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Xenophobia and the perspective of African migrants living in Cape Town, South Africa

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Master's Thesis

Xenophobia and the perspective of African migrants living in Cape Town, South Africa

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Abstract:

This study aimed to understand African migrants' views on xenophobia in Cape Town, how it impacts their lives, and to identify different manifestations of xenophobia. The research focuses on xenophobia through the lens of tribalism, nationalism, and the ethnic competition hypothesis. The methodology consisted of a mixed-method approach, initially gathering quantitative data from fifty Uber drivers, followed by nineteen semi-structured in-depth interviews with migrants and larger stakeholders to explore deeper insights into xenophobia's impacts in Cape Town. Findings show that more covert manifestations of xenophobia, such as the protection fee, are increasingly impacting the daily lives of foreigners, especially those living in specific townships or running a business. This covert manifestation of xenophobia brings a new dimension to the xenophobia discourse in South Africa as it is more complex to analyse and record xenophobic incidences compared to the violent manifestations of xenophobia. Recommendations for further research involve delving deeper into how the protection fee is shaping local dynamics and micro-politics so that strategies can be explored on how to address this covert form of xenophobia and strategize on interventions.

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Chapter 1: *Research Introduction*

1.1 Introduction

South Africa has recorded various xenophobic incidents since the end of Apartheid in 1994. The first nationwide xenophobic riots emerged in 2008, starting in Johannesburg and spreading across the country. During this nationwide xenophobic attack on international migrants, mostly migrants from Malawi, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe were affected (SIHMA, 2008). Over 70 migrants were killed, and over 100,000 migrants were displaced from their homes (Crush, 2008). After this first nationwide xenophobic attack there have been series of xenophobic attacks reported across the country; the biggest ones taking place in 2011, 2015, and again in 2019 (Crush, 2022).

In the build-up to the 2024 national elections, Allison (2023) predicted that xenophobic attacks seemed to be rising again as South Africa. It is the first time that the African National Congress (ANC), the winning political party since Apartheid ended, might lose their power due to the citizen's lack of trust in the government and emerging anti-immigrant movements and political parties such as Operation Dudula (Allison, 2023). As at the time of writing this thesis (June 2024), the ANC had actually lost its majority appeal, which resulted in new political alliances, with differential implications for immigrants residing in the country. Erstwhile, Operation Dudula is a vigilant anti-immigrant political party that scapegoats a large part of South Africa's problems on international migrants, specifically black Africans, in the country (Myeni, 2022). International migrants are scapegoated as the cause of many of the current problems in South Africa, specifically referring to the high crime rates, high unemployment rates, and housing problems (SIHMA, 2019). Xenophobia in South Africa also has an ironical racial aspect to it because it is mostly the black South Africans scapegoating other black Africans as being the issue to many of their problems (Neocosmos, 2006). The xenophobic incidents most commonly occur in the townships or informal settlements of the bigger cities as these are areas with a higher percentage of migrants residing there (Neocosmos, 2010).

Patterns and trends in xenophobia have more often than not been deduced from media reports and publications of organisations, where little or no attention is given to systematic examination of the impact from the perspectives of migrants. The purpose of this research therefore is to examine the opinions and perspectives of international migrants living in the townships/informal settlements of Cape Town with regards to xenophobia and how this affects their daily lives. This will be carried out through determining the ways in which immigrants have experienced xenophobia and exploring whether there are conditions where (from immigrants' perspectives) certain occurrences and other realities are coated as xenophobic. Thus, I will also delve deeper into the terminology of xenophobia and explore what different stakeholders perceive as xenophobic versus non-xenophobic behaviour.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

South Africa is one of the top-leading destinations for migration, specifically migrants from neighbouring African countries who are seeking better economic opportunities (Madue, 2015). The influx of immigrants from neighbouring countries, combined with the socio-economic challenges faced by South African citizens, including unemployment and delayed service delivery, frequently contribute to the propagation of myths and misunderstandings concerning foreign individuals, particularly those of African descent (Madue, 2015). Many South Africans have lost trust in the African National Congress (ANC), the leading political party since Apartheid ended in 1994. Other political parties such as the vigilante anti-immigrant party named “Operation Dudula” have been gaining a higher following over the past years through scapegoating migrants and convincing South Africans that all their problems will be solved once migrants leave their country (Myeni, 2022). The interaction of high unemployment rates and the presence of a far-right party can increase anti-immigrant attitudes (Cochrane & Nevitte, 2014). As South Africa approached its national elections in 2024, it called for an interesting time to delve deeper into the context on ground and gain insight from the perspectives of the international migrants on how they are dealing with these xenophobic narratives, realities, and contestations.

Scapegoating migrants is a worldwide phenomenon that has been studied through the lens of the scapegoating theory throughout various countries (Cecchi, 2019; Goodfellow, 2020; Greenslade, 2005; Korol et al., 2023). The scapegoating theory can be defined as *“an analysis of prejudice in which intergroup conflict is assumed to be caused, in part, by the tendency of individuals to blame their negative experiences on other groups”* (APA¹, 2024). Immigrants are often used as scapegoats for various society’s ills most frequently related to socio-economic inequalities, especially those involved in trade and commerce (Poppe, 2001). Other socio-economic inequalities relate most frequently to the high levels of unemployment, shortage of housing, levels of crime, and general welfare (Greenslade, 2005). Immigrants are often perceived as a group who ‘take’ more from a country than what they ‘give’, whereby nationals argue that this group is a high cost for the social support systems (Cecchi, 2019).

This scapegoating of migrants and the xenophobic incidents occurring in South Africa are problematic for the regional integration of the country and the continent at large (Moyo & Nshimbi, 2020). South Africa is a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), a regional bloc with an end goal of improving social, political, and economic cooperation through regional integration with the Southern African countries (Deda, 2019). The civil society has a crucial role to play in the regional integration of the SADC countries, and the xenophobic sentiments do not support the level of regional integration and free movement of people the SADC envisions (Shai et al. 2022). One of the main challenges the SADC currently faces is the participation of the civil society when it comes to regional programs or initiatives (Seck et al., 2016). People from the SADC countries, specifically Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa (as they receive the highest

¹ American Psychological Association

number of migrants) fear the regional integration of 'Free movement of people' as they feel immigrants from neighbouring countries will put more strain on the currently high levels of unemployment (Seck et al., 2016). This negative view towards migrants and extreme nationalist perspective also affects the African Union (AU) goals of creating regional citizenry and standing together as one (Moyo & Nshimbi, 2020; Seck et al., 2016).

In contradiction to the scapegoating myths that have been created about immigrants in South Africa, evidence has shown that immigrants actually contribute positively to South Africa's economic growth (approximately 9% of the GDP) and boost employment, as many working immigrants often create two local jobs (Kaziboni et al., 2022). To place this in a global context, Cecchi (2019) stated that in 2014, immigrants were responsible for 70% of the increase of jobs in Europe, and 47% of the increase in jobs in the US. In addition, as much as immigrants are often targeted in police operations and caught for minor crimes (e.g. Use/possession of drugs), they are less likely to commit serious crimes such as murder or rape in comparison to South African nationals (Kaziboni et al., 2022). Scapegoating migrants can backfire because it can result in more disappointment regarding other nationals and can decrease the trust in institutions (Boldrini et al., 2023). As the South African national elections are taking place this year, in 2024, it can be valuable to explore the current xenophobic trends and opinions from the international migrant's perspective for the body of research contributing to studies carried out post-elections.

The missing gap

There is a vast amount of research that emerged on xenophobia in South Africa after the 2008 nationwide xenophobic attacks. Much of this research focuses specifically on how this xenophobic sentiment has come about and researchers explore factors and causes of xenophobia in South Africa in relation to specific xenophobic incidents that have occurred since 2008 (Crush et al. 2008; Neocosmos 2010; Hewitt et al. 2020). The African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS) launched an open-source platform in 2016 called Xenowatch, to gain more insight into the number of xenophobic incidents occurring across the country. As much as this tool has been developed to analyse the xenophobic trends in South Africa, there is no clear criteria mentioned on the website to define what incidents are recorded as a xenophobic incident or a non-xenophobic incident. In addition, there is a lack of qualitative data from the perspective of international migrants residing in the townships and informal settlements of Cape Town. Specifically, townships such as Masiphumelele, lack research as it is a smaller and newer township further away from Cape Town's city centre. The Masiphumelele township consists of many international migrants and is challenged with the socio-economic inequalities, specifically regarding the high levels of unemployment. This socio-economic inequality is one of the factors that can lead to xenophobic incidents (Hewitt et al. 2020). In addition, Masiphumelele is a township that does not even have a police station (SA History, 2021) and it would be interesting to observe and decipher patterns and meanings of what the local context is on ground with regards to xenophobia, and its place in the daily lives of international migrants living in this township.

1.3 Research Question:

This section will elaborate on the research question, the sub-questions and the objectives of this study. The research question for this paper is:

“What are the perspectives and views of international migrants (with an African origin) living in Cape Town, about xenophobia (the evolution, patterns, triggers, and predictability) and how does it play out and influence their day-to-day sociocultural and economic interactions and decisions?”

Sub-questions:

- How do migrants perceive xenophobia as a concept and how does it affect their daily lives?
- What are the perspectives of migrants in regard to xenophobia in Cape Town versus other South African cities? What are the perceptions of xenophobia in Masiphumelele (township) as a case study?
- What factors influence the xenophobic trends in Cape Town according to international migrants?
- How do migrants perceive their sense of belonging in Cape Town, and by extension, South Africa?

Objectives:

- To explore what xenophobia means to migrants with an African origin and see if they perceive it as a problem, and to determine how migrants are affected by the xenophobic narrative in their daily lives.
- To examine the opinions and perspectives of international migrants in regard to the xenophobic trends; using Masiphumelele township as a case study (*where little research has been done and the number of migrants - specifically Zimbabweans and Malawians – are on the rise*).
- To critically examine the factors that lead to an increase in xenophobic behaviour/trends.
- To explore the depth of integration of migrants from their perspectives of living in Masiphumelele, and how they navigate their daily lives towards more integration irrespective of xenophobic pressures.
- To explore the width of the insider-outsider phenomenon through the lens of nationalism and tribalism and use this to contribute to the conceptual categorisations of xenophobia.

1.4 Paper Outline

This paper consists of five chapters to answer the research question and the sub-questions. The first chapter consists of the introduction, the statement of the problem, the research question, sub-questions, and research objectives of this study. The second chapter focuses on the theoretical and conceptual framework of this research, and it elaborates on the multi-disciplinarity of the research. The third chapter goes more in-depth on the contextualisation of the research providing a clear overview of the context of the locations, the demographics of the participants, the methodologies used, and the positionality of me as a researcher. The fourth chapter gives an overview of the thematic coding of the results and elaborates on these results through a discussion that links back to the theoretical framework and concepts discussed in the second chapter. Finally, the paper concludes with the fifth chapter by drawing conclusions and providing recommendations for further research.

Chapter 2: Academic Debate

2.1 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

Defining migrant, immigrant, and foreign-born nationals

The International Organisation of Migration (IOM) states that there is no universally accepted definition of a migrant, however for the purposes of this research the IOM definition of a migrant will be used (IOM, 2024). According to the IOM (2024) a migrant is “*an umbrella term, not defined under international law, reflecting the common lay understanding of a person who moves away from his/her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, for a variety of reasons.*” In this research, I will focus specifically international migrants, referring to people who have moved away from their usual place of residence and have crossed an international border into South Africa, where they are not nationals (IOM, 2024). Internal migrants will also be included in elements of the discussion and observations; however, the focus of this research lies on the international migrants residing in Cape Town. The reason I refer to migrants instead of immigrants is because immigrants are most commonly defined as “*a person who has come to a different country in order to live their permanently*” (Cambridge Dictionary, 2024; Oxford English Dictionary, 2024). In the case of migrants residing in South Africa, many of the international migrants have come to South Africa to look for better economic opportunities but do not necessarily have the intention of residing there permanently (International Organisation for Migration – IOM, 2013).

I will also be using this term interchangeably with foreign nationals or foreign-born migrants, whereby the OECD (2013) states foreign-born covers: “*all persons who have ever migrated from their country of birth to their current country of residence.*” Despite some stakeholders considering refugees and asylum seekers as migrants as well, it is important to highlight the distinction between the two terms. The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) recommends that the term migrant should not be used in the case of refugees because this group had fled under life- and/or freedom-threatening circumstances. In addition, refugees are classified and protected under a specific international legal framework, whereas the term ‘migrant’ is not defined under international law (UNHCR, 2022). This has led to various stakeholders using the term ‘migrant’ differently and not always providing a clear definition to which group is being referred to. This can lead to skewed and contradicting data as researchers loosely refer to the term ‘migrant’ without taking the time to clearly elaborate which groups fall under this term in their specific research. For the purposes of this research, I will be referring to the term ‘migrant’ or ‘international migrant’ using the IOM and OECD definitions as mentioned above, with the focus on migrants with an African origin.

Migration in South Africa

South Africa is one of the top leading destinations in Africa for international migrants (Dodson & Crush, 2015). In 2020, South Africa recorded a number of 2.8 million international migrants and has consistently experienced a positive net migration rate over the past years (UN DESA, 2020). This means that there have been more people migrating into South Africa in comparison to people emigrating out of South Africa. Important to note that this number does not include the undocumented migrants, which is estimated to be around 2 million according to SIHMA (2019). This figure was calculated through the support of the data collected by the Department of Home Affairs, comparing the number of foreign arrivals versus recorded departures. Most of the migrants, approximately 90%, have an African origin whereby the highest number of migrants come from Zimbabwe (SIHMA, 2019). Zimbabweans account for approximately 24% of the migrant population, followed by Mozambique (12%), Lesotho (7%), Malawi (3%), and the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Botswana, and Eswatini accounting for approximately 2% (UN DESA, 2020).

But international migrants in South Africa are often perceived negatively by the majority (57%) of the South African population (HSRC, 2020). Regardless of their immigrant status, South Africans often view immigrants as “illegal” or undocumented (Kaziboni, 2022). The most commonly used stereotypes are that migrants are criminal, diseased, job-stealers, and illegal. Migrants are seen as a threat to the lives of South African nationals and a threat to the securitisation of South Africa (Moyo, 2020). In addition, some believe that migrants are the cause of the high unemployment rates among the nationals of South Africa because migrants are ‘stealing’ their jobs (Myeni, 2022). The average unemployment rate for South Africans is approximately 27% (and approximately 30% for black South Africans) in comparison to foreign-born workers who have an average unemployment rate of 16% (SIHMA, 2019). Migrants are often more likely to take on low-skilled jobs or accept lower salaries compared to the South Africans, resulting in this difference in unemployment rates (SIHMA, 2019). These levels of inequality in socio-economic status contribute to the current xenophobic trends.

