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Effectiveness and Legitimacy of International Organisations: the case of the United Nations Security Council and International Court of Justice in addressing the crisis in Gaza

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**Effectiveness and Legitimacy of International Organisations:
the case of the United Nations Security Council and
International Court of Justice in addressing the crisis in Gaza**

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MSc Political Science: International Organisation

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Abstract

This thesis investigates the impact of effectiveness on legitimacy within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), focusing on their roles in addressing the ongoing conflict in Gaza.

Employing institutionalism theory and a mixed-methods approach that combines comparative institutional study, public perceptions analysis and semi-structured interviews, the study highlights the challenges and areas for reform to enhance effectiveness and legitimacy. The findings reveal that the Council's effectiveness is hindered by structural flaws, such as limited representation and permanent members' veto power, which negatively affect its legitimacy, as trust in its capacity to maintain peace and security declines. The Court exhibits procedural rigour and higher legitimacy due to its impartiality and adherence to international law. Nevertheless, reliance on voluntary compliance and the protracted nature of fulfilling its mandate limits its practical impact.

The study underscores the interplay between effectiveness and legitimacy, showing that procedural fairness can sustain legitimacy among intentional community.

Recommendations include expanding the Council's representation, revising veto power, and enhancing ICJ enforcement capacities. By addressing these challenges, the study advocates for a more equitable international order capable of maintaining peace and justice in a *multiplex* world.

Keywords International Organisations • Effectiveness • Legitimacy • Conflict Resolution

1. Introduction

International organisations play a crucial role in global governance, fostering cooperation, maintaining peace and security, promoting human rights, and addressing global challenges. In a multiplex world (Acharya et al., 2023), these organisations face growing scrutiny regarding their authority, effectiveness and principles upon which they operate.

Legitimacy becomes crucial to international organisations' functioning as it directly impacts their capacity to “make a difference in world politics” (Tallberg & Zürn, 2019: p. 581). Therefore, international organisations seek legitimacy from their members and external actors to obtain recognition of their authority, compliance with their rules and material support (Zaum, 2016).

Notably, the United Nations faces rising demands to strengthen peacekeeping operations, address environmental issues, and reduce inequality, but confidence in its role is globally decreasing due to its slow responses and biased decision-making (World Values Survey 2017-2022). This negative trend is amplified by the inability to prevent and react to crises, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Following the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, the subsequent Israeli military intervention in Gaza has led to a humanitarian crisis: over 1.7 million people have been displaced and more than 45,000 individuals killed, with approximately 70% being women and children. However, the death toll may exceed 186,000 people.¹

According to international law, a state can invoke the right to self-defence. However, the responsive use of force must be proportional and not deliberately target civilians. Israel's actions have raised allegations of collective punishment, prohibited under international law and Geneva Conventions. In this context, the UN has been questioned for failing to address the situation adequately. In particular, the UN Security Council has been criticised for its inability to pass resolutions demanding a ceasefire due to the veto power held by the permanent members.

Meanwhile, the case *South Africa v. Israel* brought to the International Court of Justice exemplifies the willingness to adhere to the legal order, even when enforcement and response to its violations are often protracted.² Recent initiatives, such as the *Pact for the Future* (Resolution A/RES/79/1), emphasise the necessity of reforming these institutions to address their effectiveness and enhance representativeness, justice, and democracy while reaffirming the foundational principles of the UN Charter: ensuring international peace and respecting international law.

The study applies institutional theory and a mixed methods approach, including comparative institutional analysis, to assess the effectiveness of the UNSC and the ICJ in addressing the Gaza conflict, and the impact on their legitimacy through public opinion and interview analyses.

This paper addresses the following points: firstly, the research question and its relevance; secondly, the literature review; thirdly, the theoretical and conceptual framework; fourthly, the operationalisation of the research question; and finally, the analytical methods to empirically study the relationship between legitimacy and effectiveness.

2. Research Question and Relevance

How does the effectiveness of International Organisations in addressing conflicts affect their legitimacy? **Specifically, how has the effectiveness of the UN Security Council and the ICJ in addressing the conflict in Gaza affected their legitimacy among the international community?**

This study addresses a gap in the IR literature by examining the relationship between effectiveness and legitimacy within international organisations (IOs) by applying institutionalism theory and a mixed methods approach.

Scholars have extensively explored these concepts, yet the impact of effectiveness on legitimacy in conflict resolution remains under-examined. Therefore, it is important to investigate this research question through comparative institutional study, public perceptions, and interview analyses to deepen and enhance academic understanding of this multifaceted relationship.

This contributes to the ongoing Political Science and International Relations debates about the United Nations' role and relevance in the contemporary world.

Furthermore, the research seeks to offer insights into the factors that affect the UN's responsiveness in solving conflicts and the conditions that can enhance its effectiveness and legitimacy. Understanding this relationship is crucial for personnel working within these institutions as it can inform strategies to enhance institutional performance, which is crucial for long-term success. Ultimately, this research aims to deepen the understanding of the broader implications for the future of global governance, especially the UN's capacity to address protracted crises in sensitive regions, thereby aiding efforts to foster peace and security.

3. Literature Review

A preliminary examination of the existing scholarly literature on the relationship between effectiveness and legitimacy suggests that *performance is the path to legitimacy* (Gutner and Thompson, 2010: 228): without sufficient legitimacy, international organisations are arguably constrained in their capacity to fulfil their objectives and engage effectively in problem-solving.³

Lipset distinguished between legitimacy, a matter of evaluative beliefs, and effectiveness, a matter of instrumental calculation (1960: 77-78), while Habermas linked legitimacy and effectiveness, suggesting that the European Union experiences a "legitimation crisis" when fails to fulfil its welfare promises (1973-1976: Part III).⁴

In this sense, Gutner and Thompson define performance as the organisation's ability to achieve its stated objectives, encompassing both the processes and outcomes. The scholars argue that international organisations' (IOs) performance is closely connected to their legitimacy, given that IOs' are often perceived as undemocratic. Therefore, their ability to perform effectively is key to gaining and maintaining legitimacy. In this sense, legitimacy is "the key to effective government, unlike governance based on the use of force" (Hurd, 1999, p. 388).

IOs are established with well-defined purposes; failing to fulfil them affects their legitimacy (Binder & Heupel, 2015). Consequently, when an organisation such as the United Nations effectively addresses an urgent global issue, it reinforces the perception that has authority and can enforce its purposes. Such effectiveness may foster confidence among member states, further reinforcing the organisation's legitimacy.

