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State Curtailment of International Organisations Expert Authority: The International Monetary Fund as a Case Study

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State Curtailment of International Organisations Expert Authority
The International Monetary Fund as a Case Study

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Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction	4
1.1 Background and Research Question	5
1.2 Societal Relevance	6
1.3 Academic Relevance	7
1.4 Thesis Structure	7
Chapter 2: Literature Review	10
2.1 Origins	10
2.2 Why Do States Delegate to International Organizations?	10
2.3 Power of International Organizations	11
2.4 International Public Administrations (IPAs)	12
2.5 Expert Authority	14
2.6 How Do IPAs Affect Policy Output?	16
2.7 Why States Curtail Expert Authority of International Organizations	19
2.8 How States Curtail the Expert Authority of International Organizations	22
2.9 Why the IMF	29
Chapter 3: Methodology	30
3.1 Research Design	31
3.2 Operationalization	32
3.3 Methods	33
3.4 Case Selection	34

3.5 Limitations	34
Chapter 4: Empirical Evidence	35
4.1 Core Functions of the IMF	35
4.2 Governance Structure of the IMF	39
4.3 Quotas and Voting	39
4.4 Staffing	42
Chapter 5: Empirical Analysis	48
Chapter 6: Conclusion	55
References	60

Chapter1: Introduction

1.1 Background and Research Question

The world today faces enormous challenges of a transnational nature. Climate change is real and causing havoc every year whether that is through increased temperatures, floods or rising sea levels. War has returned to the European continent with the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. The Covid 19 pandemic was a once in a century event that resulted in a vast death count, an enormous shock to the global economy and a breakdown of everyday life. The pandemic was a clear example that there are some problems that cannot be solved by sovereign states alone and required extensive collaboration between countries especially through the World Health Organization (WHO) in the formulation of a joint action plan and the creation and distribution of vaccines.

International Organizations (IO's) have become a cornerstone of the modern world. There are IO's related to every facet of modern human society, including culture, health, economy, trade, transport, law and war etc. IO's such as the United Nations and its various organs serve as a place for countries to discuss and collaborate on the world's most pressing issues. IO's such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are engaged in the financial realm. The IMF acts as a lender of last resort to financially distressed countries whilst also helping countries build up technical capacity to improve their economies. The World Bank helps developing countries in the realm of development and facilitates the building and modernization of critical infrastructure such as dams, facilitates improvements in agriculture such as the provision of funding for solar power and provides funding for the creation of schools and upgradation of the education sector. The World Trade Organization facilitates states through the provision of common trading

standards and also acts as a mediator when conflicts arise. Despite the different realms that different IO's operate in, the major commonality between IO's is that their membership consists of sovereign states that create them and fund them.

States engage with IO's due to various reasons. First of all, as mentioned before, some problems such as a global pandemic cannot be solved by states alone. Some problems require extensive expertise that only IO's possess (Martha and Finnemore, 1999 & Liese et al 2021). Collaborating through IO's also allows states to pool resources (Marks & Hooghe, 2014). An example of such pooling of resources is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which is an alliance of 32 countries from Europe and North America committed to the collective defence of each other (Nato, 2024). IO's are also the primary vehicle through which international norms are established and diffused whether that is in the form of international law or trade regulations (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999). Although IO's are beneficial to states, they can also act in ways that displease the states that trust them with authority and funding. IO's have been accused of being inefficient and unaccountable (Heldt, 2018). Furthermore, IO's can sometimes be seen as propagating their own interests at the expense of the states that fund them. It has been alleged that some IO's behave in a way to maximise their own staff numbers, budgets and competences (Vaubel, 2006).

IO's consists of staff organised in a hierarchical manner, very much so like national bureaucracies. The bureaucracy of IO's has been labelled as International Public Administrations (IPAs) in academic literature. IPA's have been defined as "hierarchically organised groups of international civil servants with a given mandate, resources, identifiable boundaries, and a set of formal rules of procedures within the context of a policy area" (Knill & Steinebach, 2022, p.2). IPA's are useful because they possess expert authority. Expert authority broadly refers to

authority that is built upon expertise, information and production of technical and specialist knowledge (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999, Litzet Monnet). This is quite beneficial for the states that are members of IO's as IPA's produce knowledge that states may not be able to produce themselves. However, as is the case with bureaucracy on a national level, IPA's can also display rogue behaviour such as inefficiency, insulation, too much rationalisation and unaccountability (Heldt, 2018; Barnett and Finnemore, 1999). Such rogue behaviour by IPA's and as a consequence by IO's is unacceptable to states and which may lead to states curtailing the expert authority of IO's.

This thesis aims to investigate the state curtailment of IO's expert authority. The research question is how states curtail the expert authority of IO's. This thesis will also delve deeply into the reasons why states feel the need to curtail this expert authority of IO's. The thesis will also look into how IO's are able to increase their expert authority. The IMF has been selected as a case study in this investigation due to its vast membership and substantial influence on global affairs. The IMF is among the leading IO's in existence today and counts 190 states as members (IMF, n.d). Furthermore, the IMF is among the most visible IO's, whether that is through its involvement in the bailout of countries such as Greece in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis or through its role during the pandemic.

1.2 Societal Relevance

As far as the societal relevance of this thesis is concerned, there are two key parts to it. First of all, is the notion of transparency and trust. IO's are funded by states meaning that the citizens of the respective states are the primary funders of IO's. Decisions of IO's such as the IMF affect millions of people and the citizens that fund such an IO should have a clear view, understanding and access to the inner workings of such an IO to judge and see whether the

decisions taken are being taken based on expertise or whether there are elements present that restrict IO's in acting on their expertise by states. Citizens should be aware of whether this entails some form of state curtailment and should be able to decide themselves if such state curtailment is justifiable. Secondly, this thesis is socially relevant because IO's such as the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions have often been accused of being controlled by a select few countries (Dreher et al 2006). This thesis provides insights on whether these claims of control by the few are true or not particularly in the case of the IMF and its internal functioning and structure.

1.3 Academic Relevance

This thesis is also academically relevant. Previous research has focused on explaining the expert authority of international bureaucracies (Liese et al, 2021), the design of international institutions (Johnson 2013; Koremenos et al, 2003), staffing and bureaucratic representation within IO's (Parizek, 2016; Parizek & Stephen 2021; Weaver et al 2022) and the tensions between politicians and the expert authority of bureaucracies on a national level (Christensen, 2022). The research gap that the author identified is the lack of an overarching framework that details curtailment of IO's expert authority by states. The provision of a framework to study the state curtailment of IO's expert authority is the main academic contribution of this thesis. This thesis also presents the idea of the existence of ideological fiefdoms within IO's.

1.4 Thesis Structure

As far as the structure of this thesis is concerned, the literature review follows post introduction. The literature review examines why states set up and delegate power to IO's. States feel the need to delegate some tasks to International Organisations due to several different reasons. The simplest reason is that delegation of some tasks to IO's makes cooperation easier

for states who use IO's to interact with each other in the pursuit of various different shared goals such as the negotiation and implementation of mutually beneficial agreements and conflict resolution (Abbot & Snidal, 1998). Furthermore, states cannot do everything on their own due to the cross border nature of some issues and sometimes due to the fact that the cost of solving a problem can be too high for individual states. In such a scenario, pooling of resources through an IO becomes the more viable option (Hooghe & Marks, 2014). Sovereign states delegating tasks to IO's endows these IO's with a rational legal authority. IO's use this rational legal authority to exert their own power through the classification of knowledge, fixing of meanings and diffusion of norms (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999).

