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Explaining the U.S. Rationale Behind NATO Enlargement



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List of abbreviations

CoEA = Council of Economic Advisors

CPHP = Miller Center: Clinton Presidential History Project

CPL = Clinton Presidential Library

CPLDL = Clinton Presidential Library Digital Library

DoSVRR = Department of State Virtual Reading Room

FCO = Foreign and Commonwealth Office

LoC = Library of Congress

NIS = Newly Independent States (who emerged after the fall of the USSR)

NSA = National Security Archives

PFP = Partnership for Peace

RPMO = Records of the Prime Minister's Office

TNA = The National Archives (United Kingdom)

1. Introduction

The 1999 US-led enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) stands out in international affairs as a puzzling phenomenon. Against the predictions of countless prominent international relations scholars, the alliance not only avoided fading away into irrelevance or straight-out collapse in the aftermath of the USSR's dissolution, but instead, NATO also expanded to include the former Warsaw Pact members Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, thereby defying the predictions of leading scholars at the time (Goldgeier & Shiffrinson, 2020). Nevertheless, despite more than twenty years since this significant development, little to no agreement exists on what caused the U.S. policymakers to push for this first NATO enlargement after the USSR's dissolution.

International relations scholars have offered a variety of explanations of what could have been driving U.S. rationale. This literature suggests various explanations, which range from a potential Western attempt to promote liberalism, including liberal democracy and capitalism, economic and industrial incentives, power-centric explanations on U.S. attempts to consolidate and ensure U.S. hegemony in a newly unipolar international system and even domestic electoral considerations in the U.S. (Asmus, 2002; Goldgeier, 1999; Sarotte, 2019; 2021). However, there is no consensus on the rationale driving the U.S. government's decision. Furthermore, given the politicisation of NATO enlargement in light of Russia's 2022 renewed invasion of Ukraine and cooling NATO-Russia relations, recent scholarship has focused chiefly on asking *when* or *how* the U.S. government decided on enlargement – not *why*. Hence, the question remains: Why did the Clinton administration push for NATO enlargement in 1999? In answering this question, this thesis contributes to longstanding scholarly debates centred around NATO enlargement, the international relations scholarship on U.S. alliances, and the literature on U.S. grand strategy during the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. By examining relevant and recently declassified archival sources of the two main recent explanations, this thesis ascertains a more comprehensive understanding of why NATO enlargement was undertaken under the Clinton administration

This thesis argues that the key factor driving NATO enlargement during the Clinton administration was the perceived necessity to retain peace in Europe by preventing violent conflict and other destabilising developments and ensuring European support for Clinton's pursuit of advancing economic globalisation, thereby furthering U.S. domestic economic

prosperity. Thus, this thesis finds that Clinton officials pursued NATO enlargement in their overarching pursuit to increase U.S. economic prosperity through an expansion of the global economy. Reinforcing the importance of NATO, a U.S.-led institution at the centre of Europe's security architecture, was found to be the best method through which the U.S. could remain influential in Europe. Hence ensuring European cooperation in Clinton's politico-economic designs. Furthermore, this thesis finds that hedging behaviour also plays a role in this decision, albeit to a lesser extent, as it becomes evident that it did not play the primary role in driving the Clinton administration to pursue NATO enlargement. This thesis' findings contribute to ongoing debates about the reasoning behind NATO enlargement after the collapse of the USSR and to the existing scholarship on U.S. foreign policy under the Clinton administration.

2. Reviewing existing explanations for the 1999 NATO enlargement¹

As previously indicated, much academic work by leading scholars on the U.S. role in NATO-E already exists, and they offer a variety of plausible explanations for why the U.S. sought to enlarge NATO eastwards after the collapse of the USSR. The four main theoretical explanations are outlined in this section. This thesis analyses the two strongest explanations in a comparative qualitative analysis of documentary evidence in later sections.

Horovitz and Götz (2020) argue that economic considerations were crucial in pushing the U.S. government towards seeking NATO-E under the H. W. Bush administration² – Clinton's predecessor. In their article, Horovitz and Götz examine the rationale behind the Bush officials becoming convinced that NATO should be enlarged, based on data they generated through interviews and using newly declassified primary sources from U.S. government archives. As they had access to this new data, Horovitz and Götz proposed an explanation as to why the U.S. administration under Bush initiated U.S. policy seeking to enlarge NATO eastwards immediately after the USSR's dissolution. According to Horovitz and Götz, U.S. policymakers at the time sought the eastward enlargement of NATO following a complex rationale: U.S. policymakers intended to increase and/or preserve European security as this would, in turn, increase economic prosperity in the U.S. as the U.S. could reap the economic benefits of an increasingly prosperous international economy. Increased economic prosperity at home would, in turn, increase U.S. security. These interlinked economic objectives of the Bush administration at the time necessitated the U.S. government to safeguard European

¹ Hereafter: NATO-E

² Hereafter: Bush

security as stability and U.S. influence in Europe were necessary to further economic globalisation. This would be achieved through NATO-E. Horowitz and Götz dub this the “security-prosperity” explanation.

The interplay of both elements in Horowitz and Götz’s (2020) security and prosperity explanation deserves a more in-depth explanation. The authors specifically laid out why U.S. policymakers at the time concluded that NATO-E was necessary to preserve NATO’s central role within Europe’s security architecture. The U.S.-dominated institution, in turn, would act as a foundation for a security architecture that would provide stability on the continent and preserve U.S. influence in Europe. Stability was necessary for U.S. strategy as it would act to prevent another major conflict between European states from arising. Essentially, the aim was to prevent European powers from starting another conflict which would threaten to draw in the U.S. At the same time, politico-economic objectives were equally important in shaping U.S. behaviour. U.S. policymakers saw stability and U.S. influence as instrumental to pursuing the goal of furthering economic globalisation – which is, essentially, increasing international trade, capital flows and investment as part of the worldwide integration of markets. Pursuing economic globalisation was seen by U.S. policymakers as the best option for the U.S. to guarantee continued economic growth, thus nurturing the administration’s domestic policies. Explicitly, the U.S. administration at the time sought to strengthen NATO to (1) avoid the reemergence of conflicts or other destabilising events in Europe, (2) prevent Europe from following protectionist economic policies, and (3) secure European support for further liberalisation of trade and globalisation as a whole.

Although focusing on the Bush administration, their explanation should broadly hold with the Clinton administration as well, as its rationale should be transferable – as should the argument of Horowitz and Götz (2020). Numerous comments from senior Clinton administration officials highlight the plausibility of this being the case. For instance, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake stated, “[upon joining a new administration] you always think you’re going to be able to reinvent every wheel. Then you discover that there were some reasons, the main one being American interests, why, in fact, the wheels are going to pretty much be in the same tracks” (Riley, 2002, May 21). Former State Department planner under both Bush and Clinton, Stephen Flanagan, explained that by the end of 1992 what he referred to as the “strategic rationale” behind enlargement had already been established and “framed” (Flanagan, 2019, pp. 93-94). Clinton’s ambassador to NATO stated that Clinton officials made only minor changes to Bush’s policy towards Europe, but essentially “built on it” (Kennedy,

2004, August 10). This matches the statement made by Clinton's Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, who wrote in his memoirs that "the foreign policy achievement of [the Bush administration]" thoroughly impressed him (Christopher, 1998, p. 11). Given these statements by senior Clinton officials, it appears possible that Horovitz and Götz's (2020) security-prosperity explanation should be transferable to the Clinton administration.

Notwithstanding Horovitz and Götz's (2020) security-prosperity explanation, three major alternative explanations exist: normative factors, domestic factors, and hedging behaviour. The first argues that leaders in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – the four countries who joined NATO as part of the 1999 enlargement – persuaded Clinton of the necessity to expand NATO membership to Central and Eastern Europe in order to further liberal democracy and market capitalism in Europe since Clinton and his administration received those positively. This argument was most notably put forward by Asmus (2002) and Talbott (1996), both of whom held senior positions in the Clinton administration – as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European affairs and Deputy Secretary of State, respectively – and were key actors in NATO-E at the time (Clinton, 2011). Posen (2006) also proposes that Clinton-era policymakers were faced with demands by Central European policymakers that they should soon be allowed to join the alliance to become part of the West as soon as possible. However, it must be noted that Posen's article primarily emphasises that these demands enabled NATO-E, but not that they caused it – once more emphasising the *how* but not the *why*. Numerous scholars, however, emphasise that the notion of expanding liberal values through the expansion of the Western world also underlines the normative incentive for NATO-E (Risse, 1996; Schimmelfennig, 1998; Williams & Neumann, 2000). NATO-E would, essentially, 'socialise' the NIS in Central and later Eastern Europe (Gheciu, 2005). This argument is supported by Clinton (2005), who wrote in his memoirs that he had been "determined to do everything [to] create a Europe that was united, free, democratic and secure" (p. 569).

