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## **Dismantling Patriarchal Paradigms: Catalysing gender norm integration in national security agendas for preventing and countering violent extremism**

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
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**Dismantling Patriarchal Paradigms: Catalysing gender norm integration in national security agendas for preventing and countering violent extremism**



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## **1. Introduction**

In the complex landscape of violent extremism (VE), women bear the brunt of conflict due to their increased vulnerability to gender-based violence, yet remain untapped agents of change. Given this reality, gender-sensitive approaches to preventing and countering this threat can no longer be overlooked. Being integral members of families and communities, women possess invaluable insights that can contribute to a broader comprehension of the localised environment for preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) (GCTF, 2016, p. 2). Beyond domestic roles, P/CVE efforts can leverage women's unique experiences and knowledge to address female radicalization overlooked by traditional masculine counterterrorism. Yet, no formal governmental or intergovernmental structure exists to facilitate women's involvement in P/CVE (Scaramella & Viartasiwi, 2018, p. 2).

Nevertheless, the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, adopted in 2000, initiated the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda. It urges nations to systematically incorporate women's participation and gender perspectives in conflict prevention, resolution, and peace efforts (UNDP, 2019, p. 6). Subsequently, UNSCR 2122 formally integrated terrorism into the WPS agenda, bridging the gap between the UNSC's thematic counterterrorism concerns and WPS principles. This paved the way for countries to integrate the WPS agenda into their National Action Plans (NAPs), providing an entry point for gender-mainstreaming P/CVE initiatives (Miller, Pournik, & Swaine, 2014, p. 51). WPS-NAPs offer governments a framework to integrate gender perspectives, women's participation, and gender analyses into security policies and programmes. Consequently, nearly 80 countries have formulated WPS-NAPs (UNDP, 2019, p. 2).

However, integrating international gender agendas like the WPS into concrete national actions varies significantly across countries, with some facing challenges in translating global commitments locally. This variation is pronounced in the Global South due to limited familiarity with WPS terminology largely shaped by Global North perspectives (Basu, 2016, p. 363). Despite ample literature on the ways international norms disseminate (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Katzenstein, 1996; Klotz, 1995), it lacks sufficient specification on structural factors facilitating the mainstreaming of international gender norms into national security agendas (Risse & Sikkink, 2017, p. 4). Thus, this thesis aims to explore:

*“What factors influence the mainstreaming of international gender norms into national security agendas aimed at P/CVE?”*

By moving away from the Western-centric focus and male-dominated classifications of P/CVE strategies, this research addresses the lack of gendered data and analysis of challenges involved with integrating West-originating gender norms within Southeast Asian contexts. Of the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), only three have adopted WPS-NAPs (UN Women, n.d.). This warrants a closer examination of the factors behind this limited adoption and the diverse approaches to integrating gender norms in the region. By understanding the factors enabling or impeding gender-mainstreaming of national security plans, policymakers and practitioners can develop more effective, localised and comprehensive P/CVE strategies.

A comparative case study of Indonesia and the Philippines, two ASEAN countries adopting WPS-NAPs to varying degrees, reveals robust gender-responsive institutional frameworks enabling women’s civil society advocacy drive higher mainstreaming of international gender norms into national security policies, overriding socio-cultural and developmental factors.

The proposed question will be explored via: (1) reviewing literature on the intersection of gender and VE; (2) exploring relevant theories and concepts regarding the integration of gender norms into national contexts; (3) a comparative case study focusing on the contrasting WPS-NAPs of the Philippines and Indonesia.

## **2. Literature Review**

### ***2.1 Gender and Violent Extremism (VE)***

The realms of counterterrorism (CT) have historically been dominated by masculine perspectives. Feminist literature has often described intelligence sectors as “gendered organisations” suffering from a hegemonic masculinist culture that prevents women from fulfilling significant security roles (Veronika, 2024, p. 6). The emergence of P/CVE programs aimed to extend beyond solely repressive and security-focused measures towards holistic and softer approaches to address underlying motivations behind violent extremism (VE) (Al-Kadi & Vale, 2020, p. 249). However, particularly in conflict-affected areas, the gender dimensions of VE and P/CVE have been overlooked in research and practice, often reduced to stereotypes that women are inherently non-violent or solely influenced by men. Initial P/CVE programs stereotyped “angry young men” as the face of VE, engaging male figures like former combatants and community and religious leaders through military campaigns (Bronitt et al., 2020, p. 13). Overlooking gender dynamics and excluding women’s perspectives has limited holistically addressing VE’s multifaceted drivers and impacts thus far.

‘Gender’ refers to socially constructed roles and behaviours deemed appropriate for women and men, while ‘sex’ refers to biological differences (Bronitt et al., 2020, p. 13). Ideas about gender are highly contextual and vary depending on cultural, societal, and temporal factors. However, during conflict, distinct gender roles are said to emerge, associating masculinity with militarism and aggression, and femininity with non-violence and supportiveness (Enloe, 2004, p. 106). Patriarchal norms, hyper-masculinity, and cultures of misogyny within VE organisations often relegate women to auxiliary victim positions, reinforcing narratives of women as life-givers rather than life-takers (Mahmoud, 2019, p. 12). Overall, feminist scholars and gender studies experts contend that deconstructing gendered narratives and patriarchal power dynamics is key to developing impactful P/CVE strategies (p. 12).

#### ***2.1.1 Women in P/CVE***

Recent scholarship questions persistent gendered assumptions about women’s motivations and recruitment into VE (Bloom & Lokmanoglu, 2020, p. 399; Khalil, 2019). For example, scholars



examine how gendered misconceptions about female Islamic State supporters as manipulated, lacking agency, and less political, fail to recognise “all women as complex actors making complex choices”, leading to CT approaches destined to fail (Sjoberg & Gentry, 2016, pp. 23-24). Substantial literature emphasises women’s autonomy and proactive roles in VE, serving as supporters, perpetrators, and preventers through intelligence gathering, resource mobilisation, sex slaves, domestic servants, and even suicide attackers (Sambaiga, 2020, p. 3). Thus, there is a scholarly understanding that assessing women’s involvement in extremism should dispel gender stereotypes to enrich understanding of the unique ways men and women participate in and are affected by extremism.

### *2.1.2 Gender-mainstreaming*

Despite global recognition of the need for gender-inclusive P/CVE strategies for effectiveness and sustainability, most National Action Plans (NAPs) remain “gender-blind” (OSCE, 2022). Few acknowledge women’s roles beyond wives of foreign fighters, and fewer analyse gender as a central power structure influencing VE groups’ operations and ideologies. Prior studies (Giscard d’Estaing, 2017; Ni Aolain, 2016; Brown, 2019) indicate that attempts to integrate gender perspectives into P/CVE have been sporadic and isolated, disregarding the influence of gender norms on both men and women’s security concerns. Additionally, many initiatives lack a foundation in gender and human rights principles, resulting in conflicting policies where ‘gender equality’ becomes securitised and women’s human rights are exploited, increasing risks and undermining grassroots P/CVE efforts (Winterbotham, 2020, p. 26).

Gender-mainstreaming in terms of WPS-NAP integration for P/CVE involves systematically incorporating gender perspectives to address local gendered drivers and impacts of VE (Brown, 2019, p. 7). It ensures programs reflect distinct needs across genders and intersecting identities, address systemic vulnerabilities faced by women, and necessitate collaborative efforts between civil society as local experts and the government (Scaramella & Viatrasiw, 2018, p. 6). Crucially, it promotes women’s meaningful participation and leadership at all decision-making levels, aligning with UN commitments on gender equality and counterterrorism (p. 6). Overall, P/CVE interventions should consider shifts in gender roles,

incorporating perspectives of both women and men and promote greater inclusion of women in decision-making processes and initiatives (Nario-Galace, 2019, p. 8).

## ***2.2 The UN's Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda***

This study extensively references the WPS agenda - a comprehensive policy framework directly intertwining gender, women's rights, and initiatives to P/CVE. The WPS agenda encompasses 10 United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCR) that emerged from feminist civil society advocacy to safeguard women's rights and needs in conflict-affected contexts (Brown, 2019, p. 11). The provisions of the WPS agenda, laid out by UNSCR 1325, are categorised into four central pillars: ensuring women's *participation* in peace and security governance, *protecting* women's rights in conflict situations, *preventing* violence and conflict-related sexual violence, and promoting gender-sensitive *relief and recovery* endeavours (Achilleos-Sarll, 2020, p. 1643). Notably, the WPS agenda's legitimacy derives from states' adherence to their obligations assumed under international human rights law, which may potentially influence varying degrees of national prioritisation, implementation, and integration with P/CVE initiatives. Thus, the WPS agenda offers insights into domesticating international gender norms that may challenge traditional state power and local gender norms in nations' security sectors.

### *2.2.1 Women's Instrumentalisation Vs. Women's Empowerment in P/CVE*

This paper's stance on whether integrating the WPS agenda into NAPs genuinely empowers women must be clarified amid recent academic debate.

UNSCRs advocate "women's empowerment" and "gender equality" in P/CVE efforts by enabling women as autonomous actors - whether as peacemakers, detectors of radicalisation, or law enforcement - while promoting a wider environment of gender equality to dismantle conditions enabling VE (Mesok, 2022, p. 615). Some scholars (Majoran, 2015) highlight that from a policy standpoint, women serve as gateways into the private domain of households, utilising their caregiving roles as mothers, wives, and sisters to engage with individuals typically challenging to reach and dissuade from extremism (Giscard d'Estaing, 2017, p. 106). Conversely, critical feminists (Winterbotham, 2020; Giscard d'Estaing, 2017) argue that portraying women as universally peaceful maternal figures relegates them to the private sphere,

marginalising their participation in core peace and security efforts. Thus, framing women's mobilisation for P/CVE as "empowerment" and "equality" reflects a neoliberal approach focused on instrumentalising women in identifying threats in households rather than it being the government's responsibility to address underlying structural gender injustices contributing to VE susceptibility for all genders (Heathcote, 2018, p. 382).