Secondly the literature review examines bureaucracy within IO's. The concept of bureaucracy is usually associated with sovereign states, however IO's also have bureaucracies that have been labelled as International Public Administrations (IPA's) in the literature on international bureaucracies. IPAs are defined as "hierarchically organised groups of international civil servants with a given mandate, resources, identifiable boundaries, and a set of formal rules of procedures within the context of a policy area" (Knill & Steinebach, 2022, p.2). IPA's can behave in very different ways depending on the level of internal and external challenges that they face. The influence of IPA's depends on the complexity of the delegated tasks as well as political contestation.

Thirdly, the literature review examines the concept of expert authority. Expert authority has been defined as a form of power that is based on voluntary deference to the knowledge-based requests of the authority holder (Busch et al 2020). Expert authority is exercised by experts due to their authoritative knowledge and position. The literature review also delves into the two types of expert authority: *de jure* and *de facto* expert authority.

The literature review also examines why states curtail the expert authority of IO's. Five sources that may cause pathological behaviour in IO's are presented based on the work of Barnett and Finnemore. The literature review section culminates in the provision of a theoretical framework that explains the various mechanisms through which states curtail the expert authority of IO's.

The chapter on methodology discusses the research design, data collection methods and potential limitations. The research design chosen for this thesis is a case study design owing to its ability to analyse a case in detail.

The chapter on empirical evidence provides detailed data on various core aspects of the IMF such as the main functions of capacity building, financing and surveillance, the organisational setup of the IMF including a discussion on the Board of Governors and the Executive Board as well as a detailed overview on the procedures through which these entities are represented. The system of quotas within the IMF as well as the mechanisms on how these quotas can be modified is also examined and discussed followed by voting powers and an overview of the voting powers held by the most prominent members of the IMF. Lastly the staffing of the IMF is dissected which includes a detailed discussion on the difference between permanent and contractual staff, support and professional staff, the representation of nationalities and the educational background of the IMF staff.

The empirical section of this thesis analyses the empirical data based on the theoretical framework developed earlier in the literature review and provides a detailed discussion on the empirical data and anomalies found in the data. The thesis culminates with a conclusion chapter that recaps, summarises and reviews the findings of the thesis. The conclusion chapter also

briefly discusses how future research can proceed in this area and also lists the limitations of this thesis.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Origins

The study of international organisations was traditionally a part of International Relations and seen as an extension of the study of states. Neoliberals thought of IO's as mere forums which states could utilise to reduce uncertainty and promote cooperation (Keohane, 1988). Others writing during that time period, especially those scholars belonging from the neorealist school of thought, did not give much attention to international institutions and saw institutions as ineffective entities that were ignored by states in favour of realpolitik (Mearsheimer, 1994). However, it was only at the end of the 20th century and at the start of the 21st century that international organisations started to become a field in itself and started getting serious interest as independent actors.

2.2 Why Do States Delegate to International Organisations

There has been extensive research on the question of why states feel the need to delegate certain tasks to international organisations. Abbott and Snidal argue that "States use international organisations to manage their everyday interactions and more dramatic episodes like international conflicts" (Abbott & Snidal, 1998, p.3). International Organizations also help states to overcome market failures, collective action dilemmas, and problems associated with interdependent social choice (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999). Furthermore, IO's facilitate negotiation and implementation of agreements, help in resolving disputes, provide technical assistance and elaborate international norms etc (Abbott and Snidal, 1998). IO's are also helpful when states cannot deal with a problem alone especially in the case of cross-border issues such

as the environment or where the cost for individual states is very high and hence delegation to an IO is the more reasonable option (Hooghe & Marks, 2014). Delegation provides states with numerous benefits. These benefits include the overcoming of issue cycling, sustaining credible commitments and providing information that states may generally not share with each other leading to reduced information costs (Hooghe & Marks, 2014). States also use IO's as a laundering tool meaning that some activities that are unacceptable in their original state-to-state form become acceptable when run through an independent, or seemingly independent IO (Abbot and Snidal 1998, see also Dijkstra 2017 for an example of laundering). It is clear that states; no matter how powerful, cannot do everything alone. IO's provide states with a neutral forum to discuss and collaborate with each other whilst also providing expert technical knowledge at the same time.

2.3 Power of IO's

Once states decide to collaborate through IO's, these IO's become independent actors themselves owing to the rational legal authority that the states bestow upon them (Martha and Finnemore, 1999). A second source of IO authority is the control over technical expertise and information (Martha & Finnemore 1999, Liese et al., 2021). These two characteristics mean that IO's possess a great degree of power in shaping the world. According to Barnett and Finnemore, IO's exercise their power in three ways:

- 1) Classification - Bureaucracies classify and organise knowledge and information (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999) Bureaucracies have the power to give and take away meanings from objects. E.g the World Bank classifying someone as a "peasant" or the use of the word refugee within the United Nations. Barnett and Finnemore argue that to classify is to be actively engaged in an act of power.

2) The fixing of meanings - IO's have the power to fix meanings. This means that they determine the particular meaning of objectives towards which state actors orient themselves (Barnett & Finnemore). An example could be the International Monetary Fund (IMF) setting the criterion of a healthy economy as having 20% of GDP in foreign reserves. Countries that are economically healthy and content will still scramble to achieve this target because of the recognised power of the IMF as a fixer of meanings in the financial domain.

3) Diffusion of norms - IO's act as "conveyor belts" of norms and models of good political behaviour. IO staff believe that it is their duty to spread, diffuse and enforce global norms and rules (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999). An example of an IO using its power to diffuse norms is the European Union promoting human rights and democracy through making trade deals contingent on some progress in the aforementioned domains (HRW, 2023).

It is clear that IO's are not only widespread but also possess substantial power to alter the shape of the world that we live in. The next section will dive deeper into the workings of IO's and introduce the concept of International Public Administrations (IPAs).

2.4 International Public Administrations

As seen above, IOs hold and exercise significant power in today's world. However, it is crucial to remember that although IO's seem like monolithic black boxes, they do exhibit qualities and characteristics that are typically seen in national bureaucracies. There are various ways and levels of abstraction to the study of international organisations. This literature review is geared towards understanding the internal workings and bureaucratic structure of international organisations. These internal workings and bureaucratic structure can be combined together in what is known as international public administration (IPA). IPAs are defined as "hierarchically organised groups of international civil servants with a given mandate, resources, identifiable

boundaries, and a set of formal rules of procedures within the context of a policy area” (Knill & Steinebach, 2022, p.2). Another definition that is more influenced by the rationalists is by Jörn Ege and colleagues who go on to define IPAs as “corporate actors made up of individual bureaucrats who are jointly able to engage in strategic behaviour” (Ege et al, 2021, p.737). IPAs have been shown to exert significant influence in various different IO’s e.g. in the implementation of IO policies, the World Health Organisation's (WHO) global aids initiative and even economic programs by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (Knill & Steinebach, 2022). However it has proven hard to measure the degree of influence that IPAs possess, particularly informal influence. Knill and colleagues (Knill et al., 2022) present the concept of administrative styles to measure the influence of IPAs. Administrative styles can be defined as “informal routines that characterise the behaviour and activities of public administrations in the policy-making process (Knill et al., 2022, p.107). An administrative style of an IPA primarily comes into existence through the interplay of two dimensions of challenges, namely external and internal challenges (Knill et al., 2022). Knill and colleagues have identified four administrative styles (based on the work of (Bayerlein et al. 2020) that can be observed and under which IPAs can be classified:

- 1) Entrepreneur - An entrepreneurial IPA arises when external challenges are high and internal challenges are low.
- 2) Consolidator - IPAs behave as consolidators when both external and internal challenges are high. The hostile environment forces IPAs to consolidate their position because they are unable to promote new policies.
- 3) Advocate - IPAs behave as advocates when external challenges are high but internal challenges are low.

