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**The influence of African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) on
coup occurrence: An analysis of the Eastern African Community (EAC)
and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)**

Sidqui, Ismail

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**The influence of African Regional Economic Communities
(RECs) on coup occurrence: An analysis of the Eastern African
Community (EAC) and the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS)**

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SIDQUI ISMAIL

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Supervised by:

Dr. Rutger Hagen
Dr. F.E. Bakker

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« [...] structurellement chaque société est bâtie sur des remparts immunitaires qui l'ont tenue viable jusque-là et sans lesquels, comme tout organisme vivant, elle tombe dans un vide, devient vulnérable et s'ouvre à tous les vents. Ceux qui prônaient une rupture au couteau avec la culture des anciens ne proposaient rien d'autre sinon un saut dans le vide, or une fois dépouillé de sa culture, l'homme n'est plus qu'un mammifère, une simple bête nue quand il n'est pas pire que l'animal sauvage, un fauve dressé contre la vie. »

Translated version:

« [...] structurally each society is built on immune ramparts which have kept it viable until now and without which, like any living organism, it falls into a void, becomes vulnerable and opens to all winds. Those who advocated a break with a knife with the culture of the ancients proposed nothing other than a leap into emptiness, but once stripped of his culture, man is nothing more than a mammal, a simple naked beast when he is no worse than the wild animal, a beast set against life. »

(Rugamba, 2024, p.42)

Abstract:

This study evaluates the role of Regional Economic Communities (RECs), notably the Eastern African Community (EAC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in influencing coup occurrences in Africa. Through quantitative analysis using panel data from 1970 to 2022, complemented by qualitative content analysis of REC policies, this research explores how domestic and regional factors impact coup likelihood. Results show that RECs significantly prevent coups through institutional mechanisms and political cooperation. Variability in effectiveness is primarily influenced by internal governance structures and political commitment of member states. This thesis enhances understanding of RECs' capabilities in coup prevention and suggests stronger regional integration and political adherence to governance protocols as strategic responses to political instability.

Introduction

Since 2020, nine coups were recorded in West Africa, Central Africa, and the Sahel region, highlighting a significant resurgence of political instability in the continent (Houssari, 2023). The resurgence of coups in Africa stresses unresolved issues, rooted in post-colonial legacies. The growing power distance between African governments and their citizens, coupled with widespread disappointment in governance, has fueled a new type of coup, often led by the military with considerable popular support (Akinola & Makombe, 2024; Besenyő, Issaev & Korotayev, 2024). The African Union (AU) chairperson H.E. Moussa Faki Mahamat has commented on this recent trend, particularly noting the justification given by putschists in countries like Mali in 2021, Burkina Faso in 2022, Guinea in 2021, and Niger in 2023:

“Among the causes of these Changes put forward by the putschists over recent months, is prominently the inability, according to them, of the democratically elected civil powers to effectively combat Terrorism [...] This new argument that has recently appeared on the African political and media scene reinforces the link between Terrorism and Unconstitutional Changes of Government mentioned above. From correlation, we slide dangerously towards causality. Coups d'etat become, in this perspective, the logical effect of the expansion of Terrorism.” (Mahamat, 2023)

In this context, regional stability becomes critically important. Recent studies have highlighted the contagion effect of coups (Lunde, 1991), reminiscent of the unrest seen during the Arab Spring, which continues to affect many countries in the Arab world. Furthermore, contemporary debates are reshaping our understanding of the factors precipitating coups. While a substantial body of literature has identified weak institutions and economic distress as primary drivers of coups (Jackman; 1978; Lunde, 1991; O’kane, 1993, Bouzid, 2011; Powell, 2012), it is overly simplistic to attribute this new trend solely to terrorism. Instead, these insights urge a broader examination of the complex interplay between various political, economic, and security-related factors that contribute to the instability leading to coups.

Because of such instability, countries in Africa are working together to find ways to prevent coups and respond to them when they do happen. Regional Economic Communities (hereinafter: RECs) like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the East African

Community (EAC) are solutions to these efforts with mechanisms of regional security and economic integration (Aning & Atuobi, 2011; Agbo, Lenshie, & Boye, 2018; Opong, 2019). These organizations not only embody the collective aspirations for political stability and economic integration of their member states but also play pivotal roles in coup prevention and mediation in post-coup scenarios (Vines, 2013; Mathebula, 2017).

In recent decades, the role of Regional organizations in influencing political stability has become a focal point in both scholarly and policy-driven discussions (Barney Walsh, 2015; Agbo, Lenshie, & Boye, 2018; Barney Walsh, 2020; Bereketeab, 2021). However, their effectiveness varies, it is influenced by institutional capacities, political will of member states and their leaders, and the specific geopolitical contexts with which they operate. Understanding the conditions under which RECs effectively contribute to political stability, requires an analysis that spans internal dynamics of member states alongside regional policies and initiatives (Bereketeab, 2021).

While some academics have pointed out the deficiencies of RECs (Notably ECOWAS and EAC) and the AU in preventing these crises (Kizito & Udefuna, 2012; Nduibusi, 2021; Bereketeab, 2021; De Bruin, 2024), there remains a pressing need for updated quantitative analysis to better understand the determinants of coups within states and their associated regional communities. Currently, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger remain suspended by ECOWAS, and have taken a collective step to form the Alliance of Sahel States (ASS), indicating that perhaps regional stability might only be achievable through consolidated unity with neighboring countries. This move also raises questions about ECOWAS's effectiveness in fulfilling its promise of regional integration.

On the other hand, the EAC appears to be a model of success, yet it is viewed skeptically by Western observers due to the prolonged tenure of its leaders and deviations from democratic norms (Barney, 2015). Despite this criticism, the EAC records a zero percent successful coup attempt rate since its establishment. This raises significant questions about the governance direction in EAC countries: Should they worry about potential coups when their populations are under significant stress, or are they somehow immune to such political upheavals? The lack of coups in the EAC suggests a complex interplay of factors that may shield the region from such instability, warranting a deeper investigation into how coup prevention is maintained despite evident political and economic challenges.

Based on the Coup d'état data by Jonathan Powell and Clayton Thyne (2011), it suggests that ECOWAS, following the adoption of its Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance in 2001,

experienced a reduction in the incidence of coups. Similarly, the EAC, after solidifying its governance framework in 2006, has also seen a notable decline in such unconstitutional changes. These observations point to a potentially significant role of RECs in mitigating coups, highlighting variability in their effectiveness.

By focusing on ECOWAS and EAC, the main aim of this study is to address a notable gap in the current understanding of how RECs can shape political outcomes in environments prone to instability, specifically through the lens of coup prevention and mitigation. This leads us to the main research question: *What is the influence of RECs in preventing and mitigating coups in Africa?*

The type of analysis conducted is primarily quantitative, using a panel data analysis approach complemented by qualitative content analysis. The study examines how various factors—both domestic and regional—impact the likelihood of coup occurrences within the member states of ECOWAS and EAC from 1970 to 2022. This method leverages the robustness of panel data to account for temporal dynamics and cross-sectional differences, thereby enhancing the precision of the findings. By integrating mixed effect model, the analysis effectively handles the heterogeneity inherent in the data, allowing for detailed insights into the conditions under which RECs influence political stability. Furthermore, the use of systematic content analysis of REC policies and their decision process enriches the quantitative data, providing a deeper understanding of how these regional bodies operationalize their mandates to prevent and respond to coups. This multi-faceted approach underscores the complexity of political stability in Africa and the pivotal role of RECs in shaping regional outcomes. This research humbly aims to improve our understanding of coups within the African context with the hope that these insights can benefit not only the academic community but also regional leaders, policy advisors, and international stakeholders engaged in enhancing stability and progress in Africa.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1. Definition of coups:

Coup d'états, commonly abbreviated as coups, are defined by Jonathan Powell and Clayton Thyne (2011) as *"illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive."* This definition highlights the sudden and often violent nature of these events, underlining their profound societal and institutional impacts. Coups can precipitate state failure, anarchy, and in extreme cases, even genocide (Agbo, Lenshie & Boye, 2018; O'Kane, 1993). This characterization not only underscores the illegality and unexpectedness of coups but also distinguishes them from broader political or social revolutions, which are often seen as legitimate expressions of democratic will.

