Meaning making in a time of crisis: A comparative study of the effect of crisis communication in post terrorist incidents

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1. Introduction:

As the world has become increasingly globalized, crises have also become more unpredictable (Longstaff, 2005; Norris et al., 2008). The shock effect produced by these crises, puts societies and their leaders under constant stress-tests, to maintain resilience (Boin et al., 2016, p. 3). Crises come in many forms, varying from natural disasters, to pandemics, technological shutdowns, and terrorist-attacks. One area that has witnessed a lack of knowledge and research, is the potentially influential role of crisis communication in achieving resilience to these shocks (Bakker & De Roy Van Zuijdewijn, 2022).

After terrorist-incidents, the public maintains a higher risk perception compared to other types of crises (Bakker & De Roy Van Zuijdewijn, 2022). This creates a discrepancy, as the likelihood of dying in a terrorist-attack is significantly lower, than dying in a car crash (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005). A disproportionate relationship between the public´s threat perception and the capabilities of terrorists is therefore present (Friedland & Merari, 1985, p. 592). Terrorism´s impact is instead related to the fear and attention created by attacks. This was famously captured by Jenkins (1985) stating: "terrorists like to see a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead" (p. 22). The impact is determined by how societies respond to the acts committed. Ideally, societies and their leaders would want to make this impact as small as possible.

If the past remains an indicator of the future, terrorism will continue to impact our societies. Hence, studying the mechanism that influences a society´s ability to maintain resilience during crises, is highly relevant. Crisis management strategies span wide, but recent years bigger crisis events have revived scholarly interest in crisis communication (Coombs, 2023). Focusing on the impact of crisis communication in mitigating these situations, provides insight into how government leaders can react when these incidents occur.

This paper contributes to the literature on crisis communication and resilience in several ways. Firstly, the study combines the two strands of research, developing a new theoretical framework, thereby overcoming previous separate focus. Secondly, previous studies of terrorism, resilience and crisis communication have almost exclusively been single case-studies (Sellnow & Seeger, 2021, p. 18). This thesis instead expands the academic discussion, using a comparative approach, to investigate the causal mechanism between a country´s crisis communication efforts and the subsequent level of community resilience.

The following sections of the thesis will entail a literature review, examining past and current scholarly contributions on the intersection between crisis communication, terrorism, and resilience. A theoretical framework will follow, leading to the development of different hypotheses. Next, the research design and methodology will be presented, leading to a comparative analysis of three case-studies. Finally, the paper will conclude by outlining the main findings, while providing suggestions for future research.

2. Literature Review:

Terrorism and counterterrorism have never been easy subjects to study. The obstacles have primarily been related to conceptual and definitional disagreements among scholars (Schuurman, 2020, pp. 1012-1013). Historically the discipline was relatively understudied, with early scholars focusing primarily on political violence through conflict theories (Bakker & De Roy Van Zuijdewijn, 2022, p. 71). The events of 9/11 are often described as a ´paradigm shift` in terrorism studies, as scholars, funding, publications and overall interest increased exponentially after 2001 (Schuurman, 2020, p. 1013).

Despite these developments, the discipline continues to be understudied, with questions remaining unanswered. Schmid & Forest (2018) outlined a list of 150 un- and under-researched topics in terrorism and counterterrorism. One topic highly prominent on the list, and in general academic discussions, surrounds the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies. After the 9/11 attacks, Western countries dramatically increased their focus and investments into counterterrorism measures (Sgueo, 2015, p. 2). Funds invested into counterterrorism, result in less funds available for other public expenditures. A larger research puzzle, open for researchers in the coming years, is therefore the effectiveness of various counterterrorism strategies (Schmid & Forest, 2018, p. 74).

To examine counterterrorism, we must first understand how terrorism affects society. Scholars broadly agree, that terrorism is about impact, meaning how ordinary citizens react both short- and long-term (Bakker & De Roy Van Zuijdewijn, 2022, p. 201). The effectiveness of counterterrorism is related to the ability of authorities, to limit this impact. Traditionally, there was thought to be a relationship between the size of the attack and the impact produced (Rohner & Frey, 2007). Contrary to this conventional wisdom, recent studies have shown that impact can vary across cases, with small-scale attacks sometimes

having a bigger impact than expected, while larger attacks can remain less influential (Nussio et al., 2021, p. 901).

One realm where scholars have tried to understand impact, is the dynamic relationship between terrorism and public opinion. Downes-Le Guin & Hoffman (1993) argued that terrorists, through their actions, seek to manipulate public opinion, to undermine the ´target government` (p. 1). This can influence public perceptions on trust in government, interpersonal trust, and feelings of safety (Nussio et al., 2021).

Recently scholars have also examined the economic impact of terrorism, which is often easier to quantify (Bardwell & Iqbal, 2021, p. 227). These studies have ranged from the impact of terrorist incidents on the physical capital of a country, to the costs associated with counterterrorism, and the vulnerability of critical infrastructure (Chesney et al., 2011). Among the most studied examples, is the effect of terrorism on financial markets, where terrorism is shown to have significant negative impacts on investor perceptions (Chesney et al., 2011, p. 266).

Yehuda & Hyman (2005) go beyond the public opinion and economic arguments, instead attributing the negative effects of terrorism to the psychological harm caused by the incidents (p. 1773). These traumatic events produce fear, causing citizens to change their behavior, negatively affecting certain industries (Yehuda & Hyman, 2005, p. 1773). This argument, labels other impacts of terrorist incidents, as side effects of the larger psychological impact. This follows Friedland & Merari´s (1985) early contribution, pointing towards the psychological impact of terrorism, as the most detrimental to society. Fear is generally recognized, as one of the main outcomes produced by terrorism. If fear prevails, it can result in negative long-term societal implications such as emotional, political and administrative overreactions (Bakker & de Graaf, 2014, p. 3). Furedi (2006) famously captured this, describing how Western societies, after 9/11, risked moving into a position of vulnerability to terrorism, where ineffective counterterrorism measures created a ´culture of fear`.

Consequently, researchers wish to understand how societies can mitigate the negative implications of terrorism. In these discussions, the concept of ´resilience` keeps appearing, understood as the ability of society to withstand sudden shocks (Longstaff, 2005). Norris et al. (2008) argue for the positive effects of resilience, adding that it reduces vulnerability,

limiting the disrupting impact on society. Bakker & Veldhuis (2012) expanded on this, claiming that resilience to terrorism does not mean that societies are unaffected, but rather that they develop the capacity to attribute meanings to threats, while incorporating positive coping mechanisms to recover from the traumatic experience (p. 5).

Scholars often attribute this recovery to effective crisis management, yet disagreement remains intact about which crisis management strategies strengthen resilience. A potential explanation for the missing coherence, is a lack of integration across the two strands of research (Williams et al., 2017, p. 733). To effectively understand the relationship between different crisis management strategies and resilience, researchers must examine the two developments in combination. Attempts of combining the two have been made within crisis communication, yet the exact causal mechanism remains understudied (Norris et al., 2008; Pfefferbaum et al., 2007). Boin et al. (2016) claims, that effective crisis management is the primary responsibility of authorities in the aftermath of a crisis (p. 3). These leaders must therefore excel in their crisis communication, if they want to solidify their image as crisis leaders (Boin et al., 2016, p. 18).

Looking at the overall state of the art, many questions remain unanswered. Current case-studies into the consequences of terrorism frequently rely on single cases, limiting their generalizability (Nussio et al., 2021, p. 901). Crisis communication studies have faced similar problems, while primarily being of a descriptive nature (Sellnow & Seeger, 2021, p. 18). Schmid & Forest (2018) therefore stressed the need for more comparative studies within the discipline, to understand the developments in a broader light. Providing policymakers and the public with insights into the phenomenon´s nuances, has always been a key task for terrorism scholars. Understanding how crisis communication can impact a society´s resilience after a terrorist incident, is therefore valuable for crisis practitioners and academics alike. Hence, the following research question will guide this investigation:

"What is the effect of a country´s crisis communication, on the public´s resilience, in the aftermath of terrorist incidents?"

3. Theoretical Framework:

3.1 Conceptualization:

Fundamental to all social science research, is the task of concept formation (Gerring, 2001, p. 35). This process becomes especially important, when discussing terrorism, resilience, and crisis(-communication), as these concepts carry highly complex meanings, varying across different contexts. Definitions are important, as they indicate principal components of a phenomenon, while allowing us to understand the theories of the field (Sellnow & Seeger, 2021, p. 5). To contribute with a meaningful analysis, Table 1 establishes working definitions for the main concepts. The complexity of these concepts, nevertheless, justifies a lengthier discussion capturing the nuances. This is available in Appendix 4.

Table 1: Conceptualization

Concept:	Definition:
(Lone actor) Terrorist Incident	"The threat or use of violence by a single perpetrator, not acting out of purely personal material reasons, but with the aim of influencing a wider audience, who acts without direct support in the planning, preparation and execution of the attack, and whose decision to act is not directed by any other group or individual" (Ellis et al., 2022, p. 4)
Resilience	"the capacity to deal with the negative impacts associated with a crisis incident, on an individual or societal basis" (Bakker & De Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2022, p. 207).
Crisis:	"a specific, unexpected, non-routine event or series of events, that creates high levels of uncertainty and a significant perceived threat to high-priority goals" (Sellnow & Seeger, 2021, p. 9) & "a major threat, that can have negative implications if not handled properly"

	(Coombs, 2010, p. 18) 5/24/24 11:38:00 AM
Crisis Communication	Regulating the behavior of receivers through "the collection, processing, and dissemination of information required to address a crisis situation" (Coombs, 2010, p. 20). Concerned with three core tasks: Sense-making, meaning-making, and fostering unity (Bakker & De Roy Van Zuijdewijn, 2022).

3.2 Community Resilience Theory:

Fig 1: Norris et al.´s (2008) model of Community Resilience

Norris et al.´s, (2008) model of community resilience theorizes a society´s transition from a pre-event state to a post-event state, when experiencing a crisis. This thesis will apply Norris et al.´s often-cited model to the context of crisis communication.

Norris et al.´s (2008) original model acknowledges, that the impact of a crisis is related to the severity, duration and surprise of the stressor triggering the crisis. What determines the outcome, is how society´s resources are either mobilized or deteriorated. These resources involve three theorized properties of ´robustness`, ´redundancy` and ´rapidity` (Norris et al., 2008). Robustness refers to the ability of systems to withstand stress without suffering degradation, characterized by the resources´ strength, combined with the probability of

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deterioration (Norris et al., 2008, p. 134). Redundancy is the extent to which a diverse set of resources are available (Norris et al., 2008, p. 134). Lastly, rapidity is the speed at which resources can be mobilized to avoid further disruptions (Norris et al., 2008, p. 134). The relationship between these properties is dynamic and must be adjusted to the individual crisis.

