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## **Squabbling on ethnic lines: A quantitative analysis of the implications of ethnic recognition for peace**

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**Squabbling on ethnic lines:  
A quantitative analysis of the implications of ethnic recognition  
for peace**

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## **Abstract**

What are the implications of recognising ethnic groups and granting them specific rights for peace? This thesis examines the ongoing debate on ethnic recognition, highlighting that while it can address minority exclusion and foster trust, it may also institutionalise ethnic cleavages and promote antagonism. To assess its effects across different institutional and political contexts, the study further focuses on ethnic party bans as crucial institutions that complicate the relationship between ethnic recognition and peace. It is argued that these bans promote political inclusion of minority groups in situations where the state has implemented ethnic recognition, and prevent the politicisation of ethnicity where the state does recognise ethnic groups. Additionally, it introduces an improved operationalization of ethnic recognition, assessing its implementation across various governance domains in constitutions and peace agreements. Using panel data and Difference-in-Differences models, the study finds that ethnic recognition generally promotes peace, particularly in countries with ethnic party bans. However, it also reveals that ethnic recognition can undermine peace in the short term, increasing political violence in countries without prior ethnic conflicts.

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## Introduction

After a violent political crisis and ethnic conflict in Kenya in 2008, the Kenyan government launched an initiative to replace the 1963 constitution. The conflict erupted after the winner of the elections, Mwai Kibaki, was accused of electoral manipulation by the opposition. Voting in Kenya occurred widely along ethnic lines, and as a result, ethnic tensions fueled protests and targeted killings, particularly against the Kikuyu community (Elhawary, 2008), of which the president was a member. Despite the downplaying of ethnicity by the government after 1963, this crisis revealed strong ethnic divisions in Kenya (Gettleman, 2007).

As the new constitution was drafted, a dispute ensued over how ethnicity was to be formally managed. One influential political commentator, Binyavanga Wainaina, argued that the constitution required the “naming and recognising of the tribal nations within our nation” (Smith, 2013). Various post-independence conflict management strategies failed to acknowledge ethnic groups and their political rights, and as a result, according to Wainaina, were proven to have been ineffective in diminishing the salience of ethnicity or fostering national unity (Smith, 2013). In the end, the Kenyan Constitution Commission chose not to recognise ethnic groups in the 2010 constitution, as chairman Yash Ghai argued that they “wanted to remove ethnicity from politics”. Instead, it included a ban on the formation of political parties based on ethnic foundations, because they “did not want parties to start squabbling on ethnic lines” (Ismail, 2017).

Although Wainaina and Ghai recognised the importance of bridging the ethnic cleavages in Kenya to promote peace, their proposed solutions could not have been more different. This example demonstrates how governments are put at a crossroads in the governance of ethnicity: should ethnic groups be recognised and granted specific legal and political rights due to their unique identity? While some policymakers and scholars argue that the recognition of ethnic groups by the state can alleviate the concerns of exclusion of minorities and promote trust between ethnic groups, others argue it institutionalises ethnic cleavages and promotes antagonism.

In the literature, *ethnic recognition* is considered to entail the acknowledgement of the existence of ethnic groups and their unique identity by the state or other actors, and the provision of specific legal and political rights to these groups. Despite a great variety of how governments worldwide recognise ethnic groups, studies on formal ethnic recognition tend to concentrate on specific types of rights, such as minority language accommodation or affirmative action policy. Furthermore, research on the topic has remained mostly qualitative, studying few subjects in country case studies. Only a fraction of the literature has sought to explain how ethnic recognition promotes or undermines peace in a way that is generalizable to more countries (King & Samii, 2020). In that regard, according to Verkuyten (2010), it has become imperative for scholars to concentrate on the conditions and circumstances which may determine or otherwise influence the implications of recognising ethnic groups. Moreover, Lieberman and Singh (2012) demonstrate a need for a deeper understanding of the role of political institutions in studies on ethnic politics more broadly.

To contribute to filling these gaps in the literature, this thesis seeks to answer: *Does ethnic recognition promote or undermine peace, and if so, how? And do ethnic party bans influence the impacts of ethnic recognition on peace, and if so, how?*

Foregrounding the ongoing political and theoretical debate, the implications of recognising ethnic groups for peace are analysed in this thesis. A neo-institutionalist approach is taken, as systemic prohibitions on the formation of ethnic parties, or *ethnic party bans*, are put forward as crucial institutions which complicate the relationship between ethnic recognition and peace. Essentially, I argue, they promote political inclusion of minority groups in situations where ethnic groups may not be recognized, and prevent the harmful politicisation of ethnicity where the state does recognise ethnic groups. Furthermore, it advances the existing research by introducing an improved operationalisation of ethnic recognition, which considers the breadth and depth of its implementation in different domains of governance in constitutions and peace agreements. It then uses panel data and a Difference-in-Differences technique in linear regression models to measure the effect of ethnic recognition in conflict-affected countries over time. By shifting the approach toward quantitative analysis and explanation in these ways, I seek generalizable results on the implications of ethnic recognition given important political and institutional contexts.

The thesis is set out as follows. First, the theoretical framework is presented, which consists of an overview of the main conceptual approaches to ethnic recognition as well as a review of the theoretical debate on its effects on peace. The methodological approach to the empirical and statistical analysis is explained next. Then, the results are presented, which reveal that adopting ethnic recognition generally promotes peace. As hypothesised, these effects are strongest in countries with a ban on ethnic parties. That said, it is also found that ethnic recognition may undermine peace in the short term, especially in countries where conflict had previously not occurred between ethnic groups. In these cases, political violence increases in the first years following the adoption of ethnic recognition.

## **Theoretical framework**

### **Conceptual approaches to ethnic recognition**

*Recognition* as a concept has received broad attention by scholars, as it has been applied extensively across scientific fields. In its most abstract sense, it pertains to the acknowledgement of the distinctiveness of another being's identity (Inwood, 1992). *Ethnic recognition* is then understood as the recognition of someone or some group's origin, culture, language, history, or religion (Chandra, 2012).

In research, ethnic recognition is an eclectic concept with many conceptualisations (McQueen, 2012). Social identity theory maintains that ethnic recognition is a product of intersubjectivity of peoples and groups of different origins (Taylor, 1992). Thereby, it is as socially constructed as ethnicity itself. The political implications of this are then that grievances regarding the distribution of goods in society are, ultimately, struggles between people for recognition (Honneth, 2004). From this perspective, recognition is not a resource that can be distributed by states, it is simply the lived experience of people (Schweiger, 2019). Nevertheless, some contend that governments have a direct role in recognition, and that they understand the consequences of failing to recognize groups (Taylor, 1992). This way, the study of the effects of recognition also concerns non-recognition, where groups are not recognised by the state, and mis-recognition, where groups are classified in ways which do not align with their self-reported identity (Xie & Kirkwood, 2021).



From a neo-institutionalist perspective, recognition can be institutionalised, making identity a resource for rights or claims of people (Kymlicka, 2005). Depending on the political system, this institutionalisation relies on popular approval (Taylor, 1992). De Zwart (2005) offers a descriptive framework for understanding how states recognise ethnic groups. It occurs through either: (1) accommodation, where states recognise ethnic groups and redistribute along ethnic lines to combat the inequalities between them, (2) denial, where states explicitly do not recognise ethnic groups, and thus do not redistribute along ethnic lines, (3) replacement, where ethnic groups are recognised in non-ethnic terms, such as class. Accordingly, these institutions can be formal or informal. While informal options such as norms or verbal agreements are fragile and less accommodative (Kuperman, 2015), formal options such as policy and laws are more stable over time and relevant politically: in a way, they signal leaders' preferences on how to deal with ethnic diversity (King & Samii, 2020). States use formal recognition in numerous ways, from language accommodation and representation quotas to offering territorial self-government.


In this thesis, I conceptualise ethnic recognition as the acknowledgement of ethnic groups and their unique identity by the state, and the provision of specific rights to these groups due to their uniqueness.

### **The effects of ethnic recognition on peace**

These conceptual approaches on ethnic recognition provide insights into the relationship between ethnic recognition and peace. In part, ethnic recognition belongs to the social reality of people, having great effects on the quality of life, particularly as it helps to make sense of one's self (McQueen, 2012). Additionally, as a policy choice, ethnic recognition is a state project, where differences between people are acknowledged and accommodated (Taylor, 1992). Nevertheless, being something more than toleration, it implies an affirmative and supportive approach to governance, making ethnicity a political resource for groups to claim. To some extent, it requires the state to redistribute resources along ethnic lines. This deepens ethnicity as a cleavage in society, as it gives people an incentive to identify ethnically (King & Samii, 2020). Faced with these various arguments, this policy choice on ethnic recognition has often been regarded as the 'dilemma of recognition' for governments. (Schraml, 2012).

Unfortunately, the literature currently lacks consensus on the effects of ethnic recognition on peace. Two lines of argumentation have been put forward, constituting a debate between those who view ethnic recognition to be beneficial to peace and those who view it to be harmful. A model capturing this theoretical debate is presented in Figure 1.

**Figure 1.** The debate on ethnic recognition



Proponents of ethnic recognition (Figure 1, top) argue that it promotes peaceful interactions and mitigates mistrust between groups as it assures them of their position within society. First, recognition has psychological effects on ethnic groups, as there is a strong symbolism of being recognised. It can alleviate concerns of exclusion, particularly among minorities (Chin & Levey, 2021). When ethnic groups are not appropriately recognised, this can foster feelings of marginalisation and resentment toward other groups or the government. This is especially true when they face consistent disadvantages vis-à-vis other groups (Taylor, 1992). Second, there are political effects, as its institutionalisation facilitates transparency in resource allocation between ethnic groups. The codification of recognition mitigates uncertainties among ethnic groups as it lays out an indisputable legal foundation of their rights for the future (King & Samii, 2020). These arguments taken together are often related to normative literature on justice and minority rights. Accordingly, to some, justice cannot be achieved without reckoning of the fact that groups may become disadvantaged when institutions are blind to the differences between them (Kymlicka & Norman, 2000).

Conversely, critics of ethnic recognition (Figure 1, bottom) contend that it has problematic mobilising effects, as it entrenches ethnic identities and licences ethnicity as a political

weapon. First, the socio-psychological arguments concern that recognition differentiates people based on things they cannot change. Ethnic recognition organises social categories into law, by which it also embeds the names, meanings and relational patterns associated with these categories (De Zwart, 2005). The categorisation informs struggles in society as they become a valuable resource to ethnic groups (Uvin, 2002). Second, when ethnicity becomes an institutionalised category with associated benefits, individuals are more likely to identify ethnically politically to secure these benefits. Acknowledging ethnicity as a political resource, elites appeal to voters by committing to policies which exclusively benefit their ethnic group. This has a tendency to spiral outward, as elites gather more support from the group by taking up more extreme political positions (Rabuhka & Shepsle, 1971). Such *ethnic outbidding* is especially harmful to peace when elites can win support by stirring up animosity with other groups (Zuber & Szöcsik, 2015). Scholars in this camp promote a state which does not discriminate: as Barry (1998) explains, while it is typical for laws to apply unevenly across society, laws which are adjusted frequently to accommodate specific groups may not be as universally considerate as intended.

I argue that these arguments hold in ethnically diverse countries, as well as in places more homogenous. Ethnic diversity does not necessarily make conflict more likely (Collier et al, 2009) and the number and size of groups also does not make ethnicity more politically salient (Weber, 2009). What matters for the implications of ethnic recognition, is how groups relate to one another, both in the present and historically (Lieberman & Singh, 2012).

This said, the analysis that will follow includes all countries which have endured conflict since the Cold War. This is important in two ways. First, conflict settings provide a unique opportunity to study ethnicity governance when stakes are high, as governments must carefully calculate policy choices like ethnic recognition, especially during conflict or reconciliation (Simonsen, 2005). Second, the case selection initially disregards distinctions between regular political conflicts and ethnic conflicts. Regardless of whether conflictual groups identify ethnically, or whether outsider experts label the conflict 'ethnic', I argue that ethnic recognition may contribute to or undermine peace more generally by bolstering assurances or exacerbating grievances of groups. Recent conflicts have become much more complex with increasingly multifaceted causes. To Gurr (1993), conflicts are oversimplified when labels like 'ethnic' are used.

This is not to say that ethnic recognition may not be the most potent in countries where a conflict between ethnic groups has occurred. Indeed, advocates of ethnic recognition particularly see its value in alleviating the concerns of exclusion of minorities, which can be most valuable where previous ethnic conflict substantiates these concerns (Chin & Levey, 2021). Similarly, critics argue that grievances induced by institutionalising ethnicity are validated when viewed in perspective of previous ethnic conflict (Lieberman & Singh, 2012). Though I thus extend the arguments outlined above beyond cases labelled ‘ethnic conflict’, subsidiary analyses measure the implications of ethnic recognition in countries where a conflict between ethnic groups has taken place.

Previous literature also suggests that the effects of ethnic recognition may vary over time. Neither proponents nor critics of ethnic recognition specify a time frame for their arguments, but some points can be considered. First, constitutions and peace agreements, which this thesis analyses for its implementation of ethnic recognition, have the greatest societal effect right after their adoption (Kuperman, 2015). Moreover, legal reforms which are more carefully formulated to address the barriers of group cooperation have the potential to promote the most durable peace (Badran, 2014). New peace agreements and constitutions often also come with high expectations in bringing political change among groups in society (Fiedler, 2019), and if the outcomes fail short of these expectations, this can generate significant tension in the short term. In this way, the adoption of ethnic recognition can prompt a sudden shift in peace dynamics, while its effects fade out over time. To study these potential time effects, the analysis tests the effect of ethnic recognition on peace over time.

### **The effects of ethnic recognition on peace under ethnic party bans**

According to neo-institutionalists, the state has numerous instruments available to manage group interactions (Cederman et al, 2009). In that regard, as previous researchers have already identified, such *institutional engineering*, or the deliberate designing of political institutions to achieve specific goals, can change what the implications are of recognising ethnic groups (Uvin, 2002; Basedau, 2011). Similarly, I argue that in countries where a systemic prohibition on the formation of ethnic parties, or an *ethnic party ban*, is in place, ethnic recognition has more favourable implications for peace. Essentially, the bans prevent

the harmful politicisation of ethnicity where the state recognises ethnic groups, and ensures the political inclusion of minority groups where they may not be recognized. Thereby, concerns raised by both proponents and critics of ethnic recognition are addressed.

The particular arrangement of ethnic party bans is crucial to understanding how it determines the effects of ethnic recognition. First, an ethnic party ban prohibits all groups from forming political parties on ethnic lines. It is systemic, as it does not specify particular ethnic groups (Gleason, 2017). Particularised bans have an opposite effect, as they can be abused for political suppression, which may foster conflict (Basedau & Moroff, 2011)<sup>1</sup>. Second, the bans require parties to be representative of the entire ‘nation’. As outlined in party regulations and constitutions, ethnic party bans mandate that parties adopt pan-ethnic or nationalistic platforms and require a regional distribution of membership (Bogaards, 2008). These features of ethnic party bans foster a system of centripetal ethnic power-sharing, forcing political competition of groups to reconfigure along non-ethnic lines (Gleason, 2017). In two ways, this complicates the implications of ethnic recognition for peace.

First, critics of ethnic recognition often argue that ethnic outbidding is a likely result of institutionalising ethnicity. When ethnic parties are banned, however, ethnic outbidding is no longer a winning strategy. For one, this is because parties are legally obliged to moderate their platforms and gather support from other ethnic groups. While the bans are not inviolable (Rashkova & Spirova, 2014, 236), they prompt ethnic political parties to undertake action, simply because they may otherwise face electoral disqualification. Indeed, there are few examples of cases where parties with extreme ethnic platforms have continued to exist despite the ban (Rosenblum, 2007). More importantly, ethnic party bans also incentivise moderation, as it increases parties’ chances of winning electorally. By requiring parties to have a certain number of supporters that belong to other ethnic groups, elites need to offer concessions to other ethnic groups to gain their members’ support (Mitchell et al, 2009). Since ethnic group members have a choice between multiple parties, a new competition between parties unfolds over the support of ethnic groups. As Gleason (2017, 6) puts it: “To become competitive, parties need to show that they can offer more to ethnic minority groups than other parties can”. The old winning strategy for elites was to gather votes from a single

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<sup>1</sup> Some ethnic groups may still be targeted with a systemic ban. While this would make it oppositely correlated with ethnic recognition in a way, the requirement that the party is representative of the nation makes it distinct. Indeed, while some countries can have bans on ethnic parties, their legal frameworks can display broad ethnic recognition. This is further shown in Appendix A.1.

ethnic group; now, it's about being the most inclusive multiethnic party to attract votes from various ethnic groups (Gleason, 2017).