The domestic factors explanation, as the name implies, entails that domestic politics guided the Clinton administration to seek NATO-E. In particular, the influence of U.S. arms manufacturers is highlighted by Gerth and Weiner (1997). Others, however, indicate that the Clinton administration was instead focused on gaining support from voters with a Central European or Eastern European background in U.S. elections for the Democratic Party (Kirschten, 1995; Stuart, 1996). These scholars suggest that an active pursuit of the Clinton administration for NATO-E would entice voters of Central and Eastern European descent to support Democratic candidates. This strategy, in turn, incentivised the Clinton administration

to push for NATO-E. Indeed, Clinton's 1995 bid for re-election emphasised his administration's belief that NATO should be enlarged by extending membership to Central and Eastern European countries. Former members of the Clinton administration, including those who held senior positions, stated that discussions in the White House regarding Clinton's campaign for re-election took into consideration the positive effects that U.S. efforts to extend NATO membership to Central and Eastern European countries – most importantly Poland – could be beneficial (Schifter, 1994, October 4). Clinton was also warned about not pursuing a policy that would enlarge NATO eastward by foreign leaders. For instance, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl reportedly warned Clinton during a phone call between the two leaders that particularly Polish lobbying groups in the U.S. would attempt to exert their influence in a way that would harm Clinton's chances of being re-elected (Gardner, 1995, May 26).

However, other domestic groups also pressured the Clinton administration's decision on whether or not to pursue enlargement. Much like Clinton's Republican predecessor, leaders of the Republican Party shared the view that the U.S. should pursue NATO-E. Given the circumstance that the Republicans would be adamant about following through on their previous policy to enlarge the alliance, Clinton officials concluded that they would face strong opposition from the Republicans if the Clinton administration opposed NATO-E. The issue of enlarging the alliance was also strongly implied to be used by Republicans in the next elections in a meeting with the President of the Czech Republic, Václav Havel, who reiterated his intention to push Clinton into allowing Central and Eastern European countries to join the alliance (Fried, 1995, October 21), much like he and other prominent pro-Western leaders from Central and Eastern Europe did in a joint statement together with the leadership of the Republican Party. Pressure by the Republicans in Congress was so strong that it appeared that Clinton and his administration "were being driven by Congressional and domestic pressure" into accelerating the decision-making process, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Richard Holbrook confessed to colleagues from the United Kingdom (Lyne, 1994, October 12). Hence, it is plausible to assume that Clinton recognised the benefits of pursuing enlargement to his personal agenda of remaining in office as President of the United States after the 1996 presidential elections. Finally, the hedging behaviour explanation holds that U.S. decision-makers saw NATO-E as a tool to expand and consolidate U.S. influence in the dawning, post-Cold War international order by preventing potential rivals from undermining U.S. influence in Europe – namely the emergence of a European bloc or the resurgence of Russia. In line with this thinking, expanding NATO eastwards would reinforce the U.S.'s supreme position in the

international system at the end of the Cold War (Posen, 2014; Walt, 2011; Mearsheimer, 2014a). According to proponents of this argument, NATO-E was seen as helpful in the overreaching goal of fostering U.S. primacy on the world stage (Posen, 2006) – a policy that sought to advance American power globally, not only through strengthening its own capacity to act but also through preventing the rise of potential rivals (Shiffrinson, 2020; Mearsheimer, 2014b). By this logic, NATO was seen as the most suitable vehicle through which Washington could preserve its ability to project power into Europe because NATO is a U.S.-dominated institution, and it was commonly expected that this would continue to be the case (Shiffrinson, 2020). Hence, if NATO were to expand, Washington also expected U.S. influence to expand. This argument assumes that NATO expansion would prevent the necessity for genuine European alternatives to NATO to be created and decrease the likelihood of their emergence. Hence denying those who sought to create alternatives in Western Europe by depriving them of potential partners (Shiffrinson, 2020). Whilst NATO-E would prevent Western European challenges to U.S. primacy, membership of former Warsaw Pact members would deny Russia from re-establishing its Cold War-era sway over Eastern Europe (Sayle, 2019). Put simply, NATO-E would maximise U.S. power whilst minimising the ability of potential rivals to mount a challenge to American primacy.

The hedging behaviour explanation enjoys broad support because there is evidence for this explanation. Indeed, U.S. policymakers in the Clinton administration have articulated their reasoning for pursuing NATO-E in a manner that can be interpreted as matching the hedging behaviour explanation. Shiffrinson (2016), for instance, highlights the fact that Harvey Sicherman, then a member of the Policy Planning Staff of then Secretary of State Baker under President Bush, described how U.S. officials perceived NATO-E as a useful tool to “organise Eastern Europe” in a manner that was advantageous to maximise U.S. influence in Europe (p. 37). This sentiment was shared by many other officials who stressed the necessity of NATO-E for the alliance to remain the anchor for European security, especially since Europe in the 1990s expanded and deepened integration within the European Communities (Shiffrinson, 2020), which later became the EU in 1993, a mere two years after the collapse of the USSR. Soon after the creation of the EU, discussions between U.S. officials began to evolve in the mid-1990s. Concretely, discussion in Washington turned towards the possibility of using NATO-E to proliferate economic and political liberalism in Europe – ideals that were seen in Washington as important to expand and reinforce U.S. influence (Shiffrinson, 2020; Reiter, 2001; Riley, 2004, pp. 27-28). The most prominent public statement by a high-ranking official of the Clinton

administration in support of avoiding the possibility for Europe to create European alternative structures parallel to NATO came in the form of then Secretary of State Albright's famous "three Ds" (Albright, 1998a). Albright stated that the U.S. would only agree to European security cooperation if it would not lead to "decoupling" from NATO, "discrimination" against non-EU members, or the "duplication" of "existing efforts" by NATO (Albright, 1998a), clear evidence that the U.S. sought to avoid the creation of European alternatives to NATO. Although envisioning different potential challengers to U.S. hegemony, these explanations share the fundamental argument: NATO-E was a tool to prevent potential challenges to U.S. hegemony.

Combined, existing scholarship offers different explanations for the Clinton administration's decision to pursue NATO-E. While normative factors and domestic factors might have influenced the decision to pursue enlargement, the other two possible explanations are supported by more concrete evidence, lending them a higher degree of credibility. Horovitz and Götz's (2020) security-prosperity explanation provides a plausible account as to why U.S. policymakers under the Bush administration sought NATO expansion. Their use of primary sources, such as declassified archival documents from that period and interviews of policymakers involved in this decision, lends strong credibility to the validity of their explanation. The security-driven hedging behaviour explanation has also been substantiated by scholarship, which mostly relies on public statements by Clinton officials at the time or interviews conducted, public statements made, and personal memoirs published after they were no longer in office, once more lending strong credibility to the validity of the explanation (Albright, 1998b; Christopher, 1998; Holbrooke, 1995a; Shiffrinson, 2016; 2020³).

The hedging behaviour explanation is based on the assumption that U.S. officials primarily sought to increase U.S. power on the international stage by preventing the emergence of potential challengers to U.S. hegemony through NATO-E. This explanation does not argue that domestic politics – in this case, economic prosperity and/or attempts to achieve Clinton's re-election – were the main reason why Clinton pursued this particular foreign policy. By contrast, the security-prosperity explanation claims that fostering domestic economic prosperity through a stable, globalised economic world order necessitated a stable Europe allied to the U.S., which required NATO-E and drove leaders to pursue this policy. Put differently, the security-prosperity explanation put forward by Horovitz and Götz (2020) argues that increasing influence in Europe through pursuing NATO-E was a means to an end, the latter being the

³ Shiffrinson's (2016; 2020) work in particular has relied on extensive accounts by a broad spectrum of foreign policy leaders at the time.

pursuit of domestic economic and political goals. The hedging behaviour explanation instead argues that increasing U.S. influence in Europe was not the means to an end but the end itself.

