policy is linked to human rights and how its identity is perceived through the development of this norm (Alden & Le Pere, 2004). In the context of human rights, South Africa differs significantly from other countries, using the concept of *Ubuntu*, a normative and ethical system native to Africa (Ewuso & Hall, 2019), which englobes certain norms such as human rights, and the importance of collective humanity, and the betterment thereof. This concept thus aligns with human rights as one of the major pillars of South African foreign policy (Ezuso & Hall, 2019; Alden & Le Pere, 2004; DIRCO, 2010-2023 [see appendix]).

The country's strong commitments to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, whilst resonating with the West and benefiting South Africa's image through Mandela's powerful persona, are one side of the dilemma plaguing South African foreign policy (Le Pere, 2014). Indeed, Le Pere (2014) shows that South Africa's ideological goals often do not align with their economic, development and defence objectives (p. 34). This strong commitment to human rights as one of South Africa's main foreign policy pillars continues to influence the country's foreign policy, as evidenced by the various statements given to the UN, and South African foreign policy documents (see appendix). In this context, the BRICS and the EU can be seen as both sides of this issue-area. Indeed, the BRICS are important for South Africa's development going forwards, giving it global political and economic reach (Fagbadebo, 2022), and the strategic partnership offered by the EU bases itself on the common values between the two: "democracy, human rights, respect for the rule of law and good governance, tolerance, equality, a commitment to fight poverty and social exclusion, and the promotion of sustainable development" (European Commission, 2006, p. 1). Consequently, this shows an important distinction between both

relationships for South Africa, hence why the following section examines the differences found in the literature about formal and informal IGOs.

Several conclusions can be drawn from the literature thus far. South African foreign policy is split between three main pillars following its ideological goals. Firstly, the goals of legitimization and leadership can be seen in the African Identity and Human Rights pillars, while economic cooperation and development is handled through the South-South cooperation pillar. Secondly, South-South cooperation is an essential pillar of South African foreign policy since it also serves to define South Africa's identity as a southern country in relation to the Global North, which remains an important trading partner for the country (DIRCO, 2010 – 2023). In addition, this pillar along with the redistributive norm of the BRICS align with the *Ubuntu* logic that aims to create a better world for everyone on the planet. This correlates strongly with South Africa's third pillar of Human Rights promotion and respect, as a clear opposition to the country's history (Alden & Le Pere, 2004).

c. The role of the EU and the BRICS

Vabulas and Snidal (2020) examine the adaptation of agreements through informal IGOs such as the BRICS, arguing that the redistribution of power plays a crucial role in this kind of instance. They note that the advantages brought by IGOs are unequal between its members, yet the long-term benefits brought to a disadvantaged state by an IGO may outstrip the short-term inconveniences, hence when a state's power increases, so does the likelihood that they would retract from a formal IGO or at least try to implement significant changes to it (Vabulas & Snidal, 2020; Von Borzyskowski & Vabulas, 2019). Empirically, this observation aligns with the rise of the BRICS in the early 2000s, in their push to create institutions to further South-South cooperation, and with the notion that the BRICS appear as a challenger of sorts to the established powers (Kingah & Quiliconi, 2016; Vabulas & Snidal, 2020; Parlar Dal & Dipama, 2022). For example, the creation of the New Development Bank (NDB) by the BRICS countries can be seen as one of the initiatives designed to reduce reliance on Western institutions and challenge Western development norms (Abdenur & Folly, 2015). Nevertheless, Jiejun (2015) argues that the NDB is more of a facilitator for increased South-South cooperation, an alternative rather than a direct challenge to Western institutions. Thus, one can infer that the role of the BRICS in international governance is that of a power redistributor that attempts to circumvent the established world order by fostering south-south cooperation with rising nations such as South Africa. This has strong implications for South African foreign policy, as a member of the BRICS, and raises questions concerning the influence the BRICS have on their member states' actions through their shared goals and perceived status as challengers to the West.

As the BRICS are an informal multilateral organization (Sawant, 2021), they do not have a common foreign policy such as the EU. Instead, the organization focuses on fostering sustainable economic development between its members and other countries of the global South (Sawant, 2021; Ali et. al, 2018; Basile & Cecchi, 2018). Basile and Cecchi (2018) go further and note that the BRICS are attempting to assume a leadership role in the sustainability field, in accordance with UN and millennium development goals to curb the impact of climate change. Käkönen (2014) however proposes that the BRICS can be seen as a more coherent organization than one that simply aims to further economic growth, as he argues that the BRICS' objectives were to bring about change in the international system. Indeed, he shows that the BRICS' goals are axed around three main points. For example, they value a comprehensive reform of the UN Security Council, in addition to an emphasis on sustainable development and the respect for international law while developing south-south cooperation and trade (Käkönen, 2014). This is in line with Vabulas and Snidal's (2020) point who argue that the BRICS maintain their status as a redistributive informal IGO where its members use their soft and hard power capacities to make stronger demands and create a clear alternative vision, away from a pre-established Western-oriented world (Vabulas & Snidal, 2020).

Since the EU's increasing involvement in global governance, its interaction with other IGOs has increased (Bierman & Koops, 2017). This more direct involvement in world affairs can also be associated with a more important role in global governance, hence emphasising the organization's difference with other IGOs. The EU fits into Vabulas and Snidal's (2021) definition of a formal IGO, yet its role can seem obscure. Manners (2006) argues that the EU has a normative role on the global stage, where it promotes nine principal norms: freedom, peace, democracy, rule of law, human rights, equality, solidarity, sustainable development, and fair governance (Manners, 2006, pp. 70-73). While these norms appear in documents such as EU treaties, Sjursen (2006) argues that EU foreign policy uses both formal and informal norms to shape the setting surrounding the institution. This is in line with the literature on formal IGOs and is relevant to the research question since the nine norms the EU formally champions are of formal importance for EU strategic partnerships and the IGO's relationship with other political entities. Moreover, the EU often has formal contractual relationships with other political actors in which it pushes for the recognition and respect of EU-norms (Björkdahl, 2005), in addition to the normative commitments made by EU member-states who have a say in the common foreign policy of the EU (Thomas, 2009). Therefore, norms are relevant for the institution's foreign policy and its relationship with other actors, since the influence EU norms can have on third actors' policies through formal agreements is non-negligible (Thomas, 2009; Manners, 2006).

Consequently, in the case of South Africa, furthering formal, and informal arrangements with the EU and with their BRICS partners is expected. This further shows the importance of understanding South Africa's Foreign Policy between these two types of IGOs. Nevertheless, the question as to how informal agreements may clash with their formal obligations, material interests and commitment to Human Rights and the rule of law remains unanswered.

The differences between the main goals of the EU and the BRICS are important to highlight, as the two organizations occupy different geographic and political spaces yet have South Africa as one common partner and member. Firstly, the EU's foreign and security policy aims to promote international cooperation (European Union Website), whereas the BRICS on the other hand focus more on the South-South aspect of international cooperation. Secondly, the EU wishes to strengthen international security, (European Union Website) hence locking in the status quo, whereas the BRICS look to rework the UN among other staple institutions of international security (Petrone, 2021). The EU's final pillar of foreign policy is to develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law, human rights and preserve fundamental freedoms, which while mentioned by the BRICS in some joint statements (see appendix) is not a fundamental pillar of the BRICS goals. Indeed, Smith (2015) shows that human rights are not respected as equally in Russia and China, and the issue of human rights has been framed by the BRICS as a Western norm to justify interference in other sovereign country's affairs. Interestingly, this contradicts some statements from the South African government and this overarching theme in their foreign policy, thus raising the question on South African identity and priorities in their foreign policy as a member of the BRICS.

3. Theoretical framework

a. Constructivism, Hypotheses, and Expectations

Constructivism is one of the main theories of international relations and has gained significant importance in the field of foreign policy analysis (Guzzini, 2000). Adler (2013) notes that there is a consensus in the literature on constructivism about the interests the theory places on the social reality, and norms used to create it. In addition, the constructivist lens places great importance on identity and the strategic consequences thereof (Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009; Mitzen, 2006; Risse, 2010; Adler, 2013). The concepts of identity and its effects on the relations states can harbour towards other actors is crucial since the academic literature on the topic describes the importance of norms such as freedom for both EU (Manners, 2006) and South African foreign policy and cooperation with other states and institutions in the post-apartheid period (Alden & Le Pere, 2004; Le Pere, 2014). Moreover, the strategic partnership South Africa

has with the EU is grounded in norms such as respect for the rule of law and the pursuit of democratic values (European Commission, 2006). Similarly, the BRICS declaration of 2011 marking South Africa joining the IGO, emphasises the importance of certain norms such as the promotion of “greater democracy” and the respect for the “universally recognized norms of international law” (BRICS, 2011). While the BRICS declarations do contain some normative importance, one can argue that the BRICS group errs more on the identity side of the spectrum of constructivism, hence showing an important dichotomy between the two IGOs.

Consequently, considering South Africa’s partnerships are both grounded in normative values and its identity as a rising southern state, this thesis formulates three main hypotheses (with H2 and H3 having two variants) based on the three main pillars of South African foreign policy. Accordingly, every hypothesis assumes that the political actors are rational. As such, this thesis answers the hypotheses considering South African foreign policy pillars and issue-areas as the dependent variables, and South African, EU, and BRICS goals as the independent variables.

H1: South Africa’s foreign policy is shaped by the BRICS through its full membership, and consequently the additional reach and weight its decisions have on the South-South cooperation pillar of its foreign policy.

H2a: South Africa’s foreign policy is shaped by the BRICS through its full membership, and its alignment other southern actors, consequently the additional reach and weight its decisions have on the African Identity pillar of its foreign policy.

H2b: South Africa’s foreign policy is shaped by the EU through its strategic partnership, and consequently the additional reach and weight its decisions have on the African Identity side of its foreign policy.

H3a: South Africa’s foreign policy is shaped by the BRICS through the strategic partnership, and consequently, the additional reach and weight its decisions have on the Human Rights pillar of its foreign policy.

H3b: South Africa’s foreign policy is shaped by the EU through its strategic partnership, and consequently the additional reach and weight its decisions have on the Human Rights pillar of its foreign policy.

This first hypothesis proposes that South African foreign policy is driven by the country's identity as a global South country and its commitments to the BRICS who aim to improve South-South cooperation. As such, should this hypothesis be true, one can expect the coding scheme to show similar goals by the BRICS and South Africa for this pillar, with little to no interaction with the EU, with no issue-areas arising for the respective dependent variable with the BRICS. Unlike the other two main foreign policy pillars, the EU is not added to this hypothesis since the EU does not have decisions with South Africa concerning south-south cooperation, as European countries are considered a part of the global north (Dados & Connell, 2012).

The second hypothesis proposes that South African foreign policy is more driven by the country's commitments its own objectives on the African continent and will align with both the BRICS and the EU depending on what both IGOs can provide that would further South Africa's objectives. If this hypothesis is true, one can expect no issue-areas to arise for this pillar. The expectation for the two versions of this hypothesis is that both the EU and the BRICS will support more development for Africa, either through the AU, or by giving political support and legitimacy to South Africa.

The third hypothesis proposes that South African foreign policy is more driven by the country's commitments to its identity as a post-apartheid state which prioritizes human rights, hence the third major pillar of its foreign policy. Considering the BRICS' somewhat poor track record of upholding human rights, the expectation for version 'a' of this hypothesis is that issue areas will arise on this topic, either through major differences, or the simple lack of any meaningful objectives. Expectations for version 'b' however are influenced by the EU's normative foreign policy, hence why little to no issue areas are expected.

Finally, since the data examines the years between 2010 and 2023, one can expect that the disruptive effects of the COVID-19 pandemic might be reflected for the years between 2020 and 2022, specifically with lower cooperation in certain areas such as for H2b and H3a, since these two hypotheses are the least likely to be true because of both IGOs' respective goals. Moreover, important to note is the fact that the hypotheses presented here operate under the assumption that every actor mentioned in this thesis is rational. Consequently, this thesis operationalizes the theoretical framework through a coding scheme as further developed in the following section.

b. Conceptualization

Abbott and Snidal (2002) brought important insights to the use of cooperation theory within the political science field, showing that while cooperation theory is important on its own,

the use of legalization helps explain why cooperation happens in the first place, which is often omitted in international relations theory. They coin the approach they develop through legalization as gradualism, which they explain as the multiple steps that take place in the formation of cooperation (Abbot & Snidal, 2002). The exploration of the concept of gradual cooperation is important in the case of this thesis since post-apartheid South African foreign policy was not born into direct cooperation with the EU or the BRICS. Consequently, to map out the political space that South Africa occupies between both IGOs must be done considering the steps that have been taken and are being undertaken to reduce or increase cooperation in all three of the dependent variables. By looking at the development of the relations over the years and hence adopting a gradualist approach, the potential answers given to the research question are more nuanced as the changes in government bodies and policies can also affect the foreign policy priorities.

Gradualism is important for the conceptualization of the key variables for this research since the variables aim to explain the changes in the impact the EU and the BRICS have on South African foreign policy. The first variable: *South-South cooperation*, defines the cooperation endeavours between disadvantaged countries of the Global South and has seen a resurgence in the past 50 years, specifically since the end of the decolonization movements in many states (Gray & Gills, 2016). This concept specifically refers to the betterment of the human condition despite a common history of oppression and colonization by the Global North (Gray & Gills, 2016; Mawdsley, 2019). The increased cooperation, while often economic in nature, also happens in the political and cultural areas, and has increased especially in the last 15 years (Mawdsley, 2019), hence the importance of gradualism in this context.

The second variable: *African Identity*, is a contentious one to conceptualize since its meaning and understanding are context-dependent. This conceptualization understands this concept as the moral, economic and political values that bind African nations together, and hence is important for South Africa's foreign policy and positioning as a regional leader. Kanu (2013) elaborates on the historical significance of this concept considering the history of colonialization in Africa. Nonetheless, he mentions the idea of an African renaissance, which seeks to renew the African identity and give it more prevalence in global affairs, preserving it from globalization at large, and seeking African problems to African solutions (Kanu, 2013, p. 40). This thus means a relative increase in political, social, and cultural cooperation between African countries and the fostering of good international relations between them in the context of a relatively shrinking globalized world, and not in contrast with how the West perceives Africa (Eze, 2017).

The third main variable: *Human Rights*, requires a complex understanding of the issues at play. For instance, Human Rights as a set of values harbour a different meaning for different cultures (Renteln, 1988), and South African foreign policy bases itself more specifically on the idea of *Ubuntu*, or humanness (Metz, 2011; Oyowe, 2013). Mwipikeni (2018) underlines the importance of Ubuntu as an ethical concept for the betterment of humanity on the globe, hence contrasting with the individualist nature present in the Western conception of Human Rights (Mwipikeni, 2018). Consequently, this variable is understood in the case of this research through the concept of Ubuntu, a more collective approach to human rights.

