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## **Accessing EU trade policies: Exploring the effect of increased parliamentary power on lobby access post-Lisbon**

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# Accessing EU trade policies: Exploring the effect of increased parliamentary power on lobby access post- Lisbon

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## **Abstract**

In light of the Lisbon Treaty's reforms in 2007, which increased the legislative powers of the European Parliament (EP), this thesis examines changes in interest group access to the European Union (EU) trade policies. Drawing on theories of access, it focuses on the interplay of demand for and supply of lobby activities and information leading to access as a result of the EP's new legislative powers. Using a qualitative comparative analysis of the pre-Lisbon EU-Mexico and post-Lisbon EU-Japan trade agreements, it aims to explore engagement levels of interest groups with Members of the European Parliament (MEP) and committee staff. The result of increased access to the EP post-Lisbon uncovers mechanisms through which interest groups and the EP navigate the evolving terrain of EU trade policy-making. Furthermore, it offers broader implications of institutional reforms on interest representation within supranational governance structures.

## **1. Introduction**

Between 2012 and 2016, the number of personal accreditations in the EP grew from around 2000 to more than 6000 (Ripoll Servent, 2018). This raises the question of why all those interest representatives deem the EP an attractive lobby destination and how lobbyists can access it. Aligned with the increasing trend of European integration, interest groups have redirected their focus towards the EP as a legislator (Eckes, 2019; Hix & Hoyland, 2022; Woolcock, 2010). One possible trigger for that development is the Treaty of Lisbon which has earned the nickname "The Treaty of Parliaments" because it increased the power of the European and national Parliaments with the central goal of democratic accountability and transparency (Brok & Selmayr, 2008; Woolcock, 2010). One of the policy areas that saw the most significant increase in EP power through the Lisbon Treaty was trade. Over the last few decades, EU trade agreements have received growing attention simultaneously (EPRS, 2016).

Hence, this thesis studies interest group access to the EP on trade policies in the legislative terms before and after the conclusion of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. This is relevant for the following reasons. Firstly, the EU is a case *sui generis*. It offers a unique institutional setting since it engages in trade negotiations with its trading partners as a single body with a single common trade policy. Meanwhile, it accommodates national interests through institutional integration with the Commission negotiating agreements on behalf of the member states (Belloc & Guerrieri, 2008). Secondly, trade policies are a relevant unit of analysis. This is because the majority of EU legislation is revising existing legislation whereas trade policies, which are created individually, offer broader opportunities for interest groups to exert influence (Rasmussen, 2015). Therefore, scholars such as Larsen (2020) advocate for an examination not merely of whether the influence of the EP in trade negotiations has increased through Lisbon, but particularly of the ways in which this influence is used, encompassing the active engagement of interest groups. Theoretically, this paper draws on theories of access and emphasizes the relevance of legislative design within this framework, highlighting the processes behind EU trade agreements that are often overlooked in quantitative research (e.g., Chalmers, 2013; Hanegraaff et al., 2023; Klüver, 2013). By scrutinizing the EP's role, this thesis aims to unveil the evolving dynamics of interest group access amidst the shifting power structures post-Lisbon. This leads to answering the research question of how the increasing power of the EP through the Lisbon Treaty changed the access of interest groups for trade policies.

Such research is novel in two ways: It contributes to filling the gap in EU lobbying literature which is dominated by research on access to the European Commission (hereinafter Commission) (Eising, 2007). Within the debate of legislative power changes and lobbying, it contributes to the holistic understanding of access to trade policies. Moreover, it adds to literature on the EP's enhanced role following institutional changes. As the effect on trade policies is an area with limited prior investigation, this thesis expands this understanding by

focusing on the comparison of two trade agreements in a most-similar systems design: The EU-Mexico trade agreement of 2000 and the EU-Japan trade agreement of 2019. This offers an in-depth study of interest group activities for both agreements which each received little attention in public discourse and scholarly literature. The research is complemented by within-case process-tracing to examine not only access opportunities that the EP offers but also the extent to which lobbyists seek access. The findings are based on the comprehensive examination of direct and indirect lobbying opportunities and efforts, e.g., workshops, hearings, and stakeholder consultations.

The thesis puts access in focus as a relevant factor that is worth studying as it can bias policy outcomes (Eising, 2007). With the increasing depth of EU trade agreements, voices of discontent and skepticism towards trade policy from interest groups and civil society have become louder (De Bièvre and Poletti, 2020). As the European trade policy faces increasing scrutiny regarding its accountability and responsibility towards civil society, it is crucial to highlight the role of interest groups since they serve as the voice of citizens and business interests, ensuring that diverse perspectives are represented in policy discussions (EPRS, 2016). As assumed by Van den Putte (2014) and Hauser (2011) for EU trade policies overall, this thesis also finds that access of interest groups to trade policy decision-making of the EP specifically has increased because of the Lisbon Treaty. Accordingly, increased parliamentary power led to increased access. Although there is evidence of lobby access pre-Lisbon, the extent of access in the post-Lisbon era notably surpassed this. In both cases, efforts were made to gain access. However, the comparatively limited access before the Lisbon Treaty was due to the EP offering few access opportunities and the interest groups, which supply lobbying activities, being less active because the EP had restricted legislative power.

The thesis is organized as follows: First, it briefly presents the existing literature on access of interest groups in and outside trade policies and on the effect of legislative power shifts on access. Second, the theoretical framework will outline the links between the demand

and supply side of information as an access good and their causal relation to legislative power changes. Third, it will be discussed why a comparative analysis with complementary within-case process tracing was chosen and how alternative explanation can be ruled out. Lastly, this thesis will test the theory by conducting a comparative analysis in a most-similar system design. The final section concludes the findings and limitations of this research.

## **2. Literature review**

### **2.1 Access to institutions**

Interest groups can access, lobby, and then potentially influence the outcome of trade policies of the EU. Kohler-Koch (1997) focus on lobby influence based on characteristics of the interest group, but later approaches such as Bouwen's (2004) took one step back and added the variable of access to decision-makers. Knowing that access is not a sufficient but necessary condition for the exertion of influence and success of lobbying activities (Ainsworth, 1993; Bouwen, 2002), it now holds significant importance in contemporary European literature concerning lobbying (Coen, 2007). Following this, Binderkrantz et al. (2017, p. 306) define access as "instances where a group has entered a political arena (parliament, administration, or media) passing a threshold controlled by relevant gatekeepers (politicians, civil servants, or journalists)".

Prior studies have shown that access to political institutions can be achieved through different channels. Antoine et al. (2024), De Bruycker and Beyers (2015) for example argue that securing media coverage has become a crucial strategy for interest groups to gain access. Junk (2020) finds that chances for access can be increased through coalition building of interest groups whereas Eising (2007) deems the size, internationality, and mission of interest groups relevant. Meanwhile, De Bruycker and Hanegraaff (2024) present that even financial resources can enhance interest groups' influence on public opinion and provide them with increased access to policy-makers. However, Carroll and Rasmussen (2017), Klüver (2013), Ibenskas and

Buena (2021) argue against this perspective, asserting that access to the EP is not contingent on financial means but rather on the promotion of legitimacy and connections to member states and voters. This emphasis on legitimacy has become more pertinent with the growing power of the EP (Eckes, 2019; Larsen, 2020; Van den Putte et al., 2014).