### *2.2.2 Settling the Debate*

This paper justifies exploring how the WPS-NAP integration beneficially intersects with nations' P/CVE plans, siding with Mesok's (2022) argument that the critique of instrumentalisation overshadows the reality of women's long-standing community-based and grassroots violence prevention even before the emergence of the P/CVE agenda (p. 618). Criticisms of instrumentalising women risk perpetuating the very structures they aim to dismantle by presuming that women involved in P/CVE initiatives are always inherently exploited by the state's security sector. This attributes false consciousness and restricts the recognition of their autonomous capacity solely to a liberal feminist interpretation of resistance against the state rather than strategic engagement (p. 618).

In summary, the literature review discusses masculine-dominant counterterrorism perspectives and critiques the notion of women as universally peaceful figures and inherently instrumentalised. This provides a critical framework to guide this research on nuanced gender dynamics and implications for effective and inclusive P/CVE strategies.

### **3. Theoretical Framework**

To effectively grasp the research question, key concepts and relevant theories pertaining to the variables must be defined. This study aims to explain the variation in the dependent variable: the degree of mainstreaming international gender norms into nations' security agendas aimed at P/CVE. The independent variables are structural factors that potentially account for this variation.

#### ***3.1 Conceptualisation:***

##### ***3.1.1 Defining Violent Extremism***

Violent extremism (VE) is not a recent phenomenon, nor solely linked to radical religious ideologies, as often assumed (UNDP, 2016, p. 12). Ethnically driven violence persists, even among communities sharing the same religious beliefs. In their P/CVE strategies, Australia, Canada, the USA, Norway, the Philippines and Indonesia all define VE as the use of violence to further ideological, religious, or political objectives (UNODC, 2018; Franco & Sumpter, 2021). Similarly, the OECD (2016) defines VE as promoting ideologies that incite violence and breed hatred, leading to inter-community violence (p. 16). UNESCO (2017) defines VE as the beliefs and actions of individuals who endorse or utilise violence to accomplish ideological, religious or political objectives, including terrorism and other politically motivated or sectarian violence (p. 19). This paper synthesises these organisations' definitions of VE into promoting views that encourage violence in support of specific beliefs, alongside fostering hatred that could result in inter-community violence.

##### ***3.1.2 Defining Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE)***

P/CVE is a comprehensive approach that extends beyond sole reliance on intelligence, law enforcement, and military strategies. It addresses extremism's structural underpinnings, including government failure, and political, economic, and social marginalisation (Frazer & Nünlist, 2015, p. 1). P/CVE involves employing non-coercive methods to dissuade individuals or groups from engaging in violence driven by ideological motives, particularly terrorism in support of political objectives (Khan, 2015). It is distinct from counterterrorism, which denotes more forceful and direct actions involving kinetic, police, or military security measures (UN Women, 2021, p. 11).

*Countering* violent extremism (CVE) specifically targets individuals who may be more inclined towards or have already committed violent acts, while *preventing* violent extremism (PVE) focuses on mitigating factors facilitating radicalisation and recruitment, even before individuals lean towards violent acts (UN Women, 2021, p. 11). Recent literature acknowledges the need for a holistic response to VE and thus, the importance of integrating softer, long-term PVE strategies and harder, occurrence-oriented short-term CVE approaches for maximum efficacy in combating VE (Speckhard, 2021, p. 11).

Notably, P/CVE initiatives are propelled by cooperative efforts between civil society organisations (CSOs), acting as local experts on early warning signs and culturally sensitive approaches that resonate with communities, and the government (Scaramella & Viatrasiw, 2018, p. 6).

### ***3.2 Theoretical discussion***

While theories on how international human rights norms are domesticated exist (Risse & Sikkink, 2017; Morgan & Rubio-Marin, 2004), no overarching theory explicitly outlines structural factors explaining the degree of gender-mainstreaming in national security sectors. Therefore, by synthesising insights from various scholars' theories, this section categorises key explanatory factors into an analytical framework that will be used for cross-case examination later on.

#### *3.2.1 Theorising the Domestication of International Gender Norms*

The WPS agenda is founded on two key 'norms': gender-balanced decision-making and gender-mainstreaming. This paper considers them as norms because they were endorsed by 189 member states at the 1995 UN Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, regarded as the most comprehensive global framework for gender equality (Kook & True, 2012, p. 105).

Acknowledging women and men's distinct societal, economic, and political roles, these norms indicate that achieving gender equality requires: (1) ensuring women's representation and participation as policymakers; (2) assessing and addressing all public policies' gendered implications (Kook & True, 2012, pp. 105-106). The following subsections illustrate key

theories providing insights into explaining the mainstreaming of international gender norms, like those underpinning the WPS agenda, into national security sectors.

### *3.2.2.1 Feminist Institutionalism*

Feminist institutionalist theory posits that a country's formal institutions like the constitution, legal system, and policymaking structures shape the adoption and implementation of gender equality norms (Morgan & Rubio-Marin, 2004, p. 115). Countries with gender-responsive constitutions, strong equality laws, and mechanisms like gender commissions are more likely to domesticate international gender norms. The theory highlights how male-dominated political systems' path dependencies and institutional inertia resist transformative gender policies. Path dependency explains gendered institutional trajectories becoming deeply rooted and change-resistant over time (Djelic & Quack, 2007, p. 161). Pivotal historical events, like the exclusion of women from voting rights, established male-dominated arrangements marginalising women's roles. Initial biases are "locked-in" through vested interests of powerholders preserving the status quo and socio-cultural resistance (p. 163). Consequently, integrating transformative gender policies into patriarchal domains like national security is challenging, perceived as too disruptive and costly to entrenched privileges and interests of powerholders.

Additionally, feminist institutionalism's discursive approach explains how international gender norms are translated by governments to resonate with global discourses while allowing adjustments to align with domestic norms. Acosta et al. (2019) argue that "gender inertia" - delayed gender parity in an organisation due to slow turnover and replacement of existing members over time - affects international norm implementation in bureaucratic processes (p. 15). For example, repeated use of identical language and predetermined gender components in policy documents across sub-national levels indicates a lack of innovation and critical thinking around gender-mainstreaming (p. 15). This shows a concerning level of bureaucratic complacency, treating gender-mainstreaming as a mere formality or "shopping list" approach driven by international pressures rather than a genuine commitment (p. 16). Similarly, vague budget line items and constrained budgetary allocations related to gender issues cause gender-mainstreaming norms to stall at the rhetorical level instead of materialising into meaningful policy instruments (p. 16). Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) concept of "strategic social construction" suggests

governments may adopt gendered language in policy-making superficially for international credibility if perceived as incompatible with deeply rooted traditional norms (p. 888).

Overall, the nature of countries' formal institutions is revealed as an important structural factor in shaping gender-mainstreaming. A rhetoric-budgetary disconnect indicates superficial domestication of international gender equality and women's empowerment norms. However, entrenched domestic norms causing a lack of genuine governmental commitment to international gender norms, and path-dependent gendered institutions were also uncovered as relevant structural factors.

### *3.2.2.2 The Norm Life Cycle*

Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) 'norm life cycle' theory explains how international norms are localised and integrated into national policies through three stages: emergence, cascade, and internalisation (p. 896). Throughout each stage, the role of "norm entrepreneurs" is central to persuading and reconstructing international norms to align with local beliefs through congruence-building, challenging top-down norm diffusion notions (p. 897). Norm entrepreneurs, whether individuals, organisations or states, dissatisfied with current norms promote new appropriate behavioural ideas from influential platforms that lend credibility to their advocacy efforts. They use various strategies, including "framing" issues to resonate with public perceptions and facilitate norm emergence (p. 897). By lobbying for the domestication of the norm at the national level and mobilising public opinion to create a critical mass of states that adopt these norms, international norms cascade and gain traction across countries. As more nations adopt the norm, a "contagion" effect pressures others to comply for credibility (p. 902). This cascade is driven by socialisation, where civil society monitors and pressures targeted actors to adopt policies aligning with international norms (p. 902).

The third stage, "internalisation", is challenged by other scholars (Iommi, 2020) as oversimplifying the processes of domesticating gender norms. Instead of it being the final, "taken-for-granted" stage, for contested norms like gender equality, internalisation is better understood as a phase requiring formal validity through laws, social recognition, and cultural validation among local stakeholders (Iommi, 2020, pp. 76-77). Even after a norm cascade leads to adoption in national frameworks, substantive internalisation faces ongoing "applicatory

contestation” over interpretation and implementation (p. 76). Here, civil society groups play a vital role in shaping this contestation and facilitating the resonance between global gender norms and local contexts. Internalisation thus emerges as an iterative process of negotiating the meaningful integration of gender norms into national security agendas amidst norm contestation, rather than an endpoint.

As the literature review highlighted CSO-government collaboration drives P/CVE initiative, through the theoretical lens of the ‘norm life cycle’, CSO’s strength, mobilisation capacity, policy influence and cultural legitimacy are key structural factors enabling their role as norm entrepreneurs in shaping the domestication of gender equality norms.

### *3.2.2.3 Institutional Design as Central to Women’s Empowerment*

While Alexander and Welzel (2007) do not directly theorise the factors leading to gender-mainstreaming of nations’ security sectors, their work offers the most comprehensive framework for understanding factors influencing the level of gender equality within countries overall. They illustrate four salient factors: socio-economic development; cultural shift towards gender-egalitarian attitudes; historical legacies stemming from cultural and political traditions related to gender roles; and a nation’s institutional design (p.1). This demonstrates that scholars have attempted to combine the factors outlined in the previous subsections when researching gender equality, situating this thesis within a credible tradition of holistically examining economic, socio-cultural, historical, and institutional variables’ influence on gender parity across contexts.

Interestingly, the authors challenge the primacy of economic development and historical legacies in determining gender equality in political leadership. They find that each of the four factors differentially impacts various stages of gender equality progress. While economic modernity and gender-egalitarian values influence women’s social empowerment, cultural modernity enables female participation in civil society. However, institutional design plays a central, mediating role in facilitating women’s political leadership (p. 23). Their findings support their hypothesis that institutional design, encompassing electoral systems and gender quota policies, becomes pivotal in facilitating gender-equal policies and women’s political representation, overriding historical and economic explanatory factors (p. 4). This directly relates



to the research question, as the literature review highlighted that promoting women's meaningful participation and leadership in all levels of decision-making is key to gender-mainstreaming. Thus, despite cultural modernity's prevalence in most stages of gender equality progress, institutional design is the most crucial factor determining women's representation in political positions - the fourth and highest stage of gender equality progress (p. 4). This leads to the hypothesis:

**H1:** Countries with *gender-responsive legal/institutional frameworks* are more likely to achieve higher mainstreaming of international gender norms into their security agendas aimed at P/CVE.