Xenophobia and the History of Xenophobia

Xenophobia is most commonly defined as “the extreme dislike or fear of foreigners” (Cambridge Dictionary, 2023). The term derives from the Ancient Greek language whereby ‘Xenos’ means foreigner or stranger, and ‘Phobos’ means fear (Bordeau, 2009). Xenowatch, an open-source South African platform recording xenophobic incidents, defines xenophobia as “*the fear or hatred of others based on ethnic, national, or racial background. It is a form of discrimination that manifests itself in violent and nonviolent ways against people from all background*” (Xenowatch, 2024). For the purposes of this research, the term “xenophobia” will refer to the Xenowatch definition as it is the platform that South Africa uses to record xenophobic incidents.

The term xenophobia stems from the Ancient Greek civilisations. At the time there was not a term that exactly matched “xenophobia” instead they used the term “xenelasia” which referred to the practice of expelling foreigners, particularly in the city Sparta. The dichotomy between Greeks and non-Greeks was foundational to ancient Greek identity and culture and Sparta’s xenophobic stance was grounded in practical concerns, fearing espionage and cultural erosion (Papanikos, 2020). Ancient texts corroborate the prevalence of xenophobia among Greeks and the differences among city-states, alongside political and social factors, contributed to variations in xenophobic attitudes (Papanikos, 2020).

Xenophobia has a long history in the global context, often intertwined with periods of social, economic, and political upheaval. Throughout history, xenophobia has manifested in various ways, such as discrimination and violence against religious and ethnic groups, racist attacks, the creation of hate groups, and even as extreme as genocide (Britannica, 2024). When looking at the global context, one of the most persistent forms of xenophobia is anti-Semitism, whereby Jews are targeted based on their religion and/or their ethnicity. The Holocaust is a tragic example of xenophobia’s extreme consequences, whereby Jews were systematically exterminated by the Nazis (Britannica, 2024).

In the current context of globalisation, xenophobia continues to persist across various countries and societies, whereby migrants and refugees often face a backlash from native citizens. An example of this is the islamophobia which gained a stronger presence after the September 11 attacks, whereby claims were made that Islamic practices were no longer compatible with the majority cultures. A more recent example is the anti-Asian discrimination and violence, driven by the fears of COVID-19, which originated in China. Within China, pandemic-related xenophobia also emerged, with foreigners facing discrimination and the government’s stringent disease control measures (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

In recent years, xenophobia has gained a growing presence in the political sphere. Far-right politicians have fuelled xenophobic sentiments and have advocated for exclusionary laws. This populist xenophobic ideology has hit the United States, France, Germany, and many other Western European countries (Beltran, 2017). There has been a noticeable surge in nationalist and xenophobic rhetoric, not only in the Third World or former communist states, but also in the most advanced liberal economies (Milisavljević, 2019). Xenophobia is a recurring phenomenon, shaped by social, economic and political factors. Despite progress being made in addressing xenophobia, it remains a persistent challenge that requires concentrated efforts to promote tolerance, diversity, and understanding in the global community.

Xenophobia, Racism, Afrophobia, Nationalism, and Ethnocentrism

To further unpack the definition of xenophobia, the term has been defined through the concepts of Racism, Afrophobia, Nationalism, and Ethnocentrism. Although xenophobia has an overlap with these concepts, it is important to highlight the distinction between these terms so that it is clear what is meant when using the

term xenophobia for the purposes of this research. Racism is defined through racial hierarchy, whereby one race is seen as superior over another race (Hewitt et al, 2020). “Race” refers to a group of people who share the same physical characteristics. The distinction between these physical characteristics is the framework that is used to determine which group/race you belong to and therefore your level of superiority within a society. Whereby racism emphasises on one racial group being superior over another/others, xenophobia’s focus lies specifically on the ‘fear’ and the ‘hatred’ towards the other. In a context involving racism, there can still be the acceptance of another racial group as long as they are kept physically and cognitively subordinate, whereas with xenophobia it revolves around the refusal and preferably removal of the “other” (Kaziboni, 2022). Whilst South Africa has actively focused on moving away from the racist regime of Apartheid, some researchers argue that the racism of South Africa’s Apartheid has formed the foundation of the xenophobia discourse and reality in the country (Kaziboni, 2022; Adjai & Lazaridis, 2013; Hewitt et al 2020). The reason why xenophobia in South Africa has a heavy overlap with racism is because the xenophobia in South Africa has a racist element to it. It is namely the black South Africans, 85% of South Africa’s population, who hold negative views towards other African migrants (Neocosmos, 2006). Tafira (2011) go as far as calling it “New Racism” whereby black people express racist attitudes towards other black people who are seen as socially/culturally inferior. Mngomezulu & Dube (2019) have a similar argument to support the need for acknowledging the racial element of South Africa’s xenophobia, but they refer to it as “Afrophobia” defined as ‘fear of the African’ whereby black South Africans hold negative attitudes towards other black Africans. Other researchers argue that xenophobia is a mutation of racism, shifting from the notion of biological superiority to a notion of exclusion due to cultural and or national difference, which relates to the concept of nationalism and what it means to be a South African (Adjai & Lazaridis, 2013). Kaziboni (2022) adds to this nationalism narrative by describing xenophobia as a negative consequence of democracy and nationalism which has led to xenophobic attitudes. Other examples on the African continent can be found in the form of nationalism in Cote d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe, ethnic cleansing in the DR Congo and Sudan, and the Rwandan genocide. Without understanding the complexities of identity politics and the role of nationalism, these violence-inducing phenomena may persist (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012)

More recent definitions of xenophobia indicate that the fear of foreigners and their influence is associated with ethnocentrism, which is marked by the belief that one’s own group or culture is superior to others (Yakushko, 2009). Xenophobia goes beyond the cultural comparisons inherent in ethnocentrism and manifests as an active fear, aversion, or dislike (Gao et al., 2024). Ethnocentrism can be seen through the framework of in-group biases, whereby favouritism and positive perceptions of one’s own group are promoted. There is a prevailing belief in the groups own superiority as the standard for assessing cultural differences (Jácome, 2020). Xenophobia is more applicable to the out-group biases, this involves negative attitudes and behaviours towards those perceived as different or outside of one’s social group, it disparages and stereotypes foreigners (Gao et al., 2024; Jácome, 2020). Xenophobia can arise alongside or as an alternative to ethnocentrism (Bravo, 2014).

Ethnic Competition Hypothesis

One important school of thought used by some studies is that of an anti-immigrant sentiment, which can lead to xenophobic behaviour, can arise due to the ethnic competition hypothesis, also sometimes referred to as the ethnic competition theory. Case studies carried out in Sweden, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, and various studies from the US have collected data to support this hypothesis (Abbondanza & Bailo, 2018; Belanger & Pinard, 1991; Gaddis & Ghoshal, 2015; Rydgren & Ruth, 2011; Savelkoul et al. 2011). The ethnic competition hypothesis is related to the key claims of competition theorists who state that “changes in levels of ethnic and racial competition for valued resources - such as jobs, houses, and marital partners - ignite ethnic collective action” (Olzak, 1994). In the case of South Africa, this ethnic collective action took place through the Black South Africans acting against other black Africans during the 2008 nationwide attacks in South Africa. Although related to the competition theorist claims, the definition of the ethnic competition hypothesis (also known as ethnic competition theory or ethnic competition thesis) states that “voters turn to the radical right-wing populist parties because they want to reduce competition from immigrants over scarce resources such as in the labour market, housing, welfare benefits, and even the marriage market” (Rydgren & Ruth, 2011). The ethnic competition hypothesis is more likely to take place in areas with a higher presence of immigrants as well as a higher number of lower-educated and lower-skilled voters who might experience competition from immigrants (Fennema, 2005; Abbondanza & Bailo, 2018). Another example of this is a study carried out in the US whereby discrimination against Arab-Americans was more likely to occur in neighbourhoods that had a higher concentration of Arabs and mosques (Gaddis & Ghoshal, 2015). This can now be seen in the South African political climate, as ANC is losing their power and anti-immigrant political parties such as Operation Dudula are gaining a growing following (Myeni, 2022). There is currently much criticism of ANCs service delivery, and many black South Africans feel threatened by the presence of international migrants (Madue, 2015).

Furthermore, black foreigners are seen as an undesirable “other” and are often identified as not fitting in with the South African identity. After the Apartheid ending in 1994, South Africa faced the challenge of looking beyond race and creating a unified national identity, also known as the Rainbow nation (Dahlberg & Thapar-Björkert 2023). This has simultaneously led to a discourse that focuses on who is *not* South African (Dahlberg & Thapar-Björkert 2023). Many immigrants living in South Africa do not feel safe to express their own ethnolinguistic identities. They learn the South African languages and try to hide their accent so that they “fit in” with the (black) South Africans and are not seen as “foreigner” (Hankela, 2020). Hiding their own identity can be used as a way of avoiding discrimination. Many immigrants therefore live in constant fear and do not feel accepted within the South African society (Hankela, 2020). There exists a thin line separating the outcomes of private efforts at linguistic integration and state-imposed language requirements for full integration of a foreign national in host societies. While this is an interesting academic

angle for research, linguistic integration is not the main subject of inquiry of this thesis, thus it is not examined in depth in the study of xenophobia.

Factors Influencing Xenophobic Trends in South Africa

Xenophobia can be seen as a social issue that emerges in specific economic and/or political contexts (AIDC, 2019). Xenophobia arises or can be triggered through a variety of factors. Some of the most commonly mentioned factors are economic distress/inequalities, pressures related to immigration, and an increase in notions of nationalism/nativism (Bordeau, 2009). Research shows that the most prominent factors leading to xenophobia in South Africa are the economic inequalities and the tendency to link criminality with foreigners (Solomon & Kosaka, 2013). Xenophobia often arises during periods of economic and political instability (Achem et al., 2022). Economic disparities drive people to migrate to countries with better earnings prospects or survival chances, while political, economic, and cultural tensions push them to seek new lands (Yakushko, 2009). This influx can make host communities feel threatened, perceiving economic strain or cultural differences through fears of reduced economic resources, rapid demographic changes, and decreased political influence (Yakushko, 2009). When irrational fear and arbitrariness guide actions, even minor provocations can spark violence. This may explain why xenophobia has sometimes led to catastrophic conflicts, e.g. War, genocides, ethnic cleansing (Achem et al., 2022). Foreigners in South Africa, particularly black African foreigners, are often scapegoated as the reason for crime, housing problems, and the high unemployment rates of South African nationals (Solomon & Kosaka, 2013). Whereby migrants in South Africa are most commonly accused of ‘stealing jobs’ (BBC, 2019).

Xenophobic behaviours are often fuelled through anti-immigrant statements made by South African politicians and high-profile people (Kaziboni et al., 2022). Political leaders scapegoat immigrants when it comes to socio-economic challenges because it shifts the public's discontent and covers up the government's shortcomings with a narrative of an outside group for a country's internal challenges (Cecchi, 2019). When public authorities portray migration as a crisis, it strengthens the already prevalent xenophobic sentiment (Hiropoulos, 2020). This has been shown through the failure of South African government officials to safeguard foreigners, excluding foreigners from basic governmental services, and the strict immigration procedures whereby arrest and deportation are used as a method of managing migration (Hiropoulos, 2020).


Xenophobia Incidents in South Africa (1994 - present date)

The first nationwide xenophobic attack took place in 2008, starting in one of the townships in Johannesburg and quickly spreading to other townships and informal settlements throughout the country. This attack mostly targeted migrants from Malawi, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe (Neocosmos, 2010). 62 people were killed, and hundreds of migrants were injured or had their houses and/or businesses destroyed and thousands were displaced (Hayem, 2013). Before 2008 there were also xenophobic incidences, but this attack was the

first nationwide attack. A year later in 2009, a group of 1500-2500 Zimbabwean farm workers were removed from their homes in a grape-farming town located in the Western Cape province (Misago, 2009). In 2015 there was a rise in xenophobic attacks Johannesburg (Gauteng province) and Durban (KwaZulu-Natal province) and spreading to the Eastern Cape province later that year. In 2019 there was another upsurge of xenophobic attacks in Johannesburg and Durban leading to 640 Nigerians taking free flights offered by the Nigerian government back to Nigeria (Reuters, 2019). In addition, xenophobic statements have been made by various political leaders of opposition parties during the 2019 national elections which created a fertile ground for anti-immigrant movement, such as Operation Dudula to emerge (Myeni, 2022). These anti-immigrant movements use a xenophobic narrative to gain a higher following of South African nationals causing the current leading political party African National Congress (ANC) to lose power.

Despite the South African government not actively recording or collecting data in regard to xenophobia, the xenophobic trends in the country can be analysed through the documentation of the African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS). The ACMS have attempted to monitor and record the xenophobic attacks that have occurred since 1994, when the Apartheid ended. In 2016 they launched an open-source platform called Xenowatch, whereby any person who has seen or experienced a xenophobic incident, can report this to the Xenowatch platform through call, email, or WhatsApp (Xenowatch, 2024). Although this platform can provide some insight into the xenophobic incidents that took place from 1994-present date, it can be argued that many incidents have not been documented or take place without it being recorded. There are also no clear criteria on the Xenowatch platform of what is considered a xenophobic incident, and the incidents that are recorded do not have the details of what type of incident it was and against which foreign group. Out of South Africa's nine provinces, Gauteng has been recorded as the province with the highest number of documented xenophobic incidents, with the Western Cape recorded as second highest province, closely followed by KwaZulu-Natal (Xenowatch, 2024). The recorded incidents are mostly found in the largest cities of these provinces; Johannesburg in Gauteng, Cape Town in the Western Cape, and Durban in KwaZulu-Natal. Important to mention that Gauteng is also the province with the highest migrant percentage (52%) whereby black Africans are more likely to live in Gauteng in comparison to the other provinces. Following Gauteng is the Western Cape with 12% of the migrant population residing in this province, and thirdly 8% of the migration population living in KwaZulu-Natal (SIHMA, 2019).

Figure 1 showing the xenophobic incidents that have been recorded in Cape Town from 1994-present




(Xenowatch, 2024)

Figure 1 gives an overview of the xenophobic incidents that have been recorded in Cape Town. The data shows that the incidents have taken place most frequently in the Khayelitsha township and surrounding townships/informal settlements. It also shows that there have been a number of xenophobic cases in the Masiphumelele township, making this township a good starting point for this research. Xenophobic incidents are often linked to proximity as many foreigners live in poor regions that lack access to services, often known as the townships (Mbuyisa, 2021).


As mentioned earlier, xenophobic incidents are most likely to occur in townships and/or informal settlements (Shoyisa & Ilesanmi, 2021). Not only are these the areas where migrants often reside, but these are also areas where many black South Africans live and where high levels of unemployment and population density can be found. These are important factors to take in consideration when studying the xenophobic trends in the townships of Cape Town. This is shown through figure 2, figure 3, and figure 4 on the following page.