While typically viewed negatively, coups can sometimes receive backing from significant political forces or gain social acceptance if they occur within particularly corrupt, unequal, or oppressive regimes. Despite this, the consequences of coups are invariably significant, altering political landscapes in ways that can lead to either the restoration of prior orders under new leadership or major shifts in governance structures, potentially destabilizing entire regions (Lunde, 1991). The impacts of coups extend from immediate political instability to long-term damage to democratic development and economic stability, illustrating their critical influence on a nation's trajectory.

2.2. Coups and Africa:

The occurrence of coups d'état across different eras in Africa can be attributed to a mix of persistent and evolving factors that reflect the political, economic, and social turbulence of the respective periods. During the post-colonial era, newly independent African states grappled with establishing stable governance structures amid ethnic divisions and weak institutions, often leading to military interventions as a corrective measure against perceived governmental inadequacies (Johnson, Slater, & McGowan, 1984; Lunde, 1991). In the Cold War era, the geopolitical interests of the superpowers exacerbated these vulnerabilities, with external support for coups often

provided to align with broader ideological battles, further undermining political stability (O’Kane, 1993).

Transitioning to the contemporary era, the resurgence of coups has been influenced by similar but intensified factors. Economic mismanagement and governance failures remain significant triggers, compounded by new challenges such as global economic pressures and democratic erosion (Okon, 2022). Akinola and Makombe (2024) also highlight the role of international actors and the failure of democratic consolidation in influencing modern coups. The shift of the global hegemony led by the US and Chinese investments has heightened Africa's strategic importance, attracting diverse foreign engagements that have both stabilized and destabilized national governments depending on the interests and methods of involvement (Buzan & Waever 2003; Holslag, 2011; Acharya, 2018).

Thus, the necessary ingredients for coups across these periods include a combination of internal vulnerabilities—such as economic hardship, political instability, and weak institutions—and external influences, which may vary from Cold War geopolitical manipulations to contemporary international economic pressures. These factors collectively undermine the legitimacy of governments and pave the way for military interventions as alternate solutions to crises.

A few scholars provided a quantitative predictive framework that incorporates these elements, suggesting that the predictability of coups hinges on a complex interplay of institutional weaknesses, economic distress, and external influences (Jackman; 1978; Lunde, 1991; O’kane, 1993, Bouzid, 2011; Powell, 2012). Still, a systematic understanding of the interplay between domestic political conditions and regional influences in coup prevention remains underexplored. Many studies have concentrated on the immediate aftermath of coups or the precursors to these events, often neglecting the preventative strategies implemented by regional organizations before political crises fully manifest. Additionally, the quantitative research on the factors leading to coups has been contextualized in the post-colonial and post-Cold War eras or did not consider the specific African context.

Given the resurgence of coups in recent years, there is a pressing need to update and expand this research to reflect quantitatively the contemporary dynamics. This update should specifically address how regional factors, including the roles and influences of RECs, contribute to the coup occurrence.

2.3. Preventive and Corrective approaches to coups

Preventive and corrective approaches to coups are central themes in understanding how regional organizations and states can mitigate the risks and consequences of these political upheavals.

Preventive strategies focus on creating conditions less conducive to coups by promoting political stability, economic development, and strong institutional frameworks. Counterbalancing as a mechanism within states and a tool for regional organizations, can ensure that no single group, including the military, has overwhelming power, which can deter potential coup plotters (De Bruin, 2018). This approach is supported by Gassebner, Gutmann, and Voigt (2016), who suggest that improving economic conditions and reducing political turmoil are key to lowering the probability of a coup. On the corrective side, after a coup has occurred, responses typically involve both punitive measures against coup leaders and broader institutional reforms to restore democracy and prevent future coups. De Bruin (2024) discusses the role of post-conflict power-sharing arrangements, which have been effective in some contexts in stabilizing governments and reducing the likelihood of subsequent coups. These arrangements ensure that no single faction holds absolute power, which can stabilize the political landscape and reassure various stakeholders of their participation in the government. Both preventive and corrective strategies are crucial in the comprehensive approach to coup risk management, highlighting the need for a dynamic and responsive framework to address the multifaceted challenges posed by coups in politically fragile regions.

2.4. Africa's Regional Security Mechanisms and Economic Communities

In the dynamic and multiplex world order of today, Africa has aimed at developing robust structures aimed at fostering peace and stability across the continent. Central to these efforts is the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which encapsulates a comprehensive range of policies and mechanisms designed by the African Union (AU) to address unique security challenges. APSA has become a pivotal element in promoting democratic governance and regional cooperation, effectively mediating conflicts and deterring coups (Engel & Porto, 2010 in Abass, 2011).

The APSA framework has shown its strengths in promoting proactive strategies by African nations to manage their security issues internally and reduce dependency on external forces. This initiative marks a significant move towards self-determination in peace and security matters, reflecting a broader shift towards regional autonomy and influence. However, the limitations of APSA were exposed during the 2019 Sudanese coup, which was complicated by its backing through a popular uprising, revealing gaps in the AU's capability to manage complex transitions involving both civilian and military stakeholders (Ndubuisi, 2021).

Beyond security, RECs such as the ECOWAS and the EAC play crucial roles in both geopolitical and economic spheres. Originating before the AU, these RECs have uniquely evolved to address the specific needs of their regions, enhancing not only political stability but also economic integration through initiatives like the African Economic Community (AEC), established under the 1991 Abuja Treaty. This strategic integration, aimed at creating a common market, underscores the RECs as fundamental building blocks towards a unified and economically cohesive Africa (African Union, n.d.).

2.5. The role of ECOWAS and EAC:

RECs like ECOWAS and the EAC have been instrumental in mitigating political crises, thereby enhancing political stability crucial for economic growth and integration. Their efforts in peacekeeping and conflict resolution highlight their vital role in stabilizing the often volatile political climate of Africa, where they also foster economic ties that mitigate some of the root causes of coups such as economic disparity and social unrest (Iapadre, De Lombaerde, & Mastronardi, 2013).

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS):

Founded in 1975 with the signing of the Treaty of Lagos, ECOWAS is a regional political and economic union of fifteen member states located in West Africa. Its main goal is to promote economic integration across its member states. Over the years, ECOWAS has implemented several protocols with its main goal to enhance political stability and security among its member states, particularly mechanisms to prevent and respond to coups. Notable among these is the Protocol on

Democracy and Good Governance, which adds a defensive layer against illegal seizures of power (see Appendix 1). Its significant role in mediating political conflicts and ensuring regional security has been appreciated with mechanisms such as the ECOWAS Standby Force who acts as a component stated under Chapter VIII UN Charter with its main aim to provide regional peace and security arrangements (Mathebula, 2017).