Crisis communication is often argued to be a key part of a government´s resource mobilization during a crisis (Boin et al., 2016; Sellnow et al., 2011). The effectiveness of this process is linked to the communications´ rapidness, accuracy, and trustworthiness of the deliverer (Longstaff, 2005, pp. 55-56). It should roughly contain three core elements of Sense-making, meaning-making, and fostering unity (Bakker & De Roy Van Zuijdewijn, 2022). Crisis communication is therefore part of counterterrorism, linked to limiting the incident´s societal impact.

Norris et al.´s (2008) model holds, that crises place societies in a state of ´transient dysfunction`, which can grow into either ´resilience` or ´vulnerability` (p. 132). The outcome of the dysfunction is determined by resource mobilization or deterioration. The combined theoretical framework would expect crisis communication to be the intervening variable, affecting how a society transitions from a pre-crisis to post-crisis environment. The thesis primary hypothesis is therefore:

H1: Crisis communication effectively mobilizes resources, outweighing the stressor. This fosters resilience, which transfers society into post-event functioning, adapted to an altered environment. Crisis communication has a determining effect.

The goal of achieving resilience can however fail, when resources are damaged or disrupted by the stressor itself (Norris et al., 2008). The centrality of resource loss is related to stress theory, arguing that systemic stress occurs when resources are threatened or lost (Hobfoll, 2006, p. 215). The theory is particularly interesting for terrorism, as a terrorist incident threatens various resources, such as safety, optimism, financial stability and companionship (Norris et al., 2008, p. 135). The stressor, being the terrorist incident, puts additional stress on the system´s ability to transition towards resilience. In incidents involving large amounts of stress, combined with lacking resource mobilization, society can transition into a state of vulnerability, leading to persistent dysfunction (Norris et al., 2008, p. 136). The second hypothesis is therefore:

H2: The stressor outweighs the resource mobilization created by crisis communication, transitioning society into a state of ´vulnerability` characterized by persistent dysfunction. Crisis communication does not have a determining effect.

The ideal outcome of a crisis is, however, a third option: resistance. Here pre-existing societal resources would effectively outweigh the stressor of the crisis, resulting in no dysfunction of society, returning to post-event functioning (Norris et al., 2008, p. 132). This sidelines the impact of crisis communication, as a government´s efforts in this scenario are not impacting the outcome. Scholars have, however, criticized this argument, for not considering the element of surprise. Longstaff (2005) argues that resistance is only effective for crises that contain a predictable element, as surprises generally tend to undermine society´s ability to resist (pp. 25-26). Seeing that a core element of terrorism, is its surprising nature, the effect is expected to be unlikely. Nevertheless, this relationship should be tested. Therefore, the final hypothesis is:

H3: Society´s resources allow for resistance, leading to post-event functioning similar to the pre-event environment. The effect of crisis communication is irrelevant.

3.3 Causal Graph:

Following Ricks & Liu (2018), constructing a causal graph allows for a structured and visual depiction of the theoretically expected causal process through which X causes Y (p. 843). Through this graph, we can identify all the moments in which an actor made a choice or an event occurred, which affected the outcome (Ricks & Liu, 2018). Fig. 2 outlines the causal graph, guided by the theoretical framework.

Fig 2: Causal Graph

3.4 Indicators:

Having constructed the causal graph, theoretically guided indicators must be established for each step of the causal chain, outlining the empirical manifestations and observables necessary for evidence gathering and evaluation (Beach & Pedersen, 2019). Table 2 summarizes the indicators for each step of the causal chain. An elaboration of each indicator is provided in Appendix 5.

Table 2: Indicators

Step of Causal Chain	Indicator(s)	Measurement
Interest to mobilize resources	Does a government mobilize resources by engaging in crisis communication	´Yes` or ´No`
Use of communication strategies	Sense Making	To what degree: Present/Not Present
	Meaning Making	To what degree: Present/Not Present
	Fostering Unity	To what degree: Present/Not Present
Change in actions and perceptions & Change in community resilience	Overall impact of terrorism	Global Terrorism Index measured on Scale 0-10 (10 is highest impact)
	Fear	Interpersonal Trust (Scale of 0-10 or 0-100, Higher scores = Higher interpersonal trust)
	Social and Political tensions	´Group Grievance Indicator` (Lower score = Less tensions)
	Trust in national government and feelings of uncertainty	10-year government bond yields (Lower yields = higher trust and less uncertainty)
	Feelings of capability	Examples of Self-Efficacy (Consistent large-scale initiatives = higher resilience)

4. Research Design & Methodology:

This research paper will carry out a comparative small-n case study, using process tracing to uncover the causal chain. Comparative case studies allow us to produce generalizable knowledge about causal questions, by examining differences, similarities, and patterns across multiple cases with a shared focus (Goodrick, 2014, pp. 1-2). In this context, crisis communication´s impact on community resilience is examined over three different cases, reaping the benefits of in-depth analysis, while overcoming the problem of generalizability, often associated with single-case studies (Halperin & Heath, 2020, p. 238).

Process tracing is now a commonly used data-analysis method for comparative small-n case studies, despite originally being used for within-case studies (Beach & Pedersen, 2016; Fontaine, 2020, p. 278). It allows us to identify the sequence of the causal chain and causal mechanism between the independent variable, and the outcome on the dependent variable (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 206). By examining how potential causes influence a specific change, process tracing permits the development and testing of multiple ideas about why a certain change occurred (Collier, 2011, p. 824). This helps mitigate the problem of inferential error, sometimes witnessed in other methods, where the use of a single theory can result in ignoring alternative equally valid explanations (Kay & Baker, 2015, p. 4). As we are dealing with a complex social phenomenon, this method permits identifying the causal process in a theoretically informed way, even when data is fragmented.

Extractive qualitative content analysis (EQCA) is employed, to understand the content of the crisis communication. The method develops a system of categories, where information is classified under these categories, before being interpreted for analysis (Glaser & Laudel, 2019). The method is particularly appropriate for combining with process tracing, as it follows a structured sequential interpretation, allowing it to help uncover parts of a full causal mechanism (Glaser & Laudel, 2019). EQCA´s structured nature allows for consistent comparison across the three cases. Coding is conducted through sentences or statements composed of multiple connected sentences. The coding frame and matrix are available in Appendix 6.

To examine our research question, we must understand the meaning of ´aftermath`. For crisis communication, a cut-off period of seven days after the incident is adopted, as it is argued that leaders need to quickly formulate a convincing narrative, to win the contest of

constructing social meaning among the population (Boin et al., 2016; Longstaff, 2005). Community resilience requires a longer perspective of up to three years, as resilience comes both short-term and long-term. A balanced choice is important, as measuring long-term effects can result in the causality problem of compound treatment, where unrelated events influence the hypothesized effect (Muñoz et al., 2019, p. 8).

4.1 Case selection:

The focus of this study will be lone-actor terrorist incidents, as recent trends have shown an increase in smaller-scale attacks, conducted by individuals (Ellis et al., 2022, p. 2). This thesis thereby moves beyond the field´s overwhelming focus on Jihadi terrorism (Bakker & De Roy Van Zuijdewijn, 2022). Additionally, previous studies have shown that Jihadi terrorism can fuel anti-migrant and Islamophobic sentiments within Western societies (Helbling & Meierrieks, 2022). By choosing lone-actor terrorist incidents, we would expect a clearer effect between government messaging and community resilience, as it does not overlap with these anti-immigrant sentiments.

For case selection, the introduction of selection bias was carefully considered. This is a common problem in small-n case studies, as the research deals with a limited number of cases (Halperin & Heath, 2020, p. 238). To some extent all small-n case studies fall victim to this bias, yet the impact can be limited by applying sound justifications and giving special attention to the criteria for case selection (Halperin & Heath, 2020, p. 238).

To mitigate these problems, three cases have been chosen from the open-source Global Terrorism Database (GTD). It is generally recognized by scholars across terrorism studies, for undertaking a variety of different studies (Bakker and de Roy van Zuijdewijn, 2022, p. 21). Choosing a generally recognized database ensures consistency in the definition of terrorism, while limiting political and cultural bias in what is labeled a terrorist attack. Facing restrictions on availability of data and articles from terrorist incidents across the world, cases were limited to members of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), as data was more readily available in these contexts (OECD, 2024).

To standardize case selection further, the following characteristics were applied to the case selection:

- The perpetrator adheres to the working definition by Ellis et al. (2016)
- The message of the attack contained extreme right-wing rhetoric, either in the form of a manifesto or other messaging device.
- The case falls into a typical case of: A terrorist incident occurs → Crisis communication is conducted by the authorities → No other terrorist incident occurs for a period of 2 years after. Employing a typical case, is an attempt at overcoming the causality problem of compound treatment, where other unrelated events happen simultaneously, thereby influencing the effect (Muñoz et al., 2019, p. 8).

4.2 Data selection:

The analysis utilizes both primary sources, including speeches and government press releases, and secondary sources such as archival data, news reports and scholarly articles. This approach allows for data triangulation, strengthening the overall reliability of the research (Carter et al., 2014). The approach thereby addresses the often-cited critique of terrorism studies, about relying too much on secondary sources (Schuurman, 2020, p. 1011). Additionally, process tracing is often thought to be a qualitative research method, yet it permits the inclusion of quantitative information, enhancing the variety of data used (Collier, 2011, p. 825).

EQCA is employed to the speeches of government leaders. The governmental apparatus of crisis management consists of many different actors, including politicians, civil servants, police officials and crisis managers. To ensure consistency across cases, only speeches of government leaders will be analyzed. This is appropriate, since governmental leaders are often seen as crisis leaders, tasked with providing a guiding narrative to the population (Boin et al., 2016, p. 3). As the guiding narrative can be expected to be consistent throughout the process, one speech of each government leader is analyzed. As the content analysis is part of a mixed-method design, this sample size was determined by the informational needs, to answer the research question coherently (Bengtsson, 2016; Krippendorff, 2018). To ensure transparency, all original transcripts, including English translations, can be found in the Appendices. Official government translations have been used.

To examine the evidence gathered, we rely on Collier´s (2011) tests for causal inference. Having a systematic approach for evidence evaluation is important, as not all evidence is equally appropriate for establishing causation (Ricks & Liu, 2018, p. 844). By drawing on

previous scholarly contributions, Collier (2011) has identified four types of evidence, summarized in Table 3 as: Straw-in-the-wind; Hoop; Smoking-Gun; and Doubly-Decisive. A comprehensive explanation of the four evidence types, can be found in Appendix 7.