Second, proponents of ethnic recognition are concerned that especially minority groups may face more political exclusion if the state does not recognise their differences from the majority. Nevertheless, ethnic party bans diminish the negative effects of the state failing to recognise. First, majority ethnic groups no longer have a winning coalition by virtue of being the largest ethnic group. More inclusive political coalitions are formed, at least to the extent that they can no longer present as an exclusively ethnic party (Mitchell et al, 2009). Moreover, because a competition has unfolded over the support of minority ethnic groups, these groups gain a great bargaining position. The parties are dependent on minority groups, and if they do not offer appropriate concessions, the minority group can look to other parties who may (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972).

## Methods

Next, I discuss the case selection and the operationalisation of variables used in the quantitative analysis. Attention will be paid to the measurement of ethnic recognition, which formed the empirical analysis. Then, I explain the Difference-in-Differences modelling technique. As outlined below, I build on King and Samii's (2020) previous research on ethnic recognition. Their data is revised and extended in a few ways.

### **Case selection: conflict countries and constitutional moments**

For this thesis, the data from *conflict-affected countries* which have had at least one *constitutional moment* between the years 1991 and 2018 has been compiled. This selection is based on King and Samii's (2020) work, although here, I apply original case selection criteria. This ensures transparency and consistency, and it enables the extension of their empirical analysis to a broader time frame<sup>2</sup>. In total, the country-year data considers 65 countries, having had 101 constitutional moments.

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<sup>2</sup> King and Samii's (2020) time frame of study was 1991 to 2012.

First, countries are identified as conflict-affected if, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2023), at least 25 deaths occurred due to political violence over three years, or at least 300 deaths in a single year, between 1991 and 2018. The cut-off of 25 deaths per year is lower than most other thresholds on civil wars and militarised conflicts, but it enables the inclusion of countries with lower-level conflicts (Lacida & Gleditsch, 2005). Moreover, including cases with 300 deaths in one year enables the inclusion of countries with short-term, but highly violent episodes. The violence occurring in these cases is not necessarily between ethnic groups, although I take extra steps to check the influence of recognition in countries where such conflict has occurred.

Second, the countries are included if they underwent a *constitutional moment* between 1991 and 2018. This refers to the establishment of a new constitution or comprehensive peace agreement (King & Samii, 2020), which will be analysed on their adoption of ethnic recognition. They are selected from the Constitute Project chronological data (2024), which has translated documents available. These ‘moments’ in time are studied, since the effects of ethnic recognition may not be consistent over time, which is something that can be captured using the Difference-in-Differences technique. Constitutions and peace agreements have been analysed for a few reasons. For one, they have a broad scope, covering the provision of rights to citizens in many domains of governance (King & Samii, 2020). Other lower-level government policy is much more varied in implementation across countries and taking these differences into account would have made this large-scale analysis unfeasible. Furthermore, they are less likely to change due to small changes in policy preferences (Kuperman, 2015). New constitutions are not frequently replaced, though they are redrafted more frequently in countries facing political crises (Ginsburg, Elkins & Melton, 2009). In this thesis’ data, constitutional moments occur on average in any country once approximately every 17 years<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> Conflict-countries which did not have a constitutional moment are omitted from this data set, which makes this calculations somewhat biased.

## Variables

In the following section, I present and discuss the selected variables used for the approximation of the effects of ethnic recognition on peace. The descriptive statistics of all variables used for model specification can be found in Table 1.

**Table 1.** Descriptive statistics of variables as used in modelling

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N	Source
<b>Ethnic recognition</b>	0.93	1.26	0	5.50	3434	Empirical analysis
<b>Positive peace:</b> Political Stability index	-0.98	0.79	-3.31	1.03	2712	World Bank (2022)
<b>Negative peace:</b> fatalities of organised violence (log)	3.16	3.04	0	13.56	3287	UCDP (2023)
<b>Ethnic party bans</b>	0.19		0	1	3434	Gleason (2017)
<b>Ethnic conflict</b>	0.22		0	1	3434	GrowUP (2024)
<b>GDP</b> (constant USD 2015) (log)	10.34	0.76	8.61	12.51	3232	World Bank (2023)
<b>GDP growth</b>	3.51	6.97	-64.05	88.96	3211	World Bank (2023)
<b>Income inequality</b>	0.60	0.07	0	0.77	3434	World Inequality Database (2023)
<b>Democracy level:</b> polyarchy	0.37	0.18	0.07	0.88	3402	V-Dem (2024)

### Ethnic recognition measure

In this thesis, I focus on ethnic recognition as the provision of rights to specific ethnic groups by the state. To deconstruct and measure this general conceptualisation of ethnic recognition, I consider both the breadth and the depth of its implementation in constitutions and peace agreements. In short, this takes into account the variety of domains of governance which the rights pertain to, and to what extent groups can claim these rights. In the analysis, an ethnic recognition score that can vary from zero (i.e. no ethnic recognition) to seven (i.e. significant



adoption of ethnic recognition) is attributed to each constitutional moment. The coding scheme used for this analysis with examples can be found in Appendix A.2.

First, governments vary widely in their approach to accommodating ethnic groups (Kymlicka, 2005). Most studies on formal ethnic recognition are nevertheless conducted through the lens of only one domain of governance which underestimates this variety. Building on King and Samii's (2020) previous work, I capture the breadth of ethnic recognition in terms of the offering of rights in seven distinct domains (executive, legislative, security, justice, civil service, education, language) in the constitutions or peace agreements. This analysis has found that these seven domains provide a comprehensive overview of how ethnic groups are offered rights in constitutions and peace agreements. This is not to say that rights in one domain may not be more empowering for ethnic groups or more costly to offer to governments, but capturing this diversity measures the willingness of governments to accommodate ethnic groups in various ways. Still, comparisons can be drawn between ethnic recognition in these domains in the effects they have on peace.

Second, ethnic recognition requires the specific mentioning by name of, or the reference to, an ethnic group. Ethnicity may be clarified as a source of law, and yet, without reference to the groups, some ethnic groups may still feel unrecognised. Indeed, no ethnic group is entitled to make claims to nonspecific laws if their existence is not appropriately recognised by the state. An ethnic group may well be rejected by the state entirely, for instance by denying citizenship (Crouch, 2019). This said, while sometimes ethnic groups are mentioned by name, a replacement of ethnicity may also occur, where ethnic distinctions are supplanted by other characteristics (De Zwart, 2005). Furthermore, indigenous groups are frequently bundled under terms as 'indigenous' to simplify states' administrative process, despite the cultural diversity among groups (Kline, 2013). In these cases, it is crucial that the rights can be claimed by groups by virtue of being a member of the ethnic group. Nevertheless, because ethnic groups face more difficulty claiming these rights, and because it demonstrates a lower commitment of government to recognising ethnic groups (De Zwart, 2005)<sup>4</sup>, I consider this more shallow ethnic recognition than when an ethnic group is directly named.

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<sup>4</sup> My approach to ethnic recognition differs from that of King and Samii (2020), who apply it more broadly. For instance, they (implementation, p. 73) designate the 1994 constitution of Ethiopia to have ethnic recognition, since: "Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia" ought to be represented in the armed forces. I argue, there is clearly a lack of entitlement to any group to claim these rights.

In the end, each constitutional moment is analysed on their adoption of ethnic recognition, in terms of its implementation in the seven different domains (breadth), each given a score from zero to one based on to what extent ethnic groups can claim the rights granted in these domains (depth). Rights which can be claimed directly by a certain ethnic group, that is, the ethnic group is directly mentioned by name, are attributed a score of one, whereas for the mentioning of an ethnic group 'indirectly' or the mentioning of more vague 'indigenous' groups, scores are halved. One right attributed directly to an ethnic group in a domain is sufficient for that domain to receive a full score. These scores per domain are added up to come to a total score of ethnic recognition, with a maximal score of seven. Finally, to create the panel data used to estimate the effect of ethnic recognition over time, the scores of ethnic recognition of the constitutional moments are assigned to all years after which the constitution or peace agreement was adopted. In this way, ethnic recognition is measured in quantifiable data that can support generalizability and reproducibility of this thesis, which is often lacking in studies on ethnic recognition (King & Samii, 2020).

### **Peace measure**

The dependent variable of interest is peace, which will be operationalised in two dimensions: negative and positive peace. Separating this concept into two captures the theoretical differences between the absence of direct violence, in terms of conflict fatalities and injuries (negative peace), and the absence of structural violence, reflecting the structural social, political and economic factors that promote peace (positive peace) (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). This approach has frequently been applied before in research and by governments and international organisations (Diehl, 2016). For negative peace, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2023) has accessible data on the number of real world fatalities due to organised violence (in terms of state-based, non-state, and one-sided) in the countries and time frame of interest. These numbers vary quite widely, from countries having no such fatal injuries, to large-scale conflict and genocide, and thus, it has been log-transformed to ensure a more normal distribution. For positive peace, the Political Stability index from the World Bank (2022) carries historical data on the most important indicators which can predict violence, such as government stability, political freedoms and orderly transfers of power, taken together in an index. These scores vary from zero (low likelihood of stability) to five (high likelihood of stability). Each model in this thesis will be assessed for both positive and negative peace, to capture these theoretical differences.

### **Ethnic party bans measure**

For data on ethnic party bans, material from Gleason (2017) will be compiled. This author has categorised prohibitions on political parties in constitutions and party regulation by country by year of implementation, in terms of different ban types. The primary type considered ethnic party bans which include articles with clear language outlawing political parties created on ethnic foundations. A secondary type concerns more vague party bans, which leave more room for interpretation. Bans in both of these categories are only considered if they: 1) are systemic and 2) require parties to be nationally representative (such as through spatial distribution membership requirements). As will become clear, this variable will be used to make subsets of the data, in order to compare the effect of ethnic recognition on peace in situations with and without ethnic party bans.

### **Stratification and control variables**

Since this analysis includes conflict-affected countries generally, further comparisons are drawn between countries with a history of ethnic conflict and those without. Since this thesis studies constitutions and peace agreements, the ethnic recognition that was identified typically targets specific ethnic groups involved in conflict or at least encompasses politically significant ethnic groups. Nevertheless, one could expect different effects of ethnic recognition in countries where no ethnic conflict had occurred before. For this, the data is again split, to contrast cases where previous conflict between ethnic groups has occurred, and where there has not. This stratification depends on ethnic conflict data from the Geographical Research On War, Unified Platform (2024). There, a country is designated as an ethnic conflict case if conflictual parties have at some point been demarcated by ethnic membership.

That said, control variables included in a Difference-in-Differences estimation serve a different purpose than they would in other linear regression models. While explained further below, they mitigate a great deal of the influence of extraneous variables by design (Abadie, 2005). Controls are mostly necessary when it can be expected that some variable may both be related to the presence of the treatment (the adoption of ethnic recognition) and how the outcome (peace) changes over time (Zeldow, Leavitt & Hatfield, 2024). The number of controls will be kept to a minimum, however, as Difference-in-Differences models are prone to biases that come with the inclusion of unnecessary controls (Huntington-Klein, 2023). In

that regard, King and Samii (2020) show how the economic situation and the level of democracy are relevant to understanding both the adoption of ethnic recognition and the development of peace over time. Additionally, while Kymlicka (2005) argues that ethnic recognition is adopted more often in liberal democratic countries, Krause et al (2018) describe how democracy and economic prosperity make peace more durable. For these reasons, the models include the economic health of a country, in terms of GDP and GDP growth, taken from the World Bank (2023), and the Gini coefficient of income inequality, drawn from The World Inequality Database (2023) as covariates. Additionally, also included is the level of democracy, operationalised as the Polyarchy Index of Democracy from the Varieties of Democracy Project (2024).

### **Statistical method: Difference-in-Differences**

This thesis employs the Difference-in-Differences (DiD) and Dynamic Difference-in-Differences (DDiD) modelling technique in a linear regression to test the effect of the adoption of ethnic recognition on peace. Essentially, they are two-way fixed effects models for panel data, commonly used to estimate the effects of policy implementations (Zeldow, Leavitt & Hatfield, 2024). They fit time and treatment dummy variables to estimate the difference in effect between years pre and post treatment within groups and that between the treatment and control group, constituting the ‘difference’ within ‘differences’ (Fricke, 2015).

Importantly, this statistical technique enables only the measuring of the effect of a homogenous treatment. That is, the only variation that is occurring in the treatment variable is the presence versus absence of treatment. Thus, the measure of ethnic recognition as described previously is necessarily dichotomized, in terms of the presence of ethnic recognition in the analysed texts, including recognition scores greater than zero (the treatment group), versus constitutions lacking in ethnic recognition (the control group). In Appendix B.3, I analyse the effects of different levels of ethnic recognition as a robustness check. It would be expected that broader and deeper levels of ethnic recognition produce stronger effects on peace. There, I also draw comparisons between different domains of ethnic recognition and how they affect peace.

While DiD shows the general effect of ethnic recognition on peace, DDiD reveals how this relationship develops over time: together, they provide a comprehensive view. First, the regular DiD estimation compares a general trend of peace before the constitutional moment to a general trend of peace after the constitutional moment. Then, it calculates a difference in effect between constitutions with and without ethnic recognition. The output of one such model is a single coefficient delineating the size of effect of ethnic recognition on peace. Second, the more complex DDiD estimation enables the effect to vary over the years studied, rather than taking the effect in all years post-treatment combined. As previously discussed, it can be expected that the size of effect may not be constant in years after its adoption. The output of these models present multiple coefficients delineating the effect of the adoption of recognition versus non-recognition in the years after the constitutional moment. Nevertheless, DDiD models are generally less precise than DiD models, because model complexity increases and sample sizes decrease for each incorporated year (Huntington-Klein, 2021).

Importantly, the models assume ‘parallel trends’. This entails that there is no difference in effect over time between treatment and control group before the treatment has occurred (McKenzie, 2020). It enables the attribution of differences in the outcome between the treatment and control groups, post-treatment, to the treatment itself, rather than to other factors. In that regard, it becomes more difficult to confidently attribute any differences in the levels of peace to ethnic recognition after the constitutional moment happens if there is already a significant difference before it happens. To justify parallel trends, placebo tests are done to estimate the effect of ethnic recognition before a constitutional moment has happened. In that regard, while one significant coefficient does not necessarily mean a violation of parallel trends, it becomes more problematic the closer it is to the time of treatment (Ryan et al, 2018). This placebo testing will be done in Appendix B.

To test the effect of ethnic recognition under ethnic party bans, a comparison is done between the models with ethnic party bans cases and all other cases. This stratification, commonly applied in DiD models, offers clearer insights than interaction effects, which add to model complexity (Puhani, 2012). Being particularly useful for DDiD models, it allows for intuitive plotting and comparison of the effects across cases. Ethnic conflict cases are also compared to other political conflicts in this way.

## Results

The summarised findings from the empirical analysis on ethnic recognition in peace agreements and constitutions can be found in Appendix A. These findings provide evidence for the robustness of ethnic recognition as I have operationalised it. This appendix furthermore includes the coding scheme, the scoring of ethnic recognition by constitutional moment in terms of breadth and depth, and the actual rights attributed to ethnic groups as found in the empirical analysis. Following, multiple analyses are carried out to test the effect of ethnic recognition on peace.

### The effects of ethnic recognition on peace

The results of the primary models, which includes estimations of the effect of the adoption of any ethnic recognition on positive and negative peace in the comprehensive sample of cases using a DiD estimation are presented in Table 2.