Müller contributes to this discussion by providing examples of failures that have impacted the UN's legitimacy; for instance, the Security Council's inability to prevent conflict, like the Iraq War, resulted in significant criticism of its authority and legitimacy.

Considering peacekeeping literature, rapid deployment is crucial in influencing the relationship between effectiveness and legitimacy: a rapid response to crises enhances effectiveness, reinforcing legitimacy; conversely, delays may undermine the mission's effectiveness, eroding trust in the UN's ability to address crises.⁵

Effectiveness is also influenced by institutions' consistent application of rules, which is believed to enhance compliance and legitimacy (Frank, 1990; Binder & Heupel, 2015). Similarly, Buchanan and Keohane argue that IOs' legitimacy depends on their capacity to fulfil the functions that justify their role in the international system.

Furthermore, institutions' organisational performance and effectiveness recall the concept of *output legitimacy*, defined by Scharpf as the institution's ability to solve collective problems effectively.⁶

In this sense, Beetham argues that institutions derive legitimacy from how well they perform, particularly their ability to produce effective outcomes and fulfil promises. Conversely, an ineffective institution risks losing legitimacy when it is perceived to be failing to fulfil its role. Organisations like the UN and WHO are expected to deliver global public goods and coordinate health emergencies. Hence, their legitimacy depends on achieving these goals and enhancing global welfare, as "if they do not fulfil their purpose or create negative externalities, they will not be considered legitimate" (Binder & Heupel, 2015: p. 241).

Furthermore, Panke et al. emphasised that performance can be divided into two aspects: the perceived quality of outputs related to problem-solving effectiveness and the normative evaluation of these outputs related to legitimacy.⁷ These scholars adopt institutionalism, whereby effectiveness is regarded as the primary means of achieving legitimacy (Cronin & Hurd, 2008).

Conversely, constructivist scholars such as Hurd argue that IOs derive legitimacy not solely from their effectiveness but also from aligning with socially constructed international norms and values.

Other scholars, including Dellmuth and Tallberg, posit that IOs' legitimacy, particularly social legitimacy, is not necessarily contingent on effectiveness but on their capacity to deliver collective goods and citizens' confidence in political institutions.⁸

Therefore, it is important to consider factors other than effectiveness that can influence the legitimacy of international organisations, such as expertise, membership and autonomy.

Zürn argues that **expertise** is central to legitimacy because it enhances credibility and authority. For instance, institutions like the WHO derive legitimacy from their technical expertise and ability to address global health challenges. Haas adds that expertise and epistemic communities are vital for tackling global issues due to their technical knowledge and ability to offer evidence-based guidance.⁹ However, expertise may negatively impact legitimacy. Some scholars argue that excess expertise, essentially creating a technocratic organisation, may undermine democracy, as experts might not adequately represent members' interests.

Meanwhile, an organisation may face criticism if it is perceived to lack expertise, particularly during a global crisis; this could undermine its legitimacy.

Another factor influencing IOs' legitimacy is its degree of **autonomy** from member states (Coicaud, 2001). Autonomous organisations act following the global community's interests rather than being constrained by narrow interests (Suchman, 1995); in this sense, Hurd highlights that autonomy is crucial for organisations like the UN to function as neutral arbiters in global governance.

Nevertheless, it is widely contested that powerful states frequently influence IOs' procedures and decision-making. This occurs because states, as *principals*, delegate political authority to these organisations, as *agents*, to address “problems without passports,” as former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted, while seeking to maintain their authority (Tallberg & Zürn, 2019). Hence, organisations must balance the political influence of their *principals* with their obligation to uphold the international legal order. Furthermore, it is essential to strike a balance between autonomy and accountability.

As Zürn argues, an excess of autonomy may cause IOs to become detached from the populations and states they are intended to serve, resulting in a legitimacy crisis.

Moreover, **membership** is a pivotal dimension that influences legitimacy. It refers to the inclusion and representativeness of different actors in an organisation's decision-making processes.

Cross argues that institutions gain legitimacy by reflecting the interests and participation of all relevant stakeholders, including member states, civil society organisations, non-governmental organisations, and private sector actors. Indeed, **universal membership** is a factor that positively affects IOs' legitimacy: those with global representation are more likely to be perceived as legitimate and authoritative, as they ensure that different world regions and smaller countries are adequately represented in the decision-making processes.¹⁰

In summary, IOs with broader membership are perceived as more representative of the global community, which enhances their legitimacy (Schmidtke & Lenz, 2024).¹¹ While universal membership increases legitimacy, it may negatively affect decision-making, as building a consensus and finding agreement becomes more challenging.

The relationship between legitimacy and effectiveness is interesting since it can be mutually reinforcing yet also mutually constraining (Sommerer & Agné, 2018). Scholars have given valuable insights into this relationship, providing comparative studies of IO performance across different institutions and issue areas and highlighting other factors that can affect or undermine legitimacy.

This paper explores the correlation between legitimacy and effectiveness concerning the Security Council and the International Court of Justice.

While UN legitimacy has been widely explored, particularly concerning authority and the Council's legitimacy regarding compliance with its decisions, as Binder and Heupel did, through evidence gathered from the General Assembly debates, the ICJ has not been subjected to the same degree of examination, nor has the role of these institutions in addressing conflicts.

This paper addresses the aforementioned research gap by providing a comparative institutional analysis of UNSC and ICJ effectiveness in addressing the conflict in Gaza and its impact on legitimacy by examining public opinion perceptions and interviews.

4. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

To understand the concepts of effectiveness and legitimacy, the theoretical framework of institutionalism is employed after examining how the concepts are discussed in IR literature.

4.1 Legitimacy

Legitimacy is a multi-faceted concept that has been part of the academic debates for decades and is generally understood as the *right to rule* (Coicaud, 2001). Hence, it is interesting to consider the relationship between legitimacy and authority, as it is a source that “transforms *naked* power into authority” and a “constraint on power, imposing self-restraint on powerful actors” (Zaum, 2016: p. 1115).¹² Lamb suggests that people accept authority as legitimate when it is *predictable, justifiable, equitable, accessible, and respectful of human dignity* (2014: pp. 28-30). Similarly, Reus-Smit asserts that an institution can act and/or rule only if socially questioned and sanctioned: an institution is rightful and legitimate when its principles are socially endorsed and, thus, considered valid (2007: p. 159).¹³ In this sense, Tallberg and Zürn observe that legitimacy becomes an issue when an institution has authority (2019: p. 586). This highlights how legitimacy is not just an abstract concept but a prerequisite in global governance, as it ensures that states respect the principles and rules on which IOs are based. Hence, legitimacy is crucial in ensuring compliance, mainly when IOs rely on normative and reputational pressures to encourage states to commit to decisions (Coen et al., 2022). Some scholars focus on legitimacy based on moral standards, while others view legitimacy as a social construct. Buchanan and Keohane, following Weber’s distinction, define the legitimacy’s normative dimension, the *right to rule*, and the sociological dimension, the *belief in the right to rule*.¹⁴ Scholte and Tallberg differentiate legitimacy into procedural legitimacy, which concerns how processes are conducted and whether they are proper, and performance legitimacy, which refers to evaluating outcomes based on whether the audiences perceive the institution's actions as enhancing or undermining the desired expectations.