Table 3: Collier´s (2011) process tracing tests for causal inference

Process Tracing Tests for Causal Inference

		SUFFICIENT FOR AFFIRMING CAUSAL INFERENCE	
		No	**Yes**
NECESSARY FOR AFFIRMING CAUSAL INFERENCE	**No**	**1. Straw-in-the-Wind**	**3. Smoking-Gun**
		a. Passing: Affirms relevance of hypothesis, but does not confirm it.	**a. Passing:** Confirms hypothesis.
		b. Failing: Hypothesis is not eliminated, but is slightly weakened.	**b. Failing:** Hypothesis is not eliminated, but is somewhat weakened.
		c. Implications for rival hypotheses: Passing *slightly* weakens them. Failing *slightly* strengthens them.	**c. Implications for rival hypotheses:** Passing *substantially* weakens them. Failing *somewhat* strengthens them.
	Yes	**2. Hoop**	**4. Doubly Decisive**
		a. Passing: Affirms relevance of hypothesis, but does not confirm it.	**a. Passing:** Confirms hypothesis and eliminates others.
		b. Failing: Eliminates hypothesis.	**b. Failing:** Eliminates hypothesis.
		c. Implications for rival hypotheses: Passing *somewhat* weakens them. Failing *somewhat* strengthens them.	**c. Implications for rival hypotheses:** Passing *eliminates* them. Failing *substantially* strengthens.

5. Analysis and Discussion:

To substantiate and leave room for an in-depth analysis of the causal chain across all three cases, a short description of the context surrounding each case is provided in Appendix 8.

5.1 <u>Case Study I</u>: Oslo & Utøya Attacks Norway

5.1.1: Crisis Communication Process:
Responding to the attack, Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg gave a memorial speech in a church in Oslo on 23rd of July, effectively signaling the government´s interest to mobilize resources, through crisis communication. This evidence passes Collier´s (2011) hoop test, affirming the relevance of our primary hypothesis H1. Contrarily, had he chosen not to engage in crisis communication, our primary hypothesis would have failed the hoop test, thereby eliminating it.

More important than signaling willingness to mobilize societal resources, is the actual process of doing so. Within crisis communication, this is signified through the content of the

speeches. Looking towards our content analysis (see Appendix 6), Stoltenberg´s speech contained both elements of meaning-making, unity, and sense-making.

Meaning-making remained the biggest category, with large parts of the speech dedicated to showing empathy for the victims, seen through statements such as: "I want you to know that we are weeping with you." (Stoltenberg, 2011). Providing hope and attributing a larger meaning to the attacks also remained part of the communication efforts, as he mentioned the importance of Norwegian values, while claiming: "Our response is more democracy, more openness, and more humanity." (Stoltenberg, 2011). An appeal to unity was given by quoting a member of the Norwegian Youth League.

Less attention was given to sense-making. Short accounts of what happened included statements such as: "92 lives have been lost, with several people still missing." (Stoltenberg, 2011). This could be explained by Stoltenberg´s personal involvement in the incident, as the attack was targeted towards government buildings, and a gathering of the youth league of the Prime Minister´s Labour Party. The involvement is seen through personal anecdotes about victims, and the quote: "Many of us know someone who has been lost" (Stoltenberg, 2011).

5.1.2: Crisis Outcome and Analysis:
Following the July 22nd attacks, Norway had to prepare for a new reality. Examining the impact on community resilience, we turn towards the Global Terrorism Index. Fig. 3 shows, that after an initial spike to 6.2 in 2011, the index starts to fall. A falling index indicates that the psychological effects are lowered (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2024). This could signal, that the Prime Minister´s crisis communication affected community resilience. Using Collier´s (2011) tests, the evidence passes a ´straw-in-the-wind`, affirming the relevance of H1, while slightly weakening the others.

Fig 3: Global Terrorism Index, Norway from 2009-2014

The idea that the psychological effects were lowered, is further strengthened by data for interpersonal trust in Norwegian society before and after the attack. Interpersonal trust increased in Norway after the attack (Enjolras et al., 2019, p. 44). Stronger interpersonal trust is expected to correlate with less fear and stronger resilience. The increase is likely the result of an intervention, as theory expects interpersonal trust to fall as society experiences a crisis (Enjolras et al., 2019, p. 44). Stoltenberg´s crisis communication marks such an intervention, again supporting H1, by passing a straw-in-the-wind test.

This pattern of support for H1 continues, when looking at Norwegian government bond yields. On the 25th of July, a few days after the attack, the 10-year government bond yield experienced a sharp decline, remaining at lower than pre-attack levels for over two years after the incident (TradingEconomics, 2024c). The long-term lower yields support the idea, that uncertainty was reduced and trust in government restored (Costantini & Sousa, 2022, p. 2). The evidence passes yet another of Collier´s (2011) straw-in-the-wind test, further contributing to the relevance of H1.

2011 also marked a notable change in the social and political divisions within Norwegian society. Stoltenberg (2011) talked about a proud nation, standing together to defend its values in a time of crisis. Norway, nevertheless, jumped a remarkable 2.3 points in the ´Group Grievance Indicator` (Fund for Peace, 2024). Since then, the level has remained relatively stable (Fund for Peace, 2024). The statistics are impactful for the resilience of society, as countries with lower levels of social tensions, generally experience stronger resilience towards crises (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019). Sudden spikes could therefore indicate that crisis communication did not effectively mobilize resources, thereby heightening

vulnerability. The evidence passes a straw-in-the-wind test for H2, indicating some vulnerability.

Self-efficacy was also largely present after the attacks. One example is how multiple youth-wings of political parties, especially the Labour party, witnessed a substantive influx of new members (Bjørgo & Jupskås, 2021, p. 6). This shows willingness to overcome the crisis, while portraying lower levels of fear, as the target of the attacks had been the Labour party and their youth wing. Another example is the memorial ceremony held in Oslo after the attacks, attended by upwards of 100.000 people (Bjørgo & Jupskås, 2021). The evidence passes another straw-in-the-wind test for H1, as Stoltenberg´s (2011) appeals for a nation standing together, are a plausible explanation for this substantive mobilization of self-efficacy.

Overall, the Norwegian case provides most support for our primary hypothesis, H1, with small inconsistencies. The crisis communication seems to have been most effective in lowering uncertainty, while restoring trust in the government. Interpersonal trust also increased following the attack, indicating lower fear. Oppositely, social tensions experienced a significant increase. This indicates that overall resources were mobilized, yet some vulnerability remained. As we are dealing with complex social phenomena, such small inconsistencies can be expected.

5.2 <u>Case Study II:</u> Christchurch Attacks New Zealand

5.2.1: Crisis Communication Process:
On 19th of March 2019, four days after the terrorist incident, New Zealand´s Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern delivered a speech to the parliament, which was also live-streamed to the public (Ardern, 2019). This action constituted a mobilization of resources, by using crisis communication. The intention to do so, passes Collier´s (2011) hoop test, as it affirms the relevance of H1.

The importance of the communication is, however, reliant on the speech´s content. The content analysis (see Appendix 6) reveals that Ardern engaged in meaning-making, unity and sense-making. The length of her speech naturally affected her ability to inform and steer the narrative within the population.

Meaning-making is present as she attributes larger meaning to the experiences, through statements such as: "We open our doors to others and say welcome. The only thing that must change after the events of Friday is, that this same door must close on all of those who espouse hate and fear." (Ardern, 2019). Another example is: "He sought many things from his act of terror, but one was notoriety, and that is why you will never hear me mention his name." (Ardern, 2019). Instead, she appeals to mentioning the names of the victims. Through promoting this narrative, Ardern seeks to lower uncertainty by imposing a convincing narrative focused towards the victims. Additionally, scholars have mentioned this as a strong example of how limiting the attention to the terrorist, can help restore a ´normal` setting (Bakker & De Roy Van Zuijdewijn, 2022, p. 221) .

Ardern also engages in promoting unity. Her speech begins with the words: "Al salam alaikum. Peace be upon you, and peace be upon all of us." (Ardern, 2019). By using a common muslim greeting, she promotes unity among the different communities of New Zealand. Additionally, she appeals to learning from past mistakes across the world, to not let tensions spark, but maintain vigilance (Ardern, 2019). Her calls for unity also refrains from stigmatizing the community of the perpetrator, attempting to lower social tensions further.

Lastly, she engages in sense-making by providing an authoritative account of the facts of the incident. The speech mentions how many were killed, who was arrested and who is responsible for the crisis management (Ardern, 2019). Her speech thereby gives the population a clear account of what happened, avoiding misinformation being spread.

5.2.2: Crisis Outcome and Analysis:
The attack also symbolized a new reality for New Zealanders. Looking towards the indicators for community resilience, the Global Terrorism Index in Fig. 4 again gives an initial overview. An initial spike to 5.5, is followed by a decrease in the years following the attack. This evidence passes a ´straw-in-the-wind` test for H1, serving as an initial guidance for the relevance of our primary hypothesis.

Institute for Economics and Peace   Value   Chg   Chg%

Fig 4: Global Terrorism Index, New Zealand from 2017-2022

Despite attempts from the perpetrator to divide New Zealanders, social and political divisions decreased after the terrorist incident. Following a slow downtrend since 2015, the ´Group Grievance Indicator` accelerated further downwards from 3.2 in 2019, hitting 2.4 in 2021 (Fund for Peace, 2024). The lower levels of social tensions signals higher community resilience, and may be a result of the government´s crisis communication. Ardern (2019) used substantial parts of her speech, on calling for unity, acknowledging different groups in society and warning about the danger of increased tensions. The evidence passes another straw-in-the-wind test, confirming the relevance of H1.

Ardern´s communication efforts also seem to have influenced the interpersonal trust among New Zealanders. National surveys revealed, that interpersonal trust averaged at 6.3 both in the months before and after the shootings (Crothers & O'Brien, 2020, p. 251). The constant level of trust, could be the result of an intervention, as theory would expect trust to fall after a threatening event (Enjolras et al., 2019, pp. 40-41). Ardern´s attempt at fostering unity and bringing society together therefore constitutes a reasonable explanation for why, no change occurred in interpersonal trust levels. This evidence therefore passes yet another straw-in-the-wind test for H1.

Looking towards government bond yields, we find additional support for H1. In 2019, 10-year government bond yields of New Zealand were already on a downward trend (TradingEconomics, 2024a). Immediately after the attacks, bond yields accelerated their decrease, evident by further declines in the following months (TradingEconomics, 2024a). Due to the unique macroeconomic environment surrounding the COVID-19 crisis, it becomes difficult to separate effects after February 2020. The initial decrease nevertheless indicates

that uncertainty was reduced and trust in the government continued (Costantini & Sousa, 2022). This could be the result of Ardern´s communicative efforts. It therefore constitutes enough evidence for passing another straw-in-the-wind test, further confirming the relevance of H1.