4. Methodology

a. Discourse Analysis, and Data

Discourse analysis is based on social constructivist knowledge involving the idea that the reality of relationships between actors is created through social interaction (Hardy, Haley & Philipps, 2004). The use of discourse analysis as a main method of study provides several key insights. Firstly, Winston (2020) shows that discourse analysis can be used to analyse norms and identities, in addition to the officially stated goals of states on policy papers, such as the BRICS declarations, or the EU and South African annual reports. In addition, Milliken (1999) shows that discourse is a form of control since it codifies relationships and practices, and can legitimize while highlighting opposition. In line with this point of view, the dataset looks at the oppositions and differences between the chosen EU's and BRICS' goals with those of South Africa. Similarly, Neumann (2008) notes that discourse can be seen as a precursor to action, and the analysis thereof can show the portrayed identities and goals of states. He also notes that certain preconditions are required for discourse analysis such as a defined number of texts to analyse and the layers and contrasting opinions (Neumann, 2008). Consequently, if the analysis finds that discourse around South-South cooperation and hence BRICS – South Africa cooperation is much more prevalent, this gives an indication of the BRICS' influence on South Africa's foreign policy. Namely, it would show that South African foreign policy focuses on a pillar of its foreign policy goals, as it sees its relationship with the BRICS as more influential for its foreign policy objectives, respective to the EU. Hansen (2016) also shows that discourse analysis is particularly useful when studying foreign policy, as foreign policy documents attempt to portray a situation as stable as possible yet may have contrasting views. Hence, while the EU/BRICS and South African documents may treat of a similar topic, the discourse may vary, thus showing issue-areas, and opposition as shown by Milliken (1999). As a result, discourse analysis provides a uniquely suited method to answer the research question.

Hansen (2016) emphasises the idea that the understanding of norms and identities being created in discourse helps paint a comprehensive picture of the situation being studied. Moreover, the use of the self and other as can be seen in the constructivist framework are often conclusive of good discourse analysis (Aydin-Düzgit & Bumelili, 2019), thus falling in line with the constructivist framework. As a result, the differentiation between the self and other, the norms being pushed, and the identities being created in the case of South African foreign policy will ensure that the role of the BRICS and the EU are displayed, especially opposing the pillars of South African foreign policy.

Since the objective is to show the impact the BRICS and the EU have on South African foreign policy, a comprehensive understanding of South Africa's partnership with the EU and the BRICS is required. To fulfil these needs, the BRICS summit declarations between 2010 and 2023, and the EU strategic partnership reports on their partnership with South Africa during those same years are examined. Adequately, as a deepening of relationships has taken place during this time, this potentially showcases a change in norms and/or identities displayed by South Africa or its partners. Then, the analysis examines annual foreign policy reports of the South African government between 2010 and 2023. Ending the chosen dataset in 2023 makes the dataset as recent as possible.

b. Operationalization

The analysis is conducted using discourse analysis, paying special attention to the gradual change in the dependent variables over the years. The framing of the dependent variables through the lens of the independent variable is done by firstly analysing the discourse in the form of statements in the annual BRICS declarations (BRICS, 2010 - 2023); South African foreign policy reports (DIRCO, 2010 – 2023), specifically the sections relating to the South African foreign policy pillars (South-South cooperation, African identity, and human rights); and the annual EU-South Africa joint reports, such as the EU-South Africa summit joint declarations of 2010 to 2013. For the years between 2014 and 2022, joint EU-African Union (AU) summit declarations were chosen as the data, since this would still give an overview of EU policy regarding the second pillar of South Africa's foreign policy when EU-South Africa summits did not happen. The joint human rights dialogue reports of 2013 to 2023 between South Africa and the EU were also incorporated for the same reasons. Since South Africa is part of the AU, Joint reports are analysed in both the EU-South Africa and BRICS-South Africa cases, since this directly shows the compromises made when comparing South Africa's own official documents with the EU and BRICS statements. The complete tables are available in the Appendix.

The keywords were chosen based on the literature (Mawdsley, 2019; Gray & Gills, 2016; Alden & Le Pere, 2014 for dependent variable 1); (Kanu, 2013, Eze, 2017; Adler, 2013 for DV 2); (Alden & Le Pere, 2004; Metz, 2011, Oyowe, 2013; Mwipikeni, 2018; for DV 3) and conceptualization on each of the variables and are outlined in Table 1. The goals for the particular year are then outlined in tables in the appendix, and the main findings for each year per hypothesis are reported in the analysis section. The opposition (as seen in Milliken, 1999) for each year between the dependent variables from a South African perspective and its partners is shown in the issue-area row, highlighting the differences for each year, and relating them to the hypotheses. This shows the framing of the dependent variables of the three main South African foreign policy pillars through the lens of the BRICS and EU goals. The results are grouped per hypotheses, as this directly showcases which is the most prevalent answer to the research question. The discussion part returns to the results and analyses patterns, providing an answer to the research question.

Table 1: Dependent Variables Conceptualization and Operationalization.

Variable	Conceptualization	Operationalization
South-South cooperation	Efforts to increase economic, financial, cultural, and political cooperation between members of the Global South.	Search for keywords including: “South”, “cooperation”, “partnership”, “emerging” and “developing”.
African Identity	Efforts to increase solidarity through stability, economic, political, and cultural cooperation with countries on the African continent.	Search for keywords including: “Africa”, “AU”, “African Union” and “pan-African”.
Human Rights	The commitments to protecting and promoting collective human rights at every level.	Search for keywords including: “Human Rights”, “Fundamental Rights”, “Fundamental Freedoms”, “protection”, “promotion”, “dignity” and “Ubuntu”.

c. Coding Scheme

To present the data in the analysis, the following structure is observed for each hypothesis, before a table containing the demonstrated opposition is presented in the discussion chapter.

Table 2: Empirical analysis table categories

Year	Goal	Impact	Issue-area

The data as shown in the appendix section is coded according to the theoretical framework and methodology considering the following:

Table 3: Coding Scheme

	South African goal	BRICS Goal	EU Goal
South African goal 1: South-south cooperation			
South African goal 2: regional identity			
South African goal 3: human rights			
Issue-Area			

South Africa’s issue-area and goals are separated since they are the dependent variables, and the other categories are coded accordingly. ‘South African goal’ is present as an independent variable since the yearly change in the goals based on government changes and exogenous events may have an impact and are thus important to document. Importantly, the BRICS and the EU can have similar areas they wish to work with South Africa on, such as the one pillar for the BRICS being improved South-South cooperation, and the respect for human rights on the EU’s side. This coding scheme purposefully separates the dependent variables on the left from the independent variables on top for readability. In addition, South Africa’s policy goals of South-South cooperation, its aspiration as a regional leader and the respect for human rights are showcased as the main three pillars of South African foreign policy. As such, through the examination of the annual reports, the analysis shows the most important yearly changes in the dependent variables, thus finding an answer to the research question.

5. Analysis

The findings are divided per hypothesis, with a singular goal or initiative and the most relevant issue-area for that year being shown in the tables. The discussion of the findings takes place in the following section.

Table 2: H1 main initiatives and impact – South-South cooperation w/ BRICS

Year	Goal	Impact	Issue-area
2010	Joining the BRICS	Increased cooperation with the BRICS countries (science, technology, and innovation)	N/A
2011	Enhance cooperation between the BRICS and other southern countries.	Increase political, economic ties.	N/A
2012	Enhance cooperation between South Africa, the BRICS, NAM and G77 countries.	Increased political and economic ties – reinforce multilateralism	N/A
2013	Enhance regional integration in Africa and increase south-south cooperation.	Increased political and economic ties.	N/A
2014	Increase engagements intra-BRICS and with other countries.	Increase political, economic, and cultural ties.	N/A
2015	Enhance collaboration intra-BRICS.	Increase political, economic, and cultural ties.	N/A
2016	Enhance cooperation and continue work with the NDB.	Increase political, economic, and cultural ties.	N/A
2017	Enhance financial BRICS cooperation.	Increase political, economic, and cultural ties intra-BRICS.	N/A
2018	Increase cooperation on science, technology, and	Increase political, economic, academic, and cultural ties intra-BRICS.	N/A

	innovation, as well as politically and economically.		
2019	Increase coordinated action to enhance economic growth	Increase political, economic ties.	N/A
2020	Increase intra-BRICS cooperation + emerging countries.	Increase political cooperation.	N/A
2021	Increase intra-BRICS cooperation on diverse sectors.	Political, economic, energetic and financial integration increase.	Focus on intra-BRICS cooperation.
2022	Increase intra-BRICS cooperation in diverse sectors.	Political, economic, energetic and financial integration increase.	Focus on intra-BRICS cooperation.
2023	Increase intra-BRICS cooperation on diverse sectors and consider BRICS expansion.	Political, economic, energetic and financial integration increase, increase in political relevance of the Global South.	N/A

Table 5: H2a initiatives and impact – African Identity / BRICS

Year	Goal	Impact	Issue-area
2010	Support African development through technical and financial cooperation.	Closer political and economic ties.	N/A
2011	Support African Union panel.	Closer political ties.	N/A
2012	Promote peace and stability in Africa in light of the turbulent situation. Increase infrastructure development and all around cooperation.	Closer political ties. Closer economic ties.	N/A
2013	Strengthen cooperation between BRICS and African continent.	Closer political and economic ties; infrastructure development.	N/A
2014	Support sustainable development, AU, stability and	Closer political and economic ties with the AU.	N/A

	development in Africa.		
2015	Support development and the political decisions taken by the AU.	Closer political ties with the AU.	N/A
2016	Support AU's goals and efforts for peace. Support AU in the dynamic integration process.	Closer political ties with the AU. Closer economic ties.	N/A
2017	Support AU's agenda for peace.	Closer political ties with the AU.	N/A
2018	Support AU's agenda for peace and increase industrialisation through funding and development aid.	Closer political, economic and financial ties with the AU.	N/A
2019	Support AU's agenda for peace, stabilization of the continent and continue development aid.	Closer political, economic ties.	N/A
2020	Support AU's agenda for peace and more stabilization through development aid.	Closer political economic ties.	N/A
2021	N/A	N/A	No objective.
2022	N/A	N/A	No objective.
2023	Support AU's agenda for peace and African solutions to African Problems. Continue development aid.	Closer political and economic ties.	N/A

Table 6: H2b initiatives and impact – African Identity / EU

Year	Goal	Impact	Issue-area
2010	“Promote and build up regional organizations to deal with local problems”	Increase capacity building in Africa.	N/A
2011	Infrastructure development aid and political support for the AU and SADC. Increase capacity building in Africa.	Closer political ties; increased political support.	N/A

2012	Collaboration with AU Chair-designate.	Providing expertise. Foster African solutions to African problems.	N/A
2013	Continue to support AU and development aid for South Africa and Africa at large.	Closer economic and political ties.	N/A
2014	Support capacity building and increase economic ties in Africa and with the AU. Increase importance of Africa in the multilateral system.	Closer economic and political ties.	N/A
2015	Enhance cooperation and development aid, specifically to combat migration.	Increase capacity building in Africa.	Migration as a central topic.
2016	N/A	N/A	No objectives.
2017	Support African capacity building and development to tackle continental problems.	Increased political cooperation.	N/A
2018	Support AU in its peace endeavours.	Increased political cooperation.	N/A
2019	Support AU in its peace and integration endeavours.	Increased political cooperation and development aid.	
2020	N/A	N/A	No objectives.
2021	N/A	N/A	No objectives.
2022	Support AU in peace and integration. Increase development and vaccine aid.	Increased political cooperation and development aid.	N/A
2023	N/A	N/A	No objectives.

Table 7: H3a initiatives and impact – Human Rights / BRICS

Year	Goal	Impact	Issue-area
2010	N/A	N/A	No objective.
2011	N/A	N/A	No objective.
2012	N/A	N/A	No objective.
2013	N/A	N/A	No objective.
2014	Foster respect of human rights, push	Increase human rights dialogue within BRICS.	N/A

	for de-escalation of conflicts.		
2015	Strengthen coordination on human rights positions within UN system.	Increased cooperation on human rights votes at the UN.	N/A
2016	N/A	N/A	No objective.
2017	Strengthen cooperation and coordination on human rights.	Increased coordination on human rights.	N/A
2018	Promotion and coordination on human rights.	Increased coordination on human rights issues at the UN.	N/A
2019	Reiterate commitment to human rights.	N/A	No objective.
2020	Promote human rights.	N/A	No objective.
2021	Strengthen cooperation on human rights issues.	Increased cooperation.	No human rights increase.
2022	Promotion and protection of human rights and democracy.	Coordination intra-BRICS for UN resolutions	N/A
2023	Promotion of human rights and democracy.	Coordination intra-BRICS.	N/A

Table 8: H3b initiatives and impact – Human Rights / EU

Year	Goal	Impact	Issue-area
2010	Promotion of peace and security, human rights, democracy, the rule of law and sustainable development regionally and globally.	Further human rights.	N/A
2011	Promotion of peace and security, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.	Promote Human rights.	N/A
2012	Promotion of human rights at UN & AU level.	Increased cooperation on human rights issues.	N/A

	Formalization of human rights consultations.		
2013	Increased bilateral and international cooperation on human rights. Promotion of peace, respect for human rights and democracy.	Increased cooperation on human rights.	N/A
2014	Promote human rights at every level.	Increased cooperation on human rights at the bilateral at international level.	N/A.
2015	Increase cooperation and bilateral talks.	Increased cooperation	N/A
2016	Increase cooperation at the UNHCR-level.	Increased cooperation and dialogue on disagreements.	N/A
2017	Increase cooperation and promotion of human rights.	Increased cooperation and dialogue at the UN.	N/A
2018	Promote human rights and strengthen cooperation at international level.	Increase cooperation, bilateral and international dialogue.	N/A
2019	Increase human rights cooperation at the UN and AU level.	Increase in cooperation and bilateral dialogue.	N/A
2020	N/A	N/A	No objective.
2021	Increase cooperation on human rights at the UN and AU level.	Increase in cooperation and bilateral dialogue.	N/A
2022	Increase human rights cooperation at the UN level, especially the UNHRC.	Increased cooperation and bilateral dialogue.	N/A
2023	Increase human rights multilateral system and international cooperation.	Increase cooperation.	N/A

6. Findings and discussion

The analysis reveals some important findings visualised per year and per hypothesis in Table 6. Instantly, the lack of cooperation in between 2020 and 2022 stands out visually and can be explained by the difficulty in coordinating high-level meetings with other states or IGOs due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, this section does not elaborate much on these years, as every continent and political body was severely impacted by the pandemic. In addition, the BRICS declaration of 2022 is considerably shorter and noticeably, was drafted by ministers, not the usual heads of state. Issue-areas are highlighted in red or yellow, for the ‘no objective’ and ‘major differences’ categories respectively. Green signifies no issue-area was found for that year, showing accordance between South African foreign policy goals and with partners on the joint releases. Dark green signifies the years where bilateral EU-South African meetings did not take place, but EU-AU meetings did, and no issue areas were found between South African foreign policy and the EU-AU declarations and goals.

Table 9: Yearly findings per hypothesis

Year	H1	H2a	H2b	H3a	H3b
2010	Green	Red	Green	Red	Green
2011	Green	Red	Green	Red	Green
2012	Green	Green	Green	Red	Green
2013	Green	Green	Green	Red	Green
2014	Green	Green	Dark Green	Green	Green
2015	Green	Green	Dark Green	Green	Green
2016	Green	Green	Red	Green	Green
2017	Green	Green	Dark Green	Green	Green
2018	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
2019	Green	Green	Dark Green	Red	Green
2020	Green	Green	Red	Yellow	Red
2021	Yellow	Red	Red	Yellow	Green
2022	Yellow	Red	Dark Green	Red	Green
2023	Green	Green	Red	Red	Green

a. H1: South-South cooperation

In line with expectations, the South-South cooperation pillar of South Africa’s foreign policy aligns with the BRICS declarations on many fronts. As Sawant (2021) highlights, the BRICS focus mostly on South-South cooperation, hence why it is to be expected that South Africa’s foreign policy does not find many issue areas for this pillar. Moreover, South Africa’s foreign policy documents explicitly state that the BRICS membership benefits the country as it increases the reach it has both with other countries and within the UN (DIRCO, 2018).