Considering the different theoretical approaches, realist scholars perceive legitimacy as a tool for powerful states to advance their interests; thus, IOs' legitimacy is subordinated to power.

In comparison, liberals believe IOs require legitimacy to promote cooperation among states and ensure compliance. Conversely, functionalists argue that legitimacy derives from the capacity to enhance collective welfare and solve collective issues (Bexell, 2014). While constructivists argue that legitimacy is socially constructed through norms and beliefs, which shape how institutions are perceived, Tallberg and Zürn, argue that legitimacy refers to the belief that the institution's authority is perceived as appropriate by relevant audiences.¹⁵ Finally, institutionalist scholars argue that organisations have specific mandates, rules, and processes to fulfil particular objectives.

Therefore, IOs' legitimacy is tied to the perception that they are functioning effectively and fairly, mainly that their authority is "desirable, proper, or appropriate" (Suchman, 1995, p. 574) and aligns with the established norms, such as justice, fairness, or respect for human rights.¹⁶ Similarly, Hurd defines legitimacy as "*a belief in the rightful use of authority by an institution*" and can be evaluated through compliance.¹⁷

Accordingly, the latter approach, institutionalism, is employed to conceptualise legitimacy.

In this study, legitimacy is conceptualised as the **perception and/or belief of key actors that the institution's authority is appropriately exercised and, therefore, recognised and accepted.**¹⁸

4.2 Effectiveness

Effectiveness is a complex concept that cannot be defined in terms of outcomes. Before defining effectiveness, it is important to acknowledge that performance and effectiveness are interconnected but distinct concepts. Performance is defined as the processes and outcomes of an organisation's efforts to achieve its objectives, while effectiveness focuses on the capacity to achieve the desired outcomes.¹⁹

Mitchell argues that most leaders highlight effectiveness as “outcome accountability”; thus, institutions are evaluated based on tangible outcomes, such as poverty reduction, conflict resolution, or global health improvement.²⁰

However, effectiveness is not only determined by tangible outcomes or results but also by institutions’ ability to fulfil their mandate and adhere to established norms. In particular, Coen et al. have defined effectiveness in terms of *constitutive effectiveness*, *compliance*, and *goal attainment*. Constitutive effectiveness refers to an organisation's capacity to foster normative consensus among members, identify pivotal actors, and establish roles, shared norms, objectives, and policies (Gutner & Thompson, 2010; Tallberg et al., 2016; Coen et al., 2022). Compliance refers to the extent to which member states adhere to the organisation’s rules and obligations, achieved through material inducements (sanctions) and softer approaches (naming and shaming). Finally, goal attainment refers to the extent to which the organisation achieve its policy objectives.

Following a constructivist approach, IOs’ effectiveness derives from their conformity with socially constructed norms and values. In this sense, Steffek posited that institutions should be judged not only on their ability to deliver outcomes but also on their compliance with normative expectations.

Panke et al. assert that effectiveness is linked to the capacity to fulfil mandates and objectives, address global challenges, facilitate cooperation, and implement policies that benefit its members. From this institutionalist perspective, organisations are designed with specific mandates, rules, and processes to achieve specific goals. Consequently, an institution's effectiveness is linked to its integrity, meaning it should operate according to its stated procedures and goals.

Therefore, the study adopts an institutionalist perspective and defines effectiveness as institutions’ capacity to fulfil their mandates. In particular, the Security Council's mandate is “maintaining peace and security,” while the ICJ's is “to settle, following international law, legal disputes submitted to it by states.” Thus, if institutions fulfil their mandates, they are effective.

Finally, considering the research question and the theoretical framework employed, **international organisations are perceived as legitimate** when their **authority** is believed to be **appropriately exercised, recognised, and accepted**. They are **effective** when they **fulfil their mandate**, conforming to international norms.

4.3 Interplay between effectiveness and legitimacy

The effectiveness of an international organisation can be defined as its capacity to fulfil its mandate. When the UNSC and the ICJ successfully maintain peace, resolve conflicts and disputes or uphold international norms, they gain legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. This is because effectiveness enhances legitimacy.

At the same time, legitimacy reinforces effectiveness, facilitating cooperation and compliance among member states and other relevant actors. A high level of legitimacy reduces contestation and promotes adherence to an organisation's decisions, enhancing its capacity to fulfil its mandates.

Therefore, the relationship between effectiveness and legitimacy is not unidirectional: legitimacy may endure, despite the ineffectiveness, when an organisation maintains the procedural process fairly. For instance, the ICJ may be legitimate due to its alignment with international law despite its enforcement mechanisms being perceived as weak. Similarly, effectiveness does not guarantee legitimacy; the Council may make effective decisions and solve conflicts, but the veto power of permanent members may still undermine its legitimacy among the international community.

4.4 Hypotheses

The study proposes two hypotheses:

H1. The **ineffectiveness** of the UNSC and the ICJ in addressing the conflict in Gaza **negatively affected their legitimacy** by **undermining trust in their ability** to ensure peace and enforce international law and creating a **legitimacy drift** and **contestation** among the international community.

If the hypothesis is proven correct, UNSC resolutions and compliance with ICJ rulings would decline, particularly among powerful states. Less powerful states and the international community may question the relevance and authority of these institutions, and debates surrounding the necessity for reform would likely intensify.

Legitimacy drift, defined by Stephen, is when an organisation faces a legitimacy deficit due to failing to adapt to a changing political context.²¹

H2. The ineffectiveness of the UNSC and the ICJ in addressing the conflict in Gaza is **not undermining** their **credibility** and, ultimately, their **legitimacy** among the international community.

If the null hypothesis is proven correct, then cooperation with the UNSC and ICJ and compliance with their decisions would be maintained or even increased despite the ineffectiveness of these bodies in resolving the conflict.

5. Research Design

This section highlights how to study the relationship between effectiveness and legitimacy empirically. The study employs an institutionalist approach to understand how IOs' effectiveness influences and shapes the perceptions of legitimacy among the international community.