Through the examination of relevant and recently made available archival sources, this thesis tests the security-prosperity explanation against the alternative hedging behaviour explanation, and it presents a set of novel opportunities to enhance several scholarly debates. Firstly, this thesis enhances the scholarly understanding of U.S. grand strategy under President Clinton by investigating the underlying rationales driving U.S. foreign policy towards Europe. Comparing this thesis' findings with those offered by Horowitz and Götz (2020) or other pieces of scholarship on the Europe policy of the Bush administration would allow future research to determine if they differ and, if so, how and why they differ. Furthermore, this thesis contribute to an improved understanding of post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy under Clinton generally. Lastly, this thesis contributes to enduring debates about NATO-E – a topic that has recently received increased attention in light of Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

3. Methodology and data collection

This thesis aims to provide insight into why the Clinton administration pursued NATO-E in 1999. To that end, this thesis tests for the hedging behaviour and the security-prosperity explanations. These are chosen as the main pieces of research upon which they are based – Horowitz and Götz (2020) and Shiffrinson (2016; 2020) – use primary sources by U.S. officials most extensively. By contrast, the literature which provides the normative and domestic factor explanations is mainly based on memoirs, newspaper articles from that time, and what policy analysts assessed was driving the decision-making processes in Washington at the time (Stuart, 1996; Gerth & Weiner, 1997; Clinton, 2005; Gheciu, 2005; Asmus, 2002). Thus, this thesis brings together two of the leading and most compelling explanations, both of which are more recent and primarily based on primary sources and archival research, to create a novel, more nuanced and enhanced scholarly understanding of U.S. rationales behind NATO-E. For these reasons, this thesis does not include the normative and domestic factor explanations. Hence, through the examination of relevant and recently available archival sources, this thesis tests whether the thinking and decision-making of Clinton administration officials were following a rationale matching the one laid out by “politico-economic considerations” as proposed by Horowitz and Götz (2020, p.3) or the security-driven hedging behaviour proposed primarily by Shiffrinson (2016; 2020). It tests to what extent critical primary sources support each of them. To this end, this thesis creates hypotheses based on the two explanations. If the Clinton

administration's primary incentive for NATO-E was security and prosperity, three key observations must be found in the data (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

(A1) Security and prosperity were pursued by Clinton officials simultaneously. They saw their domestic agenda as dependent on economic prosperity, which, in turn, they perceived as hinging upon the expansion and liberalisation of the global economy, which required stability in Europe. Instability should be seen as bearing a risk to U.S. security.

(A2) The potential emergence of protectionism, instability, and lack of European support for Clinton's political and economic plans are perceived as a threat to further globalisation. U.S. influence in Europe is seen as necessary to prevent these three threats from emerging.

(A3) Clinton officials conclude that NATO-E was the best tool to maintain U.S. influence in Europe to ensure continued European support for further globalisation and prevent the emergence of protectionism and instability in Europe.

If the primary incentive for the Clinton administration for NATO-E in 1999 hedging behaviour, three important observations must be traceable in the data (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

(B1) Clinton officials pursue American primacy on the international stage to increase national security. The emergence of potential European challengers to U.S. hegemony is perceived as a threat. Clinton policymakers hedge against them by intending to prevent their emergence.

(B2) European efforts for further integration, especially in defence and security matters, and/or the potential of Russian resurgence are seen as harmful to U.S. influence in Europe. Efforts should be taken to prevent them.

(B3) Clinton officials see NATO-E as the best tool to strengthen U.S. influence in Europe whilst preventing the emergence of the aforementioned potential challengers to U.S. hegemony.

This thesis tests these hypotheses primarily by examining recently declassified sources from U.S. and British archives and determining whether these archival sources support these hypotheses. The U.S. documents upon which most of this thesis is based stem from the CPL,

the CPLDL, the DoSVRR, the NSA, and the LoC, hundreds of documents from all of these archives were read for this thesis, many of which are cited. These archives are immensely helpful as they provide a deluge of correspondence between officials and records of all declassified meetings and discussions taking place within and across involved institutions and actors. This strengthens the authority of this thesis' findings as they allow for a thorough examination of the decision-making process culminating in enlargement. DoSVRR documents give insight into internal discussions between U.S. diplomats and how their views on NATO enlargement formed. CPL and CPLDL archives primarily contain readouts of meetings between Clinton and other officials as well as interviews with senior administration officials – openly discussing policy on Europe. These archives offer rich insight into how the policy debate about NATO-E unfolded and how the involved actors ultimately decided to pursue NATO-E. All examined documents were digitally accessed without filing FOIA requests. Most have recently been declassified between 2018 and 2019, adding to the finding's novelty. They offer a vast number of first-hand accounts by U.S. policymakers, reporting on meetings and conversations they had with U.S. and foreign government officials, memos to other Clinton officials, interagency reports, as well as reports to other officials. In these archival records, U.S. officials state their thoughts and opinions on the issues they were facing, ongoing developments at home and abroad, and what they assessed to be the intentions of other governments. They also propose policy solutions and present their potential advantages and risks, among other considerations. Officials repeatedly make the case for enlargement based on multi-layered economic-security grounds and lay out the linkage between those two policy areas. Officials clearly state what they perceived to be U.S. interests, domestically, globally and in Europe. They spell out their concerns and worries about contemporary developments and how they believed U.S. policy should address them. Many of the examined sources are either authored by or report the statements of senior members of the Clinton administration. They also include conversations between senior members of the Clinton administration Clinton's chief diplomats who were put in charge of assessing U.S. influence in and relations with Europe and the world and their respective views on how best to navigate the international environment are expressed quite clearly in these documents. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, who was the President's closest advisors in matters of U.S. security and defence interests and a close confidant of Clinton. Lake was one of the primary authors of NATO-E, having counselled Clinton on this matter on many occasions and closely coordinating policy between the White House, State Department and the Pentagon, as can be seen in the analysed documents. Clinton's Secretary

of the Treasury and his CoEA weigh in on the economic challenges faced by the administration and the potential they saw in economic globalisation. Records of correspondence between those who were put in charge of advising and assisting the administration on its Europe policy—including NATO-E and, and their thoughts on how the U.S. should pursue its interests and visions for Europe – at the State Department are utilised for following the administration’s line of thought on enlargement. These were only a few of many other sources whose correspondence was analysed for this thesis.

British archival records primarily stem from the British TNA, predominantly from its FCO and the RPMO collections, documents from all of these archives were read and cited for this thesis. British sources primarily take the form of correspondence between British diplomatic missions abroad and the Foreign Ministry in London, as well as British officials reporting on their meetings and conversations with U.S. officials. In these documents, British officials outline what they believed to be driving the decisions taken by Clinton officials as well as their impression of what was happening in Washington, based on their conversations with U.S. counterparts.

Most sources in this thesis are internal correspondence between members of the Clinton administration, as well as readouts of meeting between policymakers at the time. These documents allowed for the analysis of first-hand, unfiltered accounts of what Clinton policymakers thought at the time. Their concerns and intentions were often openly expressed in their private conversations. This insight is crucial to any attempt at understanding the rationales driving actors’ decisions (Storey, 1999), which is the ultimate aim of this thesis. The fact that this correspondence was meant to be circulated only among a select circle of officials at the time, mostly between only a handful of individuals, makes their content even more unfiltered (Raspin, 1988). Furthermore, in this case, relying on primary sources makes use of the authors’ biases, subjectivity, and incomplete set of information upon which they base their accounts strengthen this thesis’ authority as it is they (essentially rationales and motivations for decision-making) which are assessed rather than ‘hard facts’ that are ‘free of biases’. After all, these factors can help understand why U.S. officials assessed certain policy proposals as more desirable than their alternatives.

The material from U.S. and British archives allows for U.S. rationales to be triangulated (Beach, 2016). Furthermore, this thesis includes interviews of policymakers after their time in office and relevant sections of the memoirs of many former Clinton officials to supplement archival sources.

This thesis does not aim to offer a chronological account of the process culminating in the decision to pursue enlargement. Instead, it follows a step-by-step evaluation of the created hypotheses around which the analysis is centred. Therefore, it exposes the logic of the Clinton administration culminating in NATO-E.

The following is split into four sections. The first three sections test the hypotheses created against sources found in the archival material, supplemented by interviews with and memoirs by actors involved in the decision to pursue enlargement. The implications of the findings are discussed in the concluding section of this thesis. Ultimately, this thesis argues that Clinton policymakers decided to pursue NATO-E as they perceived continued European support for advancing economic globalisation as vital to fostering U.S. economic prosperity. Clinton officials concluded that NATO-E was the best-suited policy to that end. The findings thus support the security-prosperity explanation offered by Horovitz and Götz (2020). The findings also suggest that the hedging behaviour explanation cannot reliably explain why Clinton officials decided to pursue NATO-E on its own.

4. Analysis

The following sections first explain what should be found in the reviewed data for the relevant hypotheses to match reality. Second, they discuss whether the reviewed data matches what the previously established hypotheses predict. To directly compare these theses, they are grouped in pairs, namely A1-B1, A2-B2, and A3-B3. Doing so juxtaposes them, allowing for a more straightforward discussion, not only regarding whether the data supports each hypothesis but also facilitates the assessment as to which hypothesis has been more accurate. This is essential in the likely case that both hypotheses have been matched by reviewed data to varying degrees.

A1-B1: Underlying rationales

If the primary incentive for decision-makers in the Clinton administration for NATO-E in 1999 were those found in hypothesis A1, it is imperative that Clinton officials pursue security and prosperity simultaneously. Decision-makers should display their conviction that instability in Europe ought to be avoided as instability could negatively affect economic growth in the region and threaten to draw the U.S. into an armed conflict – which would harm U.S. security – thereby necessitating stabilising efforts to be taken. Simultaneously, Clinton officials need to see U.S. domestic stability as dependent on the expansion and liberalisation of international trade, which, in turn, ought to be perceived as hinging on economic growth elsewhere, particularly in Europe.