In the days following the attack, New Zealanders also showed large-scale expressions of self-efficacy. Among the examples were 40.000 people gathering ten days after the attack for a Muslim prayer ceremony, as well as a nationwide two-minute silence broadcasted on national television and radio stations (Child, 2019). Multiple non-Muslim women also started wearing headscarves, to show support (Bakker & De Roy Van Zuijdewijn, 2022, p. 221). Ardern´s (2019) direct calls for unity and meaning-making, by labeling the incident as an attack on an open, tolerant, and welcoming country, is a plausible explanation for the mobilization of self-efficacy. Hence, the evidence passes another straw-in-the-wind test for H1.

Overall, New Zealand constitutes a typical case for our primary hypothesis. The evidence passed multiple straw-in-the-wind tests, together adding up to affirmative evidence for H1. Ardern´s speech involved all three hypothesized elements for effective crisis communication, with additional attention given to meaning-making and fostering unity. These efforts seem to have affected community resilience among New Zealanders, signified by constant levels of interpersonal trust, lower levels of social tensions and maintained trust in government. This in turn lowered uncertainty and fear among the population, while stimulating an environment for self-efficacy, where the community together moved to post-event functioning.

5.3 Case Study III: Macerata Attack Italy

5.3.1: Crisis Communication Process:
On the day of the Macerata attack, Italian Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni gave a brief press conference (Gentiloni, 2018). His decision to engage in crisis communication, confirms the interest in mobilizing resources, thereby passing Collier´s (2011) hoop test, adding to the relevance of our primary hypothesis. Gentiloni´s speech remains shorter, with no additional speeches delivered before multiple weeks after the attack.

He engages in meaning-making, fostering unity and sense-making, yet to a limited degree. His few contributions in the realm of meaning-making entails one line showing empathy to

the victims, while hope is provided through claiming that law and order will be maintained (Gentiloni, 2018). No attempt at attributing larger meaning to the attack was done.

Gentiloni contributes to unity by stating: "Hatred and violence will not manage to divide us." (Gentiloni, 2018). Furthermore, he appeals to gathering around the values of the republic (Gentiloni, 2018). A particularly important quote is: "I trust in the sense of responsibility of all political forces, criminal behaviors cannot have any ideological motivation." (Gentiloni, 2018). Here, he avoids stigmatizing the community of the perpetrator, while addressing the special circumstances of the perpetrator belonging to a rival political party. This is a strong expression of unity, as he does not escalate a tense political situation.

Lastly, the speech attempts at sense-making, by giving an account of what happened, who was arrested and how crisis management will be handled (Gentiloni, 2018). Gentiloni fails to mention the number of victims, which may be a deliberate choice to avoid political narratives.

5.3.2: Crisis Outcome and Analysis:
The Italian version of the Global Terrorism Index in Fig. 5 gives an interesting outlook. After an increase to 3.6 points following the attack in 2018, the index increased further in 2019, while remaining higher in both 2020 and 2021. No other officially recorded terrorist attacks happened in Italy during this period. This evidence points towards ineffective resource mobilization, leading to vulnerability. This passes Collier´s (2011) straw-in-the-wind test, giving support to H2.


Fig 5: Global Terrorism Index, Italy from 2016-2021

The government bond yields of Italy also provide a mixed picture. Having been relatively stable throughout 2017 and the start of 2018, they decreased slightly for 2-3 months after the attack, before increasing again (TradingEconomics, 2024b). Volatile bond yields indicate that trust in government was not maintained, and uncertainty was not decreased (Costantini & Sousa, 2022, p. 2). The evidence passes another straw-in-the-wind test for H2.

The inconclusive evidence continues as we examine social and political divisions in the aftermath of the attack. The ´Group Grievance Indicator` shows a slight increase of 0.1 points to 4.9 from 2018-2019 (Fund for Peace, 2024). Despite being a small rise, this indicates increased tensions among the Italian population. As resilience is argued to be correlated with lower social tensions, the initial spike indicates that crisis communication failed to impact these tensions after the Macerata attacks (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019). The evidence also passes a straw-in-the-wind test for H2.

Despite experiencing slightly higher social and political tensions, data shows that interpersonal trust among Italians grew following the attack. Before the attack, interpersonal trust averaged 21.0 out of 100, before increasing to 23.9 by 2019 (I.Stat, 2024). Higher interpersonal trust is thought to be correlated with lower levels of fear, and higher levels of resilience (Enjolras et al., 2019). Theory expects interpersonal trust to decrease after a crisis, therefore an increase is a plausible result of Gentiloni´s crisis communication (Enjolras et al., 2019). The evidence passes a straw-in-the-wind test for H1.

Italy also experienced some degree of self-efficacy. A week after the attack, 30.000 people went on the streets of Macerata in a large-scale protest against the shooting and growing anti-migrant sentiments (Berlenga, 2018). No proof of consistent large-scale initiatives was found.

Overall, the Italian case provides mixed evidence, with most support for H2. While interpersonal trust increased and some self-efficacy was demonstrated, social tensions rose, the GTI went up, and government bond yields remained volatile. The case therefore presents an inconclusive outcome, characterized by some vulnerability.

5.4: Discussion

Overall, the analysis of the three cases showed most support for H1, yet some evidence remains inconclusive. Across cases, society did not automatically provide resistance, symbolized by moving directly to post-crisis functioning. The passing of ´hoop tests` for engaging in crisis communication across all cases, therefore eliminated the alternative hypothesis H3. This followed Longstaff´s (2005) theoretical expectation, where terrorism´s surprising element, weakens society´s ability to maintain resistance.

Looking towards the case-studies, one interesting finding across all three cases, was that interpersonal trust either remained constant or increased after the attacks. The consistent evidence strengthens support for H1, as higher interpersonal trust is believed to correlate with lower levels of fear (Enjolras et al., 2019).

Initiatives of self-efficacy were also present across cases, yet to varying degrees. The evidence showcased nationally specific variations in community resilience. The largest consistent effects were found in New Zealand, closely followed by Norway. Both cases produce additional support for H1. Italy experienced more limited evidence of self-efficacy.

For the other indicators, the evidence remains inconsistent. Norway and New Zealand produce similar patterns with a falling GTI and lower government bond yields, indicating a transition towards resilience, supporting H1. Italy oppositely experienced both a fluctuating GTI and government bond yields, indicating vulnerability, as proposed by H2. For social and political tensions, New Zealand experienced lower levels, providing support for H1. Oppositely, Italy experienced slightly higher tensions, while Norway experienced a substantial increase, both giving support to H2.

Most evidence solely passed ´straw-in-the-wind` tests, yet passing multiple such tests adds up to important affirmative evidence (Collier, 2011). Overall, a pattern of support for H1 is formed by the cases of New Zealand and Norway. The small inconsistencies are explained, by it being a complex social phenomenon, and Stoltenberg´s involvement as Labour Party leader. The Italian case, nevertheless, stood out from the others, as the outcome was anomalous with H1. Following Beach & Pedersen (2019), this analysis therefore treats Italy as a deviant case, since the process should have linked the cause to the outcome, but it

eventually broke down (pp. 274-275). Going back over the causal chain, crisis communication strategies seem to be the differing variable.

All cases contained sense-making, unity, and meaning-making. New Zealand was the most comprehensive, with consistent engagement in all three elements. Meaning-making was especially present, translating into consistent evidence of H1. Stoltenberg also included all three elements. Again, meaning-making was central, providing further support towards H1, with small inconsistencies regarding social and political tensions. Oppositely, Gentiloni´s crisis communication remained short, with a limited attempt at meaning-making and guiding the crisis narrative. This resulted in vulnerability, as proposed by H2.

Holding the deviant case together with the evidence from Norway and New Zealand, H1´s theoretically expected importance of crisis communication in fostering community resilience is strengthened. The deviant case sheds light on the elements missing for the process to operate, and when compared with two or more typical cases, heightens the validity of the identified causal chain (Beach & Pedersen, 2019, pp. 274-275). Meaning-making seems to have affected indicators across both the case of Norway and New Zealand. Boin et al. (2016) labeled both meaning-making and sense-making as necessary for effective crisis leadership (pp. 14-15). Gentiloni´s failure to engage in meaning-making, thus explains the insufficient resource mobilization to foster resilience.

Additionally, we must understand the political context the communication was conducted within. Immediately after the attacks in Norway and New Zealand, opposition politicians put political differences aside, generally supporting the government´s crisis management (Bjørgo & Jupskås, 2021; Crothers & O'Brien, 2020). In Italy, opposition politicians instead challenged the government's crisis narrative, by fostering anti-immigrant sentiments, to exploit the situation for electoral purposes (Momigliano, 2018). Gentiloni´s failure to steer the crisis narrative, could have enticed these vulnerabilities.

Looking beyond the scope of this thesis, meaning-making´s centrality is further supported by results from other case-studies. One example is the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris, which was phrased as an attack on French democratic values and freedom of expression (Pelletier & Drozda-Senkowska, 2019). Here meaning-making was also argued to help facilitate collective recovery (Pelletier & Drozda-Senkowska, 2019, p. 793).

6. Conclusion:

Drawing on existing literature, this thesis has put forward a combined approach to determine the effect of a government´s crisis communication on community resilience in the aftermath of terrorism. Applying process-tracing to a comparative small-n analysis of terrorist incidents in Norway, New Zealand, and Italy, provided support for the primary hypothesis, H1, claiming that effective crisis communication had a positive impact on community resilience.

Following Boin et al. (2016) and Bakker & De Roy Van Zuijdewijn (2022), the analysis highlighted the importance of government leaders simultaneously engaging in meaning-making, sense-making, and fostering unity within their crisis communication, as failure to do so resulted in vulnerability. The comparative analysis showcased its value, by identifying the special role of meaning-making, in fostering positive coping mechanisms needed for community resilience. This thesis has therefore demonstrated crisis communication´s role in helping societies transition towards community resilience and post-event functioning.

The overall analysis thereby re-affirmed the effectiveness of crisis communication as a counterterrorism tool worth investing in. In a time where tensions and fear of terrorism continues to impact our societies, governments should take note off these lessons, if they wish to avoid creating what Furedi (2006) labeled a ´culture of fear`.

6.1: Strengths and limitations

This thesis has moved forward the academic discussion on crisis communication and community resilience, by studying the two strands in combination, while developing new indicators, for measuring crisis communication´s effect on community resilience. Applying new indicators, such as terrorism´s impact on government bond yields, has established ground for theoretical innovation. The drawback is, however, that effects might only be valid temporally within cases, while the complexity of community resilience only allows for partial measurements. Using multiple indicators, nevertheless, remains the best way to make complexities measurable (Goertz & Mahoney, 2012).

Most evidence only passed Collier´s (2011) ´straw-in-the-wind` tests, posing difficulties for obtaining a definitive rejection of rival hypotheses. This limitation is often seen within social

sciences, yet passing multiple of these tests, produces affirmative evidence of a hypothesis (Collier, 2011, pp. 825-826).