5.1 Case selection

The study examines the case concerning the role of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in addressing the conflict in Gaza and how the ineffectiveness of these institutions in fulfilling their mandate, in particular adopting a ceasefire and ensuring the compliance with international law, influences their legitimacy among the international community. The Council is the UN's political body responsible for maintaining international peace and security, while the Court is the body that ensures compliance with international law. Both institutions have a crucial role in conflict resolution, and both have been criticised for their inability to halt the conflict. The ongoing Israeli military intervention in the Gaza Strip provides a relevant case study for examining how institutions' effectiveness impacts legitimacy.

5.2 Methodology and Operationalization

The theoretical concepts of effectiveness and legitimacy are measured using a qualitative approach. To investigate the relationship between **effectiveness** as the independent variable and **legitimacy** as the dependent variable, the research adopts a **mixed-methods approach: comparative institutional study, public perceptions analysis and semi-structured interviews**.

The concepts are operationalised as follows: **effectiveness**, defined in terms of **mandate fulfilment**, is measured by examining the extent to which the Council and the Court have fulfilled their mandates, using indicators such as the number of resolutions passed and/or blocked, compliance

with rulings and enforcement, response time, veto power use, newspapers' themes, tone and framing, and international community perceptions.

Legitimacy, defined in terms of **perceptions** of the **appropriateness of the organisation's authority**, is examined through public trust levels and the international community's perceptions.

As the case includes two IOs with different mandates, it is comprehensive to conduct a comparative case study that explores their differences in effectiveness in fulfilling their mandates.

Analysing public perceptions provides insights on a broader scale, as the sample size of respondents is larger and more globally representative than semi-structured interviews. The latter involves relevant stakeholders, including international lawyers and diplomats, to gain deeper insights into their perceptions of legitimacy and effectiveness. Specifically, the interviews investigate the respondents' perceptions regarding the actions or inactions of the UNSC and ICJ in the ongoing conflict in Gaza, investigating whether these align with their expectations of effective governance and, if not, whether this affects their perception of legitimacy. While the comparative case study centres on analysing the institutional designs and actions of the Council and the ICJ in fulfilling their mandates, semi-structured interviews shed light on the international community's perspective on whether (and how) effectiveness influences legitimacy.

5.3 Data and Sources

The study combines qualitative data sources, such as primary documentation from the UN. In particular, the official websites of the UN, UNSC, and ICJ gather data from the *United Nations Charter*, the Court's *Statute*, organisational reports, resolutions, rulings, and official statements. This documentation provides evidence of the institutions' mandate fulfilment, helping to assess their effectiveness. Conversely, the interviews are conducted with international lawyers, diplomats, and other key actors who directly or indirectly engage with these institutions.

The interviewees are identified through academic networks and conferences, including those hosted by Leiden University, T.M.C. Asser Instituut, Amnesty International, and LinkedIn. They are asked for consent, informed of the purpose of the research and assured of anonymity.

Furthermore, existing surveys and mainstream media help assess institutions' perceptions. Data are gathered from the latest public opinion survey by the *Pew Research Center* across 35 countries in Spring 2023 and Spring 2024. Additional sources include the Global Report from the *Edelman Trust Barometer* conducted in 2024, the *YouGov survey* commissioned by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) covering 14 countries in 2023 and the International Peace Institute (IPI) and the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) report on the *Multilateralism Index 2024*.

Lastly, data are also gathered from reputable media coverage. This approach enables the study to understand how the public perceives the ICJ, how its rulings are assessed, and how its legitimacy is framed and contested in mainstream media outlets by comparing BBC and Al Jazeera, which provide Western and Middle Eastern perspectives.

6. Analysis

This section explores how effectiveness impacts legitimacy, using the conflict in Gaza as a case study. It examines the influence of institutional design, decision-making processes, and enforcement mechanisms on effectiveness and how this affects the perceptions of legitimacy. To achieve this, the study employs a comparative institutional study and investigates public perceptions drawn from existing surveys, mainstream media articles, and semi-structured interviews.

6.1 Comparative Institutional Study

The study compares the UNSC and ICJ across three dimensions: institutional design, decision-making processes, and enforcement mechanisms to evaluate their effectiveness. Both institutions encounter challenges in fulfilling their mandate objectives due to structural and procedural constraints, which influence their operations and outcomes differently.

Regarding **institutional design**, the *Charter* established, under Article 7, the Security Council and the International Court of Justice among its principal organs.

The Security Council comprises 15 member states, five of which are permanent members (P5), namely China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States; the General Assembly elects the remaining ten for a two-year term. Its primary function is maintaining international peace and security, along with settling disputes, making recommendations, identifying threats to peace and proposing measures, imposing economic sanctions and authorising military action.²²

The Court, established by Article 92, Chapter XIV, is the UN's principal judicial organ and operates under the *Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice*. It comprises 15 independent judges elected by the General Assembly and the Security Council, whose mandate lasts nine years. Its primary role is to resolve disputes between states and give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to by the General Assembly and the Council. Moreover, all UN members are part of the Court's Statute and must comply with its decisions.²³

While the Council's structure incorporates political dynamics, as P5 hold considerable power and influence in shaping decisions, in contrast to their rotating counterparts, the Court's design emphasises impartiality, equality and independence as its judges do not represent their countries.

However, the design of both institutions may hinder their ability to fulfil their mandates effectively. The Council's disproportionate power distribution among its members often leads to deadlocks, especially when the P5 interests are at stake. Conversely, the Court's lack of enforcement mechanisms limits its capacity to ensure compliance with its decisions.

Considering the **decision-making processes**, each Council member has one vote. Procedural decisions require a majority of at least nine votes, and all P5 members vote on substantive matters due to their "right to veto," obstructing Council's decision-making.²⁴

Concerning the case study, the US has exercised its veto power five times since the beginning of the conflict on October 7, 2023, to block draft resolutions calling for a ceasefire, even amid widespread support. Strategic use of vetoes by the US has occurred since 1970, culminating in the vetoing of 49 draft resolutions intended to condemn Israel.²⁵ A similar pattern was observed with Russia concerning Syria and Ukraine. This evidences that veto power negatively impacts effectiveness.