Economic prosperity in Europe should be perceived as requiring a stable political and security environment on the continent. Hence, Clinton officials should show the intention to foster the global economy and prevent the outbreak of violent conflict and other destabilising events in Europe as those would damage economic growth in the region, thus hampering global economic growth in general.

If the primary incentive for Clinton officials were found in hypothesis B1, Clinton officials should display the conviction that the U.S. should pursue American primacy on the international stage to increase national security. They should display the intention to strengthen Washington's ability to project power abroad via U.S.-dominated institutions, as doing so would help maintain U.S. hegemony. The emergence of potential challengers to U.S. hegemony ought to be seen as a threat to the goal of American primacy, the prevention of which as the primary goal of U.S. policy in Europe. Notably, the emergence of a European bloc, which might materialise because of European integration, and/or the potential resurgence of Russia should be seen as potential challengers to American dominance. Thus, officials should display the intention to prevent these two potential challengers from emerging.

Interviews with senior advisors to Clinton, found in the CPHP, were consulted to illustrate how Clinton and his officials saw linkage between domestic and global economic growth. Weekly briefings and memos for Clinton and senior officials were found in the DoSVRR, CPLDL and CPL. They offer insight into economic considerations for Clinton's overarching objectives and how various cabinet members considered to achieve them as this is what they write about in their correspondence. The CPL and CPLDL were consulted to find readouts of discussions between Clinton and foreign leaders. They reveal how Clinton described a linkage between foreign and domestic policy to foreign leaders. Correspondence between officials, found in the DoSVRR, and memoirs of senior officials – including Clinton's – stress the importance of Europe in their policy designs, as do remarks delivered by Clinton to domestic and international audiences.

Examining sources

With the dissolution of the USSR during the previous Bush administration, domestic issues became the focus of most Americans, including senior Clinton officials. Indeed, Deputy National Security Advisor Berger stated that “foreign policy was not uppermost in people's minds” at the time (Riley, 2005, March 24). Britain's ambassador in Washington recognised this too and remarked a “relative lack of interest in foreign affairs” and the “clear priority given

to domestic policy” (Renwick, 1994, July 26). Still, Clinton outlined some of his key foreign policy beliefs publicly and repeatedly. For instance, two months after assuming office, Clinton (1993, April 1) argued that “[a]cross most of our history, our security was challenged by European nations, set on domination of their continent and the high seas that lie between us [...] Think of it: Land wars in Europe cost hundreds of thousands of American lives in the 20th century”. One year after his inauguration he repeated the importance of Europe to U.S. security by directly claiming in a speech in Brussels that “above all, the core of our security remains with Europe” (Clinton, 1994, January 9). He went on to add that “[n]o part of the world is more important to us than Europe” which is why he justified continued U.S. involvement in Europe, adding that he had “come here today to declare and to demonstrate that Europe remains central to the interests of the United States and that we will help to work with our partners in seizing the opportunities before us all”. He later added that “security and partnership [...] justifies this continuing commitment by the United States.” Clinton concluded that “our security depends on [...] the existence of a strong and free and democratic Europe.” In similar terms, Clinton’s Secretary of State, Warren Christopher (1998), described the importance for the U.S. to “eliminate or reduce the risk of another war in Europe that might once again draw the United States into a deadly and costly conflagration” (p. 130). The “vital” importance of Europe in U.S. strategic, political, and economic policy was also stressed by several Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of State at the time (Holbrooke, 1995b, March 9; Davis, 1993, September 7).

Simultaneously, economic issues were of high importance to Clinton officials. When Clinton assumed office, the U.S. faced an economically difficult situation after decades of extensive spending on defence under the Reagan administration, which was no longer required after the collapse of the USSR (Soderberg, 2005, pp. 17-18). Put bluntly by the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, “the hard truth was that Reagan had borrowed from Clinton, and Clinton was having to pay it back” (Greenspan, 2008, pp. 146-147). Clinton was briefed by the CoEA, which explained that “the nation’s standard of living depends on its productive capability”, which would likely require “an increased rate of investment, better education and training, and a more competitive and efficiency-orientated economic environment” (CoEA, 1994, October 31). Clinton added the handwritten note “this is worth some second thoughts” on his copy (ibid). Clinton officials recognised that pursuing their domestic agenda – healthcare, welfare, and education reform chief among their priorities – which helped Clinton get elected, would not be possible (Young, 2002, July 12). Some officials even began to worry that the increasing budget

deficit could derail the U.S. economy (Greenspan, 2008). Thus, Clinton officials concluded in materials preparing Clinton for a meeting with the British Prime Minister that that “[revitalising] the U.S. economy” was Clinton’s “top priority” (Wharton, 1993, February 18).

Clinton assessed that “there is no way that we can divide domestic and international affairs”, adding that “they are just too intertwined” (Niles, 1993, February 11). Clinton told the German Vice Chancellor, Kinkel, “I believe that [the U.S.] need to be strong at home to be effective internationally and that if withdrew from the world, we could not be strong at home”. Hence, Clinton proposed Kinkel to “work closely with Germany to promote world economic growth” (Riley, 2002, May 21). Clinton also sought cooperation with other leading economies. Clinton’s National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, stated in an interview (*ibid.*) that “[t]his was a new way of thinking at the time that “none of us foreign policy nerds did”. The CoEA (1993, December 17) linked domestic and foreign affairs in a briefing to Clinton by stating that “[t]he Uruguay Round will increase American output because the specialisation encouraged by more open markets will raise productivity. As foreign markets open, we produce more of the goods that make use of the highly skilled, highly productive U.S. workforce”, which would translate into “increased investment and innovation” in the U.S. This would incentivise specialisation, in turn increasing output, starting a loop of more investment resulting in more innovation at home. Clinton stated a simplified version of this logic to Italian Prime Minister Carlo Ciampi: “The better off countries can only grow by expanding trade” (Walker, 1993, September 17). Clinton argued that job creation was the sole thing remaining for developed economies, an issue that was only manageable by creating “global growth” but which required “agreement by the wealthy countries” (*ibid.*). An Interagency Working Group (1993, December 6) later described “enlarging the world’s free community of market democracies” to Eastern Europe as “a key test” to this new “major organising principle of American foreign policy”.

Clinton officials stressed the importance of regional stability as a basis for regional and, in turn, global economic growth. In a memo to Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, Stephen Oxman, a Department of State official, stated that it had become “almost axiomatic” that domestic economic growth “depends on a stable, secure and open international system”, which is why he assessed that Clinton communicated this to the leaders of other major economies (Gundersen, 1993, July 20). Clinton also bluntly stated to the Austrian Chancellor that “[c]haos may now be the biggest threat to global order” (Petrihos, 1994, April 30). Clinton also called for the Chancellor to convince leaders in Central and Eastern Europe of this, as he saw the future stability of the region as volatile (*ibid.*). A memorandum to prepare

Clinton for a phone call with his French counterpart makes several points that appear to try to convince France's President to support further globalisation – something he was previously wary of (Lake & Rubin, 1993, December 2).

Evaluating A1-B1

Considering the reviewed sources, it becomes clear that hypothesis A1 has been fully matched. In line with the security-prosperity explanation (Horovitz & Götz, 2020), Clinton policymakers were pursuing economic growth at home whilst seeking stability in Europe. They sought to revitalise the U.S. economy, which had been burdened by previous years of massive expenditure under President Reagan. With the attention mostly turned towards domestic issues, Clinton sought to pursue his domestic agenda. However, his administration recognised that this was hinging on economic growth. Clinton-era policymakers recognised that prosperity at home depended upon expanding the global economy. Simultaneously, Clinton was personally convinced that stability in Europe was of pivotal importance to the U.S. as instability in Europe bore the risk of spiralling into violent conflict that would eventually draw in the U.S. – harming U.S. security – as it had done during the world wars and previous crises. Clinton and other senior members of his administration have repeatedly highlighted Europe's particular importance in security, economic and political affairs. Clinton officials stressed the importance of regional stability as a basis for European and, in turn, global economic growth. Hypothesis A1 is, therefore, accepted as matching the collected evidence entirely.

The reviewed sources mention risks to U.S. security as a motive for active engagement in European affairs. This is most clearly present in the form of Clinton's remarks about European instability bearing the risk of spiralling into conflagration, which would put U.S. security at risk by drawing the U.S. into intervening in potentially violent and costly conflicts. Historical instances of this are noted as having been severe threats to national security in the past by senior Clinton officials, including the President himself. However, the reviewed data does not include any concerns regarding the possible emergence of a potential challenger to U.S. primacy in the form of a unified European bloc or a possible resurgence of Russia. Neither are other potential challengers to U.S. primacy mentioned or alluded to in the reviewed data. The pursuit of U.S. primacy is also absent from discussions of why foreign policy should be pursued. Instead, foreign policy appears to have been of secondary importance in the minds of Clinton officials, who were instead primarily focused on their domestic agenda. Whilst the absence of any allusions to and directly formulated concerns regarding threats to U.S. primacy

might result from the finite amount of data reviewed, records of policymakers stating that their focus was on domestic economic issues and not foreign policy goals provide evidence against hypothesis B1. Hence, despite security considerations playing a role in the minds of Clinton officials, they appear to have been of secondary importance compared to domestic economic considerations. B1, therefore, fails to hold in the face of the reviewed evidence.