**Table 2.** The effect of the adoption of ethnic recognition on negative and positive peace

	<b>Model 1</b> Negative peace (constant trends)	<b>Model 2</b> Positive peace (constant trends)
(Intercept)	61.950*** (4.307)	-18.56*** (1.267)
Ethnic recognition	-0.711* (0.391)	0.112** (0.048)
GDP (log)	-5.110*** (1.363)	1.577*** (0.014)
GDP growth	-0.064*** (0.012)	0.007*** (0.002)
Income inequality	-3.354 (3.277)	0.628 (0.461)
Democracy level	-3.457*** (1.051)	1.197*** (0.135)
Observations	3075	2586
Adj. $R^2$	0.534	0.578
F statistic	27.315*** (df = 134; 2940)	28.236*** (df = 130; 2455)


Note: Table entries are linear regression coefficients with cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Year and constitutional moment dummy variables have been omitted from the models in this table. The negative peace model considers the logarithm of the number of fatalities due to political violence.

\*\*\*p < 0.001; \*\*p < 0.01; \*p < 0.05

The results indicate that the adoption of ethnic recognition generally contributes to peace. Ethnic recognition is associated with a decrease in fatalities due to political violence, Model 1:  $b = -0.711$  (0.391),  $p = 0.069$ . It is also associated with an increase in the political stability of a country, Model 2:  $b = 0.112$  (0.048),  $p = 0.016$ . These models present clear implications of recognising ethnic groups for peace in the long term. This aligns with the arguments of proponents of ethnic recognition, who argue that it alleviates concerns of exclusion and promotes equitable resource allocation, thereby fostering peace and stability. While critics argue that ethnic recognition entrenches divisions and legitimises ethnic identities as political tools, fostering antagonism, the evidence suggests that the benefits outweigh these risks.

Further, the results from the Dynamic Difference-in-Differences models estimating the effect of the adoption of ethnic recognition on positive and negative peace over time are presented in Figure 2. It was hypothesised that there may be a difference between the effect of ethnic recognition on peace right after its adoption and at a later moment in time. The figure shows the effects of ethnic recognition (Y-axis) in the seven years after the year of the constitutional moment (X-axis)<sup>5</sup>. The year of implementation is also included, though this partially measures the effect before the constitutional moment has taken place (i.e. the placebo), and thus cannot be interpreted the same way.

**Figure 2:** The effect of the adoption of ethnic recognition on deaths due to political violence (Model 3, left) and on political stability (Model 4) by year with 99.9% confidence intervals.



<sup>5</sup> Nota bene: It is thus not a trend of peace, but rather a trend of the effect of ethnic recognition on peace.

Remarkably, the results indicate that, despite the general peaceful effects of ethnic recognition found in Model 1 and 2, an over time trend appears where ethnic recognition contributes to a decrease in the level of peace in the first years after its adoption. To start, the model estimating negative peace (Model 3) presents an increase in the number of deaths due to political violence in the first three years post treatment. From the fourth year, the effects are negative, representing a decrease in the level of violence due to ethnic recognition. To an extent, these same interpretations hold for the model estimating positive peace (Model 4). In this instance, in the first five years there is a negative effect of ethnic recognition on the political stability in a country. From the sixth year, this effect is again positive. Taken together, though there seems to be a general peaceful effect of ethnic recognition, it takes time to situate. After around the fourth or fifth year after the implementation of ethnic recognition, countries generally become more peaceful.

These findings suggest that while ethnic recognition may initially prompt a disturbance in peace, over the long term, it tends to contribute to a decrease in violence and an improvement in political stability. In a way, this raises questions about differences in the time dimension of the arguments proposed by proponents and critics of ethnic recognition. As previously mentioned, neither camp necessarily outlined a time frame during which their arguments would be most relevant. Nevertheless, it does not seem to be the case that ethnic recognition can be used as a short-term measure to provide an immediate sense of validation and acceptance of an ethnic group. Instead, its adoption in constitutions and peace agreements offers stability in the long term by enhancing institutional transparency. Its consistent application may help gradually build trust among ethnic groups and the state.

Further discussion is required, however. To start, most of the estimates by year by themselves are statistically insignificant. This was expected to some extent, as DDiD models are less precise due to model complexity, requiring a high number of observations to make precise estimates (Zeldow, Leavitt & Hatfield, 2024). An over time trend in the effect can nevertheless be identified taking all estimates, as a change in direction of the effects appears to happen quite gradually, and there are no outliers. While erratic changes might raise questions about the reliability of the overall trend, here, there is a certain stability to this time effect. Moreover, the time effect shows in both the models on positive and negative peace, which provides converging evidence.



Nevertheless, for Model 3, there are minor violations of the parallel trends assumption, as there are statistically significant differences in peace before the treatment has taken place (see Appendix B.1). To an extent, this means that before the constitutional moment takes place, the countries which adopt ethnic recognition in their constitutions and peace agreements do not have similar patterns in the level of peace as those who do not. This makes it harder to confidently attribute any differences in the levels of peace to ethnic recognition after the constitutional moment happens. Thankfully, Model 4 does not have any violations of this sort, which contributes to the robustness of the previous findings.

Subsidiary analyses have also been done, specifically to test the robustness of ethnic recognition as operationalised above. Appendix B.2 and B.3 present the model results and discuss the implications of these findings in more detail. It is revealed that implementing higher levels of ethnic recognition in constitutions and peace agreements has a stronger effect. This is true for both the level of violence and the political stability of a country. Broader and deeper provision of rights to ethnic groups has more power in positively impacting peace, which benefits the robustness of the measurement. Furthermore, a comparison has been done between different domains. Here, a simple distinction is drawn between ethnic recognition more civil-political in nature and more economic and cultural ethnic recognition. These results indicate that most of the explanatory power in ethnic recognition of peace resides with civil-political ethnic group rights.

### **Ethnic recognition under ethnic party bans**

The results of the DiD models estimating the effect of ethnic recognition using cases with ethnic party bans and cases without party bans are shown in Table 3, below<sup>6</sup>. The models reveal that ethnic recognition is associated with a greater decrease in political violence in countries having implemented an ethnic party ban (Model 5) than in countries with no ethnic party ban (Model 6). Nevertheless, this is not true estimations of political stability, as the effect is statistically insignificant in the model using ethnic party bans cases (Model 7).

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<sup>6</sup> The full version of these models, as well as the dynamic models are presented in Appendix B.4.

**Table 3:** The effects of ethnic recognition in countries with an ethnic party ban versus other countries on negative and positive peace assuming constant trends.

	<b>Ethnic party ban</b>	<b>No ethnic party ban</b>	<b>All cases</b>
<b>Negative peace:</b>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>	<i>Model 1</i>
Political Violence	$b = -1.166^* (0.707)$ N = 639	$b = -0.476 (0.405)$ N = 2436	$b = -0.711^* (0.391)$ N = 3075
<b>Positive peace:</b>	<i>Model 7</i>	<i>Model 8</i>	<i>Model 2</i>
Political stability	$b = 0.054 (0.127)$ N = 582	$b = 0.290^{**} (0.127)$ N = 2004	$b = 0.112^{**} (0.048)$ N = 2586

Note: DiD estimated effect  $b$  with cluster robust standard errors given in brackets. Number of observations in country-years as N.

These results indicate that ethnic recognition contributes more to a decrease in political violence in countries having implemented ethnic party bans than elsewhere. This corroborates what was previously hypothesised. Where the state recognises ethnic groups, ethnicity is prevented from politicising, as ethnic party bans promote moderate politics and broader ethnic coalitions. This fosters inclusion and trust, diminishing the occurrence of violence.

Nevertheless, these interpretations do not hold for peace more generally, as Model 7 has produced insignificant results and faces issues with parallel trends - which other Models do not. In part, however, I contribute this insignificant result to the relatively low number of observations (N = 582). This said, it is all the more noteworthy that a significant result was found in the model estimating negative peace despite a similar low number of observations (N = 639). The effect was strong enough to be detected even with this limited data.

### **Ethnic recognition in different conflict settings**

Lastly, ethnic conflict cases are considered in separation of other political conflict cases. The primary case selection of this thesis considers general conflict countries. While it was previously argued that ethnic recognition may contribute to or undermine peace more generally regardless of whether the conflict occurred on ethnic lines, it was also argued that ethnic recognition may be expected to have a stronger effect in countries with a history of ethnic conflict. You may find a summary of the results of these models in Table 4, below<sup>7</sup>.

<sup>7</sup> The full version of these models, as well as the dynamic models are presented in Appendix B.5.

**Table 4:** The effects of ethnic recognition in different conflict settings on negative and positive peace assuming constant trends.

	<b>Ethnic conflict</b>	<b>Other political conflict</b>	<b>All conflict cases</b>
<b>Negative peace:</b>	<i>Model 9</i>	<i>Model 10</i>	<i>Model 1</i>
Political Violence	$b = -0.805^* (0.414)$ N = 1584	$b = -0.324 (0.615)$ N = 1491	$b = -0.711^* (0.391)$ N = 3075
<b>Positive peace:</b>	<i>Model 11</i>	<i>Model 12</i>	<i>Model 2</i>
Political stability	$b = 0.257^* (0.137)$ N = 1347	$b = -0.199 (0.279)$ N = 1239	$b = 0.112^{**} (0.048)$ N = 2586


Note: DiD estimated effect  $b$  with cluster robust standard errors given in brackets. Number of observations in country-years as N.

Indeed, the results indicate that in countries where an ethnic conflict was present, ethnic recognition had a greater effect on peace than elsewhere. In the estimation of both political violence and political stability, statistical significance is gained when considering ethnic conflict cases (Model 9 and 11), versus cases with other political conflict (Model 10 and 12). These findings suggest that, in countries where ethnic conflict had previously occurred, adopting ethnic recognition in constitutions and peace agreements promotes peace, while in countries where there had been no conflict between ethnic groups, there is no significant effect on peace. This may be due to the additional value it has in these circumstances in alleviating the concerns of exclusion of minority groups. Although I extended the theoretical arguments recognition to all conflict cases, as I argued that ethnic recognition may contribute to or undermine peace more generally by adding to the grievances or assurances in any conflict, this somewhat overestimates the effect of ethnic recognition. That said, the general findings still hold, as a significant effect was found using all cases (Model 1 and 2).

Remarkably, using the dynamic models, a difference in the short-term effect can be found when contrasting the effect of ethnic recognition on political violence in countries with and without a history of ethnic conflict. The DDiD models estimating the effect of ethnic recognition on political violence by year in the two groups of cases are presented in Figure 3 below. As noted previously, while generally beneficial to peace, ethnic recognition can harm peace in the short term. Given these dynamic models, however, this short-term effect may be partially context-dependent. Specifically, according to this data, in the first seven years after the implementation of ethnic recognition, there is a decrease in political violence in ethnic conflict cases (Model 13). Though this effect is not significant in all years independently, a clear trend emerges. Furthermore, in the model applying all other cases, there is a statistically

significant positive effect of ethnic recognition on political violence in the first three years after the constitutional moment (Model 14). As presented, this effect diminishes over time, and taken in the long term (as in Model 9), ethnic recognition contributes to a decrease in violence in these cases. These findings suggest that while in countries with a history of ethnic conflict, the decrease in political violence happens right after implementation, in countries without a history of ethnic conflict, there is a significant increase in the level of political violence due to ethnic recognition first.

**Figure 3:** The effect of the adoption of ethnic recognition on deaths due to political violence by year in countries with a history of ethnic conflict (left) and in other political conflict-affected countries (right) with 99.9% confidence intervals.



Though there are some issues concerning parallel trends, these are minor. Furthermore, the above interpretations cannot be applied to positive peace. These models generally showed no significant effect of ethnic recognition on political stability in any of the years (see Appendix B.5).

These results suggest that while ethnic recognition may lead to a disruption in peace in the short term, this may be dependent on whether a country has previously endured conflict between ethnic groups. This difference in effect was not previously hypothesised, and so I can only offer theoretical suggestions. First, it may be that in countries without previous ethnic conflict, ethnic recognition can serve as a catalyst for new political salience of ethnicity. As the state gives people incentives to identify with a new label by providing a new

set of rights, new ethnic cleavages can be formed, or hidden ones can be uncovered. Nevertheless, ethnic cleavages which lead to violent conflict do not form overnight (Mustasilta & Svensson, 2023). Second, in comparison to countries with a history of ethnic conflict, these countries may lack the institutional mechanisms or societal norms to manage ethnic cleavages. In these countries there is often a limited awareness of managing ethnic diversity, or even a sense of complacency, as governments underestimate ethnic cleavages, as had happened in Kenya, shown at the start of this thesis.

## **Discussion and conclusion**

This thesis has reflected on the theoretical debate on the implications of ethnic recognition for peace. While some scholars argue that it fosters peaceful interactions and reduces mistrust by assuring groups of their societal status, others argue it politicises ethnicity, encouraging extreme political positions. A neo-institutional approach was taken by presupposing that ethnic diversity could be managed by institutional engineering. In that regard, it was argued that ethnic recognition has more favourable implications in the context of systemic bans on ethnic parties. The bans prevent the harmful politicisation of ethnicity where the state recognises ethnic groups, and ensures the political inclusion of minority groups where they may not be recognized. To test these arguments, the effects of ethnic recognition, as implemented in peace agreements and constitutions in conflict-affected countries were estimated using a Difference-in-Differences technique.

Using data gathered with an new and improved operationalisation of ethnic recognition, it was found that granting ethnic groups particular rights generally promotes peace. The findings also suggest that the prohibition of ethnic parties generally improves the implications of ethnic recognition on peace. That said, it is also found that ethnic recognition may undermine peace in the short term, especially in countries where conflict had previously not occurred between ethnic groups.

In view of these results, it is necessary to acknowledge certain limitations that might impact the conclusions of this research. First, though the measure of ethnic recognition captures the ways ethnic groups are granted rights in constitutions and peace agreements, it does not

consider the varying costs to governments or benefits to ethnic groups. The motivations behind recognizing ethnic groups in specific ways are beyond this thesis's scope. Yet, further research can explore how and why governments grant different rights to ethnic groups and how these groups perceive these accommodations. Additionally, while the measure shows a de jure commitment of governments, whether they uphold these commitments in practice remains unanswered. These factors clearly have important implications for peace and deserve further scholarly attention. Nevertheless, the measure of ethnic recognition proved robust for the purpose of this thesis and contributed to analysing the effects of recognizing ethnic groups, which is significant as previous research has been primarily qualitative.

Second, while this thesis has attempted to delve into the causes of conflict, especially between ethnic groups, there may still be additional underlying mechanisms that warrant further investigation. An analysis of countries where conflict between ethnic groups had previously occurred already proved to be relevant to understanding the over time effects of ethnic recognition. Indeed, as was noted, ethnic diversity does not necessarily lead to conflict: what matters is how groups relate to one another. At an earlier stage in the process, this thesis aimed to analyse these mechanisms, by including variables such as the politicisation of ethnicity or inter-ethnic trust in the modelling. However, due to a lack of comprehensive data, they were omitted. Future research could benefit from addressing these things.

Still, the findings from this thesis provide suggestions for policymakers, as it has been shown that ethnic diversity can be managed. Especially in countries with a history of violence between ethnic groups, recognising ethnic groups can be a force for peace. It is important to consider these implications carefully, nevertheless, as ethnic recognition can exacerbate divisions in the short term. Furthermore, the benefits of systemic bans on ethnic parties as a tool of institutional engineering deserve the attention of policymakers who look for ways to manage ethnic diversity.

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## **Appendices**

The appendices are structured as follows. First, the appendices on the empirical analysis of ethnic recognition are presented. In subsections, this includes the general finding from the analysis, the coding frame, the coding scores per constitutional moment, and the actual ethnic recognition identified in the constitutions and peace agreements in terms of rights attributed to ethnic groups. Second, the appendices include additional and auxiliary modelling results. The structure abided by in this appendix generally follows the flow of the results section in the main body. It also includes linear regression assumptions testing.