Consequently, the BRICS impact South African foreign policy through South Africa's membership, and the shared redistributive goals for a more multilateral world order, in line with the literature review and expectations. Nevertheless, the post-covid period does show some important differences between South African foreign policy and the BRICS, namely the enhanced focus on intra-BRICS cooperation. While this is not a direct confrontation with South Africa's foreign policy goals for those years, it is nonetheless a departure from the increase in South-South cooperation with other countries than those of the BRICS, as wished by South Africa. Therefore, the BRICS do impact South Africa's foreign policy through this variable.

b. H2a: African Identity – BRICS

Paramount for South African foreign policy, the analysis shows that this pillar is also an important discussion point for the BRICS, as evident by the continued support the BRICS express for the AU and supporting development in Africa. This aligns with the expectations, and the first hypothesis since the African continent is mostly considered a part of the global South (Dados & Connell, 2011). Therefore, supporting African development, and being invested in African affairs and wanting closer political ties with Africa is logical for both the BRICS and South Africa. Interestingly however, 2021 and 2022 are standout years for the BRICS declarations, since Africa is only mentioned once as a continent, and the AU is not mentioned at all in 2021. This however remains an outlier and could potentially be attributed to the BRICS focusing more of their attention on resolving the pandemic issues and privileged boosting their economies through intra-BRICS cooperation instead of trying to open new channels with their African partners. Moreover, the pandemic was far from being over for most countries in 2021, hence the possible change in priorities for that year. Nevertheless, for the subsequent and previous years, the BRICS do show increased cooperation and focus on African issues, specifically after 2014 at the eThekweni summit, chaired by South Africa. This is shown by a gradual importance accorded to Africa as a continent and increased political and economic ties. Therefore, the BRICS show a gradual increase in interest for the African continent, to match that of South Africa, showing that South Africa's foreign policy has not been influenced by the BRICS, rather the contrary is a possible observation.

c. H2b: African Identity – EU

EU-AU and EU-South Africa joint statements reveal that the EU and South Africa have similar stated goals for Africa at large: Increasing integration, fostering peace on the continent, combatting corruption, and promoting democracy, all the while developing Africa's capacity to answer to its own problems. Consequently, when bilateral EU-South Africa or EU-AU talks

happen, few issue areas arise, between the joint declarations and African foreign policy. Nevertheless, important to note is that South Africa's strategic partnership with the EU while fruitful in many aspects has not led to discussions every year between it and the EU, as highlighted in Table 6. Therefore, while the EU and South Africa did not have bilateral discussions on this topic every year, few issue-areas can be seen through the empirical analysis, showing a common foreign policy on this aspect. Moreover, the analysis of the joint communiqués and South African foreign policy annual reports shows that EU development aid and FDI to South Africa remains high throughout the analysed period (DIRCO, 2010 – 2023), demonstrating cooperation, and incentives for South Africa to align its position to that of the EU. Importantly, however, the lack of bilateral meetings between the EU and South Africa for multiple years is of note. While the 2013 summit ended with the statement that both parties were looking forward to the next meeting in 2014, the next and last summit of that magnitude (to date) between the EU and South Africa happened in 2018, showcasing several possible points. Firstly, this can imply possible opposition on certain issues that were discussed behind the scenes and not shown in the official joint statements. Speculations of tensions between the EU and South Africa did surface in recent years (Bloomberg, 2024), despite having been rejected by both parties. Secondly, since the EU also treated with the AU during the years when it did not have direct joint statements with South Africa, this can also show that the EU-AU level relationships were prioritized by either one, or both parties. Thirdly, since after 2015, only one year was in direct accordance with South African foreign policy and written in conjunction with the South African foreign ministry, it also happens to be the year where the EU shows a much stronger focus on the migration aspect, and hence perhaps privileges relations with the AU as a continental IGO rather than South Africa as a direct partner. Fourth, perhaps South Africa's foreign policymakers decided to privilege their relationship with the BRICS or other IGOs instead of the EU during that timeframe. Finally, this hypothesis reveals that while the EU-South Africa goals remain mostly similar throughout the years, they did not cooperate much bilaterally on this aspect directly after 2013, hence showing the lack of influence the EU has on South Africa's second foreign policy pillar.

d. H3a: Human Rights – BRICS

Human rights are mentioned in every BRICS declaration, yet several issue-areas arise between the BRICS joint declarations, and the objectives highlighted in South African foreign policy. For example, while the BRICS often reiterate their commitments to human rights issues, (2016, 2019, 2020, 2021) few objectives are proposed to solve the issues they mention, other than improved cooperation between the BRICS members on such issues or on multilateral

voting at the UN level (2014, 2015, 2017, 2018, 2022, 2023). As a result, despite South Africa's commitment to human rights issues in their foreign policy, the analysis finds that this pillar is stifled at the BRICS level. Notwithstanding the lack of concrete objectives however, human rights remain important for South Africa since it has been an influential member of the UNHRC and has sought ways to promote human rights throughout the years, despite the lack of interest by the BRICS at large. The BRICS summit in 2014 chaired by South Africa sees an increase in interest by the BRICS at large for the topic. In addition, since South Africa has been playing an increasingly important role at the UN level and its involvement has been supported by China and Russia specifically (BRICS, 2011- 2023) who are both members of the UN's highest authoritative body, the analysis finds that South Africa's third foreign policy pillar is shaped, not by the BRICS' lack of commitment, but by the BRICS' collective weight as individual countries at the UN. Thus, while the results show mostly a lack of objectives on the BRICS policy-side, the influence of the BRICS is shown through other means, despite the gradual change since 2014, for which the same observation as H2a can be made.

e. H3b: Human Rights - EU

The EU-South Africa human rights dialogue was a yearly occurrence (except in 2021, most likely because of COVID-19), highlighting the importance of the topic and the common ground found between the EU and South Africa. As expected, few issue areas and opposition are found for this fundamental pillar for both participants. Moreover, South Africa has used its relationship and the common dialogue with the EU to ask the IGO to support its candidacy at the UNHRC in 2021 (EEAS, 2021; DIRCO, 2021), highlighting the importance the EU has on the human rights issues, and the weight its voice has at the multilateral level. As a result, the research finds that H3b is true, showcasing the strong impact the EU has on South Africa's foreign policy.

f. South Africa's political space

The question of political space in the context of South Africa's foreign policy is a complex one to quantify, yet the empirical analysis elucidates a small portion of the overall discussion. Considering the research, this thesis finds that the BRICS and the EU impact South Africa's foreign policy through different pillars, yet the means remain similar. Since the BRICS, the EU and South Africa all seek a more multilateral world where Africa plays a larger part, the African identity pillar and reinforcing the continent aligns with both IGOs. Crucially, the analysis finds that the importance attached to the multilateral fora, specifically the UN, is the crux of the answer to the research question. The analysis finds that the question of influence hinges on the

human rights pillars, since this is where the analysis shows the most, and least issue-areas respectively. In addition, South Africa's importance in the UN system is remarkable (Melber, 2014) and has increased somewhat. Moreover, the analysis of South African foreign policy annual reports has shown that BRICS membership is important for the country's ability to project its values outside of the African continent, namely at the UN level, a platform through which it promotes its values of human rights and is active in. This, in conjunction with the EU's backing as a normative power (Manners, 2006) which aims to promote the respect for human rights at the international level provides South Africa's human rights foreign policy with additional political weight and theoretical legitimacy. As a result, South Africa's membership to the BRICS and the EU do not constrict the political space it has but elevates its foreign policy to punch above its (supposed) weight class.

7. Conclusion

As the geopolitical discussion surrounding the BRICS garners more importance in the wake of the BRICS+ expansion of 2024, the differences between both it and the EU, two of the most important IGOs in the world is increasing in importance. In addition, as the BRICS+ group seeks a more cohesive approach to international issues, the question on the influence IGOs such as the BRICS or the EU have on their member-states and partner countries surfaces as an important one to elucidate. Consequently, this thesis has answered the research question "*How is South African foreign policy influenced by its commitments to the BRICS and the EU?*" through a constructivist lens, framing through five hypotheses. The empirical analysis finds that H1, H3a and H3b stand out as the main answers to the research question for different reasons. Crucially, for H1, South-South cooperation is one of the founding ideas behind the BRICS, and thus the impact the group has on the topic globally is reflected in the possibilities South Africa has. H3a provides an important step in answering the research question, as it shows that BRICS membership does not reduce the political space South Africa can occupy by being in the BRICS, despite issue-areas arising on the topic of human rights. Instead, it can leverage its BRICS membership and status as an emerging power at the multilateral level. Importantly for the overall answer, H3b provides the second piece of this puzzle, as it shows that despite South Africa's BRICS membership, it relies on other powerful political allies to back it up at the international level when it comes to this specific aspect of its foreign policy. This is noteworthy, as the importance as one of South Africa's main foreign policy pillars coincides with EU norms related to human rights, and can hence seek a closer relationship with the formal IGO on this topic on the multilateral front through their bilateral relationship. Consequently, despite the differences in formality between both IGOs, the research concludes that the political space occupied by a

member-state of the BRICS which also has ties to a formal IGO can not be restricted, depending on the main areas of cooperation.

While the analysis provides insights into the research question, some limitations apply to this research project. Firstly, the lack of regular bilateral meetings between South Africa and the EU between 2014 and 2023 is an inconsistency in the dataset, which somewhat affects the validity of the results. Secondly, despite the information gathered through official joint statements and their comparison, much of the influence exerted on certain policies happens behind closed doors, where no record is kept, joint statements providing a useful façade. Consequently, while the research question has been answered to an extent, further research opportunities exist in this field using different methodologies which might yield different results. In addition, the idea that formal IGOs such as the EU seek to lock the status-quo in with South Africa through rules and regulations is not particularly apparent in the case of this research, contrasting with previous research on different examples (Hurt, 2012; Guei, Mugano & Le Roux, 2017). Therefore, this research does not dismiss previous findings in the field but offers a different insight into situations and provides a new angle to analyse the relationship between formal and informal IGOs. Nevertheless, for further research, the use of interviews with BRICS, South African and EU officials who participated in the negotiations might reveal some interesting new aspects of the influence both IGOs have on South African foreign policy, and consequently the difference in impact of formal vs. informal organisms.

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Appendix

Every document used is labelled from 1 to 5. 1 and 2 are always the South African and BRICS joint statements, while 3 and above are EU-related documents when more than one was used.

Table 10: South African foreign policy goals , BRICS & EU declarations - 2010

1. DIRCO. (2011). Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu. White Paper on South Africa's Foreign policy.
2. Second BRIC Summit of Heads of State and Governments: Joint Statement. Brasília, 15 April 2010.
3. Third South Africa-European union Summit Joint Communiqué, Brussels, 28 September 2010.

	South African goal	BRICS Goal	EU Goal
South African FPG 1: South-south cooperation increase	<p>“In terms of South Africa’s liberation history, its evolving international engagement is based on two central tenets, namely: Pan-Africanism and South-South solidarity.” (p. 3)</p> <p>“South Africa will promote the increased alignment between the developmental agenda of Africa and the South and that of global organisations. In this regard, South Africa will work in partnership with other African countries to forge a collective vision.” (p. 24)</p> <p>“South Africa’s multilateral relations with the South will continue to find expression particularly through the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP), the Commonwealth, the NAM, and the G77.” (p. 25)</p>	<p>“We believe the deepened and broadened dialogue and cooperation of the BRIC countries is conducive not only to serving common interests of emerging market economies and developing countries, but also to building a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity. We have agreed upon steps to promote dialogue and cooperation among our countries in an incremental, proactive, pragmatic, open and transparent way.”</p> <p>“In the interest of promoting international economic stability, we have asked our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to look into regional monetary arrangements and discuss modalities of cooperation between our countries in this area. In order to facilitate trade and investment, we will study feasibilities of monetary cooperation, including local</p>	N/A

		currency trade settlement arrangement between our countries.”	
South African FPG 2: regional identity	<p>“South Africa’s investment and trade with African countries have increased dramatically since 1994, and South Africa is now the largest investor in Africa.” (p. 8)</p> <p>“committed to development partnerships around the world. It draws on the spirit of internationalism, pan-Africanism, South-South solidarity; the rejection of colonialism and other forms of oppression; the quest for the unity and economic, political and social renewal of Africa; the promotion of poverty alleviation around the world; and opposition to the structural inequality and abuse of power in the global system. South Africa further pursues democracy within the international system of governance.” (p. 11)</p> <p>“Consequently, Africa is at the centre of South Africa’s foreign policy. South Africa must therefore continue to support regional and continental processes to respond to and resolve crises, strengthen regional integration, significantly increase intra-African trade, and champion sustainable development and opportunities in Africa. (p. 20)</p>	N/A	“Promote and build-up local organizations to deal with local problems.”
South African FPG 3: respect for human rights	“Multilateral cooperation is more relevant than ever before in seeking equitable multilateral solutions to global problems. The United Nations (UN) system, through its universal membership and broad mandate, occupies the central and indispensable role within the global system of governance.” (p. 24)	N/A	“Promotion of peace and security, human rights, democracy, the rule of law and sustainable development regionally and globally” (B - p. 1)

	“South Africa also remains committed to the major international instruments for the promotion and protection of human rights and advocates a holistic approach that places equal emphasis on civil and political rights as well as social, economic and cultural rights.”		
Issue-Area	N/A	No African Identity Objectives No Human Rights Objectives	N/A

Table 11: South African foreign policy goals , BRICS & EU declarations - 2011

1. DIRCO. (2011). Annual Report 2010/2011: Presentation to the Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation.
2. BRICS. (2011). *III BRICS Summit Sanya Declaration, BRICS Leaders Meetings, Sanya, China.*
3. Fourth South Africa-European Union Summit, Joint Communiqué, September 16, 2011.