### ***3.3 Conclusion of Theoretical Framework***

Through synthesising these theories, four categories of structural factors influencing mainstreaming of international gender norms in national security agendas merit examination across cases, detailed in Table 1 (Appendix A): (1) Institutional mechanisms for gender-mainstreaming; (2) Political will and leadership; (3) Historical legacies and socio-cultural resonance; (4) Role and influence of CSOs.

## **4. Methodology**

### ***4.1 Research Design and Case Selection***

Employing a Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) suits this qualitative, theory-guided comparative case study on explanatory factors influencing gender-mainstreaming of national security agendas aimed at P/CVE. MSSD controls for shared characteristics to test if a crucial difference between the cases (the hypothesised IVs) explains the variation in the DV (Halperin & Heath, 2020, p. 239).

This research aims to generate novel perspectives and deepen understanding of why localisation of the western-centric WPS agenda varies within Southeast Asia's distinct socio-cultural context. This thesis narrowed the conceptualisation of the "Southeast Asian" region to ASEAN member countries to focus on a cohesive regional framework, guiding the selection of two critical cases: Indonesia and the Philippines. Both cases adopted a WPS-NAP, enabling precise analysis by controlling for the initial adoption of the same international gender framework (WPS agenda), eliminating confounding effects of varying frameworks.

Importantly, the DV must differ for MSSD. Exploring literature and reports on WPS-NAP implementation left an initial impression of contrasting implementation levels between the two cases. The Philippines is known as the first Asian country to adopt a WPS-NAP in 2010, demonstrating early commitment to the agenda (Miller, Pournick, & Swaine, 2014, p. 121). Contrastingly, Indonesia is criticised for not mentioning civil society participation in its NAP, among other limitations (WILPF, 2020). However, content analysis of Indonesia and the Philippines's NAP would empirically confirm their differing progress.

The purposive selection of the Philippines and Indonesia is grounded in several theoretically important shared characteristics, a criteria of MSSD. As Muslim-majority nations in the Southeast Asian region, they share broad cultural, historical, socio-political, and economic trajectories shaped by their ASEAN membership. Both experienced European colonialism and dictatorships before transitioning to democracy through popular revolutions. Their maritime, archipelagic nature comprises numerous islands with Austronesian-rooted national languages, and are categorised as middle-income countries struggling with corruption (Andaya, 2024). Additionally, both face threats from Islamic extremism within their borders, often by the same organisations. These regional, religious, geographic, linguistic, economic, and security

similarities provide a strong theoretical foundation for employing MSSD, minimising extraneous regional variations that could confound cross-case comparisons. This enables a systematic examination of the hypothesised IVs contributing to their differing progress in gender-mainstreaming national security agendas.

## **4.2 Operationalisation and Data Collection**

### *4.2.1 Content Analysis to Identify the Dependent Variable (DV)*

This research operationalises the DV (the degree of mainstreaming of international gender norms into national security agendas aimed at P/CVE) as the level of WPS agenda integration into countries' National Action Plan (NAP). NAPs are the primary national-level implementation mechanisms for the WPS agenda - an internationally recognized framework promoting gender-mainstreaming of peace and security efforts. A country's NAP directly reflects its prioritisation and commitment to localising international gender norms into policies, laws, and action plans related to peace, security, and P/CVE (UN Women, 2024). By analysing the Philippines' and Indonesia's NAPs via qualitative content analysis (QCA), a systematic comparative analysis can be conducted to examine the variation in the DV across these cases, enabling an assessment of the hypothesised structural factors influencing this outcome. QCA systematically examines written texts to identify characteristics or themes, making it suitable for assessing the degree of WPS principles integration in NAPs (Halperin & Heath, 2020, p. 174).

First, a set of criteria and indicators for what constitutes meaningful gender-mainstreaming in P/CVE initiatives is developed, drawing from UNSCR 1325 - a pioneering framework for assessing how countries localise and implement WPS principles through national policies. After developing a coding framework derived from 14 UNSCR 1325 member state obligations, this framework is systematically applied to evaluate the level of WPS-NAP integration in the Philippines and Indonesia through QCA (UNSC, 2000, p. 3). Through this, relevant sections, action points, or language demonstrating their approach to fulfilling each obligation is identified. These 14 statements are outlined in Table 2 (Appendix A).

The level of specificity in each NAP's sentences or priority actions is coded as "Non-Specific" when an element lacks detail or "Specific" when clear information like actions, responsible parties, timelines, or measurable targets is provided. As highlighted by Miller,

Pournick, and Swaine (2014), the aspect of specificity crucially impacts effective implementation and accountability, as ambiguity can lead to gender becoming a shared responsibility without clear ownership (pp. 24-25). See Table 3 (Appendix A) for examples of “Specific” and “Non-specific” language from countries’ NAP.

#### *4.2.2 Secondary Source Analysis of Independent Variables (IVs)*

Regarding the IVs hypothesised to influence the DV, a historical and political analysis of secondary sources is an appropriate research methodology. This approach involves examining literature, government reports, policy documents, and scholarly works to trace the historical trajectories, political dynamics, and institutional contexts within each country. Triangulating evidence from multiple secondary sources enhances validity and reliability, providing a comprehensive understanding of how these structural factors influence WPS-NAP integration (Halperin & Heath, 2020, p. 175).

Analysing a country holistically when examining each IV is crucial because national security is deeply interconnected with socio-political, economic, and cultural factors. Thus, each IV is assessed through secondary sources to develop a comprehensive understanding of the country, beyond just its security sector.

#### **4.3 Scope**

This research examines the current NAPs of the Philippines (2023-2033) and Indonesia (2014-2019), as they represent the latest comprehensive articulation of their approach to integrating WPS principles into national security. Vietnam’s NAP, the only other ASEAN WPS-NAP, is excluded due to its availability only in Vietnamese, risking translation inaccuracies for content analysis without adequate linguistic and cultural expertise.

## **5. Analysis**

### ***5.1 Background Information***

To provide context for the analysis, an overview of the Philippines and Indonesia's efforts in P/CVE is necessary.

Even two decades after the 9/11 attacks, jihadist organisations continue to destabilise Southeast Asia, with a resurgence of militant activities fuelled by Islamic State's rise since the mid-2010s (Franco & Sumpter, 2021). Prominent extremist organisations like ISIS-affiliated Dawlah Islamiya Maute and Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, and Darul Islam in Indonesia aim to establish a Southeast Asian Islamic Caliphate. These groups increasingly recruit Muslim women to attack, bomb, and disseminate extremist propaganda across the region, but mainly in the Philippines and Indonesia (Sanguila, 2023). The Philippines is the sole nation in Southeast Asia ranked among the top ten countries globally most severely affected by terrorism (IEP, 2020, p. 28).

Responding to the Islamic State's rise and the migration of more women and children to its self-proclaimed "Caliphate", Indonesia and the Philippines committed to emphasising women's P/CVE roles (Papp et al., 2022, p. 4). The Philippines launched its fourth NAP on WPS (2023-2033), outlining measures for women's conflict prevention participation. Puzzlingly, Indonesia, another Muslim-majority country in the same region and facing similar Islamic extremist threats, progressed relatively slower, currently in its 2nd NAP cycle and without any mention of civil society participation (Government of Indonesia, 2014, p. 1). The following section will compare these cases in more detail, aiming to uncover possible explanatory factors for the variation observed.

### ***5.2 Analysis of WPS-NAP integration (DV)***

The QCA demonstrates the Philippines' WPS-NAP exhibits significantly higher integration and alignment with UNSCR 1325 obligations than Indonesia. Several crucial distinctions deserve to be highlighted.

57 sentences aligned with the 14 UNSCR 1325 obligations in the Philippines NAP, with 70.18% coded as "Specific", while Indonesia's had only 32 relevant sentences, with 59.38% coded as "Specific". This provides quantitative evidence that the Philippines WPS-NAP suggests

a stronger attempt to translate these international obligations into concrete policies and actions. Of these sentences, the Philippine plan (2023-2033) is more specific, actionable, and comprehensive, setting quantifiable targets like ensuring at least 30% representation of women, with a goal of 50%, in leadership positions across peace mechanisms (p. 23). In contrast, Indonesia uses broad language without clarifying concrete implementation pathways. The Philippines NAP provides granular details on capacity-building efforts, specifying partnerships with UN Women and training activities for organisations working on WPS issues, while Indonesia's NAP lacks such specificity (p. 14). On increasing financial, logistical and technical support, a key UNSCR 1325 obligation, the Philippine NAP outlines strategies for all three support types, whereas Indonesia's NAP only brushes over methods of financial support. The Philippine NAP references specific laws like the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act and includes programs on the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) General Recommendation 30 - core international instruments that Indonesia's NAP never mentions (pp. 13 & 35). It also explicitly covers prosecuting war crimes against women and excluding such crimes from amnesty provisions - another UNSCR 1325 obligation which Indonesia's NAP is completely silent (p. 27).

A striking difference is that the Philippine NAP extensively engages with civil society and emphasises collaborative politics involving CSOs throughout its development, implementation and monitoring - the most detailed aspect of Philippine's NAP. It explicitly states it was developed via "multiple rounds of regional cluster consultations, where CSOs and national and local government agencies ... participated to determine the key action points to be included in the NAP" (Philippines NAP, 2023-2033, p. 10). In contrast, Indonesia's NAP completely lacks any mention of the words "civil society" or "CSO".

Most relevant to this research is the UNSCR 1325 obligation that urges member states to increase the representation of women at all decision-making levels related to conflict prevention, management, and resolution. This allows for the analysis of how nations plan to gender-mainstream P/CVE policies. The Philippine NAP (2023-2033) robustly commits to empowering women in peace and security decision-making, setting 30-50% leadership representation targets and outlining strategies involving women in security reforms and uniformed services (p. 23). Conversely, Indonesia's NAP lacks concrete targets or actionable

measures to promote women's meaningful participation and leadership in P/CVE decision-making.

Collectively, these crucial distinctions substantiate the Philippines' higher degree of WPS-NAP integration compared to Indonesia.