### **Appendix A: Empirical analysis**

- A.1. Analysis of ethnic recognition
- A.2. Ethnic recognition coding frame
- A.3. Ethnic recognition scores by constitution or peace agreement
- A.4. Ethnic group rights identified in constitutions and peace agreements by country

### **Appendix B: Auxiliary modelling results**


- B.1. The effect of ethnic recognition on peace over time with placebo tests
- B.2. The effect of ethnic recognition at different levels of implementation
- B.3. The effect of ethnic recognition along different domains
- B.4. The effect of ethnic recognition under ethnic party bans with placebo tests
- B.5. The effect of ethnic recognition in ethnic conflict cases with placebo test
- B.6. Assumptions testing of the primary models

## Appendix A: Empirical analysis

### Appendix A.1: Analysis of ethnic recognition

In this appendix, I analyse my measure of ethnic recognition, to see if it works and makes sense. I present the main findings from the coding of the constitutions and peace agreements. A map presenting the total recognition scores acquired by country as an average of their constitutions and peace agreements is presented in Figure A.1.

**Figure A1.1:** Average ethnic recognition scores in constitutions and peace agreements from 1991-2018 in conflict-affected countries



Note: Countries in grey were omitted from the case selection of this analysis.

Ethnic recognition was adopted in 52 of the 101 constitutional moments, which were from 44 of the 65 countries considered in this analysis. The constitutions of Iraq (2005) and Moldova (1994), and the Yugoslavian Rambouillet Agreement (1999) contained the most recognition, scoring around 5.5, 5.0 and 4.0, out of 7, respectively. The map above reveals that ethnic recognition is relatively more prevalent in the Latin American countries covered in this analysis (on average, 1.553), while South-East Asian governments are less accommodative (on average, 0.688). In Africa and the Middle East, the most prevalent continent in this analysis, varying degrees of ethnic recognition occur.

Crucially, I find that ethnic recognition is not significantly correlated ( $r = -0.024$ ) with the ethnic diversity of a country, measured in ethnic fractionalization (from Quality of Government, 2024). To an extent, this corroborates the idea hypothesised previously that ethnic recognition occurs as a result of an intersubjective struggle, rather than being a necessary result of diversity. This provides support for Lieberman & Singh's (2012) theory, which states that while there must be some level of diversity between groups for the state to institutionalise ethnicity, states use ethnic recognition in response to the complex social dynamics and power struggles between groups in society. Indeed, as King and Samii (2020) point out, factors such as historical narratives, ethnic relations and democracy are more likely to play significant roles in determining the level of ethnic recognition implemented by governments. One of their major findings is that regimes led by a minority group are less likely to adopt recognition than regimes where an ethnic majority has leadership. That said, whether countries adopt ethnic recognition is beyond the scope of this thesis, and possible reverse causality has been accounted for by the modelling technique.

In terms of breadth, ethnic recognition was adopted most in the legislative and language domains, having 31 and 29 instances of ethnic recognition in the 101 constitutions and peace agreements, respectively. In terms of depth, ethnic groups were also most frequently mentioned by name in these domains: in 45.2% and 51.7% of instances, respectively. That said, ethnic recognition was adopted least in the civil service (12 instances) and security (13 instances) domains. In the justice domain (17 instances), no ethnic group was mentioned by name, as the ethnic groups were only recognised indirectly or through 'indigenous' catch-all terms.


Additionally, although peace agreements generally contained more ethnic recognition than constitutions (0.97 versus 0.90 average), the two group averages are not significantly different from one another ( $p = 0.80$ ). That said, peace agreements generally contained more recognition in the security domain, constituting a 0.12 ethnic recognition score difference on average. This makes sense regarding some differences in the scope between the legal documents. Nevertheless, the other domains of ethnic recognition do not appear to vary in score between constitutions and peace agreements. Moreover, despite the fact that peace agreements generally scored higher ethnic recognition scores than constitutions, constitutions were more likely to name ethnic groups directly by name, though only by a small margin (5 percent points). In the end, these findings support the idea that differences between the

constitutions and peace agreements produce no significant biases regarding ethnic recognition scores and can thus be used jointly when studying ethnic recognition empirically.

Importantly, there is a weak but statistically significant negative correlation between the presence of an ethnic party ban and scores of ethnic recognition ( $r = -0,149$ ). It was previously mentioned that an ethnic party ban can, paradoxically, reflect some form of ethnic mis-recognition as some ethnic groups may be still targeted despite its systemic nature. There seems to be some merit in this argument, since the imposition of bans are associated with a lack of recognition of ethnic groups. In this way, related to the theoretical arguments of this thesis, there may be some connection in countries picking ethnic party bans as a way of preventing the politicisation of ethnicity, and choosing not to ethnically recognize for the same reason. Nevertheless, the correlation can generally be considered very weak, thus interpreting this any further is mostly speculation.

Lastly, though some argued that a decreasing salience of ethnicity would have followed economic modernisation and the strengthening of nation-states (Gellner, 1983; Snyder, 2000), governments worldwide have also increasingly been meeting these groups' demands (Gurr, 2000). Nevertheless, this analysis finds that since 1991, there has been a general downward trend of ethnic recognition in the 101 constitutions and peace agreements from conflict-affected countries, as shown in Figure A.2.

**Figure A1.2** Average scores of ethnic recognition in constitutions and peace agreements in conflict-affected countries, by year, in the years 1991-2018



## Appendix A.2: Ethnic recognition coding frame

Breadth	Description	Example		
Executive	Related to executive positions in state government	<i>“The Government is open to all the ethnic compositions. Of its ministers and vice-ministers, there must be at most 60% from the Hutu tribe and at most 40% from the Tutsi group.”</i> Burundi Const. 2005. art. 129		
Legislative	Related to representation in national or other legislatures.	<i>“Provision shall be made according to Federal law for the representation of political parties to file candidacy for the election of the House of Representatives for proportional representation system through closed list of women, Dalit, Adibasi Janajati, Khas Arya, Madhesi, Tharu, Muslim, and backward regions.”</i> Nepal Const. 2015. art. 84		
Judicial	Related to positions in the state judiciary or other legal systems	<i>“The authorities of the indigenous peoples may exercise their jurisdictional functions within their territorial jurisdiction in accordance with their own laws and procedures as long as these are not contrary to the Constitution and the laws of the Republic.”</i> Colombia Const. 1991. art. 246		
Security	Related to representation in military or police force	<i>“The Kurdistan regional government shall be responsible for all the administrative requirements of the region, particularly the establishment and organisation of the internal security forces for the region such as police, security forces, and guards of the region.”</i> Iraq Const. 2005. art. 121.5		
Civil service	Related to representation in government administration or public service	<i>“the Government will make an effort while taking account of the qualifications required - to integrate officials from the Movements and people from among the populations of Northern Mali, into the various organs of the public and semi-public services.”</i> Mali Pacte Nationale 1992. art 53		
Education	Related to diversity in education systems	<i>“This Constitution shall guarantee the [...] educational rights of the various nationalities, such as Turkomen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and all other constituents, and this shall be regulated by law.”</i> Iraq Const. 2005. art 125		
Language	Related to language accommodation	<i>“Arabic shall be the official language, while the linguistic and cultural rights of the Amazigh, the Tabous, the Touareg and the other components of the Libyan society shall be guaranteed.”</i> Libya Const. 2011. art 1		
Depth	Description	Example(s)	Clarification	Score
Direct	Specific ethnicity, nation, tribe or language is mentioned by name. Individuals can claim these rights directly by virtue of being a member of the ethnic group.	<i>“The Government is open to all the ethnic compositions. Of its ministers and vice-ministers, there must be at most 60% from the Hutu tribe and at most 40% from the Tutsi group.”</i> Burundi Const. 2005. art. 129  <i>“From among the languages of Pashtu, Dari, Uzbeki, Turkmani, Baluchi, Pashai, Nuristani, Pamiri (alsana), Arab and other languages spoken in the country, Pashtu and Dari are the official languages</i>	Hutu’s and Tutsi’s are mentioned directly by name.  Turkic languages are mentioned directly.	1.0



		<i>of the state. The Turkic languages (Uzbaki and Turkmen), Baluchi, Pashai, Nuristani and Pamiri (alsana) are – in addition to Pashto and Dari – the third official language in areas where the majority speaks them.”</i> Afghanistan Const. 2004. art.16.		
Indirect	Specific ethnicity, nation, tribe or language is not mentioned by name, but is one of the following: 1) addressed without direct mentioning 2) addressed indirectly through ‘replaced’ group distinctions, such as political parties, armed groups, regions, etc. which are understood to overlap with an ethnic group.	“ <i>As a rule, the President of the Republic and the federal prime minister may not be from the same member republic.</i> ” Yugoslavia Const. 1991. art. 97.  “ <i>the Government will make an effort while taking account of the qualifications required - to integrate officials from the Movements and people from among the populations of Northern Mali, into the various organs of the public and semi-public services</i> ” Mali Pacte Nationale 1992, art. 53.	Art.2 delineates the Yugoslavia to consist of Serbia and Montenegro, each having respective ethnic groups  The Mali conflict in the 90s was generally over Northern Malian rights, which are understood to consist of Tuareg, Berber and other Arab peoples	0.5
Indigenous	Non-specific indigenous populations or communities are recognised. Can mention ‘tribal’; ‘traditional’; ‘communities’, etc.	“ <i>The State shall organize by means of a law the regime of autonomy for the indigenous peoples and ethnic communities of the Atlantic Coast, which shall have to contain, among other rules: the functions of their government organs, their relation with the Executive and Legislative Power and with the municipalities, and the exercise of their rights.</i> ” Nicaragua Const. 2014, art. 181	The indigenous communities of the Atlantic Coast consist of Miskitos, Mayangna, Rama among others.	0.5
Mixed	When recognition is identified but there is a mix of depths in a single domain, or when it does not fit any predetermined category of depth.			0.25, 0.5 or 0.75
None	Lack of direct, indirect, indigenous or other ethnic recognition.			0

### Appendix A.3: Ethnic recognition scores by constitutional moment

Country	Constitutional moment	Type	Executive	Legislative	Security	Justice	Civil Service	Education	Language	Score
Afghanistan	Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2004	Const.	None	Direct	None	None	None	None	Direct	2
Algeria	Constitution of Algeria, 1996	Const.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	0
Algeria	Constitution of Algeria, 2008	Const.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	0
Angola	Constitution of Angola, 1992	Const.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	0
Angola	Lusaka Protocol, 1994	Peace agr.	Indirect	None	None	None	None	None	None	0,5
Angola	Constitution of Angola, 2010	Const.	Indig.	None	None	Indig.	None	None	None	1
Azerbaijan	Constitution of Azerbaijan 1995	Const.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	0
Bangladesh	Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord 1997	Peace agr.	Indig.	Direct	Indig.	None	Indig.	Indig.	None	3
Bosnia & Herzegovina	Constitution of Bosnia & Herzegovina/Dayton Agr, 1995	Both	Direct	Direct	None	Indirect	None	None	None	2,5
Burundi	Arusha Peace Agreement, 2000	Peace agr.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	0
Burundi	Constitution of Burundi, 2005	Const.	Direct	Direct	Indirect	Indirect	Indirect	None	None	3,5
Cambodia	Paris Agreement, 1991	Peace agr.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	0
Cambodia	Constitution of Cambodia, 1993	Const.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	0
Central African Rep.	Constitution of the Central African Republic, 2004	Const.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	0
Central African Rep.	Constitution of the Central African Republic, 2013	Const.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	0
Central African Rep.	Constitution of the Central African Republic, 2015	Const.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	0
Chad	Constitution of Chad, 1996	Const.	None	None	None	Indig.	None	None	None	0,5
Chad	Constitution of Chad, 2018	Const.	None	None	None	Indig.	None	None	None	0,5
Colombia	Constitution of the Republic of Colombia, 1991	Const.	Indig.	Direct	None	Indig.	Indig.	Indig.	Indig.	3,5
Rep. Congo	Constitution of the Republic of Congo, 2001	Const.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	0
Rep. Congo	Constitution of the Republic of Congo, 2015	Const.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	0
D.R. Congo	Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2006	Const.	None	None	None	None	None	None	Direct	0
Ivory Coast	Constitution of Ivory Coast 2000	Const.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	0,5
Ivory Coast	Accra Agreements, 2004	Peace agr.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	0,5
Ivory Coast	Pretoria Agreement, 2005	Peace agr.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	1
Ivory Coast	Constitution of Ivory Coast 2016	Const.	Indig.	None	None	None	None	None	None	1
Djibouti	Constitution of Djibouti, 1992	Const.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	0,5
Djibouti	Agreement on Peace and National Reconciliation, 1994	Peace agr.	None	None	Indirect	None	None	None	None	0
Djibouti	Reform and Civil Concord Agreement, 2001	Peace agr.	None	None	Indirect	None	None	None	None	3
Egypt	Constitution of Egypt, 2014	Const.	Indirect	Indirect	None	None	None	None	None	2
El Salvador	Chapultepec Agreement, 1992.	Peace agr.	None	None	None	None	None	None	Indig.	0
Eritrea	Constitution of Eritrea, 1997	Const.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	1,5
Ethiopia	Constitution of Ethiopia, 1994	Const.	Indirect	Indirect	None	Indirect	Indirect	Indirect	Indirect	0
Georgia	Constitution of the Republic of Georgia, 1996	Const.	None	Direct	None	None	None	None	Direct	0
Ghana	Constitution of Ghana 1992	Const.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	0
Guatemala	Constitution of Guatemala, 1993	Const.	Indig.	None	None	None	None	Indig.	Mixed (0.5)	0



Serbia & Montenegro	Constitution of Yugoslavia, 1991	Const.	Indirect	Indirect	None	None	None	None	None	None	1
Serbia & Montenegro	Rambouillet Agreement, 1999	Peace agr.	Direct	Direct	Indirect	Indirect	None	Indirect	Indirect	Indirect	4
Serbia & Montenegro	Serbia and Montenegro Constitutional Charter, 2003	Const.	Direct	Direct	None	None	None	None	None	None	2
Sierra Leone	Constitution of the Sierra Leone, 1998	Const.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	Indig.	0,5
Sierra Leone	Lome Agreement, 2000	Peace agr.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	0
Somalia	Somali Transitional Charter 2004	Const.	Mixed (0.75)	Mixed (0.75)	None	None	None	None	None	None	1,5
Somalia	Constitution of Somalia, 2012	Const.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	0
South Africa	Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996	Const.	None	None	Indirect	None	None	None	None	Direct	1,5
South Sudan	Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011	Const.	None	None	None	Indig.	None	None	None	Indig.	1
Sudan	Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 2005	Peace agr.	Indirect	Indirect	Indirect	Indirect	Indirect	None	None	Mixed (0.75)	3,25
Sudan	Constitution of Sudan, 2005	Const.	Indirect	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	0,5
Syria	Constitution of Syria, 2012	Const.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	0
Tajikistan	Constitution of Tajikistan, 1994	Const.	None	Indirect	None	Indirect	None	None	None	Direct	2
Thailand	Constitution of Thailand, 1997	Const.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	0
Thailand	Constitution of Thailand, 2007.	Const.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	0
Thailand	Constitution of Thailand, 2017	Const.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	0
Tunisia	Constitution of Tunisia, 2014	Const.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	0
Turkey	Constitution of Turkey, 2010.	Const.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	0
Uganda	Constitution of Uganda, 2005	Const.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	0
Ukraine	Constitution of Ukraine, 1996	Const.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	Direct	1
Ukraine	Constitution of Ukraine, 2004	Const.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	0
United Kingdom	Good Friday Agreement, 1998	Peace agr.	None	Indirect	None	None	None	Direct	Direct	Direct	2,5
Venezuela	Constitution of Venezuela, 1999	Const.	Indig.	Indig.	None	Indig.	None	Indig.	Indig.	Indig.	2,5
Yemen	Constitution of Yemen, 1991	Const.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	0
Zimbabwe	Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2007	Const.	None	Indig.	None	None	None	None	None	None	0,5
Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe Power Sharing Agreement, 2008	Peace agr.	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	0
Zimbabwe	Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013	Const.	Indig.	Indig.	None	Indig.	None	None	None	Direct	2,5

## Appendix A.4. Ethnic group rights identified in constitutions and peace agreements by country

Country	Executive	Legislative	Security	Justice	Civil Service	Education	Language
Afghanistan	None	The constitution provides for representation of the Kochis in the decision-making process for appointing senators (Art. 14)	None	None	None	None	"From among the languages of Pashtu, Dari, Uzbeki, Turkmani, Baluchi, Pashai, Nuristani, Pamiri (alsana), Arab and other languages spoken in the country, Pashtu and Dari are the official languages of the state. The Turkic languages (Uzbaki and Turkmen), Baluchi, Pashai, Nuristani and Pamiri (alsana) are – in addition to Pashto and Dari – the third official language in areas where the majority speaks them." Afghanistan Const. 2004. art. XVI.
Algeria	None	None	None	None	None	None	None
Angola	Neither the constitution nor the Lusaka Protocol contain specific provisions pertaining to ethnic recognition. The Lusaka Protocol (1994) does allow for UNITA rebel group members to be integrated into government positions and administration, without specific quotas mentioned. UNITA recruited mostly, though not exclusively, from the Ovimbundu ethnic group. "1. In application of the relevant provisions of Article 4 (c) of the general principles of National Reconciliation above, the concrete modalities of participation by UNITA in the various posts in the Government, State administration and diplomatic missions abroad, as agreed between the Government and UNITA and which appear in a document which is an integral part of the annex of the Lusaka Protocol relating to National Reconciliation, shall be specified in a letter to be written by the Angolan	None	None	Constitution 2010: Art 224 - Recognition of the institutions of the traditional authorities shall oblige public and private entities to respect, in their relations with these institutions, the values and norms of customary law that are observed within traditional political and community organisations and do not conflict with the Constitution or the dignity of the human person.	None	None	None Constitution 2010 recognises 'other' languages but does not name them.