- 4) Servant - IPAs behave as servants when external challenges are low but internal challenges are high. The internally hostile environment forces the IPA to keep working on its given mandate.

2.5 Expert Authority

The key reason why IPAs are valued is because of their expert authority. Expert authority has been described as a form of power that is based on voluntary deference to the knowledge-based requests of the authority holder (Busch et al 2020). Littez Monnet describes expert knowledge as “the forms of codified knowledge that are either produced by specialists (as indicated by qualifications or institutional affiliation)”; or which involve specialist or technical methods, equipment or accumulated knowledge that is generally assumed to require skills and experience not possessed by professional administrators” (Littoz-Monnet, 2017, p.2). Barnett and Finnemore also touched upon the idea of bureaucratic expertise by stating that apart from IO’s obtaining independent power from their legal personality, IO’s also obtain power due to their technical expertise and information (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999). Barnett and Finnemore define expert authority as a form of power that is based on voluntary deference to the knowledge-based requests of the authority holder (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999; Busch et al 2020). The common theme that can be found from the definitions of expert authority provided by all the authors in this paragraph is that expert authority is something embodied by specialists who are at the top of their respective fields and are considered mostly as a group, the chief producers of knowledge in their respective domains.

Expert authority can be of two types, de jure expert authority and de facto expert authority. De jure expert authority is formal and the basis of de jure authority are legal structures and documents that enshrine the powers and limits of the expert authority (Busch et al, 2020). On

the other hand, the basis of de facto authority is grounded in the sociological realm where de facto expert authority manifests itself in behavioural ways (Busch et al, 2020). To simplify, de facto expert authority is a type of expert authority which when exercised has a legal basis to it and whose actions can be traced back to a legal document e.g. a treaty among states. On the other hand, de jure expert authority is authority that is recognised by actors but does not have any legal foundations and relies heavily on precedent rather than any legal structures.

Peter Haas uses the term epistemic communities, which are defined as “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area (Haas, 1992, p.3). Haas provides four key characteristics that make a person a part of an epistemic community. These characteristics are as follows:

- 1) A shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members (Haas,1992).
- 2) Shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes (Haas,1992).
- 3) Shared notions of validity – that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise (Haas,1992).
- 4) A common policy enterprise – that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence. (Haas, 1992)

Some scholars have criticised the idea of IPAs. Some scholars dismiss the idea of IPAs owing to its weak theoretical underpinnings (Christensen & Yesilkagit, 2018).

2.6 How do IPAs affect policy outputs?

Jörn Ege and colleagues have researched the informal ways in which international bureaucracy affects policy outputs. In regards to how IPAs become influential, complex policy problems and political contestation are the conditions that enable this influence (Ege et al, 2021). Political contestation as a concept is quite straightforward. Political contestation is the objection towards an action of the IPA from the member states. However, contestation provides room for IPAs to manoeuvre when there is a discrepancy in the degree of contestation from each member state. If all member states contest an action, it becomes very difficult for the IPA to do anything but retreat. However, when the member states are at different levels of contestation, the IPA can use this to its advantage. Complexity can also vary, especially programmatic complexity. Programmatic complexity denotes the degree of difficulty in addressing a problem because of its underlying requirements for context-specific knowledge or technical expertise (Ege et al 2021; Busch and Liese, 2017; Johnson and Urpelainen, 2014).

Jörn Ege and colleagues distinguish between two types of influence strategies: expertise-related and procedural influence strategies (Ege et al 2021). This is based upon Max Weber's distinction between technical expertise (Fachwissen) and process-related knowledge (Dienstwissen) (Ege et al 2021). Gathering evidence and synthesising data is among the core responsibilities of IPAs. This can include country data as well as reports etc. If a problem is programmatically complex, an IPA can be entrepreneurial in its approach and recommendations, owing to its monopoly over expertise over the particular programmatically complex problem. As far as process related strategies are concerned, IPAs do not hold any formal voting power of their

own, however they may collaborate with like minded stakeholders in three ways: (i) During agenda setting: IPAs have broad discretionary powers in agenda setting and may cooperate with one or several stakeholders to make sure that certain items are discussed in the legislative or executive body (ii) During negotiations: IPAs may collaborate with like-minded stakeholders to help them become members of certain influential committee or to help them chair negotiations. The IPA may also brief the chairperson for the negotiation beyond the typical procedural support that IPAs provide and may provide them with strategic expertise, and (iii) Strategic preparation of drafts: since IPAs are in charge of drafting the final documents of negotiations, IPAs may steer the final document in a direction that they see fit or which is in line with what they have agreed upon with like minded stakeholders. This steering of the document may be done so by manipulating linguistic aspects of the document to feature language that conveys and propagates a certain viewpoint or by placing ideas in a way where ideas that the IPA and its collaborators want to propagate are more visible and impactful and where certain ideas are hidden deep into the document, likely not be paid much attention by the readers of the document. (Ege et al 2021; also see Dijkstra 2017 to understand collusion between secretariats and member states).

		COMPLEXITY	
		<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>
CONTESTATION	<i>High</i>	Scenario 1 IPA influence potential highest, expertise-based and procedural strategies at work	Scenario 3 IPA influence potential low, procedural strategy most relevant
	<i>Low</i>	Scenario 2 IPA influence potential high, expertise-based strategies most relevant	Scenario 4 IPA influence potential lowest, no specific utility from either type of strategy

(Ege et al, 2021, p.750)

Jörn Ege and colleagues have presented four scenarios under which an IPA can find itself (Ege et al, 2021). These scenarios build upon the conditions and strategies discussed in the previous section. In scenario 1, both contestation and programme complexity are high leading to the IPA having the highest potential to greatly influence proceedings and decision making. When contestation and complexity are high, an IPA is likely to deploy both expertise based and procedural strategies. In scenario 2, programme complexity is high whereas contestation is low, leading to the IPA having high potential to influence proceedings and decision making. In this scenario, an IPA will mostly use expertise based strategies. The low or non reliance on procedural strategies here is due to the fact that because contestation is low, the IPA cannot play members against each other, this makes it much harder for an IPA to employ procedural based strategies. In scenario 3, programme complexity is low whereas contestation is high. This scenario leads to the IPA having low potential to influence proceedings or decision making. An IPA that finds itself in this scenario will mostly employ procedure based strategies because the low programmatic complexity means that member states understand the problem themselves and do not need the expertise of the IPA to make sense of the problem. However, since contestation is high, the IPA can still employ procedure based strategies to play the members against each other and obtain its objectives whether individually or in collaboration with other actors. In scenario 4, both programme complexity and contestation are low, leading to an IPA that finds itself in this situation having the lowest potential influence on proceedings or decision making. Low programme complexity means that member states understand the problem themselves and do not need the expertise of the IPA. Low contestation in this case means that the member states are on the same page and hence it makes it very difficult to employ procedural strategies to affect proceedings or decision making.