### ***5.3 Analysis of Structural Factors (IVs)***

The analysis of each IV, illustrated by the subsequent sub-headings, covers the theoretically-grounded potential indicators detailed in Table 1 (Appendix A).

#### *5.3.1 Institutional Mechanisms for Gender-Mainstreaming*

##### *The Philippines*

The Philippines has significantly institutionalised gender-mainstreaming across government agencies through formal structures like the Philippine Commission on Women (PCW), the primary coordination and oversight body for gender-mainstreaming efforts. The mandated Gender and Development (GAD) program has a Focal Point System within agencies, comprising dedicated personnel for gender-mainstreaming activities like audits and training (Guillen, 2022, p. 16). By institutionalising enhanced GAD audits, the government ensures proper auditing of GAD budgets under the Magna Carta of Women Act, complying with the Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (GEWE) Plan 2019-2025 - the government's framework for promoting gender equality and formulating GAD plans and budgets (p. 22). This framework supports the government's long-term Philippine Plan for Gender-Responsive Development (1995-2025).

The Philippine parliament prioritises gender equality through the Senate Committee on Women, Family Relations and Gender Equality, overseeing policies and gender-mainstreaming across parliamentary work (Senate of the Philippines, 2013). The government institutionalised gender budgeting, requiring agencies to allocate 5% of budget for GAD plans, which are reviewed by the PCW (PCW, n.d). Importantly, the 1987 Constitution enshrines gender equality, non-discrimination based on sex, and protection for working women as fundamental principles.

## Indonesia

Indonesia's constitution presents challenges in upholding gender equality and women's rights principles through its legal architecture. While the 1945 Constitution guarantees equality before the law and prohibits gender discrimination (Art. 28H), discriminatory provisions persist. For instance, the new Penal Code (Art. 441(1), 2022) criminalises adultery and sexual relations outside of marriage, disproportionately impacting women due to gender biases, leading to harsher social stigma and legal consequences.

The World Bank assessed Gender Responsive Public Financial Management and Budgeting in Indonesia, scoring budgeting and auditing entities from A to D, with D signifying no gender considerations (PEFA, 2020, p. 13). Indonesia's national parliament was reported to not prioritise gender equality as a significant agenda item nor exercise robust oversight over government gender-mainstreaming policies and budgetary commitments. Furthermore, Indonesia does not have a dedicated parliamentary committee on gender equality issues. Indonesia's Supreme Audit Institution excludes gender equality findings from its annual audit reports on government financial statements to parliament. Consequently, Indonesia scored a D for "gender-responsive legislative scrutiny", meaning the parliamentary Budget Review Committee (Badan Anggaran) does not examine the budget's impacts on gender equality during its review process (p. 27).

Despite lacking a dedicated parliamentary gender committee, Indonesia has established gender units in various ministries, comprising "Gender Champions" mandated to develop the Ministry's Gender Equality action plans (WCO, 2021). However, while the government collects data on budget execution for gender-specific outputs, the published annual budget reports do not reflect actual expenditures for these gender-specific allocations (PEFA, 2020, p. 26).

## Evaluation of Evidence

The contrasting institutional mechanisms for gender-mainstreaming between the Philippines and Indonesia explain the difference in WPS-NAP integration by underscoring the feminist institutionalist theory in two key ways. First, the Philippines demonstrates robust legal architecture and institutionalised frameworks that facilitate the domestication of international gender norms. Its 1987 Constitution and laws like the Magna Carta of Women Act enshrine



gender equality principles. The Philippines dedicated structures for gender-mainstreaming across all sectors, including a parliament that prioritises gender equality through its Senate Committee. This aligns with feminist institutionalist theory, which posits that gender-responsive constitutions, strong equality laws, and mechanisms like gender commissions aid the domestication of international gender norms. Institutional mechanisms for gender auditing in the Philippines demonstrate how formal rules and gender machinery within the legislature can promote integration of gender perspectives in national security plans like their NAP.

Secondly, Indonesia struggles with gender-mainstreaming due to limitations in its legal architecture, including discriminatory constitutional provisions and inadequate parliamentary oversight without a dedicated gender committee. A rhetoric-budgetary disconnect exists where gender-tagged budgets lack scrutiny of actual expenditures. As feminist institutionalist theory predicts, these weaknesses in institutional design constrain the integration of gender equality frameworks across policies. This also reflects Acosta's et al. (2019) theory that norms lacking adequate financial resources and oversight mechanisms impede effective domestication of international gender equality norms into meaningful policy instruments (p. 16).

### *5.3.2 Political Will and Leadership*

#### *The Philippines*

The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, adopted after Ferdinand Marcos' regime fell and Corazon Aquino's presidency as the first female leader, enshrined the fundamental equality of women and men before the law. For the first time, women's rights were explicitly included as an official state policy, marking a watershed moment (Sandoval, Fontamillas, & Aguilar, 2021, p. 19). However, the current administration under President Marcos Jr. has not prioritised gender issues through major public statements, unlike the Philippine Commission on Women, which actively advocates for women's empowerment. His predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, was criticised for making numerous misogynistic remarks and "rape jokes" that normalised sexism in Philippine culture (Abad, 2023). Politically, women's parliamentary representation is declining, with only 27% of cabinet ministers being female (IDEA, 2022). Despite the 1987 Constitution's landmark for women's rights and progress through legislation and policies, the Philippines still

faces major challenges in achieving substantive gender equality in practice, as reflected in its low political empowerment ranking and lack of strong leadership commitment on this front.

### Indonesia

Despite some progress, public statements by Indonesian leaders on gender equality have been limited and lack concrete commitments. In the 2024 presidential debates, women's issues were minimally discussed, framed as a minority or vulnerable group rather than a priority agenda (Fahadi, Savirani, & Setiawan, 2024). No specific plans to enhance women's participation and leadership in politics and business were discussed. Despite a 30% gender quota for legislative candidates, women are frequently placed lower on party lists, reducing their chances of being elected. In the 2024 elections, only 19.65% of legislators are projected to be women, lower than the previous term (Halimatus sa'Diyah, 2024). Megawati Sukarnoputri was Indonesia's only female president, however indirectly after her predecessor's removal in 2001, as the country has never directly elected a woman as president or vice president (Davies, 2024). Overall, tangible gains from existing gender equality initiatives have been limited.

### Evaluation of Evidence

While the Philippines has demonstrated a deeper WPS-NAP compared to Indonesia, as established in the content analysis of their NAPs, the secondary source evidence on this hypothesised IV shows that both countries face significant limitations in terms of weak political will and leadership commitment on this front. Thus, the hypothesised structural factor of "political will and leadership" proves to not be a clear explanation for why the Philippines has achieved higher WPS-NAP integration as they both are evidently weak in this structural factor.

Through the 'norm life cycle theory' lens, the evidence suggests that while both countries may be grappling with the "internalisation" stage of integrating the WPS agenda, "norm entrepreneurs" other than political leaders have played a crucial role in shaping the degree of WPS-NAP integration in the Philippines (Finnemore and Sikkink's, 1998, p. 897). For example, the Philippine Commission on Women, mentioned in the evidence, shaped the WPS agenda's "applicatory contestation" and resonance between international gender norms and local contexts more effectively than their current president who lacks such commitment (Iommi, 2020, p. 76).

This facilitated deeper WPS mainstreaming in the Philippines despite weak political leadership on gender equality.

### *5.3.3 Historical Legacies and Socio-cultural Resonance*

#### *The Philippines*

In 1937, the Philippines was one of the first republics in Asia to grant women's suffrage, following a long campaign by the women's rights movement (ADB, 2013, p. 1). However, despite this early political inclusion, traditional patriarchal norms persisted, limiting women's participation in governance and decision-making roles. The long history of colonialism in the Philippines has embedded a patriarchal culture among Filipinos, with conceptions of women as subordinate to men, full-time homemakers, reserve labour force, and sexual objects (FES, 2000, p. 1). Societal gender role norms decrease the probability of women's labour force participation by 14-22%, with over 80% of Filipino women agreeing men should earn money while women's job is family care (Buchhave & Belghith, 2022). While the vibrant women's movement pushed for a cultural shift in gender norms, Southeast Asian cultural sentiments around gender roles often reinforce patriarchy, hindering the advancement of gender equality.

#### *Indonesia*

Women's suffrage was granted relatively early in 1945 after gaining independence from Dutch colonial rule. However, women's political representation remained low for decades due to entrenched patriarchal norms that saw women primarily as wives and mothers (World Bank, 2020, p. 2). Following the 1999 direct elections, where women secured only 8.8% of parliamentary seats, activists successfully lobbied for a 30% gender quota on party candidate lists, which was enacted in 2003 (Robinson, 2023). Despite this, women won only 22% of national parliament seats in 2019 (IDEA, 2019). The 2019 Jokowi-Amin campaign coined female supporters 'Ibu Bangsa' or 'mothers of the nation', circumscribing womanhood solely to maternal roles (World Bank, 2020, p. 81). However, the post-Suharto reformasi period, which marked the end of the authoritarian New Order regime and the start of democracy, enabled women's movements to push for reforms like the 2004 domestic violence law, although progress has been "mixed" (Robinson, 2023). Persistent patriarchal attitudes and restrictive policies

continue to hinder substantive gender equality in Indonesia. Only in 2003 did legislation enforce a 30% quota for female candidates, mirroring challenges in combating patriarchal norms and harmonising gender parity with cultural contexts (Idrus, Anurlia, & Fadiyah, 2023, p. 2).

### Evaluation of Evidence

The evidence suggests that both the Philippines and Indonesia share deeply entrenched patriarchal socio-cultural norms and gender role attitudes, viewing women primarily in traditional roles. Since both countries face similar challenges in terms of deeply rooted patriarchal cultural norms and attitudes, this structural factor alone cannot account for the difference in the degree of WPS-NAP integration. This suggests that historical and socio-cultural factors may not be central elements for explaining the varying degrees of gender-mainstreaming in national security plans. The relative success of WPS-NAP integration in the Philippines appears to go against the expectations of feminist institutionalism, which would predict that persistent patriarchal norms and locked-in male-dominated institutional arrangements would hinder the adoption of transformative gender equality norms. If patriarchal norms were a central explanatory factor, one would expect both countries to exhibit similar low levels of WPS-NAP integration.