Conversely, the ICJ's decision-making process ensures equal voting rights among judges. Following written submissions and public hearings, judges independently deliberate in closed sessions, issuing binding judgments based on the majority of votes.²⁶ While these procedures guarantee fairness and consistency, the decision-making process can be protracted in time. This indeed can undermine the Court's ability to effectively address urgent disputes, as exemplified by the ongoing case, "Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip," brought by South Africa v. Israel. Recognising that the final decision may take years, South Africa requested the Court to indicate provisional measures to "protect against further, severe and irreparable harm to the rights of the Palestinian people" and "to ensure Israel's compliance with its obligations under the Genocide Convention" (No. 2023/77, ICJ, 2023).

In particular, RSA filed a case on December 29, 2023, alleging that Israel is displaying a “disproportionate use of force” in Gaza, combined with systemic displacement and significant civilian casualties, is “genocidal in character...intended to bring about the destruction of a substantial part of the Palestinian national, racial and ethnical group”²⁷ under Article 2, Genocide Convention.²⁸ Despite the protracted nature of the deliberation, the ICJ has effectively addressed the RSA's request for interim measures.

Comparing the institutions, the Council's decision-making is disproportionate and unrepresentative of today's world. Indeed, it is criticised for allowing any P5 member to block a substantive resolution, regardless of international support. By contrast, ICJ's judges cannot unilaterally block a decision, but the lengthy processes limit its effectiveness.

Examining the **enforcement mechanisms**, the Council possesses significant enforcement powers under the Charter, including imposing sanctions, deploying peacekeeping operations, and authorising military intervention. However, these mechanisms rely on the members' capacity to reach a consensus, often challenging due to political divisions. The conflict in Gaza exemplifies this limitation as debates within the Council remain deeply divided, preventing it from reaching a unanimous decision. For instance, the UNSC failed to adopt the last resolution in November 2024 because the US vetoed it, with the American delegate arguing that “this resolution would have sent a dangerous message to Hamas.” In response, the Russian representative criticised: “We will not allow the US to muzzle the voice of the Council.”²⁹

Furthermore, its effectiveness depends not only on its approved resolutions but also on their implementation by states, which can further undermine its role. Conversely, the Court lacks such powers; while its rulings are legally binding, it relies on states' cooperation and compliance, along with the support of other UN bodies, particularly the Council, to enforce its decisions. Consequently, relying on states' voluntary compliance weakens its effectiveness, as powerful states may disregard its rulings. In *South Africa v. Israel* case, the Court's president stated: “The facts and

circumstances... are sufficient to conclude that at least some of the rights claimed by South Africa... are plausible” and recommended six provisional measures on February 26, 2024: Israel must prevent genocidal acts, ensure its military refrains from such actions, preserve evidence of war crimes for fact-finding missions, report on the implementation of these measures within a month, punish incitement to genocide, and guarantee essential services and humanitarian aid in Gaza; adding on March 28: “in view of the worsening conditions of life faced by Palestinians...in particular the spread of famine and starvation” that Israel shall take “all necessary and effective measures to ensure... unhindered provision... basic services and humanitarian assistance” and stated on May 24, 2024, that should: “immediately halt its military offensive and any other action in the Rafah Governorate” (Press Release, ICJ, 2024). However, these provisional recommendations have not been enforced, as reported by several human rights organisations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, which indicated that Israel is not complying with preventing acts of genocide and delivering humanitarian aid (Osgood & Siddiqui; Al Jazeera, 2024). This reflects the broader limitations of the Court’s enforcement power, as seen in other cases, such as Russia’s defiance of rulings in the Ukraine v. Russia case.

The case study underscores the institutions' structural and procedural challenges in fulfilling their mandates in Gaza. The UNSC, despite its enforcement powers, is paralysed by a political deadlock. While the Court has demonstrated its impartiality by issuing provisional measures consistent with the international legal framework, it struggles with enforcement and voluntary compliance, rendering its recommendations ineffective. This is evidenced by Israel dismissing the measures, invoking its right to self-defence under Charter’s Article 51 and criticising RSA allegations, with PM Netanyahu as “false”, “outrageous”, “decent people everywhere should reject it” (BBC, 2024). In this study, the Council's unrepresentative institutional design and politicised decision-making process, combined with the ICJ’s constrained enforcement mechanisms, underscore the limitations of both institutions, which hindered them from effectively addressing the crisis in Gaza.


6.2 Public Perceptions Analysis

The existing and more recent surveys do not specifically address the conflict in Gaza or its direct impact on trust levels and, more broadly, on the legitimacy of the Council and the Court, as they predominantly refer to the UN as a whole. However, public perceptions of the UN are relevant as an inference for understanding whether the broader community has changed its perceptions.


The PEW Research Center and Edelman conducted the most recent surveys to explore UN perceptions, collecting data from the end of 2023 to the early part of 2024, during which the Gaza conflict occurs.

The **PEW Research Center** conducted a public opinion survey in 35 countries. A median of 58% of respondents have a favourable view of the UN. The survey focuses on data from “Spring 2023” and “Spring 2024” and shows there has been a declining shift in public opinion toward the UN. Among the nations of the study, it is interesting to consider Israel, as it has suffered from an atrocious attack and is taking part in the conflict; the US, as Israel’s critical ally, the UK and France, are considered because they are the Council’s permanent members. Including Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, and Hungary as key actors within the European Union is pertinent and can provide insights from European citizens. Additionally, Brazil, due to its unwavering support for South Africa’s case, Kenya and Nigeria for their influence in the Global South.

The charts show the UN’s favourable opinion by country (**Fig. 1**) and the percentage points change (**Fig.2**) in 2023 and 2024. It is evident that the “total favourable” (calculated by summing the “very” and “somewhat” favourable) has decreased within the time frame.



Israel is the country that, among the countries sampled, views the UN most unfavourably: in 2023, 31% of the population expressed a “favourable” opinion, while in 2024, there has been a decline of ten percentage points (21%). Similarly, the UK exhibited a




ten percentage-point decline, from 72% to 62% in 2024. The US also experienced a decrease: from 57% of the population being “favourable” to 52%. Moreover, substantial declines in individuals expressing a “favourable” opinion have also been observed in other countries: Nigeria dropped from 78% to 69%, France from 62% to 53%, Germany from 69% to 61%, and South Africa’s from 52% to 44%. Despite the decrease in “favourable” opinion, Sweden maintains the highest levels of public support for the UN (76%) among the nations examined, followed by the Netherlands (69%). Conversely, it is surprising that Hungary shows an increase of 15 percentage points, from 50% to 65% in 2024. Kenya's remained steady, increasing by two points, from 78% to 80% in 2024.

Overall, the survey results indicate a complex global perception of the UN, with most countries displaying growing scepticism and declining confidence.