2.7 Why States Curtail IO's Expert Authority

Despite creating IO's and benefiting from the enhanced cooperation that is possible because of the presence of IO's, why do states feel the need to curtail the expert authority of IO's? It would not be wrong to state that although working through IO's and their IPAs has become a fact of the modern world for states, states are still not comfortable with the idea and always fear IO's as the main challengers to the state centric anarchic world order. IO's sometimes behave in a rogue manner or what Barnett and Finnemore described as 'the pathologies of IO's' (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999). This rogue behaviour is unsettling for states who enable IO's in the first place by providing autonomy and funding. Barnett and Finnemore have identified five sources that may cause pathological behaviour in IO's. These have been complemented with examples and research by other authors. The pathological behaviours include:

- 1) The irrationality of rationalisation - Barnett and Finnemore borrow the idea of the irrationality of rationalisation from German sociologist Max Weber. Weber was of the view that bureaucracies were excellent at making rational decisions, however this rationalisation can become an obsessive endeavour leading to the organisation making rules and procedures an end in themselves (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999)
- 2) Bureaucratic universalism - Bureaucratic universalism refers to the tendency of bureaucracies to discourage and suppress diversity in favour of universalism (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999) Bureaucracies often make rules that are meant to "catch" as much of the population as possible, however such rigid universal rules often do not consider the complexities of individual cases leading to a small minority within the population not served adequately by the bureaucracy. Examples of bureaucratic universalism within the context of IO's include the

IMF's response to the Asian financial crisis at the turn of the millennium and the inability of UN peacekeeping missions to be considerate of the political and social sensitivities of the local populations in the countries where they are deployed.

- 3) Normalisation of deviance - Barnett and Finnemore argue that IO's may at certain times and situations bend rules and deviate from established norms and rules because of new environmental or institutional developments. IO's are quite cautious in this regard and only bend the rules to the extent where they know that bending the rules will not lead to policy failure (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999) A clear example of such deviance is the WHO secretariats collusion with like minded states to further their goal of reducing the harm caused by Non Communicable Diseases (Ege et al, 2021).
- 4) Insulation - Some IO's may be insulated from external feedback and as a consequence often develop internal cultures and worldviews that do not promote the goals and expectations of those outside the organisation who created it and whom it serves i.e. sovereign states.
- 5) Cultural Contestation - There is a chance of infighting among different parts of an IO over matters such as budgets, autonomy and power (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999).

According to Heldt (2018), the World Bank was criticised by scholars, policy makers and civil society for being unaccountable and inefficient. In the face of this criticism, the World Bank created informal accountability mechanisms such as the Independent Evaluation Group, Inspection Panel and office of the ombudsman. Heldt concludes that instead of enhancing accountability and transparency, such measures actually reduce accountability in large and

complex IO's such as the World Bank (Heldt, 2018). The research presented by Heldt (2018) is a testament to the fact that some IO's such as the World Bank have become unaccountable behemoths. The research also provides legitimacy to the states that want curtailment of IO's and provides evidence showing that the concerns that states have regarding IO's are not just paranoid delusions but rather have factual roots.

The principal agent model is useful in understanding the rogue behaviour of IO's. The basic premise of the principal-agent model is that there are certain tasks that the principal cannot perform on its own and thus delegates this task to an agent for fulfilment. For optimum task fulfilment, the principal provides authority and resources to the agent. In the context of IO's, states (the principals) delegate the implementation of a legalised agreement to an international organisation (the agent) (Kleine, 2013). This delegation has been described as "a conditional grant of authority by member states to an independent body" (Hooghe & Marks, 2014, p.307). Delegation provides states with numerous benefits. These benefits include the overcoming of issue cycling, sustaining credible commitments and providing information that states may generally not share with each other leading to reduced information costs (Hooghe & Marks, 2014). However, the principal-agent model also explains why IO's are distrusted. Scholars have argued that IO's as agents have vested interests such as the survival and growth of their organisation. This can include more staff, larger budgets and increasing responsibilities and competencies (Vaubel, 2006). These interests often differ from the interests of the principal. Vaubel argues that the ultimate principal is the voter and voters are "rationally ignorant of most of the activities of IO's and/or lack the power to impose their will (Vaubel, 2006). This notion of non-accountability further strengthens the arguments put forward by Heldt and her analysis of the World Bank as an unaccountable behemoth. The fact that two thirds of intergovernmental

organisations globally were not created by states alone but with the participation of international bureaucrats working in pre-existing IGOs (Johnson, 2013) further justifies the fears that states have about IO's. Although IO's provide states with several benefits (Abbot and Snidal, 1998), IO's do behave in ways that undermine the power that states possess in the current world order and hence it becomes necessary for states to curtail the activities of IO's. How states curtail the activities of IO's will be discussed in the next paragraph.

2.8 How States Curtail IO's Expert Authority

There are factors that restrain IO's, their IPAs and their independence. Notable among these is intervention by powerful states. Abbot and Snidal (1998) touched upon this by stating that "member states, especially the powerful, can limit the autonomy of IO's, interfere with their operations, ignore their dictates, or restructure and dissolve them" (Abbott and Snidal, 1998. p.5). However this statement does not clarify how member states actually limit the autonomy of IO's. In light of more recent academic literature on this topic, the author has identified five key factors through which powerful states control or influence IPAs. These factors are Institutional Design, Staffing, Shadow Bureaucracies, Unilateral Action and Collusion.

A) Institutional Design - Institutional design refers to how an international institution is designed. It has been argued that design differences in different institutions are not random and states actually pay significant attention to institutional design when creating an institution (Koremenos et al., 2003). States invest significant time and energy on institutional design because once an institution has been created, it is excruciatingly hard to change the institutional design of such an institution. It is also important to note here that states that miss out on achieving their objectives at the start of the designing of an institution bear the costs for a long time (Johnson, 2013) A clear example of this is

Germany and Japan's absence from the permanent membership of the Security Council of the UN because they were weak in 1945 in the aftermath of WW2 and were unable to influence the institutional design of the Security Council. Barbara Korremenos and colleagues provide five key dimensions within which institutions may vary. These five dimensions are

- a) Membership rules (Membership) - Different institutions have different membership rules. Some are exclusive such as the UN Security Council whereas some are open to all such as the World Bank Group. Some institutions restrict their membership to a geographical boundary such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which represents the economic interests of states that are geographically located in Western Africa. Some institutions restrict their membership to having a high enough Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to be granted membership. Examples of such institutions include the G-7 and the G-20. Membership in these institutions might change on a yearly basis depending on the economic circumstances of countries.
- b) Scope of issues covered (Scope) - Different institutions deal with very problems. As an example the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine's (CCNR) scope only extends to dealing with issues concerning inland navigation on the river Rhine (CCNR, n.d) On the other hand, the scope of an institution such as the World Trade Organization covers a plethora of issues such as trade facilitation, dispute settlement, economic watchdog and institutional building in developing countries (WTO, n.d.)