There is also variation in the lobbying target. As noted by Rasmussen and Gross (2015), numerous national interest organizations now aim to directly present their concerns to both the Commission and the EP. It is consequently the legislative power of the institution that determines the incentives to seek access (Berkhout et al., 2017) which leads to a strong relevance of legislative power as a determinant of access to trade policies. Correspondingly, as the content and scope of trade agreements evolved, so did the interest of interest groups that aim to partake in its negotiations and access decision-making processes (EPRS, 2016). The EU's trade agreements are mixed agreements when they cover several policy areas such as environmental policy or human rights and therefore require consent from both the EU and member states (Conconi et al., 2021). Since most EU trade agreements are mixed (Conconi et al., 2021), growing politicization led to Lisbon formalizing parliamentary engagement (Van den Putte et al., 2014). The EP is now involved in agenda setting through informal consultations, in the negotiation stage as an observer, and in the ratification stage through signature and consent of trade agreements (Ripoll Servent, 2014). Moreover, only once the EP has given consent, the Council of the European Union (hereinafter Council) can adopt decisions, which is why the Commission now regularly communicates with the EP to guarantee democratic oversight (Devuyst, 2014; EPRS, 2016; Rosen, 2017). This has resulted in new layers of political discussion and increased transparency in the EU trade policy-making process (Kleinmann, 2015).

Some scholars (Kleinmann, 2011; Leeg, 2014) contend that despite the newfound powers, the EP's impact on EU trade negotiations remains limited, citing its comparative lag behind the Council in legal authority, experience, and technical proficiency. Conversely,



Devuyst (2014), Eckes (2019), and Van den Putte et al. (2014) argue that the EP does exert influence in negotiations, attributing this to its growing expertise and the increasing politicization of the trade agenda.

## 2.2 Access good: Information

The dimensions of this newly found power through Lisbon can be connected to information as an access good. The literature on access suggests a broad range of explanations that connect through the provision of information (Crombez, 2002). Beyers (2004, p. 213) puts this in focus by defining access as “the exchange of policy-relevant information with public officials through formal or informal networks”.

To gain access, interest groups can either rely on formal or informal strategies. The former involves the provision of papers, amendments, parliamentary inquiries, and own-initiative reports (Dionigi, 2017). The latter encompasses regular communication and relationship management, engagement with various interest groups, sharing of information, and ultimately establishing oneself as a significant player and informational resource within the legislative process (Dionigi, 2017). This perception dates back to early scholars such as Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) who theorize access to policymakers through their Resource Dependency Theory. It asserts that organizations require support from their external surroundings. This implies that decision-makers depend on expert information to create policies. From the same point of view, Woll and Artigas (2007) assume that, for example, businesses engage in lobbying efforts not merely through the exchange of votes or money, but by providing expertise and political backing in return for access to decision-making processes (Kleinmann, 2011).

The need for more information stems from two streams because there exist two types of information: Technical information focusing on content, and political information which is information about the preferences of other actors (Brandsma, 2013). Van Schendelen (2013) emphasizes the EU's dependence on interest groups for technical information due to budget

constraints, while other scholars, noting the dual role of the EP as both a legislative body and a political forum, argue for MEPs' requirement of a mix of technical and political information to engage effectively in decision-making (Coen & Katsaitis, 2014; Lehmann, 2009). De Bièvre and Poletti (2020) also find that more politicization of trade issues leads to a higher demand for information from decision-makers.

### 2.3 Access and legislative power shifts

To my knowledge, no study provides evidence for the concrete effect of legislative power shifts on access for interest groups to the EP and let alone to trade policy-making of the EP.

Eckes (2019), Ripoll Servent (2014), and Rosen (2017) highlight the enhancement of the EP's role in negotiations as a legislative actor post-Lisbon regarding international agreements. Other scholars (Rittberger, 2012; Woolcock; 2010) agree with those findings in the context of EU trade policy-making as well, and Pasquariello Mariano and Luciano Theodoro (2019) even diagnose the parliamentarization of EU trade policies. However, those scholars do not address the specific role of interest groups accessing the EP. Especially regarding the role of legislative changes for access, the literature is limited to few scholars highlighting only the overall relevance of legislative power for access (Bouwen, 2002, 2004; Dür & De Bièvre, 2007; Eising, 2007).

Literature on EU legislative changes suggests that it increases lobbying. While Klüver et al. (2014) focus on lobbying and present a contextual approach to EU legislative lobbying which shows that lobbying is influenced by institutional factors, these findings are not specific to trade policies. When it comes to the relation of legislative power shift to the EP and lobbying, most scholars were merely able to predict effects and did little to back up this connection. Van den Putte et al. (2014) observe that the normative approach of the EP to trade negotiations has increased post-Lisbon, predicting stronger ties with interest groups. However, they do not specify this claim in terms of accessibility or the concrete relationship with these interest

groups. Hauser (2011) predicted that the Lisbon Treaty would increase EU lobbying overall but did not specify particular policy areas. Thus, the author identifies a research gap regarding Lisbon's impact on lobbying access to EU institutions, which this thesis will address. Hence, the question of how the Lisbon Treaty has led to changes in access of interest groups to decision-making processes around trade policies in the EP is unanswered and will be discussed in the following.

### **3. Theory**

Through the Lisbon Treaty, the EP is now a stronger platform for policy-making that is not only in need of more information on the demand side but also one that is more appealing to interest groups who are on the supply side.

Based on the literature, it is clear that lobbying access should have increased because of two simultaneous developments, namely 1) a shift in demand for information in return for access driven by the assumption that new competencies will result in an increased need by the EP, and 2) a shift in supply of information in return for access caused by increased legislative output and enhanced reward for lobbying. This constitutes a symbiotic relationship.

#### **3.1 Demand**

Bouwen's (2002) theory of access goods combines several mechanisms in which information as an access good is relevant. It states that in exchange for access to policy-makers and the decision-making process, interest groups have to provide expert knowledge, knowledge on the needs and interests of the sector relevant to the policy field, and interest of the sectors in the European economic field. While Bouwen (2002) states that the demand for expert knowledge is limited because of the limited legislative role that the EP had, the Lisbon Treaty now increased this legislative power and therefore the demand for this type of information.

In addition, trade is often a complex policy area that requires high technical expertise, e.g., for information on regulations and their economic consequences (Antoine et al., 2024). As the EP has to react to Commission reports that are highly technical, it is in need of more technical information. Consequently, the EP faces limitations in staff, resources, expertise for drafting amendments, and research capabilities (Kleinmann, 2011; Richardson, 2012). Hence, MEPs, their assistants, and committee staff have incentives to seek assistance from interest groups. This implies that the more informational value the interest group has for the decision-maker, the more they gain early access to the legislative process (Coen & Katsaitis, 2014).

On the other hand, we know that more politicization of issues leads to more demand of the EP for on-the-ground political information (Coen & Katsaitis, 2014; De Bièvre & Poletti, 2020; De Bruycker & Hanegraaff, 2023; Lehmann, 2009). When the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, Woolcock (2010) predicted that the EP's increased powers over the EU's trade policy would also partially fill a democratic deficit. Lobbyists help to legitimize the EP by representing citizens' interests and filling representational gaps through information, e.g., on voter support (Devuyst, 2014; Eckes, 2019).

### 3.2 Supply

In addition to the increased demand of the EP for contact with interest groups, "Lobbyists target institutions where power is concentrated" (Hauser, 2011, p. 706). Power shifts promoted the EP's attractiveness as a lobby destination, in addition to ease of access compared to the Commission and Council. The Council is even less attractive after Lisbon because of the decreased veto power of its members, leading interest groups to the EP (Devuyst, 2014). While the policy development phase within the Commission may seem more appealing and advantageous, the EP offers greater accessibility for interest groups from the beginning (Dionigi, 2017; Dür, 2008).

Despite that, since Lisbon took power away from the member states and increased the power of the EP, especially for trade policies, the attention of domestic lobby groups shifted to the EP. MEPs' ties with their home countries increased this effect further (Kleinmann & Hillmann, 2010). The attractiveness of the EP as a lobby destination is also determined by the offer of contact points such as hearings, workshops, meetings, and roundtables with the responsible committees and staff, leading to increased incentive for lobbying efforts (Woolcock, 2010).

Combining the demand and supply side of access goods implies the following hypothesis:

*The increased power of the European Parliament through the Lisbon Treaty increases interest groups' access to the decision-making process in trade policies.*

In the following, I will outline how the link of EP power post-Lisbon to interest group access will be tested.