Similarly, the **2024 Edelman Trust Barometer** surveyed 28 countries’ populations about their level of trust in the UN. The highest trust levels are observed in India, Kenya, and China, with trust percentages of 77%, 77%, and 76%, respectively. Conversely, the level of trust in the UN is notably lower in Italy (48%), Japan (38%) and Argentina (38%), where the majority of the population distrust the UN. **Fig. 3** compares relevant countries for the thesis—namely, the US, UK, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, Germany, France, Ireland, Saudi Arabia, Colombia, and South Africa. They share a similar trend: approximately half of their populations express moderate trust in the UN, while the portion is slightly higher in France and Colombia (51%), South Africa (53%), UK (57%).

Sweden and the Netherlands maintain a higher trust in the UN, respectively 63% and 60%. Nevertheless, a notable decline has been observed in Ireland, which faces an 8% drop, reaching 50%. The country typically exhibits higher levels of trust,



reflecting its commitment to multilateral diplomacy and international law. This sharp decline in 2024 may reflect public sentiment regarding the UN’s role in Gaza. Indeed, the Irish population is among the most supportive of the Palestinian cause, as shown by an Amnesty International poll conducted in November 2023, which found that 71% of respondents believe that “Palestinians live under an apartheid regime”, and 62% think that the EU “should impose a set of sanctions on Israel”.³⁰ While the UK, South Africa, France, and Spain have seen a slight increase, their level of trust remains moderate. This sample of countries has seen significant and consistent public protests supporting a ceasefire in Gaza. The decline in UN trust, particularly in Ireland, can be attributed to the Security Council's ineffectiveness in addressing and easing the humanitarian crisis in the Strip. Furthermore, the **Multilateralism Index** report, published in October 2024, reveals that the UN faces significant challenges in addressing global crises. Although the UN has effectively delivered humanitarian aid, its capacity to prevent or resolve ongoing conflicts remains limited, as conflicts worldwide increased from 39 to 55 between 2013 and 2022. Additionally, it evaluates the performance of the Security Council, which has seen a decline in resolutions passed since 2016, with 2023 recording the fewest resolutions: from 77 resolutions to 50, a decrease of 35%. This trend is also linked to the increased use of vetoes since 2022; Russia has vetoed resolutions concerning Ukraine, Syria, North Korea, and Mali, while the US has vetoed several resolutions related to Israel-Palestine.³¹

Indeed, a recent survey conducted by FES & YouGov, **Global Census 2023**, across 14 countries, reveals a significant demand for international organisations to “take an active role in solving global problems” and strong support for Security Council reform, particularly among respondents from Kenya (85%), South Korea (79%), and South Africa (73%). This is reasonable, given that Global South countries are not equitably represented. Surprisingly, respondents from countries with permanent seats, such as France (56%) and the US (59%), support changes to the UNSC’s structure.³²

Lastly, to complete the public perceptions analysis, it examined how the ICJ is depicted in mainstream media. This analysis, summarised in **Fig.4**, evaluates the provisional rulings concerning the South Africa v. Israel case across Western and Middle Eastern outlets, particularly the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Al Jazeera, examining recurring themes, framing, and tones.

Fig. 4 Mainstream Media Perceptions of the International Court of Justice, from 3 January 2024 to 17 May 2024

	BBC Coverage	Al Jazeera Coverage
Tone	Neutral, balanced	Critical, advocacy-oriented
Role	Symbol of accountability and justice	A way for mobilising global opinion against alleged violations
Framing	Impartial arbiter in legal disputes	May be influenced by countries’ political agenda
Criticism	Lack of enforcement power, limited effectiveness	Lack of enforcement power, blames Western inactions for ICJ’s ineffectiveness
Comparison with other cases	Limited reference to other conflicts	Comparison with the Ukraine v. Russia case to highlight inconsistencies

The BBC factually reports on the rulings and reactions, referencing the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Gaza. The UN's top court is often depicted as a “critical legal body” that upholds international law but is constrained since it “does not have the power to enforce” its decisions.³³ Furthermore, the news outlet highlights reactions from both sides; proponents, including South African and pro-Palestinians, view the provisional measures as fundamental for accountability and justice ³⁴, while critics, particularly Israeli leaders, deem them as “baseless”, “unfounded” and “outrageous”.³⁵

The BBC maintains a neutral and balanced tone for its diverse audience while explicitly outlining the Court's limitations regarding enforcement and timeframe for decision-making. The articles often emphasise that the final ruling is "likely to take several years" and that it cannot "influence powerful states", raising questions about its role and effectiveness.³⁶

Conversely, Al Jazeera adopts an advocacy-oriented perspective, framing the rulings as critical and symbolic for Palestinian justice while emphasising the significance of the provisional measures in mobilising global opinion.³⁷ Al Jazeera recognises that the Court has "more weight than the Security Council" but critiques both the reluctance of Western nations to act following the interim measures and ICJ's to rule in halting the conflict, referring to Ukraine's case v. Russia.³⁸ This comparison is framed as evidence of systemic bias and inconsistencies in enforcement.

Similarly to the BBC, Al Jazeera describes the ICJ's final deliberations as a "painstaking process," criticising the slowness and questioning impartiality as "judges...in the past voted in line with their countries' politics".³⁹ Finally, it highlights the Court's provisional rulings as subject to legal obligations but underscores the lack of authority to enforce them.⁴⁰

The two outlets demonstrate thematic overlaps but diverge in tone and framing. The BBC adopts a neutral tone, while Al Jazeera assumes a more critical stance, emphasising the conflict's broader geopolitical dynamics. Both media outlets view the Court as crucial in upholding international law and addressing its violations while highlighting its lack of enforcement power and systemic limitations.

6.3 Interviews

To complement the data, ten key stakeholders from the international community, including international lawyers, diplomats, and current and former ambassadors, were interviewed using a snowball sampling strategy. Given the challenges of directly engaging with the institutions' members, snowball sampling allows for a heterogeneous sample of individuals with expertise in global governance and conflict resolution. Meanwhile, semi-structured interviews are suited for a small sample, enabling in-depth insights into the research question within the constraints of time and resources.

Given the nature of the research topic and the participants' professional roles, anonymity was guaranteed to facilitate unbiased responses. Each interviewee is referenced descriptively (e.g., 'a diplomat') without disclosing personal or institutional identifiers.

The questions in the appendix are categorised into key themes: respondents' backgrounds and experiences, evaluation of institutions' effectiveness, evaluation of legitimacy, structural obstacles and measures to enhance effectiveness and strengthen legitimacy.