A2-B2: The importance of maintaining sway over European affairs

If hypothesis A2 is accurate, protectionist European policies ought to be perceived negatively by U.S. policymakers, as should European reluctance to collaborate with Washington to foster economic globalisation and liberalisation, and instability in Europe would threaten the politico-economic objectives of the Clinton administration. Clinton officials should argue that, in addition to stability in Europe, the U.S. required influence in Europe to manage these challenges successfully. Hence, they should recognise the need for a policy that sought stability and U.S. influence on the European continent.

Supposing that the Clinton administration was in line with hypothesis B2, Clinton officials should reason that preventing the emergence of potential challengers to U.S. hegemony – namely a resurgent Russia and/or some form of a European bloc – should be achieved through expanding and consolidating U.S. influence in Europe. Clinton policymakers should display concerns regarding European leaders seeking alternatives that are independent of or, at least less influenced by, the U.S. Alternatively, Clinton officials should see Russia as potentially interested and capable of re-establishing a sphere of influence akin to the one it had before the collapse of the USSR. Hence, Clinton officials should conclude that there existed a need to strengthen U.S. influence in Europe's security architecture. Doing so would safeguard and increase U.S. influence in Europe, thereby strengthening American primacy.

This section utilises readouts and reports on conversations Clinton and senior officials had with other world leaders, mostly found in the DoSVRR and CPLDL and in British archives – RPMO and FCO. They illustrate why Clinton sought further globalisation and why other governments should do the same. CPLDL and DoSVRR records are consulted to gain further insight as to why U.S. influence in Europe was seen as important by Clinton officials and how they contemplated changing certain policies to remain influential in European affairs. British archives as well as DoSVRR, CPLDL and CPL records were consulted to determine whether the issue of hedging was important to Clinton officials. U.S. archives rarely raise the issue. Hence, British sources were searched through to triangulate whether U.S. officials raised this

concern to their British counterparts. Only British sources contemplate the issue seriously – without basing their assumption on discussions with U.S. officials. These sources are found in the RPMO and FCO.

Examining sources

Clinton and his administration were concerned about the rise of protectionist sentiments at home. The British ambassador to the U.S., Robin Renwick, wrote to his Prime Minister that “Clinton promised [to a domestic audience] to open markets for U.S. exports [abroad] and to pursue a result-orientated approach eschewing theoretical debate about free trade versus managed trade” (Renwick, 1993, May 28). Renwick assessed that this explained Clinton’s strong determination to leave the ongoing negotiations of the Uruguay Round with a positive result by the end of 1993 whilst simultaneously “[aggressively] posturing towards Japan and the EC”. Renwick concluded by stating that “[Clinton] is sincere in wanting to implement NAFTA and the Uruguay Round” but that he had to fend off opposition in Congress – even within the Democratic party – against further globalisation, especially against more free trade.

Wayne (1993, March 26) reports that, in a meeting with German Chancellor Kohl, Clinton expressed his concerns: “the U.S. cannot do it all – encourage world growth, support Russia, solve Bosnia, open the world trade system”. Clinton admitted that the U.S. needed “partners in these efforts”. Clinton was pressed to make further globalisation pay off quickly at home. Clinton stated, “I can see the danger of letting the economy get too bad – the people vote in protest. I had to face those who wanted protectionism in my campaign. I resisted and argued that we need a good GATT agreement and a good NAFTA package” (ibid.). Clinton pleaded with Kohl to “do what we can together to promote economic growth and liberalise trade” (ibid.). According to a readout authored by a State Department official (Wharton, 1993, June 11), Clinton revealed his concerns about regional trade liberalisation becoming preferred to globalised free trade to German President von Weizsäcker. “Some are afraid that the EC may become more closed [to third parties]. Others fear Japan’s actions”(ibid.). Clinton even appeared to highlight the benefits of remaining open to globalised free trade by mentioning “a need for the Mexican market” in case of protectionist policy emerging in the U.S. (ibid.). In this case, access to the Mexican market would require not regional free trade deals but a trade deal that included a NAFTA member state, stressing the advantage of a globalised free trade system as opposed to the proliferation of regionalised trade blocs.

Clinton officials repeatedly stated their belief that the success of their pursuit for further

globalisation primarily hinged upon the cooperation of Western European states. Clinton officials were keen on ensuring a continued outward-orientated policy for the EC and individual European states. For instance, reporting on his conversations with State Department and National Security Council officials, the British ambassador to the U.S. described the U.S. attitude towards the EU as “ambivalent” (Renwick, 1995, July 10). According to him, “[Clinton officials] are in favour in principle, but do not like the practical manifestations – including the Commission and the [Common Agricultural Policy]”. Renwick noted that Clinton officials did not want “to see [British] influence marginalised. [British] influence in Europe is important to the Americans because they believe, rightly, that it will be exerted to keep the European Union outward-looking, open to the accession of new members from Eastern Europe and continuing to work in close economic and military partnership with the United States” (ibid.). In a meeting between the two, Clinton told German President von Weizsäcker “that the U.S. intends to stay in Europe and in NATO” after von Weizsäcker had highlighted that “the Atlantic Alliance is [...] essential of course” (Wharton, 1993, June 11). Clinton appeared to want to highlight his intention to keep the Atlantic Alliance.

Clinton officials did not appear concerned by European countries further integrating their defence policies. Clinton’s Secretary of State believed that European efforts towards further defence integration did not threaten NATO. After a conversation between him, his deputy and a senior German parliamentarian, Christopher (1994, March 31) believed the opposite was the case and that “the Franco-German Eurocorps is not an effort to diminish NATO’s importance, but rather a mechanism to draw France closer to NATO”. Christopher agreed with the German assessment that “the French are realising more and more that Europe cannot achieve its potential without American involvement”. Still, Deputy Secretary of State Talbott expressed his concerns that “the U.S. Administration may have inadvertently created the impression that [they were] absorbed with Russia, to the detriment of Central and Eastern Europe” (ibid.). However, “[t]his would be more impression than reality, since in fact [they] have been very active in the region” (ibid.). In a memo to Clinton, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake stated his belief that the “[u]nified Germany is once again becoming the European continental power, giving some pause to France, the UK, and eastern neighbors as they eye Germany’s return to pre-eminence” (Lake, 1994, July 2). Lake argued that this was beneficial for Clinton’s overarching goals. “Germany’s strength and self-confidence are essential to many of our most important goals, such as global economic growth, reform in Russia, NIS and CEE, and adjusting Western institutions (especially NATO and the EU) to

welcome Europe's new democracies". Lake believed that "Germans know what they stand to benefit – or lose – most from success or failure of democratic transitions in Europe's east and have been willing to invest more there both politically and economically than other West Europeans" further stating that "[o]ur continued role as Germany's strongest friend is an essential element of European stability" (ibid.), thus emphasising the positive opinion Clinton officials held towards genuine European efforts towards safeguarding the continent's stability and the positive view on commitments by major European countries to participate in a globalised economy.

Although sure to receive support from Britain and Germany, France was assessed to be reluctant to support steps taken towards further globalisation whilst simultaneously trying to expand its influence in Europe. In a report to London, British diplomats assessed that, whilst France had accepted U.S. leadership to handle the Yugoslav crisis, policymakers in Paris were "talk[ing] of a French re-think [of European defence policy] after the election" (Gozney, 1993, February 4). It was believed that "the impetus towards a politically separate Common Defense Policy of the European Union remains strong" among the minds of French policy makers (ibid.). Matching this assessment, the British ambassador to France, Christopher Mallaby (1993, December 31), informed London of his conviction that the purposes of French policy were "to lead Europe in order, first, to maintain competitive advantage in [foreign and defence policy] over Germany following unification; second to develop Europe under French leadership into some kind of counter-weight in the single superpower world, where France fears that the United States [...] may become dominant and domineering; and, third, to preserve France's permanent membership of the Security Council.