Figure 2 showing the ethnicity distribution in Cape Town (White, Coloured, Indian/Asian, Black)




(SAHO, 2023)

Figure 3 showing the population density in Cape Town



(Scheba et al, 2021)

Figure 4 showing the percentage of unemployed in Cape Town



(Lloyd et al, 2021)

Current Context of Xenophobia in South Africa

The purpose of this study is to get deeper insight into the experiences, the encounters and the current context of African migrants living in Cape Town in relation to xenophobia. The fieldwork for the study was conducted in the run up to the national elections of South Africa, which took place on the 29th of May 2024. The previous presidential election of 2019 caused a flare up of xenophobic attacks (Davis, 2019) and I was interested in documenting what the sentiment would be like leading up to this year’s national elections in 2024, given past experiences. In addition, the emergence of the political party Operation Dudula, known as an anti-immigrant, vigilant movement, captured my attention. This movement had a ‘loud’ presence in 2021,

and specifically 2022, yet interestingly enough they barely appeared on the News24² platform in 2023 and 2024.³ This finding will be further elaborated on in the discussion chapter of this paper, in light of the interviews held with the respondents.

Xenophobic violence in South Africa has been most prominent in major urban areas where the socio-economic pressures are high and where there are significant populations of migrants (SIHMA, 2019). Johannesburg (Gauteng province) and Durban (KwaZulu-Natal province) are two major cities that are mentioned most frequently throughout xenophobia studies carried out in South Africa as these two cities are where the xenophobic nationwide attacks started⁴ (Bekker, 2015). In 2008, Cape Town (Western Cape province) was particularly susceptible following the series of violent incidents in the Gauteng province. However, in 2015 there were no apparent violent xenophobic outbursts in Cape Town as many had temporarily departed from their residences in response to the violent xenophobic rumours coming from Durban and Johannesburg (Bekker, 2015). This led me to question why nationwide xenophobic upsurges have not originated in Cape Town and question if there is a difference in the xenophobia manifestations in Cape Town. This led me to my research question:

“What are the perspectives and views of international migrants (with an African origin) living in Cape Town, about xenophobia (the evolution, patterns, triggers, and predictability) and how does it play out and influence their day-to-day sociocultural and economic interactions and decisions?”

2.2 Multi-disciplinarity

The concept xenophobia is in itself a multi-disciplinary concept. In this paper, framing of the concept are considered in the following disciplines: History, Economics, Sociology, Geography, Politics. In the conceptual framework I explored the history of xenophobia, its origins, and the history of migration in South Africa. This section also relates to economics because most of the migrants have come to South Africa to look for better economic opportunities. In sociological constructs, the concept of xenophobia is examined via racism, tribalism, and the ethnic competition hypothesis. Geography is a discipline that emerges more strongly during the general discussion of the results whereby there is a focus on the differentiation between and within townships and suburbs. Lastly, I also look at xenophobia through a socio-political lens by looking at concepts such as nationalism and identity politics. In regard to politics, the study also took place during an interesting time leading up to the 2024 national elections of South Africa which took place in May 2024. In the context of my research, I also take this multi-disciplinary approach through the methodologies used whereby I analyse xenophobia through wide scope of sources: papers, articles, documentaries, social media expressions, personal interviews, and observation on ground.

² News24 is the most widely read news platform in South Africa (SimilarWeb, 2023)

³ When I carried out a discourse analysis on the news platform News24, I discovered that Operation Dudula was frequently mentioned in the news in 2022 (157 posts) in comparison to 2023 (32 posts) and 2024 (13 posts). There was also a BBC documentary created about Operation Dudula (BBC News Africa, 2023).

⁴ In 2008 the xenophobic attacks started in a township in Johannesburg and in 2015 the nationwide attack started in Durban (Bekker, 2015).

Chapter 3: Contextualization

3.1 Location

Cape Town

Cape Town has a rich and complex ethnographic history that is shaped by centuries of colonization, migration, and cultural interactions. Figures 2, 3, and 4 found in Chapter 1 illustrate the current context of Cape Town in regard to ethnicity distribution, population density, and the percentage of unemployment rates presented in visual graphs of Cape Town. To elaborate on these figures, it is important to mention that Cape Town is made up of suburbs, townships, and informal settlements. In South Africa the term suburb is used to refer to neighbourhoods, smaller geographical subdivisions of the city (Worden et al., 1998). The term township in South Africa derives from the Apartheid Era the Group Areas Act of 1950 whereby “white residential areas, generally situated in more favourable localities, occupied most of the urban space, while other sectors and peripheral localities were set aside for non-whites; many of these latter areas were initially devoted to segregated public-housing estates called *townships*” (Britannica, 2024). Informal settlements are “residential areas that do not comply with local authority requirements for conventional (formal) townships. They are, typically, unauthorised and are invariably located upon land that has not been proclaimed for residential use” (Adlard, n.d.). Cape Town consists of about 437 informal settlements or townships, these are often places where citizens are forced to live and usually have a high population density (Clarke, 2016). Approximately 60% of Cape Town’s population reside in a township or an informal settlement (Baker, 2019). According to Charman & Piper (2012) xenophobia is more likely to occur in townships or informal settlements because of the intense economic competition, high levels of unemployment, and prevalence of criminal activities in these areas.

Masiphumelele Township

A lot of research has been carried out in Johannesburg, Durban, and Pretoria, as these are cities where a lot of the xenophobia, and the violent xenophobic attacks arise. Cape Town does not appear in the news or journal articles as frequently as the other cities when it comes to the violent manifestation of xenophobia (News24, 2023). Does this imply that there is “less” xenophobia in Cape Town versus other cities. Yet, when looking at the Xenowatch statistics dashboard, the Western Cape province stands as the region with the second highest recorded number of xenophobic attacks, with most of the attacks occurring in Cape Town – the largest city in the Western Cape province. It is necessary to collect the views and perspectives of migrants currently living in Cape Town as they can shed more light on the current dynamics of xenophobia

and how it affects their daily lives, if at all. The starting point for this research took place in the Masiphumelele township, one of the more recent townships situated in Cape Town.

Masiphumelele is a township where many migrants reside, with a high number of Zimbabweans and Malawians, yet little research has been carried out in this township (Projekt Ubuntu, 2024). Masiphumelele means “we will succeed” in Xhosa, South Africa’s second most spoken language out of their 11 official languages (SAHO, 2023). Masiphumelele was originally formed in the 1980s when 400-500 black people decided to create the first informal settlement in this area. Under the apartheid laws they were chased away, however after Apartheid ended, these people started to move back, to what was then called Site 5, and named it Masiphumelele (SAHO, 2019). There is currently no accurate data of the exact population of Masiphumelele township, as residents in townships are often sceptical of the census data and do not want to participate in these national data collections. However, NGOs working in the area estimate the population to be at around 35,000 people, whereby 30% are foreign nationals and it is not clear how many migrants currently reside in Masiphumelele, as foreign nationals are a sub-group of migrants in South Africa (Freedom House, 2017). Although it is one of the smaller townships of Cape Town, it is very multicultural and has seen an influx of foreign nationals over the past years, mostly with migrants who have an African origin (Freedom House, 2017).

3.2 Data Collection and Participants

The data collection process was divided into two phases. The first phase was the identification of Uber taxi drivers of foreign origin. These Uber drivers were targeted because of their constant interaction with the traveling public who use apps to hail taxi services. The digital intermediary between the customer and the eventual driver serves as an unintended objective barrier, that precludes prejudice of race, class, and religious divides. Eventual meeting between the taxi driver and service user marks the turning point in their commercial and social interaction. More importantly here, is the social impression the interaction leaves with the driver of foreign origin, particularly on the subject of xenophobia. Thus, I embarked on collecting the demographics of fifty Uber drivers and briefly asked them about their perspectives/views in regard to xenophobia and about their social relationship with South Africans. In addition, the pool of Uber drives provided an unusually large data set of African foreigners, as almost none of the Uber drivers in Cape Town were South African. cursory observation and interaction also indicate that most of these drivers come from Zimbabwe. A register of Uber drivers was not obtainable at the ‘Ministry of Transport’ or the ‘taxi licensing authority’, thus a reliance on personal observations for choice-making in the interview process. Collecting data through Uber drivers proved to be particularly effective, as it inherently created a safe and private environment for participants. Conducting interviews in the comfort of their own cars allowed drivers to share openly, without the presence of external listeners, thereby providing them with a sense of control in a safe space. Each participant was asked for permission and provided verbal informed consent before their demographic information was included in the research.

Table 1 showing the origin of the Uber Drivers

Origin	Number of participants
Zimbabwe	33
Somalia	5
South Africa	5
Rwanda	4
Malawi	2
Congo	1
Total	50

About two-thirds (66%) of the Uber drivers that I encountered originated from Zimbabwe. This could be attributed to the fact that I was traveling mostly to and from the township Masiphumelele, where my internship was based. Masiphumelele was also coined in one of the interviews as ‘Little Zimbabwe’, so it is known to be an area where many Zimbabweans reside. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence in and around Cape Town indicate that most of the Uber drivers are foreign with a high majority being Zimbabwean. Interesting to note that the five South Africans were all internal migrants; whereby two originated from the Eastern Cape, one from KwaZulu-Natal, and two from Johannesburg. This means that none of the Uber drivers from this study had origins in Cape Town. Figure 1 shows a map of the areas where the respondents are living in

Cape Town. This provides more insight when exploring reasons as to why some respondents experience xenophobia and others do not.




Figure 1 showing the living areas in Cape Town of the Uber drivers

Approximately one-third (fifteen participants) were living in the Masiphumelele township. This provided a more detailed insight into the current context of the Masiphumelele township in relation to xenophobia.

The second phase of the data collection process consisted of nineteen in-depth semi-structured interviews. Eleven of these interviews were conducted with Uber drivers (seven from Zimbabwe - whereby one had grown up in SA her whole life, two from South Africa, one from Rwanda, one from Congo). The limitation of this method of data collection are two-fold; firstly, Uber drivers can only be met at their job spaces, which means that I had to hail an Uber; also, all the Uber drivers were males, which meant that I was only getting a male perspective. Through convenience sampling I was able to interview four female international migrants residing in other areas of Cape Town. The last four interviews were conducted with larger stakeholders (Xenowatch, two representatives in a combined interview of an international organisation that I met in official capacity (but do not want the organisation's name to be published), and two research experts, both based in South Africa, researching the topics of xenophobia and/or international migrants. In addition, two of the interviews included an element of the focus group interview technique, whereby the interviews were informally held with three to four people. Ideally, focus group discussions by methodological definition

should comprise of five to ten participants (Krueger, 2014). On this occasion, attaining the minimum number was not possible, yet the topic at hand would profit better from a research moderated discussion. Thus, I went ahead with conducting a focus group discussion with four participants.

The interviews focused on gaining insight on the current views and perspectives of international migrants, specifically Zimbabweans (as they are the largest migrant group), in relation to xenophobia and how it affects or does not affect their daily lives. The respondents were found through the snow-balling method, convenience sampling, and using the community network of Projekt Ubuntu. In addition, observation was also used as a method for data collection, observing the behaviours in different townships and having conversations with diverse locals to get a broader perspective of the current context.

The Xenowatch open-source platform was consistently used throughout this study to quantitatively collect and analyse the current xenophobic trends. Through interviewing the program director of the Xenowatch platform I was able to gain a more thorough understanding of this platform and how it is currently being used.

3.3 Limitations of Data Collection

During the data collection process one of the biggest limitations, I faced was that not everyone was willing or open to have their interview recorded. This led to a high number of informal discussions that created a wide scope of perspectives and views, however these discussions were not thoroughly documented compared to the transcribed interviews. I overcame this limitation by taking notes directly after an interaction to ensure that the information could be used as part of my observations in addition to the transcribed interviews. Another limitation was the lack of female participants, it was easy to find male participants through Uber, however it was much harder to find willing female participants as many were afraid or shy to share their perspective. I also did various attempts to interview foreigners who were selling arts & crafts along the street in different areas, however I quickly came to realize that people did not feel comfortable to share information in such an 'open setting.' Looking back, the method of collecting data through Uber proved to provide richer data because the participants felt comfortable to speak openly in the closed space of their car.

Another limitation was that I was not able to walk around freely in the Masiphumelele township due to safety measures, and this limited the type of interviews and more importantly informal discussion I could have had with people living in that township. I also did not manage to interview people from the townships that were considered more 'dangerous' according to the participants. These areas included Cape Flats, Khayelitsha, Gugulethu, and Delft. This is because it was not safe to drive there on my own, and Uber drivers were unwilling to drive there in fear for their safety. Getting respondents from these areas would have shed more light on the discussion between non-violent versus violent xenophobic behaviours found in Cape Town.

3.4 Method of Data Analysis

The analysis of the collected data from phase 1 of the data collection process is carried out through presenting the collected verbal quantitative data (that was obtained from the interviews with the Uber drivers) in an excel sheet. These statistics were subjected to easy-to-decipher means of central tendencies and in relation to the background demographics/social statistics of the respondents. In addition, the notes of conversation have been included in this sheet to analyse how specific demographics can have an influence on the level of xenophobia experienced by each stakeholder.

With regards to the qualitative data collection, the in-depth semi-structured interviews were transcribed and subjected to content analysis, discourse analysis, and narrative analysis. The methods of content analysis and discourse analysis were used to identify similar and contrasting patterns and themes between the participants. Through narrative analysis I described the observed feelings and bodily expressions of the participants to contextualise their responses.

3.5 Ethical Considerations

During my research it was crucial to keep in mind that xenophobia can be a sensitive topic for migrants to talk about. I needed to acknowledge that not everyone was willing to share information in regard to this topic and that some people did not want the interviews to be recorded out of fear. Some migrants were open to do an interview but did not want to be recorded. In addition, it was important that the semi-structured interviews were conducted in a safe space, where people felt comfortable and at ease to share their perspectives and opinions.

Informed consent took place through verbal recordings and agreements for participants to take part in the study and consent was always asked if interviews were recorded. Participants were always informed that their data could always be removed at later stages in the process if they did not feel comfortable sharing specific aspects of the interview. In addition, I have ensured their confidentiality and their anonymity during the data analyses and discussion of the findings.

3.6 Reflexivity

Throughout the data collection process, I gained a heightened awareness of my positionality as a researcher. At the beginning, I often used my own story as an introduction to break the ice and find grounds of connection by telling the participant that I am a Dutch person by nationality, but I have lived in Tanzania for most of my life and it is the place I call home. I quickly realised that this personal introduction often created a sense of commonality and provided a useful technique in making the interview a safe space to share. I also discovered the power of informality as I guided interviews to making people feel at ease so that they are more open to share and discuss a sometimes-challenging topic such as xenophobia. As much as being an

'outsider' in South Africa myself, it was also a barrier to gaining a deeper insight into the current context. On one hand, it was useful in getting perspectives of foreigners on the concept; on the other hand, not growing up in South Africa made me realize the gap that I have in the lived experience of immigrants, the complexity of South Africa's history and eventually the slight nuances when it comes to discussing a topic like xenophobia can sometimes be challenging to fathom. I came to Cape Town thinking I would only be discussing xenophobia, but I often ended up leaving an interview with deeper philosophical questions circling back to what xenophobia even means as a word and reflecting on our societies system through topics such as nationalism, tribalism, insider/outsider concepts.