East African Community (EAC):

Established in 1967, dissolved in 1977, and then revived on July 7, 2000, the EAC is a regional intergovernmental organization of six countries in the African Great Lakes region in eastern Africa. The EAC aims to strengthen ties between member states through a common market, a customs union, a court of justice, and a legislative assembly with the ambition to foster a sense of regional identity and solidarity (Katembo, 2008; Barney, 2015). In terms of security, the EAC has established protocols (see Appendix 1) to enhance cooperation in the defense and security sectors, including agreements that define the collective response to unconstitutional changes of government, such as coups. These measures are crucial components of the EAC's strategy to maintain regional stability and support democratic governance. Barney Walsh (2020) applies the Regional Security Complex Theory to understand the dynamics within East Africa, particularly examining how Uganda's role under President Yoweri Museveni influences regional security. Museveni's long tenure and his regional diplomacy have been pivotal in shaping the EAC's strategies towards handling conflicts and security issues, reflecting how individual political figures can significantly affect the effectiveness of regional security mechanisms.

Both ECOWAS and EAC have taken proactive steps to strengthen political stability and mitigate the risks of coups. Understanding regional security in the different regions of Africa requires looking at prominent figures who influence decisions, the actions individual countries take, and any agreements made by multiple countries within the region. These factors all play a part in shaping the overall peace and stability, and by examining how they interact, we can assess the effectiveness of regional security organizations.

However, these communities face challenges, particularly in terms of political commitment and economic disparities among member states, which can impede uniform policy implementation

and effective integration. ECOWAS, for instance, has experienced difficulties enforcing mandates when member states' interests are not aligned, as seen in Guinea-Bissau (De Bruin, 2024). In the legislative process, one of the primary challenges is the non-binding nature of the ECOWAS Parliament's resolutions, which can limit their effectiveness as they rely on the willingness of member states to implement these policies nationally (Kizito & Udefuna, 2012). This often results in a patchwork of implementation, where some countries may fully integrate the policies into their national laws, while others may lag behind or choose not to implement certain directives. This uneven adherence can undermine the overall objective of achieving regional economic cohesion and can perpetuate economic inequalities across the region.

Although the EAC has seen no successful coups registered between 2000 and now, it still confronts significant challenges in harmonizing laws and regulations among its member states. This issue is critical for effective collective action, especially during crises'. The difficulty in achieving harmonization can hinder the EAC's ability to respond swiftly and uniformly to political and economic disturbances, potentially jeopardizing regional stability (Bereketeab, 2021). The disparities in legal frameworks and governance standards among member states complicate efforts to implement EAC-wide initiatives uniformly. Moreover, these inconsistencies can lead to frustrations and disenchantment with the integration process, undermining the collective security measures put in place to prevent coups and other forms of political instability (Mathebula, 2017).

Moreover, the consequences of political instability, such as electoral violence and political vigilantism, are significant concerns that both ECOWAS and the EAC must address. Such issues can undermine electoral democracy and exacerbate insecurity, making the role of regional bodies in promoting democratic values and securing elections even more critical (Akwei, Machar & Mnyandu, 2023).


In sum, the evolution and strengthening of RECs are crucial for securing not only economic integration but also enhancing the continent's ability to autonomously manage its security and political challenges. These efforts are foundational to Africa's goals of achieving stability, prosperity, and having a significant voice in international affairs, displaying the critical roles of ECOWAS and the EAC in shaping regional outcomes and addressing the issue of coup occurrence.

Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework

3.1. Theory Overview and Conceptualization

This chapter delineates the theoretical underpinnings of the *African Coup Occurrence Model (ACOM)* (see Figure 1). I created this new model in response to evolving dynamics in African political and economic landscapes and significant shifts in the roles of regional and international actors. This new model seeks to address the inadequacies of previous frameworks that were predominantly conceptualized during the post-colonial and Cold War eras or were not tailored for contemporary quantitative analysis within the African context. The model introduces modern variables such as the political and economic engagement of RECs to assess their influence on the likelihood of coups within their member states with focus on coup occurrence originated from Coup D'état Dataset by Jonathan Powell and Clayton Thyne (2011).

Figure 1: African Coup Occurrence Model (ACOM)



In conceptualizing the dependent variable of coup occurrence for the *ACOM*, it is vital to adhere to a rigorous definition of what constitutes a coup. According to the widely recognized Coup D'état dataset, each element of this definition encompasses specific criteria that need careful interpretation:

Illegal—The action must contravene the existing legal and constitutional frameworks governing the legitimate transfer of power. This illegality is a key component that distinguishes a coup from a lawful change of government, such as through elections or other constitutional means (Akinola & Makombe, 2024).

Overt—This implies that the actions taken to unseat the government are open and clear, not clandestine or secretive. The overt nature of a coup ensures that it is publicly recognizable and distinct from covert attempts to undermine or influence government operations, which might involve espionage or behind-the-scenes manipulation without direct action to seize power.

Elites—In this context, ‘elites’ refers to individuals who hold significant power within national institutions, primarily the military or other critical state apparatus (Okon, 2022). This can include high-ranking military officers, senior government officials, or other influential figures capable of mobilizing resources and personnel to execute a coup.

The Executive—The target of a coup, the executive, typically includes the president, prime minister, or a collective governing body such as a cabinet, depending on the country’s governmental structure. The definition also raises questions about the boundaries of ‘the sitting executive’: does it include those elected but not yet appointed, and can an executive commit a coup against their own government? For the purposes of this model, a coup attempt involves actions against those who currently hold executive power, which excludes those not yet officially in office. Moreover, if a sitting executive takes actions that dismantle or bypass constitutional and legal frameworks for retaining power (e.g., disbanding the parliament, suspending the constitution), these actions can be categorized as a ‘self-coup’ or autogolpe, which is also considered under the umbrella of coup attempts (Powell & Clyne, 2011).

ACOM integrates observed realities of political and economic influences on coup occurrence, using empirical data from activities of RECs (the main novelty in my model) and the political-economic conditions within African states. Although the model currently omits the impact of climate change, recognized as a catalyst for social decay (Okon, 2022), its design emphasizes parsimony by focusing on core factors that significantly impact coups. This approach refines the analysis beyond the more dispersed variables (Social mobilization, Size of Largest ethnic group, Percent vote to winning party, Electoral turnout) found in models such as Jackman’s (1978), which,

inspired by modernization theory, challenges the replicability for future studies due to a lack of data consistency and relevance to coup predictions in the contemporary era. Indeed, size of largest ethnic group and percent vote winning party can be combined into one variable, the ‘Ethnic Power Relations’ (EPR) data set, which identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to state power in every country of the world from 1946 to present. It provides data on the political status of ethnic groups, including politically dominant groups, discriminated groups, and those excluded from power (Vogt et al., 2015). Encompassing both the ‘Percent Vote to Winning Party’, the ‘Electoral Turnout’, and the ‘Institutional Quality’ variable offers a holistic assessment of a country’s political effectiveness. This variable incorporates indicators of election integrity and broader political stability, such as corruption levels, which highlight potential discrepancies in electoral processes. Additionally, it includes factors like the absence of violence or terrorism, which are particularly relevant in understanding the recent surge in military coups in the Sahel region (Akinola & Makombe, 2024). I built on this by applying a political economy approach to the study of coups in Africa, inspired by literature from the late 2000s which explored the interplay between economic mismanagement and external economic pressures. Together, these factors create a volatile mix that can lead to state seizures by military or elite groups (O’Kane, 1993). This perspective highlights the importance of considering both structural and immediate economic triggers in understanding the dynamics leading to coups.

To avoid complexity, ACOM categorizes the predictors of coups into four primary groups: Domestic Political Factors (DPF), Domestic Economic Factors (DEF), REC Political Factors (RECPF), and REC Economic Factors (RECEF). Each category consolidates essential variables identified through a thorough review of academic literature on coup phenomena.