#### **4. Methodology**

To test this hypothesis, this thesis will use comparative analysis. It compares the cases of two Free Trade Agreements (FTA), the pre-Lisbon EU-Mexico Economic Partnership Agreement (hereinafter MEUFTA) in force since 2000, and the post-Lisbon EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (hereinafter JEUFTA) in force since 2019. These cases were selected as they are most similar based on the type of agreement, significance of trade relations, geographic proximity, level of politicization, and because of their conditions of negotiations. Despite that, previous research (Larsen, 2020) found that the EP emerged as an influential player specifically during EU-Japan trade agreement negotiations. The comparative analysis is complemented by within-case process-tracing to create cross-case inferences and clarify the mechanism that connected the cause and outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2019; e.g., as used by Clarke, 2018). To prevent confounding variables such as the anticipation of the Lisbon Treaty or increased lobby efforts towards the end of tedious negotiation processes (see EU-South Korea Trade

Agreement (Elsig and Dupont, 2012)), a comparison of two cases was chosen over a within-case comparison over time of a single agreement that was negotiated pre- and post-Lisbon such as EU-MERCOSUR.

To compare access pre- versus post-Lisbon, this thesis will look at the overall level of engagement of the EP with interest groups, the change of access opportunities, and the efforts that interest groups make to lobby the EP. This can be operationalized through the findings of Ripoll Servent (2018), Eising (2007), and Antoine et al. (2024) who identify the following lobbying channels: Informal and formal opportunities for meetings with MEPs, MEP assistants, committee and other EP staff. Guided by Hauser's (2011) research on EU-lobbying post-Lisbon and De Bruycker's and Beyers' (2019) conceptualization of modes of lobbying in the EU, this thesis will make use of sources that provide information on events, workshops and hearings organized by the responsible Committees or the Commission for EU stakeholder consultation, and contact with third country's industries, thinktanks, and stakeholders, as well as activities of consultative committees and workgroups. This also includes parliamentary resolutions, meeting minutes, impact assessments, as well as media monitoring and press releases regarding interest group activities. Focus will be on the EP Committee on International Trade (INTA) as the committee in charge of JEUFTA, and the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) for MEUFTA. This is because INTA was only established in 2004. Before that, ITRE (formerly named Committee on Industry, Trade, Research and Energy) was the committee responsible for trade matters. Conclusions on the level of access for each trade agreement will be drawn based on the aggregated amount and extent of direct and indirect opportunities that interest groups had to access the decision-making process, and the efforts that interest groups made to seize access.

To access older documents, digital archives and databases such as Policy Commons, Wayback Machine, ProQuest, Kluwer Law International, and others were used. A potential bias of those sources is that they are mostly published by the policy-makers themselves which is

why I cross-checked the information of the policy-makers with press releases and statements of interest groups. For this research, time is the largest obstacle to comparison and an alternative explanation of increased lobbying access. As MEUFTA was negotiated around 25 years ago, the risk of incomplete and undigitized documentation remains. Many of the MEUFTA documents are in paper and under closed access in the archives of the European University Institute in Florence. Nonetheless, to ensure comparability of information about both agreements, only sources that publish information since 1995 were used. Only since 2019 is it mandatory for MEPs to publish meetings. Hence, there is no data available on either of the agreements. Moreover, the transparency register has only been launched on 23.06.2011 which is why it cannot be used as a mean of comparison. This led to avoiding the use of the transparency register and reports on individual meetings of MEPs in this thesis, and also rules out enhanced transparency requirements over time as an alternative explanation. Moreover, media outlets usually tend to cover politicized topics rather than offer general information on access. Politicization could also be a confounding variable for the supply of lobbying from interest groups. However, this will most likely not bias the results of this thesis as both JEUFTA and MEUFTA are agreements that experienced little public attention and politicization. Furthermore, this thesis does not differentiate the level of access among different types of interest groups such as Civil Society Organizations (CSO), trade unions, and business associations, as well as among different interest fields such as environmental issues, human rights, or labor rights. This is because it would bias the results since this thesis looks at an agreement of a developing country versus an agreement of a developed country that are each characterized by different dominating interest groups and export competing industries.

To confirm the hypothesis, it is necessary to observe that the increased legislative power of the EP resulted in increased access to JEUFTA compared to MEUFTA. If this occurs based on the mentioned indicators and while ruling out alternative explanations, it implies that the

changes in legislative power through the Lisbon Treaty are a sufficient condition for more interest group access.

## 5. Comparability of the EU-Japan FTA and EU-Mexico FTA

In 1994, Mexico started trade negotiations with the EU on an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). At the time of negotiations, the EU was Mexico's second-largest trade partner (Sanahuja, 2000). While Mexico's trade volume in 1999 was lower than Japan's (see Table 1), it still had significant weight as a trading partner since MEUFTA was the first time that the EU entered into such an agreement with a Latin American country (Grieger, 2020).

On 28.05.2011 in Brussels, the EU and Japan decided during their 20<sup>th</sup> summit to initiate an FTA which would also be concluded as an EPA. At that time, Japan and the EU were major trading partners. In 2011, Japan was a key trading partner for the European Union, ranking as the seventh largest for imports and exports (European Commission, 2018).

**Table 1:** Trade volume of the EU with Japan and Mexico in billion euro.

	EU to Japan (1999)	EU to Japan (2015)	EU to Mexico (1999)	EU to Mexico (2015)
<b>Exports</b>	35.0	54.7	10.4	31.9
<b>Imports</b>	70.0	52.4	4.7	17.7

Source: Table based on figures by Allen (2000a, 2000b) and Eurostat (2022a, 2022b).

Significant welfare effects were both expected in the case of JEUFTA (Copenhagen Economics, 2009) and MEUFTA (Sanahuja, 2000). Mexico's membership in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) made it an attractive country for foreign direct investment (Condon, 2007), and eventually under MEUFTA, the EU was granted similar market access as the US (Dür, 2007). In short, MEUFTA and JEUFTA do not have the same levels of trade volume and yet their significance is comparable.



### 5.1 Legislative framework and mode of negotiations

With negotiations starting in 2012, JEUFTA was finalized in 2017 and submitted to the Council in April 2018. In the autumn of 2018, the INTA committee submitted its recommendation for acceptance which then led to the EP to decide with a single vote under the consent procedure for the Council to finish the conclusion of the agreement (Chowdhry et al., 2018). Additionally, the EP issued several resolutions throughout the negotiations and a non-legislative resolution that put forward detailed opinions on the agreement and proposed next steps for its implementation (see Appendix 11). JEUFTA includes tariffs, non-tariff measures, services, investment, intellectual property rights, competition, and public procurement. In addition, a complementary agreement, which would cover political, global, and sectoral cooperation, was negotiated simultaneously (Armanoviča, 2012). Unlike mixed agreements such as the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), it did not require ratification by the member states as its scope was under exclusive EU competence because of Lisbon's new rules (Austrian Federal Chamber of Labour, 2018; Chowdhry et al., 2018). This characteristic allows to analyze the effects of the Lisbon Treaty in comparison with MEUFTA which required member states' ratification.

MEUFTA, referred to as the Global Agreement, was signed in 1997 and entered into force in 2000 (Grieger, 2020). It covered trade in goods and some non-tariff measures (NTM). Most NTMs and trade in services were negotiated outside of EP competence (see Appendix 1). An Interim Agreement was negotiated, ratified first in 1998, and in force two months later, which allowed for trade discussions and ratifications to start without awaiting ratification by 15 member states of the Global Agreement in other issue areas (Zabludovsky & Gomez Lora, 2005). Additionally, a joint declaration in 1997 stipulated parallel negotiations by the Joint Council on trade matters falling under the competence of the European Community, and on other trade-related matters (see Appendix 1) which were the competence of member states

(Appendix 10; Grieger, 2020). As MEUFTA was negotiated under the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EP was only allowed to vote on the agreement going into effect (Szymanski & Smith, 2005). It voted twice in the last phases of the process, in 1998 and 1999, to approve or reject the text that was negotiated by the Commission (Szymanski & Smith, 2005). MEUFTA and JEUFTA had a similar procedure timeline, and the EP plenary ratified them after the first reading (Appendix 4). However, given the EP's legislative power, the EP approved MEUFTA under the consultation procedure under the Treaty of Amsterdam, while JEUFTA was approved under Lisbon by the EP under the consent procedure.