Chapter 4: Findings and Discussion

4.1 Results

This chapter will focus on the findings derived from the fieldwork carried out in Cape Town, South Africa. The results are divided into two phases to further explore the different themes that emerged during the two phases of data collection. The first phase represents the verbal quantitative data collection of fifty Uber drivers working in Cape Town. The second phase focuses on data collected from the nineteen semi-structured in-depth interviews. For phases I used thematic coding as a methodology to uncover and further explore overlapping themes that emerged during this phase of data collection. The program used for this thematic data analysis was Dovetail, an online coding program for qualitative data analysis. The two phases can also be found in table format in the annex section. This results section focuses on showing the findings through quote examples and uncovering key themes that emerged from both phases, whereas the discussion section (*see page 35*) will delve deeper into the analysis of these findings.

4.1.1 - Phase 1: Thematic coding of the Uber drivers' perspectives on xenophobia

During the verbal quantitative data collection with the fifty Uber drivers there were eight themes that emerged as common themes. These eight themes will be elaborated on during the Discussion section, however this section gives a brief overview of the themes that will be discussed when answering the sub-questions of this study:

- 1) Reasons for moving to Cape Town
- 2) Xenophobia experiences
- 3) South Africans and foreigners
- 4) Social life
- 5) The concept of home and describing where home is
- 6) Politics and the South African government
- 7) Unsafe areas, crime, and gangsterism
- 8) Protection fee and/or business fee

Each theme will be shortly summarized below in light of the key findings with some example quotes. Further elaboration on the findings can be found in the Discussion section (*see page 35*) of this chapter.

1) Reasons for moving to Cape Town

Many foreigners, and also the internal migrants, who were a part of this study (due to convenience sampling of Uber drivers), move to Cape Town for the purpose of economic opportunity. Often the context in their home country or region (for internal migrants), does not allow them to secure jobs or earn money, so they

come to Cape Town to find these opportunities. The respondents coming from Zimbabwe also travelled back home to Zimbabwe regularly as can be seen in one of the quotes below:

“I’m just here for work, I always go back home at least once a year, and then I go for 2-3 months” - Male from Zimbabwe, living in Cape Town since 2009, currently resides in Masiphumelele (township)

In addition, most of the Uber drivers already had family connections in Cape Town so it was easier to move to Cape Town.

“I first worked in Joburg, but my uncle told me to move to Cape Town. I prefer Cape Town because it’s more relaxed here, safer, and there are more job opportunities” - Male from Zimbabwe, living in Cape Town since 2009, living in Mitchell’s Plain (township)

These examples show that the main reason respondents move to Cape Town is for economic opportunity. This is an important theme for the xenophobia discussion as ‘stealing jobs’ is one of the key arguments local South Africans use against foreigners. This will be elaborated on in the Discussion section.

2) Xenophobia experiences

Xenophobia is more likely to be present in the townships and never seem to happen in the suburbs according to the respondents. People often have not experienced violent xenophobic manifestations personally, but they have all heard stories or have relatives who have been attacked. These stories make them feel fearful and unsafe living in South Africa, and especially those living in the townships:

“Here you can’t sleep. You must always watch out here.” - Male from Zimbabwe, in Cape Town since 2009, resides in Ocean View (township)

And those living in the suburbs of Cape Town often fear the living situations in the townships, especially as a foreigner. This can be seen through the following quote:

“There is no xenophobia here, that was way back in 2007/2008 - but I stay in Steenberg (a suburb). Maybe in the townships you will experience it...but you shouldn’t live there” - Male from Malawi, in Cape Town since 2012, resides in Steenberg (suburb)

In addition, when asking about xenophobia experiences most of the respondents referred to other cities as having more xenophobia, such as Johannesburg and/or Durban. In the quote below this is explained through the higher presence of internal migrants residing in Cape Town changing the xenophobia dynamics because internal migrants can also be considered as foreigners in Cape Town:

“There is xenophobia here but not like in Johannesburg. The black South Africans here are mostly from the Eastern Cape, so that they are also internal foreigners here, which changes the dynamics as well” - Male from Somalia, in Cape Town since 2011, resides in Bellville (urban area)

3) South Africans and Foreigners

There is a clear divide between migrants (with an African origin) and local South Africans. The respondents from this study often described the South Africans as xenophobic, lazy, and jealous. This can be seen through the following two quotes presented below:

“I don’t smoke, I don’t drink beer, and most of the South Africans they drink and party almost every day” - Male from Zimbabwe, in Cape Town since 2007, resides in Masiphumelele (township)

“Xhosa people hate us because we are making money. Xhosa people don’t want to work and they’re not patient - they need easy things.” - Male from Zimbabwe, in Cape Town since 2015, resides in Masiphumelele (township)

As mentioned earlier, Masiphumelele is a township where many Xhosa people and African migrants reside. This creates an interesting dynamic because the Xhosa people are originally from the Eastern Cape province and can also be considered as a ‘foreigner’ in Cape Town. Despite both parties being a migrant, the Xhosa people and the international migrants generally do not integrate according to the respondents of this study.

4) Social life

Most of the Uber drivers are focused solely on work and earning money so that they can have a better life. This leaves little time for social interactions and the focus lies heavily on work, their wives (since all the Uber drivers but one were male), and their children. Many respondents have also found their wives in Cape Town (usually from the same origin in the case of this dataset) and started families while living and working in Cape Town:

“Found my wife here, she’s also from Rwanda.” - Male from Rwanda, in Cape Town since 2015, resides in Salt River (suburb)

“I only came with my wife from Zimbabwe, but now we have 3 children here” - Male from Zimbabwe, in Cape Town since 2007, resides in Masiphumelele (township)

“My husband is also from Congo and we both work in Uber, we have 5 children to take care of” - Female from Congo, living in Cape Town since 2000, did not want to mention the living area

“My wife is also from Somalia. We have 6 kids and they were all born here” - Male from Somalia, living in Cape Town since 2009, currently resides in Mitchell’s Plain (township)

In addition, Uber drivers are generally not interested in making friends because they do not trust people. There seems to be a high level of distrust among most of the respondents, which could potentially link back to feeling unsafe.

“I have no friends. I am just here to work and focus on the family.” - Male from Zimbabwe, living in Cape Town since 2005, currently resides in Masiphumelele (township)

5) The Concept of Home and Describing Where Home is

For the Zimbabwean respondents of this dataset, all of them still considered Zimbabwe as home and usually go back at least once a year. Many respondents also send money they make back home to Zimbabwe to relatives or to start new projects back home (e.g. building houses, building businesses). Hereby three quotes to illustrate how respondents reacted to the theme of ‘home.’

“I miss home, home is always the best. But the situation won’t allow” - Male from Zimbabwe, in Cape Town since 2014, resides in Masiphumelele (township)

“I am building a house in Zim to one day move back there” - Male from Zimbabwe, in Cape Town since 2009, resides in Ocean View

“I didn’t move here. I just came to work here. Here I can work, in Malawi the economy is not good for work” - Male from Malawi, in Cape Town since 2007, resides in Rondebosch (suburb)

For the Somalians and the Rwandans of this dataset, the respondents mentioned that they missed their home (country of origin) but also saw Cape Town as another home. The internal migrants, South Africans, from this dataset still considered their own region or province as home and usually go back and forth quite frequently; every three months or at least twice a year.

6) Politics and the South African Government

All the respondents were strongly opinionated about the South African government and its flaws. Particularly the Zimbabweans emphasized on struggling with the paperwork and not being able to get the right permits or the correct documents to be able to work and live in South Africa, Cape Town. This can be seen from the following quote below:

“It’s very difficult to get papers here. Even a work permit.” - Male from Zimbabwe, living in Cape Town since 2007, currently resides in Masiphumelele (township)

In addition, many respondents mentioned anti-immigrant parties or movements but explained that these movements were more active in Johannesburg and Durban without clear reasoning as to why this is, however I will expand on this topic in the Discussion section.

7) Unsafe Areas, Crime, and Gangsterism

All the respondents spent a good amount of time expanding on the theme of crime and argued that the levels of crime go beyond xenophobia as South Africans are also engaging in criminal activities against each other. This usually led to the topic of gangsterism and its influence on the city and various townships of Cape Town. Hereby three quotes to illustrates the unsafe areas and level of crime occurring in various areas across Cape Town:

“I don’t pick up people from the Cape Flats. They robbed me 2 times at the Cape Flats” - Male from Zimbabwe, in Cape Town since 2014, resides in Masiphumelele (township)

“Problems are mostly in the townships. Masiphumelele is a better township though. Khayelitsha, Gugulethu, Philipi, and Delft is problematic! Those are so bad; you can’t come out alive.” - Male from Somalia, in Cape Town since 2011, resides in Bellville (urban area)

“My Uber got hijacked twice. At the Cape Flats I had a situation with 6 men robbing me. I feel like the crime situation in South Africa will only get worse” - Male from Johannesburg, South Africa, living in Cape Town since 2023

The most commonly listed unsafe areas were some of the larger townships in Cape Town (e.g. Cape Flats, Khayelitsha, Gugulethu). There was a clear consensus among the respondents regarding the most unsafe areas in Cape Town.

8) *Protection Fee and/or Business Fee*

Protection fees and business fees is a theme that emerged consistently throughout this phase of data collection with the Uber drivers. This is a fee that foreigners have to pay to local South Africans (often a gangster group according to the respondents) to protect their lives or their business in the areas that they live/work. Hereby two examples that illustrate this implementation of the protection fee:

“Even the taxi drivers collect 500R for every Uber that comes into Masiphumelele” - Male from Zimbabwe, living in Cape Town since 2016, residing in Masiphumelele.

“We were 3 of us and they shot all of us, just to injure us but not to kill. They then came back asking for protection fee.” - Male from Somalia, living in Cape Town since 2011, currently resides in Belville.

It seems to be becoming a more frequently used system in recent years, almost becoming the “new norm.” Various participants explained that the protection fee is a relatively new concept that some (not all) of the respondents are encountering.

“All people doing business in Masiphumelele they have to pay protection fee for their businesses. Two years ago, there was no protection fee. This thing started after lockdown, in Khayelitsha, and from there it spread” - Male from Zimbabwe, living in Cape Town since 2014, currently resides in Masiphumelele.

Important to note that this system is not part of any legal framework and is being implemented by local South Africans themselves. Despite this system possibly lowering the violent manifestations of xenophobic incidences, it can be considered as a more covert and subtle manifestation of xenophobia.

4.1.2 - Phase 2: Semi-structured in-depth interviews (nineteen participants)

For the second phase of the data collection process (in-depth interviews), I used thematic coding to explore the perspectives and views of foreign-born migrants and how it affects their daily lives. Since four of the interviews were also held with larger stakeholders, or researching institutes, I analysed the cross-cutting themes mentioned by the respondents and by the researching institutes. The cross-cutting themes that emerged from these interviews included:

- 1) Defining xenophobia
- 2) The level of xenophobia is location-dependent
- 3) Dependency systems are decreasing the prevalence of xenophobic violence
- 4) The role of tribalism and ethnicity
- 5) Politics and the South African government
- 6) Daily life (work and social life)

Some of these themes overlap with the previous phase carried out with the fifty Uber drivers. These themes will be combined and brought together in the Discussion section of this paper. This section will continue to delve into expanding on the themes listed above with quote examples from the respondents.

1) *Defining xenophobia*

Respondents had different ideas about the definition of xenophobia and what behaviours are considered xenophobic. Most of the respondents referred to the term with the interpretation of ‘xenophobic violence’ and did not initially consider other manifestation of xenophobia. However, when questioned further, it became clear that other more covert and subtle manifestations of xenophobia are indeed present in their daily lives:

“You see, they just want to steal money from us. That’s the problem we are now experiencing on this side with the taxi owners. Now thinking about it, it is actually like xenophobia. You know most of the Uber drivers are foreigners, so they take that advantage. Just to take money from us... [So, you mean that there is indeed xenophobia, unlike you mentioned earlier?] Yes, it is definitely here, but it is not violent. It’s here but in a more hidden way.” - Male, Zimbabwe, Uber driver, living in Cape Town since 2012, currently resides in Masiphumelele (township)

“You know there’s black tax here. People make their own economy. In the nothingness there is something. It’s very very clever.” - Female, white South African, working in Masiphumelele (township), part of the focus group discussion

I also explored the definition of xenophobia among South Africans themselves delving deeper into questioning why the term xenophobia is not used when it comes to internal migrants residing in a different South African region compared to their origin. The quote below illustrates the relationship between xenophobia and different tribes within South Africa:

“...that’s probably some of the questions that we need to investigate, but our research definitely shows that xenophobia is applicable to other groups, those who are deemed outsiders, even if they are not deemed foreign nationals. But obviously those people would want to call it something different like ethnic tension or ethnic violence. To sum it up, I would also say xenophobia applies to anyone who is deemed as an outsider, a stranger, or someone outside of the community / local area, regardless of if you come from another country or not.” - Male, Research professional at the African Centre for Migration and Society, resides in Johannesburg

2) *The level of xenophobia is location-dependent*

Throughout the various interviews it became increasingly clear that despite there being slight differences between xenophobia between the major cities, the prevalence of xenophobia seemed to be mostly township specific. This means that xenophobia only occurs in specific areas within the bigger cities, usually the townships or informal settlements according to the respondents. Below are some quotes to illustrate how the emergence of xenophobia is dependent on where you live. One of the researchers also mentioned the importance of the governance of space, meaning that those who control the space also have the power over the prevalence of xenophobia. Masiphumelele was often coined as one of the more ‘safer’ townships.

"Joburg probably has double the incidents than other cities. Xenophobic incidents are more frequent here. This could be because of the population size and the number of townships and informal settlements we have here and how crowded the situation is. But also, the corrupts in community

governors. In Joburg informal settlements, the police tell us, local authorities tell us, those are no-go areas, no-go zones. The authorities don't even go there. I would say that makes it different.” - Male, Research professional at the African Centre for Migration and Society

“ Yes, I don't experience any problems. For example, now when I'm done with my shift I will just drive home, park my car in the street behind my house and walk home with no problems. Even if there is load shedding, no problems.” - Male, Zimbabwe, Uber driver, living in Cape Town since 2014, currently resides in Masiphumelele

3) Dependency systems are decreasing the prevalence of xenophobic violence

Respondents mentioned that there are currently systems in place that have made local South Africans dependent on the presence of foreigners. Two of the most commonly expressed examples of this dependency South Africans now have on foreigners include the RDP housing system (shown below) and the emergence of the protection fee (examples found under the subheading *Defining xenophobia*).