- c) Centralization of tasks (Centralization) - Centralization of tasks often reduces bargaining and transaction costs through information dissemination by a single entity. As an example, the International Monetary Fund collects, synthesises and publishes statistics on member states' economies. Centralization is often met by disdain from member states as they feel that centralization threatens their sovereignty.
- d) Rules for controlling the institution (Control) - Although Koremanos and colleagues state that control is determined by a range of factors such as the rules for electing key officials and the financing of an institution, they specifically focus on voting arrangements as an important and observable aspect of control. Different institutions have very different voting arrangements. In some institutions, votes are disproportionately divided between states. As an example, the largest donors of the Bretton Woods institutions possess disproportionate voting rights. Another important dimension of voting in institutions is the power of veto. Some institutions, most notably the UN security council, provide some members with a right to veto. In the case of a veto, any resolution in the UN security is rejected without any further action.
- e) Flexibility of arrangements (Flexibility) - Flexibility in institutional design is concerned with an institution's ability to tackle unanticipated events or shocks, or contestation from states. Koremenos and colleagues present two kinds of institutional flexibility: adaptive and transformative. Adaptive flexibility means to allow member states to respond to domestic circumstances whilst preserving existing institutional arrangements. Transformative flexibility is concerned with

an institution's ability to reinvent itself after a certain time period to remain relevant and useful.

B) Staffing - Due to the transnational nature and widespread membership of international organisations, the staff of international organisations is also not homogenous and usually comprises individuals from all member states. (Parizek, 2016) argues that powerful member states seek dominant positions in IO's secretariats, in order to grow their ability to control these secretariats. Using a dataset of 20 UN agencies, Parizek found that the distribution of staff in international organisations is linked with the size of the economy and population of their respective member states (Parizek, 2016). More interestingly, Parizek concludes that since high representation from powerful countries creates legitimisation challenges particularly to their epistemic authority, international organisations try to mitigate this by also employing a disproportionate amount of staff from the weakest countries which usually are the primary clients of the work of many international organisations (Parizek, 2016). The notion that International Organizations employ more staff from powerful member states is further substantiated through the work of Marieke Kleine. Kleine (2013) argues that powerful states informally agree to divide spheres of influence within International Organizations among themselves (Kleine 2013). Kleine argues that different parts of international organisations can start resembling "national fiefdoms". To elaborate, "national fiefdoms are divisions where there is a preferable recruitment of co-nationals at the senior level, and where this senior staff monitor and rein in the bureaucracy's daily operation" (Kleine 2013, p.322). These national fiefdoms are most visible in the European Union. As an example, most often in the European Commission's history, Frenchmen have headed the European Commission's

Directorate General for Agriculture and Rural Development, Germans have headed the Directorate General for Competition whilst Italians for a long time occupied the highest position in the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (Kleine, 2013). Such fiefdoms are not just restricted to the European Union's institutions, they are also visible in more global international organisations. As a broad example, there is a gentleman's agreement between the United States and Europe about the heads of the Bretton Woods institutions. The president of the World Bank has always been an American and the managing director of the IMF has always been a European (Kleine, 2013). Within the United Nations, Kleine found out that certain departments are always headed by nationals from the same country, e.g. a German most often holds the post of Director General of the UN Environmental Program whereas a Chinese most frequently heads the UN's department of Economic and Social Affairs (Kleine, 2013). These various examples of staffing based on nationality show that even though International Organizations appear neutral externally, state power is always present in some form deep inside these organisations. This is especially important for powerful states because it reduces their uncertainty and fears when delegating to an international organisation. It basically reduces agency costs associated with delegation to IO's.

- C) Shadow bureaucracies - Some powerful states may invest in shadow bureaucracies because they do not trust the secretariat's information on crucial matters (Dijkstra, 2014). A shadow bureaucracy is defined as "any sort of administrative capacity of the principal which gathers, processes and/or verifies information autonomously of the agent in order to exert control" (Dijkstra 2014, p.27). These shadow bureaucracies may consist of a "front office" and "back office". Permanent representations are part of the front office

and deal with the secretariats. The diplomats in the permanent representations are supported by a significant number of support staff which are the back office. The back office plays the important role of acting as a bridge between the national ministries and the bureaucrats in the permanent representations. Shadow bureaucracies comprise the whole arsenal of information gathering resources that a state possesses. Information is received from embassies, intelligence services and diplomats stationed everywhere in the world (Dijkstra, 2014).

- D) Unilateral action - Unilateral action refers to the situation where states can exert unilateral influence on autonomous international bureaucrats, either through rewards or through punishments to pursue their particular interests (Urpelainen 2012). Unilateral influence is often possible due to disproportionate voting powers in IO's or the fact that a handful of countries contribute the most towards the budgets of IO's. In some instances, the problem at hand is so sensitive and important to the member states that they do not trust the assessments of international bureaucrats within IO's and commission their own information gathering mechanisms. An example of states commissioning their own information gathering mechanisms was Germany during the Greek financial bailout where Germany would send its own bilateral mission to Greece and gather information on Greece's economic health through its embassy. This was mostly because Germany paid the largest share and had a strong interest in conditionality (Dijkstra, 2014).
- E) Collusion - Hylke Dijkstra (2017) has argued that "individual or groups of states team up with secretariats to achieve outcomes at the expense of other states" (Dijkstra, 2017, p.601) He terms this teaming up as collusion (ibid.). Dijkstra argues that collusion is informal and it includes a range of activities such as jointly confronting other states,

precooking meetings, discussing strategies, and exchanging resources (Dijkstra,2017). The informal nature of collusion leads me to think that it must be hard to measure and prove. Dijkstra provides three conditions under which collusion is most likely to take place:

- a) States and secretariats have complementary resources - Secretariats possess rational-legal, delegated, moral, and expert authority (Martha and Finnemore 1999, Dijkstra, 2017). This personality provides secretariats with resources which is why it incentivizes states to work with secretariats. Complementary resources are important because if secretariats are weak, states would see no reasons to work with such a toothless secretariat.
- b) They share preferences - A communist state colluding with the International Monetary Fund to propagate free market liberalism is highly unlikely. States and secretariats need to be on the same page regarding policy preferences for collusion to take place. This means that collusion is likely issue dependent and may change from issue to issue.
- c) Risk of reputation is small for the secretariat. - IO's and as an extension their secretariats have often a reputation of impartiality in regards to the treatment of all member states that comprise a particular IO. Collusion will only take place when the benefits outweigh the risk of damage to the secretariat's reputation (Dijkstra, 2017).

As illustrated above, states have a number of options that they deploy to affect the internal workings of an IO and reduce some of the delegation costs such as agency slack that are associated with delegating tasks to international IO's.

After a thorough review of the literature on IOs, their expertise, powers and their relationship with sovereign states, I have concluded that although studies have been done on the curtailment of bureaucratic power (Christensen, 2020) and how states contest IO decisions and may suppress IOs if powerful enough (UNSC.nd.), I have been unable to find literature on states specifically curtailing IOs expert authority. This is the main investigative puzzle of this thesis. The five factors that I have synthesised from the literature to show state curtailment of IO expertise will act as a theoretical framework for the aforementioned investigative puzzle.