	South African goal	BRICS Goal	EU Goal
South African FPG 1: South-south cooperation increase	<p>“accepted the invitation from President Hu Jintao on behalf of BRICS Member States for South Africa to join the BRICS and to attend the 3rd BRICS Summit” (p. 40)</p> <p>Enhance cooperation with Russia on the “African Agenda, the G8, G29, and the United Nations.” (p. 63)</p>	<p>“Accelerating sustainable growth of developing countries is one of the major challenges for the world.”</p> <p>“We have agreed to continue further expanding and deepening economic, trade and investment cooperation among our countries.”</p> <p>“We reviewed the progress of the BRICS cooperation in various fields and share the view that such cooperation has been enriching and mutually beneficial and that there is a great scope for closer cooperation among the BRICS. We are focused on the consolidation of BRICS cooperation and the further</p>	N/A

		<p>development of its own agenda.”</p> <p>“We intend to explore cooperation in the sphere of science, technology and innovation, including the peaceful use of space”</p> <p>“Enhance existing cooperation programs.”</p> <p>“Strengthen financial cooperation among the BRICS Development Banks.”</p> <p>“Engage in joint research on economic and trade issues.”</p>	
<p>South African FPG 2: regional identity</p>	<p>“Unique opportunity to coordinate efforts in the three organisations primarily mandates for the maintenance of peace and security on the African Continent.” (p. 15)</p> <p>“Promote the peaceful resolution of disputes.” (p.15)</p> <p>“Support efforts to strengthen peacekeeping on the continent through participation in deployment in the DRC and the Sudan” (p. 31)</p> <p>“South Africa continued with its efforts to promote the peaceful resolution of disputes as is illustrated by our efforts in Madagascar, Côte d’Ivoire, and our participation in the African High-Level Panel on Lybia.” (p. 15)</p>	<p>“express support for the African Union High-Level Panel Initiative on Lybia.”</p>	<p>“We agreed that infrastructure development is a crucial part in the development of both the African continent and the EU region. In particular the North-South Road and Rail Corridor holds great potential for the states of Southern and East Africa for greater economic and market integration, concomitant economic growth and job creation for the region’s population. The approach will be broadened to include sectors and sub-sectors that are linked to the North – South Corridor”</p> <p>“We emphasised the importance of all parties involved actively working to lay the foundations for peaceful relations between Sudan and South Sudan. In this context, we welcomed the signing of the Border Security</p>

			<p>Agreement on 29 July 2011 between the Government of Sudan and the Government of South Sudan and called for its speedy implementation”</p> <p>“We welcome the key role undertaken by the African Union High Level Implementation Panel for Sudan (AUHIP), led by former President Mbeki, and pledged continued efforts for its work.”</p> <p>“The EU commends the efforts of South Africa and SADC in assisting the political leadership in Zimbabwe to implement the GPA and encouraged them to remain seized with the process.”</p> <p>“We agreed that the African Union has an important role to play in supporting the Libyan people to establish a democratic, independent and united country. We welcomed the outcomes of the meeting of the AU High Level <i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on Libya, held in South Africa on 14 September 2011.”</p>
South African FPG 3: respect for human rights	“foreign policy of promoting human rights and democracy” (p. 20)	N/A	“We call for the respect of human rights and regret any form of action that contradicts the letter and spirit of the GPA”
Issue-Area	N/A	Lack of African identity-oriented solutions and cooperation. No Human Rights-related objectives.	N/A

Table 12: South African foreign policy goals, BRICS & EU declarations - 2012

1. DIRCO. (2012). *Vote 5 – Annual Report 2011-2012. Department of International Relations and Cooperation.*
2. BRICS. (2012). *IV BRICS Summit Delhi Declaration.* Delhi.
3. Fifth European Union-South Africa Summit Joint Communiqué. EU-South Africa: a partnership for our people, prosperity, and peace.

	South African goal	BRICS Goal	EU Goal
South African FPG 1: South-south cooperation increase	<p>“enhance cooperation between. The Republic and other countries, in particular African countries” (p. 10).</p> <p>“Strengthening South-South cooperation” (p. 13; p. 16; p. 41)</p> <p>“Engagement with the non-aligned movement (NAM) and G77 within the multilateral system.” (p. 47)</p>	<p>“work with others, developed and developing countries together, on the basis of universally recognized norms of international law and multilateral decision making, to deal with the challenges and the opportunities before the world today. Strengthened representation of emerging and developing countries in the institutions of global governance will enhance their effectiveness in achieving this objective.”</p>	N/A
South African FPG 2: regional identity	<p>“Strengthening of the AU is a strategic priority” (p. 13).</p> <p>“Solutions to pressing peace and security issues on the African continent” (p. 20)</p> <p>“Champion the interests of [Africa] the continent [...] particularly with regard to development and infrastructure.” (at the BRICS summit in Sanya and New Dehli)</p> <p>“The era of African solutions to African problems is now.” (p. 16).</p>	<p>“We congratulate South Africa on the successful hosting of the 17th Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 7th Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol”</p> <p>“the developing political scenario in the Middle East and North Africa that we view with increasing concern”</p> <p>“We recognize the vital importance that stability, peace and security of the Middle East and North Africa holds for all of us, for the</p>	<p>“We welcome the completion of the transition process in Somalia. The creation of a new Parliament and election of a new Speaker and of a new President are a landmark in Somali history, and we urge the rapid appointment of a full government.”</p> <p>“We reiterate our joint commitment to promote peace and prosperity in the African continent and look forward to closely collaborating with African Union</p>

		<p>international community, and above all for the countries and their citizens themselves whose lives have been affected by the turbulence that has erupted in the region. We wish to see these countries living in peace and regain stability and prosperity as respected members of the global community.”</p> <p>“We agree that the period of transformation taking place in the Middle East and North Africa should not be used as a pretext to delay resolution of lasting conflicts but rather it should serve as an incentive to settle them, in particular the Arab-Israeli conflict.”</p> <p>“We attach the highest importance to economic growth that supports development and stability in Africa, as many of these countries have not yet realised their full economic potential.”</p> <p>“This will be through infrastructure development, knowledge exchange and support for increased access to technology, enhanced capacity building, and investment in human capital, including within the framework of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).”</p>	<p>Chair-designate Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, in particular to advance our joint priorities under the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership.”</p>
<p>South African FPG 3: respect for human rights</p>	<p>“Our mission is to promote South Africa’s national interests and values in the world, and to promote human rights, democracy, good governance and champion the African Agenda.” (p. 13)</p>	<p>“Syria conflict: call for an immediate end to all violence and violations of human rights in that country.”</p>	<p>“reaffirm our commitment to a strategic partnership based on shared values and interests, including the promotion of peace and security, human rights, democracy, the rule of law and inclusive</p>

	<p>“Will continue to embrace the advancement of human rights and the promotion of democracy as the central pillars of our foreign policy.” (p. 16).</p> <p>“working towards the development of new international human rights norms and standards in UN fora” (p. 50).</p> <p>“contribute to the entrenchment of good governance and human rights on the African continent” (p. 64).</p>		<p>sustainable development across our regions.”</p> <p>“We welcome the formalisation of our human rights consultations covering a broad and comprehensive set of issues and look forward to the first such dialogue by the end of 2012. Beyond this formal process, both South Africa and the EU remain strongly attached to close and early consultations in Geneva, New York and Pretoria on a broad range of issues - including discrimination, gender, children rights, and private military companies.”</p>
Issue-Area	N/A	Lack of human rights objectives.	N/A

Table 13: South African foreign policy goals, BRICS & EU declarations - 2013

1. DIRCO. (2013). Department of International Relations and Cooperation Annual Report, 2012/2013.
2. BRICS. (2013). *V BRICS Summit Ethekewini Declaration BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development Integration and Industrialisation.*
3. Sixth South Africa-European Union Summit, Joint Communiqué.

	South African goal	BRICS Goal	EU Goal
South African FPG 1: South-south cooperation increase	<p>“Strengthening South-South cooperation” (p. 11; 12)</p> <p>“Foreign policy remains predisposed towards Africa and South-South cooperation” (p. 13)</p> <p>“Deepened South-South cooperation after BRICS summit” (p. 13)</p> <p>“Continued to advance the principles underlying South-South cooperation, by highlighting the challenges and developmental agenda of the continent and countries of the South” (p. 31) (Relating to G77 and NAM)</p>	<p>“The Retreat is an opportunity for BRICS and African leaders to discuss how to strengthen cooperation between the BRICS countries and the African Continent.”</p> <p>“We are open to increasing our engagement and cooperation with non-BRICS countries, in particular Emerging Market and Developing Countries (EMDCs)”</p> <p>“Recognising the importance of regional integration for Africa's sustainable growth, development and poverty eradication, we reaffirm our support for the Continent's integration processes”</p> <p>“Stimulate infrastructure investment on the basis of mutual benefit to support industrial development, job-creation, skills development, food and nutrition security and poverty eradication and sustainable development in Africa. We therefore, reaffirm our support for sustainable infrastructure development in Africa.”</p> <p>“We emphasise the importance of ensuring steady,</p>	<p>“We look forward to the establishment of the SA-EU Business Council.”</p> <p>“we note the possibility of establishing an Employment and Social Affairs Dialogue. The meetings of 16 July 2013 which discussed, inter alia, possible cooperation on employment and skills development, lay a strong basis for further cooperation in this area.”</p> <p>“We reviewed our trade and economic relations and we noted with satisfaction that overall trade has steadily grown over the last ten years. Bilateral foreign direct investment has grown five fold since 2004, with EU investors accounting for three quarters of foreign direct investment stock in South Africa. We recognise the strong investment relationship between South Africa and the EU and that legal certainty and predictability contribute</p>

		<p>adequate and predictable access to long term finance for developing countries from a variety of sources. We would like to see concerted global effort towards infrastructure financing and investment through the instrumentality of adequately resourced Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and Regional Development Banks (RDBs). We urge all parties to work towards an ambitious International Development Association (IDA)17 replenishment.”</p> <p>“Meeting of BRICS ministers and representatives”</p>	<p>to further enhancing bilateral investment flows.”</p> <p>“We agreed to cement this growth by remaining committed to open and transparent trade rules in line with our bilateral and multilateral commitments and to refrain from taking protectionist measures. We also agreed to work together for policies that promote bilateral trade and investment to our mutual benefit. This will create more jobs and growth opportunities.”</p> <p>“We welcome the new R1.3 billion/€100 million planned programme to blend grants with loans from the DBSA and European Development Finance Institutions to support South Africa's infrastructure programme.”</p>
<p>South African FPG 2: regional identity</p>	<p>“DIRCO is committed to promoting South Africa’s national interests and values, the African Renaissance and the creation of a better world for all” (p. 6).</p> <p>“We have reorientated our approach to foreign relations to prioritize Africa, placing the continent at the centre of our foreign policy. Our commitment to the continent is demonstrated by our continued promotion of the African Agenda, including working towards greater regional integration” (p. 6)</p>	<p>“The Retreat is an opportunity for BRICS and African leaders to discuss how to strengthen cooperation between the BRICS countries and the African Continent.”</p> <p>“We welcome the conclusion between our Export-Import Banks (EXIM) and Development Banks, of both the “Multilateral Agreement on Cooperation and Co-financing for Sustainable Development” and, given the steep growth trajectory of the</p>	<p>“We welcomed the transformation of the African-led international Support Mission to Mali into the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the appointment of Mr Albert Gerard Koenders as Head of MINUSMA and General Jean Bosco Kazura as Force Commander”</p>

	<p>“invested diplomatically in Pan-African efforts to energise Africa’s renewal through the African Renaissance.” (p.6)</p> <p>“secure support for integration and development priorities.” (p. 29)</p> <p>“South Africa pursued discussions aimed at advancing the interests of the African continent in the area of enhancing African peacekeeping capacity” (p. 30)</p>	<p>African continent and the significant infrastructure funding requirements directly emanating from this growth path, the “Multilateral Agreement on Infrastructure Co-Financing for Africa”</p> <p>“Recognising the importance of regional integration for Africa's sustainable growth, development and poverty eradication, we reaffirm our support for the Continent's integration processes.”</p> <p>“We acknowledge that infrastructure development in Africa is important and recognise the strides made by the African Union to identify and address the continent's infrastructure challenges through the development of the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), the AU NEPAD Africa Action Plan (2010-2015), the NEPAD Presidential Infrastructure Championing Initiative (PICI), as well as the Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plans that have identified priority infrastructure development projects that are critical to promoting regional integration and industrialisation. We will seek to stimulate infrastructure investment on the basis of mutual benefit to support industrial development, job-creation, skills development, food and nutrition security and poverty eradication and sustainable development in Africa. We therefore, reaffirm our support for sustainable infrastructure development in Africa.”</p>	<p>“We share the view that increased regional and international engagement, including through South Africa's contribution to the Intervention Brigade, creates the opportunity to bring lasting solutions to the problems in the Eastern DRC.”</p> <p>“The legitimate aspirations of the Egyptian people need to be addressed in a comprehensive manner in order to find a sustainable solution. We took note of the AU's and EU's recent statements on the developments in Egypt.”</p>
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South African FPG 3: respect for human rights	<p>“Contribute to continental and global development, security and human rights for all through identified processes, mediation, peace support, post-conflict reconstruction efforts of multilateral institutions, security bilateral mechanisms and multilateral engagements.” (p. 22)</p> <p>“promote international respect for human rights and democracy” (p. 12)</p> <p>“human rights remained a key priority for South Africa’s foreign policy.” (p.14)</p>	<p>“We express our deep concern with the deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation in Syria and condemn the increasing violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law as a result of continued violence”</p> <p>“We urge all parties to ensure the safety of humanitarian workers.”</p>	<p>“We have launched new cooperation in the areas of maritime security and human rights.”</p> <p>“We believe that our Human Rights Dialogue which was formally launched in Pretoria on 27 May 2013, will pave the way for enhanced cooperation on human rights both bilaterally and at the international level. It represents a unique opportunity to establish synergies for further dialogue and cooperation on issues of common concern.</p> <p>A planned EU programme of R 325 million / € 25 million with the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development will support initiatives on constitutional rights with particular focus on socio-economic rights in South Africa.”</p>
Issue-Area	N/A	No Human Rights objectives.	N/A

Table 14: South African foreign policy goals, BRICS & EU declarations - 2014

1. DIRCO. (2014). Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2013/2014 Annual Report.
2. BRICS. (2014). *VI BRICS Summit Fortaleza Declaration. Fortaleza.*
3. Fourth EU-Africa Summit. 2-3 April 2014, Brussels Declaration.