“But those organising for the violence, they don't take into consideration what is going on. Foreigners don't get RDP houses because they get them from government. South Africans get a free house, they need money, they rent it out to foreign nationals, but those organising violence are saying that foreigners are stealing RDP houses. Sometimes locals even sell RDP houses, which is not even legal. So, it's the locals who enter some kind of transaction with the foreign nationals, either rent or buy, but those foreign nationals don't want to hear that” - Male, Research professional at the African Centre for Migration and Society, resides in Johannesburg

“[...] or they stay in the RDP house and build shacks around it to rent to foreigners, it's a huge cash-income, and undeclared cash income. So, the city is trying to regulate that, but I don't think they'll ever manage to regulate it. For example, I know this one place in Masiphumelele where the rental income is about 40,000R (2,021 euros) per month cash income” - Female from Zimbabwe, living in Cape Town since 2016, working as a retailer, resides in Claremont - part of a Focus Group Discussion

4) The role of tribalism and ethnicity

Tribalism and ethnicity emerged as a key theme during the discussions around xenophobia. During the interviews there were many references to Zulus, Xhosas, and Black South Africans. Below is one of the examples of this:

“Zulu's I have to say. It's definitely them. They are very xenophobic. Because I remember when I was in Joburg, like maybe if there was a xenophobic attack, you would know that Zulus are leading. So, I feel like Zulu's are more xenophobic and thank God Cape Town doesn't have a lot of Zulus” - Female from Zimbabwe, grew up in South Africa, living in Thornton (suburb in Cape Town)

In addition, when interviewing Zimbabwean respondents, many of them also mentioned overlaps between the Ndebele (Zimbabwean tribe) and the Zulus (South African tribe) who originate from the same Nguni ancestry (SAHistory, 2021) This will be elaborated on in the Discussion section of this paper.

“I don’t know, and it’s especially with the Zimbabweans. But what I know, like if you know from back then, most people from Joburg or Durban, they speak the same language as the Zimbabweans, so it’s more like one, Zulu (a South African tribe) and Ndebele (a Zimbabwean tribe). So, I think those tribal differences are still continuing,, they never liked each other. But I feel they should be brothers and sisters, but it’s not like that” - Female from Zimbabwe, living in Cape Town since 2016, working as a retailer, resides in Claremont (suburb of Cape Town) - part of a Focus Group Discussion

These tribal overlaps account for the emphasis on Zimbabweans adaptability skill as the Shona and Ndebele languages (national languages of Zimbabwe) have many similarities to the South African languages, such as Xhosa and especially the Zulu language. This can cause identities to be confused, whereby a local South African is sometimes mistaken for a Zimbabwean as was mentioned during the interview with a researcher from the Xenowatch platform. The quote below also shows that Zimbabweans sometimes use these tribal overlaps to their advantage and try to hide their identity so that they do not get scapegoated by the South Africans.

“... you know because of xenophobia people didn’t want to admit that they were from Zim. Also with me, it took me some time to even tell my close friends that I was from Zimbabwe, like I was hiding it because I was scared of how they would treat me. F: So, they initially thought that you were from South Africa? P: Yeah, they thought I was from South Africa because I could speak the South African languages and I grew up here.” - Female from Zimbabwe, grew up in South Africa, living in Thornton (suburb of Cape Town)

5) Politics and the South African Government

According to the respondents from the researching institutes, there has been a shift in the xenophobia discourse in that it has found its way into mainstream politics, often using migrants as a scapegoat to South Africa’s struggles. Other respondents also mentioned a lack of trust in the South African government and a lack of service delivery as can be seen from the quotes below:

“They need votes from South African people. And the South Africans are complaining that we’ve got more foreigners. So, for them to win votes, they say that they give foreigners a specific amount of time to reside in SA. But you see it’s a mind game. They won’t actually do that, they are just saying that to gain more votes” - Male, Zimbabwe, Uber driver, living in Cape Town since 2012, currently resides in Masiphumelele

“The Home Affairs Ministry, you can’t really know what’s going on or what informs their decisions. They come up with things all the time, things are not legally sound, they are challenged, they appeal, they lose, they try again - I really don’t understand what’s going on there.” - Male, Research professional at the African Centre for Migration and Society

In addition, respondents also argued that vigilante groups such as Operation Dudula are taking matters into their own hands and handling outside of legal frameworks:

“But you see these vigilante groups who are operating in places like Johannesburg, like Operation Dudula, are using these tactics to prevent migrants from accessing health care services or taking the law into their own hands. Going into spaces, searching people, closing Spaza shops, and saying all that stuff” - Female researcher from Botswana, working at Xenowatch

6) *Daily Life (Work and Social Life)*

This theme sheds light on the daily lives of the respondents in the context of xenophobia. Through asking questions related to their social life and sense of belonging, the level of integration and consequences of xenophobia became more visible. Most respondents said that they do not have a social life outside of work and family, they mentioned that it is difficult to make friends because they do not trust people. In addition, some Zimbabweans respondents said that they sometimes try to hide their cultural identity tied to Zimbabwe because they are fearful of experiencing xenophobic behaviours. A quote below illustrates this:

“...you know because of xenophobia people didn't want to admit that they were from Zim. Also with me, it took me some time to even tell my close friends that I was from Zimbabwe, like I was hiding it because I was scared of how they would treat me. [...] Mmm, well I currently do not really have friends as such here in Cape Town, but I do know a few people who are living in Cape Town” - Female from Zimbabwe, grew up in Johannesburg, South Africa, living in Thornton (suburb of Cape Town)

One of the Uber driver respondents said that there is a social and financial support system that a group of foreigners have set up through Whatsapp. The quote below illustrates how this system works:

Every week everyone pays a certain amount of money, it's actually 2000R (100 euros) in a week, and the payout is 200,000 (10,000 euros) and we are 100 people. So every week we raise 200,000R (10,000 euros), meaning that every week we can buy a car. If you want a car, we buy you a car, if you want cash, we go at the back of the queue because there is no security in cash. With a car there is security. So we buy you a car, and at least the car remains the project car until we are done. I think we have got 5 guys from Malawi, 3 from Congo, 1 lady from SA, 1 Somalian, and 2 Coloureds. But the majority are from Zim.”

- *Male from Zimbabwe, Uber driver, living in Masiphumelele (township)*

This shows that despite not having direct friends, this social system is providing a support system among foreigners to help each other grow in opportunities.

In the Discussion section (the next section) these findings will be analysed through the lens of the research question and the research sub-questions.

4.2 Discussion

The aim of this study was to get more insight on the current perspectives and views of migrants with an African origin living in Cape Town about xenophobia and how it affects their daily lives. This is an important addition to the current body of research available on xenophobia because many xenophobia studies have had a more focused lens on the xenophobic trends and perspectives in Johannesburg and Durban. As much as the xenophobia incidences appear to be more frequent in those cities and is often manifested in a violent manner in those cities, the stories about xenophobia in Cape Town appeared to be more hidden and/or subtle. For the purposes of this research, I will focus on the key themes in light of the sub-questions stated in Chapter 1. These sub-questions will also form the framework for the discussion of the findings of this study. Hereby a recap of the sub-questions:

- (1) How do migrants perceive xenophobia as a concept and how does it affect their daily lives?
- (2) What are the perspectives of migrants in regard to xenophobia in Cape Town versus other South African cities? What are the perceptions of xenophobia in Masiphumelele (township)?
- (3) What factors influence the xenophobic trends in Cape Town according to international migrants?
- (4) How do migrants perceive their sense of belonging in Cape Town, and by extension, South Africa?

(1) How do migrants perceive xenophobia as a concept and how does it affect their daily lives?

During the data collection phase, it quickly became clear that most respondents automatically associated xenophobia with violence and did not consider more covert manifestations of xenophobia. This led to many respondents initially answering that they were not affected by xenophobia in their daily lives. However, when diving deeper into the interviews it became clear that respondents were indeed affected by xenophobia in their daily lives, but xenophobia was manifested in other ways. The most common example emerging out of this study was xenophobia manifested in the form of protection fee or paying a business fee (to protect your business) as a foreigner. The migrants living in townships referred more frequently to this protection fee compared to the migrants living in the suburbs of Cape Town. In addition, Uber drivers from Masiphumelele explained that they often had to pay the taxi industry a specific fee if they were caught working in the territory of the taxis. Hereby a couple of examples to show how the protection fee or business fee is affecting the daily lives of international migrants:

“Like last week Sunday I was going to Fish Hoek with my family, and they said I must pay 400R (20 euros), I said for what? They said because this is not a taxi, you are taking our job. I said this is my family, I’m taking my family. They said yes you have to pay, so I gave them 200R (10 euros). And then they say, okay now you must pay for protection. I don’t know what kind of protection; they are going to protect me where? Because me, I am only in Masi when I come back from work, so how are you going to protect me wherever I go? You

see, they just want to steal money from us. That's the problem we are now experiencing on this side. With the taxi owners."

- *Zimbabwean male, living in Cape Town since 2012, currently residing in Masiphumelele (township), working as an Uber driver*

"The gangsters. There are people who say 'we want protection fee' there are those people walking around with a gun, skinning people (...) because now taxi drivers are coming to us Uber drivers and are saying; you must pay 500R (25 euros) per month, you see. How can I pay 500R (25 euros) per month - I pay rent, I pay money for the car that I'm using, and you still want 500R (25 euros) for what."

- *Zimbabwean male, living in Cape Town since 2013, currently residing in Masiphumelele (township), working as an Uber driver*

These two examples show that the protection or business fee is currently affecting the foreign Uber drivers, specifically in the township Masiphumelele as the taxi industry seems to have high control over the activities that take place in that township.

Protection Fee

The protection fee can be seen as a manifestation of xenophobia affecting the daily lives of international migrants. Protection fees is *"money that criminals take from people in exchange for agreeing not to hurt them or damage their property"* (Cambridge Dictionary, 2024). It is an illegal payment demanded by local South Africans, often under threat of violence or harm. These groups then claim to provide safety and prevent harm or damage to the payer's property or business in return for monthly or regular payments. When asking respondents how long this protection fee or business fee existed, most respondents answered that it has been around between 2-4 years.

The concept of the protection fee has most commonly emerged on various news platforms in association with Somalians and the Spaza shops that they run in Cape Town (News24, 2023; IOL, 2022; GroundUp, 2023). However now this protection fee seems to be spreading to other spheres of economic activity involving foreign-run businesses. The findings of this research show the growing presence of the protection fee as a shift in the micro-politics happening at a local or township-level. This growing problem was also mentioned by research experts as a topic that needs to be explored further as it is shaping South Africa's xenophobia dynamics while at the same time undermining South Africa's current governance system as it does not follow any legal framework.

"They don't trust the police, if they call the police they don't come. Actually, the police are part of the people who come to extort them. So, what is happening now, there are so many extortion groups happening or emerging in those informal settlements and townships, one thing they do is 'protection of foreign-owned businesses' - you pay every month so that you are kind of protected. And some even give receipts, with like a

number and a phone number. They put it like a license from the municipality there, like a statement saying, 'see I've paid, don't disturb me' and nobody dares to attack somebody that has this."

- Male, Senior Researcher at the African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS)

The protection fee seems to be a fairly new concept in the townships and seems to be causing a decrease in the violent manifestations of xenophobia. Although it may be decreasing the xenophobic violence, it is essentially another form of xenophobia.

"The protection fee is growing now. I wouldn't say it's completely new but over the last few years it has really been growing. It has become the norm. And we are doing research to see whether it is now associated with what we see as a decline in the xenophobic attacks, at least on foreign-owned businesses. Because we are actually seeing some sort of decline. You pay, you get protection. So, we are still investigating this matter, but there definitely seems to be some sort of correlation between the decline and the increase of extortion, protection fees. Not everybody gets protected but if you are protected by a very strong group, like a gang group, then nobody will attack you. When you are attacked, you don't report to the police but you report to your gang leader and sometimes they actually go and bring back the things that were taken and they go and punish those people who have attacked you"

- Male, Senior Researcher at the African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS)

Protection fees can cause a financial burden on foreign business owners, especially since local South African business owners are not targeted. This makes it difficult for foreigners to sustain their businesses and it can lead to economic marginalisation and social isolation of these foreign nationals. This is a manifestation of xenophobia because it discriminates individuals based on their nationality and it exploits the vulnerability of foreign nationals who lack legal protections and support networks. The protection fee reinforces a negative stereotype of foreigners and make them easy targets for extortion because they are portrayed as a problem. This system continues to perpetuate a hostile environment that derives from xenophobic manifestations despite it not being in the form of xenophobic violence. So as much as international migrants do not initially refer to experiencing xenophobia in their daily lives, since it is often associated with violence, this covert manifestation of xenophobia in the form of the protection fee shows that this practice contributes to the subtlety of xenophobia in Cape Town.

(2) What are the perspectives of migrants in regard to xenophobia in Cape Town versus other South African cities? What are the perceptions of xenophobia in the township Masiphumelele?

Cape Town versus Perceptions of Other Cities

When respondents were asked about xenophobia in Cape Town in relation to other South African cities, almost all respondents mentioned Johannesburg or Durban as more xenophobic cities compared to Cape

Town. Respondents mentioned that in comparison to Johannesburg, most people felt relatively safer in Cape Town, especially if they had previously experienced living in Johannesburg. In Johannesburg there seems to be a higher focus on regular and unexpected document checks, whereby people who do not have valid documentation will be brought directly to the Zimbabwean border. For that reason, the proximity between Johannesburg and the Zimbabwean border makes it less appealing for Zimbabwean nationals to live in Johannesburg compared to Cape Town. Other respondents also mentioned that the local government may also have an influence on the prevalence of xenophobic violence, whereby Cape Town is being run by the Democratic Alliance, and other provinces are being run by the African National Congress (ANC) at a regional level. However, this argumentation does not have any evidence-based research to support it.

In Durban there is a strong sense of tribalism which seems to be impacting the prevalence of xenophobia. Durban falls under the province of KwaZulu-Natal, the region where the Zulu tribe originate from. In 2015, the xenophobic violence in KwaZulu-Natal was said to have been sparked by the Zulu King, Goodwill Zwelithini, who called for the expulsion of foreigners by emphasising on job competition and the high unemployment rates in South Africa (Campbell, 2015). In addition, Operation Dudula is an anti-immigrant, vigilante political party that originates from the Zulu tribe. This will be elaborated on during sub-question 3, under the subheading Politics and South Africa's National Elections.

Localising Xenophobia

The findings of this study show that although xenophobia may differ from city to city, the real differences are felt at a more localised level, from township to township. As one of the research experts mentioned:

“In some ways the comparison is not at that [nationwide/city] scale. The comparison is one township to another. Even within Joburg there might be xenophobic violence in Alexandra, Diepsloot, and Katlehong, which doesn't look the same. And for Cape Town if you go to Masi, or other areas, there are different dynamics. So yes, it will be Western Cape government, yes, the police are common, but it's very much rooted in the history of the neighbourhood or the township, and its leadership structures. In ways that: was it a Coloured township or primarily Black? Was it ANC controlled? DA controlled? Like these things matter more than whether it's Pretoria, Joburg or Cape Town for example.”

- Male, Research professor at the African Centre for Migration and Society, residing in Johannesburg

This differentiation between various suburbs and townships repeatedly came back as a common theme in the data collection phase. Respondents who lived in suburbs near the city centre claimed to not experience any xenophobia at all, yet they feared living in the townships. The respondents living in the townships shared various stories of xenophobia, but personal experiences differed between the various townships.

This finding makes it difficult to generalise the xenophobic experiences in Cape Town, as the perspectives differ between suburbs and townships. The findings show that people residing in the townships of Cape Town are more likely to experience xenophobia compared to people living in other neighbourhoods not classified as townships. This can be seen throughout various interviews, hereby an example of a Zimbabwean female residing in a suburb of Cape Town that is not classified as a township.