## 5.2 Similarities

Both agreements have in common that their main reason for initiating negotiations was the progress of other trade negotiations. For JEUFTA, the EU was motivated by FTAs that Japan was pursuing with the other two of the world's four largest economies - the US (through the Transpacific Partnership (TPP)) and China (through China-South Korea-Japan FTA). Those would have disadvantaged the EU's position in the world trade arena if the EU would not have negotiated its own trade deal (Armanoviča, 2012). Japan's motivation originated from the EU-South Korea FTA that took effect in July 2011 (Kyodo News, 2011). Meanwhile, MEUFTA was prompted by concerns that NAFTA would harm EU exports and promote discrimination (Dür, 2007; Zabludovsky & Gomez Lora, 2005).

Both agreements also had in common that they were overshadowed by other negotiations. JEUFTA negotiations were conducted in the shadow of CETA, TTP, and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Notably, CSOs and other interest groups were comparatively silent on the EU-Japan talks (Kettunen & Alystam, 2023; Suzuki, 2017). Similarly, MEUFTA negotiations were overshadowed by the EU-MERCOSUR Framework Cooperation Agreement that started in 1995 and entered into force in 1999. The

start of the negotiations of the EU-MERCOSUR FTA with their launch in 2000 played into this (Pasquariello Mariano & Luciano Theodoro, 2019).

By reaching into policy areas such as climate change and corporate governance, JEFTA had a broader scope than agreements of that time (Chowdhry et al., 2018). Similarly, MEFTA was the first trade agreement that Mexico has ever concluded which is based on respect for democracy and human rights. It was also one of the most comprehensive accords the EU has ever reached with a non-European country that had no prospect of joining the EU (Szymanski & Smith, 2005).

## **6. Access to trade policies of the EU-Japan FTA**

### **6.1 Indirect access**

When the debate arose on whether the EU should start negotiations with Japan for an FTA, it was already clear that the EP would have a key role because of its new legislative power post-Lisbon (Ivanov, 2011). The initial step was to determine scope and breadth of a potential agreement (Söderberg, 2012). Simultaneously, the Commission pursued a mandate from the EP to finalize the EPA. Although it was not in place yet at that stage of the negotiation process, this mandate is crucial as the EP holds ultimate power over declining any EU trade agreement (Söderberg, 2012). Silva Pereira as rapporteur also chaired a monitoring group that was established by INTA. This monitoring group had 28 meetings with the Commission, European and Japanese business associations as well as civil society representatives and trade unions. The aim was to reach a comprehensive understanding of the consequences for stakeholders (Silva Pereira, 2018). The main priorities of the Parliament during negotiations were 1) transparency, 2) civil society engagement, 3) maintaining EU standards on environment, consumer protections, the right for regulation as well as labor and food safety, and meeting the demands of business and civil society (Silva Pereira, 2018). The latter was pursued right from the beginning of negotiations.

Starting with a first resolution in May 2011, the EP stressed the importance of removing Japanese Non-tariff barriers (NTB). A year later, The EP requested in June 2012 that the Council hold off on approving the start of trade talks until after Parliament has expressed its opinion about the suggested negotiating mandate, based on a report from INTA that was based on its own impact assessment, including stakeholder analysis (Armanoviča, 2012). Four months later, the EP argued in another resolution that the potential of the agreement has not yet been fully used with NTB and market access for European Business remains a problem. It delivered numerous recommendations to the Commission. It then called for rapid conclusion in another resolution in April 2014 (Appendix 11). These are examples of how the EP used its enhanced power to offer access and receive information.

In the early stages of JEUFTEA, stakeholder consultations were mostly organized by the Commission and were also the main basis for an initial EP assessment of the agreement as was the case for MEUFTEA (Appendix 11; Ivanov, 2011; Matthes & Watanabe, 2012). However, rapporteur Silva Pereira (2018, p. 22) stated that for JEUFTEA, the EP was following the negotiations closely from the beginning while constantly taking “a demanding position towards the negotiators”. This became evident through the presence of EP staff at stakeholder roundtables outside the EP early on in the process. In April 2015, the European Economic and Social Committee, which the EP consults for decision-making, organized a stakeholder roundtable called “Potential Social Impacts of the EU-Japan FTA” (Appendix 3). During this roundtable, stakeholders as well as two staff members of the EP were present. In another roundtable for stakeholders hosted by the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE) in May 2015 (Appendix 2), the EP was present too. Moreover, EP staff attended two out of nine Civil Society Dialogue meetings of the Commission (European Commission, 2016).

## 6.2 Direct access

The EP ensured access throughout the JEUFITA decision-making process. In 2012, INTA organized a workshop (Appendix 9) to gather stakeholder views and public opinion, where NGOs such as the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), business and industry representatives (e.g., from Eurocommerce and Bosch), as well as EU citizens, had a say (Matthes & Watanabe, 2012). In July 2018, INTA also organized a public hearing which hosted interest groups such as BusinessEurope (European Business Association), COPA-COGECA (European Farmer and agro-cooperatives Organisation), and BEUC (European Consumer Organization) to speak about their demands and talk to INTA staff and MEPs (Appendix 8). Access to the EP was not just given in Strasbourg and Brussels, but also in Japan. The EP organized three delegation visits to Japan, of which two were organized by INTA, to meet with stakeholders and assess the situation. In 2011, the first delegation visit to Tokyo took place. The EP delegation met with several stakeholders and took part in field visits, e.g., to IKEA (Appendix 7). In November 2015, INTA Chair Bernd Lange led a mission of the EP delegation to Japan and came back to Brussels with a positive prospect of the agreement. According to INTA, the EP representatives met with all key stakeholders of the agreement, including representatives from Greenpeace, WWF, Keidanren, Japanese trade unions, and the European Business Council (Appendix 5). In another three-day delegation visit to Japan of INTA in September 2018, the INTA committee rapporteurs again met with stakeholders and CSOs (Appendix 6) such as the Japanese trade union, representatives from the responsible ministers, and members of the DIET.

Different types of interest groups made use of the access opportunities and shared their demands. Overall, with the exception of the automotive industry and companies such as Bosch (Armanoviča, 2012; Rios, 2018), most interest groups from different industries and fields as well as political groups were satisfied with the outcome of the agreement because they gained access and were able to share information. In press releases that were published on the same

days, the European People's Party (European People's Party, 2017) and S&D (Silva Pereira, 2018) deemed the agreement a success. BusinessEurope (2017), the European Services Forum (2017), Food Drink Europe (2012), and COPA-COGECA (Binder, 2017), agreed. Additionally, the EU-Japan Business Roundtable expressed its satisfaction with the negotiation process repeatedly (Appendix 11).

Access is also visible when looking at stakeholders' demands and how the EP reflected those in its demands towards the Commission. For instance, the EP was successful in focusing on the protection of SMEs' market access as it was requested several times by civil society and business representatives (Chowdhry et al., 2018; Silva Pereira, 2018). While some concerns about JEUFTRA were not sufficiently picked up by the Commission (Fleming, 2011), MEPs stepped in. For instance, Green MEP Helmut Scholz opposed a claimed success of JEUFTRA because Japanese competition would put employment in the automotive industry at risk (Rios, 2018) which was criticized by the European automotive industries during stakeholder consultations and roundtables of the EP before (Armanoviča, 2012). In a joint statement, the Japanese trade unions and the European Trade Union Confederation asked negotiators to establish an agreement that fosters the development of a monitoring system that contributes to quality employment and workers' rights (Binder, 2017). By adopting a resolution on monitoring practices for the implementation phase, the EP picked this concern up (Appendix 11). In other cases, concerns were picked up but without success. Greenpeace (2017) was dissatisfied with social, environmental, and transparency issues. The Greens/EFA MEPs were representing this criticism by expressing their dissatisfaction with sustainability requirements. Prior to and during the negotiations, the Green/EFA Trade Working Group picked up concerns raised by environmental NGOs (The Greens/EFA, 2018). For instance, Fern (2018) asked the EP not to proceed with the ratification before the provisions on forests and timber are specified and promote the protection of forests as described in EU commitments.