	South African goal	BRICS Goal	EU Goal
South African FPG 1: South-south cooperation increase	<p>“In nurturing our South-South relations, South Africa still took an African Agenda-focused approach.” (p. 5)</p> <p>“Strengthening South-South Relations” (p. 9; 13)</p> <p>“The core of South Africa’s foreign policy, however, remains predisposed towards Africa and South-South cooperation.”</p> <p>“In our involvement in fora such as the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS); India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA); and the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC); and multilateral bodies such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the G 77 plus China, we continued to put the interest of Africa first.” (p. 5)</p>	<p>“We renew our openness to increasing engagement with other countries, particularly developing countries and emerging market economies, as well as with international and regional organizations, with a view to fostering cooperation and solidarity in our relations with all nations and peoples. To that effect, we will hold a joint session with the leaders of the South American nations, under the theme of the Sixth BRICS Summit, with a view to furthering cooperation between BRICS and South America.”</p> <p>“To better reflect the advancement of the social policies of the BRICS and the positive impacts of its economic growth, we instruct our National Institutes of Statistics and the Ministries of Health and Education to work on the development of joint methodologies for social indicators to be incorporated in the BRICS Joint Statistical Publication. We also encourage the BRICS Think Tanks Council to provide technical support in this task. We further request the BRICS National Institutes of</p>	N/A

		<p>Statistics to discuss the viability and feasibility of a platform for the development of such methodologies and to report thereon.”</p> <p>“We commend the efforts of the AU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Mali aimed at restoring sovereignty and territorial integrity of Mali. We support the civilian efforts of the Malian Government and its international community partners in realising the transitional programme leading up to the presidential and legislative elections. We emphasise the importance of political inclusiveness and economic and social development in order for Mali to achieve sustainable peace and stability. We express concern about the reports of the deterioration in humanitarian conditions in Mali and call upon the international community to continue to cooperate with Mali and its neighbouring countries in order to ensure humanitarian assistance to civilian population affected by the armed conflict.”</p> <p>Establishment of the NDB. “The NDB will strengthen the cooperation among our countries and will supplement the efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for global development, thus contributing to our collective commitments for achieving the goal of strong,</p>	
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		sustainable and balanced growth”	
South African FPG 2: regional identity	<p>“Commensurate with South Africa’s desire to contribute to the resolution of crisis solutions in Africa and finding African solutions to African problems” (p. 10)</p> <p>“Strengthen Political and Economic Integration of Southern African Development Community (SADC) Countries” (p. 13).</p> <p>“In November 2013, South Africa engaged in a Joint Permanent Commission on Defence and Security with Zimbabwe for the purpose of cooperation on cross-border and regional security.” (p. 43)</p> <p>“South Africa is in the process of implementing two projects for Somalia: The first, to be conducted by ACCORD, will offer expert advice on the formulation of policies and structures that are required for taking the country forward in areas such as reconciliation and national unity. The second project is an anti-piracy feasibility study focusing on the actual root causes of piracy.” (p. 44)</p> <p>“Contribute to continental and global development, security and human rights for all through identified processes, mediation, peace support, post-conflict reconstruction efforts of multilateral institutions, structured bilateral mechanisms and multilateral engagements” (p. 32).</p>	<p>“Recognising the importance of regional integration for Africa's sustainable growth, development and poverty eradication, we reaffirm our support for the Continent's integration processes”</p> <p>“We therefore, reaffirm our support for sustainable infrastructure development in Africa.”</p> <p>“We recognize the importance of promoting long-term political stability in Guinea-Bissau, which necessarily encompasses measures to reduce food insecurity and to advance a comprehensive security sector reform, as proposed by the Guinea-Bissau Configuration of the UN Peacebuilding Commission”</p> <p>“We commend the efforts of the international community and acknowledge the central role of the African Union (AU) and its Peace and Security Council in conflict resolution in Africa. We call upon the UNSC to enhance cooperation with the African Union, and its Peace and Security Council, pursuant to UNSC resolutions in this regard. We express our deep concern with instability stretching from North Africa, in particular the Sahel, and the Gulf of Guinea. We also remain concerned about reports of deterioration in humanitarian conditions in some countries”</p>	<p>“We are convinced that the growth of our two continents will be mutually beneficial: our economies remain closely linked, and we will work to ensure that the growth of the one will help the other. We are also convinced that trade and investment and closer economic integration on each of our continents will accelerate that growth.” (p. 2)</p> <p>“We strongly support the African aspiration and commitment to ensure peace, security and stability in Africa, in the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).” (p. 3)</p> <p>“We agree to support these efforts to enhance African capacities in the field of peace and security through the range of means at our disposal, with a particular focus on capacity- building. This should enable African partners such as the AU, regional organisations and individual countries to better provide for security and stability in their own regions.” (p. 3)</p> <p>“We undertake to cooperate more closely</p>

		<p>situation in West Africa: “We call upon all parties in these conflicts to cease hostilities, exercise restraint and engage in dialogue to ensure return to peace and stability.”</p> <p>“We support the efforts of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in its task to help the Government of Mali fully stabilize the country, facilitate national political dialogue, protect civilians, monitor the human rights situation, create conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and the return of displaced persons, and extend the State authority in the whole country”</p> <p>South Sudan: “We condemn the continuation of violence against civilians and call upon all parties to ensure a safe environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance”</p> <p>“We support, in this regard, the regional efforts to find a peaceful solution to the crisis, especially the mediation process led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). We welcome the "Agreement to Resolve the Crisis in South Sudan", signed on May 9, and expect the political leaders of South Sudan to remain committed to the negotiation process and to the completion of dialogue on the formation of a transitional government of national unity within 60 days, as announced by IGAD on</p>	<p>in preventing conflicts and further agree on the importance of tackling the root causes of instability, fragility and conflict in order to prevent its recurrence and achieve sustainable recovery in line with the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, as well as AU initiatives in this area.” (p. 3)</p> <p>“The EU will continue to support African countries in the preparation of national and regional climate-resilient and low-emission development strategies to reinforce the resilience of their economies to climate change, in particular in sectors such as agriculture and access to sustainable and renewable energy in the context of the United Nations Sustainable Energy for all Initiative.” (p. 5)</p> <p>“The EU pledges its support to the AU decision to fast track the establishment of a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) in Africa and offers to draw on its experience of building the Single Market to provide capacity support to this initiative.” (p. 7)</p>
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		<p>June 10. We commend the efforts of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan to fulfill its mandate and express our deep concern about the armed attacks that were led against UN bases in the country.”</p> <p>“We support the efforts by the UN, in particular the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), deployed under UN Security Council resolution 2098, and the regional and sub-regional organizations to bring peace and stability to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and we call upon all involved to honor their obligations in order to achieve lasting peace and stability in the DRC.”</p> <p>“We welcome the AU Malabo Summit decision to establish an interim African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) by October 2014 to respond quickly to crisis situations as they arise. We stress the importance of adequate support to ensure the timely operationalization of the ACIRC, pending the final establishment of the African Stand-by Force.”</p> <p>“The New Development Bank Africa Regional Center shall be established in South Africa concurrently with the headquarters. We direct our Finance Ministers to work out the modalities for its operationalization.”</p>	
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<p>South African FPG 3: respect for human rights</p>	<p>“The South African Government, in the Third Committee of UNGA, succeeded to ensure that global human rights issues were addressed in keeping with the principles of international human rights law. In this process, South Africa managed to mitigate the propensity of dominant states to slant the international human rights agenda in favour of their domestic political expediencies.” (p. 54).</p> <p>“The South African Government continued to play a prominent role in democracy forums and structured dialogue forums on human rights. These structures have a primary focus on the promotion of democracy, good governance, rule of law and accountable electoral processes, including the deepening of democracy and accountability at global level.” (p. 55)</p> <p>“South Africa and the European Union (EU) established the SA-EU Structured Dialogue Forum on Human Rights, which will be the major framework between the parties to resolve some of the intractable challenges faced by these parties on the evolution of the UN human rights agenda.” (p. 55)</p> <p>“South African positions on the promotion and protection of human rights were advanced during the following sessions of the UNHRC”</p>	<p>“We agree to continue to treat all human rights, including the right to development, in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing and with the same emphasis. We will foster dialogue and cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual respect in the field of human rights, both within BRICS and in multilateral fora - including the United Nations Human Rights Council where all BRICS serve as members in 2014 - taking into account the necessity to promote, protect and fulfill human rights in a non-selective, non-politicized and constructive manner, and without double standards.”</p> <p>South Sudan: “We condemn the continuation of violence against civilians and call upon all parties to ensure a safe environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance.”</p> <p>“We express deep concern about the ongoing violence and the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Syria and condemn the increasing violations of human rights by all parties”</p> <p>“We express our deep concern with the situation in Ukraine. We call for a comprehensive dialogue, the de-escalation of the conflict and restraint from all the actors involved, with a view to finding a peaceful political solution, in full compliance with the UN Charter and universally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms”</p>	<p>“We pledge to ensure a transparent, democratic, accountable and peaceful environment for those we represent, and to uphold our common values and goals in pursuit of good governance, democracy and the rule of law. We commit ourselves to respect all rights and principles set out in the Treaties and Charters that we have respectively signed and ratified, and to work together in all countries to respect our peoples' demands for justice, reconciliation, respect for international law, human rights, gender equality and dignity.” (p. 2)</p> <p>“Upholding human rights in Africa and Europe is our duty and we will work together to ensure that the African Human Rights Year in 2016 is a success. Aware of the fact that the AU’s vision is the realisation of “An Integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena” and also taking into consideration the national dynamics of each African country, we will increase cooperation in support for international human rights and international humanitarian law.” (p. 8)</p> <p>“We shall hold regular consultations on civil,</p>
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		<p>“We reaffirm our commitment to continue to tackle transnational organized crime, with full respect for human rights”</p> <p>“We strongly condemn acts of mass electronic surveillance and data collection of individuals all over the world, as well as violation of the sovereignty of States and of human rights, in particular the right to privacy.”</p>	<p>political, economic, social and cultural rights. We shall pay particular attention to gender equality, the rights of the most vulnerable groups, including people with disabilities, the elderly and refugees, as well as to women, youth and children's rights.” (p. 8)</p>
Issue-Area	N/A	N/A	Not a bilateral agreement directly with the EU, but through the AU.

Table 15: South African foreign policy goals, BRICS & EU declarations - 2015

1. DIRCO. (2015). Department of International Relations And Cooperation, Annual Report, 2014/2015.
2. BRICS. (2015). *VII BRICS Summit Ufa Declaration*. Ufa.
3. EU Valletta summit on migration.
4. Action plan EU Valletta summit on migration. (B)
5. The 3rd EU-South Africa Structured Dialogue Forum on Human Rights.

	South African goal	BRICS Goal	EU Goal
South African FPG 1: South-south cooperation increase	<p>“That is why the essence of our foreign policy during the year under review found expression through programmes aimed at regional integration, enhancing multilateral relations, reinforcing South-South cooperation and continuing as we have in the past by being involved in global system of governance.” (p. 8)</p> <p>“The African Agenda continues to inform the conduct and management of South-South relations. This finds expression in our engagements in formations such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS); India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA); the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA); and the G77 plus China.” (p. 9)</p> <p>“In 2014, South Africa was unanimously elected as Chair of the G77+China for the year 2015. During our term as Chair, we have positioned ourselves as the voice of developing countries on critical development issues</p>	<p>Intra-BRICS “To step up coordinated efforts in responding to emerging challenges, ensuring peace and security, promoting development in a sustainable way, addressing poverty eradication, inequality and unemployment for the benefit of our peoples and the international community. We confirmed our intention to further enhance the collective role of our countries in international affairs.”</p> <p>“consolidating our engagement with other countries, particularly developing countries and emerging market economies”</p> <p>“We welcome and support the creation of a platform of joint discussion for trade cooperation amongst BRICS countries through enhanced dialogue between the BRICS Export Credit Agencies”</p> <p>“We welcome the Initiative on Strengthening IPR Cooperation among the BRICS Countries. We support the efforts aimed at</p>	N/A

	<p>facing the global community, including eradicating poverty, unemployment and inequality.” (p. 9)</p>	<p>establishing and enhancing the cooperation mechanisms in such areas as SMEs support, trade promotion, sharing experiences on single window projects, inter alia, and direct officials to identify concrete activities in these areas.”</p>	
<p>South African FPG 2: regional identity</p>	<p>“The pursuit of the African Agenda is the focal point in telling the good African story, which is influenced by our foreign policy objectives that is anchored in the National Development Plan. It is also in synch with the continent’s Agenda 2063, which seeks to create a united, stable, developmental and prosperous Africa that is a leading continent in global politics.” (p. 8)</p> <p>“A key component of South Africa’s foreign policy for Africa in general, and in particular the East African region, is support for the consolidation of peace and political stability. In line with the objective of intensified economic diplomacy and the realisation of the high economic growth rate in certain East African economies, DIRCO has aimed its economic efforts at further increasing intra-African trade.” (p. 44)</p> <p>“To pursue a peaceful and secure Africa</p> <p>To pursue a sustainable developed and economically integrated Africa” (p. 77)</p>	<p>“We welcome the efforts of the Federal Government of Somalia aimed at establishing capable state authorities, solving acute socio-economic problems and building constructive relations with all the Somali regions. We recognize the tangible achievements of the Somali army and the units of the peace keeping African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in fighting the Al-Shabaab extremist group. We express our concern about the growth of the terrorist threat in the countries of Northeast and East Africa. We strongly condemn the inhumane attack by Al Shabaab fighters on the University of Garissa, Kenya on 2 April 2015, which resulted in deplorable casualties. We express our solidarity with the Government and the people of Kenya in their struggle against terrorism. We stress that there can be no justification for terrorism whatsoever.”</p> <p>“We also express deep concern about the scourge of terrorism and violent extremism and condemn the terrorist acts perpetrated by Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram</p>	<p>“Our common response will focus on reducing poverty, promoting peace, good governance, rule of law and respect for human rights, supporting inclusive economic growth through investment opportunities and the creation of decent jobs, improving the delivery of basic services such as education, health and security. Rekindling hope, notably for the African youth, must be our paramount objective.”</p> <p>“Support African countries, regional and pan-African institutions, in particular the African Union, in developing or further strengthening national and regional migration strategies while taking note of individual countries specificities” B</p> <p>“Take action with regard to conflicts, human rights violations, and abuses that, generate internal displacement, irregular migration and refugee flows.” B</p> <p>“Reinforce support to diplomatic initiatives, including mediation efforts, for some of the most urgent crisis situations in Africa.” B</p>

		and other groups, which pose a serious threat to peace and stability in Africa.”	
South African FPG 3: respect for human rights	<p>“On the multilateral front, the focus, during the reporting period, has been to break or unblock the current impasse on the South African-led initiatives at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva.” (p. 9)</p> <p>“Within the UN human rights system, the notion of business and human rights has become an extremely topical issue in the UN. The lack of protection measures at the national level, due to weak national legislation or total absence thereof, has resulted in a situation where the corporate sector with its transnational character continues to commit grave human rights violations with impunity. In this regard, South Africa has assumed a leadership role in the elaboration of new norms and standards in international human rights and humanitarian law aimed at ensuring accountability for the corporate sector.” (p. 60)</p> <p>“The focus, during the reporting period, has been to break or unblock the current impasse on the South African-led initiatives at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva.” (p. 60)</p> <p>“South African-led initiatives at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. This includes the elaboration of complementary standards to</p>	<p>“We reaffirmed our strong commitment to the United Nations as a universal multilateral organization entrusted with the mandate of helping the international community maintain international peace and security, advance global development and promote and protect human rights”</p> <p>“We reaffirm the intention to strengthen the principle of equitable and mutually respectful cooperation of sovereign states as the cornerstone of international activities to promote and protect human rights. We will continue to treat all human rights - civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, as well as the right to development - on the same footing and to give them equal attention”</p> <p>“Within the UN human rights institutions, including the Human Rights Council and the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly we will strengthen coordination of our positions on the issues of mutual interest. We support the universal periodic review carried out by the UN Human Rights Council and will constructively contribute to its work”</p>	<p>“The Dialogue was recognised as a useful platform to bring forward the human rights agenda and to narrow the gaps, particularly in multilateral fora.” (C)</p> <p>“On issues such as country- and thematic resolutions (human rights defenders, peaceful protests, civil society space, reprisals, racism, preventing and countering violent extremism), both sides agreed to share experiences and ideas with each other in advance so as to better understand the issues at stake with the view to bringing both sides closer to agreement.” (C)</p> <p>“Both sides agree to work in partnership and organise joint side events in areas of mutual concern and interest, and in this regard proposed to mark the occasion of the International Day in Support of Victims of Torture in June 2016.” (C)</p> <p>“Furthermore, other issues of priority and mutual interest and concern between the parties were thoroughly reflected on and a platform for further deliberations has been established.” (C)</p>

	<p>the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in the form of additional protocols addressing xenophobia, Islamophobia, anti-Semitism and incitement to hatred; the elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations (holding the corporate sector accountable for human rights violations in international law); the elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on the PMSCs (holding the Private Military and Security Companies accountable for human rights violations in international law); and the elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on the extractive industries (holding the PMSCs accountable for human rights violations in international law).” (p. 9)</p>		
Issue-Area	N/A	N/A	No direct communication between the EU and South Africa. Summit focused on migration.

Table 16: South African foreign policy goals, BRICS & EU declarations - 2016

1. DIRCO. (2016). Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Annual Report, 2015/2016.
2. . BRICS. (2016). *VIII BRICS Summit Goa Declaration*.
3. South African Government. (2016). International Relations on 4th EU-South Africa Structured Dialogue Forum on Human Rights.