“I was still in high school at that time, I wasn’t in Cape Town in 2008 or in 2015. So, I honestly don’t know much about xenophobia, and also, I think it really depends on where you are staying here in Cape Town. If you are in townships, I think you will experience a lot of those, because I’ve been hearing people saying the South African knows that there’s a Zimbabwean living here and then they can go and knock on their door and say ‘give us your belongings’ just like that”

- Zimbabwean female, living in Cape Town since 2016, lived in the suburbs Claremont and Kenilworth (both are not townships), working in retail

In addition, there are a few townships which respondents repeatedly refer to as the most dangerous or xenophobic. When discussing these areas further it became clear that these areas are also considered dangerous to the local South Africans due to the high crime and gangsterism taking place in those areas. Some of the areas that were mentioned as unsafe included Khayelitsha, Gugulethu, Delft, and Philippi.

Masiphumelele Township as a Case Study

Masiphumelele was used as a case study in my research since it is one of the more recently formed townships, and within twenty years it grew from being a Xhosa-dominated township (South Africans coming from the Eastern Cape) to reaching a 50-50 balance between South Africans and foreigners (Projekt Ubuntu, 2024). Masiphumelele is known to have a high majority of Zimbabweans and Malawians residing in that area and the dynamics between South Africans and foreigners showed that there is a dependency system in place; South Africans depending on foreigners’ income. This makes Masiphumelele one of the ‘safer’ townships when it comes to xenophobia.

Yeah, it’s a big problem. But the thing is now, for example our location in Masiphumelele, they didn’t allow xenophobia there. Those taxi drivers they didn’t allow those people, because you know they are getting money from foreigners. Like those taxis and those landlords, they didn’t want xenophobia to happen.

- Zimbabwean male, living in Cape Town since 2013, currently residing in Masiphumelele (township), working as an Uber driver

Yes, yes. Masiphumelele is a good township to live in, unlike many others. Because also where it is, it’s just a small area. Masi is different from all the townships because where it’s located, the mentality of the people in Masi is completely different. Masi is not an old township. Masi is small, very small. A recent township.

Same as Red Hill, the one that is in the mountain there. It's not like Khayelitsha. Khayelitsha has been there for years, and people that are there in Khayelitsha... it's quite a lot of people there, they couldn't control their society. Unlike Masi, Masi doesn't want any nonsense there. It's not like xenophobic or 'foreigners must go' - Masi is a different society.

- Zimbabwean male, living in Cape Town since 2007, currently residing in Heathfield (a suburb in Cape Town), working as an Uber driver

As these two quotes show, Masiphumelele seems to more commonly be seen as a township whereby foreigners are more protected. Respondents have frequently mentioned that local South Africans in Masiphumelele are very aware of their dependency on the extra income coming from foreigners and therefore stand up against anti-foreigner movements.

(3) What factors influence the xenophobic trends in Cape Town according to international migrants?

As mentioned earlier (look at sub-question 1), the protection fee is one of the factors that international migrants have mentioned affecting the xenophobia dynamics at a local level. Other factors such as the history of a township (was it originally a Black or a Coloured township), RDP housing, governance of space, gangsterism and crime, governmental systems (such as the ZEP permits), and politics in regard to the national elections were themes that came up as factors influencing the xenophobic trends in Cape Town. These factors will be elaborated on in this sub-question.

Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) Housing:

The Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) is a socio-economic policy that was implemented by the government of Nelson Mandela in 1994. The RDP is a housing program for people who are earning less than 3500R (175 euros) per month per household whereby the government offers beneficiaries a fully constructed house free of charge (DHS, 2024). Recipients are still responsible for paying the municipal rates such as water, electricity and other services. This construct plays an interesting role in the xenophobia narrative because interviews revealed that some local South Africans use this construct as a means of getting additional income through renting RDP housing to foreigners for a high price per month while remaining to live in their shacks. This changes the housing dynamics for local foreigners as can be seen through the following two quotes:

"[...] and also, the thing is, most of the South Africans, let's say you're owning your RDP housing, they just build flats so that you can house a lot of people there, so now they'll be changing 2000R (100 euros) per room, of which South Africans don't want to be paying that much, but us foreigners we are willing to pay that much. That's the thing. So, they are saying; because of the Zimbabweans now the accommodation has become expensive."

- *Female from Zimbabwe, living in Cape Town since 2016, residing in Kenilworth (a suburb in Cape Town), working as a retailer*

“Yes indeed, correct. Or they stay in the RDP house and around it they build shacks. It’s a huge cash-income, and undeclared cash income. So, in a sense everyone is paying taxes, but that’s a huge untenable thing going on right now. So, the city is trying to regulate that, but I don’t think they’ll ever manage to regulate that. They’re trying to regulate the taxi industry here; they can’t do that you know. So basically, I know one place in Masi where the rental income is about 40,000R per month cash income”

- *White female South African who grew up in Cape Town, living on the outskirts of Masiphumelele township, participant of a focus group discussion*

As is shown in the quotes above, there is a lot of undeclared cash-income around this system of RDP housing with foreigners. Other local South Africans decide to live in the RDP housing construct but build shacks in their yard to also rent out to foreigners. This income through RDP housing creates a dependency mechanism between local South Africans and foreigners because South Africans become dependent on the monthly financial income they receive from foreigners. During the 2007/2008 nationwide attacks, most people fled from the townships and tried to find refuge through their workplaces, churches, or friends/family living in safer suburbs. Masiphumelele was one of the leading townships in Cape Town that stood up for the foreigners and told them it was safe to come back. The local South Africans residing in Masiphumelele quickly realised that their township could not run effectively without the presence of foreigners. Many businesses, landlords, and the taxi industry were dependent on the money coming from foreigners, so they realised they needed to welcome them back (Projekt Ubuntu, 2024).

Governance of Space

The governance of space is a key factor in determining the prevalence of xenophobia and the type of manifestations of xenophobia. As mentioned earlier, the prevalence of xenophobia differs from township to township depending on the demographics and the history of the township, and most importantly who has the power in that area. In the case of Masiphumelele, it quickly became clear that the taxi industry is in charge of the governance of Masiphumelele. They influence the xenophobic dynamics, and they were also the people who managed to stop xenophobic violence from occurring because they quickly became aware of their dependency on foreigners’ money. This dependency can be seen through transporting the foreigners, collecting protection fees, and/or receiving rent money from the foreigners. In addition, the taxi industry has control over who does business in Masiphumelele, whereby Uber drivers are forced to pay a high amount of money if they are caught working in the territory of the taxi industry. This quote shows an example of the power the taxi industry holds in the Masiphumelele township.

The taxi drivers they came to me. I was off that day; it was on a Sunday. They came and stopped me and said: "Where are you coming from?" I said, "I'm coming from Church". They said: "okay who is this?" And I said, "It's my wife." They said: "So you're not doing Uber" and I said "I do Uber, but not today. I am coming from church" and they said: "oh so you do Uber?" "Yes, I do Uber" "Oh so you take people from here?" "No" I replied. "Why?" They asked. "Because I'm scared". "Why are you scared?" "I said because I had a friend who took people from Masi, and he lost a car, so I don't want to experience that." Then they asked, "Where do you work?" I said, "I go to Kommetjie, Fish Hoek, Simon's Town, anywhere, but not here." Then he said to me: "Are you aware that Uber drivers who live here are supposed to pay 500R (25 euros) per month". I said "Why?!" They said "Ah just because maybe one day you'll have a trip from here and you'll want to take it, then we won't have a problem with you" I said: "I just told you; I don't work in Masi. If you want 500R (25 euros) from me, you're going to give me a perfect reason as to why I should give you 500R (25 euros). If it's about me having trips from Masi [Masiphumelele], I don't. Even if it's card trip or cash trip or 5 stars, whatever, I don't." Then they said: "No you have to, because everyone else does it"

- Zimbabwean male, living in Cape Town since 2011, currently residing in Masiphumelele (township), working as an Uber driver

In other townships, gangster groups were mentioned as having the control or governance over a space. Some of those gangster groups are so highly organised that they have their own security camera system in place, and they can monitor exactly who enters and exits the township. Although this gangster control touches on another level of crime, it influences the xenophobic narrative because some foreigners feel safer or protected when paying protection fees to these gangster groups, instead of relying on governmental and police services to protect them.

Gangsterism and Crime

Most of the respondents indicated that the high levels of crime were a more significant concern than xenophobia. In Cape Town, particularly in some of the townships (e.g. Khayelitsha, Cape Flats, Gugulethu), crime and gangsterism are prevalent issues, even among South Africans themselves. Respondents often referred to the Coloured communities as having dangerous gangster groups who mostly commit crimes among themselves. The taxi industry in Cape Town is often referred to as operating like a mafia, whereby they have the power to shut down the country if they want to. Foreigners sometimes felt more comfortable reporting a crime to a gangster group whom they were already paying a protection fee to, because they know something will be done.

"...So, we are still investigating this matter, but there definitely seems to be some sort of correlation between the decline and the increase of extortion, protection fees. Not everybody gets protected but if you are protected by a very strong group, like a gang group, then nobody will attack you. When you are attacked, you don't report to the police, but you report to your gang leader and sometimes they actually go and bring

back the things that were taken and they go and punish those people who have attacked you, they bring back your things” - Male, Research professional at the African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS)

This quote also shows that the gangster groups seem to be gaining more power because many respondents do not believe in the governmental systems such as the police services. These governmental services will be elaborated on in the next section of governmental systems.

Governmental Services

The governmental services were also indicated as a challenge when interviewing a respondent responsible for the Xenowatch program because people do not feel or see the added value of reporting a xenophobic incidence because nothing will be done with the police. This can be challenging for a platform such as the Xenowatch open-source platform attempting to collect more details surrounding xenophobic incidences occurring across the country. People reporting xenophobic incidences to the Xenowatch platform often get frustrated because no action is taken by the governmental services or the police.

“So now we’re at a phase where we’re restructuring because we wanted to initially serve as an early warning platform, but has early warning actually helped? Because like I said, it doesn’t necessarily translate to action, even if you call the police or you report to authorities that are mandated to intervene in such cases, rarely that happens. And so now we are in a phase where we are trying to re-strategize as the Xenowatch project, like what would best serve the purpose that we are trying to achieve as a research centre, as an academic institution, as a knowledge production, in the knowledge production space”

- Female, originally from Botswana, research expert at Xenowatch

This lack of trust in local authorities causes people to lose hope in the current governmental services whereby respondents feel more inclined to resort to gangster groups where it is more likely that action will be taken if they pay them. This allows the gangsters to continue this system of exploiting foreigners without criminal conviction.

Governmental Laws (ZEP permits)

Immigration policies and specifically the Zimbabwean Exemption Permits (ZEP) permits were also mentioned as factors influencing the level of xenophobia. Some Zimbabwean respondents mentioned that it was unclear what the outcome of the decision around the ZEP permits was, however, some Zimbabweans decided to go back to Zimbabwe at the beginning of the year (January 2024) and then come back after national elections (end of May 2024). Many respondents believed that the termination of the ZEP permit was a strategy implemented by the ANC to gain more votes during the election phase. The termination of the ZEP permit means that Zimbabweans will no longer be allowed to reside in the country unless they have

another form of documentation. This has the potential to further fuel the xenophobic sentiment because they then become illegal immigrants residing in South Africa. It was also interesting to discover that since many Zimbabweans do not manage to get the right documentation to work in the country, many Uber drivers mentioned Uber as the perfect solution because you do not need a work permit to operate as an Uber driver (Uber, 2024).

Politics and South Africa's National Elections

Xenophobia in South Africa has increasingly become a more prominent issue in the political sphere. Particularly in the years of 2021 and 2022 when Operation Dudula, an anti-immigrant vigilant party became a political party and spread their anti-immigrant narrative throughout the country. This study took place during an interesting time leading up to South Africa's national elections in May 2024. In the previous elections, xenophobic violence appeared to flare up before the national elections and also during the elections (Ngoma, 2020). In contrast to the previous elections, the collected data in this study revealed no clear change in xenophobic dynamics leading up to the national elections, up to the point where larger stakeholders such as the Xenowatch platform were surprised at the level of 'calmness' before the elections this year. As one of the research experts mentioned in his interview:

"The main shift has been that the mobilisation for migrants has really been at local level, community level at the beginning, but now it has gotten into mainstream politics. You see now parties like Operation Dudula, Action SA, Patriotic Alliance, in local action but also national elections. So xenophobic mobilisation is now into mainstream politics, where we see national political players not only involved in the rhetoric but also in actual action. Dudula does attack people. Patriotic Alliance goes to the borders to monitor what is going on and report people, they are trying to act like the police. It's like everybody does what they want. But the populism has been attractive for national leaders in terms of getting votes. People are getting votes because of anti-migrant stance that they have."

- Male, Research professor at the African Centre for Migration and Society

Leading up to the 2019 National Elections, and post-2019 elections, South African politicians have used migrants as scapegoats to blame them for South Africa's social and economic challenges. Interestingly enough, there seemed to be less visible xenophobia compared to previous years leading up to the 2024 national elections this year. Even after speaking to larger stakeholder groups, it was not clear as to why this was.

(4) How do migrants perceive their sense of belonging in Cape Town, and by extension, South Africa?

Most of the respondents refer to South Africa as a place they have come to looking for better economic opportunities. Most of the respondents have lived in South Africa for 10+ years but still do not consider South Africa as home and still hope to return to their country of origin if the situation back ‘home’ approves.

This internal lack of belonging may in part stem from the external xenophobia they experience. This sub-question will be answered through the lens of tribalism and the ethnic competition hypothesis as these concepts came up as key aspects of migrants’ experience when diving deeper into their current sense of belonging in South Africa. These concepts also relate back to the theoretical framework from Chapter 2.

Tribalism

The findings of this study revealed a strong element of tribalism and how the history and migration trends of tribes in South Africa have shaped or affected the xenophobia dynamics that migrants experience in their daily lives. Tribalism can intensify xenophobic attitudes as individuals or groups prioritise their own tribal identity and view outsiders with suspicion or hostility. This ‘in-group’ loyalty can foster an ‘us versus them’ mentality which can lead to exclusion and discrimination against those who are seen as ‘outsider’ (Jácome, 2020; Yakushko, 2009). Respondents mentioned that this distinction is particularly visible in Durban, as Durban has a high population of Zulu’s which has led to a stronger xenophobic sentiment.

For the case of Zimbabweans, there is a high overlap between the Shona and the Ndebele Zimbabwean cultures, and the Zulu tribe of South Africa who originate in KwaZulu-Natal. The Zulu, Xhosa, and Ndebele all trace their roots to the Nguni people, so they share the same Nguni ancestry (SAHistory, 2021). The Ndebele even used to live in the KwaZulu-Natal region but were attacked by Afrikaners in 1837 and migrated northwards to what is now known as Zimbabwe (UNHCR, 2004). This high overlap in cultures affects the xenophobia discourse: many Zimbabwean respondents said they often try to ‘hide’ their identity by speaking the South African languages fluently. This demonstrates the fear they have of experiencing xenophobia if they show their true origin as can be seen in the following quote:

“[...] because of xenophobia people didn’t want to admit that they were from Zimbabwe. Also with me, it took me some time to even tell my close friends that I was from Zimbabwe, like I was hiding it because I was scared of how they would treat me. They initially thought I was from South Africa because I could speak the South African languages and I grew up here.”