### 6.3 Access and public interest

The change of institutional power through Lisbon caused a surge of public interest in EP trade policy-making (Eliasson & Garcia-Duran, 2020). Hence, a confounding explanation of increased access post-Lisbon could be politicization. Although the EP's elevated role allowed for more public discussion, JEUFITA was not subject to this. The public's focus in Japan was on TPP negotiations and in the EU on TTIP, leaving little room for politicization of JEUFITA (Kettunen & Alvstam, 2023). For instance, the INTA Committee stated that they received only few inquiries about negotiations with Japan, compared to hundreds about the TIPP. There were neither major lobbying efforts in the EP, nor citizens' initiatives or major protests against the EU-Japan trade agreement (Eliasson & Garcia-Duran, 2020). On the one hand, being able to rule out politicization as an explanation of lobby access supports the hypothesis that Lisbon is responsible for more access of interest groups to the EP in this case comparison. On the other hand, politicization through the institutional mechanisms of the EP could have been an additional mean of access (Kleinmann, 2015).

## **7. Access to trade policies of the EU-Mexico FTA**

Despite the fact that the EP had limited power with negotiations under the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam, it tried to be an active player in trade negotiations. Commission officials briefed EP members and the EP sent observers to trade negotiations. Access for lobby groups, however, was limited and occurred in selected cases. For instance, pressure from the EP led to the rejection of a Mexican proposal for a weakening of the so-called democratic clause (Dür & Zimmermann, 2007). The rapporteurs stressed the importance of the human rights clause while asking for further consultation (Sanahuja, 2000). As a consequence, the EP invited victims of human rights violations and representatives of Mexican NGOs to share their experiences in various parliamentary committees (Szymanski & Smith, 2005s). Further, the EP established connections with pertinent NGOs that shared their concerns, e.g., the Copenhagen Initiative for

Central America and Human Rights Watch (Szymanski & Smith, 2005). Additionally, the Greens took advantage of the EP's right which urges the Commission to provide an explanation of motives for any foreign agreement to the EP for debate (Szymanski & Smith, 2005). Those findings imply that MEUFTA was a rather progressive agreement with regard to advocacy and lobby access for certain policy areas such as human rights given the legislative restrictions and period of time. However, MEUFTA was more a story of interest group success rather than overall access. This is because besides this example, the EP ensured little access in other direct or indirect settings in comparison to JEUFTA. On the one hand, some interest groups such as the Europe-Latin American and the Caribbean Bi-regional Network Enlazando Alternativas made efforts to represent their interests. Among others, they attended meetings of the EP to enter into dialogue and presented their proposals (Aguirre Reveles & Perez Rocha, 2007). On the other hand, interest groups complained about a lack of access opportunities to the EP (Chowdhry et al., 2018).

In total, only four consultations in the EP took place on both the global and interim agreement (Appendix 10). Unlike post-Lisbon EU trade agreements, the Interim and Global Agreement mainly set broad trade objectives, leaving detailed provisions and implementation to a Joint Council for negotiation (Appendix 1; Grieger, 2020). But once the stage of negotiations passed, there was no opportunity for involvement of the EP or interest groups left (Appendix 10; Grieger, 2020). Correspondingly, in a report on the implementation of the interim agreement published on 13.03.2000 (Appendix 10, 2000, n.p.), the rapporteur Concepció Ferrer stated that she "Regrets that it [the EP] was not kept systematically informed during the negotiating process in order to make the Agreement more transparent". Aguirre Reveles and Perez Rocha (2007) even find that European legislators have often ignored demands from the dialogue venues due to insufficient involvement and accountability of the EP. Hence, the EP was not responsive and powerful enough to incentivize interest groups to seek access. Further, after thorough research (Appendix 10), there is no evidence of delegation visits abroad,



workshops, the establishment of a committee monitoring group, public hearings or other access opportunities organized by the EP, as they were present in the case of JEUF TA.

**Table 2:** Access opportunities in comparison.

	MEUF TA	JEUF TA
Delegation visit abroad	0	3
Stakeholder consultations organized by the EP or INTA/ITRE	4	3
Participation in external stakeholder roundtables and civil society dialogues	1	5
Workshop	0	1
Public hearing	0	1
Other opportunities of access	1	0
Committee monitoring group on negotiations	No	Yes, 28 meetings
Measures taken to exert influence in the implementation phase	No	Yes

Given those findings in the case of MEUF TA pre-Lisbon, there existed an interplay of little access opportunities, meaning demand for lobbying and information coming from the EP, and little incentives for interest groups to seek more access, meaning supply of such directed to the EP. That confirms the hypothesis of less access pre-Lisbon versus post-Lisbon regarding trade policies of the EP. This finding is confirmed by earlier works and statements. Aguirre Reveles and Perez Rocha (2007, p. 20) stated:

“Little has been done to ensure that the political dialogue goes beyond the governments. So far, there is no place or mechanism in this dialogue for participation by parliaments and congresses or by civil society organizations, despite proposals put forth by the latter

in two dialogue forums (Brussels in 2003 and Mexico in 2005). There has been no concrete response to any of the many proposals about participation [...].”

Most importantly, Aguirre Reveles and Perez Rocha (2007) find that there was a lack of consultation of the EP. Criticism on accessibility of MEUFTA also emerged from early within during negotiations. In its recommendation on the Interim Agreement as of 27.04.1998 (Appendix 10), the Committee on External Relations as Committee for opinion also regretted (1998, p. 15) that:

“mechanisms for political dialogue [...] contain no provision for any contribution to be made by civil society (civil, grass-roots and trade-union organizations, NGOs, etc.) through the organization of regular conferences and by ensuring its active involvement in the corresponding fora”.

Considering that only seven years after the agreement went into force, Aguirre Reveles and Perez Rocha (2007) could not find sufficient evidence of access for interest groups to the EP, it is unlikely that the lack of evidence found in this thesis 24 years after the conclusion of the agreement is due to documents being deleted or not available online. Instead, this suggests that there was generally low access to MEUFTA pre-Lisbon which is in line with the statement of the Committee on External Relations.

The findings are further supported when contextualizing MEUFTA with other agreements pre-Lisbon. Dür (2007) found that it was easier to access policies when the EU negotiated with smaller nations. Accordingly, MEUFTA was among the more accessible agreements before the Lisbon Treaty. This could imply that either 1) if interest groups would have wanted to, they could have received access but had no incentives to seek it or 2) even a relatively accessible agreement like MEUFTA had low accessibility opportunities compared to JEUFTA post-Lisbon. Both implications support the hypothesis that access to trade agreements was generally lower pre-Lisbon since they show a lack of either supply or demand for access and information.

## **8. Conclusion**

This thesis examined access to trade policies of the European Union. It finds that the increased power of the European Parliament through the Lisbon Treaty did increase the access of interest groups to the decision-making process in trade policies and therefore confirms the hypothesis. As expected, JEUF<sup>TA</sup>, a trade agreement that was negotiated post-Lisbon, offered more access opportunities, meaning demand for access, for interest groups to the EP and EU policy-making process overall than MEUF<sup>TA</sup>, a trade agreement that was negotiated pre-Lisbon. Additionally, interest groups showed less efforts to seek access pre-Lisbon, meaning they offered little supply. In both cases, the EP tried to represent the interests of interest groups that they have gathered but access to gather those from interest groups in the first place was restricted in the case of MEUF<sup>TA</sup> by the EP's legislative power.