	South African goal	BRICS Goal	EU Goal
South African FPG 1: South-south cooperation increase	<p>“South Africa successfully completed its one-year term as Chair of the Group of 77 (G77) and China at the start of January 2016. During its Chairpersonship, particularly in 2015, South Africa led the 134 developing country members of the group in significant negotiating processes by articulating and promoting the collective economic and developmental interests of the South within the United Nations (UN) System.” (p. 13)</p> <p>“Strengthening South-South Relations”</p> <p>“Through bilateral relations, the priority needs of Africa and the South are also pursued.” (p. 51)</p> <p>“2015 witnessed an extremely busy year in the relations between South Africa and China. Not only was the focus on the political and economic pillars that structure the relationship, but the vast array of areas covered in Sino-South African relations were also displayed by the myriad of activities organised by China to</p>	<p>“We welcome the report presented by NDB President on the work of the Bank during the first year of its operations. We are pleased to note the progress in operationalising the Africa Regional Centre (ARC) of the NDB and pledge our full support in this regard. We look forward to developing new BRICS initiatives in a wider range of areas in the years to come.”</p> <p>“We emphasise the importance of our cooperation in order to help stabilise the global economy and to resume growth.”</p>	N/A

	<p>celebrate the “Year of China in South Africa – 2015”.” (p. 58)</p> <p>“Strong cooperation among countries and groupings of the South and the development of common positions on political, economic, social and human rights issues are essential for an effective response in addressing the historic marginalisation of countries in the South. In addition, to harness emerging collective political and economic influence of countries of the South in pursuit of the Development Agenda.” (p. 118)</p>		
<p>South African FPG 2: regional leader</p>	<p>“Negotiated and influenced the resolutions, decisions and outcomes to reflect South Africa’s national interest through reported structures and processes of bodies such as the African Union (AU), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the United Nations (UN) and its agencies” (p. 33)</p> <p>“Economic diplomacy, especially the promotion of intra-African trade, remains at the heart of South African foreign policy.” (p. 52)</p> <p>“A review of the Amani Africa Exercise, hosted by the AU Commission (AUC) was held in Maputo, Mozambique, from 4 to 8 April 2016 with the objective of undertaking a comprehensive assessment of the exercise. Although the review noted progress being made towards the operationalisation of the ASF, the matter of inadequate funding threatens the ability of</p>	<p>“We are deeply concerned about the situation in the Middle East and North Africa. We support all efforts for finding ways to the settlement of the crises in accordance with international law and in conformity with the principles of independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the countries of the region.”</p> <p>“We welcome the African Union's (AU) vision, aspirations, goals and priorities for Africa's development enshrined in Agenda 2063”</p> <p>“We support the AU's efforts to resolving conflicts through its peace and security architecture, in collaboration with the United Nations and the continent's regional organisations, and to contribute towards lasting and sustainable peace and security in Africa”</p> <p>“We welcome the decision of the African Union's Assembly to operationalise its Peace Fund, in order to contribute to financing</p>	<p>N/A</p>

	<p>AU member states to further enhance this important mechanism. In the interim, ACIRC will continue to make its contribution pending the realisation of the ASF's full operational capability.” (p. 100)</p> <p>“We continued to pursue the African Agenda and Agenda of the South within our strategic engagements with the countries of the North. Our engagements with the European Union (EU) enabled us to secure an EU commitment to support Africa’s socio-economic development path and the continent’s peace and security initiatives.”</p>	<p>of its peace and security operations. We support efforts aimed at full operationalisation of the African Standby Force (ASF) and note the progress being made in this regard, including the contributions by the African Capacity for Immediate Responses to Crises (ACIRC)”</p> <p>“We note the dynamic integration processes across the regions of the world, particularly in Asia, Africa and South America. We affirm our belief to promote growth in the context of regional integration on the basis of principles of equality, openness and inclusiveness”</p>	
<p>South African FPG 3: respect for human rights</p>	<p>“Negotiated and influenced the outcomes of multilateral meetings and processes to reflect South Africa’s national interests in peace and security, sustainable development (social, economic and environmental), human rights and humanitarian affairs, international crime and international law” (p. 33)</p> <p>“Participated in the 30th Session of the HRC, held in Geneva from 14 September to 2 October 2015, where South African positions on various human rights thematic issues were advanced. In this regard, South Africa presented 11 statements in its national capacity, such as the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action on the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights and the violations and atrocities committed by Boko Haram in Nigeria” (p. 79)</p>	<p>“All counter-terrorism measures should uphold international law and respect human rights.”</p> <p>“We reaffirm that ICT expansion is a key enabler for sustainable development, for international peace and security and for human rights”</p> <p>“We reiterate that the use and development of ICTs through international and regional cooperation and on the basis of universally accepted norms and principles of international law, including the Charter of the UN; in particular political independence, territorial integrity and sovereign equality of States, the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, non-interference in internal affairs of other States as well as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to privacy; are of paramount importance in</p>	<p>“As Strategic Partners, both parties share a commitment to democracy, human rights, good governance, tolerance and respect for the rule of law. The Strategic Partnership envisages cooperation on the global scene and in international organisations, with the aim of defining a common position and defending the mutual interests of the two parties on global issues”</p> <p>“Both sides agreed to explore ways they could do more together in the future to promote priority issues of common interest and expand cooperation, including follow up to the torture event and on migrant children. Both parties shared information on current developments and discussions on ways to</p>

	<p>“South Africa also supported the Resolution on “Promoting Reconciliation, Accountability and Human Rights in Sri Lanka” (HRC/30/L.29), which was unanimously adopted at the 30th Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) on 1 October 2015.” (p. 61)</p>	<p>order to ensure a peaceful, secure and open and cooperative use of ICTs.”</p>	<p>improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the Human Rights Council.”</p> <p>“The ICC was raised by the EU. Both parties decided to consult with relevant stakeholders domestically, with a view to convene a dedicated meeting between SA and the EU as soon as possible and before the EU-SA Summit in 2017.”</p>
<p>Issue-Area</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>No bilateral meeting on African Identity-related topics, yet the EU still supports African development, as shown in South Africa’s foreign policy.</p>

Table 17: South African foreign policy goals, BRICS & EU declarations – 2017.

1. DIRCO. (2017). Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Annual Report, 2016/2017.
2. BRICS. (2017). *VIII BRICS Summit Xiamen Declaration. Xiamen.*
3. European Council. (2017). 5th African union-European Union9-30/11/2017, 29-30 November 2017.

	South African goal	BRICS Goal	EU Goal
South African FPG 1: South-south cooperation increase	<p>“Our partnerships and formations within South-South relations continue to provide complementary mechanisms to furthering our economic imperatives, among others. The Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) countries continued to be the leading sources of foreign direct investment (FDI) among emerging investor countries” (p. 11)</p> <p>“Despite some of the challenges facing member states, the summit concluded a number of memoranda of understanding (MoUs). Among the key ones are MoUs on Customs Cooperation, BRICS Diplomatic Academies and the BRICS Agriculture Research Centre. The conclusion of these MoUs is critical for achieving the objectives set in the National Development Plan (NDP), which remains South Africa’s blueprint for its developmental aspirations.” (p. 15)</p> <p>“A Trilateral Agreement for the implementation of a South-South Cooperation (SSC) project with the Republic of Guinea and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to</p>	<p>“We have furthered our cooperation with emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs). We have worked together for mutually beneficial outcomes and common development, constantly deepening BRICS practical cooperation which benefits the world at large.”</p> <p>“We stress the importance of enhancing BRICS financial cooperation to better serve the real economy and meet the development needs of BRICS countries.”</p> <p>“We urge developed countries to honor their Official Development Assistance commitments in time and in full and provide more development resources to developing countries.”</p> <p>“We emphasize the importance of people-to-people exchanges to promoting development and enhancing mutual understanding, friendship and cooperation among BRICS peoples. We agree to deepen cooperation in such fields as culture, education, science and technology, sports and health as well as among media</p>	N/A

	<p>improve food security in Guinea by increasing the production, quality and value of rice and vegetable products bore positive results for the people of Guinea.” (p. 49)</p>	<p>organizations and local governments, to strengthen the third pillar of BRICS cooperation and foster a meaningful resonance of the BRICS partnership amongst its peoples.”</p>	
<p>South African FPG 2: regional leader</p>	<p>“South Africa continued to support the AU Commission as well as its new leadership, who was elected in January 2017, in order to continue with our continental journey towards the Africa we aspire by 2063.” (p. 10).</p> <p>“reiterated South Africa’s support for the efforts of the AU’s continued appeal for enhanced and coordinated international action towards the organisation of a referendum for self-determination, in compliance with the Organisation of African Unity/AU decisions and UN resolutions and to bring the project of decolonisation to its final conclusion.” (p. 50)</p> <p>“Contribute to continental and global development, security and human rights for all through identified processes, mediation, peace support, post-conflict reconstruction efforts of multilateral institutions, structured bilateral mechanisms and multilateral engagements.” (p. 33)</p>	<p>“We reaffirm our commitment to strengthen cooperation with Africa and help the continent to address illegal wildlife trade, promote employment, food security, infrastructure development and industrialization including through connectivity and developmental initiatives and projects. We reaffirm our strong support for African Union’s implementation of its various programs under Agenda 2063 in pursuit of its continental agenda for peace and socio-economic development.”</p> <p>“We support efforts towards comprehensively resolving the issues in Democratic Republic of Congo, Libya, South Sudan, Somalia, Central Africa Republic and Western Sahara.”</p>	<p>“We commit to stronger mutual engagement and a more coordinated approach to ensure effective multilateralism, including through stronger AU-EU cooperation at the UN and other international institutions. We will also strengthen AU-EU-UN trilateral cooperation” (p. 2)</p> <p>“Security: In this regard, we recognise the need to strengthen the relationship between the AU and EU and agree on the principle of developing as soon as possible a framework document, which will put our partnership on peace and security on a more solid and structured basis, taking into account the complexity of these threats and the need to address their root causes” (p. 3)</p> <p>“We reiterate our commitment to the implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). We acknowledge the successful deployment of African peace support operations as well as EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions. Ongoing AU reform efforts and actions to secure predictable and</p>

			<p>sustainable financing are important stepping stones to strengthen this process” (p. 3)</p> <p>“We strongly commit to mobilize financial and technical resources to support the joint priority projects for using appropriately integrated instruments and mechanisms in the context of the unique relationship between Africa and EU, notably in terms of trade, investment, development and peace and security.” (p. 4)</p> <p>“We support Africa’s ambitious agenda to "silence the guns by 2020". Therefore, we maintain the focus on people and on strengthening human security. We recognise that young people often constitute the majority of the population of countries affected by armed conflict” (p. 8)</p> <p>“The aim of our partnership is to strengthen dialogue and institutional cooperation. In doing so we resolve to support the implementation of “African solutions for African problems”, as envisioned by the African Union's Agenda 2063, and which prioritises Africa's aspiration to a peaceful and secure continent” (p. 8)</p>
<p>South African FPG 3: respect for human rights</p>	<p>“Spearheaded numerous flagship resolutions within the framework of the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) and the UNGA, consistent</p>	<p>“We reaffirm our commitment to the United Nations as the universal multilateral organization entrusted with the mandate for maintaining international peace and</p>	<p>“We welcome progress in the respect for democratic principles, human rights, rule of law and good governance. The integrity of elections, abiding by national</p>

	<p>with South Africa’s priorities in the areas of the elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.” (p. 79)</p> <p>“South Africa continues its ongoing mission to retain its historical stature and branding as a leading human rights country with moral authority on matters of human dignity, human equality, gender and the pursuit of the ideal of universal justice.” (p. 79)</p> <p>“Internationally, South Africa has taken leadership in calling for global acceptance of gay rights. In 2011, its leadership was considered critical to pass a Human Rights Council resolution to recognise gay rights as human rights.” (p. 79)</p>	<p>security, advance global development and to promote and protect human rights.”</p> <p>“We stress that the fight against terrorism must be conducted in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, international refugee and humanitarian law, human rights and fundamental freedoms.”</p> <p>“We will strengthen cooperation on issues of common interests both within BRICS and in multilateral fora including the United Nations Human Rights Council, taking into account the necessity to promote, protect and fulfill human rights in a non-selective, non-politicized and constructive manner, and without double standards.”</p>	<p>constitutions, are important democratic parameters. We recognize the need to increase confidence in democratic processes and will pursue our operation on effective, inclusive and accountable governance at all levels and on combatting corruption” (p. 4)</p>
Issue-Area	N/A	N/A	N/A

Table 18: South African foreign policy goals, BRICS & EU declarations – 2018.

1. DIRCO. (2018). Department of international Relations and Cooperation, Annual Report, 2017/2018.
2. BRICS. (2018). *X BRICS Summit Johannesburg Declaration*.
3. European Council. (2018). European Union - South Africa Summit, Joint Declaration.

	South African goal	BRICS Goal	EU Goal
South African FPG 1: South-south cooperation increase	<p>“South Africa will need to develop a foreign policy stance that strengthens the bridging role it has played over the last 24 years between the different global blocs premised on a largely independent foreign policy orientation. This will allow South Africa to contribute to strengthening and democratising the global multilateral system so that it fosters peace, stability, prosperity, equality and human rights for all people, especially in Africa, and work towards establishing equality between countries.” (p. 9)</p> <p>“Our partnerships and formations within the broader South-South relations are historic and remain important. In furthering our economic imperatives, the world’s leading emerging economies, namely Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) countries continued to be the leading sources of foreign direct investment (FDI) among emerging investor countries, as flows from these five economies rose from US\$7billion in</p>	<p>“We undertake to strengthen BRICS cooperation in energy, especially in transitioning to more environmentally sustainable energy systems supportive of the global sustainable development agenda, balanced economic growth and the collective socio-economic wellbeing of our citizens.”</p> <p>“We welcome the dynamic development of BRICS cooperation in science, technology and innovation”</p>	<p>“Over the past years the EU and South Africa have deepened cooperation through twenty policy dialogues in areas such as climate change, natural resources, science and technology, research and innovation, employment, education and training including digital skills, health, energy, macro-economic policies, human rights and peace and security.”</p> <p>“We reaffirm our commitment to enhance cooperation towards addressing challenges of inequality and poverty, to achieving gender equality and our shared interest in fostering investments notably towards sustainable development, decent jobs”</p> <p>“The EU and South Africa will, amongst others, explore the opportunities provided by the EU External Investment Plan under its three pillars.”</p> <p>“Recognizing the EU as a significant and long term investor in South Africa, we commit to exploring all of the opportunities for investment, technical assistance including project preparation, and the improvement of business and</p>