	<p>authorities to the leaders of that party.”</p> <p>Constitution 2010: 2. Art - 213</p> <p>The forms of local government organisation shall include local authorities, the institutions of the traditional authorities and other specific forms of citizen participation, under the terms of the law. Also: art. 223 and 224 recognise traditional authorities.</p>						
Azerbaijan	None	None	None	None	None	None	None
Bangladesh	<p>Sec. B.8 - If the office of the Chairman falls vacant and in absence of the Chairman a tribal member elected by other members of the Council shall preside and perform other responsibilities. Sec B.13 - There shall be a Chief Executive Officer as secretary in the Council. Tribal Officers shall be given priority in this post.</p>	<p>C.2 Chairman of this Council shall be elected indirectly by the elected members of the Hill District Councils where status shall be equivalent to a State Minister and he must be a Jumma.</p> <p>C.3 The Council shall be formed with 22 (twenty two) members including the Chairman. Twothird of the members shall be elected from among the tribals. The Council shall determine its procedure of functioning. Composition of the Council shall be as follows : Chairman 1 Members tribal (men) 12 Members tribal (women) 2 Members nontribal (men) 6 Members non tribal (women) 1 Among the tribal men members 5 persons shall be elected from among the Chakma tribe, 3 persons from the Marma tribe, 2 persons from the Tripura tribe, 1 person from the Murung and Tanchongya tribes and 1 person from the Lusai, Bawm, Pankho, Khumi, Chak and Khyang tribes. Among the nontribal men members 2 persons shall be elected from each district.</p>	<p>24. a. By amendment of subsection (1) of section 62 this section shall be made as follows: "Notwithstanding anything contained in any Act for the time being in force, all members of the rank of SubInspector and below of Hill District Police shall be appointed by the Council in manner laid down by regulations and the Council may transfer and take disciplinary action against them as per procedure laid down by regulation: provided that in the matter of such appointment tribals shall be given priority</p>	None	<p>Sec B.14b - The subsection (2) of section 32 shall, by amendment, be made as follows: The Council may, in accordance with regulations, appoint, transfer, suspend, dismiss, remove class three and class four employees and inflict any other punishment on them. Provided that, priority to the tribals is maintained in the matter of the said appointment.</p> <p>D. 10 Until development equal to other region of the country the govt shall continue reservation of quota system in govt services and educational institutions for the tribals. With an aim to this purpose, the govt shall grant more scholarships for the tribal students in the educational</p>	<p>D. 10 Until development equal to other region of the country the govt shall continue reservation of quota system in govt services and educational institutions for the tribals. With an aim to this purpose, the govt shall grant more scholarships for the tribal students in the educational</p>	None
Bosnia & Herzegovina (1992-)	<p>Art. 5 The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of three Members : one Bosniac and one Croat, each directly elected from the territory of the Federation, and one Serb directly elected from the territory of the Republika Srpska. Also 2(d): A</p>	<p>Article IV -</p> <p>1. House of Peoples. The House of Peoples shall comprise Delegates, two-thirds from the Federation (including five Croats and five Bosniacs) and one-third from the Republika Srpska (five Serbs). (a) The designated</p>	None	<p>Art Vi - Constitutional Court Composition. The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall have nine members. (a) Four members shall be selected by the House of Representatives of the Federation, and two members by the Assembly of</p>	None	None	None

		<p>dissenting Member of the Presidency may declare a Presidency Decision to be destructive of a vital interest of the Entity from the territory from which he was elected, provided that he does so within three days of its adoption. Such a Decision shall be referred immediately to the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska, if the declaration was made by the Member from that territory; to the Bosniac Delegates of the House of Peoples of the Federation, if the declaration was made by the Bosniac Member; or to the Croat Delegates of that body, if the declaration was made by the Croat Member.</p>	<p>Croat and Bosniac Delegates from the Federation shall be selected, respectively, by the Croat and Bosniac Delegates to the House of Peoples of the Federation. Delegates from the Republika Srpska shall be selected by the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska.</p> <p>3 (b) Nine members of the House of Peoples shall comprise a quorum, provided that at least three Bosniac, three Croat, and three Serb Delegates are present. More included in Art. 3.</p>		<p>the Republika Srpska. The remaining three members shall be selected by the President of the European Court of Human Rights after consultation with the Presidency.</p>		
Burundi	<p>The Constitution requires that 60% of the Ministers are Hutu and 40% are Tutsi &gt; Const. of Burundi. 2005. Title V.I. art. CXXIX.</p> <p>Article 2 peace agreement - General principles: 1. Burundi shall be a sovereign independent nation, united but respecting its ethnic and religious diversity and recognizing the Bahutu, the Batutsi and the Batwa, who make up the one nation of Burundi.</p>	<p>The Constitution requires that 60% of the legislature are Hutu and 40% are Tutsi, seats are specifically allocated for ethnic Twa. &gt; Const. of Burundi. 2005. Title V.I. art. CXXIX.</p>	<p>According to the Constitution, "The President of the Republic, after consultation with the two VicePresidents of the Republic, sees to it that the Minister given the charge of the Force of National Defense is not of the same ethnicity as the Minister responsible for the National Police - Const. of Burundi. 2005. Title V.III. art. CXXX.</p>	<p>The Constitution of stipulates that judicial power must consist of an ethnic "equilibrium" [50/50], it also requires that the Superior Council of the Magistrature consist of a balance of ethnicities. Const. of Burundi. 2005. Title VIII. art. CCVIII. Const. of Burundi. 2005. Title VIII. art. CCXVII.</p>	<p>Article 135 of the constitution requires that the members of the Government make or propose the appointments in the public administration and to the diplomatic posts taking into account the necessity to maintain an ethnic, regional, political and gender equilibrium. Further, no more than 67% of all commune administrators should belong to the same ethnic group (art 266, para. 2). Additionally, regarding appointments in public administration and in diplomatic posts, the government must keep in mind the need to preserve an ethnic, regional, political, and gender balance (art. 135 of the Constitution). As far as the positions in state-owned companies are concerned, appointments should be carried out on a 60% Hutu/40% Tutsi basis (art. 143)</p>	<p>The constitution recognizes the right to equal access to education for all Burundians, but does not specify based on ethnicity.</p>	<p>None</p>
Cambodia	None	None	None	None	None	None	None - only Khmer recognised
Central African Republic	None	None	None	None	None	None	None
Chad	None	None	None	<p>Article 156 1996 Until their codification, the customary and traditional rules are only applicable in the communities</p>	None	None	None

				where they are recognized. Article 161 2018 Until their codification, the customary and traditional rules are only applicable in the communities where they are recognized.			
Colombia	Articles 329 and 330 of the constitution provide for the establishment of indigenous territorial entities with separate executive authorities	Article 171 of the constitution reserves two out of 102 senate seats for indigenous communities, although those wishing to become senators from these communities must be endorsed by a Minister. Article 176 allots one representative for Indigenous peoples and one representative for Afro-Colombians to the House of Representatives.	None	Article 246 of the Constitution explicitly establishes that indigenous peoples may exercise their jurisdictional functions within their territories in accordance with their own laws	Constitution art. 356 provides authority over civil service in those communities. The article 130 of the also Constitution establishes the functions of the National Civil Service Commission, NCSC, with financial and technical autonomy	Article 10 of the Constitution mandates that education can be provided in communities with their own linguistic traditions, provided the education is also bilingual	While Article 10 of the Constitution establishes Spanish as the only official language, it also notes that languages and dialects of ethnic groups are also official in their territories
Congo, Democratic Republic of	None , despite power sharing provision	None	None	None	None	None	Its official language is French. The national languages are Kikongo, Lingala, Swahili and Tshiluba. The State assures their promotion without discrimination. The other languages of the country are part of the Congolese cultural patrimony of which the State assures the protection: Const. Dem. Rep. Congo. (2005). Title I, Chapter I, Art. I.
Congo Cote d'Ivoire	None Article 175, constitution 2016 - Traditional chieftaincy is represented by the National House of Kings and Traditional Chiefs. The National House of Kings and Traditional Chefs is the Institution regrouping all the Traditional Kings and Chiefs of Côte d'Ivoire. It is notably responsible for the valuing of habits and customs; the promotion of the ideals of peace, development and social cohesion; the non-judicial settlement of conflicts in villages and between communities. The traditional chieftaincy participates, under the conditions determined by a law, in the administration of the territory.	None None	None None	None None	None None	None None	None None
Djibouti	None .	None , though there is a form of customary recognition	The 1994 accord states that "the Government engages to	None	None	None	None



			guarantee the FRUD combatants jobs and integration within the political, military, administrative, social and economic fields, in concordance with the stipulations and quotas fixed jointly by the two parties and recorded in the annex of the present Peace agreement. The stipulations concerning the integration of the combatants within the military field will regard the return of a quota of FRUD combatants with their arms.” Thus, Afar rebel units integrated into national army as part of 1994	None	None	None	None
Egypt	Article 180. Every local unit elects a local council by direct, secret ballot for a term of four years. A candidate must be no younger than 21 years old. The law regulates other conditions for candidacy and procedures of election, provided that one quarter of the seats are allocated to youth under 35 years old, one quarter is allocated for women, workers and farmers are represented by no less than 50 percent of the total number of seats, and these percentages include a proper representation of Christians and people with disability	Article 244. The state grants youth, Christians, persons with disability and expatriate Egyptians appropriate representation in the first House of Representatives to be elected after this Constitution is adopted, in the manner specified by law	None	None	None	None	None
El Salvador	A constitutional amendment recognizes the rights of indigenous people	None	None	None	None	None	“The official language of El Salvador is Spanish. The government is obligated to keep watch for its conservation and teaching. The native languages that are spoken in the national territory form part of the cultural patrimony and shall be the object of preservation, dissemination and respect. - Art 62
Eritrea	None	None	None	None	None	None	None
Ethiopia (1993-)	None Power sharing in ethnic federation but ethnic groups not mentioned by name.	None Power sharing in ethnic federation but ethnic groups not mentioned by name.	None Ethnic groups not mentioned by name, armed forces need to be representative of entire country.	None Ethnic groups not mentioned by name, but subunits empowered to have own representative judiciary	None Ethnic groups not mentioned by name, but subunits empowered to have own representative civil service	None Ethnic groups not mentioned by name, but subunits empowered to have own representative institutions of education	None Ethnic groups not mentioned by name, but subunits empowered to have own language
Georgia	None	Article 4 of the Constitution states that “The Senate shall	None	None	None	None	Article 8 of the constitution stipulates that while the

		consist of members elected from Abkhazia, the Autonomous Republic of Ajara and other territorial units of Georgia and five members appointed by the President of Georgia					official language of Georgia is Georgian, in Abkhazia the official language is Abkhazian.
Ghana	None	None	None	None	None	None	None
Guatemala	“the indigenous communities and others that hold lands that historically belong to them and which they have traditionally administered in special form, will maintain that system.” (Article 67).	None	None	None	None	Article 76 of the Constitution: “In the schools established in regions with a predominantly indigenous population, the education must be provided preferentially in [a] bilingual form	The constitution of Guatemala provides the following with regards to language rights: • Article 66: “The State recognizes, respects, and promotes their forms of life, customs, traditions, forms of social organization, the use of the indigenous attire by men and women, [and their] languages and dialects.” • Article 18: “In the course of the year following its effectiveness, the Constitution shall be broadly disseminated in the Quiché, Mam, Cakchiquel, and Kekchí languages.”
Guinea	None	None	None	None	None	None	None
Guinea-Bissau	None	None	None	None	None	None	None
Haiti	None	None	None	None	None	None	None
Indonesia	Preamble: the government of the Acehese people can be manifested through a fair and democratic process within the unitary state and constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.	1.2.1: "Understanding the aspirations of Acehese people for local political parties, GoI will create, within one year or at the latest 18 months from the signing of this MoU, the political and legal conditions for the establishment of local political parties in Aceh in consultation with Parliament."	None	None	None	None	None
Iraq	Kurdistan is recognised by the constitution and is respected as an autonomous region. Turkomen, Chaldeans and Assyrians are also recognised. Article 121 recognizes the regional powers as having the right to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial powers in accordance with this Constitution, except for those authorities stipulated in the exclusive authorities of the federal government. See also art. 116, art 120, art 117, art 125, art 141	Article 121 recognizes the regional powers as having the right to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial powers in accordance with this Constitution, except for those authorities stipulated in the exclusive authorities of the federal government. See also art. 116, art 120, art 117, art 125, art 141	Constitution of Iraq designates Peshmarga as the guardian force of the Kurdistan Region; Article 121 leaves the responsibility of formation of local security forces such as police and internal security forces to the regional governments.	Article 121 recognizes the regional powers as having the right to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial powers in accordance with this Constitution, except for those authorities stipulated in the exclusive authorities of the federal government. See also art. 116, art 120, art 117, art 125, art 141	Art 125 This Constitution shall guarantee the administrative, political, cultural, and educational rights of the various nationalities, such as Turkomen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and all other constituents, and this shall be regulated by law.	Art 125 This Constitution shall guarantee the administrative, political, cultural, and educational rights of the various nationalities, such as Turkomen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and all other constituents, and this shall be regulated by law.	Art 4 - The Arabic language and the Kurdish language are the two official languages of Iraq. The right of Iraqis to educate their children in their mother tongue, such as Turkmen, Assyrian, and Armenian shall be guaranteed in government educational institutions in accordance with educational guidelines, or in any other language in private educational institutions.
Kenya	None	None	None	None	None	None	the State must “(a) promote and protect the diversity of

							language of the people of Kenya; and (b) promote the development and use of indigenous languages, [...] Constitution of the Republic of Kenya, 2010, Chapter 2. Article 7.3.
Laos	None	None	None	None	None	None	None
Liberia	None	None	None	None	None	None	None
Libya	None	None	None	None	None	None	Article (1) Libya shall be an independent democratic state in which the people shall be the source of all powers. Its capital shall be Tripoli, Islam shall be its religion and Islamic Shari'a shall be the main source of legislation. The State shall guarantee for non-Muslims the freedom to practice their religious rituals. Arabic shall be the official language, while the linguistic and cultural rights of the Amazigh, the Tabous, the Touareg and the other components of the Libyan society shall be guaranteed. Article 6.1 - Annex C - The parties invite the international community, including the OSCE, to increase its assistance for projects in the area of media in order to further strengthen radio, TV and print media, including Albanian language and multiethnic media
Macedonia	None	The Committee consists of seven members each from the ranks of the Macedonians and Albanians within the Assembly, and five members from among the Turks, Vlachs, Romanies and two other communities. The five members each shall be from a different community; if fewer than five other communities are represented in the Assembly, the Public Attorney, after consultation with relevant community leaders, shall propose the remaining members from outside the Assembly. - article 78	None	None	None	None	None
Madagascar	None	None	None	None	None	None	None
Mali	None	Article 56 of the Constitution States: There will be, furthermore, one or two additional seats to ensure a fair representation of Malian populations essentially from the North but installed outside the country, which will be part of those seats in the National Assembly which have been	The Pacte Nationale, Article 7A. an internal security corps will be instituted {Gendarmerie, Goum Guards, Police} composed of all sections of the local populations including integrated combatants from the Unified Movements and Fronts of Azawad (MFUA), which	None	The Pacte Nationale, Article 53 states: "... the Government will make an effort while taking account of the qualifications required - to integrate officials from the Movements and people from among the populations of Northern Mali, into the various	The Pacte Nationale, Article 53 states: "... the Government will make an effort while taking account of the qualifications required - to integrate officials from the Movements and people from among the populations of Northern Mali, into the various organs of the public and semi-	None