#### *5.3.4 Role and Influence of CSOs*

##### The Philippines

The Philippines has a vibrant civil society sector advocating for women's rights and gender equality. Prominent organisations like the Women's Legal Bureau (WLB), GABRIELA, Pilipina, and the Philippine Commission on Women (PCW) directly interact with grassroots women, advocating for women's rights laws while equipping community-based women's organisations with leadership capacities and developing feminist legal resources (WLB, 2024).

The government has institutionalised mechanisms for CSO participation in policymaking, such as PCW's consultative processes and CSO engagement in the CEDAW shadow reporting, where hundreds of women's organisations provided independent assessments and recommendations (PCW, n.d.). CSOs have achieved significant policy victories, including the enactment of the Magna Carta of Women, the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health

Act, the Davao City Women and Development Code, and the WPS-NAP (Congress of the Philippines, 2009). WLB (2009) states that the enactment of the Anti-Violence against Women and Children Act, the Anti-Rape Law, and the Anti-Sexual Harassment Law, are “concrete indicators” of women’s civil society groups’ victories in legislative advocacy (p. 5).

### Indonesia

Indonesia has numerous women’s rights and gender equality organisations like Komnas Perempuan, Perempuan Bergerak, Solidaritas Perempuan, and LBH APIK, playing crucial advocacy roles. However, because no formal national mechanism for CSO participation in gender policy-making exists, it takes consistent campaigning to raise awareness on issues like gender-based violence. It took over a decade of sustained advocacy, spanning two governments and electoral terms, to build consensus and pass the Sexual Violence Crime Bill in 2022 (Nugraheny & Prabowo, 2022). Notably, the content analysis of Indonesia’s NAP revealed a glaring omission - there was no mention whatsoever of any role or input from CSOs, not just in decision-making processes, but about their national security agenda as a whole.

### Evaluation of Evidence

Both Indonesia and the Philippines have numerous CSOs advocating for women’s rights and gender equality. Through the lens of the ‘norm life cycle’ theory, the evidence suggests that the active and influential civil society sector in the Philippines has played a significant role as “norm entrepreneurs” in facilitating the resonance between global gender norms and local contexts (Finnemore and Sikkink’s, 1998, p. 897). However, the evidence suggests the mere existence of these CSOs is not the central factor determining the variation in WPS-NAP integration. The crucial structural factor appears to be the presence or absence of institutionalised mechanisms for CSO participation in policymaking processes. The Philippines government has formalised channels for CSO involvement, enabling them to shape the “applicatory contestation” over the interpretation and implementation of gender norms (Iommi, 2020, p. 76). This institutional design facilitated significant civil society input and grassroots women’s recommendations in the WPS-NAP, facilitating gender policy victories. Conversely, Indonesia lacks formal national

mechanisms for CSO participation in gender policy-making, hindering women's rights organisations from having the same influence as in the Philippines.

#### ***5.4 Discussion***

The analysis of each structural factor (IV) concluded with an evaluation of secondary source evidence to determine the extent to which that factor accounts for the variation in WPS-NAP integration between the Philippines and Indonesia. These evaluations were grounded in theories explored in the theoretical framework to justify the factor's explanatory power. This section aims to summarise these evaluations and examine their relevance to the research question and hypothesis.

The hypothesis asserts that institutional design is the central structural factor for explaining differences in the degree of mainstreaming international gender norms into national security agendas, with gender-responsive designs leading to greater WPS-NAP integration. Consequently, the structural factor "institutional mechanisms for gender-mainstreaming" was the primary focus. This factor was indeed explanatory of the DV, as demonstrated in the evaluation.

Nevertheless, to avoid bias and account for alternative explanations, other theory-driven structural factors were also analysed. This provided a comprehensive understanding of why variations in adopting international gender frameworks exist between countries like the Philippines and Indonesia, which share many regional similarities. The analysis confirmed that factors such as entrenched patriarchal norms and gender role attitudes, as well as limited political will and leadership, were not crucial in explaining the differences in the outcome (WPS-NAP integration) between the two countries. Instead, the key difference lay in institutional design, where the Philippines had a more gender-responsive institutional framework, significantly impacting its higher degree of WPS-NAP integration than Indonesia.

Regarding the last structural factor, the role of civil society, both countries had numerous CSOs and women's organisations. However, the Philippines' civil society was more effective in influencing national policy due to the existence of institutionalised mechanisms for CSO involvement in decision-making processes. The Philippine's WPS-NAP (2023-2033) directly stated that its creation "was a result of collaborative politics involving CSOs and the government" (p. 10). In contrast, Indonesia did not acknowledge CSO involvement in their

WPS-NAP creation, which could explain the lack of influence its CSOs had as norm entrepreneurs.

Thus, these findings suggest that institutional design is vital for mainstreaming international gender norms into national security agendas, while socio-cultural and historical factors have weaker explanatory power.

## **6. Conclusion**

The goal of this research was to investigate factors influencing the mainstreaming of international gender norms into national security agendas aimed at P/CVE in Southeast Asia, focusing on the Philippines and Indonesia. The findings highlight that institutional mechanisms for gender-mainstreaming and the active involvement of CSOs are crucial for embedding the WPS agenda into national security policies. CSOs' active advocacy for gender-mainstreaming and legislative victories was notably contingent on the existence of institutional mechanisms provided by the country to facilitate such advocacy. Also, while both countries face limitations in achieving full gender parity due to entrenched gender norms from historical and cultural legacies, these structural factors did not decisively impact gender-mainstreaming capacity. This is because, despite shared colonial patriarchal legacies, the Philippines domesticated the WPS more extensively due to stronger gender-responsive legal and institutional frameworks.

Therefore, through a detailed content analysis of the NAPs of these countries and a review of secondary sources, the findings support the hypothesis that *countries with gender-responsive legal/institutional frameworks are more likely to achieve higher mainstreaming of international gender norms into their security agendas aimed at P/CVE.*

Building on gender and security scholarship, this research contributes to discussions on norm diffusion, localisation, and international organisations' influence in advancing gender equality norms, especially in traditionally resistant sectors like security. However, this research is limited to analysing NAP content, which are essentially policy plans. Actual on-ground implementation may differ due to contextual factors. A comprehensive WPS agenda implementation assessment would require evaluating concrete actions, programs, and outcomes over time, and considering diverse stakeholders' perspectives, including CSOs and women's

groups. Additionally, collaborating with Vietnamese researchers to translate Vietnam's WPS-NAP enables replicating this small-N study across all ASEAN countries currently holding such plans, enhancing the generalisability of findings regionally, which this research lacks.

While progress has been made in gender-mainstreaming P/CVE approaches, challenges remain in broadening the understanding of "gender" beyond synonymising it with "women" to encompass all genders (Bronitt et al., 2020, p. 20). This includes encompassing the experiences of the LGBTQ+ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer) community and other marginalised groups. Therefore, this study could be complemented by future research conducting fieldwork to evaluate the WPS agenda's actual implementation and impact within P/CVE initiatives by expanding the gender focus beyond a homogenous group. Integrating intersectional factors like race, religion, socio-economic status, class, disability, and nationality is crucial for a more comprehensive and inclusive approach to gender-mainstreaming in P/CVE strategies.



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## **8. Appendix A**

***Table 1. Categorisation of Theory-derived Structural Factors (IVs)***

<b>Structural Factors (IVs)</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Potential indicators</b>
<b>Role and influence of CSOs</b>	The extent to which civil society organisations advocating for gender equality are able to influence policy-making and hold governments accountable.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● Number and strength of women's rights/gender equality CSOs</li><li>● Institutionalised mechanisms for CSO participation in policymaking</li><li>● Evidence of CSO advocacy leading to policy changes</li></ul>
<b>Institutional mechanisms for gender-mainstreaming</b>	Formal structures, policies and processes institutionalised within government to promote gender mainstreaming across all sectors, including the extent to which a country's legal architecture (e.g. their constitution) upholds principles of gender equality and women's rights.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● Gender units/focal points across ministries</li><li>● Gender budgeting initiatives</li><li>● Gender analysis requirements for policies/programs</li><li>● Constitutional provisions on gender equality</li></ul>

**Political will  
and leadership**

The commitment and prioritisation of gender equality by political leaders and decision-makers.

**Historical  
legacies and  
socio-cultural  
resonance**

The influence of a society's cultural traditions, historical pathways, and the resonance of gender equality principles with local narratives.

- Domestic laws prohibiting gender discrimination
- Existence of parliamentary committees on gender equality
- Number of parliamentary debates/questions on gender issues
- Audits/reports evaluating gender mainstreaming efforts
- Public statements by leaders on gender equality
- Gender parity in political appointments
- Resource allocation for gender equality programs
- Timing of women's suffrage and political inclusion
- Prevalence of patriarchal norms and attitudes
- Alignment of gender equality with indigenous value systems

**Table 2. Description of UNSCR 1325's 14 Obligations for Member States**

(UNSC, 2000, pp. 2-3)

<b>UNSCR 1325 Statements: Obligations for Member States</b>	
<b>1</b>	Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict.
<b>2</b>	Calls on Member States to provide candidates to the Secretary-General, for inclusion in a regularly updated centralised roster.
<b>3</b>	Invites member states to incorporate the training guidelines and materials (which will be provided by the Secretary-General) on protection, rights and the particular needs of women as well as the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures, into national training programs for military and civilian police personnel in preparation for deployment.
<b>4</b>	Invites member states to incorporate HIV/AIDS awareness training into member states' national training programs for military and civilian police personnel in preparation for deployment.
<b>5</b>	Urges Member States to increase their voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts, including those undertaken by relevant funds and programmes, inter alia, the United Nations Fund for Women and United Nations Children's Fund, and by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant bodies.



<b>6</b>	Calls on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including the special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction.
<b>7</b>	Calls on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary.
<b>8</b>	Calls on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including measures that support local women's peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements.
<b>9</b>	Calls upon all parties to armed conflict to respectfully international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls, especially as civilians, in particular the obligations applicable to them under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the Protocol thereto of 1967, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979 and the Optional Protocol thereto of 1999 and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto of 25 May 2000, and to bear in mind the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
<b>10</b>	Calls on all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict.
<b>11</b>	Emphasizes the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes including those relating to sexual and other violence against women and girls, and in this regard stresses the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible from amnesty provisions.