With these results, this thesis contributes to the literature on access of interest groups to EU institutions. It uncovers the role of legislative changes for access, specifically through the Lisbon Treaty. More importantly, it reveals that the EP has become a key player and relevant lobby destination in trade negotiations and therefore contributes to literature on EU trade policy-making in the EP. In a broader sense, it also implies the parliamentarization of the EU. The results of this thesis hold importance in light of ongoing legislative power shifts from member states to the EU, coupled with major contestation of the EU because of perceived democratic deficits. Hence, it is relevant to demonstrate that policy areas such as trade have undergone reforms that increased the ability for interest groups to actively participate in decision-making processes. Given that this thesis coincides with the June 2024 European Parliament elections, it is vital to underscore the accessibility of policy-making within the European Parliament, which is directly elected by citizens and has a representative function.

Although the hypothesis is confirmed, it is necessary to point out that access of interest groups to the EP's trade policy-making processes can vary depending on the scope of the trade

agreement. As the scope of the trade agreement also determines whether additional ratification is required from the member states when it is mixed and how strong interest groups are, the results of this thesis in the case of two non-mixed agreements might differ for mixed-agreements. Another shortcoming of this thesis are differences in the focus of negotiations that can influence access. While human rights were not of interest to JEUF TA (European Commission, 2016), they were a significant negotiation point for MEUF TA and vice versa for environmental standards. Hence, the very high individuality of trade agreements that the EU negotiates might limit the generalizability of the findings of this thesis. Further, the opportunities and efforts for access were outlined to my knowledge, but might not be exhaustive. This thesis was also not able to identify and account for industry-specific asymmetries in lobbying access between MEUF TA and JEUF TA since certain interest groups seek to evade transparency by representing their interests in the protection of influential business entities such as Japan's Keidanren or BusinessEurope (Nelson, 2012). According to Nelson (2012), the prioritization of industry-specific interests has overshadowed general interests during the negotiations of JEUF TA. Such case-specific claims require further research with regard to the role of lobby access to the EP. Hence, next research steps could focus on precise reasons for the existence or absence of access in trade negotiations in the EP, which theories of access already imply.

Ultimately, although this thesis has limitations, its results reflect a broader, positive trend towards increased transparency and interest representation through the EP.

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## Appendices

### Appendix 1: The EP's role and mandate in MEUFTA negotiations.

Instrument	Objective	Substance	Approval procedure	Approval date
Global Agreement	Govern trade, political and cooperation relations between Mexico and the EU	<b>Three dimensions: political dialogue, cooperation and trade.</b> Unlike cooperation and political dialogue, the trade section does not contain the results of the negotiations, but solely the mandate to negotiate the EUMFTA	European Parliament Mexican Senate  Parliaments of the 15 EU members	May 6, 1999 March 20, 2000  February 2001
Interim Agreement	Allow the start of trade negotiations in areas of Community competence without awaiting approval of the Global Agreement	<b>Trade dimension.</b> Mandate for negotiations on: tariffs, rules of origin, technical, sanitary and phytosanitary norms, safeguards, antidumping, government procurement, competition and dispute settlement	Mexican Senate European Parliament	April 23, 1998 May 13, 1998
Joint Declaration	Allow negotiations in the areas of member state competence, at the same time as the Interim Agreement	<b>Trade dimension.</b> Mandate for negotiation of: trade in services, investment and intellectual property		

Source: Zabłudovsky and Gomez Lora (2005, p. 14)

**Appendix 2:** List of registered participants of the Roundtable for Stakeholders in the Transport Equipment (Railway, Ships, Aircraft) and Government Procurement Sectors on “Potential Economic Impacts of the EU-Japan FTA” hosted by the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE) in May 2015.

<u>Name</u>	<u>Organisation</u>
Niels Karssen	AVISA
Yuki Hirajo	Grayling
Talander Jansen	Grayling
Patrice Chazerand	DigitalEurope
Ichiro Takahashi	East Japan Railway Company Brussels Branch
Frederic Feller	Toyota Motor Europe
Kenji Mikami	Japan Machinery Center for Trade & Investment
Tetsuro Fukunaga	JMC (Japan Machinery Centre for Trade and Investment)
Leonardo Dongiovanni	UNIFE
Lucia Zivec	ASD
Gohar Topchyan	EESC
Kathrin Obst	European Commission
Susana Mendonca	European Parliament
Bahar Güclü	Permanent Delegation of Turkey to the EU
Jesper Kleingeld	Brunswick

Source: European Commission, 2016, p. 306



**Appendix 3:** List of registered participants of the Stakeholder Roundtable on “Potential Social Impacts of the EU-Japan FTA” hosted by the European Economic and Social Committee in April 2015.

<u>Name</u>	<u>Organisation</u>
Paul-Henri Lava	a.v.e.c. Association of Poultry Processors and Poultry Trade in the EU countries
Nils Karssen	AVISA
Desirée LeClercq	ILO
Pascal Kerneis	ESF
Máté Kander	ACEA
Salla Ahonen	Confederation of Finnish Industries EK
Maret Veiner	CECIMO
Philippe Huysveld	GBMC (Global Business & Management Consulting)
Motoko Huysveld	GBMC (Global Business & Management Consulting)
Maurice Fermont	BusinessEurope
Daniele Basso	ETUC
Alexander Kirschall	Deutsche Post DHL
Tzonka Iotzova	EESC
Cédric Cabanne	EESC
Ichiro Takahashi	East Japan Railway Company Brussels Branch
Tetsuro Fukunaga	JMC (Japan Machinery Centre for Trade and Investment)
Frederic Feller	Toyota Motor Europe
Concha Picón Muñoz	Orgalime
Jesus Cisneros	InsuranceEurope
Cecile Coulet	ESF
Giovanni Casale	UIL (Unione Italiana del Lavoro)
Yuki Hirajo	Grayling
Magdalena Ruda	EESC
Melina van der Velden	European Parliament
Elina Viilup	European Parliament
Shinichiro Oka	JAMA
Mayuko Tsuruoka	JAMA
Patrice Chazerand	DigitalEurope
Jana Votoupal	European Commission

Source: European Commission (2016, p. 292)

**Appendix 4:** Comparison of the legislative procedures of the main trade parts of EU-Mexico Agreement and the EU-Japan Agreement.

Date	Mexico	Date	Japan
18/01/2000	Initial legislative proposal published	29/06/2018	Legislative proposal published
11/02/2000	Legislative proposal published	10/09/2018	Committee referral announced in Parliament
18/02/2000	Committee referral announced in Parliament	05/11/2018	Vote in Committee
13/03/2000	Vote in Committee	09/11/2018	Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st reading/single reading
13/03/2000	Committee report tabled for plenary, 1st A5-0066/2000 reading/single reading	11/12/2018	Debate in Parliament
16/03/2000	Debate in Parliament	12/12/2018	Results of vote in Parliament

16/03/2000	Decision by Parliament	12/12/2018	Decision by Parliament
23/03/2000	Act adopted by Council after consultation of Parliament	20/12/2018	Act adopted by Council after consultation of Parliament
23/03/2000	End of procedure in Parliament	20/12/2018	End of procedure in Parliament

Sources: European Parliament (n.d. a); European Parliament (n.d. b)

**Appendix 5:** Selected Stakeholders and Civil Society Organizations present at meetings during the official mission of the Committee on International Trade to Tokyo, Japan, 4-6 November 2015

<p>Japanese Ministers and Politicians in charge, including:</p> <p>Minister of Economic Revitalization,</p> <p>Minister for Economy, Trade and Industry,</p> <p>State Minister for Foreign Affairs,</p> <p>Vice-Minister for Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry</p> <p>Vice-Minister for Land, Infrastructure and Transportation,</p> <p>Director General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs</p> <p>Members of the Diet, representing the Economic and Industry Committee, International Affairs Committee, Agricultural Committee, Transport and Construction Committee.</p>
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Japanese Stakeholders, including:

Chairman of the Federation of Japanese Industry (Keidanren),

Chairman of the Japanese Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA),

Chairman of the Japanese Electronics and Information Technologies Industries Association (JEITA),

General Secretary of the main Japanese main trade union (RENGO).