		reserved for Malians living abroad	will be provided to local authorities within their police powers		organs of the public and semi-public services.	public services.; The Pacte Nationale also states art. 57 “National unity requires equal rights and duties for all Malian citizens, it will find its best guarantee in an educational and training program fairly applied across the country. In this regard, a special program for civil and military training and education will be hired for the populations of northern Mali, program to be extended by a national map of egalitarian organization of education in the respective competencies each of the local, regional and national.”	
Moldova	Gagauzia, an ethnic territory, is recognised as a federal subunit with autonomy. Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, 1994. Article 23. Law Concerning Rights of National Minorities, Chapter IV - Governor of Gagauzia must know Gagauzian; Within the autonomous territorial unit of Găgăuzia there shall function representatives and executive bodies according to the law - article 111	Article 73 - Legislative initiative: The right to legislative initiative is attributed to the members of Parliament, the President of the Republic of Moldova, the Government and the People’s Assembly of the autonomous territorialunit of Găgăuzia	None	None	Găgăuzia is an autonomous territorial unit having a special statute and representing a form of selfdetermination of the Găgăuzian people, constitutes an integrant and inalienable part of the Republic of Moldova and shall solve independently, within the limits of its competence, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, in the interest of the whole of society, the political, economic and cultural issues. - Article 111	Article 6 further guarantees the right of minorities to attend primary, secondary, (general and vocational), higher, and postgraduate education in the Moldovan and Russian languages, and shall provide conditions for the exercise of said right to education and instruction in the mother tongue (Ukrainian, Gagauz, Bulgarian, Jewish, Yiddish etc.). This article also enshrines the right of minorities to obtain a higher education	Yes. Article 13 of the Constitution notes that while the official language is Moldovan, the state must “acknowledge and protect the right to the preservation, development and use of the Russian language and other languages spoken within the territory of the State
Mozambique	None	None	None	Article 118 of the constitution states: “The State shall recognise and esteem traditional authority that is legitimate according to the people and to customary law... The State shall define the relationship between traditional authority and other institutions and the part that traditional authority should play in the economic, social and cultural affairs of the country, in accordance with the law	None	None	None
Myanmar Nepal	None Executive power of Nepal is vested in the Council of Ministers. The Interim Constitution requires political consensus for the constitution of the Council of Ministers	None Article 142 of the 2006 constitution requires the parties to include members in the executive committee from neglected and suppressed regions including the Women	None Article 146 interim gives a provision for supervision, integration, and rehabilitation of the combatants of the Maoist army. Further, “In order to conform to Nepali State	None	None The interim constitution also has a provision for the representation of indigenous communities in the civil service, security forces, provincial and federal	None Art 40 (2) constitution 2015 - Provisions of free education with scholarships shall be made for Dalit students from the primary to higher level of education as provided for in	None None

(Articles 37 and 38). Article 38 goes on by explaining “consensus” as: “political consensus reached between the seven parties- Nepali Congress, NCPN(UML), Nepali Congress (Democratic), Janamorcha Nepal, Nepal Sadbhawana Party (Anandidevi), Nepal Majdur Kisan Party, Samyukta Bam Morcha Nepal and NCP(Maoist) on 22 Kartik 2063 (November 8, 2006). See context

and Dalits. Additionally, 73 members from and on behalf of NCP (Maoist) and 48 members “from among the Samyukta Bam Morcha, people based and professional organizations, class organizations and professional bodies oppressed tribe, backward region, indigenous tribe, women and various political personalities nominated through understanding

Article 84 of the 2015 constitution: (2). Provision shall be made according to Federal law for the representation of political parties to file candidacy for the election of the House of Representatives for proportional representation system through closed list of women, Dalit, Adibasi Janajati, Khas Arya, Madhesi, Tharu, Muslim, and backward regions. Balance in geography and province shall be considered for such candidacy. Article 176: (6) The representation of women, Dalit, indigenous, indigenous nationalities, Khas Arya, Madhesi, Muslim, backward region and minorities community on the basis of geography and population in the nominations filed by the political parties for the election to be held for the Provincial Assembly through the proportional representation (PR) election system shall be made on the basis of closed list in accordance with Federal law. Explanation: ‘Khas Arya’ shall mean Chettri, Brahman, Thakuri, Sanyasi (Dashanami) community.

Law, which requires that 45 percent of all vacant government positions should be reserved for excluded groups, the army in 2006 amended its Army Act. Out of the 45 percent of reserved posts, 28 percent are for people from the Madhesi community or, in other words, 12.6 percent of all vacant posts are reserved for Madhesi. Article 267 2015 constitution: The entry of women, Dalit, indigenous community, Khash Arya, Madhesi, Tharu, Muslim, people of backward class and backward region shall be ensured in Nepal Army, based on the principle of equality and principles of inclusion as provided for in the Federal law

legislature. Art 40 2015 constiution - Dalit shall have the right to participate in all agencies of the state based on the principle of proportional inclusion. There shall be special legal provision of empowerment, representation, and participation of Dalit community for employment in other area also including the public service

law. Special provision shall be made in law for Dalits to pursue higher education in technical and professional subjects.

Nicaragua

Article 89 - The communities of the Atlantic Coast have the right to preserve and develop

Article 181- The State shall organize by means of a law the regime of autonomy for the

None

None

None

Article 121 - The indigenous peoples and ethnic communities of the Atlantic

Art. 90 - The communities of the Atlantic Coast have the right to the free expression and

	<p>their cultural identities within the national unity, to provide themselves with their own forms of social organization, and to administer their local affairs to their traditions.</p> <p>Article 181- The State shall organize by means of a law the regime of autonomy for the indigenous peoples and ethnic communities of the Atlantic Coast, which shall have to contain, among other rules: the functions of their government organs, their relation with the Executive and Legislative Power and with the municipalities, and the exercise of their rights</p>	<p>indigenous peoples and ethnic communities of the Atlantic Coast, which shall have to contain, among other rules: the functions of their government organs, their relation with the Executive and Legislative Power and with the municipalities, and the exercise of their rights. This law shall require for its approval and reform the majority established for the amendment of constitutional laws</p>				<p>Coast have the right in their region to intercultural education in their native language, in accordance with the law.</p>	<p>preservation of their languages, art and culture. The development of their culture and their values enrich the national culture. The State shall create special programs to enhance the exercise of these rights.</p> <p>Article 11 - Spanish is the official language of the State. The languages of the Communities of the Atlantic Coast shall also be officially used in the cases established by law.</p>
Nigeria	<p>No formal provisions for ethnic recognition in constitutions</p>	<p>Regional divisions are used as ethnic proxies to make up the National Assembly as ethnically heterogeneous</p>	<p>No formal provisions for ethnic recognition in constitutions</p>	<p>The Constitution requires that the shall be no less than three judges on the Court of Appeal versed in Islamic law and no less than three versed in Customary Law and further states that any person arrested must be provided with information regarding their arrest in a language he or she understands.</p>	<p>No formal provisions for ethnic recognition in constitutions</p>	<p>The constitution states that three Nigerian indigenous languages, namely Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo, have been constitutionally recognized as 'major' languages. The constitution requires the promotion of indigenous languages, as well as providing education in one of the three main languages of Hausa, Yoruba, and Ibo</p>	<p>The constitution states that three Nigerian indigenous languages, namely Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo, have been constitutionally recognized as 'major' languages. The constitution requires the promotion of indigenous languages, as well as providing education in one of the three main languages of Hausa, Yoruba, and Ibo</p>
Niger	<p>No formal provisions for ethnic recognition in constitutions</p>	<p>Federal Autonomy, the Peace agreement provides autonomy to the Niger Tuareg people to rule the Northern region. However, the agreement does not directly mention the Tuareg ethnicity, but it mentions ORA, which is a group representing the Tuareg.</p>	<p>The 1995 Peace Agreement states that "A. Units with a special military status will be created in the regions of Aïr, Azawak and Kawar. The special status of these units (command, personnel management, recruitment, training, advancement) will be determined by texts of regulations on the proposition of an interdepartmental committee where representatives of the ORA also will be members. These units will have as their mission to guarantee the maintenance of order and of public security. Within the framework of their mission they will have to act in coordination with and complementing the classical forces of defence and security. The personnel of these units will be composed of</p>	<p>No formal provisions found in the constitution</p>	<p>The 1995 Peace Agreement states that the Government must integrate demobilized elements from the ORA at all levels of the Public administration according to the criteria of competence and to the needs of the State</p>	<p>In the peace agreement there are requirements to adapt school programming to social and cultural realities of the regions, including the promotion of national languages and writing, especially Tamachek and Tifinar [these are Tuareg languages and named], and further encourages the creation of institutions of higher education in the regions in the North [indirect reference to Tuareg region in the North]. Clause 22 further encourages the employment of teaching staff from the regions in the North.</p>	<p>In the peace agreement there are requirements to adapt school programming to social and cultural realities of the regions, including the promotion of national languages and writing, especially Tamachek and Tifinar [these are Tuareg languages and named], and further encourages the creation of institutions of higher education in the regions in the North [indirect reference to Tuareg region in the North]. Clause 22 further encourages the employment of teaching staff from the regions in the North.</p>

			demobilized elements from the ORA and of people coming from the affected regions.” And further that similar integration will within the national police forces. Because ORA, as well as these regions, are understood as the Tuareg ethnic group who were aiming to achieve autonomy/their own nation-state.				
Pakistan (1971-)	No formal provisions for ethnic recognition in constitutions	Pakistan is a federation, wherein the provinces are understood to be ethnic-based. Article 1 states that Pakistan consists of “the provinces of [Balochistan], the [Khyber Pakhtunkhwa], the Punjab and [Sindh]; 2(c) the Federally administered Tribal Areas. Further, Article 5(3) state “The seats in the National Assembly...shall be allocated to each Province, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.” See also 51(3) for an allocation per ethnic group.	No formal provisions for ethnic recognition in constitutions	No formal provisions for ethnic recognition in constitutions	No formal provisions for ethnic recognition in constitutions	No formal provisions for ethnic recognition in constitutions	No formal provisions for ethnic recognition in constitutions
Papua New Guinea	None	None	None	None	None	None	None
Peru	None	None	No formal provisions for ethnic recognition in constitution	Article 149 of the Constitution recognizes the judicial authorities of rural and native communities	No formal provisions for ethnic recognition in constitution	No formal provisions for ethnic recognition in constitution	Article 48 specifies that the official languages are “Spanish and, wherever they predominate, Quechua, Aymara, and other native tongues, in accordance with the law
Philippines	None	The Mindanao Agreement states that “there shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines	Article 20 of the Mindanao Agreement states that “Five thousand seven hundred fifty (5,750) MNLF members shall be integrated into the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). 250 of whom shall be absorbed into the auxiliary services. The government shall exert utmost efforts to establish the necessary conditions that would ensure the eventual integration of the maximum number of the remaining MNLF forces into the Special Regional Security Force (SRSF) and other agencies and instrumentalities of the government. There shall be a special socioeconomic,	None	The Peace Agreement states that “For a period not longer than five (5) years from the establishment of the Regional Autonomous Government, the GRP will endeavour to provide for appropriate civil service eligibility to applicants in the Autonomous Region, provided, the minimum educational qualifications for the position are met.” In addition, In ARMM, the 1996 Final Peace Agreement <sup>7</sup> mandates the Philippine government to appoint Muslim representation in national line agencies.”	No formal provisions for ethnic recognition in constitution	Article 114 of the Mindanao Agreement states that in addition to Filipino, regional languages may be used as auxiliary official languages in the region as well as auxiliary medium of instruction and communication

			cultural and educational program to cater to MNLF forces not absorbed into the AFP, PNP and the SRSF to prepare them and their families for productive endeavors, provide for educational, technical skills and livelihood training and give them priority for hiring in development projects				
Russia	11.2. State power in constituent entities of the Russian Federation shall be exercised by bodies of State government formed by those constituent entities. The following shall be within the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and constituent entities of the Russian Federation:m) establishment of general principles of the organisation of the system of State government and local self-government bodies;	104.1 The right of legislative initiative shall belong to the President of the Russian Federation, the Council of Federation, senators of the Russian Federation, deputies of the State Duma, the Government of the Russian Federation, and legislative (representative) bodies of constituent entities of the Russian Federation	None	The following shall be within the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and constituent entities of the Russian Federation: a) measures to ensure the correspondence of constitutions and laws of republics, the charters, laws and other normative legal acts of krays, oblasts, cities of federal significance, autonomous oblast and autonomous okrugs to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws; b) protection of human and civil rights and freedoms, protection of the rights of national minorities, ensuring lawfulness, law and order, public security; border zone regimes; k) personnel of judicial and law enforcement bodies; lawyers, notaries;	No formal provisions for ethnic recognition in constitution	The following shall be within the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and constituent entities of the Russian Federation: f) general issues of upbringing, education, science, culture, physical education and sport, youth policy;	68.2 Republics shall have the right to establish their own State languages. In State government bodies, local self-government bodies and State institutions of republics they shall be used together with the State language of the Russian Federation.
Rwanda Senegal	None None	None None	None None	None None	None None	None None	None The official language of the Republic of Senegal is French. The national languages are the Diola, the Malinké, the Pular, the Sérère, the Soninké and the Wolof and any other national languages which shall be codified
Serbia & Montenegro	The 2003 Constitutional Charter requires that the Assembly from it's deputies the President and the Vice-President, who cannot be from the same member state, further the President of the Assembly and the President of Serbia and Montenegro cannot be from the same member state. The Rambouillet Agreement also	The Rambouillet Agreement requires that Kosovo is autonomous in the legislative branch and that it has an Assembly composed of 120 members, in addition to these 120 members "A further 40 members shall be elected by the members of qualifying national communities. I) Communities whose members	The Rambouillet Agreement requires that communal police units shall reflect the ethnic make-up of the national communities, and the communal police shall be the only police in Kosovo	The Rambouillet Agreement requires that Kosovo have a Constitutional Court, a Supreme Court, District Courts, and Communal Courts, who have jurisdiction throughout the Kosovo region	None	The Rambouillet Agreement states that "The communes shall have responsibility for ... (c ) providing education, consistent with the rights and duties of national communities, and in a spirit of tolerance between national communities and respect for the rights of the members of all national communities in	The Rambouillet Agreement state that "National Communities and their members shall have additional rights as set forth below in order to preserve and express their national, cultural, religious, and linguistic identities in accordance with international standards and the Helsinki Final Act. Such rights



	requires that the citizens of Kosovo have the right to self-governance in the executive branch	constitute more than 0.5 per cent of the Kosovo population but less than 5 per cent shall have ten of these seats, to be divided among them in accordance with their proportion of the overall population. Ii) Communities whose members constitute more than 5 per cent of the Kosovo population shall divide the remaining thirty seats equally. The Serb and Albanian national communities shall be presumed to meet the 5 per cent population threshold.” Further, Article 20 of the Constitutional Charter requires that of the 126 member Assembly of Serbia and Montenegro, 91 are from Serbia and 35 are from Montenegro. There are an additional five seats allotted to the Albanians in the Assembly				accordance with international standards	shall be exercised in conformity with human rights and fundamental freedoms
Sierra Leone	None RUF/SL was transformed into a party, enabled to hold public office and enabled to join executive positions in the Lome Peace Agreement, however, this group was not devoted to fighting for an ethnic group or region ( <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ruf.htm">https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ruf.htm</a> ; <a href="https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/revolutionary-united-front-1991-2002/">https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/revolutionary-united-front-1991-2002/</a> )	None RUF/SL was transformed into a party, enabled to hold public office and enabled to join executive positions in the Lome Peace Agreement, however, this group was not devoted to fighting for an ethnic group or region ( <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ruf.htm">https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ruf.htm</a> ; <a href="https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/revolutionary-united-front-1991-2002/">https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/revolutionary-united-front-1991-2002/</a> )	None	None	None RUF/SL was transformed into a party, enabled to hold public office and enabled to join executive positions in the Lome Peace Agreement, however, this group was not devoted to fighting for an ethnic group or region ( <a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ruf.htm">https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ruf.htm</a> ; <a href="https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/revolutionary-united-front-1991-2002/">https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/revolutionary-united-front-1991-2002/</a> )	None	Art. 9 of the constitution: The Government shall promote the learning of indigenous languages and the study and application of modern science, foreign languages, technology, commerce and business.
Somalia	The election of the president involves a complex and indirect system, wherein the clans, sub-clans, and sub-sub-clans choose 329 Parliament members, who then vote for president. Article 11 of the Transitional Federal Charter further defines the system as decentralized, and Chapter 5 details the devolution of powers of the state. “The selection process [for the Executive and Legislative branches] was framed by the ‘4.5 formula’, a	The Transitional Federal Charter states that the legislative power is vested in Parliament according to the Charter. It calls for a single chamber, representing the unity of the nation. Article 30 of the Charter calls for representation of different tribes, and sub sub-clan Somali political leaders. Further, Article 64 requires that members of the House of the People of the Federal Parliament must represent all communities of the Federal	No formal provisions found in the constitution	No formal provisions found in the constitution	No formal provisions found in the constitution	No formal provisions found in the constitution	No formal provisions found in the constitution