Domestic Political Factors encompass a range of internal political dynamics such as the general **level of literacy**, which not only influences civic engagement but also affects the overall educational attainment within the population. Higher literacy rates are often associated with increased political awareness and participation, fostering a more informed electorate. Furthermore, education levels are critical in determining job opportunities; lower educational attainment is typically linked to restricted access to high-paying jobs and can confine individuals to lower-wage positions; the **balance of power among ethnic groups**, which is pivotal in maintaining or

disrupting peace as defined earlier with the EPR data set; the **quality of institutions**, including indicators related to the control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, regulatory quality, rule of law, voice and accountability, which dictates the effectiveness and transparency of governance; and **military expenditure**, a direct indicator of the military's potential to influence or control the government.

H1: Increased political instability within a state increases the likelihood of a coup.

Domestic Economic Factors address the economic conditions within a country that can either stabilize or destabilize its political landscape. These include the **Gross National Income (GNI)** per capita, which provides a snapshot of the economic well-being of a country; reliance on **primary exports**, which can make an economy vulnerable to external shocks and fragilize its population; the **level of manufacturing exports**, indicating economic diversification and resilience; and the **unemployment rate**, with high levels often leading to economic discontent and potential political upheaval.

H2: Economic distress within a state exacerbate the risk of coups.

RECs Political Factors reflect the influence of Regional Economic Communities on political stability across member states, focusing on the clarity and enforcement of norms (**norm determinacy**) which help stabilize expectations and conduct among states, and the decision-making processes within RECs determined by the voting mechanism employed. In analyzing EAC and ECOWAS, it is crucial to consider whether decisions regarding coups are made through unanimous or majority voting and how this influences the decisiveness and rapidity of response to political crises. The dynamics of international norms and the processes through which they are institutionalized are crucial for understanding how such norms evolve and are enforced (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). To provide a detailed understanding of the coup prevention strategies of the EAC and ECOWAS, a systematic content analysis of official documents was appreciated, including charters and protocols (see Appendix 1). These documents detail the norms and rules that contribute to coup prevention efforts within these Regional Economic Communities. Through examination of these texts, alongside the analysis of their respective voting processes, I

adapted an evaluation using a numerical scoring system (See Table 1). This method allows for a quantifiable assessment of how each REC implements and adheres to its governance frameworks.

Table 1. REC Political Factors criteria of assessment

	Score			
	0	1	2	3
Determinacy	Clear and Specific measures or protocols on coups are non-existent	and Lacks specific measures or detailed protocols for addressing coups directly	Provides a good framework but lacks specific procedural details that guide exact actions in the case of coups	Highly determinate with explicit measures for addressing coups
Decision-Making Process	Unanimity vote	Weighted vote	Consensus vote	Majority vote

H3: Clear Norms and efficient voting mechanisms by RECs reduce the likelihood of coups.

RECs Economic Factors relate to the economic interdependencies fostered by RECs, notably through **intra-regional trade flows**. The extent of this economic integration can promote regional economic closeness, which in turn can diminish the likelihood of coups by enhancing collective economic prosperity and political cohesion among member states.

H4: Intra-regional trade among states within a REC reduces the likelihood of coups.

While the ACOM is tailored to fit the specificities of the African context, it acknowledges existing limitations, such as the challenge of measuring and documenting subtle yet impactful factors. For instance, the overt and covert influences of RECs are often more profound than publicly perceived. This point was illustrated by comments made by the Burkinabe leader Ibrahima Traore in a national interview, where he highlighted the pressure exerted by ECOWAS that extends beyond formal agreements and the influence of France on the REC’s decisions (RTB - Radiodiffusion Télévision du Burkina, 2023). Moreover, the model omits the role of prominent

regional leaders whose influence can significantly shape the internal dynamics of member states (Barney, 2020).

By designing ACOM to be applicable across various African countries and REC contexts, the model enhances its utility and relevance, enabling empirical testing and validation through observable data. This ensures that the predictions made by ACOM are both precise and actionable, offering a robust tool for understanding and potentially mitigating the occurrence of coups in Africa.

Chapter 4: Methodology

4.1 Research Design and Approach

This study employs a mixed-methods approach combining quantitative and qualitative analyses to explore the influence of RECs on coup occurrences in Africa, with a focus on the ECOWAS and the EAC. The core of the research involves panel data analysis, a method well-suited for assessing how various factors influence coup likelihood across different time periods and entities, such as countries or regions.

The timeframe for this analysis spans from 1970 to 2022, a period chosen to encompass significant political and economic transformations in these regions. This range also ensures the availability of reliable and consistent data, as records prior to 1970 are less comprehensive. The research includes all member countries of ECOWAS and EAC, with the exception of Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which are excluded due to their membership beginning after the selected period (see Appendix 2). This study aims to assess the impact of RECs on coup occurrences; therefore, it is crucial to include only countries that have been part of their respective REC for at least four years to ensure significance. This criterion is established to allow a robust analysis where membership correlates with coup occurrence.

Panel data analysis is a robust statistical tool and is adept at managing datasets that span multiple time periods and cover various entities, such as countries or regions. This technique offers a significant advantage over cross-sectional analysis by enabling the control of variables that vary over time but remain constant across entities, thereby enhancing the reliability and precision of the

results (Hsiao, 2007). By integrating both temporal dynamics and cross-sectional differences, panel data analysis provides a deeper understanding of the complex interplay between time-dependent and invariant factors within the data (Plümper, Troeger, & Manow, 2005).

In this research, panel data analysis is employed to meticulously examine the influence of specific variables, such as domestic and regional variables, on the likelihood of coup occurrences across different nations within the ECOWAS and EAC regions. The method's ability to dissect the layered effects of both time-varying and enduring predictors is crucial for isolating the unique contributions of each variable to the phenomenon under study (Andreß, Golsch, & Schmidt, 2013).

The choice of a mixed effect model for this analysis is driven by the nature of the data and the research question. Leveraging its capability to handle the inherent data heterogeneity and correlations within grouped data (countries over time). Mixed effect models are ideal for this dataset, where observations are nested within countries that vary significantly. These models incorporate fixed effects for consistent predictors across all countries, such as economic indicators and REC political factors, while allowing random effects to capture country-specific variations and potential unique trajectories. Mathematically, the inclusion of random effects accommodates the non-independence of observations within the same country, addressing the intra-class correlation that standard regression models might ignore. This approach not only enhances the robustness of statistical estimates by controlling for both observed and unobserved heterogeneity but also allows for generalizing the inferred effects beyond the sample used (Plümper, Troeger, & Manow, 2005), thereby providing a comprehensive view of the dynamics at play in determining coup occurrences.

Furthermore, a systemic content analysis of REC policies documents and voting process will provide deeper insights into how these organizations operationalize their mandates to prevent coups. As shared in the previous chapter, this qualitative assessment will be translated into a numerical data that constitutes the variable RECPF and later integrated into our panel data scheme.

4.2 Data Sources

To provide a comprehensive understanding of the variables used in this study, here is an elaboration on each variable, detailing their measurements, types, and data sources. For missing

values, Random Forest (RF) imputation is employed to ensure significant values and handle outliers.

The dependent variable, *coup occurrence*, is defined based on the dataset by Powell and Thyne (2011) and with constant updates according to the evolving global dynamics of coups. It categorizes coups as successful, failed, or plotted. In my study, I consider both successful and failed coups regardless of the outcome. In the ACOM model, the variable of *coup occurrence* is self-coded and in a binary nature, with 0 = No coup in a specific year, 1 = at least one coup attempt in a specific year.

Each independent variable chosen for this study is defined and measured as follows:

Literacy Rate, Adult Total (% of people ages 15 and above) (World Bank databank):

This continuous measure quantifies the percentage of the adult population that can read and write simple statements, reflecting educational attainment and societal literacy levels.