Process tracing´s inclusion of vast amounts of information, has heightened this study´s ability to capture *actual* causal effects, rather than quantitative methods which only capture the probabilistic averages of such effects (Clarke, 2023; Goertz & Mahoney, 2012). Additionally, data triangulation strengthened the reliability of findings. A main limitation, however, is what Bennett & Checkel (2014) labeled the risk of "infinite regress", where more data always remains available for refining the causal path (p. 102). Despite being a clear weakness, process tracing remains better suited than other methods, for systematically uncovering the largest possible portion of the causal chain.

Process tracing´s relatively large standards for selecting observations and evidence, can result in the potential introduction of bias, when selecting, arranging and presenting material for the causal chain (Bennett & Checkel, 2014, p. 103). To overcome this problem, this thesis has grounded all methodological choices in theory, including the implementation of Collier´s (2011) tests for causal inference. Full elimination of bias, nevertheless, remains hard to guarantee. This falls back to Popper´s (1963) old critique of empiricism, arguing that humans by nature, are inclined to see patterns and construct coherent narratives (p. 62).

The findings of the research contributed to highlighting the importance of meaning-making in crisis communication, for facilitating collective recovery from crises. The thesis has moved forward the academic discussion, by producing cross-case comparisons with similar findings to single-case studies of other European terrorist incidents. The comparative approach demonstrated its value, through its heightened generalizability. It must, however, be recognized, that these findings cannot be applied world-wide, as this thesis covered Western countries. Non-western perspectives remain understudied, despite most terrorist incidents occurring outside the Western world. This creates a ´Western bias`, which hurts the research agenda, and the external validity of this study (Bakker & De Roy Van Zuijdewijn, 2022, p. 90).

6.2: Future research agenda

Future studies should contribute further to the academic discussion, with theoretically founded indicators for what constitutes community resilience after a terrorist incident. In line with previous studies of indicators for community resilience in pandemics and natural disasters, core indicators should be developed for terrorism. Seeing the impact these attacks have on society, these studies have a well-founded academic and societal relevance.

As mentioned in the limitations, the field of terrorism studies would benefit from understanding terrorism through a non-Western lens. The reasoning behind the current Western focus, has been the availability of data and research funding. This does, however, not remove the need for more studies into countries where terrorism symbolizes a daily threat. Data is becoming more readily available, marking a possibility for future researchers to delve into this phenomenon. One such example is the newly launched ´Safety Perceptions Index`, which provides data on feelings of safety and risk perceptions from 121 countries worldwide (Vision of Humanity, 2023).

Moving ahead, researchers should continue to examine resilience in combination with crisis management, elevating integration of the two fields. Crisis communication remains only one element of crisis management, meaning other non-verbal strategies could also affect community resilience. As resilience is key to limiting the impact of various crises, society would benefit from further exploration into these developments.

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Appendix 1: Speech of Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg, 23ʳᵈ of July 2011 – Original Transcript and English translation provided by the Norwegian government

Original Version: Norwegian

Deres majesteter, kjære Eskil, kjære alle sammen,

Det er nå snart to døgn siden Norge ble rammet av den største ugjerningen siden krigen. På Utøya og i Oslo. Det føles som en evighet. Det har vært timer, dager og netter fylt av sjokk, fortvilelse, sinne og gråt. I dag er det tid for sorg. I dag skal vi tillate oss å stoppe litt opp. Minnes de døde. Sørge over dem som ikke er mer. 92 menneskeliv er gått tapt. Flere er fortsatt savnet. Hver og en av de som er gått bort er en tragedie. Til sammen utgjør tapet en nasjonal tragedie. Fortsatt strever vi med å begripe omfanget. Mange av oss kjente noen som er borte. Enda flere vet om noen. Jeg kjente flere. En av dem var Monica. I rundt 20 år jobbet hun på Utøya. For mange av oss var hun Utøya. Nå er hun død. Skutt og drept mens hun skapte omsorg og trygghet for ungdom fra hele landet. Hennes mann John og døtrene Victoria og Helene er i Drammen kirke i dag. Det er så urettferdig. Dere skal vite at vi gråter med dere. En annen som er borte er Tore Eikeland. Leder av AUF i Hordaland og en av våre aller mest talentfulle ungdomspolitikere. Jeg husker at han fikk hele landsmøtet i Arbeiderpartiet til å juble da han holdt et engasjert innlegg mot EUs postdirektiv, og vant. Nå er han død. Borte for alltid. Det er ikke til å begripe. Dette er to av dem vi har mistet. Vi har mistet mange andre, på Utøya og i regjeringsbygget. Snart får vi navn og bilde på alle. Da vil omfanget av ondskapen tre fram i all sin gru. Det blir en ny prøvelse. Men vi skal klare den også. Midt i alt det tragiske er jeg stolt av å bo i et land som har maktet å stå oppreist i en kritisk tid. Jeg er imponert over hvor mye verdighet, omsorg og fasthet jeg har møtt. Vi er et lite land, men vi er et stolt folk. Vi er fortsatt rystet av det som traff oss, men vi gir aldri opp våre verdier. Vårt svar er mer demokrati, mer åpenhet og mer humanitet. Men aldri naivitet. Ingen har sagt det finere enn AUF-jenta som ble intervjuet av CNN: "Om én mann kan vise så mye hat, tenk hvor mye kjærlighet vi alle kan vise sammen."

Til slutt. La meg si til familier over hele landet som har mistet en av sine kjære:
Dere har min og hele Norges dypeste medfølelse i sorgen. Ikke bare det. Hele verden føler med dere. Jeg har lovet å overbringe kondolanser til dere fra Barack Obama, Vladimir Putin, Frederik Reinfeldt, Angela Merkel, David Cameron, Dimitry Medvedev og mange andre statsledere og regjeringssjefer. Dette kan aldri erstatte tapet. Ingenting kan bringe deres kjære tilbake. Men vi trenger støtte og trøst når livet er som mørkest. Nå er livet som mørkest for dere. Dere skal vite at vi er der for dere.

Translated version: English

Your Majesties, Dear Eskil, Dear all of you,
It is nearly two days since Norway was hit by the worst atrocity it has seen since the Second World War. On Utøya, and in Oslo. It seems like an eternity. These have been hours, days and nights filled with shock, despair, anger and weeping. Today is a day for mourning. Today, we will allow ourselves to pause. Remember the dead. Mourn those who are no longer with us. 92 lives have been lost, with several people still missing. Every single death is a tragedy. Together they add up to a national tragedy. We are still struggling to take in the scale of this tragedy. Many of us know someone who has been lost. Even more know of

someone. I knew several. One of them was Monica. She worked on Utøya for 20 years or so. For many of us she was Utøya. Now she is dead. Shot and killed while providing care and security for young people from all over the country. Her husband John and daughters Victoria and Helene are in Drammen Church today. It is so unfair. I want you to know that we are weeping with you. Another is Tore Eikeland. Leader of the Labour Youth League in Hordaland and one of our most talented young politicians. I remember him being met with acclaim by the whole Labour national congress when he gave a stirring speech against the EU Postal Directive, and won the debate. Now he is dead. Gone for ever. It is incomprehensible.

 These are two of those we have lost. We have lost many more on Utøya and in the government offices. We will soon have their names and pictures. Then the full extent of this evil act will become apparent in all its horror. This will be a new ordeal, but we will get through this too. Amidst all this tragedy, I am proud to live in a country that has managed to hold its head up high at a critical time. I have been impressed by the dignity, compassion and resolve I have met. We are a small country, but a proud people. We are still shocked by what has happened, but we will never give up our values. Our response is more democracy, more openness, and more humanity. But never naivity. No one has said it better than the Labour Youth League girl who was interviewed by CNN: "If one man can create that much hate, you can only imagine how much love we as a togetherness can create." Finally, I would like to say to the families all over the country who have lost one of their loved ones: You have my and the whole of Norway's deepest sympathy for your loss. Not only that. The whole world shares your sorrow. I have promised to pass on the condolences of Barack Obama, Vladimir Putin, Frederik Reinfeldt, Angela Merkel, David Cameron, Dimitry Medvedev and many other heads of state and government. This cannot make good your loss. Nothing can bring your loved ones back. But we all need support and comfort when life is at its darkest. Now life is at its darkest for you. I want you to know that we are there for you.

Appendix 2: Speech of New Zealands Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, 19th of April, Original Transcript (Ardern, 2019)

I wish to make a ministerial statement relating to the Christchurch mosque terror attacks. Al salam alaikum. Peace be upon you, and peace be upon all of us.

The 15th of March will now be for ever a day etched in our collective memories. On a quiet Friday afternoon, a man stormed into a place of peaceful worship and took away the lives of 50 people. That quiet Friday afternoon has become our darkest of days, but for the families, it was more than that. It was the day that the simple act of prayer, of practising their Muslim faith and religion, led to the loss of their loved ones' lives. Those loved ones were brothers, daughters, fathers, and children. They were New Zealanders. They are us. And because they are us, we, as a nation, mourn them. We feel a huge duty of care to them, and we have so much we feel the need to say and to do.

One of the roles I never anticipated having, and hoped never to have, was to voice the grief of a nation. At this time, it has been second only to securing the care of those affected and the safety of everyone. In this role, I wanted to speak directly to the families. We cannot know your grief but we can walk with you at every stage. We can and will surround you with aroha, manaakitanga, and all that makes us us. Our hearts are heavy but our spirit is strong.

Less than six minutes after a 111 call was placed alerting the police to the shootings at Al Noor Mosque, police were on the scene. The arrest itself was nothing short of an act of bravery. Two country police officers rammed the vehicle from which the offender was still shooting. They pulled open his car door, when there were explosives inside, and pulled him out. I know we all wish to acknowledge that their acts put the safety of New Zealanders above their own, and we thank them, but they were not the only ones who showed extraordinary courage. Naeem Rashid, originally from Pakistan, died after rushing at the terrorist and trying to wrestle the gun from him. He lost his life trying to save those who were worshipping alongside him. Abdul Aziz, originally from Afghanistan, confronted and faced down the armed terrorist after grabbing the nearest thing to hand—a simple EFTPOS machine. He risked his life, and no doubt saved many, with his selfless bravery. There will be countless stories, some of which we may never know, but to each we acknowledge you in this place, in this House.

For many of us, the first sign of the scale of this terrorist attack was the images of ambulance staff transporting victims to Christchurch Hospital. To the first responders, the ambulance staff, and the health professionals who have assisted and who continue to assist those who have been injured, please accept the heartfelt thanks of us all. I saw first-hand your care and your professionalism in the face of extraordinary challenges. We are proud of your work and incredibly grateful for it.