Despite their role and country of origin, the respondents consistently criticised the Council for its inability to fulfil its peacekeeping mandate, particularly in Gaza. A recurring theme is the role of the P5 and their frequent use of veto power, which respondents identified as significant barriers.

An Irish diplomat noted: "The Security Council has been hampered in taking any effective action by veto power". Similarly, a Palestinian diplomat highlighted: "It is often paralysed... especially in sensitive matters... that can affect somehow the US or Russia's interests". A UK former minister further elaborated: "Veto undermines Council's ability to act decisively". The respondents unanimously highlight that the UNSC's decision-making process is overly politicised and hampered by competing interests, preventing effective interventions in critical crises.

Conversely, all the respondents noted that the Court has been more effective than the Council and praised its legal robustness and the substantial majority it had in voting on the provisional rulings in

the South Africa vs. Israel case. An international lawyer emphasised that it possesses “moral authority” and a “strong foundation for international law.” While they universally recognise its authority and independence, it has been asserted that “reliance on voluntary compliance significantly diminishes its impact” and, consequently, its effectiveness.

Additionally, while the Court concluded that the plausibility of Israeli actions in Gaza could amount to genocide, a Dutch diplomat stated that the “legal way of establishing whether it is genocide...can only be done afterwards.” An international lawyer remarked, “It will likely take years to reach substantive conclusions.”

Considering the evaluation of legitimacy, there is a widespread agreement that the Council’s legitimacy is “severely undermined” and “corroded by political engineering”. An international lawyer asserted that it “is a sword that cuts both ways; it kills initiatives and perpetuates unfair representation”. Universally, it is also criticised for its geographical underrepresentation and inequality as P5 “disproportionately influence its decisions,” as argued by a UN diplomat. However, a Spanish ambassador suggested that it could still be considered legitimate as nations continue to bring issues and conflicts to it. Similarly, the Irish diplomat asserted it “has a degree of legitimacy as a global forum, but repeated failures to address crises like Gaza or Ukraine may diminish its credibility.”

The Court is “fairly well respected” and is widely regarded as more legitimate due to its adherence to international law and impartiality. A diplomat added that legitimacy “derives from its moral authority and the global community subscribing to it.” Lawyers emphasise the Court’s normative power since its judgments refine the international legal order and indirectly influence state behaviour over time. Moreover, the ICC’s recent arrest warrants were discussed as they impact the international legal order’s legitimacy. Respondents view them as a “boost to moral authority” that challenges the perception that international law is powerless against influential leaders.

They also remarked that these actions enforce accountability and strengthen the rule-based order, which is "worsening by the day." While the ICC "lacks legitimacy because of global membership," it somehow enforces the ICJ's measures.

Considering the structural obstacles, respondents identified veto power and the underrepresentation of regions such as Africa, Latin America, and Asia as the most significant challenges. The UK former minister emphasised that "Global South hold evidence that these organisations take actions against African leaders but not Western leaders". These contribute to its inability to function as a global institution. Indeed, all respondents called for reforms to make the organisations more democratic and inclusive. They recommended expanding membership and reforming the veto system to "limit its use in crises that require urgent action" and suggested a shift towards a majority or a qualified majority voting that would create a "more equal system" and prevent "unilateral obstruction."

The Court's "reliance on voluntary compliance is a major structural flaw." The reliance on states to comply with decisions "weakens its institutional authority," which is a universal concern among the respondents. Another limitation is the judges' election and eventual politicisation: "(they) may come from weaker legal traditions ... or a non-democratic legal system."

To overcome these obstacles, the respondents proposed developing an international mechanism through regional bodies or a "dedicated enforcement agency" to enforce its judgements. An international lawyer proposed a "mechanism analogous to domestic courts, where non-compliance results in tangible consequences." Another measure is to improve the selection process to ensure a more transparent system.

7. Findings and Discussions

The analyses consistently demonstrate the limited effectiveness of the Security Council and the ICJ, highlighting structural and procedural challenges to fulfil their mandate.

The UNSC institutional design, particularly the power held by the permanent members, emerged as the most significant challenge for fulfilling its peacekeeping mandate. The decision-making process, significantly hindered by veto power and political interests, often leads to failures during urgent crises. The UN diplomat stated, “The Council’s actions are often paralysed due to P5 political interests...and divisions among them... we see this in Gaza; Russia and China vetoed US-backed resolutions twice, and the US vetoed resolutions for a ceasefire.”

The 35% decline in resolutions since 2016 highlights the Council's ineffectiveness. Regarding the conflict in Gaza, only four of the fourteen resolutions proposed over the last 14 months have been passed, failing to halt the conflict.

Conversely, the ICJ is recognised for its legal robustness and impartiality. Nevertheless, reliance on voluntary compliance weakens its practical impact, especially in cases involving powerful countries.

Public perceptions analysis aligns with these findings, identifying the Court as procedurally rigorous but constrained in enforcement. Its timeliness in issuing rulings, as evidenced by the case of *South Africa v. Israel*, limits the fulfilment of its mandate in real-time conflicts.

Surveys indicate moderate global trust in the United Nations, with most countries displaying a decline, including Israel, UK, France, Germany, and South Africa, and a sharp decline in Ireland, Spain, and Colombia. The trend shows increasing scepticism in both the Global South and Western nations, highlighting declining confidence in the UN’s ability to address emerging global challenges. The findings across the analyses show significant discrepancies in legitimacy perceptions. The UNSC’s legitimacy is significantly eroded “after decades of hypocrisy and selective action”; its “outdated structure” fails to reflect today’s world.

Meanwhile, the ICJ maintains a higher legitimacy due to its impartiality and adherence to international law. However, public perception analysis evidences concerns regarding procedural fairness and enforcement limitations as challenges to its credibility. Media coverage depicts the Court as a crucial institution yet highlights its systemic limitations. Nonetheless, it has maintained trust among the international community by upholding legal principles and implementing provisional measures in the South Africa v. Israel case in contrast to the Council.

The interplay between effectiveness and legitimacy has emerged as a critical theme across analyses. The Council's ineffectiveness in addressing key conflicts directly undermines its legitimacy, with interviews universally arguing that UNSC's repeated failures significantly contributed to the erosion of trust "among not only smaller nations but also western and powerful countries."

Overall, interviewees are pessimistic about the Council's future role unless it is reformed.

The Court's legitimacy is more stable as its impartiality sustains its authority; however, the lack of enforcement mechanisms negatively affects its effectiveness and threatens the trust in its ability to enforce international law. Indeed, an international lawyer argued, "Without enforcement, international law is reduced to moral declarations."