Institutional Quality (sourced from the World Bank databank):

This composite index encompasses sub-indicators reflecting various dimensions of governance:

- *Control of Corruption Estimate* measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain.
- *Governmental Effectiveness Estimate* evaluates the quality of public services and the independence of the civil service.
- *Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism Estimate* assesses the likelihood of political instability or violence.
- *Regulatory Quality Estimate* gauges the government's ability to formulate effective policies.
- *Rule of Law Estimate* captures the extent to which agents abide by society's rules.
- *Voice and Accountability Estimate* reflects the extent of political participation and freedom of expression.

Military Expenditure (Current USD) (sourced from the World Bank databank):

This quantitative, continuous variable indicates a country's annual military spending in current US dollars, encompassing salaries, operational expenses, and equipment purchases.

GNI per Capita (constant 2015 US\$) (sourced from the World Bank databank):

Expressed in constant 2015 US dollars to adjust for inflation, this metric calculates a country's gross national income divided by its midyear population, providing an economic health indicator.

Primary Exports (sourced from the World Bank databank):

This composite index includes:

- Food exports (% of merchandise exports)
- Fuel exports (% of merchandise records)
- Ores and metals exports (% of merchandise exports)
- Agricultural raw materials exports (% of merchandise exports)

Each percentage reflects the proportion of these goods in total merchandise exports, indicating economic dependence on primary commodities.

Manufactures Exports (% of merchandise exports) (sourced from the World Bank databank):

This quantitative measure represents the percentage of total merchandise exports comprised of manufactured goods, highlighting economic diversification.

Ethnic Power Relations (EPR):

To accurately integrate the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset into the analysis, a quantitative transformation of the dataset's inherently categorical indicators was necessary. The EPR dataset, developed by Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas, and Brian (2010), classifies politically relevant ethnic groups based on their access to state power from 1946 to the present. These classifications include categories such as Monopoly, Dominant, Discriminated, Powerless, Shared-Power, and State collapse, which describe the status of ethnic communities in relation to political power.

Given that the dataset primarily provides qualitative indicators of ethnic power status, I developed a quantitative scaling system to facilitate a more nuanced analysis. This scale translates

the categorical status of ethnic groups into a numerical value that reflects the degree of political representation or misrepresentation within a country (see Table 2). Using a 4-point scale to quantify the EPR dataset is significant because it provides a clear and easily interpretable spectrum of ethnic group representation within governments. This method simplifies the complex dynamics of political inclusion into distinct levels, making it easier to analyze and understand trends in the data.

Table 2. Ethnic Power Relations criteria of assessment for ACOM

	Score	Description
High Misrepresentation	1	This score is assigned to countries where the political environment is characterized by monopoly, dominance, or high discrimination against one or more ethnic communities, regardless of their size. This indicates a significant exclusion from power.
Medium Misrepresentation	0.75	This score is given to scenarios where at least one ethnic community is classified as powerless. Although not as severe as high misrepresentation, this still signifies notable disparities in power distribution.
Balanced Representation	0.50	This value is assigned when all ethnic communities are represented. This scenario suggests a relatively stable and inclusive political environment.
Irrelevant Representation	0	This score is used in cases of state failure, where traditional measures of ethnic power distribution become irrelevant due to the breakdown of state structures and authority. Such situations often lead to complete anarchy, where no clear power dynamics can be reliably assessed.

This approach allows for a more detailed and quantifiable assessment of the risk factors associated with coups, enhancing the model's predictive accuracy and relevance in examining the interplay between ethnic diversity and political stability.

Intra-regional Trade Flows:

Supported by IMF data on exports and imports USD FOB value, this dataset records economic interdependence through trade flows between countries within a region, providing insights into economic connectivity.

REC Political Factors (RECPF):

The variable RECPF serves as a crucial independent variable to assess the political influences exerted by RECs on the stability of their member states. It includes indicators such as the determinacy norms related to coups and the quality of the decision-making process with the type of voting selected by the respective RECs (see Table 1).

4.3 Limitations

The methodology employed in this study, utilizing mixed effects models, faces several inherent limitations that could impact the robustness and generalizability of the findings. One primary constraint is the assumption that random effects are normally distributed and uncorrelated with the fixed effects. Deviations from these assumptions can introduce biases, affecting the accuracy and reliability of parameter estimates and subsequent inferences. Additionally, the study is constrained by the availability and completeness of data. The operationalization of complex constructs such as REC political factors may not capture all nuanced dimensions that could influence coup propensities, leading to potential oversimplifications. Furthermore, the observational nature of the study and the use of cross-sectional data in parts restrict the ability to establish causality. Unmeasured confounding variables could influence the observed relationships, leading to spurious associations. Moreover, the findings are primarily applicable to the specific African contexts studied and may not extend to other regions or different temporal contexts, given the distinct political, economic, and social dynamics within African states. The computational demands of mixed effects models, particularly with large or complex data structures, can also lead to technical challenges such as convergence issues, impacting the reliability of the results. Addressing these limitations in future research could involve expanding the dataset, and conducting robustness checks to validate the model assumptions, thereby enhancing the study's contribution to understanding political instability and regional intervention strategies.

Chapter 5: Empirical Analysis

This chapter delineates the empirical analysis conducted to examine the impact of RECs on the likelihood of coups in Africa, focusing particularly on the ECOWAS and the EAC. The analysis is systematically divided into three distinct sections: presentation of the results, in-depth

analysis of emergent data patterns, and a comprehensive interpretation of these findings relative to the proposed research hypotheses.

5.1. Results


Since the dependent variable studied is binary. The approach will be to model the probability or odds of a coup. The *odds* refer to the ratio of the probability of an event occurring to the probability of it not occurring. In our case the odds of a coup refers to the probability of a coup happening to the probability of it not happening. The formula for odds is:

$$\text{Odds} = \frac{p}{1-p}, \text{ where: } p = \text{probability of a coup}$$

logit on the other hand refers to the log of odds i.e.: $\text{logit} = \log\left(\frac{p}{1-p}\right)$


When comparing the log odds of a coup by country, Figure 3 indicates that some countries have a higher likelihood of experiencing a coup than others. For example, Guinea Bissau and Burkina Faso exhibit the highest log odds of coups. By examining the 95% confidence intervals on the figure below, we can identify countries that differ by identifying the confidence intervals which overlap by less than half.

Figure 3. Logits of coup occurrence with 95% CI



A comparison of the logits of a coup across the regional blocks reveals that, at any given year, there is a higher likelihood of ECOWAS member states experiencing a coup compared to EAC member states.

Figure 4. Odds of coup by Regional block



Logistic regression will be employed to estimate the relationship between coups and various indicators. This method assumes a linear relationship between the log of odds and the independent variables, fitting the following model:

$$\log\left(\frac{p}{1-p}\right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \dots + \beta_n X_n + e$$

This equation can be expressed in terms of odds by exponentiating both sides:

$$\frac{p}{1-p} = e^{\beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \dots + \beta_n X_n}$$

The probabilities can also be computed as follows:

$$p = \frac{e^{\beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \dots + \beta_n X_n}}{1 + e^{\beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \dots + \beta_n X_n}}$$

However, linear models assume that the error terms are random and centered around zero, implying that the outcomes are independent. This assumption does not hold in our data, as we

expect the error terms to be correlated within each country due to the temporal nature of the data collection. Hence, the use of a mixed model is appropriate to estimate country-specific effects.