Mr Speaker, if you'll allow, I'd like to talk about some of the immediate measures currently in place, especially to ensure the safety of our Muslim community, and, more broadly, the safety of everyone. As a nation, we do remain on high alert. While there isn't a specific threat at present, we are maintaining vigilance. Unfortunately, we have seen in countries that know the horrors of terrorism more than us that there is a pattern of increased tension and actions over the weeks that follow that mean that we need to ensure that vigilance is maintained. There is an additional and on-going security presence in Christchurch, and, as the police have

indicated, there will continue to be a police presence at mosques around the country while their doors are open. When they are closed, police will be in the vicinity.

There is a huge focus on ensuring the needs of families are met. That has to be our priority. A community welfare centre has been set up near the hospital in Christchurch to make sure people know how to access support. Visas for family members overseas are being prioritised so that they can attend funerals. Funeral costs are covered, and we have moved quickly to ensure that this includes repatriation costs for any family members who would like to move their loved ones away from New Zealand. We are working to provide mental health and social support. The 1737 number yesterday received roughly 600 texts or phone calls. They are, on average, lasting around 40 minutes, and I encourage anyone in need of reaching out to use these services—they are there for you.

Our language service has also provided support from more than 5,000 contacts, ensuring, whether you are ACC or the Ministry of Social Development, you're able to pass on the support that is needed in the language that is needed. To all those working within this service, we say thank you. Our security and intelligence services are receiving a range of additional information. As has been the case in the past, these are being taken extremely seriously and they are being followed up.

I know, though, that there have, rightly, been questions around how this could have happened here in a place that prides itself on being open, peaceful, diverse, and there is anger that it has happened here. There are many questions that need to be answered, and the assurance that I give you is that they will be. Yesterday, Cabinet agreed that an inquiry—one that looks into the events that led up to the attack on 15 March—will occur. We will examine what we did know, could have known, or should have known. We cannot allow this to happen again.

Part of ensuring the safety of New Zealanders must include a frank examination of our gun laws. As I've already said, our gun laws will change. Cabinet met yesterday and made in-principle decisions 72 hours after the attack. Before we meet again next Monday, these decisions will be announced.

There is one person at the centre of this terror attack against our Muslim community in New Zealand. A 28-year-old man, an Australian citizen, has been charged with one count of murder; other charges will follow. He will face the full force of the law in New Zealand. The families of the fallen will have justice. He sought many things from his act of terror, but one was notoriety, and that is why you will never hear me mention his name. He is a terrorist, he is a criminal, he is an extremist, but he will, when I speak, be nameless, and to others I implore you: speak the names of those who were lost rather than the name of the man who took them. He may have sought notoriety but we in New Zealand will give him nothing—not even his name.

We will also look at the role social media played and what steps we can take, including on the international stage and in unison with our partners. There is no question that ideas and language of division and hate have existed for decades, but their form of distribution, the tools of organisation—they are new. We cannot simply sit back and accept that these platforms just exist and that what is said on them is not the responsibility of the place where they are published. They are the publisher, not just the postman. There cannot be a case of all profit, no responsibility.

This of course doesn't take away the responsibility we too must show as a nation to confront racism, violence, and extremism. I don't have all of the answers now, but we must collectively find them and we must act. We are deeply grateful for all the messages of sympathy, support, and solidarity that we are receiving from our friends all around the world, and we are grateful to the global Muslim community who have stood with us, and we stand with them.

I acknowledge that we also stand with Christchurch and the devastating blow that this has been to their recovery, and I acknowledge every member of this House who has stood alongside their Muslim community, but especially those in Canterbury as we acknowledge this double grief.

As I conclude, I acknowledge that there are many stories that will have struck all of us since 15 March. One I wish to mention is that of Hati Mohemmed Daoud Nabi. He was a 71-year-old man who opened the door at the Al Noor Mosque and uttered the words "Hello, brother, welcome."—his final words. Of course, he had no idea of the hate that sat behind that door, but his welcome tells us so much—that he was a member of a faith that welcomed all its members, that showed openness and care.

I've said many times that we are a nation of 200 ethnicities, 160 languages. We open our doors to others and say welcome. The only thing that must change after the events of Friday is that this same door must close on all of those who espouse hate and fear. Yes, the person who committed these acts was not from here. He was not raised here. He did not find his ideology here. But that is not to say that those very same views do not live here.

I know that as a nation, we wish to provide every comfort we can to our Muslim community in this darkest of times, and we are. The mountain of flowers around the country that lie at the doors of mosques, and the spontaneous songs outside the gates—these are ways of expressing an outpouring of love and empathy. But we wish to do more. We wish for every member of our communities to also feel safe. Safety means being free from the fear of violence, but it also means being free from the fear of those sentiments of racism and hate that create a place where violence can flourish, and every single one of us has the power to change that.

On Friday, it will be a week since the attack. Members of the Muslim community will gather for worship on that day. Let us acknowledge their grief as they do. Let's support them as they gather again for worship. We are one. They are us. Tātou, tātou. Al salam alaikum. Weh Rahmat Allah. Weh Barakaatuh.

**Appendix 3: Speech of Italian Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni, 3rd of February 2018
Official Government Youtube Video with Transcript - (Gentiloni, 2018)**

Original Transcript:

Lo sparatore che stamani a Macerata ha colpito alcuni cittadini inermi è stato arrestato, e so di interpretare il sentimento di tutti nel ringraziare le forze dell'ordine per il loro intervento. Il ministro Minniti presiederà, oggi pomeriggio, il Comitato per la Sicurezza e l'Ordine Pubblico presso la Prefettura di Macerata. Sarà anche un'occasione per esprimere la vicinanza del Governo a una comunità che nei giorni scorsi è stata già colpita da un efferato delitto nel quale è stata massacrata una ragazza. La magistratura assumerà le proprie decisioni ma una cosa è certa: delitti efferati e comportamenti criminali saranno perseguiti e puniti. Questa è la legge; questo è lo stato.

Confido nel senso di responsabilità di tutte le forze politiche, comportamenti criminali non possono avere alcuna motivazione ideologica. Delinquenti sono delinquenti. Lo stato sarà particolarmente severo verso chiunque pensi di alimentare una spirale di violenza. Fermiamolo questo rischio, fermiamolo subito, fermiamolo insieme. Odio e violenza non riusciranno a dividerci. Il popolo italiano saprà stringersi attorno alle istituzioni e ai comuni valori della Repubblica.

English Translation:

The shooter who this morning in Macerata hit some armless citizens was arrested, and I know to interpret the sentiment of everyone in thanking the police for their work. Minister Minniti will preside this afternoon on the Committee for Security and Public Order at the Prefecture of Macerata. It will also be an occasion to express the closeness of the Government to a community that in recent days has already been hit by a heinous crime in which a girl was massacred. The judiciary will make its own decisions, but one thing is certain: heinous crimes and criminal behaviors will be persecuted and punished. This is the law; this is the state.

I trust in the sense of responsibility of all political forces, criminal behaviors cannot have any ideological motivation. Delinquents are delinquents. The state will be particularly strict towards anyone who thinks of fueling a spiral of violence. Let's stop this risk, let's stop it immediately, let's stop it together. Hatred and violence will not manage to divide us. The Italian people will know how to gather around the institutions and the common values of the Republic.

Appendix 4: Conceptualization – In depth discussion

<u>Terrorist Incident:</u>

Scholars have long failed to reach consensus on the definition of "terrorism", due to the terms subjective, politicized and complex nature (Bakker & De Roy Van Zuijdewijn, 2022, p. 21). A main definitional problem, is the usage of the term to de-legitimize and criminalize certain groups (Schmid, 2004, p. 385). This is often summarized in the phrase: "one man´s freedom fighter, is another man´s terrorist" (Bakker & De Roy Van Zuijdewijn, 2022, p. 35). These definitional complexities, makes it hard to establish common ground. Labelling an event as terrorism has implications, as it moves the crisis to a higher level, generally associated with increased fear levels within the population (Domschat et al., 2023; Mythen & Walklate, 2006). Despite these broader conceptual disagreements, most definitions emphasize the use of violent acts, by certain actors, to achieve political goals, through spreading fear and anxiety (Bakker & De Roy Van Zuijdewijn, 2022, p. 201).

For this analysis, the terms terrorism and terrorist incident are used interchangeably, as they denote the same basic definition. The term ´terrorist` instead signifies the perpetrator(s) committing the attack. Terrorist incidents, however, come in many different forms. To achieve a meaningful comparison across cases, this study will focus on right-wing lone actor terrorist incidents. As the expertise of intelligence agencies in disrupting large-scale plots from bigger organizations has grown, a trend has seen an increase in smaller-scale attacks, conducted by individuals (Ellis et al., 2022, p. 2). The term ´lone-actor terrorist` has faced its own debates, yet scholars have come up with a broad working definition, that also serves as a definition for this paper: "The threat or use of violence by a single perpetrator, not acting out of purely personal material reasons, but with the aim of influencing a wider audience, who acts without direct support in the planning, preparation and execution of the attack, and whose decision to act is not directed by any other group or individual" (Ellis et al., 2022, p. 4).

<u>Resilience:</u>

With roots in the fields of psychology, civil engineering and ecology, the basic connotation of the word is, the ability of an organism or material to withstand sudden shocks (Bakker & De Roy Van Zuijdewijn, 2022, p. 207). The element of surprise involved in terrorist incidents, would signify such a shock. In the context of counterterrorism, we can therefore define

resilience as "the capacity to deal with the negative impacts associated with a terrorist incident, on an individual or societal basis" (Bakker & De Roy Van Zuijdewijn, 2022, p. 207) There is no agreed consensus among scholars, about what constitutes "withstanding sudden shocks" or "the capacity to deal with negative impacts", however, ´fear management` and ´self-efficacy` are often-mentioned examples within the scholarly debate.

Fear is a central part of many terrorism definitions, therefore the management of it is key to obtaining resilience. Fear can have a broad range of negative impacts on society, including vulnerability to emotional, political and administrative overreactions (Bakker & De Roy Van Zuijdewijn, 2022, p. 204). Governments should in their crisis management and crisis communication, therefore seek to promote positive coping mechanisms, while refraining from reinforcing negative ones (Bakker & de Graaf, 2014, p. 14). This can be done by reducing fear through the use of crisis communication to construct meaning-making, or phrasing a response around principles of justice (Bakker & de Graaf, 2014, p. 15).

Another positive coping mechanism thought to strengthen societal resilience, is self-efficacy. Defined as the willingness of members of the public to move beyond being merely by-standers of a crisis, instead achieving the feeling of being actively involved in overcoming the crisis (Bakker and De Graaf, 2014, p. 15). Self-efficacy is particularly important in the early stages of a crisis, as it shapes the move from behavioral intention to action (Wirtz & Rohrbeck, 2018, p. 357). Authorities can actively use their crisis communication to shape the extent of this belief, by asking the public to help the authorities through initiatives such as donating blood, providing shelter, uploading videos and reporting suspicious behavior (Bakker & De Roy Van Zuijdewijn, 2022, pp. 214-215).