	Somali variation on the Lebanese consociational democratic model in which each of the four major clan-families are equally represented, so negotiations over representation occur within rather between the clan-families, each of which selects 61 MPs from their lineage	Republic of Somalia in a balanced manner. All Federal Member States must also have an equal number of representatives in the House of Representatives. Finally, "The plan calls for 275 parliamentarians in the Lower House of parliament to be selected using the 4.5 clan formula. It also proposed the assemblies of the regional administrations select six members each for the 54-seat Upper House, with Puntland and self-declared independent Somaliland (which certainly will not participate in the process) receiving three extra seats each					
South Africa	No formal provisions found in the constitution	No formal provisions found in the constitution	Section 195 (1) (i) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 states that "public administration must be broadly representative of the South African people, with employment and personnel management practices based on ability, objectivity, fairness, and the need to redress the imbalances of the past to achieve broad representation".	No formal provisions found in the constitution	No formal provisions found in the constitution	No formal provisions found in the constitution	Article 6 of the Constitution states that "(1) The official languages of the Republic are Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, siSwati, Tshivenda, Xitsonga, Afrikaans, English, isiNdebele, isiXhosa and isizulu. (2) Recognising the historically diminished use and status of the indigenous languages of our people, the state must take practical and positive measures to elevate the status and advance the use of these languages." And further it requires that the national and provincial government may use any particular language in order to take into account the needs and preferences of the population, governments must also use at least to official languages. All languages must enjoy parity and equity under the law
South Sudan	No formal provisions for ethnic recognition in the constitution		No formal provisions for ethnic recognition in the constitution	The constitution recognizes traditional authority and customary law and in many provisions, customary courts are the only judicial system	No formal provisions found in the constitution	No formal provisions found in the constitution	The constitution recognizes all indigenous languages of South Sudan as national languages
Sudan (-2011)	The peace agreement and the constitution mention special rights for the Southern Sudanese people. Without direct reference to the ethnic group, these represent indirect	The peace agreement stipulates that there shall be equitable representation of the South Sudanese peoples in both legislative chambers, without direct reference to ethnic	The Comprehensive Peace Agreement provides specific allocations for power sharing within the armed forces. Units are to include the Sudanese People's Liberation Army	The CPA requires an adequate representation of Southern Sudan in the Constitutional Court	Between 20-30% of the positions of the National Civil Service were set aside for the people of South Sudan, including 20% of the middle- and upper-level positions in	No formal provisions found in the constitution	The CPA requires that all indigenous languages are national languages which are to be promoted and respected, and additionally the legislatures of any sub-national

		recognition. Southern Sudanese people are of African descent with Christian religion, Sudanese people are Arabs.	groups or provisions regarding what 'equitable' means. Article 2.2.2.1/2.2.2.2	(SPLA) in the South, Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in the North, and the joint units in both North and South, in order to form Joint Integrated Units. The Joint Defense Board for the armed forces were also to be composed of the Chiefs of Staff for both the SPLA and SAF, as well as four officers from each party		the NCS, with 20% in the first three years, and 25% in five years. Article 2.6	level of government may adopt any other national language(s) as additional working languages. (Art 2.5)
Syria	None	None	None	None	None	None	None
Tajikistan	None	Article 49 of the constitution mandates the governances of the Badakhshan Mountainous Autonomous Region. Given that Pamirs occupy the majority of this region, this is consistent with de facto recognition of the Pamirs (Hiltrud, 2001)		Articles 84, 85, and 89 of the Constitution provide for local autonomy of the judicial system in the Badakhshan Mountainous Autonomous Region and also require that one of the seven judges on the Constitutional Court must be from this region as well. Given that Pamirs occupy the majority of this region, this is consistent with de facto recognition of the Pamirs (Hiltrud, 2001)	None	None	Article 2 of the constitution states that Tajik shall be the state language and Russian shall be the language of international communication, but also notes that all nationalities have the right to use their mother tongue.
Thailand	None	None	None	None	None	None	None
Tunisia	None	None	None	None	None	None	None
Turkey	None	None	None	None	None	None	None
Uganda	None	None	None	None	None	None	None
Ukraine	None	None	None	None	None	None	Art. 10 - Free development, use, and protection of Russian and other languages of national minorities of Ukraine shall be guaranteed in Ukraine. Article 11. The State shall promote the consolidation and development of the Ukrainian nation, its historical consciousness, traditions, and culture, as well as development of ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identity of all indigenous peoples and national minorities of Ukraine.
United Kingdom	None	Clause 3 of the Good Friday Agreement established that the Assembly "will exercise full legislative and executive authority in respect of those matters currently within the responsibility of the six Northern Ireland Government Departments, with the possibility of taking on	None	None	None	The Good Friday Agreement recognizes, under the Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity, the "statutory duty [of] the Department of Education to encourage and facilitate Irish medium education in line with current provision for integrated education	The Good Friday Agreement, clause 4, states that "In the context of active consideration currently being given to the UK signing the Council of Europe Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, the British Government will in particular in relation to the Irish language, where

responsibility for other matters as detailed elsewhere in this agreement.” Clause 4 further states that “operating where appropriate on a cross-community basis - will be the prime source of authority in respect of all devolved responsibilities.” The Good Friday Agreement also provides safeguards to ensure that all sections of the “community” can participate and work within the Assembly and that key decisions must be taken on a cross-community basis, for example via “(i) parallel consent, i.e. a majority of those members present and voting, including a majority of the unionist and nationalist designations present and voting... or (ii) a weighted majority (60%) of members present and voting, including at least 40% of each of the nationalist and unionist designations present and voting.

Venezuela

Article 119: The State recognizes the existence of native peoples and communities, their social, political and economic organization, their cultures, practices and customs, languages and religions, as well as their habitat and original rights to the lands they ancestrally and traditionally occupy, and which are necessary to develop and guarantee their way of life. It shall be the responsibility of the National Executive, with the participation of the native peoples, to demarcate and guarantee the right to collective ownership of their lands, which shall be inalienable, not subject to the law of limitations or distraint, and nontransferable, in accordance with this

Article 125: Native peoples have the right to participate in politics. The State shall guarantee native representation in the National Assembly and the deliberating organs of federal and local entities with a native population, in accordance with law.  
Article 186: The National Assembly shall consist of Deputies\* elected\* in each of the federal entities by universal, direct, personalized and secret ballot with proportional representation, using a constituency base of 1.1 % of the total population of the country. Each federal organ shall also elect three additional deputies\*. The native peoples of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela shall elect three deputies\* in accordance with the provisions established

None

Article 260: The legitimate authorities of the native peoples shall have the power to apply within their territorial competence levels of administration of justice based on their ancestral traditions and affecting their members only, in accordance to their own rules and proceedings, provided the same are not contrary to this Constitution, law and public order. The manner in which this special competence shall be coordinated with the national judicial system shall be determined by law.

None

Article 121: Native peoples have the right to maintain and develop their ethnical and cultural entity, world view, values, spirituality and holy places and places of cult. The State shall promote the appreciation and dissemination of the cultural manifestations of the native peoples, who have the right to their own education, and an education system of an intercultural and bilingual nature, taking into account their special social and cultural characteristics, values and traditions.

appropriate and where people so desire it: take resolute action to promote the language; facilitate and encourage the use of the language in speech and writing in public and private life where there is appropriate demand; seek to remove, where possible, restrictions which would discourage or work against the maintenance or development of the language; make provision for liaising with the Irish language community, representing their views to public authorities and investigating complaints; place a statutory duty on the Department of Education to encourage and facilitate Irish medium education in line with current provision for integrated education; explore urgently with the relevant British authorities, and in co-operation with the Irish broadcasting authorities, the scope for achieving more widespread availability of Teilifis na Gaeilge in Northern Ireland  
Article 9: Spanish is the official language. The use of native languages also has official status for native peoples, and must be respected throughout the territory of the Republic, as constituting part of the cultural heritage of the Nation and humanity.

	Constitution and the law. Article 166: In each state, a Public Policy Planning and Coordination Council shall be created, chaired by the Governor* and having as members the Mayors*, the state directors* of the various ministries and representatives of the legislators* elected by the State to the National Assembly, as well as representatives from the Legislative Council, the municipal councils* and organized communities, including native communities where they exist.	under election law, respecting the traditions and customs thereof.					
Yemen	None	None	None	None	None	None	None
Yugoslavia/Serbia-Montenegro	Article 97 of the constitution states that the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister cannot be from the same "member republic" (Serbia and Montenegro)	Article 80 of the Constitution requires that each member republic has a minimum of 30 federal deputies in the Chamber of Deputies and a minimum 20 deputies in the Chamber of Republics	None	None	None	Despite Articles 46 and 47 of the Constitution requiring that national minorities have the right to education in their own language, no ethnic groups are recognised.	Despite Articles 15 and 21 of the constitution mandate that minorities have the right to use their own language and in regions where they are the dominant group, government communication must also be offered in those languages, no ethnic groups are recognised.
Zimbabwe	Constitution 2013: Article 282 - Except as provided in an Act of Parliament, traditional leaders have authority, jurisdiction and control over the Communal Land or other areas for which they have been appointed, and over persons within those Communal Lands or areas.	Const. of Zimbabwe, 2008. Section 111 - There shall be a Council of Chiefs which shall consist of such number of Chiefs elected by the Chiefs from each of the various areas of Communal Land in such manner as is prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament, so, however, as to secure as far as is practicable equitable representation for the various areas of Communal Land with due regard to the total number of <u>tribespeople</u> in each such area: Constitution 2013 - Article 120 + ... : The Senate consists of eighty Senators, of whom sixteen are chiefs [=traditional leader], of whom two are elected by the provincial assembly of Chiefs from each of the provinces, other than the metropolitan provinces, into which Zimbabwe is divided;	None	Constitution 2013: Article 282 - Except as provided in an Act of Parliament, traditional leaders have authority, jurisdiction and control over the Communal Land or other areas for which they have been appointed, and over persons within those Communal Lands or areas.	None	None	Article 6 - The following languages, namely Chewa, Chibarwe, English, Kalanga, Koisan, Nambya, Ndau, Ndebele, Shangani, Shona, sign language, Sotho, Tonga, Tswana, Venda and Xhosa, are the officially recognised languages of Zimbabwe. The State and all institutions and agencies of government at every level must-- ensure that all officially recognised languages are treated equitably; and take into account the language preferences of people affected by governmental measures or communications. The State must promote and advance the use of all languages used in Zimbabwe, including sign language, and must create conditions for the development of those languages.

## Appendix B.1. The effect of ethnic recognition on peace with placebo tests

These models estimate the effect of ethnic recognition on negative and positive peace using dynamic trends (Model 3 and 4 in the main text), but they include the placebo tests.

**Table B.1:** The effect of the adoption of ethnic recognition on deaths due to political violence (Model 3, left) and on political stability (Model 4) by year. The **highlighted** coefficients denote a simple violation of the assumption of parallel trends.

	<b>Model 3</b> Negative peace (dynamic trends)	<b>Model 4</b> Positive peace (dynamic trends)
(Intercept)	59.570*** (4.324)	-18.09*** (1.272)
[Control variables]	[...]*** (...)	[...]*** (...)
5 years before treatment	0.672 (0.461)	-0.105 (0.118)
4 years before treatment	0.704 (0.485)	-0.078 (0.119)
3 years before treatment	0.492 (0.411)	-0.074 (0.129)
2 years before treatment	<b>0.863*</b> (0.383)	-0.072 (0.133)
Year of implementation	<b>0.767*</b> (0.366)	0.003 (0.104)
1 year after treatment	0.365 (0.372)	-0.031 (0.111)
2 years after treatment	0.410 (0.308)	-0.067 (0.098)
3 years after treatment	0.030 (0.274)	-0.078 (0.082)
4 years after treatment	-0.291 (0.319)	-0.036 (0.074)
5 years after treatment	-0.270 (0.324)	-0.014 (0.081)
6 years after treatment	-0.253 (0.336)	0.024 (0.083)
7 years after treatment	-0.268 (0.304)	0.030 (0.078)
Observations	3075	2586
$R^2$	0.555	0.599
Adj. $R^2$	0.534	0.576
F statistic	25.760*** (df = 142; 2932)	26.478*** (df = 138; 2447)

Note: Table entries are linear regression coefficients with cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. It excludes the dummy variable of the year prior to treatment, which serves as a baseline, something commonly done in DDiD (Huntington-Klein, 2021). Controls, and year and constitutional moment dummy variables have been omitted from the models in this table for presentation purposes.

\*\*\*p < 0.001; \*\*p < 0.01; \*p < 0.05

## **Appendix B.2. The effect of ethnic recognition at different levels of implementation**

In this annex, I analyse the effect of different levels of ethnic recognition. As highlighted in the main body of text, it can be expected that higher levels of ethnic recognition produce stronger effects on peace. Nevertheless, the Difference-in-Differences statistical technique enables only the measuring of the effect of a homogenous treatment. That is, the only variation that is occurring in the treatment variable is the presence versus absence of treatment. My measure of ethnic recognition considers the concept in different levels of depth and breadth, which is not a heterogeneous treatment (i.e. it has more variation). Nevertheless, the measure of ethnic recognition can be dichotomized at different levels to study lower versus higher levels of ethnic recognition. If ethnic recognition at higher scores produces stronger effects on peace, this is to the benefit of my quantitative measurement of ethnic recognition.

The primary models as previously presented in Table 1 in the main text have been re-estimated with the semi-arbitrary recognition thresholds at 1%, 25% and 50%. Essentially, the 1% level reflects cases which had any ethnic recognition adopted in the constitution or peace agreement. In total, 52 of the 101 analysed texts had at least some ethnic recognition. A score of 25% represents a higher commitment of governments to ethnic recognition, requiring ethnic recognition in at least two domains. This was the case for 24 of 101 constitutional moments. The last, 50%, reflecting a score of 3.5, only 3 constitutions received. These reflect the highest commitment to ethnic recognition. Nevertheless, the heavily skewed distribution of this last predictor reduces statistical power and increases bias potential, which will be taken into consideration. Surpassing higher thresholds indicates a higher commitment to ethnic recognition.

It was expected that peace is affected more strongly in the cases with higher ethnic recognition. Indeed, as shown in Table B.2 below, increasing the threshold for ethnic recognition generally increases its effect on peace, as coefficients increase. The exception here is the 50% threshold coefficient of positive peace, which interestingly shows a reversal of the effect. Nevertheless, this effect is not statistically significant. As expected, statistical power is lost due to the low number of cases included.

**Table B.2:** The effects of ethnic recognition at different levels on negative and positive peace assuming constant trends.