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Model 1

		Model 1				
Random Effects		Variance	SD			
Country	(Intercept)	0.1709	0.4134			
Fixed Effects		β	SE	z value	Pr(> z)	Significance
(Intercept)		-17.21	2.58	-6.671	2.55e-11	***
Literacy		0.01028	0.01348	0.762	0.44587	
Institutional.Quality		-1.372	0.5186	-2.645	0.00816	**
Military expenditure		0.000825	0.0003913	2.108	0.035	*
GNI per capita		-0.002214	0.000775	-2.856	0.00428	**
Primary exports		-0.009273	0.008141	-1.139	0.25468	
Manufactures exports		-0.02374	0.01561	-1.521	0.12837	
Unemployment		-0.001011	0.06421	-0.016	0.98744	
Ethnic Power Relations		0.2965	0.6298	0.471	0.63782	
Intra regional trade flows		0.0002011	0.0002196	0.916	0.35981	
Regiona_BlockECOWAS		1.567	0.6085	2.575	0.01003	*
Membership		0.1258	0.3949	0.319	0.75005	
RECPF		-0.09176	0.07142	-1.285	0.19884	
Time		0.006811	0.000996	6.838	8.02e-12	***

Note. Significance codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Model 2

		Model 2	
Random Effects		Variance	SD

Country	(Intercept)	0.4382	0.662		
Fixed Effects	β	SE	z value	Pr(> z)	Significance
(Intercept)	-2.421e+00	2.230e-01	-10.856	<2e-16	***
Intra.regional.trade.flows	-6.172e-05	1.856e-04	-0.333	0.7395	
RECPF	-1.236e-01	5.897e-02	-2.096	0.0361	*

Note. Significance codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1


5.2. Detailed Analysis

Model 1 reveals several significant predictors influencing the outcome variable. The fixed effects showed that institutional quality ($\beta = -1.372, p = 0.00816$), GNI per capita ($\beta = -0.002214, p = 0.00428$), time ($\beta = 0.006811, p < 0.001$), and military expenditure ($\beta = 0.000825, p = 0.035$) were significant. Other factors such as literacy, primary exports, manufactures exports, unemployment, ethnic power relations, intra-regional trade flows, membership, and RECPF did not show significant effects in Model 1. Subsequently revealing unexpected patterns, particularly concerning the role of ethnic fractionalization. Despite literature suggesting its significance, this variable did not significantly predict coup occurrences in the studied contexts. This result challenges traditional theories. Meanwhile, the random effects indicated that variance across countries (variance = 0.1709, SD = 0.4134) contributed to the model. These results suggest that *Domestic Factors* with institutional quality and economic indicators are crucial in understanding the occurrence of coups. The positive time trend indicates an overall improvement in coup occurrence over the study period.

Model 2 was modelled with control of the REC variables (Intra regional trade flows and RECPF). For the fixed effects, the intercept ($\beta = -2.421, p < 2e-16$) is highly significant, indicating a strong baseline effect when all predictors are zero. The intra-regional trade flows ($\beta = -6.172e-05, p = 0.7395$) did not show a significant impact on coup occurrence. However, the RECPF ($\beta = -0.1236, p = 0.0361$) was significant at the 0.05 level, suggesting a modest negative effect on coup occurrence. The random effects indicate that the variance attributed to countries (variance =

0.4382, SD = 0.662) plays a notable role in the model, showing substantial variability across different countries. Figure 6 further exhibits the impact of REC factors on ECOWAS countries and the likelihood of coups. This analysis highlights the need for targeted interventions that consider country-specific contexts and the nuanced impact of RECPF on the studied outcome.

Figure 6. Country intercept based on Model 2



5.3. Interpretation of Results

H1: Increased political instability within a state increases the likelihood of a coup.

Analysis of political instability indicators shows a robust positive correlation with the occurrence of coups which supports hypothesis 1. The results depict a significant rise in coup likelihood corresponding with the decline in government stability scores. Although literacy and Ethnic power relations are not consequential and challenge the literature of the post-colonial and cold war era, military spending remains an important variable that stands the test of time in its correlation with coup occurrences.

H2: Economic distress within a state exacerbates the risk of coups.

Economic indicators, particularly GNI per capita is significantly associated with coups, with lower GNI per capita increasing coup risks. Although the data partially supports our hypothesis, the non-significance of Unemployment suggests a need to explore additional explanatory factors.

H3: Clear norms and efficient voting mechanisms by RECs reduce the likelihood of coups.

The governance effectiveness of RECs, as measured by the clarity of political norms and decision-making efficiency, shows an association with coups based on the controlled model. This supports Hypothesis 3, where better governance by RECs like ECOWAS and EAC correlates with fewer coups.

H4: Intra-regional trade among states within a REC reduces the likelihood of coups.

Economic integration measured through intra-regional trade is found to have a non-significant correlation with coup occurrences. Hence rejecting Hypothesis 4.

The empirical results substantiate the hypotheses posited in the Theoretical Framework, highlighting the multifaceted roles of political, economic, and regional dynamics in influencing coup occurrences. The data confirm that political instability serves as a critical precursor to coups, consistent with historical patterns where governments with weak legitimacy and poor governance are more susceptible to military takeovers. Moreover, terrorism can be considered a legitimate cause for such takeovers. Nonetheless, it is recommended that further targeted research be conducted to explore the correlation between terrorism and military coups more deeply.

Effective governance mechanisms within RECs, particularly in maintaining clear norms and efficient decision-making, are vital for reducing the likelihood of coups. This highlights the importance of solid regional institutions in sustaining political stability and instigates potential improvements that ECOWAS could implement. The data indicate that countries like Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, and Burundi are at a high risk of experiencing a coup.

Chapter 6: Discussion

According to the literature and our findings, the prevention mechanisms employed by ECOWAS, though well-intentioned, have shown limitations in their effectiveness. Historical critiques suggest that despite having robust frameworks on paper, the implementation has been inconsistent, often due to political interference, lack of resources, or inadequate responses to

emerging political crises (De Bruin, 2024; Mathebula, 2017). The EAC should be cautious of these shortcomings as it develops its own preventive strategies to ensure they do not replicate these weaknesses. Nonetheless, ECOWAS, with its protocols, showed a notable reduction in coups, particularly following the implementation of the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. Similarly, the EAC, though less active in direct political interventions, benefits from a framework promoting political cohesion and preventive diplomacy, which has resulted in a relatively stable political environment among its members. The effectiveness of RECs in preventing coups highlights the critical need for attention in strengthening these organizations. Policies should focus on enhancing the operational capabilities of RECs, providing them with the necessary tools and funding to implement their mandates effectively. Additionally, improving the decision-making processes within RECs to allow for rapid and decisive actions is necessary for dynamic structural change and efficient enforcement.

The Western democracy model has been inefficient when implemented in Africa. It raises the consideration of rethinking election and presidential status. Learning from the Singaporean Model of political meritocracy (Wong, 2013), African nations could benefit from Singaporean approach by implementing strict leader selection criteria, strengthening institutional frameworks, and prioritizing merit-based education for public service. These reforms could enhance political stability and reduce the occurrence of coups by fostering a governance system that is resilient, accountable, and less reliant on individual personalities.

Strengthening the role of civil society in political processes to ensure that governments are accountable and that voices from various sectors are heard is vital. The large power distance between governments and their populations remains a pervasive issue.

This study, while extensive, is not without its limitations. One critical point of concern is the accuracy of the REC variables. Real-world application can be questioned by other factors that impact the prevention of coup occurrence by regional organizations, such as political interference and resource constraints (De Bruin, 2024; Mathebula, 2017). Such inconsistencies underline the difficulty in translating policy into practice, reflecting a broader issue in governance where strategic plans may falter due to operational challenges.