<u>Crisis:</u>
Across the different fields of study, the definition of the term varies. On a semantic level there are differences, with the discipline of sociology preferring the word ´disaster`, where communication researchers and political scientists generally have favored the terminology of ´crisis` (Sellnow & Seeger, 2021, p. 5). For this paper, disaster and crisis will be used interchangeably, as they denote the same basic concept, while allowing us to draw on an interdisciplinary variety of perspectives. Crisis can come in many different forms, varying from natural disasters, to pandemics, technological shutdowns, and terrorist-attacks. Hermann (1963) early on characterized three basic elements that separates a crisis from an unpleasant

event: "1) it threatens high-priority values of the organization, 2) it presents a restricted amount of time in which a response can be made, and 3) it is unexpected by the organization" (p. 64).

Sellnow & Seeger (2021) propose a now often cited definition of a crisis being: "a specific, unexpected, non-routine event or series of events that creates high levels of uncertainty and a significant perceived threat to high-priority goals" (p. 9). Coombs (2010) agrees on the unpredictable nature of a crisis, while adding that it is a major threat, that can have negative implications if not handled properly (p. 18). Defining a certain event as a crisis also carries significant implications, as it signals that action must be taken to mitigate the situation (Sellnow & Seeger, 2021, p. 12). An important distinction lays between an ´intentional` and an ´unintentional` crisis, with terrorism belonging to the former (Sellnow et al., 2011, pp. 9-10). The labelling becomes important, as different types of crisis requires applying different crisis management strategies (Coombs, 2023; Sellnow et al., 2011).

Crisis Communication:

Closely related to the concept of crisis, lays crisis communication. Also varying across contexts, when attributed to certain crisis definitions, the term ´crisis communication` is generally agreed to entail: "the collection, processing, and dissemination of information required to address a crisis situation" (Coombs, 2010, p. 20). A fundamental part of the communication process, is the attempt at regulating the behaviour of the receivers (Sellnow & Seeger, 2021, p. 15). Norris et al. (2008) therefore adds that crisis communication entails " the creation of common meanings and understandings and the provision of opportunities for members to articulate needs, views and attitudes" (p. 140). Crisis Communication can be roughly divided up into three core tasks: Sense-making, Meaning-making, and fostering unity (Bakker & De Roy Van Zuijdewijn, 2022).

- *Meaning-making:* "the attempt to reduce public and political uncertainty and inspire confidence in crisis leaders by formulating and imposing a convincing narrative" (Boin et al., 2016, p. 79). Meaning-making involves the process of building resilience through attributing larger meaning to experiences, such as terrorist attacks, where the abnormality of the event is stressed, while attempting at restore a normal setting (Bakker & De Roy Van Zuijdewijn, 2022, p. 210). The concept moves beyond simple

crisis communication, as it concerns itself with the challenge of formulating a convincing message, to the population, in a *political* setting (Boin et al., 2016, p. 80).

- *Sense-making:* refers to getting the facts of the situation correct, outlining what happened, how many are injured, who was the perpetrator(s) and how is the crisis being managed (Bakker & De Roy Van Zuijdewijn, 2022, p. 213).

- *Fostering Unity:* Attempting to foster solidarity and unity within a population. The process involves lower social tensions, as to not create divisions within society in the aftermath of terrorism (Bakker & De Roy Van Zuijdewijn, 2022, p. 213).

Appendix 5: Indicators

<u>Interest to mobilize resources:</u>

This step of the causal graph is at its core a ´Yes` or ´No` question, of whether a government leader chooses to mobilize resources, by pursuing crisis communication after the terrorist incident. It is nevertheless important for establishing causation, as a choice not to, would eliminate any relevance crisis communication has on the outcome of community resilience.

<u>Use of communication strategies:</u>

Sense-making refers to getting the facts of the situation correct, outlining what happened, how many are injured, who was the perpetrator(s) and how is the crisis being managed (Bakker & De Roy Van Zuijdewijn, 2022, p. 213).

Meaning-making is oppositely focused on attributing larger meaning to crisis events, by fostering a strong narrative about the situation at hand (Boin et al., 2016, p. 79). Narratives affect the sense of shared understanding among members of a community, which in turn affects their resilience (Norris et al., 2008, p. 140). Boin et al. (2016) therefore situates meaning-making as a primary responsibility of government leaders, to reduce uncertainty within the population (p. 79). The process includes things such as labelling an attack as an attack on a country values, democracy, or way of life (Bakker & De Roy Van Zuijdewijn, 2022, p. 210). Meaning-making also often involves showing empathy for victims or installing hope within the population (Bakker & De Roy Van Zuijdewijn, 2022).

Lastly, crisis communication should *foster solidarity and unity*. For community resilience to be achieved, society must be united. The tasks includes avoiding stigmatizing the community of the perpetrator, recognizing the role of various groups within a community, and generally fostering a sense of unity among the population (Bakker & De Roy Van Zuijdewijn, 2022, p. 213)

<u>Change in actions and perceptions & Change in community resilience</u>

Currently, the literature has not identified clear indicators for measuring resilience in a post-terrorism environment. This paper builds on existing literature, as well as theorized indicators from other crises, to construct a new set of indicators fitted for examining community resilience after a terrorist incident.

Overall impact of terrorism:

The closest we get to a consistently used indicator is ´The Global Terrorism Index`, which since 2007 has produced an annual ranking of 163 countries across the world. Countries are scored on a scale from 0-10, with 0 indicating no impact, and 10 indicating the highest impact (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2024). The index measures the direct and indirect effect of terrorism in a given year, through a variety of factors including total incidents, fatalities, injuries caused and hostages caused (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2024). Factors are weighed from 0-3, with a five-year weighed average applied to capture the latent psychological effects of terrorist incidents (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2024). While the index provides a general overview, various properties must be examined more in-depth to draw meaningful conclusions.

Fear:

One such property is fear, which nevertheless has remained hard to measure within a population, due to its subjective nature. Closely related to fear, is the level of interpersonal trust among a population. There is thought to be a general relationship between interpersonal trust and the levels of fear within a population. Scholarly expectation is, that interpersonal trust falls, when individuals are confronted with threatening events (Enjolras et al., 2019, pp. 40-41). Societies with high levels of interpersonal trust between citizens, are expected to be less fearful in the context of terrorist attacks (Bjørgo & Jupskås, 2021). Measuring interpersonal trust is subjective and therefore usually done in a survey format. Despite studies being conducted by national statistics agencies, all surveys were conducted similarly. Respondents were asked to relate to the following statement on a 0-10 or 0-100 scale: "Generally speaking, would you say most people can be trusted?".

Social and Political tensions:

Scholars have long argued for a link between lower social tensions and the resilience of a community. Countries with lower levels of social tensions, are argued to maintain a higher resilience to withstand different crises (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019). One indicator that captures these developments is the ´Group Grievance Indicator` from the Fragile States Index (Fund for Peace, 2024). The indicator focuses on social and political divisions between groups within a society, and their access to services, resources and feelings of participation in the political process (Fund for Peace, 2024). The score can be interpreted as the lower the number, the less social tensions are present (Fund for Peace, 2024).

Trust in national government and feelings of uncertainty:

Closely related to feelings of uncertainty is the argument, that crisis events impact financial markets, as they shape investor perceptions (Chesney et al., 2011, p. 266). Previous studies have used the stock market as an indicator, yet these markets are often volatile, with different factors influencing them. Instead, other studies have argued, that government bonds can be an indicator for whether there is trust in the national government, as well as feelings of uncertainty (Costantini & Sousa, 2022). This thesis therefore seeks to use government bonds yields as a useful combined indicator for capturing whether a population 1) has confidence in their government, and 2) have a sense of uncertainty surrounding them. As argued by, Costantini & Sousa (2022), uncertainty usually results in spikes in the sovereign bond yields of national governments (p. 2). Therefore, lower bond yields could indicate higher trust in the stability of the government (Costantini & Sousa, 2022, p. 2). If crisis communication is effective, we theorize that bond yields will fall, as trust in government is maintained, while uncertainty is lowered.

Feelings of capability:

A final indicator for the resilience of a community is self-efficacy. It involves members of a community moving from being bystanders of a crisis, to feeling actively involved in overcoming the crisis (Bakker and De Graaf, 2014, p. 15). Previous actions include initiatives such as: donating blood, providing shelter, uploading videos, reporting suspicious behavior or arranging memorial marches (Bjørgo & Jupskås, 2021). The presence of self-efficacy in the aftermath of a terrorist incident, is a strong indicator for the recovery of society, as it heightens feelings of capability, reduces fear and lowers societal tensions (Bakker & de Graaf, 2014, p. 15). Self-efficacy is less quantifiable, yet consistent proof of large-scale initiatives, would indicate higher community resilience.

Appendix 6: Coding Frame & Matrix

Categories	Description	Indicators
Meaning-Making	"The attempt to reduce public and political uncertainty and inspire confidence in crisis leaders by formulating and imposing a convincing narrative about what and why it happened." (Boin et al., 2016)	Shows empathy for victims Provides hope Attributes larger meaning to experiences
Unity	Fostering a sense of unity and solidarity among the population (Bakker & De Roy Van Zuijdewijn, 2022)	Avoids stigmatizing the community of the perpetrator. Calls for unity. Mentions relevant communities in society.
Sense-making	Getting the facts straight about the situation unfolding (Bakker & De Roy Van Zuijdewijn, 2022)	Mentions what has happened. Mentions how many are injured. Mentions how many perpetrators were involved. Mentions who oversees the crisis management

Matrix:

Category:	Indicator	Norway	New Zealand	Italy
Meaning-Making	Shows empathy for victims.	"Every single death is a tragedy" (Stoltenberg, 2011) "Many of us know someone who has been lost"	"Those loved ones were brothers, daughters, fathers, and children. They were New Zealanders. They are us. And because they are us, we,	"It will also be an occasion to express the closeness of the Government to a community that in recent days has already been hit by a heinous crime in which a girl

		(Stoltenberg, 2011). "I want you to know that we are weeping with you." (Stoltenberg, 2011) "Finally, I would like to say to the families all over the country who have lost one of their loved ones: You have my and the whole of Norway's deepest sympathy for your loss." (Stoltenberg, 2011) "This cannot make good your loss. Nothing can bring your loved ones back. But we all need support and comfort when life is at its darkest. Now life is at its darkest for you. I want you to know that we are there for you." (Stoltenberg, 2011)	as a nation, mourn them." (Ardern, 2019) "We cannot know your grief but we can walk with you at every stage. We can and will surround you with aroha, manaakitanga, and all that makes us us. Our hearts are heavy but our spirit is strong." (Ardern, 2019)	was massacred." (Gentiloni, 2018)

| | Provides hope. | "We are still shocked by what has happened, but we will never give up our values" (Stoltenberg, 2011)