- *Female from Zimbabwe, grew up in South Africa (Johannesburg), currently lives in Thornton (a suburb in Cape Town), works as a cost-estimator in a bigger company*

Vice versa, Zulus living in Cape Town sometimes fear that they will be mistaken for a Zimbabwean during a xenophobic flare up, as was mentioned by a Zulu tour guide in the Langa township of Cape Town. In the interview with the Xenowatch platform, the researcher mentioned that various xenophobic incidents in their system have shown that South Africans are also killed during xenophobic uproars, mistaken to be a foreigner (Xenowatch, 2024).

In addition, intercultural marriages and foreign children growing up in South Africa are adding another dimension to the xenophobia discourse and the exploration of what it means to be an “insider” or an “outsider.” Most of the respondents have spent more than 10 years in South Africa and many of them started families in Cape Town. This has resulted in children with foreign parents who have spent their whole lives living in South Africa, so they do not know associate with their parents’ origin as a country of ‘home.’ However, South Africa does not provide the automatic right for citizenship for non-South African citizens, despite being born in South Africa (CDH, 2023). This makes it extremely difficult for children of foreign nationals to get the right documentation. For further research it would be interesting to dive deeper into this group and their perspective of xenophobia.

These points illustrate that even those foreigners who speak local languages fluently, and are raising their families in South Africa, are confronting rejection or fearing xenophobia. They usually do not feel safe or accepted within the South African community.

Ethnic Competition Hypothesis

As mentioned in Chapter 2, the conceptual and theoretical framework, the ethnic competition hypothesis refers to “*changes in levels of ethnic and racial competition for valued resources - such as jobs, houses, and marital partners - ignite ethnic collective action*” (Olzak, 1994).” The changes in levels of ethnic and racial competition have frequently been mentioned by respondents as a factor igniting xenophobia. Especially in the townships where a higher number of African foreigners reside, and where many of the unemployed South Africans live, there seems to be a strong anti-foreigner sentiment, often blaming the foreigners for stealing jobs. This claim has been made because according to the semi-structured in-depth interviews, migrants often accept low-skilled jobs for a salary that is below minimum wage, a job many local South Africans are not willing to accept. Furthermore, local South Africans who are not part of the RDP housing construct claim that migrants are stealing their houses because other local South Africans are renting out these houses to migrants, often pricing it higher. These two elements of jobs and housing create competition for valued resources between ethnicities; local South Africans versus migrants; fuelling the xenophobic sentiment that local South Africans have towards migrants.

The interesting thing about South African society is that this ethnic competition also occurs between local South African tribes, whereby the Xhosa tribe do not necessarily get along with the Zulu tribe and vice versa

(Masuku & Mlambo, 2023). This quickly led me to question why the term xenophobia was only used against foreigners and not as a term used generally against ethnicities within South Africa. One of the researchers from the semi-structured in-depth interviews attempted to distinguish xenophobia in relation to foreigners versus xenophobia among local South African tribes:

“[...] I think the difference here is that most of the time the conflicts between the ethnic groups are different from xenophobia. I don't think there is a xenophobia embedded in it. I think it's issues that pre-date back to or before the Apartheid era. I mean you look at all these Bantu stands, and how they divided these different ethnic groups into Bantu stand groups, and like isolate them. So, it's complex in that sense, those issues emanate, Zulus and other tribes are issues that were carried over the apartheid period. Whereas with foreigners there is a clear distinction that I dislike you because you are an 'other' because you are different, you know there's connotations that you are going to take away my job or whatever

- Female researcher working for Xenowatch open-source platform

This quote shows an interesting element between ethnicities and calls for further research when looking at the relationship between xenophobia and the ethnic competition hypothesis between local tribes within South Africa. A recent study by Masuku and Mlambo (2023) delves into this discussion and uses the term ethnophobia to describe these tribalistic and ethnic divisions occurring among South African tribes. This study emphasizes that internal ethnic and tribal tensions persist despite the end of Apartheid and concludes that the 1994 political transition failed to address these divisions. This shows that ethnic competition also plays out between ethnicities within South Africa and not just against foreign ethnicities. This adds an extra dimension of the ethnic competition hypothesis in major cities whereby people (internal and international migrants) compete for resources such as jobs and housing. In the case of Cape Town, some respondents mentioned feeling safer in the Western Cape province because it is dominated by the Coloured community (Britannica, 2024). This means that South Africa's two largest tribes, Zulus⁵ and the Xhosa⁶, can also be considered as a 'foreigner' in Cape Town.

⁵ Zulu – largest ethnic group in South Africa and the majority live in the KwaZulu-Natal province (major city: Durban) and the Gauteng province (*major city: Johannesburg*) (SAHO, 2015).

⁶ Xhosa – second largest group in South Africa and they are originally from the Eastern Cape province (SAHO, 2015).

Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations

This chapter provides a summary of the research followed by recommendations for future research.

5.1 Conclusion

This study was conducted to gain more insight on the current perspectives and views of African migrants on the topic of xenophobia and explore how it affects their daily lives when living and working in Cape Town. To answer the research question, this study consisted of four research objectives (see page 7). To achieve the central objectives, the research methodology was deployed in two phases. The first phase consisted of a verbal quantitative data collection with fifty Uber drivers working and living in Cape Town, and the second phase consisted of nineteen semi-structured in-depth interviews with migrants living in different areas in Cape Town and various larger stakeholders to provide a deeper insight into the current context of xenophobia in South Africa. This in addition to observations on ground, justified the mixed methodology approach to attaining the four objectives.

To conclude, most of the respondent's associate xenophobia with a violent manifestation and do not initially consider other more covert manifestations as a form of xenophobia until further questioning during an interview. An example of this covert manifestation of xenophobia is the protection fee, whereby foreigners must pay a monthly fee to ensure their safety or to protect their businesses. This practice, frequently mentioned by respondents, has led to an illegal system controlled by local South Africans (often by local gangster groups) and beyond the South African government's reach. While such covert xenophobia manifestations may reduce visible instances of xenophobic violence, making it appear as though xenophobia is decreasing, this covert form is more complicated to detect. Xenophobic violence is a form of xenophobia that has visible consequences, whereas the secretive nature of protection fees can be carried out under threats of harm for disclosure. This makes it more difficult to uncover and address this form of xenophobia.

The other factors and main themes that emerged when exploring the factors influencing xenophobia were; the protection fee, the history of a township, RDP housing, governance of space, gangsterism and crime, governmental systems (such as the ZEP permits and the new labour law), and politics in regard to South Africa's national elections. Specifically, topics such as the protection fee and the RDP housing system, whereby in both cases local South Africans receive 'free' money from migrants, have created a shift in the xenophobia dynamics. This dependency system whereby local South Africans depend on monthly income from migrants has resulted in a shift moving away from the 'foreigners must go' narrative. Examples of this can be found in the Masiphumelele township whereby the taxi industry, the people who indirectly control the township, stood up for the foreigners during a xenophobic flare up and did not allow vigilant anti-immigrant

parties such as Operation Dudula to infiltrate the Masiphumelele township. Lastly, the respondents from this study still did not feel accepted in South Africa or Cape Town. This was evident in several statements expressing feelings of insecurity to openly show their cultural identity tied to their country of origin. When analysing xenophobia through the lens of the ethnic competition theory it also became evident that South Africa extends beyond conflicts between local and foreign ethnicities, encompassing rivalry among different South African ethnic groups for resources like jobs and housing in major cities. In Cape Town, the predominance of the Coloured community influences migrants' perceptions of safety, suggesting that even South Africa's largest tribes, the Zulus and the Xhosa, can be viewed as 'foreigners' in regions where they are not the majority. This adds complexity to the xenophobia and sense of belonging dynamics, especially in urban areas. Despite xenophobia not being as violently manifested in Cape Town versus other cities, according to the respondents, there is still a high prevalence of xenophobia occurring but it is being manifested in other, more covert forms.

These other forms of xenophobia may have newer significance in light of the shifting political landscape marked by the African National Congress (ANC) losing power in the 2024 national elections. For the first time since the Apartheid ended in 1994, the ANC lost the majority vote leading to a historic shift for South Africa as it has formed a new multiparty cabinet for the first time. This coalition government incorporates seven different parties, however the agreement largely rests on the ANC and the Democratic Alliance (DA), as they are the two biggest parties. These two parties have been political foes for more than twenty years, and now have to put their ideological differences aside. For the time being, public attention has shifted away from the 'immigrant' that used to bear the brunt of political venom and attention has been brought back to racial connotations as the DA is seen by some people as focusing on the interests of South Africa's white minority (Britannica, 2024). ANC's coalition with the DA also led to the third and fourth biggest parties declining to take part in the coalition, specifically due to the participation of the white-led Democratic Alliance and Freedom Front Plus (Britannica, 2024). However, a recent BBC news article about Mr. McKenzie (the leader of the Patriotic Alliance⁷) who has recently been appointed in the portfolio of the multi-party government⁸ has brought the xenophobia discourse back into the political sphere as critics claim that his campaign was xenophobic⁹ (BBC, 2024). What the new political order means for inter-ethnic cooperation, racial rivalry and racial tolerance remains to be seen in the political arena of South Africa in the medium and long term, before national attention swings back to the immigrant when things go politically awry.

⁷ Patriotic Alliance – received 2% of the votes in South Africa's National Elections, ranking in 6th place (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2024)

⁸ Mr. McKenzie was appointed as the Minister of Sports, Arts, and Culture (BBC, 2024)

⁹ The Patriotic Alliance campaign targeting undocumented migrants resonated with voters, though mainstream politicians have generally avoided the issue. McKenzie adopted the slogan "Abahambe" which means "They must leave" in the Zulu language. He also staged a publicity stunt at the Zimbabwean border to deter migrants (BBC, 2024)

5.2 Recommendations for Further Research

This study sparked much thought for further research suggestions, especially since there seems to be a shift in the xenophobia dynamics whereby it is being manifested in more covert forms. Below I have listed some recommendations for further research:

- What is the impact of the protection fee and how does it relate to the prevalence of xenophobic violence (is there a decline in xenophobic violence because of the protection fee)?
- Does the xenophobic narrative change according to one's country of origin (e.g. comparing Zimbabwean, Malawian, Somalian, etc.)?
- How is the protection fee shaping the local dynamics and micro-politics of a township?
- What is the perspective on xenophobia of children who have spent their whole lives growing up in South Africa but have parents with a foreign background?
- What are the xenophobic dynamics from the perspective of intermarriage couples (whereby a local South African is married to a person with a foreign background)?
- What role does xenophobia play between local South African tribes and does this affect the xenophobia discourse against foreigners in South Africa?
- How do the 2024 national elections differ from the 2019 national elections in regard to xenophobia and what are factors that have influenced these dynamics?

Concluding Remarks

The central objectives of this study have been realised and it would be interesting to see if these patterns of xenophobia from the perspectives of African migrants holds true for the whole of South Africa. This is because there seems to be a pattern to the presence of different foreign nationalities in South Africa, whereby different migrant groups favour staying in particular living areas, and the urban-rural settling of African migrants may have its own pattern. A larger study is therefore necessary for a more systematic national outlook to further unpack the perspectives of African migrants on xenophobia and how it influences their day-to-day sociocultural and economic interactions.

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Annexes

ANNEX 1 – Table illustrating Phase 1 of the Results

Theme	Key Highlights	Quotes from Uber Driver respondents	Meaning
Reasons for moving to Cape Town (providing context of the migrant backgrounds)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economic opportunity - Family already in Cape Town - Safer than Johannesburg - Current context in home country is bad (e.g. Zimbabwe) 	<p><i>“I first worked in Joburg, but my uncle told me to move to Cape Town. I prefer Cape Town because it’s more relaxed here, safer, and there are more job opportunities” - Male from Zimbabwe, living in Cape Town since 2009, living in Mitchell’s Plain</i></p> <p><i>“Green pastures - in Eastern Cape we have the mentality of finishing grade 12 and then going to find a job in one of the bigger cities. Here in the Eastern Cape, there is nothing.” - Male from Eastern Cape (South Africa), living in Cape Town since 2011</i></p> <p><i>“I’m just here for work, I always go back home at least once a year, and then I go for 2-3 months” - Male from Zimbabwe, living in Cape Town since 2009, currently resides in Masiphumelele</i></p>	<p>Many foreigners and also internal migrants move for the purpose of economic opportunity. Often the context is back home does not allow them to secure jobs or earn money, so they come to Cape Town to find these opportunities. In addition, most of the Uber drivers already had family connections in Cape Town so it was easier to move there. Lastly Cape Town is seen as safer than other big cities in South Africa.</p>
Xenophobia Experiences	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Fear - Feeling unsafe - Do not trust anyone - No experience of xenophobia personally, just heard stories 	<p><i>“Here you can’t sleep. You must always watch out here.” - Male from Zimbabwe, living in Cape Town since 2009, currently resides in Ocean View</i></p> <p><i>“There is no xenophobia here, that was way back in 2007/2008 - but I stay in Steenberg (a suburb). Maybe in the townships you will experience it...but you shouldn’t live there” - Male from Malawi, living in Cape Town since 2012, currently resides in Steenberg</i></p> <p><i>“There is xenophobia here but not like in Johannesburg. The black South Africans here are mostly from the Eastern Cape, so that they are also internal foreigners here, which changes the dynamics as well” - Male from Somalia, living in Cape Town since 2011, currently resides in Belleville</i></p>	<p>Xenophobia is more likely to be present in the townships and never seems to happen in the suburbs according to these respondents. People also often have not experienced xenophobia personally, but they have heard stories, this makes them feel fearful and unsafe.</p>

<p>South Africans and Foreigners</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Foreigners have a negative view towards the mentality of (black) South Africans 	<p><i>“Xhosa people hate us because we are making money. Xhosa people don’t want to work and they’re not patient - they need easy things.” - Male from Zimbabwe, living in Cape Town since 2015, currently resides in Masiphumelele</i></p> <p><i>“I don’t smoke, I don’t drink beer, and most of the South Africans they drink and party almost every day” - Male from Zimbabwe, living in Cape Town since 2007, currently resides in Masiphumelele</i></p> <p><i>“No one is lazy, but the problem is that the South Africans are just working for money and don’t want to develop and upgrade” - Male from Zimbabwe, living in Cape Town since 2014, currently resides in Masiphumelele</i></p>	<p>There is a clear divide between foreigners and local South Africans. The foreigners often describe the South Africans as xenophobic, lazy, and jealous. Even some of the South Africans themselves (from this dataset) will admit to those stereotypes.</p>
<p>Social Life</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Role of the Family - No friends, just here to work - If they do have friends, these are usually friends from the same tribe - Many got children in South Africa 	<p><i>“Found my wife here, she’s also from Rwanda.” - Male from Rwanda, in Cape Town since 2015, currently resides in Salt River</i></p> <p><i>“I only came with my wife from Zimbabwe, but now we have 3 children here” - Male from Zimbabwe, living in Cape Town since 2007, currently resides in Masiphumelele</i></p> <p><i>“My husband is also from Congo and we both work in Uber, we have 5 children to take care of” - Female from Congo, living in Cape Town since 2000</i></p> <p><i>“My wife is also from Somalia. We have 6 kids and they were all born here” - Male from Somalia, living in Cape Town since 2009, currently resides in Mitchell’s Plain</i></p> <p><i>“I have no friends. I am just here to work and focus on the family.” - Male from Zimbabwe, living in Cape Town since 2005, currently resides in Masiphumelele</i></p>	<p>Most Uber drivers are very focused on work and earning money so that they can have a better life. This leaves little time for social interactions and the focus lies heavily on work, wife, and children. In addition, people are not interested in making friends because they do not trust people.</p>