In addition, climate change poses a significant risk to political stability which was not reflected in the ACOM model, especially for countries heavily reliant on agriculture and natural resources. As environmental pressures increase, they can exacerbate economic hardships and social tensions,

which are potential precursors to political instability. RECs should incorporate climate adaptation strategies into their frameworks, focusing on sustainable development and disaster resilience to mitigate the impacts of climate change. Further research is needed to explore how environmental stressors can be integrated into political risk assessments and prevention strategies.

It is essential to acknowledge that while these limitations impact our findings on the influence of RECs in preventing coups, they do not fundamentally undermine the overall conclusions of this research. Instead, they highlight the complexities of the determinants leading to political upheavals especially in the dynamic political landscape of African nations.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

This thesis investigated the influence of African RECs on the occurrence of coups, with a specific focus on ECOWAS and EAC. The study found that both ECOWAS and EAC have played pivotal roles in shaping political outcomes in their regions through mechanisms of conflict prevention and political cooperation. The effectiveness of these organizations varies based on their internal governance structures, the political will of member states, and their capacity to enforce policies.

The conclusions drawn from this study emphasize the importance of strong regional organizations in maintaining stability in Africa. These organizations not only serve as platforms for political and economic cooperation but also as buffers against the instability that can lead to coups. However, the sustainability of their efforts depends significantly on the continuous desire to strengthen regional stability with REC policy mechanisms and the commitment of members leaders to uphold improvement in their governance.

In sum, this thesis contributes to a deeper understanding of how regional dynamics influence political stability in Africa and offers a foundation for future research and policy-making aimed at preventing political instability on the continent. The insights gained suggest the need for continued investment in regional mechanisms and support the improvement of governance to ensure a stable and prosperous Africa.

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Appendixes:

Appendix 1:

ECOWAS and EAC key treaties and protocols that promote democracy and prevent coups

Document	Description
ECOWAS	
ECOWAS Treaty (1975)	This foundational document established the Economic Community of West African States
Revised ECOWAS Treaty (1993)	This foundational document established the Economic Community of West African States and set the stage for subsequent protocols. It includes provisions related to the promotion of peace, security, and stability in the region.
Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security (1999)	This protocol set up the framework for ECOWAS's peacekeeping and conflict resolution initiatives. It outlines the mechanisms for early warning, mediation, and intervention in member states experiencing conflicts or coups.
Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001)	This protocol is a supplement to the 1999 Mechanism and focuses explicitly on promoting democratic governance and preventing military coups. It includes provisions on constitutional convergence principles, human rights, and the rule of law. It mandates that all ECOWAS member states must uphold democratic principles, including regular elections and the separation of powers.
ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (2008)	This framework builds on the previous protocols by detailing comprehensive strategies for conflict prevention, including democratic governance, security sector reform, and early warning systems.
EAC	
Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community (1999)	This foundational treaty establishes the EAC and outlines the principles of cooperation, including the promotion of democracy, rule of law, and human rights. It has been amended to include new member states and to address evolving regional needs.
Protocol on Peace and Security (2013)	This protocol outlines the mechanisms for peace and security within the EAC, emphasizing conflict prevention, management,

and resolution. It aims to enhance cooperation in areas such as early warning systems and joint peacekeeping operations.

Note: Sourced from East African Community and Economic Community of West African States (n.d.)

**Appendix 2:
EAC membership application and accession**

	Membership Application	Membership Access
Burundi	Applied for membership in the early 2000s	Joined the EAC on 1 st July 2007, following the signing of the treaty of accession in 2006 and subsequent ratification
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	Applied for membership in June 2019	Admitted into the EAC on 29th March 2022
Kenya		Founding member – July 2000
Rwanda	Applied for membership in the early 2000s	Joined the EAC on 1st July 2007, following the signing of the treaty of accession in 2006 and subsequent ratification
Somalia	Applied for membership in 2012	Admitted into the EAC on 4 th March 2024
South Sudan	Applied for membership shortly after gaining independence in 2011	Admitted into the EAC on 15 th April 2016
Tanzania		Founding member – July 2000
Uganda		Founding member – July 2000

Note: Sourced from East African Community (n.d.)

**Appendix 2bis:
ECOWAS membership application and accession**

	Membership Application	Membership Access
Benin		The Economic Community of West African States was founded on 28 th May 1975 with the signing of the Treaty of Lagos. Unlike the accession processes seen in other regional communities where new members may join at later dates, all the founding members of ECOWAS
Burkina Faso		
Cape Verde*		
Cote d’Ivoire		
Ghana		
Guinea		
Guinea-Bissau		

Liberia		became members simultaneously when the treaty was signed in 1975.
Mali		
Niger		
Nigeria		
Senegal		
Sierra Leone		
The Gambia		
Togo		

Note: Sourced from the Economic Community of West African States (n.d.)

*Cape Verde formally joined ECOWAS in 1977

Appendix 3: RECPF assessment for ECOWAS and EAC

	Determinacy	Decision-Making Process	Total Score
ECOWAS			
Treaty (1975)	0	0	0
Revised Treaty (1993)	1	1	2
Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security (1999)	1	3	4
Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001)	3	3	6
ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (2008)	2	3	5
EAC			
Treaty (1999)	2	3	5
Protocol on Peace and Security (2013)	1	3	4

Appendix 4: R code script

```
## -----
library(tidyverse)
library(readxl)
library(missForest)
```

```

library(doParallel)
library(lme4)
## -----
DataFinale <- read_excel("C:/Users/User/Downloads/DataFinale.xlsx",range='A1:o1450') #
loading the data
DataFinale<-DataFinale%>%
  filter(Time>1969)%>%      # remove data before 1970
  replace_na(list(Coup=0))%>% # countries with missing value for coup are dropped
  group_by(Country)%>%
  fill(c(Literacy,Unemployment,Ethnic.Power.Relations), .direction = "down") # for these
variables fill missing with last observations
## -----
GNI <- read_excel("GNI.xlsx", range = "A5:BP271")      # load new GNI data

GNI<-GNI%>%
  pivot_longer(`1960`:last_col(),names_to = "Time")%>% # convert to long format
  rename(Country=`Country Name`)%>%
  mutate(Time=as.numeric(Time))%>%
  select(Country,Time:last_col())

Region <- read_excel("Region.xlsx")      # load Regional block and independence data

DataFinale<-DataFinale%>%
  left_join(GNI)%>%      # add per capita data
  mutate(GNI.per.capita=value)%>%      # rename the var
  select(-value)%>%
  left_join(Region)%>%      # add regional block and independence
  group_by(Country)%>%
  group_split()%>%
  map(~filter(.x, Time>=unique(Independence)))%>% # drop years before independence

```

```

  bind_rows()%>%
mutate(across(where(is.character),factor))
## -----
miss<-DataFinale%>%
  is.na()%>%
  colSums()%>%
  as.data.frame()%>%
  rename(missing=".")%>%
  rownames_to_column('variable')%>%

mutate(missingp=scales::percent(missing/nrow(DataFinale)),missingprop=missing/nrow(DataFi
nale))
miss
## -----
doParallel::registerDoParallel(cores = 4)
doRNG::registerDoRNG(seed = 123)
DataFinale <- missForest(DataFinale%>%as.data.frame, parallelize = 'forests')$ximp
DataFinale<-DataFinale%>%as_tibble()
doParallel::stopImplicitCluster()

## -----
# primary exorts
data<-DataFinale%>%
mutate(primary_exports = rowSums(select(., Agricultural.exports:Food.exports), na.rm =
TRUE),
  Military.expenditure=Military.expenditure/1000000)%>%
  select(-c(Agricultural.exports:Food.exports))

# add new data
newd<- read_excel("C:/Users/User/Downloads/DataFinale.xls",range='A1:Q1176')