Whilst France was assessed, by British officials, to try and expand its influence in Europe through further European defence and security integration separated from the U.S., British diplomats assessed that U.S. influence was waning due to Clinton's reluctance to intervene in the ongoing Balkan crisis. In the eyes of Britain's ambassador to the U.S., "Clinton is determined to get himself reelected. A key preoccupation is to avoid a foreign policy disaster that could fatally damage his presidency as they did for his two Democratic predecessors", hence explaining Clinton's reluctance to get involved (Renwick, 1994, February 25). Clinton was seen as "caught between a foreign policy establishment demanding U.S. activism and middle American opinion strongly resistant, post-Somalia, to putting U.S. troops on the ground" (ibid.). Renwick also reported that, during a meeting between him and two former Secretaries of State, Henry Kissinger and George Schultz, he was informed of the U.S. seeing

itself as capable of conducting a military intervention (Renwick, 1994, July 25). However, maintaining favourable public opinion was seen as more important to Clinton officials (ibid.). According to Renwick, Kissinger and Schultz believe that Clinton's problem was a "predilection for domestic policy and the warnings of his domestic policy advisers that he must not allow himself to become mired in a foreign crisis" (ibid.). Despite recognising domestic pressures as the reason for Clinton's inaction, Renwick expressed his belief that U.S. influence was decreasing among Europeans. "[European diplomats in Washington] genuinely believe that the Americans have failed to shoulder their share of the responsibility [regarding Bosnia]", Renwick wrote to London (Renwick 1994, February 25). He recommended to his Prime Minister that "we [must] succeed in drawing the United States into the negotiations".

Clinton officials also recognised that U.S. influence in Europe was at risk. Clinton himself appeared concerned with the impression his inaction left on German Chancellor Kohl and explained to Kohl that "[w]e want to bring about peace in Bosnia, but our fundamental interests are to prevent the conflict from spreading and to ensure that our fundamental alliance doesn't weaken, whatever differences we have" (LeBourgeois et al., 1994, December 13). Clinton's National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, believed that ignoring the unfolding humanitarian crisis in Bosnia would hurt Clinton's public approval. However, an unknown author (1993, July 25) reports that National Security Advisor Lake told the Prime Minister's foreign policy aide, Roderic Lyne, and the former British envoy to Moscow, Rodric Braithwaite, that "beyond the question of Bosnia the consequences would have to be calculated". This report was sent to Downing Street 10. According to Lake, intervention could "[risk] war in Kosovo and then Macedonia, a further Serbo-Croat war" (ibid.). Slowly, Clinton officials recognised that the U.S. had to find ways to reinvigorate European leaders' trust in the U.S.' willingness to play an active role in stabilising the situation – thereby demonstrating the advantages of U.S. influence in European security affairs. Evidence for this can be found in an inter-agency review of U.S. policy towards Central and Eastern Europe. In a presidential review directive, Lake (1993, July 5) outlined the key tenets to cabinet members in a presidential review directive by stating that, although the violent conflict in the Balkans was not posing an immediate threat to the "vital strategic interests of the U.S. or its European allies", it nonetheless posed "a significant threat to European stability". Therefore, action needed to be taken to prevent conflicts or at least contain them as "the potential for large refugee flows or even a spill-over of fighting [...] challenged the efficacy and cohesion of Western security institutions, and because they hold the potential to ignite ethnic tensions in other areas of CEE and NIS"

(ibid.). Lake proposed that “the eastward spread of market economy and democratic government would further movement toward a united and peaceful Europe and lead to transatlantic economic relations reinvigorated by the markets of CEE and NIS” (ibid.). Should the region, instead, be unstable and backslide into authoritarian government, Lake concluded that this could “bring the return of a divided Europe, dash hopes of tapping new economic opportunities and undermine confidence among [America’s] Western European allies and economic partners” (ibid.). Another interagency report on overarching consequences of instability in Europe concluded that “the resulting turmoil could produce refugee flows that strain the democratic and open societies of [Western Europe]” as “ethnic conflict, chaos, war or massive flows of refugees anywhere can threaten stability everywhere, including in the most advanced Western European democracies” (Interagency Working Group, 1993, December 6).

Evaluating A2-B2

Considering the reviewed sources, it becomes clear that hypothesis A2 has been fully matched. In line with the security-prosperity explanation (Horovitz & Götz, 2020), Clinton officials recognised that protectionism, instability, and disinterest in Europe to support the political and economic plans of the Clinton administration were threatening to upend Clinton’s overarching policy goals. Indeed, Clinton officials – including Clinton himself – displayed their concern that domestic pressure in the U.S. was gathering to halt Clinton’s policy pushing for further globalisation. Clinton himself admitted the possibility of a future U.S. administration discontinuing Clinton’s politico-economic policy to his German counterpart. One might even interpret this statement as a threat aimed at deterring European policymakers from continuing a policy that would exclude the U.S. from future trade agreements, as the emergence of protectionist policies in the U.S. would undoubtedly hurt European economic growth. However, one could also interpret this statement as a plea for European leaders to support Clinton in allowing his administration to deliver positive effects for voters in the U.S. whom Clinton relied upon for his bid to be re-elected. This interpretation appears plausible as it aligns with Clinton officials seeking support from other European leaders. Clinton officials saw the potential for the emergence of protectionist policies in Europe as a threat to economic growth in the U.S., thereby threatening overall U.S. policy. Clinton officials assessed that major European countries, first and foremost Britain and Germany, supported steps towards further globalisation. This support was crucial in the eyes of policymakers in Washington. Evidence for France’s reluctance to support Clinton’s policies has been found primarily in British sources.

According to them, policymakers in Paris were reluctant to allow the U.S. to continue playing an essential role in European affairs. Generally, Clinton officials appeared to have grown increasingly concerned that American influence in Europe was threatened due to Clinton's reluctance to intervene in the ongoing crisis in the Balkans. This crisis was perceived to have the potential to further destabilise the region, with some Clinton officials going as far as to suggest that it could spill over into other European countries, resulting in less stability and less economic growth in Europe – and globally. Altogether, hypothesis A2 is accepted as protectionism, instability, and disinterest in Europe to support Clinton's policy were seen as harmful to the administration's overarching goals. Clinton officials displayed their intention to prevent these threats from materialising and propose policy to that end.

The reviewed evidence does not support hypothesis B2. While there exist records that outline how French policy was perceived as aiming to contain U.S. influence in Europe, these assessments could only be found in British sources. These sources do not appear to represent the convictions of U.S. policymakers. Whilst it could be possible to assume that U.S. officials might have shared a similar view of French intentions, there is no evidence that Clinton officials were unduly concerned about them. Quite to the contrary, senior Clinton officials expressed their support for specific instances of European defence integration, such as the Franco-German Eurocorps. There also exists no evidence in the reviewed data that would allow the conclusion that Russia's potential resurgence could threaten U.S. primacy. What hypothesis B2 correctly predicts is the intention of Clinton officials to seek a strengthening of U.S. influence in Europe. However, its rationale cannot be identified as originating in hedging behaviour. Instead, it appears to align with the politico-economic logic found in hypothesis A2.

A3-B3: Choosing NATO-E

If hypothesis A3 is accurate, Clinton officials should conclude that NATO-E was the best vehicle through which U.S. influence in Europe could be maintained to ensure continued European support for further globalisation. Simultaneously, NATO-E would reinvigorate U.S. influence in Europe's security architecture. This should enable policymakers in Washington to prevent the outbreak of destabilising events – such as armed conflicts between Europeans, which were assessed to likely cause secondary effects, such as refugee flows, and ensure stability and prosperity on the continent. Continued European support for Washington's politico-economic plans, coupled with the growth of European economies due to stability on the continent, would eventually allow Clinton to revitalise the U.S. economy and enable his

administration to pursue its domestic goals.

Support for the accuracy of hypothesis B3 should come in the form of Clinton officials arguing that NATO-E was the best tool with which Washington could prevent the emergence of potential challengers to U.S. hegemony in Europe. Influence over European affairs should be seen as crucial as it allows U.S. officials to prevent the rise of powers that could have the intention to weaken U.S. primacy. Clinton officials should attempt to reinforce NATO to prevent the emergence of parallel European security structures independent from Washington, which would offer an alternative to the existing, U.S.-dominated European security architecture and/or prevent the potential resurgence of Russia. Thus, given that NATO is a U.S.-dominated institution, Clinton officials should conclude that NATO-E would be the most suitable tool to strengthen U.S. hegemony, or at least strengthen U.S. influence in Europe, whilst hedging against potential challengers to U.S. primacy.

This section primarily relies on records of meetings Clinton and senior administration officials had with European heads of state and high-ranking officials. These are primarily available in the DoSVRR and NSA. Combined with internal memos between U.S. officials found in the CPLDL, they clearly show how the option of NATO-E became to be increasingly perceived as the best available policy option. Particularly Secretary of State Christopher's accounts of his discussions with CEE leaders offer a direct illustration of how he and the administration as a whole increasingly began to favour enlargement. British RPMO and FOC records of their discussions with Clinton and his officials give further examples of this development, as do secondary sources of people who briefed Clinton on security affairs, as does an interview found in the CPLDL.