Japan NGO Centre for International Cooperation.

European stakeholders, including:

Chairman of the European Business Council in Japan (EBC) leaders of its Committees,

The EU-Japan League of Friendship

Representatives of NGOs and CSOs including:

WWF,

Global Environmental Forum,

Green Alliance of Japan,

Greenpeace.

Source: INTA Mission Report (see appendix 11, 2015, pp. 2-4)

**Appendix 6:** Selected Stakeholders and Civil Society Organizations present at meetings during the Delegation Visit to Japan, 18-20 September 2018 of the Committee on International Trade.

Japanese ministers and politicians in charge, including:

Foreign Minister of Japan (MoFA), Mr. KONO,

Minister of Trade (METI), Mr. SEKO,

Minister for Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), Mr. KATO,

Vice Minister for International Affairs of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure,  
Transport and Tourism, Mr. SHINOHARA,  
State Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), Mr. TANIAI,  
Prime Minister Abe's Special Advisor, Mr. MIYAKOSHI,  
Members of the Japanese Parliament (DIET) that to the International Labour Organisation  
(ILO) LEAGUE  
Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. MIYAKE.

Japanese stakeholders, including:

Business representatives from the Japan Business Federation (KEIDANREN),  
The Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA),  
The Japan Electronics and Information Technologies Industries Association (JEITA)  
Trade union representatives from Japan Trade Union Confederation (RENGO),  
Consumer representatives from Japan Consumers' Cooperative Union (JCCU),  
Japan Automobile Standards Internationalisation Center (JASIC),  
Japanese logistics company YAMATO,

European and other stakeholders, including:

**EU Ambassador Ms. Patricia FLOR, Head of EU Delegation in Japan**

European Business Council (EBC),

“a broad set of representatives from Civil Society” (p. 2)

Source: INTA Mission Report (see Appendix 11, 2018, p. 2)

**Appendix 7:** Selected Stakeholders and Civil Society Organizations present at meetings during the delegation meeting of INTA to Tokyo, Japan, 3-5 October 2011

Japanese ministers and politicians in charge, including:

Minister for Economy, Trade and Industry,

Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Land, Infrastructure Transport and Tourism,

Senior vice minister in the Ministry for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries,

Senior vice minister in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs,

Diet key members and parliament leaders,

Japanese stakeholders, including:

Japan Business Federation (Keidanren),

Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA).

Japan Electronics and IT Manufacturers Association (JEITA).

Nissan (visit to the corporation's plant in Oppama).

Keio University.

European stakeholders, including:

European Business Council in Japan (Automobile, Medical Equipment, Banking, Telecommunications, Food, Construction and Railway Committees)

CEO Airbus Japan

IKEA (visit to the store in Yokohama).

Source: INTA Notice to Members/ Mission Report (see Appendix 11, 2011, p. 1)

**Appendix 8:** Participants of the Public Hearing “The EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement: Taking a close look at a landmark trade deal” organized by INTA on 9 July 2018.

Ms. Luisa SANTOS, Director of International Relations Department, BusinessEurope, European Business Association;

Mr. Akira SHIMIZU, Planning & Coordinating Sub-Committee, Committee on Europe, KEIDANREN, Japan Business Federation;

Mr. Pekka PESONEN, Secretary General, COPA-COGECA, European farmer and European agro-cooperatives Organisation;

Mr. Chihiro KAWASHIMA, Executive Director of Department of Economic and Social Policy, JTUC-RENGO, Japanese Trade Union Confederation;

Ms. Léa AUFFRET, Senior Policy Officer and Trade Team Leader, BEUC, the European Consumer Organisation;

INTA MEPs and staff

Source: INTA Public Hearing Draft Programme (see Appendix 11, 2018, p.1)

**Appendix 9:** Participants of the Workshop “Towards a Free Trade Agreement with Japan” organized by INTA and the Directorate-General for External Policies in September 2012.

Prof. Yoritumi Watanabe, Keio University, Japan;

H.E. Kojiro Shiojiri, Ambassador of Japan to the EU;

MEP Metin Kazak, INTA committee, Standing Rapporteur;

INTA Chairman Prof. Vital Moreira;

Mr. Matsuda, a member of the House of Councilors of the Japanese parliament;

Prof. Quick of Business Europe;

Mr Jean-Luc Demarty, Director General for Trade, European Commission;

Dr Jürgen Matthes, Senior Economist at the Cologne Institute for Economic Research (Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft - IW Köln);

Mr. Takidera of Hitachi Ltd. on behalf of Keidanren;

Mr. Bergelin of the European Automobile Manufacturers' Association (ACEA);

A representative of Robert Bosch;

The responsible for trade in the UK representation;

A representative from Eurocommerce;

A representative of the recording industry organization IFPI;

A representative of the European chemical industry association;

A representative from Digital Europe representing the global ITC industry;

A representative of CEPS, the Centre for European Policy Studies;

European Parliament Staff Members;

EU citizens (specifically mentioned an engineer);

Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS);

A representative of Confindustria, the Italian business organization;

Mr. Noguchi of Toshiba

Source: Matthes and Watanabe (2012)



**Appendix 10:** Reviewed documents around the negotiations of MEUFTA.

<b>Author/ Publisher</b>	<b>Document type</b>	<b>Official title</b>	<b>Document number/ Identifying number</b>	<b>Date</b>
European Parliament	Procedure File	EC/Mexico Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement	1997/0289(AVC)	n/a
European Parliament	Procedure File	Procedure file EC/Mexico Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement: trade in goods	2000/0024(CNS)	n/a
European Parliament	Procedure File	Procedure File EC/Mexico Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement: trade in services	2000/ 0296(CNS)	n/a
Committee on External Economic Relations	Recommendation	RECOMMENDATION on the proposal for a Council decision concerning the conclusion of the interim agreement on trade and trade- related matters between the European Community, on the one part, and the United	PE 225.176/fin.	27.04.1998

		<p>Mexican States, on the other part</p> <p>(COM(97)0525 - 11619/1/97 rev.1 + 11620/1/97 rev.1 - C4-0024/98 - 97/0281(AVC))</p>		
European parliament	Working Paper	Trade relations between the European Union and Latin America	n/a	01.04.1999
Committee on External Economic Relations	Recommendation	<p>RECOMMENDATION on the proposal for a Council Decision concerning the conclusion of the Economic Partnership, Political Co-ordination and Co-operation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, on the one part, and the United Mexican States, on the other part</p> <p>(COM(97)0527 - 11618/97+11620/97+COR 1 - C4-0023/98 - 97/0289(AVC))</p>	PE 230.532/fin.	22.04.1999

European Parliament	Decision	European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a Council decision on the Community position within the EC-Mexico Joint Council on the implementation of Articles 3, 4, 5, 6 and 12 of the Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters (5965/1/2000 - COM(2000) 9 - C5-0076/2000 - 2000/0024(CNS) )	2000/0024(CNS)	16.03.2000
European Commission	Communication from the Commission	COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ACCOMPANYING THE FINAL TEXT OF THE DRAFT DECISIONS BY THE EC-MEXICO JOINT COUNCIL  Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION on the Community position within the EC-Mexico Joint Council	COM(2000) 9 final/4 2000/0024 (CNS)	22.02.2000

		on the implementation of Articles 3, 4, 5, 6 and 12 of the Interim Agreement		
Committee on Industry, (formerly Trade), Research and Energy (ITRE)	Report	REPORT  on the proposal for a Council decision on the Community position within the EC-Mexico Joint Council on the implementation of Articles 3, 4, 5, 6 and 12 of the Interim Agreement on trade and trade- related matters  (5965/1/2000 – COM(2000) 9 – C5-0076/2000 – 2000/0024(CNS))	PE 232.910	13.03.2000
European Parliament	Resolution	European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a Council decision on the Community position within the EC-Mexico Joint Council on the implementation of Articles 3, 4, 5, 6 and 12 of the Interim Agreement on trade and trade- related matters (5965/1/2000 - COM(2000) 9 - C5-0076/2000	A5-0066/2000	16.03.2000