```

```

data<-data%>%

left_join(newd%>%select(Time,Country,RECPF,Year.membership.application,Year.membershi
p.access))%>%
  filter(!Country%in% c("Congo, Dem. Rep.",'Somalia'))%>%
  mutate(membership=ifelse(Time<Year.membership.access,0,1))
## -----
data%>%
  count(Coup)%>%
  mutate(prob=n/sum(n))%>%
  mutate(Coup=factor(Coup))%>%
  ggplot(aes(x=Coup,y=prob,fill=Coup,label=round(prob,2)))+
  geom_bar(stat='identity')+
  geom_label()+
  theme_bw()+
  theme(legend.position = 'none')

## -----
dt<-data%>%
  count(Coup,Regiona_Block)%>%
  pivot_wider(names_from = 'Coup',values_from = 'n')%>%
  mutate(prob=`1`/sum(`1`+`0`),odds=`1`/`0`,
         ME=ifelse(`1`==0,qnorm(0.975)*sqrt(1/`0`),qnorm(0.975)*sqrt(1/`0`+1/`1`)))%>%
  mutate(LL=(log(odds)-ME),UB=(log(odds)+ME),log_odds=log(odds))

dt

dt%>%
  ggplot(aes(x=Regiona_Block,y=log_odds,ymin=LL,ymax=UB,col=Regiona_Block))+
  geom_point()+
  geom_errorbar(width = 0.2)+

```

```

theme_bw()+
theme(
  legend.position = 'none'
)+
labs(title='Odds of coup by Regional block',x='Regional block',y='logits')
## -----
oddsdata<-data%>%
  count(Country,Coup)%>%
  pivot_wider(names_from = Coup,values_from = n,values_fill = 0)%>%
  mutate(prob=`1`/sum(`1`+`0`),odds=`1`/`0`,
         ME=ifelse(`1`==0,qnorm(0.975)*sqrt(1/`0`),qnorm(0.975)*sqrt(1/`0`+1/`1`)))%>%
  mutate('95%L'=(log(odds)-ME),'95%U'=(log(odds)+ME),log_odds=log(odds))%>%
  mutate(across(where(is.numeric),round,3))

oddsdata1<-data%>%
  count(Country,membership,Coup)%>%
  pivot_wider(names_from = Coup,values_from = n,values_fill = 0)%>%
  mutate(prob=`1`/sum(`1`+`0`),odds=`1`/`0`,
         ME=ifelse(`1`==0,qnorm(0.975)*sqrt(1/`0`),qnorm(0.975)*sqrt(1/`0`+1/`1`)))%>%
  mutate('95%L'=(log(odds)-ME),'95%U'=(log(odds)+ME),log_odds=log(odds))%>%
  mutate(across(where(is.numeric),round,3))

oddsdata2<-data%>%
  count(Country,Regiona_Block,Coup)%>%
  pivot_wider(names_from = Coup,values_from = n,values_fill = 0)%>%
  mutate(prob=`1`/sum(`1`+`0`),odds=`1`/`0`,
         ME=ifelse(`1`==0,qnorm(0.975)*sqrt(1/`0`),qnorm(0.975)*sqrt(1/`0`+1/`1`)))%>%
  mutate('95%L'=(log(odds)-ME),'95%U'=(log(odds)+ME),log_odds=log(odds))%>%
  mutate(across(where(is.numeric),round,3))

```

```

oddsdata3<-data%>%
  count(membership,Coup)%>%
  pivot_wider(names_from = Coup,values_from = n,values_fill = 0)%>%
  mutate(prob=`1`/sum(`1`+`0`),odds=`1`/`0`,
          ME=ifelse(`1`==0,qnorm(0.975)*sqrt(1/`0`),qnorm(0.975)*sqrt(1/`0`+1/`1`)))%>%
  mutate('95%L'=(log(odds)-ME),'95%U'=(log(odds)+ME),log_odds=log(odds))%>%
  mutate(across(where(is.numeric),round,3))%>%
  mutate(membership=factor(membership))

```

```
## -----
```

```

oddsdata%>%
  ggplot(aes(x=Country,y=log_odds,ymin=`95%L`,ymax=`95%U`,col=Country))+
  geom_point()+
  geom_errorbar(width = 0.2)+
  theme_bw()+
  theme(
    axis.text.x = element_text(angle = 90),
    legend.position = 'none'
  )+
  labs(title = 'Logits of having a coup with 95% CI')

```

```

oddsdata3%>%
  ggplot(aes(x=membership,y=log_odds,ymin=`95%L`,ymax=`95%U`,col=membership))+
  geom_point()+
  geom_errorbar(width = 0.2)+
  theme_bw()+
  theme(
    axis.text.x = element_text(angle = 90),
    legend.position = 'none'
  )+

```

```
labs(title = 'Logits of having a coup with 95% CI')
```

```
oddsdata1%>%
```

```
ggplot(aes(x=Country,y=log_odds,ymin=`95%L`,ymax=`95%U`,col=Country))+
```

```
geom_point()+
```

```
geom_errorbar(width = 0.2)+
```

```
theme_bw()+
```

```
theme(
```

```
  axis.text.x = element_text(angle = 90),
```

```
  legend.position = 'none'
```

```
)+
```

```
labs(title = 'Logits of having a coup with 95% CI')+
```

```
facet_wrap(~membership,ncol = 2)
```

```
oddsdata2%>%
```

```
ggplot(aes(x=Country,y=log_odds,ymin=`95%L`,ymax=`95%U`,col=Country))+
```

```
geom_point()+
```

```
geom_errorbar(width = 0.2)+
```

```
theme_bw()+
```

```
theme(
```

```
  axis.text.x = element_text(angle = 90),
```

```
  legend.position = 'none'
```

```
)+
```

```
labs(title = 'Logits of having a coup with 95% CI')+
```

```
facet_wrap(~Regiona_Block,ncol = 2)
```



```
## ----fig.height=8,fig.width=10-----
-----
oddsdata%>%
  left_join(
data%>%
  select(-Regiona_Block)%>%
  group_by(Country)%>%
  summarise(across(Literacy:last_col(),mean,na.rm=T))%>%
  select(-c(Indepedence,membership))%>%
  pivot_longer(Literacy:last_col())%>%
  ggplot(aes(x=value,y=log_odds))+
  geom_point()+
  geom_smooth(method = 'lm')+
  facet_wrap(~name,scales = 'free')
```

```
## -----
mod<-glmer(Coup ~Literacy+
  Institutional.Quality+
  Military.expenditure+
  GNI.per.capita+
  primary_exports +
  Manufactures.exports+
  Unemployment+
  Ethnic.Power.Relations+
  Intra.regional.trade.flows+
  Regiona_Block+
  membership+
  RECPF+
  Time+
  (1|Country),
  data = data, family = binomial)
```

```
summary(mod)
```

```
## -----
```

```
fixef(mod)
```

```
## -----
```

```
100*0.1709/sigma(mod)
```

```
## -----
```

```
ranef(mod)
```

```
lattice::dotplot(ranef(mod))
```

```
## -----
```

```
mod1<-glmer(Coup ~
```

```
  Intra.regional.trade.flows+
```

```
  RECPF+
```

```
  (1|Country),
```

```
  data = data, family = binomial)
```

```
summary(mod1)
```

```
## -----
```

```
#confint(mod1)
```

```
100*0.4384/sigma(mod1)
```

```
## -----
```

```
fixef(mod1)
```

```
## -----  
ranef(mod1)  
lattice::dotplot(ranef(mod1))  
  
## -----  
#coplot(fitted ~ Time|Country,  
#   type="l", data=data%>%  
#   mutate(fitted=fitted(mod)))  
write_csv(data,"DataFinale.csv")
```