2.9 Why the IMF

There has been considerable previous research on how the IMF acts as a bargaining tool for the most powerful states that control the IMF through their voting power as well as other major multilateral bodies such as the UN security council. Thacker (1999) showed that governments voting in alignment with the United States on key issues in the UN General Assembly were far more probable to participate in IMF programs, presumably as a reward from the US (Thacker, 1999). Several other authors have also taken a similar view. Since it is mostly financially distressed countries that seek the help of the IMF, it can be assumed that most of the recipients of the IMF's programs are developing countries. Empirical research shows that developing countries voting alongside the US get better terms from the IMF (Barro and Lee, 2005, Vreeland, 2005, Dreher and Jensen, 2007, as cited in Dreher et al, 2006). Some researchers go further and plainly state that the IMF is a tool for the most powerful countries, particularly the G7 grouping (Rieffel, 2003, as cited in Dreher et al, 2006). Axel Dreher and colleagues have provided several examples where developing countries received substantial support from the IMF after they voted in favour of resolutions in the United Nations Security Council as temporary members (Dreher et al 2006). Stephen Nelson takes a different approach and argues

that it is shared beliefs that shape the IMF's lending decisions (Nelson, 2014). Specifically, Nelson concludes that “when the beliefs of a policy team are close to the beliefs of the IMF, loans are larger, conditionality is weaker, and enforcement is less rigid (Nelson, 2014, 324). It has also been argued that governments receiving more US foreign aid receive lighter punishments for noncompliance with policy conditions under IMF programs (Stone, 2002 & 2004). Mark Copelovitch has argued that it is “preference heterogeneity” among the G5 countries (i.e. United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France and Japan) in the Executive Board of the IMF that explains the size and conditionality of IMF lending decisions (Copelovitch, 2010).

Most researchers describe the IMF as a monolithic institution and have not delved deep into the institution itself. Although the author is in broad agreement with the stance of prominent researchers on the IMF's passive nature in front of the leading shareholders, the author felt that previous research has not been qualitatively rich enough.

Those researchers that have studied the internal workings of the IMF, particularly representation, often focus on groups of countries such as the BRICS grouping (Parizek, 2021) and the classification of staff into middle income and low income countries (Weaver, 2022). This does not mean that their research is not helpful, however the author believes it is not state centric enough. This is among the main reasons why the author chose the IMF as a case study.

Chapter3: Methodology

This chapter titled ‘Methodology’ has been written to explain the various research choices and rationale that have been employed in the writing of this thesis. To recap, this thesis has been written with several key objectives in mind. First of all, this thesis has been written to investigate state curtailment of IOs expert authority. To clarify, how exactly states limit the

influence of IO's expertise. The literature review section of this paper outlines reasons why states feel forced to curtail the expert authority of IO's and goes on to detail five mechanisms that states use that the author has identified. Secondly, the literature review also provides the reader with an understanding of IPAs and their expert authority. The author exclusively consulted peer reviewed academic articles in the writing of the literature review and has thoroughly reviewed and synthesised pertinent literature culminating in a theoretical framework.

The next section is the research design section in which the choices that have been made in regards to the research design will be discussed. The chapter also discusses the methods used in the collection of data for this thesis. Furthermore, case selection and the limitations of using the particular research design are also discussed.

3.1 Research design

Research design can be described as the research strategy that a researcher employs to answer research questions and conduct research. In this instance, investigating the question of how states curtail the expert authority of IO's. Epistemologically this thesis has positive underpinnings rather than normative underpinnings meaning that research is based upon empirical and factual evidence rather than subjective normative judgements. According to Toshkov (2016), positive research is research that focuses on describing, explaining and understanding reality as it is whilst suspending normative judgements (Toshkov, 2016). To further elucidate, the author of this thesis has conducted research with the aim of investigating and explaining the state curtailment of IO's expert authority, and has refrained from expressing subjective normative judgments of whether this state curtailment of IO's expert authority is good or bad. As far as the research design of this thesis is concerned, the author has chosen a case study research design. The definition of case study research is a much contested affair, with

various scholars providing their own definitions. A possible reason for this variation is the fact that case study research is not restricted to a single field or strand and instead is utilised extensively in various fields such as anthropology, international relations, political science, public administration and sociology etc. Case study research has been defined as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the “case”) in depth and within its real-world context” (Yin, 2009, p.13), as “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units” (Gerring, 2004, p.341) and as the intensive study of a single case (Toshkov, 2016, p.286). A case can be defined as a bounded delineated unit of analysis and can be a person, object, organisation etc. Case study research can be further divided into cross case and within case. This thesis has utilised a within case approach. In a within case approach, a case is chosen and the emphasis is placed on extensively studying various factors within the case rather than comparing factors across cases or across time.

In this thesis, the author started with a literature review and based on the findings in the literature review, formulated a theoretical framework. This theoretical framework provided two key contributions in the context of the research process. First of all, it guided the author in the collection of empirical evidence. By consulting the theoretical framework, the author was able to guide his empirical collection efforts towards phenomena present or related to the theoretical framework. Secondly, the theoretical framework acts as an outlet to evaluate the empirical evidence against it.

3.2 Operationalization

Operationalization refers to the process of defining abstract concepts in a way that enables the researcher to empirically measure them. In the context of this thesis and its research question, the key abstract concepts that emerged are expert authority and state curtailment.

Expert authority has been defined as authority that is built upon expertise, information and production of technical and specialist knowledge (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999, Litzet Monnet, 2017). State curtailment in the context of this thesis refers to the various mechanisms and ways that states use to reduce or restrict the expert authority of IO's. Expert authority is operationalized by looking at the key functions of the IMF and determining whether these functions fall under the umbrella of expert authority. State curtailment has been operationalized by first identifying the mechanisms of state curtailment such as institutional design, staffing, unilateral actions, collusion and shadow bureaucracies. In the second step, evidence was gathered from IMF documents and then analysed under the light of the aforementioned mechanisms on state curtailment.

3.3 Methods

There are several data collection methods that a researcher can use in case study research. The author of this thesis relied extensively on document analysis to gather data. Document analysis is a qualitative tool of data collection in which a researcher can gather data from both electronic and printed documents (Bowen, 2009). Document analysis has several strengths that make it a useful tool to be used in case study research. First of all, document analysis allows the researcher to delve deeper into a case than other methods. Secondly, documents analysis acts as a useful tool of data collection when other data collection methods such as interviews are unavailable (Bowen, 2009). The disadvantages of document analysis can include interpreting a document outside of the context that it was published in and the lack of independent verification of documents meaning that the publishers of documents have to be trusted in regards to the reliability of information provided (Bowen, 2009). In this thesis the author made extensive use of documents published by the IMF. Data was collected from the IMF's website as well detailed

documents that are published by the IMF such as the diversity report through which the author was able to detail the composition and grades of staff within the IMF. In the rare case where there is a source present in the empirical evidence section that is not an IMF published source, it is a secondary source which derives its data from IMF published data.

3.4 Case Selection

There are several reasons behind the selection of the IMF as the object of study or case for this thesis.. The first reason is logistical and relates to the availability of data. I have chosen the IMF as the subject of this investigation due to the fact that a plethora of data is available, produced by both the IMF itself and outside actors. Furthermore, the IMF is among the top IOs in terms of membership and impact, further enhancing its suitability as the object of this investigation.

The second reason behind choosing the IMF as the object of study for this thesis is because of its substantive relevance. Substantive relevance has been defined as the real world societal relevance that a case holds (Toshkov, 2016). The IMF is the global lender of last resort which means its existence and decisions affect almost every person around the globe, whether that is directly through financial arrangements for countries that are struggling financially or whether it is through its policy advice and predictive economic reports.

The IMF was also chosen because of its broad mandate and membership. The author is deeply interested in the workings of bureaucracies in IO's and possibly apart from the UN and the World Bank, there are not that many IO's with such a broad membership profile and impact.