<p>The concept of home and describing where home is</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Home is still country of origin - SA is just for work - Some travel back home every year (Zimbabwe) - Plans to move back in the future 	<p><i>“I wish to be back in Zim, but things aren’t great there. Now I’m used to the Cape Town life” - Male from Zimbabwe, living in Cape Town since 2015, currently resides in Masiphumelele</i></p> <p><i>“I miss home, home is always the best. But the situation won’t allow” - Male from Zimbabwe, living in Cape Town since 2014, currently resides in Masiphumelele</i></p> <p><i>“I am building a house in Zim to one day move back there” - Male from Zimbabwe, living in Cape Town since 2009, currently resides in Ocean View</i></p> <p><i>“I didn’t move here. I just came to work here. Here I can work, in Malawi the economy is not good for work” - Male from Malawi, living in Cape Town since 2007, resides in Rondebosch</i></p>	<p>For Zimbabweans, home is still Zimbabwe, their country of origin, and they often go back at least once a year.</p> <p>For the Somalians and Rwandans in this dataset, they confessed to missing home, but also saw Cape Town as another home. The South Africans from this dataset still considered their own region as home and often go back and forth</p>
<p>Politics and South African Government</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Documentation (e.g. ZEP permit) - Department of Home Affairs - Operation Dudula 	<p><i>“It’s very difficult to get papers here. Even a work permit.” - Male from Zimbabwe, living in Cape Town since 2007, currently resides in Masiphumelele</i></p> <p><i>“Operation Dudula is not active here in Cape Town, only in Johannesburg.” - Male from Zimbabwe, living in Cape Town since 2008, currently resides in Sunnysdale</i></p> <p><i>“Patriotic Alliance are also on this narrative of foreigners must leave. Based in Joburg and gaining quite a following” - Male from Zimbabwe, living in Cape Town since 2008, currently resides in Sunnysdale</i></p>	<p>All the respondents were very opinionated about the South African government and its flaws. Particularly the Zimbabweans emphasised on struggling with the paperwork and not being able to get the right permits.</p>

<p>Unsafe Areas, Crime, and Gangsterism</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Names of unsafe areas in Cape Town - Unsafe townships - High levels of crime - Gangsterism - Coloureds - Police are scared - Crime among South Africans themselves 	<p><i>“I don’t pick up people from the Cape Flats. They robbed me 2 times at the Cape Flats” - Male from Zimbabwe, living in Cape Town since 2014, currently resides in Masiphumelele</i></p> <p><i>“Problems are mostly in the townships. Masiphumelele is a better township though. Khayelitsha, Gugulethu, Philipi, and Delft is problematic! Those are so bad; you can’t come out alive.” - Male from Somalia, living in Cape Town since 2011, resides in Belville</i></p> <p><i>“My Uber got hijacked twice. At the Cape Flats I had a situation with 6 men robbing me. I feel like the crime situation in South Africa will only get worse” - Male from Johannesburg, South Africa, living in Cape Town since 2023</i></p> <p><i>“Protection fee has been created for gangsterism” - Male from Zimbabwe, living in Cape Town since 2014, currently resides in Masiphumelele</i></p> <p><i>“The police here are scared of the gangster groups” - Male from Rwanda, living in Cape Town since 2015, resides in Salt River</i></p>	<p>All respondents spent a good amount of time expanding on the theme of crime and that the current levels of crime go beyond xenophobia as South Africans are also using crime against each other. The most commonly listed unsafe areas were some of the larger townships in Cape Town (e.g. Cape Flats, Khayelitsha, Gugulethu). There was a clear consensus among the respondents on the unsafe areas in Cape Town.</p>
<p>Protection Fee and/or Business Fee</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Uber drivers fee - Taxi drivers - Spaza shops - Business Fee 	<p><i>“Even the taxi drivers collect 500R for every Uber that comes into Masiphumelele” - Male from Zimbabwe, living in Cape Town since 2016, residing in Masiphumelele</i></p> <p><i>“We were 3 of us and they shot all of us, just to injure us but not to kill. They then came back asking for protection fee.” - Male from Somalia, living in Cape Town since 2011, currently resides in Belville</i></p> <p><i>“All people doing business in Masiphumelele they have to pay protection fee for their businesses. Two years ago, there was no protection fee. This thing started after lockdown, in Khayelitsha, and from there it spread” - Male from Zimbabwe, living in Cape Town since 2014, currently resides in Masiphumelele</i></p>	<p>Protection fees and business fees is a theme that consistently emerged throughout the interactive quantitative data collection with the Uber drivers. It seems to be becoming a more frequently used system in recent years, almost becoming the “new norm.” Important to note that this system is not part of any legal framework and is being implemented by local South Africans themselves. Despite this system possibly lowering the xenophobic incidents, it can be seen as another manifestation of xenophobia.</p>

ANNEX 2 – Table illustrating Phase 2 of the Results

Theme	Theme Explained	Sub Themes	Quotes
Definition of Xenophobia	<p>Various respondents had different ideas about xenophobia and what it meant. Most of them referred to the term with the interpretation of ‘xenophobic violence.’ When questioned further however, it would become clear that other manifestations of xenophobia were indeed present in their daily lives.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Definition of Xenophobia - Manifestations of Xenophobia - Racism - Afrophobia - Personal anecdotes of xenophobic encounters 	<p>“There are different manifestations of xenophobia: Xenophobic violence is one of the expressions or manifestations of those attitudes. There are many other manifestations, including for instance, denied access to services or selective enforcement by laws” - Male, Research professional at the African Centre for Migration and Society</p> <p>“...that’s probably some of the questions that we need to investigate, but our research definitely shows that xenophobia is applicable to other groups, those who are deemed outsiders, even if they are not deemed foreign nationals. But obviously those people would want to call it something different like ethnic tension or ethnic violence. To sum it up, I would also say xenophobia applies to anyone who is deemed as an outsider, a stranger, or someone outside of the community / local area, regardless of if you come from another country or not.” - Male, Research professional at the African Centre for Migration and Society</p>
The level of xenophobia is location-dependent	<p>The interviews showed that despite there being some differences between the bigger cities, the prevalence of xenophobia was very township-specific. This means that xenophobia only occurs in specific areas within the bigger cities</p> <p>Governance of Space when discussing the townships</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Xenophobia in Cape Town - Comparison to other bigger cities (Johannesburg, Durban, Pretoria) - Township vs. Suburb: Governance of Space - Masiphumelele (Case Study) - Why is xenophobia different in Cape Town 	<p>“Joburg probably has double the incidents than other cities. Xenophobic incidents are more frequent there. F: but why? M: My thinking is, because of the population size and the number of townships and informal settlements we have and how crowded the situation is. But also, the corrupts in community governors. In Joburg informal settlements, the police tell us, local authorities tell us, those are no-go areas, no-go zones. The authorities don’t even go there. I would say that makes it different.” - Male, Research professional at the African Centre for Migration and Society</p> <p>“P: Yes, you do hear it in cape town, but it’s not that strong. Because it’s only a few people. I: So, you have never experienced anything yourself? P: No, I haven’t” - Male, Zimbabwe, Uber driver, living in Cape Town since 2012, currently resides in Masiphumelele</p> <p>“But you are quite lucky that you say you feel safe. U: Yes, I don’t experience any problems. For example, now when I’m done with my shift I will just drive home, park my car in the street behind my house and walk home with no problems. Even if there is load shedding, no problems.” - Male, Zimbabwe, Uber driver, living in Cape Town since 2014, currently resides in Masiphumelele</p>

<p>Dependency system decreasing the prevalence of xenophobic violence</p>	<p>Over the past years, various systems have emerged from the local South Africans, that have created a dependency framework whereby local South Africans have become dependent on foreigners for (extra) income; e.g. RDP Housing, Protection Fee, Business Fee</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - RDP Housing - Business Fee - Protection Fee - Uber Fee 	<p><i>"P: You see, they just want to steal money from us. That's the problem we are now experiencing on this side. With the taxi owners. I: What are you experiencing? R: It's like xenophobia. You know most of the uber drivers are foreigners, so they take that advantage. Just to take money from us. I: So, you mean that there is indeed xenophobia, unlike you mentioned earlier? P: Yes, it is definitely here, but it is not violent. It's here but in a more hidden way." - Male, Zimbabwe, Uber driver, living in Cape Town since 2012, currently resides in Masiphumelele</i></p> <p><i>"You know there's black tax here. People make their own economy. In the nothingness there is something. It's very very clever." - Female, white South African, working in Masiphumelele, part of the focus group discussion</i></p> <p><i>"The thing is, if they catch me now, they won't kill me, but sometimes they will say 'give us 2000R' so if I have to give that amount to them, it's a loss for me. So, to avoid all this, I don't work in this area (Masiphumelele)" - Male from Zimbabwe, working as Uber driver, living in Masiphumelele</i></p> <p><i>"But those organising for the violence, they don't take into consideration what is going on. Foreigners don't get RDP houses because they get them from government. South Africans get a free house, they need money, they rent it out to foreign nationals, but those organising violence are like, no no foreigners are stealing RDP houses. sometimes locals even sell RDP houses, which is not even legal. So, it's the locals who enter into some kind of transaction with the foreign nationals, either rent or buy, but those foreign nationals don't want to hear that" - Male, Research professional at the African Centre for Migration and Society</i></p> <p><i>"Or they stay in the RDP house and build shacks around it to rent to foreigners, it's a huge cash-income, and undeclared cash income. So, the city is trying to regulate that but I don't think they'll ever manage to regulate it. For example, I know this one place in Masiphumelele where the rental income is about 40,000R per month cash income" - Female from Zimbabwe, living in Cape Town since 2016, working as a retailer, resides in Claremont - part of a Focus Group Discussion</i></p>
<p>Tribalism & Ethnicity</p>	<p>Tribalism plays a big role in the discussions that take place around xenophobia. There is much reference to Zulus, Xhosas, and Black South Africans. In addition, there is also an emphasis on Zimbabweans adaptability skill as the Shona and Ndebele languages have many similarities to the South African languages. This can cause identities to be confused, whereby a local South African is sometimes mistaken for a Zimbabwean.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Globalisation and migration trends - continuous movement between countries - Covering up identities; blending cultures - South African tribes; Zulu, Xhosa - Black South Africans vs. Foreigners - Coloureds - White People - Inter-marriage - Children who have a foreign origin but spent their whole lives in South Africa 	<p><i>"Zulu's I have to say. Yo, it's definitely them. They are very xenophobic. Because I remember when I was in Joburg, like maybe if there was a xenophobic attack, you would know that Zulus are leading. So, I feel like Zulu's are more xenophobic and thank God Cape Town doesn't have a lot of Zulus" - Female from Zimbabwe, grew up in South Africa, living in Thornton</i></p> <p><i>"I don't know, and it's especially with the Zimbabweans. But what I know, like if you know back then, most people from Joburg or Durban, they speak the same language as the Zimbabweans, so it's more like one, Zulu and Ndebele. So, I think those differences are still continuing and all that, they never liked each other. But I feel they should be brothers and sisters, but it's not like that" - Female from Zimbabwe, living in Cape Town since 2016, working as a retailer, resides in Claremont - part of a Focus Group Discussion</i></p> <p><i>"... you know because of xenophobia people didn't want to admit that they were from Zim. Also with me, it took me some time to even tell my close friends that I was from Zimbabwe, like I was hiding it because I was scared of how they would treat me. F: So, they initially thought that you were from South Africa? P: Yeah, they thought I was from South Africa because I could speak the South African languages and I grew up here." - Female from Zimbabwe, grew up in South Africa, living in Thornton</i></p>

<p>Politics and the South African Government</p>	<p>According to Misago (2024) there has been a shift in the xenophobia discourse in that it has found its way into mainstream politics, often using migrants as a scapegoat to South Africa's struggles.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Department of Home Affairs - Corruption and flawed systems (e.g. Police) - Scapegoating migrants - 80/20 rule and Black Economic Empowerment - National Elections - Operation Dudula - Documentation; e.g. ZEP permits 	<p><i>"The Home Affairs Ministry, you can't really know what's going on or what informs their decisions. They come up with things all the time, things are not legally sound, they are challenged, they appeal, they lose, they try again - I really don't understand what's going on there."</i> - Male, Research professional at the African Centre for Migration and Society</p> <p><i>"They need votes from South African people. And the South Africans are complaining that we've got more foreigners. So, for them to win votes, they say that they give foreigners a specific amount of time to reside in SA. But you see it's a mind game. They won't actually do that, they are just saying that to gain more votes"</i> - Male, Zimbabwe, Uber driver, living in Cape Town since 2012, currently resides in Masiphumelele</p> <p><i>"But you see these vigilante groups who are operating in places like Johannesburg, like Operation Dudula, are using these tactics to prevent migrants from accessing health care services or taking the law into their own hands. Going into spaces, searching people, closing Spaza shops, and saying all that stuff"</i> - Female researcher from Botswana, working at Xenowatch</p>
<p>Daily Life (Work & Social life)</p>	<p>This theme sheds light on the daily lives of the respondents and will reflect further on how xenophobia (has or has not) influenced or has shaped their daily lives.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Work Life - Family - Friends - Levels of integration - Where is home? 	<p><i>"I: So, have you experienced any xenophobia? P: there, when I was still working for the trucks, yes I have. Because it was more on the truck drivers. I: Why? P: because you would find out when you are driving, people would start blocking the road. And they can kill you. I: But have you experienced anything like that? P: Mostly not, because of WhatsApp we are able to communicate with each other and inform each other about situations on the road."</i> - Male from Zimbabwe, living in Cape Town since 2008, first working as a truck driver, now working as an Uber driver</p> <p><i>"I have people that I know. Friends, no. I have come to a stage where I've started to realize that, as for me, it doesn't happen to everyone, people have you because they want to get something from you. As long as I don't have what they want from me, or I don't entertain them the way they want, give them the love that they want, they don't take me as one of theirs. That's my experience of life"</i> - Male from Johannesburg, South Africa, living in Cape Town since 2023, working for Uber for 3 months</p> <p><i>"...Mmm, well not really friends as such, but I do know a few people who are living in Cape Town"</i> - Female from Zimbabwe, grew up in South Africa, living in Thornton</p>