Consequently, the first hypothesis is largely validated, yet the Council's ineffectiveness is more subject to scrutiny than the Court's. This results in the legitimacy and trust in the former being "severely undermined," while ICJ maintains higher legitimacy as public opinion confides in its moral authority. This phenomenon is known as *legitimacy drift*, which occurs when an organisation experiences a legitimacy decline due to its failure to adapt to a changing context. This legitimacy deficit leads to contestation among public opinion and the international community regarding the Council's relevance and authority, intensifying calls for reforms. This is a recurring result across all analyses, particularly among Global South nations that perceive "the council as a remnant of colonialism that fails to adapt to today's world," as stated by an international lawyer and a Dutch diplomat.

Reforms to restore the credibility and effectiveness of the Council focus on expanding representation and limiting veto power to prevent unilateral obstruction.

Regarding the Court, the key recommendations include strengthening enforcement mechanisms, improving procedural transparency, especially in judges' selection and creating tangible consequences for non-compliance with rulings. Interviewees suggest mechanisms analogous to domestic courts and more collaboration with regional organisations.

7.1 Limitations of the study

Integrating a mixed-methods approach encompassing institutional comparative analysis, public perception, and semi-structured interviews presents challenges in aligning the diverse data.

Additionally, the small sample size for the interview may not fully capture diverse perspectives, particularly from underrepresented regions, and interviewees may be biased due to subjective and institutional perspectives.

Furthermore, using existing survey data for public perception analysis may over-represent certain nations and regions, potentially skewing the results.

To overcome these challenges, it is advisable to develop surveys, conduct interviews with more respondents, compare other institutions, such as the International Criminal Court and include a quantitative analysis.

8. Conclusions

The study examines the effectiveness and legitimacy of the Security Council and the International Court of Justice in addressing the conflict in Gaza. The findings suggest that both institutions face challenges in their mandate fulfilment, which hinders their legitimacy.

Data highlights that trust in the UN is declining, particularly in key nations: Israel, Ireland, UK, France, and US. In particular, the two bodies have not totally fulfilled their mandate, being ineffective. Therefore, the Council faces significant distrust, which erodes its legitimacy. Meanwhile, the Court maintains its authority and higher legitimacy because it adheres to international law and has protracted procedures.

However, as the Dutch diplomat interviewed stated, “the power of the system depends on the willingness of its participants to take part in it.” In the absence of nations’ adherence to the Court’s rulings, the Court’s authority and, consequently, legitimacy are compromised. This is exemplified by the interim rulings in *South Africa v. Israel* case, wherein Israel has demonstrated non-compliance. As a former UK parliamentarian and minister emphasised, this situation has deleterious effects on the international legal order and threatens future world peace.

These findings contribute to the field of international relations by emphasising the interplay between effectiveness and legitimacy, which is not unidirectional but rather bidirectional. If, on the one hand, the ineffectiveness undermined the Council’s legitimacy and constrained the Court’s.

On the other hand, a decrease in legitimacy results in a vicious cycle: institutions with lower legitimacy will face more challenges in being effective. For instance, Israel’s failure to implement provisional measures could compromise the Court’s credibility, especially among the Global South nations. This is due to the perception that the ICJ is biased against less powerful countries, mainly African countries. This will undoubtedly impact legitimacy, creating a vicious cycle because “politics is trying to overcome the legal order”, as an interviewed lawyer emphasised.

Therefore, institutional reforms are crucial for both bodies to restore effectiveness and legitimacy.

The proposals for the Council include revising veto power and expanding representation to reflect the multiplex world. Conversely, the ICJ requires enforcement mechanisms and procedural transparency. These reforms would enhance trust and geographical representation and address the growing discontent and contestation among Global South nations and international community.

Further research should delve into comparative studies of similar institutions, such as the ICC, or similar conflicts and assess the impact of the *Pact for the Future* or similar initiatives advocating for institutional redesign.

Finally, this interplay between effectiveness and legitimacy will be a decisive factor for the future of global governance; as international crises and conflicts escalate, the role of the Council and the Court will be increasingly scrutinised, and without substantial reforms, these bodies risk losing their relevance. Conversely, by addressing their limitations, they can transition from symbolic to effective agents of global order.

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APPENDIX

- RESPONDENT'S BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE

1. Can you briefly describe your role and experience within global governance?

1.1 Have you ever been involved with the UNSC or the International Court of Justice?

If yes, could you describe your role?

1.3 Have you been involved in the ongoing conflict in Gaza in any way? If yes, how?

- EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INSTITUTIONS

2. How do you evaluate the effectiveness of the UNSC and ICJ in addressing the ongoing conflict in Gaza?

2.1 In light of the ICC's recent arrest warrants issued against Benjamin Netanyahu (Prime minister), former defence minister Yoav Gallant, and Hamas leader Mohammed Deif, how does this affect your perception of the effectiveness of the SC and the ICJ in addressing the conflict?

- STRUCTURAL OBSTACLES

3. What are the key political and structural/procedural factors that impact the effectiveness of the UNSC and ICJ? How about conflict resolution?

3.1 How do you think the institutional designs, the decision-making processes and the enforcement mechanisms affect their effectiveness?

3.2 How would you compare the effectiveness of the UNSC versus the ICJ in the specific context of Gaza?

4. If we define effectiveness in terms of mandate fulfilment, maintaining peace and enforcing international law in legal disputes, do you believe the UNSC and ICJ have fulfilled their respective mandates in Gaza? Why?

- EVALUATION OF LEGITIMACY

5. How would you assess the current legitimacy of the UNSC and ICJ within the international community?

5.1 Do you believe that the ICC's arrest warrants have affected the perceptions of the legitimacy of these IOs?

6. In your opinion, does the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of the UNSC and ICJ affect their legitimacy? Can you provide specific examples?

7. Have you observed any challenges or contestations to the legitimacy of the UN, particularly regarding the UNSC's incapacity to adopt a ceasefire resolution or the ongoing South Africa vs Israel case at the ICJ, during this past year? If so, how have these been manifested/expressed?

8. Has the international community's trust in the UN Security Council and the ICJ been maintained or eroded? If so, why?

- MEASURES TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS AND STRENGTHEN LEGITIMACY

9. How do you see the role of the UNSC and ICJ evolving in global governance?

9.1 Do you think that their legitimacy is at risk in the future?

10. What reforms would you propose to improve the effectiveness of these institutions?

10.1 What measures could the UNSC and ICJ take to strengthen their legitimacy among the international community?

10.2 Do you believe that addressing issues like the veto power in the UNSC and the limitation in enforcement mechanisms for the ICJ would help?