	<p>2000 to US\$145 billion in 2012, accounting for 10% of the world total.”</p>		<p>investment climates to promote sustainable development.”</p> <p>“We welcome the conclusion and provisional implementation in 2016 of the EU-Southern African Development Community (SADC) - Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), which has created the foundation for a new and mutually beneficial economic relationship between the EU, South Africa and the other partners of the EU-SADC EPA”</p>
<p>South African FPG 2: regional leader</p>	<p>“In the area of continental multilateralism, South Africa was instrumental in negotiations leading to the finalisation of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) and the Single African Air Transport Market.” (p. 93)</p> <p>“The AU Peace Fund was also established during the reporting period and we hope that this will support the AU Peace and Security Council work on peacebuilding in the region, including building on the role that women play in peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the region. We believe that stronger continental mechanisms are required to ensure that the goal of “silencing the guns” by 2020 is realised.”</p> <p>“South Africa coordinated the NEPAD Resolution on behalf of the G77 and China (G77) The three resolutions were adopted by consensus and reflected South Africa’s and</p>	<p>“We commend the African Union’s commitment to the “Silencing of the Guns by 2020” and support efforts to strengthen the African Peace and Security Architecture.”</p> <p>“We support the importance of stimulating infrastructure investment on the basis of mutual benefit to support industrial development, job-creation, skills development, food and nutrition security and poverty eradication and sustainable development in Africa.”</p> <p>“We note the long overdue outstanding task of ensuring the adequate representation of African States in the UN, especially in peace and security matters.”</p> <p>“Keenly aware of the need for Africa’s industrialisation and the realisation of the African Union’s Agenda 2063, we commend African countries and the African Union on the signing of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The</p>	<p>“We welcomed each other’s role in fostering peace and security in our respective regions and noted South Africa’s important regional and continental role in peace and security.”</p> <p>“We confirm our commitment to a stronger and sustainable partnership between the African Union and the EU and agree to the full implementation of the outcomes of the 5th AU-EU Summit in 2017, and to continue to support and solidify the gains made by the African Union’s Agenda 2063, its First Ten Year Implementation Plan and the various African Flagship Programmes. We welcome the new Africa-Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs as put forward by the European Commission.”</p>

	Africa’s policy positions and interests” (p. 87)	<p>AfCFTA is an important step to economic integration on the continent and the unlocking of the tremendous potential of intraAfrican trade and in addressing its socio-economic challenges. In this regard, we reiterate our support for Agenda 2063 and efforts to promote continental integration and development.”</p> <p>“We acknowledge the importance of infrastructure development and connectivity in Africa and recognise the strides made by the African Union to identify and address the continent's infrastructure challenges, inter alia, through the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA). We support the importance of stimulating infrastructure investment on the basis of mutual benefit to support industrial development, job-creation, skills development, food and nutrition security and poverty eradication and sustainable development in Africa. We therefore reaffirm our support for sustainable infrastructure development in Africa, including addressing the infrastructure financing deficit.”</p>	
South African FPG 3: respect for human rights	“South Africa is committed to multilateralism and a rules-based international order and to this end participates and plays an active role in all fora of the United	“We reaffirm our commitment to the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, and support for the United Nations as the universal intergovernmental	“We agree to strengthen cooperation at the United Nations Human Rights Council and other multilateral fora and to continue to engage on human rights issues in the framework of the South Africa-European

	<p>Nations (UN) system and its specialised agencies, funds and programmes, promoting the pillars of multilateral activity, namely: global security, sustainable development, human rights and international law” (p. 36)</p> <p>“South Africa continued its constant strive to retain its historical stature and branding as a leading human rights country with the moral authority on matters of human dignity and equality, empowerment of women and gender equality and the pursuit of the ideal of universal justice.” (p. 71)</p> <p>“Negotiated and influenced the outcomes of the following 20 multilateral meetings and processes to reflect South Africa’s National Interest on peace and security, sustainable development (social, economic and environmental), human rights and humanitarian affairs, international crime and international law” (p. 74)</p>	<p>organisation entrusted with the responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, advancing sustainable development as well as ensuring the promotion, and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms”</p>	<p>Union Structured Dialogue Forum on Human Rights, especially as regards the respect for, the promotion, protection and fulfilment of all universally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms”</p>
Issue-Area	N/A	N/A	N/A

Table 19: South African foreign policy goals, BRICS & EU declarations – 2019.

1. DIRCO. (2019). Department of Cooperation and International Relations, Annual Report, 2018/2019.
2. BRICS. (2019). XI BRICS Summit Brasília Declaration.
3. EEAS (2019). The Sixth EU-South Africa Structured Dialogue Forum on Human Rights – Press Release.
4. European Union-African Union ministerial meeting, 21-22/01/2019

	South African goal	BRICS Goal	EU Goal
South African FPG 1: South-south cooperation increase	<p>“The work we are doing with countries of the South will enable us to bridge the historic North-South divide. This bridging work includes challenging the false dichotomy between civil and political rights championed by countries of the North and economic, social and cultural rights championed by countries of the South.” (p. 9)</p> <p>“The goals of peace and development in Africa will find support from our relations with the Global South. In this regard, we assumed the Chairship of BRICS from 1 January to 31 December 2018 under the theme: “BRICS in Africa: Collaboration for Inclusive Growth and Shared Prosperity in the 4th Industrial Revolution”.</p> <p>The BRICS bloc continues to be a leading source of foreign direct investment with its economies exceeding US\$1 trillion.”</p> <p>“In line with South Africa’s commitment to South-South cooperation, DIRCO continued to engage the IBSA South-South development cooperation mechanism, contributing to the decision to elevate the IBSA brand internationally, using,</p>	<p>“We call on developed countries to fully implement their Official Development Assistance (ODA) commitments and to provide developing countries with additional development resources.”</p> <p>“We stress the need for greater participation of developing countries in global value chains. We will continue to cooperate within the G20 and advance the interests of EMEs and developing countries.”</p> <p>“We support the conclusion of the BRICS Trade Ministers that bold, coordinated international action is required to increase economic growth and sustainability. Increased trade can help with global growth, but the demand deficit in the global economy requires additional sources of growth, which could include infrastructure investment, including in digital infrastructure, skills development, particularly for young people, sustainable investment, investment in local basic services, and outward investment to areas of high</p>	N/A

	<p>among others, the legacy of Nelson Mandela. IBSA's activities will be expanded to enhance cooperation with other developing countries through the IBSA Fund for the Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger, a model for South-South based development cooperation." (p. 11)</p>	<p>potential growth, including on the African continent."</p>	
<p>South African FPG 2: regional leader</p>	<p>"South Africa will continue to play a leading role in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. The strengthening of the AU and its structures is a strategic priority in deepening the continental integration process. In addition, the role of regional economic communities (RECs) as building blocs in the integration process will be strengthened. South Africa will continue supporting the establishment of a peaceful, integrated and prosperous Africa, driven by its citizens and taking its rightful place in the world by 2063. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) will be utilised to strengthen good governance, democracy and respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law." (p. 86)</p>	<p>"We commend the efforts of the African Union and sub-regional organizations in addressing regional issues and managing conflicts in the interest of peace and security in the continent and reiterate the importance of collaboration between the United Nations and the African Union. We urge all parties to cease immediately all military action in Libya and to engage with the United Nations and the AU High Level Committee on Libya and relevant stakeholders to ensure a comprehensive and sustainable solution through a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process."</p> <p>"We congratulate the Sudanese people for the signing on 17 August 2019 in Khartoum of the Political Agreement and Constitutional Declaration, which we consider an important step towards the stabilization of the political situation in Sudan. We acknowledge the efforts of the African Union and the Ethiopian government, whose mediation contributed to the conclusion of negotiations. Intra-BRICS Cooperation."</p>	<p>"The EU, having experienced the multiple benefits of regional integration and of an increasingly harmonised business and investment climate, reaffirmed its commitment to share its own experience and partnership in regional integration and cooperation, to which it will lend its full support. Ministers agreed on the importance of developing trade relations between Africa and Europe" (p. 2)</p> <p>"The meeting was updated on the progress of the <i>EU External Investment Plan</i>, which is deploying EUR 4.1 billion to leverage an estimated EUR 37 billion in African and European private investments." (p. 2)</p> <p>"Ministers welcomed the positive steps towards regional peace and stability, particularly the Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement and its wider impact for peace and security in the Horn of Africa, and agreed to support the process." "In the framework of the EU's longstanding support for sustainable and</p>

		<p>“We also attach great importance to other key cooperation initiatives, encompassing the BRICS Task Force on PPP and Infrastructure, which facilitates dialogue on infrastructure, including the G20 infrastructure agenda, the NDB’s Project Preparation Facility, the effectiveness of which will be enhanced by launching its first set of projects at the earliest, and our cooperation with a view to enhancing the representation of developing countries and emerging economies in the Multilateral Development Banks.”</p>	<p>predictable financing for African-led Peace Support Operations, both sides welcomed the commitment of EU Member States to replenish the African Peace Facility for the period 2019-2020. Ministers underlined the importance of ongoing negotiations in New York on the use of UN-assessed contributions for AU-led Peace Support Operations authorised by the UN Security Council.” (p. 3)</p>
<p>South African FPG 3: respect for human rights</p>	<p>“We have sought to integrate the human rights and development agenda in all areas of our work. As Co-Chair of the G20 Development Working Group, we prioritised key developmental areas for South Africa and Africa in industrialisation, infrastructure development and the fight against illicit financial flows out of the continent.” (p. 9)</p> <p>“The development of common positions on political, economic, social and human rights issues remains essential in addressing the historic marginalisation of countries of the South.” (p. 11)</p> <p>“South Africa articulated South Africa’s position on human rights and those of the Global South and impacted all resolutions that were before the committee, bearing in mind international norms and standards in international human rights and humanitarian law through negotiations.” (p. 68)</p>	<p>“We remain committed to multilateralism, cooperation of sovereign States to maintain peace and security, advance sustainable development and ensure the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all and build a brighter shared future for the international community.”</p>	<p>“We recognise that increasing our bilateral cooperation and deepening of dialogue with others is crucial for promotion and protection of human rights, as well as defending their universality. South Africa’s non-permanent UN Security Council membership and the upcoming Presidency of the African Union (AU) both create an additional window of opportunity for strategic coordination and cooperation in this respect.”</p> <p>“Both sides have agreed to explore opportunities for joint action in view of the 25th anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action in 2020.”</p> <p>“The EU invited South Africa to consider joining</p>

	<p>“South Africa continued to influence norms and standards in international human rights and international humanitarian law and the law of protection in the multilateral system, championing human rights as the beacon of our foreign policy.” (p. 68)</p> <p>“South Africa further provided substantive proposals to various resolutions, including on human rights and climate change; violence against women; the right to education; human rights in the context of HIV and AIDS; enhancement of international cooperation in the field of human rights; the operationalisation of the prevention mandate of the HRC; business and human rights; human rights on the Internet; and human rights and the regulation of civilian acquisition, possession and use of firearms.” (p. 73)</p>		<p>the Good Human Rights Stories Coalition.”</p>
Issue-Area	N/A	N/A	N/A

Table 20: South African foreign policy goals, BRICS & EU declarations – 2020.

1. DIRCO. (2020). Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Annual Report, 2019/2020.
2. BRICS. (2020). *XII BRICS Summit Moscow Declaration*

	South African goal	BRICS Goal	EU Goal
South African FPG 1: South-south cooperation increase	<p>“South Africa participated successfully during the 11th Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa (BRICS) Summit, which was held from 13 to 14 November 2019, in Brasilia, [...] Participation by South Africa demonstrated once again that South Africa’s membership of BRICS enables the country to employ additional soft tools power” (p. 12)</p>	<p>“We will reinforce the resilience of agriculture, rural areas and farmers in light of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic through deepening agricultural cooperation including South-South and the promotion of comprehensive development of rural areas, through forms of support compatible with WTO rules on agriculture. Rural development is of great significance to the balanced improvement of the world agricultural production, food security and the implementation of sustainable goals in agriculture. We acknowledge the importance of avoiding food loss and waste and encourage joint efforts towards the reduction of food loss and waste.”</p> <p>“enhance further BRICS countries dialogue on issues on the UN Security Council agenda and for continued cooperation of BRICS countries in areas of mutual interest, including through regular exchanges amongst their Permanent Missions to the United Nations and in other international fora”</p> <p>“Valuing the continued role of the G20 as the premier forum for international economic cooperation and coordinated</p>	N/A

		<p>action to overcome the current global challenges, we commit to continue coordination and collaborative efforts within the G20 on issues of mutual interest to the BRICS countries and with the aim to advance in the G20 the interests and priorities of emerging market economies and developing countries, including the updating of the G20 Action Plan.”</p>	
<p>South African FPG 2: regional leader</p>	<p>“South Africa has endeavoured to play a leading role on African issues being discussed by the Security Council, as well as maintaining a principal position on issues outside the continent, including the possibility of playing a bridge-builder role.” (p. 98)</p> <p>“South Africa will vigorously pursue the implementation of the AfCFTA during its Chairship of the AU in 2020 to 2021”</p>	<p>“We call for international support for regional and subregional initiatives aimed at strengthening peace and security on the continent based on the principle «African solutions to African problems» as articulated by Africans themselves. We commend the African Union’s commitment to promote the «Silencing the Guns by 2020» initiative and underscore the importance of an enhanced partnership between the United Nations and the African Union in the area of international peace and security”</p> <p>“We reaffirm our readiness to develop further cooperation with the African continent, including with the aim to strengthening its potential to address the intertwined health, economic, and social effects of COVID-19.”</p> <p>“We recognize that many developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America will also take longer to recover from the COVID-19 and its associated implications. We call on donor countries to honour their Official Development Assistance (ODA) commitments, and to facilitate</p>	<p>N/A</p>

		capacity building and the transfer of technology to developing countries together with additional development resources.”	
South African FPG 3: respect for human rights	<p>“South Africa played a leadership role in several intergovernmental processes at the UN with the objective of influencing the norms and standards that would inform the international community’s approach to international human rights and humanitarian law” (p. 103).</p> <p>“South Africa is also committed to the protection and promotion of human rights as enshrined in the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the continent, which the country has been a State Party to since 1996” (p. 147)</p>	<p>“We reinforce our commitment to a world of peace, stability and prosperity, mutual respect and equality, and to upholding international law, including the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations as its indispensable cornerstone, and to the central role of the United Nations in an international system in which sovereign States cooperate to maintain peace and security, advance sustainable development, ensure the promotion and protection of democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all with the aim to build a brighter shared future for the international community based on mutually beneficial cooperation.”</p>	N/A
Issue-Area	N/A	N/A	No Objectives or cooperation increase.

Table 21: South African foreign policy goals, BRICS & EU declarations – 2021.

1. DIRCO. (2021). Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Annual Report, 2020/2021.
2. BRICS. (2021). *XIII BRICS Summit New Delhi Declaration*.
3. 17th AU-EU Human Rights dialogue Joint communique.