Examining sources

Clinton officials were convinced that NATO should continue to serve as the U.S. primary vehicle through which U.S. governments could influence European affairs. Indeed, only one month into Clinton's first term as U.S. President, the Head of Policy Planning at the State Department stated in a memo to Secretary of State Christopher that strengthening "the democratic community that won the Cold War" was the first and foremost of five immediate "post-Cold War challenges" (Lewis, 1993, February 16). The briefing called for steps to be taken towards "rejuvenating and adapting the trans-Atlantic relationships". Furthermore, the U.S. should continue "promoting democracy, economic reform and security in Russia and the NIS". In similar terms, Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, Stephen Oxman, wrote to Under

Secretary for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff that transforming NATO “is a way to demonstrate the continuing relevance of NATO, and the importance of the United States remaining engaged” (Oxman, 1993, September 14). In an interview, then-Director of Policy Planning Jim Steinberg noted that “an obvious outgrowth of the overall view of [NATO] enlargement [was that] you needed NATO to be relevant in order to keep the U.S. engaged” (Riley, 2008, April 1). The reasoning was that “there was always the option that NATO could wither away. The Cold War was over. [NATO] was created against the Soviet Union. So, for the engagement wing of the strategy, the adaption of NATO was critical to answering the question, how does the United States stay in harness with our European allies and stay involved on that stage?” (ibid.). After no longer serving in the Clinton administration, Deputy Advisor for National Security Affairs to Clinton Nancy Soderberg – in charge of briefing Clinton and drafting security policy – described a “need [for] U.S. leadership” abroad to protect “U.S. interests” (Soderberg, 2005, pp. 96-97). Soderberg outlined what she described as the cornerstones of U.S. engagement by stating that the first point of order was “ensuring that the cornerstone of U.S. national security remained its alliances with Europe and Asia” (ibid.). Lake (1995, May 10) recounts how Clinton, in a read out of a meeting between him and Russian President Yeltsin, explained that the U.S. needed “a security relationship with Europe along with a political and economic leadership” to uphold its previous alliance as “the Cold War is over and [because] Russia does not present a threat to the NATO states”. Yeltsin challenged Clinton’s assessment and questioned whether this linkage between economic, political, and security relationships was truly necessary. Clinton replied, “I believe we do” (ibid.).

Contrary to Clinton’s intentions, U.S. influence and the importance of NATO weakened as a result of Clinton’s actions – or rather inaction – regarding the Yugoslav wars, as outlined in the previous part of this analysis. The credibility of Washington’s commitment to European security was undermined to an extent that made European governments reconsider their available options to maintain European stability in case of continued American disinterest in directly getting involved. For instance, British members of cabinet assessed that “France and Germany were less willing to give political primacy [in defence matters] to the Americans” as a result of Clinton’s policy not to get directly involved in Yugoslavia (Leslie-Jones, 1994, September 27). Dutch officials were described to have made similar conclusions, according to the British ambassador to the Netherlands, who concluded in a report to London that “[the U.S.] cannot be relied upon to maintain their commitment to European stability, or a military presence in Europe” (Miers, 1993, October 25).

Whilst Western European leaders began questioning whether the U.S. could be relied on to maintain stability in Europe – which had been the argument to tolerate U.S. influence in European affairs – interest in joining NATO remained strong in states which recently gained their sovereignty after the collapse of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. The U.S. ambassador to Poland, Nicholas Rey (1994, April 12), reports that during a conversation with Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, Polish President Lech Wałęsa stated his concerns that Russia would attempt to re-establish its spheres of influence, which it had recently lost. “Russia is already rebuilding its former sphere of influence, and one cannot assume that it will be content with recovering what it had before”, Wałęsa told Talbott (ibid.). According to Wałęsa, Russia was interested in dominating “the CEE countries, [...] Germany and France as well”. In an attempt to calm the Polish President, Talbott told Wałęsa that the U.S. “wants to remain in close cooperation with Poland in preparing a strategy for all possible eventualities” (ibid.). Czech President Vaclav Havel told Clinton that Central and Eastern European countries “should no longer hang in a vacuum”, according to a readout written by the National Security Council’s Senior Director for Central and Eastern Europe (Fried, 1995, October 21). Clinton replied that a fast enlargement of NATO was not possible at the moment but promised that “if Russia moves in an aggressive direction in Europe we may have to speed up the NATO progress. We have kept it slow and it could stay slow if Russia relented. But an aggressive Russia would make us reconsider this” (ibid.). U.S. officials disagreed with the assessments of Havel and Wałęsa, believing that Russia did not pose a threat to European security. In a memo for National Security Advisor Lake, a National Security Council official concluded that “the Russian military is not an immediate conventional threat to the CEE region [...] it would take years to rebuild a Russian conventional military capability which would be a threat to CEE countries. Such rebuilding would be obvious to us and could elicit an appropriate response” (Schifter, 1994, October 4).

Although Clinton was hesitant to enlarge NATO quickly, fearing it would alienate Russia, members of his administration disagreed. In a memo to Secretary of State Christopher, the Head of Policy Planning at the State Department and an Under Secretary of State, claimed that further deferring the debate on enlargement “will not be possible”, “nor would it be in our interest to do so” (Lewis & Davis, 1993, August 12). They argued that “avoidance of this issue will undermine NATO by reinforcing the growing perception that the Alliance is only marginally involved in addressing Europe’s new security problems. It would also feed growing disillusionment with the West and democratic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. This mood could trigger instability in that region, with dangerous ripple effects across the continent”

(ibid.). Deputy Secretary of State Talbott argued to European counterparts that swift expansion could be achievable if it were possible to “avoid presenting the Russians with shocks and to persuade them that the integration process was not inimical to their interest, as much as the West had done in getting Gorbachev to accept a unified Germany in NATO” (Eizenstat, 1994, April 18).

Clinton officials recognised that Central European leaders were facing a dilemma. The British ambassador to Poland assessed that recent Russian constitutional crisis and increased support among Russian voters for ultranationalist politicians “increased Poland’s sense of vulnerability” (Llewellyn Smith, 1994, January 6). Hence, although hoping for NATO membership, Polish leaders were considering choosing alternatives if NATO membership remained out of reach (ibid.). Secretary of State Christopher appears to have made similar conclusions as he attempted to convince Central European foreign ministers that the best alternative for now remained NATO’s PFP. According to Christopher, PFP “represented the best opportunity to integrate Europe and to ensure that the countries in the East would stay on the course toward freedom. At the same time, the PFP represented opportunities to respond appropriately in the case of revanchism or other threats in the East” (Christopher, 1994, January 16). However, Christopher did not convince the Polish foreign minister, who stated, “I see the words, but come on” (ibid.). U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright (1994, January 26), reported to Clinton, that this “apprehension” originated in the Central European’s “fear that we are naïve about the Russians, and that we are willing to sacrifice their security to preserve our relations with Russia”, she added that Polish officials “pointed out that if no obvious fruits materialised from PFP, then they might have to look for other arrangements”. France was seen as attempting to challenge the U.S.’s role as Europe’s security provider by offering genuinely European alternatives to NATO-E. Indeed, in a memo, U.S. officials informed Secretary of State Christopher that French officials approached British counterparts with an “implicit quid pro quo [agreement] on expansion and [European Security and Defence Initiative] package”, which would be more in line with “Euro-centric approaches to dealing with instability in Central and Eastern Europe” (Davis, 1993, September 7). In a conversation with British Prime Minister John Major, Clinton expressed his thoughts regarding the French proposal by stating that “he was concerned that the French might be on the way to undermining PFP”, according to the readout authored by Major’s foreign policy aide (Lyne, 1994, March 3).

A U.S. reassessment of Russian reactions to NATO-E also played a role in U.S. considerations. Moscow would undoubtedly dislike an expansion of NATO. This was

communicated to Clinton by his ambassador to Russia, who wrote that “[n]o foreign policy issue has greater potential for aggravating tensions with Russia or feeding the sense among Russians across the political spectrum that the West is taking advantage of their moment of historical weakness” (Pickering, 1995, February 22). However, Clinton officials argued that Russian opposition would risk isolating Moscow from countries it hoped to win over as investment and trading partners. This is why Assistant Secretary Holbrooke reportedly “struck” John Major’s foreign policy aide with “the cavalier way in which he discounted Russian objections and sensitivities” (Lyne, 1994, October 12). British officials reported that Holbrooke’s views “rested on the American assessment that the Russian bottom line was at all costs to avoid renewed confrontation with the West” (ibid.). Furthermore, Clinton officials had no interest in being perceived as granting Moscow an informal veto regarding enlargement. Christopher (1994, June 7) reported from a meeting he had with British Foreign Minister Hurd that it was decided that “[w]e need to make explicit that NATO expansion is inevitable; that Moscow’s public attacks will not derail the process but may undermine our ability to pursue the NATO-Russia track and deal constructively with Moscow’s particular concerns about expansion” (ibid.).