		- 2000/0024(CNS) )		
Official Journal of the European Communities	Final Trade Agreement	Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the United Mexican States, of the other part	L 276/46	28.10.2000
Committee on Industry, (formerly Trade),Research and Energy (ITRE)	Report	Report on the proposal for a Council decision establishing the Community position within the EC-Mexico Joint Council with a view to the adoption of a decision implementing Articles 6, 9, 12(2)(b) and 50 of the Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement (COM(2000)739 – C5- 0698/2000 – 2000/0296(CNS))	PE 297.123	30.01.2001
EU-Mexico Joint Council/ Foreign Trade	Decision	Decisions of the EU-Mexico Joint Council	Decision N°1/2000 to	23.03.2000 to 15.12.2008

Information System			Decision N°3/2008	
EU-Mexico Joint Council/ Foreign Trade Information System	Joint Press Release	Documents relating to meetings of the EU-Mexico Joint Council	EU Mexico: Joint Council 1 <sup>st</sup> session – 6 <sup>th</sup> session	27.02.2001 to 14.05.2009
EU-Mexico Joint Committee/ Foreign Trade Information System	Joint Press Release	Documents relating to meetings of the EU-Mexico Joint Committee	EU Mexico Joint Committee meeting 1 <sup>st</sup> meeting to 8 <sup>th</sup> meeting	02.10.2001 to 14.10.2008
EU-Mexico Joint Committee/ Foreign Trade Information System	Decision	Decisions of the EU-Mexico Joint Committee		20.12.2002 to 17.09.2010

**Appendix 11:** Reviewed documents around the negotiations of JEUFTA.

<b>Author/ Publisher</b>	<b>Document type</b>	<b>Official title</b>	<b>Document number/ Identifying number</b>	<b>Date</b>
European Parliament	Procedure File; Procedure subtype: Motion for a resolution under consent procedure	EU/Japan Economic Partnership Agreement	2018/0091M(NL E)	n/a
European Parliament	Procedure File; Procedure subtype: Consent by Parliament	EU/Japan Economic Partnership Agreement	2018/0091(NLE)	n/a
MEP Pablo Zalba Bidegain (EPP)	Question for Written Answer	Question for written answer E- 005743/2011 to the Commission Rule 117 Pablo Zalba Bidegain (PPE) Subject: EU-Japan FTA - 'Kei' cars	E-005743/2011	2011
European Parliament	Resolution	European Parliament resolution of 11 May 2011 on EU-Japan Trade relations	P7_TA(2011)022 5	11.05.2011

Committee on International Trade (INTA)	Mission Report/ Notice to Members	Report of the delegation of the Committee on International Trade to Japan (Tokyo, 3-5 October 2011, travel days included 2-6 October 2011)	PE474.019v01-00	07.11.2011
Committee on International Trade (INTA)	Workshop	Workshop: Towards a Free Trade Agreement with Japan	PE 457.125	October 2012
European Parliament	Resolution	European Parliament resolution of 13 June 2012 on EU trade negotiations with Japan,	<a href="#"><u>2012/2651(RSP)</u></a>	13.06.2012
European Parliament	Press Release	EU-Japan trade talks: MEPs fear for EU car market	03A-DV-PRESSE_IPR(2012)06-13(46762)	13.06.2012
European Parliament Press Service	Resolution	European Parliament resolution of 25 October 2012 on EU trade negotiations with Japan	P7_TA-PROV(2012)0398	25.10.2012
Committee on International Trade (INTA) Secretariat	Appraisal of European Commission Impact Assessment	Initial appraisal of a European Commission Impact Assessment European Commission proposal to authorise the opening of negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and Japan	PE 494.454	November 2012



Council of the European Union	Note	Note from the General Secretariat of the Council to the Delegations. Subject: Partial summary of the meeting of the European Parliament Committee on International Trade (INTA) held in Brussels on 18 and 19 March – Items 3 to 4 and 6 to 15 on the agenda Chair: Mr Lange (S&D, DE)	7707/15	27.03.2015
Committee on International Trade (INTA)	Recommendation	Recommendation of the Committee on International Trade and the opinions of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety and the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development	(A8-0000/2018),	30.11.2015
Committee on International Trade (INTA)	Mission Report	Mission REPORT following the official mission of the Committee on International Trade to Tokyo, Japan (4-6 November 2015)	CR\1081361EN	30.11.2015

Directorate General for Trade of the European Commission	Impact Assessment	Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment of the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and Japan Final Report	n/a	2016
Committee on International Trade (INTA) Secretariat	INTA Committee Newsletter	Newsletter	8th legislature, N°78	07.07.2017
Committee on International Trade (INTA)	Draft Recommendation	Draft Recommendation on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and Japan for an Economic Partnership (07964/2018 – C8- 0382/2018 – 2018/0091(NLE)) by Rapporteur Pedro Silva Pereira	PE627.597v01- 00	5.09.2018
Committee on International Trade (INTA)	Mission Report	Mission REPORT following the Delegation Visit to Japan, 18-20 September 2018	CR\1168478EN	20.10.2018
Committee on International Trade (INTA) Secretariat	INTA Public Hearing Draft Programme	“The EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement: Taking a close look at a landmark trade deal”	n/a	05.07.2018

		<p>INTA Public Hearing 9 July</p> <p>2018 Timing: 15:00 and 17:00</p> <p>Room: ASP 3 E 2</p> <p>Draft Programme</p>		
<p>ENVI</p> <p>Committee on</p> <p>the</p> <p>Environment,</p> <p>Public Health</p> <p>and Food</p> <p>Safety</p>	Draft Opinion	<p>DRAFT OPINION</p> <p>of the Committee on the</p> <p>Environment, Public Health and</p> <p>Food Safety</p> <p>for the Committee on</p> <p>International Trade</p> <p>on the Council decision on the</p> <p>conclusion of the Economic</p> <p>Partnership</p> <p>Agreement between the</p> <p>European Union and Japan</p> <p>(COM (2018)0192 –</p> <p>2018/0091(NLE))</p>	<p>PE625.210v02-</p> <p>00</p>	12.7.2018
<p>Committee on</p> <p>Environment,</p> <p>Public Health</p> <p>and Food</p> <p>Safety (ENVI)</p>	Opinion	<p>OPINION</p> <p>of the Committee on the</p> <p>Environment, Public Health and</p> <p>Food Safety</p> <p>for the Committee on</p> <p>International Trade</p> <p>on the draft Council decision on</p>	<p>PE625.210v03-</p> <p>00</p>	17.10.2018

		the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and Japan for an Economic Partnership (07964/2018 - C8-0382/2018 – 2018/0091(NLE)) Rapporteur for opinion: Adina-Ioana Vălean		
European Parliament Press Service	Press Release	Press release: Parliament endorses landmark EU-Japan free trade agreement	Reference No: 20181205IPR20930	12.12.2018
Business Europe Joint Statement	Business Europe, Keidanren, sme united, copa cogecca, eurochambers, Japan Business Council in Europe, European Business Council in Japan	Business Europe calls on the European Parliament to ratify the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement	n/a	12.10.2018
European Council	Council Decision	COUNCIL DECISION on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and Japan for an Economic Partnership	2018/0091 (NLE)	29.06.2018

European Commission	Commission response to text adopted in plenary	Follow up to the European Parliament non-legislative resolution on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and Japan for an Economic Partnership	SP(2019)355	12.06.2019
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