3.5 Limitations

Generalizability - Perhaps the greatest point of critique that can be levied upon this thesis and case studies is their lack of generalizability. This means that the findings of case study

research cannot be applied to the broader class of cases that the case belongs to. An example according to this logic would be that studying the IMF for state curtailment of its expert authority would lead to a conclusion that only applies to this case and cannot be assumed to be correct for other cases in this category i.e. other IO's. However a lack of generalizability does not mean that case study research cannot be a fruitful endeavour, it can deeply enhance researchers' knowledge of particular phenomena that they are interested in, particularly in the social sciences where there are no general context independent theories (see Flyvberg, 2006 for a broader discussion).

Subjectivity of data collection/bias- Another limitation of this thesis and indeed qualitative case study research is the fact that the author of any such research induces a degree of bias just by the mere fact of engaging with the case.

Lack of research tools - It has been argued that researchers that conduct case study research must deal with the frustration of not having enough professional research tools to conduct their research (Toshkov, 2016). This means that researchers have to rely on others in the accumulation of data for research. In this case the author is deeply interested in the case of the IMF, however the author can only work with the data provided by the IMF and despite some shortcomings of that data such as no detailed data on staff provided by each member state, the author has no other data source to capture this phenomenon.

Chapter 4: Empirical Evidence

4.1 Core Functions of the IMF

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was established in 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference (IMF, n.d.). The main aim behind the establishment of the IMF was exchange rate stability and the gradual reduction in trade barriers between states post World War 2 (WW2)

(ibid). The IMF counts 190 states as members. The core functions of the IMF are policy advice, financial assistance and capacity development (IMF, 2022c).

As part of the policy advice domain, the IMF monitors the economies of the member states. This is known as surveillance (IMF, 2022c). The IMF monitors the economies of member states to identify systematic risks and to propose structural remedies for these risks. As part of the monitoring process, IMF staff embark on yearly visits to member states to assess their economies. This may include discussions on exchange rates, foreign reserves, fiscal policy, monetary policy as well as structural reforms (IMF, 2022c). The IMF visiting party meets with several key stakeholders in the economy such as government ministers, members of the legislature and representatives of trade unions to gain a better understanding of the overall state of the country and economy. The visiting party also holds discussions on matters beyond hardcore economics that however have the potential to affect the economy such as climate change and digitalization (IMF, 2022c).

As far as the IMF's function of financial assistance is concerned, the IMF provides financial assistance to countries that are already experiencing financial crises or to countries where the IMF and the country's authorities think that financial assistance is crucial to avert a potential crisis (IMF, 2022b). The most common type of crisis that IMF member states face is a balance of payments crisis where the member state is unable to afford necessary imports to keep the economy running. This mostly happens due to the member state having insufficient foreign reserves. In such a situation the IMF may step up to shore up the foreign reserves of the member state in exchange for promises of structural adjustments from the member state. This is known as conditionality (IMF, 2022b).


Lastly, the IMF helps member states with capacity development. Capacity development is technical assistance provided by the IMF to member states that are willing to make use of it (IMF, 2022a). Member states have to approach the IMF and request capacity development. Around a third of the IMF's yearly expenditure is spent on capacity development within member states (IMF, 2022a). Capacity development includes many facets of the economy but is very often focused on improving the tax infrastructure and tax laws within the member state. However it can also include improvements in data collection, training of personnel and modernization reforms for the economy (IMF, 2022a).

4.2 Governance Structure of the IMF

The governance structure of the IMF is quite complex with a plethora of organs interacting to make the organisation work. Figure 1. excellently summarises the governance structure of the IMF (Lamdany et al., 2008). The Board of Governors is the highest decision-making body of the IMF and consists of one governor and one alternate governor for each member country (IMF, n.d.). Member states usually appoint the minister of finance or the governor of the central bank of their respective countries as governors on the BoG. All the power of the IMF is vested in the BoG (IMF, n.d.) The BoG elects the members that comprise the EB and usually delegates power to the EB for fulfilment of its wishes, however it does retain some powers for itself. These powers that the BoG still retains are the approval of quota increases, the allocation or cancellation of special drawing rights (SDR), approving the admission of new member states, initiation withdrawal proceedings against a member and amendments to the articles of agreement and by-laws. (IMF, n.d).

At the heart of the governance structure of the IMF is the Executive Board (EB). The Executive Board is composed of 24 directors and one managing director, who acts as chairman of the board (IMF, 2021). The directors are elected by countries or groups of countries (ibid).

Figure 1. Stylized View of IMF Governance



Source: Lamaday et al, 2008

The EB is the organ within the IMF responsible for conducting the day-to-day business of the IMF. The EB discusses national, regional, and global consequences of each member's economic policies and helps member countries address temporary balance of payments problems through approving financing (IMF, 2021). Furthermore, the EB of the IMF also oversees the IMF's capacity development efforts. The decisions of the EB are usually consensus based, however on the rare occasion of disagreement between the members of the EB, voting takes place (IMF, 2021). The votes within the EB are not equal. The votes of each member equal the sum of its basic votes which is the same for all members and quote-based votes in which there is a large disparity between member states. Essentially, a member states quota within the IMF determines its voting power (discussed in depth later in this chapter). The EB is informally

guided by two main sources, the G groupings of the leading economies of the world (G7, G20 etc) and two committees: the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) and the Development Committee (IMF, 2021).

The IMFC mirrors the composition and size of the EB. The members of the IMFC are elected in the same fashion as members of the EB i.e. being nominated by individual countries or groupings of countries. The members proposed to the IMFC by individual countries or groups of countries are usually central bank governors, ministers or individuals of a similar stature. The IMFC meets twice a year. The draft agenda of these meetings is prepared by the Managing Director and discussed by the Executive Board, approved by the IMFC Chair, and formally adopted by the IMFC at the meeting. A statement is released at the end of each meeting that guides the work of the IMF for the time period until the next half yearly meeting (IMF, 2021).

Another ministerial committee alongside the IMFC is The Joint Ministerial Committee of the Boards of Governors of the Bank and Fund on the Transfer of Real Resources to Developing Countries, better known as the Development Committee. The Development Committee is staffed in a similar fashion as the EB and IMFC i.e. 24 members who usually are ministers of finance or ministers of development of their respective countries or are of a similar stature. The development committee of the IMF is concerned with development issues and on the financial commitments and resources required to promote economic development in developing countries. The Committee usually meets twice a year following the IMFC meeting. The Development Committee is unique among the organs of the IMF as it not only reports to the BoG of the IMF but also reports to the BoG of the World Bank (IMF, 2021)

Another key organ within the governance structure of the IMF is the Managing Director (MD). The MD is the head of the IMF staff and chairs the EB. The MD is chosen by the EB for a

term of five years that can be renewed as well. Like other decisions that the EB makes, the MD is chosen by the votes cast by each member, however in the recent past the EB has chosen the MD based on consensus. The MD is assisted by one First Deputy Managing Director and three Deputy Managing Directors. These “assistants” are chosen solely by the MD. The MD is detached from the BoG and is provided instructions by the EB to implement its decisions through the staff that the MD controls. The EB also acts as a watchdog, overseeing and reviewing the decisions made by the MD. The MD is also informally advised by the G groupings of countries (G7 & G20)(IMF, 2021).

The member states that are part of the IMF also play an important albeit less visible role in the decision making and governance structure of the IMF. The most crucial action that member states take is electing the members of the EB vis a vis the BoG, since the EB is responsible for the day to day running of the IMF.