Evaluation A3-B3

Considering the reviewed sources, it becomes apparent that hypothesis A3 has been fully matched. In line with the security-prosperity explanation (Horowitz & Götz, 2020), Clinton officials expressed their conviction that NATO had to remain the primacy vehicle through which the U.S. could influence European affairs, as it had done during the Cold War. Clinton policymakers argued that reinforcing the transatlantic relationship was crucial to Clinton’s policy goals. They argued that continued U.S. support for democratic and economic reforms in Europe was pivotal for stability on the continent. Clinton himself declared his belief that the transatlantic relationship relied upon an interconnected economic, political, and security partnership between Europe and the U.S. However, for NATO to remain the instrument through which the U.S. could remain an influential actor in European affairs, it had to remain relevant to Europeans, Clinton officials asserted. Although initially reluctant, Clinton officials soon realised that expanding NATO eastwards – by granting membership to certain Central and Eastern European states – was the best policy through which NATO and, with-it U.S. influence, could remain central to European affairs. This influence was seen as necessary for the U.S. to continue having significant influence in transatlantic security and economic and political

partnership. This influence was crucial to Clinton's policy as continued U.S. leadership in globalisation would plausibly allow the U.S. to take significant advantage of further economic globalisation. Simultaneously, Clinton officials asserted that NATO-E would have a stabilising effect on states in Central and Eastern Europe who feared Russian revanchism as a source of instability.

The reviewed data partially matches hypothesis B3. Whilst Clinton officials indeed asserted that NATO-E was the best vehicle through which the U.S. could enhance its influence over European affairs, this decision was not driven by concerns about the potential emergence of a European bloc or a resurgent Russia that would attempt to challenge U.S. primacy. Quite the opposite appears to be the case. The fear of a resurgence appears to have been a particularly well-documented non-issue as U.S. officials assessed that Russia was not and would remain incapable of posing a conventional threat to European security for several years. Clinton officials argued that, even if Russia began attempting to create the capabilities necessary to pose a threat, these efforts would easily be identified and could be prevented. Central and Eastern European policymakers even criticised U.S. officials for what they perceived as naïve U.S. assessments of Russian intentions. However, despite these findings, Clinton officials – including Clinton himself – did express concern that France was attempting to play a more prominent role in European security policy by creating Eurocentric security structures which would threaten to, at least, undermine U.S. influence on the continent. Hence, it is possible to argue that concerns regarding the creation of European security structures separate from U.S. influence did play a role in reinforcing the Clinton administration's decision to accelerate NATO-E. Nevertheless, the evidence does not allow for the conclusion that these concerns were the primary driver of NATO-E. Therefore, hypothesis B can only be partially accepted.

5. Conclusion

This thesis has outlined the line of thought which led to the Clinton administration's decision to pursue NATO-E. Through creating hypotheses based on two rival explanations for this development and having tested them against recently declassified and highly relevant archival sources, this thesis has demonstrated that the interplay of long-term strategic objectives and political and economic considerations was the primary driver behind the decision to pursue enlargement. The findings of the analysis lend strong support for the explanations offered by the security-prosperity explanation, based on the work by Horovitz and Götz (2020).

Indeed, the reviewed evidence shows that Clinton officials focused on promoting

economic growth in the U.S. whilst simultaneously pursuing stability in Europe. Clinton policymakers endeavoured to rejuvenate the U.S. economy, which had been struggling after years of substantial spending during the Reagan presidency. With a focus on internal matters, Clinton first and foremost sought to advance his domestic agenda. However, Clinton officials realised that achieving their domestic goals relied on economic growth. They understood that this was intrinsically linked to the expansion of economic globalisation. Simultaneously, they believed that Europe needed to remain stable and at peace, as war and instability would threaten to pull the U.S. into a conflict that would inevitably harm U.S. prosperity and security. Clinton officials concluded that this required other major economies to join Clinton in his efforts to create a globalised economy whilst preventing the emergence of instability. U.S. officials singled out Europe as particularly important to that end. Accordingly, Clinton officials agreed that long-term security on the European continent was fundamental to ensure stability, whilst U.S. influence was required to ensure continued European support for Clinton's politico-economic designs. Clinton officials were convinced that stability and influence in Europe depended on NATO remaining a cornerstone of European affairs. They also concluded that the continued importance of NATO could only be preserved by expanding it eastward. This would mitigate European security concerns whilst ensuring that the U.S. would continue playing a central role on the continent. Furthermore, enlargement would undermine efforts to undermine NATO's importance by undermining calls for creating Eurocentric security structures that threatened to render the alliance obsolete or at least less important to European security. Hence, Clinton officials decided to pursue NATO-E.

The reviewed evidence does not support the notion that hedging behaviour was the primary driver behind the Clinton administration's decision to enlarge NATO. Whilst the reviewed evidence does mention risks to U.S. security as a motive for active engagement in European affairs, these do not include any concerns regarding the possible emergence of a potential challenger to U.S. hegemony in the form of a unified European bloc or a possible resurgence of Russia as the hedging behaviour explanation would suggest. In fact, contrary to the predictions offered by hedging behaviour explanations, foreign policy appears to have generally been of secondary importance in the minds of Clinton officials, who were primarily focused on their domestic agenda. Whilst some Clinton officials expressed the intention to prevent states – first and foremost France – from undermining U.S. influence, the evidence does not suggest that NATO-E was pursued primarily to thwart the emergence of a potential challenger to U.S. primacy. Had this been the case, confidential exchanges between U.S.

officials should have, at least occasionally, mentioned the perceived necessity to prevent the emergence of prospective challengers to U.S. hegemony. However, they do not. The analysis' findings even suggest that Clinton officials were in favour of European states working towards deepening European defence and security cooperation and highlight U.S. concerns that division between European states was harmful to economic growth in Europe and, therefore, U.S. economic prosperity at home. As long as U.S. officials remained convinced that the U.S. would greatly benefit from further global economic growth, they assessed that intra-European infighting must be prevented. The findings go even further regarding the threat perception vis-à-vis Russia, with no evidence suggesting that Russia was perceived to become capable of challenging U.S. primacy any time soon. Hence, at most, the hedging behaviour explanation is only occasionally capable of partially explaining minor mechanisms that played a non-primary role in the Clinton administration's decision to pursue NATO-E.

This thesis' findings provide important and novel implications for ongoing scholarly debates. Firstly, the empirical findings combine two schools of research that dominate the field of research on U.S. foreign policy towards Europe in the 1990s. The first school claims that security concerns and fears of European instability are the main motivations driving U.S. engagement in European affairs. Proponents of this school assume that U.S. policymakers were convinced of the supposed inability of Europeans to organise their own security without U.S. involvement. The second school of thought suggests that U.S. involvement in European affairs is primarily motivated by economic goals. However, this school fails to explain why the world's predominant economic power would choose to advance its economic interests through an institution tasked with managing security matters. The findings of this thesis, having pursued a more comprehensive approach to U.S. foreign policy towards Europe, reveal that both schools of thought play an important role in highlighting parts of the rationale underpinning the decision to enlarge NATO, but that they are individually incapable of explaining it in its entirety. By integrating both schools of thought in a more complex and nuanced account, this thesis offers a new and refined starting point towards resolving an ongoing debate on the origins of U.S. foreign policy towards Europe in the 1990s.

Although relying on hundreds of pages of primary sources from U.S. and British archives, and despite best efforts to substantiate them by including oral histories and secondary sources such as the memoirs of actors who were in key positions of the Clinton administration at the time, many U.S. documents on this topic remain classified and are thus not available to be reviewed for the purpose of this thesis. Still, the archival sources this thesis is based upon

offer valuable and new insight into the decision-making processes of senior Clinton officials – lending significant authority to this thesis’ findings. Furthermore, many documents which offered further insight into the decision-making and reasoning, not only of the U.S. but also of many European officials at the time, could not be included. Hence, future research would likely benefit from investigating further linkage using a greater quantity of European sources. Doing so would offer further depth and nuance to the novel findings revealed by this thesis. These limitations notwithstanding, this thesis has extensively used declassified files.

Future research pathways can take the form of further comparisons with alternative explanations for NATO-E. For instance, the influence of normative and domestic factors might have had on Clinton administration officials’ decision to pursue NATO-E merits further investigation, especially since they were not included in this thesis. Furthermore, one could attempt to subsume alternative explanations under the security-prosperity explanation. Since this thesis has found the hedging behaviour explanation to hold limited explanatory value, at best, of why Clinton officials pursued NATO-E, one might attempt to subsume it under the security-prosperity explanation. That might be possible because, although Clinton officials did not showcase significant concerns or saw it as likely that some form of a European bloc or resurgent Russia would mount a serious challenge to U.S. primacy, they did display some levels of concern regarding certain European states – most notably France – to grow their influence and enact policies that were opposed to Clinton’s politico-economic designs.

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