<b>12</b>	Calls upon all parties to armed conflict to respect the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, and to take into account the particular needs of women and girls, including in their design, and recalls its resolutions 1208 (1998) of 19 November 1998 and 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000.
<b>13</b>	Encourages all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependents.
<b>14</b>	The Security Council, member states, United Nations entities and civil society organisations to reaffirm their commitment and strengthen efforts to fully implement UNSCR 1325. The National Action Plan identifies the level of involvement of NGOs, the community or both in the implementation.

**Table 3. Examples of Specific and Non-specific NAP statements**

<b>Specific (S)</b>	<b>Reasoning</b>	<b>Non-Specific (NS)</b>	<b>Reasoning</b>
<p>“Increase women’s meaningful participation and leadership in UK defence, foreign and security policy, including aiming to increase the percentage of women joining the Armed Forces to 30% by 2030 and aim to have greater parity of senior male and female negotiators”. (United Kingdom NAP (2023-2027), p. 14)</p>	<p>Outlines dedicated allocations in terms of monetary funding and/or personnel (Miller, Pournik, Swaine, 2014, p. 27).</p>	<p>“Collaboration with similarly thinking countries and civil society in content and suggestions progress”. (Slovenia NAP (2018-2020), p. 11).</p>	<p>It does not clearly identify the specific countries or civil society organisations that Slovenia intends to collaborate with and the areas or issues for collaboration are not defined (Miller, Pournik, Swaine, 2014, p. 27).</p>
<p>“Hence, Local and Chiefdom Councils will lead in coordinating the implementation of SiLNAP II at District and Chiefdom levels in conjunction with the District Steering Committee (DSC), and the Chiefdom Steering Committee, respectively, while the MSWGCA with the RSC and NSC will lead coordination of the</p>	<p>It specifies the lead coordinating bodies at different levels, it highlights the multi-level governance approach adopted, It identifies the supporting committees/structures, and clearly delineating the roles and responsibilities of various institutions at different administrative levels is crucial for streamlining efforts (Miller,</p>	<p>“We will strengthen implementation by: increasing women’s participation and leadership in the peace and security sector”. (Australia NAP (2021-2023), p. 10)</p>	<p>The statement does not provide any concrete details or action plans on the specific measures, initiatives, or strategies that will be employed to increase women’s participation in the peace and security sector. There is no mention of responsible entities or implementation mechanisms. ((Miller, Pournik, Swaine, 2014, p. 27)</p>

<p>implementation of the SiLNAP at Regional level and National level respectively”. (Sierra Leone NAP (2019-2023), p. 9)</p>	<p>Pournick, Swaine, 2014, p. 27).</p>		
<p>“GPS partners are also engaging in local decision-making spaces to address gender discrimination and gender-based violence, and a group successfully advocated for a 30 per cent gender quota in a local ethnic minority Culture and Literature Committee in Tamu Town, Sagaing Region”. (Australia NAP (2021-2023), p. 25).</p>	<p>It identifies the actors involved, it specifies the areas of engagement, it provides a concrete example of their advocacy efforts, and a high level of detail, including the name of the committee (Miller, Pournick, Swaine, 2014, p. 27).</p>	<p>“To deepen and disseminate knowledge on the Women, Peace and Security Agenda”. (Brazil NAP (2017-2019), p. 37).</p>	<p>Does not provide any concrete details or action plans on the specific measures, initiatives, or strategies that will be employed to deepen knowledge on the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda.</p>

*Table 4. Content Analysis of Indonesia VS. the Philippine's National Action Plan*

<b>UNSCR 1325's 14 Member-state Obligation</b>  <b>(Numbers from Table 2)</b>	<b>Philippine's National Action Plan (2023-2033)</b>	<b>Specificity Code</b>	<b>Indonesia's National Action Plan (2014-2019)</b>	<b>Specificity Code</b>

<p>1.</p>	<p>“This vision extends beyond merely including women in peace processes; it involves actively empowering them to lead and make decisions that impact their lives and communities” (p. 5).</p> <p>“Importance of women’s meaningful participation in decision-making processes and governance at all levels related to conflict prevention, resolution, and peacebuilding” (p. 9).</p> <p>“The decision to put primacy on human rights and women’s agency highlights the mandate of duty bearers to treat women and girl children not merely as passive beneficiaries or victims but as active agents of peacebuilding and conflict transformation” (p. 11).</p> <p>“It is recommended that gender parity in peace panels and other peace mechanisms be set at 50%” (p. 13).</p>	<p>NS</p> <p>S</p> <p>S</p> <p>S</p>	<p>“Empowerment of women in conflict areas will be given to women who are victims of conflicts or non-victims of conflicts in such a way that women ... involved in decision-making to protect women and children during conflicts” (p. 12).</p> <p>“Empowerment of women and children means ... intensify the participation of women and children in peace building” (p. 3).</p> <p>“Government’s commitment to protect, promote, and uphold human rights, especially for women ... and give opportunity to women to participate in the peace process” (p. 7).</p> <p>“The increased participation of women as mediators and negotiators of peace in conflict areas” (pp. 36-37).</p>	<p>NS</p> <p>NS</p> <p>NS</p> <p>NS</p>
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	<p>“Ensure that women, in all their diverse and intersecting identities, including former women combatants and rebels, occupy at least 30%, with the goal of reaching 50% of leadership positions in peace panels, peace agreement implementation, and other peace mechanisms” (p. 23).</p>	S		
	<p>“addressing women’s underrepresentation in cybersecurity decision-making, and approaching peace education challenges through a holistic perspective” (p. 15).</p>	NS		
	<p>“The pillar of empowerment and participation recognizes that women, in all their diverse and intersecting identities, have the agency and capability to be active change agents in conflict prevention, resolution and transformation, post-conflict development, and peacebuilding. It emphasises the importance of</p>	S		

	<p>meaningful representation, participation, and leadership in decision-making processes and activities related to peace and security” (p. 20).</p> <p>“Empowering women and promoting their active participation in peace processes and decision-making effectively enhances their capacity to contribute to conflict prevention, resolution, and peacebuilding” (p. 20).</p> <p>“The creation of institutional mechanisms and increased representation of women in decision-making positions, both nationally and internationally, further contributes to the realisation of this pillar” (p. 23).</p> <p>“Incorporate protocols that ensure the involvement of women, in all their diverse and intersecting identities, in the decision-making process for land reform grants” (p. 24).</p>	<p>NS</p> <p>NS</p> <p>S</p>		
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	<p>“Increase the number of women in decision-making positions in uniformed service” (p. 24).</p> <p>“Increase the representation of women of diverse and intersecting identities in leadership and decision-making positions at strategic, operational, and tactical levels in the uniformed service” (p. 24).</p> <p>“Generate and continually update evidence on the underlying and structural barriers in recruiting, training, deploying, career-pathing, placing, and assigning women in decision-making and leadership positions in the security sector to address gender gaps” (p. 25).</p>	<p>S</p> <p>S</p> <p>S</p>		
2.	N/A		N/A	

<p><b>3.</b></p>	<p>“These initiatives encompassed capacity building training, psychosocial and mental health support for women in conflict” (p. 14).</p>	<p>S</p>	<p>“in such a way that women are able to participate in peace-building through training on the skills of negotiation, mediation, advocacy, campaigning to stop conflicts” (p. 12).</p>	<p>NS</p>
	<p>“It calls for comprehensive programmatic design and policies to facilitate the recruitment, training, deployment, and career advancement of women” (p. 23).</p>	<p>S</p>	<p>“enhance the competence of the trainers in the prevention of violence against women” (p. 9).</p>	<p>NS</p>
	<p>“Covering activities from the provision of training sessions, monitoring the utilisation of newly-acquired skills, up until it is assessed that the communities are able to independently operate in relation to their respective skillsets” (p. 35).</p>	<p>S</p>	<p>“Increased number of trainers for the prevention of violence against women and children during conflicts” (p. 25).</p>	<p>NS</p>
	<p>“The Workshop was organised by OPAPRU in partnership with the UN Women to deepen the context and salient issues that inform the substantive and programmatic direction of the draft NAPWPS 2023- 2033” (p. 14).</p>	<p>S</p>	<p>“Training module on rights and justice for women and children” (p. 35).</p> <p>“Provide training on productive economic undertaking/ trade for women in conflict areas” (p. 35).</p>	<p>NS</p> <p>S</p>

	“continuous and scaled-up capacity-building activities to allow organisations working on the ground to dynamically respond to multidimensional issues relating to conflict” (p. 18).	NS	“Implement TOT and training of women, peace, and security” (p. 37).	S
<b>4.</b>	N/A		N/A	

<p>5.</p>	<p>“Tap domestic and international donor agencies and nongovernment organisations for technical assistance and financial support to facilitate the implementation of the NAP” (p. 21).</p>	<p>NS</p>	<p>“The funding needed to implement RAN P3A-KS shall be allocated from the budgets of the respective ministries/institutions” (p. 5).</p>	<p>S</p>
	<p>“Provide overall policy direction, as well as manage, coordinate, monitor, evaluate, and report on the implementation of the NAP” (p. 21).</p>	<p>NS</p>	<p>“Provide capital assistance for women who are victims of conflicts” (p. 36).</p>	<p>NS</p>
	<p>“Parallel to this, the Ad Hoc Committee will be composed of technical experts that can provide guidance and concrete recommendations in the finalisation of the M&amp;E plan, especially the indicators to track the success of NAPWPS implementation” (p. 34).</p>	<p>S</p>		
	<p>“strengthen reporting mechanisms for agencies implementing Official Development</p>	<p>S</p>		