	<b>1% threshold</b>	<b>25% threshold</b>	<b>50% threshold</b>
<b>Negative peace</b>	$b = -0.711$ (0.391) $p = 0.069$	$b = -0.868$ (0.482) $p = 0.072$	$b = -1.984$ (1.326) $p = 0.134$
<b>Positive peace</b>	$b = 0.112$ (0.048) $p = 0.016$	$b = 0.311$ (0.158) $p = 0.049$	$b = -0.187$ (0.538) $p = 0.728$

Note: Cluster robust standard errors given in brackets, and significance in  $p$ .



### **Appendix B.3: The effect of ethnic recognition along different domains**

In this Appendix, a comparison is drawn between the effects of ethnic recognition in different domains. It was previously theorised that rights in certain domains may be more empowering for ethnic groups or more costly to offer to governments than in others. That said, this thesis used a more holistic approach to ethnic recognition, capturing its diversity in implementation.

To make some comparisons nevertheless, here, a distinction is drawn between ethnic recognition more civil-political in nature (rights in the executive, legislative, security, justice and civil service domains) and more economic, social and cultural ethnic recognition (in terms of language and education rights). This is a common distinction of human rights, also used by the United Nations, and there have been theoretical discussions about which are more highly valued by minority groups (Wheatley, 2002). A frequently brought up argument is that civil-political rights are foundational to other rights, as without them, there are no mechanisms to protect and advocate for economic and cultural interests (Piovesan, 2003). To Sen (1999), political rights serve as a basis for human freedom. Nevertheless, Ilesanmi (1997) argues that they cannot really be considered separate from one another, as they are interdependent in the realisation of peaceful societies.

In terms of data, while recognition was most frequently adopted in the legislative (31 of 101 times), and language (29 times) domains, the security and civil service domains saw the least (13 and 12 times, respectively). Civil-political rights were implemented more frequently (97 times) than socio-cultural rights (45 times), though they averaged out to 19.4 and 22.5 adoptions per domain, respectively.

The primary models as previously presented in Table 1 in the main text have been re-estimated using ethnic recognition scores split up by domain, in Table B.3, below. The results of this analysis indicate that, within the full measure of ethnic recognition, most of the power in influencing peace resides with the provision of civil-political rights. This holds for both negative peace and positive peace. Socio-cultural ethnic recognition does not have a statistically significant effect on peace. This corroborates the idea that civil-political rights are more relevant in the discussion of ethnic recognition. They may serve as more fundamental to other demands, and can thus be seen as more impactful when provided.

**Table B.3:** The effects of ethnic recognition in domains on negative and positive peace assuming constant trends.

	<b>Civil-political rights</b>	<b>Socio-cultural rights</b>	<b>All ethnic recognition</b>
<b>Negative peace</b>	$b = -0.796$ (0.386) $p = 0.039$	$b = -0.436$ (0.473) $p = 0.356$	$b = -0.711$ (0.391) $p = 0.069$
<b>Positive peace</b>	$b = 0.208$ (0.119) $p = 0.081$	$b = -0.070$ (0.215) $p = 0.745$	$b = 0.112$ (0.048) $p = 0.016$

Note: Cluster robust standard errors given in brackets, and significance in  $p$ .

## Appendix B.4: The effect of ethnic recognition under ethnic party bans with placebo test

The models in Table B4.1 estimate the effect of ethnic recognition on negative and positive peace in ethnic party bans cases versus no ethnic party bans cases (Model 5 to 8 in the main text). The models in Figure B4.2 show the dynamic versions of these, with placebo tests prior to the constitutional moment.

**Table B4.1.** Estimating the effect of ethnic recognition on negative and positive peace in cases with ethnic party bans and cases without ethnic party bans assuming constant trends (DiD).

	<b>Model 5</b> Ethnic party ban: Negative peace	<b>Model 6</b> No ban: Negative peace	<b>Model 7</b> Ethnic party ban: Positive peace	<b>Model 8</b> No ban: Positive peace
(Intercept)	-14.15 (9.515)	58.890*** (5.367)	8.398*** (2.238)	-19.20*** (1.554)
Ethnic recognition	-1.166* (0.707)	-0.476** (0.405)	0.054 (0.127)	0.290** (0.127)
GDP (log)	0.894 (1.512)	-4.677*** (1.624)	-0.750 (0.476)	1.654*** (0.574)
GDP growth	-0.044*** (0.013)	-0.076*** (0.014)	0.005** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.003)
Income inequality	17.259** (7.013)	-5.287 (3.650)	-3.014*** (1.082)	0.200 (1.450)
Democracy level	-1.107 (2.485)	-3.414*** (1.137)	1.265** (0.535)	1.226*** (0.431)
Observations	639	2436	582	2004
Adj. $R^2$	0.760	0.547	0.776	0.642
F statistic	30.775*** (df = 68; 570)	24.172*** (df = 127; 2308)	34.060*** (df = 61; 520)	30.971*** (df = 120; 1883)

Note: Table entries are linear regression coefficients with cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Year and constitutional moment dummy variables have been omitted from the models in this table. \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$

**Table B4.2** Estimating the effect of ethnic recognition on negative and positive peace in cases with ethnic party bans and cases without ethnic party bans using dynamic trends, with placebo tests. The **highlighted** coefficients denote a simple violation of the assumption of parallel trends.

	<b>Model 5.1</b>	<b>Model 6.1</b>	<b>Model 7.1</b>	<b>Model 8.1</b>
	Ethnic party ban:	No ban:	Ethnic party ban:	No ban:
	Negative peace	Negative peace	Positive peace	Positive peace
(Intercept)	-16.120*** (9.492)	57.201*** (5.404)	8.324*** (2.223)	-18.790*** (1.572)
[Control variables]	[...] <sup>***</sup> (...)	[...] <sup>***</sup> (...)	[...] <sup>***</sup> (...)	[...] <sup>***</sup> (...)
5 years before treatment	1.697 (0.893)	0.578 (0.378)	-0.204 (0.378)	-0.099 (0.104)
4 years before treatment	1.823 (0.891)	0.508 (0.362)	-0.699 (0.374)	-0.052 (0.104)
3 years before treatment	<b>1.898*</b> (0.892)	0.229 (0.335)	<b>-0.922*</b> (0.336)	-0.054 (0.099)
2 years before treatment	1.783 (0.892)	<b>0.608*</b> (0.331)	-0.664 (0.241)	-0.012 (0.097)
Year of implementation	1.070* (0.506)	0.585* (0.347)	0.016 (0.117)	0.070 (0.096)
1 year after treatment	1.364** (0.502)	0.103 (0.347)	-0.051 (0.117)	0.004 (0.093)
2 years after treatment	0.517 (0.500)	0.299 (0.348)	-0.117 (0.111)	0.004 (0.087)
3 years after treatment	0.508 (0.500)	-0.037 (0.347)	-0.048 (0.111)	-0.060 (0.082)
4 years after treatment	0.869 (0.498)	-0.633* (0.358)	-0.103 (0.109)	0.022 (0.079)
Observations	639	2436	582	2004
Adj. $R^2$	0.764	0.544	0.781	0.635
F statistic	28.22 (df = 76, 562)	22.49 (df = 135, 2300)	31.08 (df = 69, 512)	28.26 (df = 128, 1875)

Note: Table entries are linear regression coefficients with cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. It excludes the dummy variable of the year prior to treatment, which serves as a baseline, something commonly done in DDiD (Huntington-Klein, 2021). Controls, and year and constitutional moment dummy variables have been omitted from the models in this table for presentation purposes.

\*\*\*p < 0.001; \*\*p < 0.01; \*p < 0.05

### Appendix B.5: The effect of ethnic recognition in ethnic conflict cases with placebo test

The models in Table B5.1 estimate the effect of ethnic recognition on negative and positive peace in cases with a history of ethnic conflict, and those without (Model 5 to 8 in the main text). The models in Table B5.2 show the dynamic versions of these (Models 13 to 16 in the main text), with placebo tests prior to the constitutional moment.

**Table B5.1** Estimating the effect of ethnic recognition on negative and positive peace in ethnic conflict cases and other political conflict cases assuming constant trends.

	<b>Model 9</b> Ethnic conflict: Negative peace	<b>Model 10</b> Other conflict: Negative peace	<b>Model 11</b> Ethnic conflict: Positive peace	<b>Model 12</b> Other conflict: Positive peace
(Intercept)	35.940*** (6.175)	79.530*** (6.886)	-15.570*** (1.858)	-20.880*** (1.877)
Ethnic recognition	-0.805* (0.414)	-0.324 (0.645)	0.257* (0.137)	-0.199 (0.476)
GDP (log)	-2.388* (1.412)	-6.839*** (1.884)	1.138* (0.595)	1.920*** (0.706)
GDP growth	-0.060*** (0.013)	-0.071*** (0.021)	0.008*** (0.031)	0.007* (0.004)
Income inequality	-4.426 (5.203)	-0.747 (5.035)	2.709* (1.628)	-1.626 (1.520)
Democracy level	-3.967 (1.082)	-3.324* (1.805)	1.162*** (0.365)	0.418 (0.665)
Observations	1584	1491	1347	1239
Adj. $R^2$	0.584	0.472	0.599	0.617
F statistic	26.505*** (df = 87; 1496)	16.652*** (df = 85; 1405)	25.492*** (df = 82; 1264)	23.589*** (df = 79; 1159)

Note: Table entries are linear regression coefficients with cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Year and constitutional moment dummy variables have been omitted from the models in this table.

\*\*\*p < 0.001; \*\*p < 0.01; \*p < 0.05

**Table B5.2** Estimating the effect of ethnic recognition on negative and positive peace in ethnic conflict versus regular political conflict cases using dynamic trends, with placebo tests. The **highlighted** coefficients denote a simple violation of the assumption of parallel trends.

	<b>Model 13</b>	<b>Model 14</b>	<b>Model 15</b>	<b>Model 16</b>
	Ethnic conflict	Other conflict	Ethnic conflict	Other conflict
	Negative peace	Negative peace	Positive peace	Positive peace
(Intercept)	32.970*** (6.144)	75.690*** (6.941)	-14.500*** (1.863)	-20.960*** (1.925)
[Control variables]	[...] <sup>***</sup> (...)	[...] <sup>***</sup> (...)	[...] <sup>***</sup> (...)	[...] <sup>***</sup> (...)
5 years before treatment	<b>1.085*</b> (0.628)	0.298 (0.671)	-0.177 (0.151)	0.158 (0.173)
4 years before treatment	1.105 (0.562)	0.093 (0.720)	-0.147 (0.151)	0.140 (0.192)
3 years before treatment	-0.023 (0.508)	0.984 (0.601)	-0.156 (0.155)	0.087 (0.220)
2 years before treatment	0.521 (0.442)	<b>1.093*</b> (0.603)	-0.106 (0.152)	0.069 (0.234)
Year of implementation	0.503 (0.451)	0.832 (0.520)	0.033 (0.128)	-0.022 (0.185)
1 year after treatment	-0.448 (0.389)	1.559** (0.625)	-0.014 (0.132)	-0.107 (0.190)
2 years after treatment	-0.110 (0.415)	0.723* (0.374)	-0.064 (0.133)	-0.092 (0.157)
3 years after treatment	-0.507 (0.336)	0.794*** (0.300)	-0.136 (0.122)	-0.061 (0.127)
4 years after treatment	-0.643* (0.358)	0.354 (0.478)	-0.115 (0.105)	-0.018 (0.139)
5 years after treatment	-0.509 (0.395)	0.068 (0.456)	-0.044 (0.096)	-0.015 (0.132)
6 years after treatment	-0.586 (0.406)	0.377 (0.464)	0.049 (0.100)	-0.054 (0.128)
7 years after treatment	-0.187 (0.370)	-0.397 (0.418)	0.040 (0.099)	-0.039 (0.127)
Observations	1584	1491	1347	1239
Adj. $R^2$	0.583	0.475	0.592	0.585
F statistic	23.599 (df = 98; 1485)	15.046*** (df = 96; 1394)	22.018*** (df = 93; 1253)	20.401 (df = 90; 1148)


Note: Table entries are linear regression coefficients with cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. It excludes the dummy variable of the year prior to treatment, which serves as a baseline, something commonly done in DDiD (Huntington-Klein, 2021). Controls, and year and constitutional moment dummy variables have been omitted from the models in this table for presentation purposes.

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$


## Appendix B.6: Assumptions testing

In this appendix, the assumptions of linear regression are tested. The parallel trends assumption has been tested and elaborated on previously, and so this will not be done again here. The models as previously presented have also already been controlled for homoscedasticity and independence of errors and cases in the estimation of the effect sizes, standard errors and significance. What follows next are tests on outliers, influential cases, multicollinearity, linearity and normality of error distribution of the primary models (Model 1 and 2).

In terms of **outliers**, which are cases that deviate widely from the regression line, some have been found. To calculate it, I use standardised residuals (see the histograms below). Ideally, there are no standardised residuals values higher than 3 or lower than -3; and not more than 5% of values higher than 2 or lower than -2. That said, for negative peace, there are 12 cases above 3 or below -3, and 4.59% of values are higher than 2 or lower than -2 (N = 2940). For positive peace, there are 18 cases above 3 or below -3, and 6.10% of values are higher than 2 or lower than -2 (N = 2455). This increases the variability in my data to some degree, which distorts some statistical power of the models above. Nevertheless, these critical values have only marginally been exceeded, and thus I argue that there are no systematic problems concerning outliers. More caution has nevertheless been taken in the interpretation of the results. To note, the outliers have not been removed from the analysis as this would lead to other misinterpretations or biased conclusions.



In terms of **influential cases**, which are cases that effectively influence the regression line, calculated using Cook's Distance, there are no problems. See the plots below. There are no cases above 0.395 (left, negative peace) or 0.430 (right, positive peace), which are the critical values of the Cook's Distance in this instance, calculated using  $2 \cdot \text{sqr}(k/n)$ . Some cases stick out above the rest in these plots, but they are far from the critical value to have a real influence on the regression line by themselves.




**Multicollinearity** was expected in these models, since the models are estimated using two-way fixed effects in panel data. For instance, it is expected that the value of the year 1991 is correlated with 1992, et cetera. The data previously controlled for the independence of cases in this regard (through cluster robust standardisation). Furthermore, the adoption of ethnic recognition in constitutional moments (see below: `post_recog`) did not correlate significantly with any other variables in the model. Any value above 10 would be problematic. The GDP (below: `log_gdp_2015`) variable did present collinearity. This was also expected as it was included in a model with both the level of democracy and GDP growth, which are arguably intricately related concepts. That said, the other independent variables have not been interpreted as they have merely been used as a way to justify the parallel trends assumption, so there are no real problems due to multicollinearity regarding the general findings of this thesis.

	GVIF	Df	GVIF <sup>1/(2*Df)</sup>		GVIF	Df	GVIF <sup>1/(2*Df)</sup>
id	78617.517861	95	1.061123	id	4.718960e+05	98	1.068927
year	6.217949	33	1.028075	year	5.090719e+00	26	1.031791
post_recog	3.802722	1	1.950057	post_recog	5.491076e+00	1	2.343304
log_gdp_2015	77.443546	1	8.800201	log_gdp_2015	9.421973e+01	1	9.706685
gdp_growth	1.182418	1	1.087391	gdp_growth	1.220584e+00	1	1.104801
ineq	5.753273	1	2.398598	ineq	8.917024e+00	1	2.986139
dem	3.487239	1	1.867415	dem	4.133399e+00	1	2.033076



Some non-**linearity** has been found. Ideally, the red plot lines below are straight lines, which would denote that the independent variables linearly affect the dependent variable (left: negative peace, right: positive peace). Nevertheless, it does not appear problematic to an extent which hurts the general findings of this thesis. The relationship between two variables does not have to be perfectly linear in order to estimate a linear model. As explained previously, the measure for negative peace (fatalities due to political violence) has already been log transformed, to ensure a more normal distribution.



Lastly, the **errors are normally distributed**. The plots below (left: negative peace, right: positive peace) show that values do not systematically deviate from the residuals line. There are no outliers, there is no problematic skewness (minimally in the model on positive peace), there is no non-linearity.