"This will be a new ordeal, but we will get through this too." (Stoltenberg, 2011)

"Amidst all this tragedy, I am proud to live in a country that has managed to hold its head up high at a critical time" (Stoltenberg, 2011) | "As I conclude, I acknowledge that there are many stories that will have struck all of us since 15 March. One I wish to mention is that of Hati Mohemmed Daoud Nabi. He was a 71-year-old man who opened the door at the Al Noor Mosque and uttered the words "Hello, brother, welcome."—his final words. Of course, he had no idea of the hate that sat behind that door, but his welcome tells us so much—that he was a member of a faith that welcomed all its members, that showed openness and care." (Ardern, 2019) | "The judiciary will make its own decisions, but one thing is certain: heinous crimes and criminal behaviors will be persecuted and punished. This is the law; this is the state." (Gentiloni, 2018) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Attributes larger meaning to experiences | "Our response is more democracy, more openness, and more humanity." Stoltenberg, 2011) | "He sought many things from his act of terror, but one was notoriety, and that is why you will never hear me mention his name. He is a | |

| | | We are a small country, but a proud people. (Stoltenberg, 2011)

"We are still shocked by what has happened, but we will never give up our values" (Stoltenberg, 2011) | terrorist, he is a criminal, he is an extremist, but he will, when I speak, be nameless, and to others I implore you: speak the names of those who were lost rather than the name of the man who took them. He may have sought notoriety but we in New Zealand will give him nothing—not even his name." (Ardern, 2019)

"I've said many times that we are a nation of 200 ethnicities, 160 languages. We open our doors to others and say welcome. The only thing that must change after the events of Friday is that this same door must close on all of those who espouse hate and fear." (Ardern, 2019) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|

Unity	Avoids stigmatizing the community of the perpetrator.		"Unfortunately, we have seen in countries that know the horrors of terrorism more than us that there is a pattern of increased tension and actions over the weeks that follow that mean that we need to ensure that vigilance is maintained." (Ardern, 2019)	"I trust in the sense of responsibility of all political forces, criminal behaviors cannot have any ideological motivation." (Gentiloni, 2018)

| | Calls for unity. | "No one has said it better than the Labour Youth League girl who was interviewed by CNN: "If one man can create that much hate, you can only imagine how much love we as a togetherness can create."" (Stoltenberg, 2011) | "Al salam alaikum. Peace be upon you, and peace be upon all of us."

"This of course doesn't take away the responsibility we too must show as a nation to confront racism, violence, and extremism" (Ardern, 2019)

"We are one. They are us. Tātou, tātou. Al salam alaikum. Weh Rahmat Allah. Weh Barakaatuh." (Ardern, 2019) | "The state will be particularly strict towards anyone who thinks of fueling a spiral of violence." (Gentiloni, 2018)

"Let's stop this risk, let's stop it immediately, let's stop it together." (Gentiloni, 2018)

"Hatred and violence will not manage to divide us." (Gentiloni, 2018)

"The Italian people will know how to gather around the institutions and the common values of the Republic." (Gentiloni, 2018) |
| | Mentions relevant communities in society. | | "It was the day that the simple act of prayer, of practising their Muslim faith and religion, led to the loss of their loved ones' lives" (Ardern, 2019) | |

			"On Friday, it will be a week since the attack. Members of the Muslim community will gather for worship on that day. Let us acknowledge their grief as they do. Let's support them as they gather again for worship" (Ardern, 2019)	
Sense-making	Mentions what has happened.	"It is nearly two days since Norway was hit by the worst atrocity it has seen since the Second World War" (Stoltenberg, 2011)	"The 15th of March will now be for ever a day etched in our collective memories. On a quiet Friday afternoon, a man stormed into a place of peaceful worship and took away the lives of 50 people." (Ardern, 2019) "Less than six minutes after a 111 call was placed alerting the police to the shootings at Al Noor Mosque, police were on the scene." (Ardern, 2019)	"The shooter who this morning in Macerata hit some armless citizens was arrested, and I know to interpret the sentiment of everyone in thanking the police for their work" (Gentiloni, 2018)

	Mentions how many are injured.	"92 lives have been lost, with several people still missing." Stoltenberg, 2011)	"On a quiet Friday afternoon, a man stormed into a place of peaceful worship and took away the lives of 50 people." (Ardern, 2019)	"The shooter who this morning in Macerata hit some armless citizens was arrested" (Gentiloni, 2018)

	Mentions how many perpetrators were involved.		"On a quiet Friday afternoon, a man stormed into a place of peaceful worship and took away the lives of 50 people." (Ardern, 2019) "There is one person at the centre of this terror attack against our Muslim community in New Zealand. A 28-year-old man, an Australian citizen, has been charged with one count of murder; other charges will follow" (Ardern, 2019)	"The shooter who this morning in Macerata hit some armless citizens was arrested" (Gentiloni, 2018)
	Mentions who oversees the crisis management.		"As a nation, we do remain on high alert. While there isn't a specific threat at present, we are maintaining vigilance" (Ardern, 2019) "There is an additional and on-going security presence in Christchurch, and, as the	"Minister Minniti will preside this afternoon on the Committee for Security and Public Order at the Prefecture of Macerata." (Gentiloni, 2018)

			police have indicated, there will continue to be a police presence at mosques around the country while their doors are open. When they are closed, police will be in the vicinity." (Ardern, 2019)	
			"We are working to provide mental health and social support. The 1737 number yesterday received roughly 600 texts or phone calls. They are, on average, lasting around 40 minutes, and I encourage anyone in need of reaching out to use these services—they are there for you." (Ardern, 2019)	

Appendix 7: Collier´s (2011) Process Tracing Tests for Causal Inference

    1) Straw-in-the-wind

These tests can either increase the plausibility of a hypothesis or raise doubts about it, yet alone they do not produce decisive evidence. Out of Collier´s four tests, they are the weakest, but also the most common, as they require the least possible evidence and restrictions on the researcher. Straw-in-the-wind tests are often used to produce valuable benchmarks and give an initial indication of the examined hypothesis. Collier does, however, argue that if multiple straw-in-the-wind tests pass, it can add up to affirmative evidence.

    2) Hoop

These tests have a more demanding standard for passing, yet in themselves cannot confirm a hypothesis. Despite not confirming a hypothesis, if passed, it contributes to the relevance of that hypothesis. Hoop tests can, however, eliminate a hypothesis if they fail, as the evidence then does not reach the threshold of "jumping through the hoop". These tests also have stronger implications for rival hypothesis, as passing the test can result in weakening rival hypothesis, without fully removing the possibility that alternative hypothesis may be of relevance.

    3) Smoking-Gun

The metaphorical image of this test is the idea, that if a suspect is caught holding a smoking gun, they can be expected to be guilty. If this test passes, it is often thought as sufficient criteria for accepting causal inference. Passing the test provides strong evidence for the examined hypothesis, however, failure to pass does not mean elimination of that hypothesis. Passing a smoking-gun test also substantially weakens rival hypothesis, yet it does not finally exclude them.

    4) Doubly-Decisive.

This test is the strongest of the four, thereby also the rarest. It has the necessary and sufficient standard for establishing causation, as passing the test simultaneously confirms one hypothesis, while eliminating all others. The doubly-decisive are especially rare within social science. The few times they are achieved, it has been done through the combination of multiple tests, that creates leverage enough to confirm one hypothesis, while eliminating all others.

Appendix 8: Context of each case study

Case study I: Oslo & Utøya Attacks Norway

On 22nd of July 2011, Norway experienced a terrorist incident, as lone-actor terrorist Anders Breivik attacked government offices in Oslo with a car-bomb, followed by a gun-attack aimed at the Norwegian Labour Party´s annual summer camp on the island of Utøya (Bjørgo & Jupskås, 2021, pp. 2-3). Leading up to the attack, Breivik had prepared a 1500-page manifesto of anti-islamic sentiments, containing his ideas about the war against the ´invasion` of Islam into Europe (Bjørgo & Jupskås, 2021, p. 3).

For a country not often hit by terrorism, this attack symbolizes an interesting case for examining what impact the government´s crisis communication had on community resilience in the aftermath of the attack. The case differentiates itself from the two other case studies, since it was targeted towards the government, more specifically the Labour party. While the two other cases directly targeted migrants or muslims, Breivik targeted the government itself, whom he viewed as responsible for the problems of migration.

Case Study II: Christchurch Attacks, New Zealand

On 15th of March 2019, a lone-actor terrorist attacked two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, killing 51 individuals and wounding many more (Crothers & O'Brien, 2020, p. 248). The perpetrator emailed his 74-page manifesto, ´The Great Replacement`, containing extreme anti-migrant rhetoric, to politicians and news agencies, while livestreaming parts of the attack on Facebook (Crothers & O'Brien, 2020, p. 248).

The case differs from the other case studies, as the perpetrator used social media to live-stream the attacks (Crothers & O'Brien, 2020, p. 248). Traditional media and government agencies therefore no longer maintained a ´filter` on the communication of images. The increased exposure of society to images of the attacks, can have influenced fear levels and impact of the terrorist incident among the general public (Bakker & De Roy Van Zuijdewijn, 2022, p. 203).

Case Study III: Macerata Attack Italy

On February 3rd, 2018, the town of Macerata Italy was hit by a terrorist incident, injuring 6 migrants. The perpetrator, a lone-actor terrorist, and member of far-right party Lega Nord,

shot at a crowd of migrants (Marone, 2023, p. 20). The perpetrator maintained extreme anti-migrant views, evident both through the targets of his attack, as well as a short speech he improvised during his arrest (Marone, 2023, p. 20). The attack was additionally framed as a revenge for the rape and murder of a 18-year old Italian girl a few days earlier (Marone, 2023, p. 20).

The attack marks an interesting case for this study, as Italy long have been characterized by high levels of far-right mobilization, yet very low incidence of lone-actor terrorist attacks (Marone, 2023, p. 19). The Italian case differs from the two other attacks in several ways. Firstly, there were no casualties from the attack, yet 6 individuals suffered injuries. Secondly, Italy it is embedded within a larger context by being a European Union member. As shown previously by De Roy Van Zuijdewijn & Sciarone (2021), terrorist incidents happening in other European Union countries has convergent effects on the issue salience across the Union (pp. 1727-1728). We may therefore expect a skewed outcome on indicators. Lastly, the perpetrator was a member of the political party Lega Nord. As shown previously, the politicized nature of terrorism creates problems around labelling, since different political interests might shape the crisis management process (Bakker & De Roy Van Zuijdewijn, 2022).