	<p>Assistance (ODA)-funded GAD PAPs in armed conflict areas, ensuring the integration and reporting of WPS in all cycles of program management” (p. 32).</p> <p>“The support of bilateral partners including the Government of Australia, Global Affairs Canada, Republic of Korea and the United Kingdom have ensured that technical and logistical assistance were available in the process of developing the NAPWPS” (p. 5).</p> <p>“Women who were on the peace panel and other Moro, Indigenous, and Christian women contributed significant technical support to the peace talks” (p. 11).</p> <p>“In response to the localization challenges identified in the Sunset Review of the NAPWPS 2017-2022, the PCW’s Technical Services and Regional Coordination Division</p>	<p>S</p> <p>S</p> <p>S</p>		
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	<p>(TSRCD) convened a gathering of various RGADC representatives” (p. 15).</p> <p>“Promoted evidence-based learning, documentation, and knowledge sharing to support research and initiatives for generating evidence on current and emerging themes in WPS” (p. 32).</p>	NS		
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<p>6.</p>	<p>“Women have the rights to protection and security in times of disasters, calamities, and other crisis situations, especially in all phases of relief, recovery, rehabilitation, and construction efforts” (p. 4).</p> <p>“Ensure the development and inclusion of women’s welfare and concerns in the peace agenda in the overall peace strategy and women’s participation in the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of rehabilitation and rebuilding of conflict-affected areas” (p. 4).</p> <p>“Through the integration of NAPWPS into national government frameworks related to security and development, along with the establishment of a gender-responsive and conflict-sensitive inter-agency humanitarian protection and rehabilitation program, the</p>	<p>S</p> <p>NS</p> <p>S</p>	<p>“... directly to women and children of victims of conflicts, such as: health rehabilitation services, including reproductive health, social rehabilitation, social reintegration, legal aids and assistance, in accordance with the minimum service standards and standard operating procedures already established” (p. 9).</p> <p>“Availability of health rehabilitation services which are free of charge for women” (p. 28).</p> <p>“Provide social reintegration services free of charge for women” (p. 29).</p> <p>“Provide legal aids and assistance which are free of charge to women” (p. 29).</p> <p>“Increased productive business undertaking of women who are victims of conflicts” (p. 36).</p>	<p>S</p> <p>S</p> <p>S</p> <p>S</p> <p>S</p>
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	<p>vulnerabilities of women in conflict contexts will be specifically addressed” (p. 26).</p> <p>“...gender-responsive, CSPP interagency humanitarian protection and rehabilitation program that specifically addresses the context of various conflict situations and the vulnerabilities of women and men in all their diverse and intersecting identities” (p. 26).</p> <p>“Women, in all their diverse and intersecting identities, affected, displaced, and vulnerable to various forms of conflict (i.e., vertical and horizontal) have expeditious access to comprehensive healing, rehabilitation, and recovery programs and services” (p. 27).</p> <p>“Develop and implement a comprehensive gender-responsive, CSPP-compliant humanitarian rehabilitation and recovery program, with a particular focus on shelter, health (including psychosocial programs),</p>	<p>S</p> <p>NS</p> <p>S</p>	<p>“Provide assistance to women who are victims of conflicts in developing productive economic undertaking” (p. 36).</p>	<p>NS</p>
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	<p>social health insurance, livelihood, electrification, and educational support” (p. 27).</p> <p>“Women former rebels and combatants, along with their families or women as immediate family members of former combatants, benefited from reintegration, rehabilitation, and normalisation programs, including amnesty for women former rebels with pending criminal cases” (p. 28).</p> <p>“Mainstreamed WPS perspective in all existing government programs and projects in the menu of government post-conflict and rehabilitation services” (p. 30).</p>	<p>S</p> <p>NS</p>		
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<p>7.</p>	<p>“Engaged the Legislative, and Judiciary Branches of the Government at both at the national and local levels in the implementation of the NAPWPS” (p. 30).</p> <p>“Interface with relevant House and Senate Committees on the implementation of the NAPWPS, ensuring meaningful representation of women in all aspects” (p. 30).</p> <p>“Provide capacity building for the Judiciary and Legislature on WPS and gender-responsive policy-making and the criminal justice system in conflict-affected communities, ensuring meaningful representation of women in all aspects” (p. 30).</p> <p>“This encompasses research on women in governance, legislation, and the judiciary, health security, and the impact of customs, traditions and other factors on WPS” (p. 32).</p>	<p>S</p> <p>S</p> <p>S</p> <p>NS</p>	<p>“The efforts to protect and empower women and children during social conflicts is are not simple ... these efforts need to be made continuously, sustainably and integrated by all parties, namely the central government, local governments, law enforcers, community organisations, non-governmental organisations, researchers/academicians, religious leaders, traditional leaders, community leaders, peace activists and as all layers of the communities jointly” (p. 19).</p> <p>“RAN P3A-KS shall serve as a reference for the local governments when preparing the action plans for the protection and empowerment of women”(p. 4).</p> <p>“implement the provisions of Article 18 paragraph (2) of Presidential Regulation No.18 of 2014 on the Protection and</p>	<p>S</p> <p>S</p> <p>S</p>
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	<p>“Recommended interventions include legislating specific statute for internally displaced persons, fast-tracking the passage of the Human Rights Defenders Bill, and strengthening the implementation of special laws such as the Universal Health Care Law, Mental Health Law, Reproductive Health Law, Indigenous People’s Rights Act, Alternative Learning System Law, etc (p. 13).</p> <p>“Achieving full implementation requires institutionalising and enhancing a culturally sensitive and gender-sensitive approach at all levels of government, encompassing the executive, legislative, and judicial branches” (p. 13).</p> <p>“Thus, peace-promoting and rights-based perspectives must be integrated into government plans, policies, processes,</p>	<p>S</p> <p>S</p> <p>S</p>	<p>Empowerment of Women and Children during Social Conflicts” (p. 1).</p> <p>“RAN P3A-KS shall be carried out by ministries/institutions in accordance with their respective duties and functions” (p. 5).</p> <p>“RAN P3A-KS shall serve as a guideline for the ministries/institutions and local governments to provide protection to and empowerment of women and children during conflicts through systematic, coordinated, planned and sustained with clear assignment corresponding with their respective authorities and functions as the bodies that are responsible for the implementation of the protection and empowerment of women and children during conflicts” (p. 7).</p> <p>“These National Action Plans also relate to the elaboration of the program activities at the provincial and district/city level, of which</p>	<p>S</p> <p>S</p> <p>S</p>
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	<p>programs, and services (e.g. WPS lens in Disaster Risk Reduction and Management and environment planning, etc.)” (p. 13).</p> <p>“Ensure women’s meaningful and substantive representation, participation, and leadership in the legislation, planning, design, and governance of technology and cybersecurity for peace and security” (p. 25).</p> <p>“Engage in legislative and policy advocacy work towards the passage of bills and operationalization of policies supporting the WPS agenda in the Philippines and its autonomous regions” (p. 30).</p> <p>“Support research and evidence-generation initiatives for WPS policies and programs, addressing emerging themes, including economic security for women in all their diverse and intersecting identities vulnerable to</p>	<p>NS</p> <p>S</p> <p>S</p>	<p>their implementation will be reviewed every 5 (five) years” (p. 8).</p> <p>“Coordination at the district/city will be carried out by RAN P3A-KS Working Groups at the district/city level, attended by all members at district/city level. Coordination will be conducted with the aim to monitor, discuss issues and constraints and synergize the implementation of measures of protection and empowerment of women” (p. 15).</p> <p>“Build awareness of the communities, local governments, and traditional institutions, religious community forums of communication to give protection for women and children during conflicts” (p. 22).</p> <p>“Intensify law enforcement to protect and provide justice for women” (p. 30).</p>	<p>S</p> <p>S</p> <p>NS</p>
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	conflict. This encompasses research on women in governance, legislation, and the judiciary, health security, and the impact of customs, traditions and other factors on WPS” (p. 32).			
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<p><b>8.</b></p>	<p>“Ensure gender-responsive and CSPP-compliant implementation of government services for Indigenous Peoples” (p. 30).</p> <p>“Women who were on the peace panel and other Moro, Indigenous, and Christian women contributed significant technical support to the peace talks” (p. 11).</p> <p>“strengthening the implementation of special laws such as the Universal Health Care Law, Mental Health Law, Reproductive Health Law, Indigenous People’s Rights Act” (p. 13).</p> <p>“The primary consideration in implementing these measures should be the distinct needs of marginalised sectors, taking into account their intersecting identities based on age, gender, ability, indigenous group, etc” (p. 13).</p>	<p>S</p> <p>S</p> <p>S</p> <p>S</p>	<p>“Better promotion of the products made by the women’s groups who are victims of conflicts” (p. 37).</p>	<p>NS</p>
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	<p>“This included involving academia across sectors, recognizing the contributions of non-governmental organisations (NGO) and private sector, refining language and terminology, delineating government roles in policy frameworks, emphasising Indigenous Peoples’ perspectives” (p. 15).</p>	NS		
	<p>“Enhance awareness using appropriate local languages of WPS-related policies and other laws concerning vulnerable groups such as Persons with Disabilities and Indigenous Peoples particularly those that involve rights and social protection” (p. 30).</p>	S		

<p>9.</p>	<p>“Including programs on GAD, GEWE, SDGs, WPS, CEDAW General Recommendation 30, NAPWPS, Magna Carta of Women” (p. 35).</p>	<p>S</p>	<p>“...pursuant to the principles set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Law No. 11 of 2005 on the Ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and Law No. 12 of 2005 on the Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” (p. 3).</p>	<p>S</p>
	<p>“Including, but not limited to CEDAW, BPFA, WPS, SDG 16, and ASEAN RPA WPS” (p. 35).</p>	<p>S</p>		
	<p>“recognizing supplemental frameworks such as the Comprehensive Agreement on the Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) agreement” (p. 15).</p>	<p>S</p>		
	<p>“Harmonising key laws and directives (e.g. RA 9710 or the Magna Carta Act of Women, RA 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act, among others” (p. 17).</p>	<p>S</p>		
	<p>“The human rights of women and men, in all their diverse and intersecting identities, are</p>	<p>NS</p>		