	South African goal	BRICS Goal	EU Goal
South African FPG 1: South-south cooperation increase	<p>“We have remained committed to South-South cooperation and continued to use engagements with groupings such as BRICS and India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA), to the benefit of South Africa and the African continent. During the year under review, South Africa engaged its BRICS partners to advocate for the provision of sufficient vaccines to Africa and countries of the South.” (p. 8)</p> <p>“The main objectives of South Africa’s fully committed engagement in Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) have been to enhance the future growth and development of South Africa and to strengthen intra-BRICS relations and mutually beneficial cooperation across the three pillars of cooperation, namely: policy and security, economy and finance, and culture and people-to-people exchanges.” (p.12)</p> <p>“The IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) Dialogue Forum has provided an important value- driven mechanism for South Africa</p>	<p>“Making instruments of global governance more inclusive, representative and participatory to facilitate greater and more meaningful participation of developing and least developed countries, especially Africa, in global decision-making processes and structures and make it better attuned to contemporary realities”</p> <p>“We welcome the ongoing practical cooperation within the BRICS Energy Research Cooperation Platform (ERCP) and take note of the BRICS Energy Technology Report 2021.”</p> <p>Reinforcing inter-BRICS cooperation on different aspects such as tourism, protection of children etc.</p> <p>“Making instruments of global governance more inclusive, representative and participatory to facilitate greater and more meaningful participation of developing and least developed countries, especially Africa, in global decision-making processes and structures and make it better attuned to contemporary realities.”</p>	N/A

	<p>to address historical inequalities and imbalances, and to safeguard and advance mutual political, economic and social interests, common positions and shared values in the pursuit of a just and equitable developmental agenda and global order.”</p> <p>“The main objectives of South Africa’s engagement in BRICS are to enhance the future growth and development of South Africa, and to strengthen intra-BRICS relations and mutually beneficial cooperation across the three pillars of cooperation, namely policy and security, economy and finance, culture and people-to-people exchanges.” (p. 123)</p> <p>“The Moscow Declaration, as adopted, has 97 paragraphs and covers all pillars of cooperation. The most controversial subject was United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reform with South Africa insisting that the status quo was patronising.” (p. 123)</p>	<p>“Recognizing the importance of agriculture and rural revitalization for achieving the 2030 Agenda, we reiterate our commitment to enhancing intra-BRICS agricultural cooperation for food security and promotion of comprehensive development of rural areas. We welcome the BRICS Agriculture Information Exchange System and the BRICS Agricultural Research Platform, as well as the adoption of the Action Plan 2021-2024 for Agricultural Cooperation of BRICS Countries.”</p> <p>“We appreciate the importance of BRICS Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) Cooperation in bringing together our researchers to tackle new and emerging challenges and acknowledge the progress achieved by the BRICS STI Steering Committee and joint research projects, especially on the various thematic working groups. We look forward to the early finalization of the BRICS Action Plan on Innovation Cooperation for 2021-2024.”</p> <p>“We recognize that continuity in youth exchanges in different spheres, including in such areas as science, education, arts and culture, innovation, energy, diplomacy, volunteerism and entrepreneurship, would ensure a bright future for intra-BRICS cooperation and appreciate India’s efforts to</p>	
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		host the BRICS Youth Summit despite the pandemic.”	
South African FPG 2: regional leader	<p>“SADC is the primary vehicle for South Africa’s foreign policy to achieve regional development and integration within southern Africa. South Africa contributes within SADC towards regional initiatives geared towards peace, security, stability and sustainable development and the advancement of socio-economic development, through active participation in relevant structures as envisaged in the SADC Treaty.” (p. 77)</p>	<p>“We express our concern at the continuing conflicts and violence in different parts of the world. We endorse the position taken by our Foreign Ministers at their last meeting on the situation in Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, the Palestinian-Israeli issue, the Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen, Afghanistan, Korean Peninsula, the Iran nuclear issue and Myanmar.”</p> <p>“We reaffirm our commitment to the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of States and reiterate that all conflicts must be resolved by peaceful means and through political and diplomatic efforts in line with international law, in particular the UN Charter.”</p>	N/A
South African FPG 3: respect for human rights	<p>“While not a member of the Human Rights Council during the period under review, South Africa played a key role in its own capacity and as a member of the Africa Group in Geneva to advocate for the protection and promotion of human rights in line with the norms and values of our Constitution, paying particular attention to the protection of the rights of vulnerable persons and rights of people in developing countries.” (p. 13)</p> <p>“South Africa successfully participated in the 44th Session where the impact of</p>	<p>“We underscore the priority of fighting terrorism, including preventing attempts by terrorist organisations to use Afghan territory as terrorist sanctuary and to carry out attacks against other countries, as well as drug trade within Afghanistan. We emphasise the need to address the humanitarian situation and to uphold human rights, including those of women, children and minorities”</p> <p>“We reiterate the need for all countries to cooperate in promoting and protecting human rights and</p>	<p>“The Dialogue proved once again to be a unique platform to update one another on the situation of human rights in respective continents and with a focus on specific country situations, share experiences, exchange points of view and strengthen cooperation on specific human rights issues.”</p> <p>“The EU noted the finalisation and adoption of the AU Strategic Plan for the promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights in Africa (2021-2030) and stands ready to consider possible joint actions contributing to its implementation in Africa”</p>

	<p>COVID-19 was acutely discussed with emphasis on the fact that the pandemic cannot be separated from human rights as it impacts directly thereon.” (p. 102)</p>	<p>fundamental freedoms under the principles of equality and mutual respect. We agree to continue to treat all human rights, including the right to development, in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing and with the same emphasis. We agree to strengthen cooperation on issues of common interests both within BRICS and in multilateral fora including the United Nations Human Rights Council, taking into account the necessity to promote, protect and fulfil human rights in a non-selective, non-politicized and constructive manner, and without double standards. Economic and Financial Cooperation for Sustainable Development”</p>	<p>“The EU welcomed the AU Guidelines for Elections during COVID-19 and other Public Health Emergencies and pledged to support its implementation at the national level.”</p>
Issue-Area	N/A	Shift in focus to intra-BRICS cooperation. Lack of African cooperation.	No objectives for the African-Identity pillar

Table 22: South African foreign policy goals, BRICS & EU declarations – 2022.

1. DIRCO. (2022). Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Annual Report, 2021/2022.
2. BRICS. (2022). BRICS Joint Statement on “Strengthening BRICS Solidarity and Cooperation, Respond to New Features and Challenges in International Situation”.
3. Sixth European Union - African Union Summit: A joint vision for 2030.

	South African goal	BRICS Goal	EU Goal
South African FPG 1: South-south cooperation increase	<p>“We continue to push for the reform of the United Nations and the UN Security Council as the premier body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. This body needs to be democratised so that it is reflective of the current world order. We are also committed to the reinvigoration of the Non-Aligned Movement and will continue to work within BRICS to forge greater collaboration between Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. As the only African country within the G20, we will continue to champion the African Agenda and the interests of the global South within that forum, as well as within the G77.” (p. 7)</p> <p>“The main objectives of South Africa's engagement in BRICS are to enhance the future growth and development of South Africa and to strengthen intra-BRICS relations and mutually beneficial cooperation across the three pillars of cooperation.” (p. 28)</p>	<p>“BRICS countries shall continue to enhance the framework of intra-BRICS cooperation under the three pillars - political and security, economic and financial, and cultural & people-to-people exchanges, to contain the spread and effects of the COVID-19 pandemic with solidarity, to speed up the implementation of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, and to further broaden and deepen the cooperation amongst the BRICS countries. The Ministers agreed that facing the newly emerging features and challenges, the BRICS countries should enhance their solidarity and cooperation and work together to address them.”</p> <p>“They supported the call for greater representation of developing countries in the international organizations and multilateral fora so that they could play an important role in global governance”</p>	N/A

<p>South African FPG 2: regional leader</p>	<p>“While economic conditions in most countries on the continent remained unfavourable, missions in Africa continued to engage in economic diplomacy activities to promote the increase of value-added South African exports to the continent and the expansion of the South African investment footprint.” (p. 36)</p> <p>“The Southern African Development Community (SADC) continued to serve as the primary vehicle to achieve regional development and integration within southern Africa. South Africa recognises that its growth and prosperity are inextricably linked to that of the African continent, especially that of its neighbours in southern Africa. In this regard, support was extended towards SADC's objective of balanced, equitable and developmental regional integration as a fundamental condition for peace and security in the region, capable of addressing challenges such as unemployment, poverty and underdevelopment.” (p. 36)</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>“We agree that the aim of the Joint Vision is to consolidate a renewed Partnership for solidarity, security, peace and sustainable and sustained economic development and prosperity for our citizens and for our future generations, bringing together our people, regions and organisations.” (p. 1)</p> <p>“Team Europe will mobilise EUR 425 million to ramp up the pace of vaccination, and in coordination with the Africa CDC, to support the efficient distribution of doses and the training of medical teams and the capacity of analysis and sequencing. We will also contribute in this context to the fight against health-related disinformation.” (p. 2)</p> <p>“We announce an Africa-Europe Investment Package of at least EUR 150 billion that will support our common ambition for 2030 and AU Agenda 2063, composed of an Investment, a Health and an Education Package.” (p. 3)</p> <p>“Through joint action and capacity-building, including with dedicated African migration institutions, we will aim at preventing irregular migration, enhancing cooperation against smuggling and trafficking in human beings, supporting strengthened border management and achieving effective improvements on return, readmission and reintegration, including promoting voluntary return and facilitating sustainable reintegration of returned</p>
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			persons, as well as enhancing migration dialogues between the two Continents” (p. 5)
South African FPG 3: respect for human rights	<p>“South Africa successfully participated in the June, September 2021 and March 2022 sessions of the Human Rights Council, ensuring that the promotion and protection of human rights for all and, particularly focussing on the rights of vulnerable persons, are pursued.” (p. 27)</p> <p>“South Africa’s interests and the African Agenda promoted and reflected in the outcomes of multilateral and multistate organisations dealing with peace and security, human rights, and economic and social development.” (p. 133)</p> <p>“South Africa, on behalf of the Africa Group, presented a resolution on the “Promotion and protection of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of Africans and people of African descent against excessive use of force and other human rights violations by law enforcement officers through an agenda towards transformative change for racial justice and equality” (p. 156)</p>	<p>“The Ministers called for the respect of democracy and human rights. In this regard, they underlined that they should be implemented on the level of global governance as well as at national level. They reaffirmed their commitment to ensuring the promotion and protection of democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all with the aim to build a brighter shared future for the international community based on mutually beneficial cooperation.”</p>	<p>“The EU and South Africa devoted part of the meeting also to cooperation in multilateral human rights fora, with a particular view of the upcoming debates at the United Nations Human Rights Council, and at the Third Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. In this context, South Africa informed about its candidacy for the United Nations Human Rights Council in the term 2023-2025 and requested the EU for support. The EU invited South Africa to join the Alliance for Torture-Free Trade.”</p> <p>“South Africa and the EU agreed to organise joint events and expert level exchanges on a number of specific issues, including gender equality, business and human rights and the right to development. Both sides also agreed to gather a group of countries to exchange best practices on how to enhance protection of human rights defenders.”</p> <p>“The EU and South Africa agreed to continue expanding their cooperation in the field of human rights and to hold the 8th EU-South Africa Structured Dialogue Forum on Human Rights in 2023 in South Africa.”</p>
Issue-Area	N/A	No objectives for African-related topics. No objectives for Human Rights. Shift in	N/A

		focus to intra-BRICS cooperation.	
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Table 23: South African foreign policy goals, BRICS & EU declarations – 2023.

DIRCO. (2023). *Annual Report: 2022/2023: Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)*

BRICS. (2023). *XV BRICS Summit Johannesburg II Declaration. BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Mutually Accelerated Growth, Sustainable Development and Inclusive Multilateralism.*

South Africa: 8th Human Rights Dialogue with the EU.

	South African goal	BRICS Goal	EU Goal
South African FPG 1: South-south cooperation increase	<p>“Regarding South–South cooperation, South Africa pursues mutually beneficial cooperation among countries and groupings of the South to develop common positions on political, economic, social and human rights issues as an effective response in addressing the historic marginalisation of these countries.”</p> <p>“It is our hope that formations such as BRICS will play a transformative role in bringing about greater global collaboration and the pursuance of a progressive international development agenda.”</p> <p>“The main objectives of South Africa’s fully committed engagement in BRICS have been to enhance the future growth and development of South Africa and to strengthen intra–BRICS relations and mutually beneficial cooperation across the three pillars of cooperation, namely political and security, economic and financial, and culture and people–to–people cooperation.”</p>	<p>“We believe that multilateral cooperation is essential to limit the risks stemming from geopolitical and geoeconomic fragmentation and intensify efforts on areas of mutual interest, including but not limited to, trade, poverty and hunger reduction, sustainable development, including access to energy, water and food, fuel, fertilizers, as well as mitigating and adapting to the impact of climate change, education, health as well as pandemic prevention, preparedness and response.”</p> <p>“Therefore, we are committed to a balanced approach by continuing to amplify and further integrate the voice of the global South in the G20 agenda as under the Indian Presidency in 2023 and the Brazilian and South African presidencies in 2024 and 2025.”</p> <p>“We commit to strengthening intra-BRICS cooperation to intensify the BRICS Partnership on New Industrial Revolution (PartNIR) and create new opportunities for accelerating industrial development”</p>	N/A

		<p>“We agree to continue to deepen cooperation on competition amongst BRICS countries and create a fair competition market environment for international economic and trade cooperation.”</p> <p>“We call for collaboration amongst the BRICS countries on technological neutrality and further urge for the adoption of common, effective, clear, fair and transparent standards and rules for assessment of emissions, elaboration of compatible taxonomies of sustainable projects as well as accounting of carbon units.”</p> <p>“We appreciate the considerable interest shown by countries of the global South in membership of BRICS. True to the BRICS Spirit and commitment to inclusive multilateralism, BRICS countries reached consensus on the guiding principles, standards, criteria and procedures of the BRICS expansion process.”</p>	
<p>South African FPG 2: regional leader</p>	<p>“We will be serving in the AU Peace and Security Council for two years and hope that intensified efforts will be given to finding peace in Northern Mozambique, Sudan, South Sudan, Mali, Libya, Chad and Burkina Faso.”</p> <p>“our foreign policy outlook on the African continent remains the advancement of the African Agenda through strengthening political and economic relations with countries across the continent and contributing to regional and continental peace,</p>	<p>“We reiterate that the principle “African solutions to African problems” should continue to serve as the basis for conflict resolution. In this regard we support African peace efforts on the continent by strengthening the relevant capacities of African States.”</p> <p>“We reiterate our support to the African Union Agenda 2063 and to Africa's efforts towards integration, including through the operationalisation of the African Continental Free Trade Area”</p>	<p>N/A</p>

	<p>security, stability as well as sustainable development.”</p> <p>“We celebrate the achievement of African solutions to African problems in the hosting of the Africa Union (AU)–led peace talks between the Ethiopian Government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)”</p>	<p>“Underline the importance of strengthening the partnership between the BRICS and Africa to unlock mutually beneficial opportunities for increased trade, investment and infrastructure development.” (p. 11)</p>	
<p>South African FPG 3: respect for human rights</p>	<p>“Western European countries understand South Africa’s positions on key global issues in the UNSC and the broader UN Global Agenda, sharing similar views on, for example, human rights, gender equality, eradicating poverty and reducing inequality.”</p> <p>“DIRCO waged a successful campaign last year for South Africa to serve for three years on the UN Human Rights Council (HRC). South Africa received the highest number of votes of the candidate countries standing for the HRC; a resounding 182 votes out of a maximum possible total of 190. The vote outcome reflects the appreciation of member states for the constructive and principled role that our country plays in promoting human rights internationally. “</p> <p>“putting the human rights of all at the centre of cooperation programmes.”</p> <p>“The advancement of the human rights of these persons is one of the key priorities of the South African Government”</p>	<p>“We reaffirm our commitment to ensuring the promotion and protection of democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all with the aim to build a brighter shared future for the international community based on mutually beneficial cooperation.”</p>	<p>“In the dialogue session, the EU and South Africa reiterated their commitment to the universality and indivisibility of human rights as well as to the strengthening of the multilateral human rights system”</p> <p>“In this regard, the two delegations agreed on the need to strengthen mechanisms to protect civic space and uphold human rights for all, redoubling efforts to fight any form of discrimination”</p> <p>“The elaboration of international regulatory framework governing the activities of private military and security companies was also discussed.”</p>
<p>Issue-Area</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>No human rights objective.</p>	<p>African identity-related topic absent not discussed.</p>