	<p>protected at all times—before, during, and after various conflict situations and complex emergencies. Incidents of violence against women, their children, and sex and gender-based violence that violate human rights and international humanitarian law are prevented” (p. 26).</p>			
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<p><b>10.</b></p>	<p>“Access to justice mechanisms should operate seamlessly from pre-conflict to post-conflict situations, necessitating the establishment of preventive measures against gender-based sexual violence” (p. 13).</p> <p>“...address the multidimensional impact of gender-based violence in the context of conflict” (p. 17).</p> <p>“access to justice services, particularly for women and girls who are victim-survivors of conflict-related sexual gender-based violence (e.g., integrating principles of the Safe Spaces Act in developing evacuation and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps; establishing a clear, efficient and effective reporting and documentation system for sexual gender-based violence in conflict areas” (p. 18).</p>	<p>NS</p> <p>NS</p> <p>S</p> <p>NS</p>	<p>“Conduct studies of gender-based violence cases from conflicts” (p. 21).</p> <p>“Increasing rescue and special protection to women and children and human rights activists from becoming victims of violence in conflict zones” (p. 31).</p> <p>“Violence against women and children means any action based on gender differences that causes misery or physical, sexual, mental, psychological suffering” (p. 3).</p>	<p>NS</p> <p>NS</p> <p>S</p>
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	<p>“Increase the participation of women, especially from the security sector, in international committees and inter-state initiatives related to gender, conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence, shadow economy, illicit drug trade, human trafficking, and WPS” (p. 25).</p> <p>“Incidents of violence against women, their children, and sex and gender-based violence that violate human rights and international humanitarian law are prevented (p. 26).</p> <p>“Facilitate immediate and efficient referral systems, parallel interventions, case management, reporting/documentation, investigation, prosecution, and resolution of conflict-related SGBV, including early and forced child marriages, rape, prostitution, trafficking practiced” (p. 27).</p>	<p>NS</p> <p>S</p> <p>S</p>		
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	<p>“Provide needs-specific initiatives related to the protection, psychosocial support, healing and development programs, as well as access to justice for children, especially young women and girls born of conflict-related rape” (p. 27).</p> <p>“This covers forms of VAW directly resulting from the situation of conflict and humanitarian issues including, but not limited to trafficking, rape, and sexual harassment” (p. 35).</p> <p>“The illegal trade and exploitation of individuals, particularly women and girls, for forced labour, sexual exploitation, or other forms of servitude in conflict-affected areas, often involving gender-specific vulnerabilities” (p. 8).</p>	<p>S</p> <p>S</p>		
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<p><b>11.</b></p>	<p>“Facilitate immediate and efficient referral systems, parallel interventions, case management, reporting/documentation, investigation, prosecution, and resolution of conflict-related SGBV” (p. 27).</p> <p>“Institutionalisation of gender-transformative transitional justice and access to justice programs through documentation of crimes, tribunals, institutionalisation of symbolic commemoration and awareness-raising of communities” (p. 25).</p> <p>“This entails identifying the root causes and drivers of armed conflict, including but not limited to socio-economic and political factors such as poverty, discrimination, impunity for injustices, and abuse of power, among others. It emphasises the need to intensify social reforms and poverty reduction programs that</p>	<p>S</p> <p>S</p> <p>S</p>	<p>N/A</p>	
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	target the diverse and intersecting needs of women, girls, and the youth” (p. 13).  “amnesty for women former rebels with pending criminal cases” (p. 28).	NS		
<b>12.</b>	“integrating principles of the Safe Spaces Act in developing evacuation and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps” (p. 18).  “Establish Women-child-friendly spaces (WCFS) as a standard procedure in all evacuation areas and IDP camps” (p. 27).	S  S	N/A	

<p><b>13.</b></p>	<p>“Ensure that women, in all their diverse and intersecting identities, including former women combatants and rebels, occupy at least 30%,<sup>6</sup> with the goal of reaching 50% of leadership positions in peace panels, peace agreement implementation, and other peace mechanisms” (p. 23).</p>	S	<p>“Facilitating social reintegration services free of charge to women” (p. 29).</p>	S
	<p>“Includes the implementation of relevant laws and policies (i.e. normalisation; end of hostilities, disposition of firearms, disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration)” (p. 35).</p>	NS		
	<p>“Women former rebels and combatants, along with their families or women as immediate family members of former combatants, benefited from reintegration, rehabilitation, and normalisation programs, including amnesty for women former rebels with pending criminal cases” (p. 28).</p>	NS		

	<p>“Support the participation of women impacted by conflicts, including women former combatants,, women impacted by extremist ideologies, those affected by extremist ideologies, women IDPs, and those trapped in ongoing violence, in both the formal and informal economy” (p. 24).</p>	S		
	<p>“Include proportional number of former women combatants and rebels in their integration from non-state armed groups into the government uniformed services as part of peace process implementation” (p. 25).</p>	NS		



<p><b>14.</b></p>	<p>“The development of the NAPWPS in the Philippines was a result of collaborative politics involving civil society organisations (CSOs) and the government” (p. 10).</p> <p>“A fourth major feature of this fourth generation of NAPWPS is its explicit recognition of the contributions of civil society organisations to the entire process of peacebuilding and conflict transformation” (p. 17).</p> <p>“The 11-point CSO agenda consolidated the various threats/issues/ concerns related to peace and security that civil society actors find paramount in their community” (p. 13).</p> <p>“Therefore, CSO representation is now included in the NSCWPS to facilitate their meaningful participation in the peace process</p>	<p>NS</p> <p>S</p> <p>S</p> <p>NS</p>	<p>“Disseminate and advocate on the protection and empowerment of women and children during conflicts to the communities, local governments, traditional institutions, and religious community forums of communication” (p. 22).</p>	<p>NS</p>
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	<p>and in shaping the future direction of the NAPWPS” (p. 17).</p> <p>“This process began in 2007 and included multiple rounds of regional cluster consultations, where civil society organisations and national and local government agencies, including the security sector, participated to determine the key action points to be included in the NAP” (p. 10).</p> <p>“This ten-year plan is the culmination of the extensive collaborative efforts of our various peace stakeholders. I extend my gratitude to the member-agencies of the National Steering Committee on Women, Peace and Security, civil society organisations, local governments, and sectoral experts whose invaluable input and unwavering dedication have shaped this comprehensive roadmap for women empowerment” (p. 3).</p>	<p>S</p> <p>S</p>		
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	<p>“Key themes emerging within this substantive pillar include the integration of a gender approach in all procedures and mechanisms of the peace process, the explicit inclusion of provisions for gender and women’s political and economic empowerment in peace agreements, and the active engagement of civil society and grassroots organisations” (p. 23).</p> <p>“The fourth iteration of the Philippines’ WPS Agenda highlights the importance of a strengthened collaboration between the government and civil society, multi-level implementation at the national and local levels, inclusion of emerging issues such as digital peacekeeping and cybersecurity, and the introduction of a comprehensive Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability, and Learning System (MEALS) as a framework for</p>	<p>S</p> <p>S</p>		
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	<p>measuring and enhancing the impact of programs/ projects” (p. 4).</p> <p>“the PCW recognizes the significant contributions of all the members of NSCWPS, civil society organisations, and sectoral experts in completing the NAPWPS” (p. 4).</p> <p>“Spurred by reflections from civil society organisations and implementing local and national government agencies, the NAPWPS has undergone a notable transformation, now being firmly anchored in human rights and women’s agency” (p. 11).</p> <p>“There should also be women’s representation in the NSCWPS – the determination of which should be through an autonomous process of selection among different CSOs or women’s rights organisations” (p. 14).</p>	<p>S</p> <p>NS</p> <p>S</p> <p>NS</p>		
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	<p>“Strengthening community-based monitoring systems and other participatory initiatives at the community level is crucial to fostering more inclusive and secure platforms and spaces for discussions, contributing to the sustainability of peace” (p. 14).</p>	S		
	<p>“Active inclusion of civil society and people’s organisations, women’s rights organisations, persons with disabilities organisations (PWDOs), indigenous people’s organisations (IPOs) and grassroots women’s constituencies<sup>9</sup> at all stages of the peace process” (p. 24).</p>	S		
	<p>“This process engaged key sectoral agencies, civil society, including religious leaders and the academe, subject matter experts, the NSCWPS Executive Committee (ExeCom) and Technical Working Group (TWG), and various stakeholders, particularly rights-holder groups and duty bearers” (p. 11).</p>	NS		

	<p>“This gathering exemplified a rigorous consultation process, ensuring that the draft NAPWPS 2023-2033 was enriched with valuable insights from diverse stakeholders, both from the government agencies and civil society organisations” (p. 14).</p>	NS		
	<p>“Participants in both consultations represented a diverse spectrum, comprising individuals from various government agencies and civil society organisations” (p. 16).</p>	NS		
	<p>“Essentially, the 2023-2033 NAPWPS operates on a renewed commitment to address the root causes of conflict. In doing so, it allows lead implementing agencies and civil society actors to shift from a reactive perspective towards a more proactive one in addressing and responding to conflict, especially as it</p>			

	<p>intersects with new and emerging realities” (p. 17).</p> <p>“Moreover, it actively seeks to include and involve civil society by coordinating, consulting, and meaningfully collaborating with civil society organisations in the implementation of this pillar” (p. 26).</p> <p>“The plan also recognizes the complexities and threats faced by duty-bearers, both in the government and civil society; thus, this pillar considers the necessity of developing and implementing protocols to protect duty-bearers.” (p. 26).</p> <p>“Strengthen partnerships with civil society and people’s organisations, women’s rights organisations, PWDOs, IPOs, and grassroots women’s constituencies in the monitoring and evaluation of the NAPWPS” (p. 32).</p>	<p>NS</p> <p>S</p> <p>NS</p> <p>S</p>		
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	<p>“Active CSO support in policy advocacy and implementing programs and projects on WPS in conflict-affected and conflict vulnerable areas, particularly in the Bangsamoro” (p. 12).</p>	NS		
	<p>“To further create an enabling environment for CSOs’ meaningful participation, this current national action plan emphasises end-to-end support for CSO stakeholders” (p. 18).</p>	NS		
	<p>“Strengthen CSO collaboration to effectively engage the NAPWPS with governance institutions, bodies, existing peace and development mechanisms, and task forces at the regional and local levels” (p. 24).</p>	NS		
	<p>“This collaborative approach aims to restore and strengthen CSO participation and involvement, leveraging their valuable</p>	NS		



	<p>contributions to the monitoring, evaluation, accountability, and learning processes” (p. 31).</p> <p>“During the visioning exercise, participants outlined crucial aspects for the proposed vision statement. This included involving academia across sectors, recognizing the contributions of non-governmental organisations (NGO) and private sector” (p. 15).</p> <p>“Form a dedicated TWG comprising representatives from identified government agencies, NGOs, and other key stakeholders” (p. 33).</p>	NS		
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