4.3 Quotas and Voting

As mentioned earlier, voting power within the IMF is not equal and there is great discrepancy among members. Each member state has a single vote as well as votes in direct proportion to its quota. A quota is the basic contribution of each state towards the IMF and broadly determines each member states position in the global economy (IMF, 2023). Quotas are important due to several important but varied reasons. First of all, quotas provide the maximum amount of resources a member state is obliged to provide to the IMF. This is what makes up the bulk of the IMF's resources. Secondly, quotas are an important determinant of voting power within the IMF. Each member state has a single vote as well the votes it gets in proportion to its quota. Member states get one additional vote per 100,000 Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). SDRs are the IMF's own reserve asset. Thirdly, quotas allow member states to borrow from the IMF, a

member states quota is used to determine the maximum amount of financing that they are able to borrow from the IMF. At last, quotas are useful in determining a member state's share in the total allocation of SDRs. It is quite evident that quotas are among the key cogs in the functioning of the IMF.

Quotas are fixed and the BoGs is the only organ of the IMF that can change the quotas under very specific circumstances. These are circumstances are:

- 1) 85% of the votes from the total voting power within the IMF.
- 2) A member states quota cannot be changed without its consent. (IMF, 2023b)

The BoG usually reconsiders quotas at least once every five years. A country can also request a change in its quota allocation on an adhoc basis (IMF, 2023).

As far as voting power is concerned, the author has decided not to mention all the members and their voting power but instead just the top 20 members and their voting power. This is due to the fact that a large number of countries have insignificant voting power within the IMF. Here is a list of the top 20 member states of the IMF with the most voting power:

Country	Votes	Votes as percentage of total votes
Australia	67,183	1.33%
Belgium	65,566	1.30%
Brazil	111,879	2.22%
Canada	111,698	2.22%
China	306,288	6.08%
France	203,010	4.03%
Germany	267,803	5.31%
India	132,603	2.63%
Italy	152,159	3.02%

Japan	309,664	6.14%
Korea	87,286	1.73%
Mexico	90,586	1.80%
Netherlands	88,824	1.76%
Russian Federation	130,496	2.59%
Saudi Arabia	101,385	2.01%
Spain	96,814	1.92%
Switzerland	59,170	1.17%
United Kingdom	203,010	4.03%
United States	831,401	16.50%

Source: (IMF, 2021a)

According to the above table, the G7 grouping of countries hold 41.25% of the total votes. If the European Union is also considered as part of the G7 then the share of votes of the G7 goes up to 46.23%. If the countries of the EU that are not included in this table are also added to the G7, then the total share of the G7 becomes 54.34% (IMF, 2021a).

4.4 Staffing

As an IO with a membership of 190 countries, the IMF employs 3497 individuals from over 160 member states out of which over 2700 are professional staff whereas almost 800 are support staff (IMF, 2021). The IMF publishes a biennial report on diversity and inclusion within the IMF, of whose last version was the 2020/2021 report. This report categorises staff based on various variables such as education, gender, nationality and rank within the IMF. However prior to delving into this report, it is crucial to explain the various grades within the IMF staff hierarchy. The main categories are A and B level staff (IMF, 2017). Within A level staff, staff have been assigned grades ranging from A01 to A15. Within B level staff, the grades range from

B01 to B05. Staff falling between the grades A01 to A08 are support staff, occupying positions such as staff assistant, administrative assistant and research assistant. Staff falling between the grades A09 to A15 are categorised as professional staff by the IMF. This professional staff includes various roles and can include for example a librarian in grade A09, accountant in A10, economist and counsel in A11, resident representative in grade A12, deputy division chief in grade A14 all the way to division chief in grade A15/B01. Staff in the B category are categorised by the IMF as managerial staff. Staff in the B category can consist of roles such as division chief and senior resident representative in grades B01 and B02, assistant department director in grade B03, deputy department director in grade B04 and finally the role of department director in grade B05 (IMF, 2017). Apart from a difference in the respective grades of IMF staff, there is also a broader division of staff into permanent and contractual staff (IMF, 2021).

Now that the reader is aware of the categorization of staff within the IMF, this thesis will now delve into the IMF diversity and inclusion report. According to the IMF diversity and inclusion report 2020/2021, out of the 3497 total staff members of the IMF, 2825 (80.8%) are permanent staff members whereas the remaining 672 (19.2%) are contractual staff (IMF, 2021). First I will look at the composition of the permanent staff members into the employment grades and how each member state or grouping of member states such as the G7 fares in terms of permanent staff members within the IMF. If we look at staff members between the grades of A01-A08, there are a total of 412 individuals that fall into this employment grade range (IMF, 2021). This represents 14.6% of all permanent staff of the IMF. If we look at the nationality of the staff within this grade range, American nationals make up 36.4% of the total staff. The second most represented country is the Philippines, making up 10.8% of staff within this grade range. The third most represented country is India with a share of 5.3% within this grade range.

Apart from these countries, the rest of the permanent staff belonging to the grades A01 to A08 comes from the rest of the globe (IMF, 2021). It is not hard to understand why the U.S. contributes the most number of staff to these grades. The IMF is headquartered in Washington and the staff working in these grades are generally administrative and research assistants (IMF, 2017), hence it makes sense to hire locally. This is also confirmed by the IMF itself which states on its recruitment website that all support staff except for applicants to the Research Assistant Program, are hired locally from the District of Columbia Metropolitan Area (IMF, 2019). The more perplexing question is the vast number of support staff hailing from India and especially the Philippines. This can be partially explained through demographics and culture. The Philippines is a former colony of the U.S and there are an estimated two million Filipino immigrants residing in the U.S as of 2021 (Davis & Batalova, 2023). Coupled with the fact that English is an official language of the Philippines, it is not hard to see why Filipinos might be overrepresented in the support staff grades. As far as the representation of Indian nationals is concerned, there are an estimated 2.7 million Indian immigrants residing in the U.S as of 2021 (Batalova & Hoffman, 2022). Similarly to the Philippines, English is also an official language in India meaning that Indians may find it easier to work as support staff within the IMF.

If we look at the staff statistics for the professional grades i.e. A09-A15, there are 2063 (73% of the total permanent staff) individuals within these grades. This number coupled with the fact that these grades are composed of professionals means that this grade range is the beating heart of the IMF. The most represented nationality within this grade range is the U.S with 10.7% of total staff. No other individual member state holds a share higher than 4.4% (China), with the G7 grouping of countries contributing a combined 25.5% of staff to the professional grades of A09-A15 (IMF, 2021). As far as the managerial grades of B01-B05 are concerned, individuals in

these grades number 350 and are 12.4% of the total permanent staff. Out of this 12.4%, 2.2% hail from the U.S and 1% hail from Germany with the G7 grouping contributing 5.9% of managerial staff (IMF, 2021). Overall Europe and North America contribute a combined 45.2% permanent staff to the IMF.

The IMF also provides statistics on the number of staff that are economists between the grades of A09 to B5. These economists represent 55.7% of the total permanent staff. American nationals once again represent the highest proportion of economists with 8.9% of all economists being U.S nationals. Other countries with a notable number of economists within the IMF are China (5.5%), France (5.9%) and Germany (5.7%). Nationals hailing from the G7 grouping amount to 35.3% of all economists within the grades A09 to B5 (IMF, 2021). The IMF also provides statistics on the educational background of its permanent staff. According to the IMF, there are 770 individuals within the permanent staff that hold doctorates. Among this staff, 56.5% obtained their doctorate from the U.S, with 11.6% of staff having obtained their doctorate from the U.K. 1.6% of doctorate holders within the IMF obtained it from the regions of Sub Saharan Africa (SSA), Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and China with 30.3% of staff obtaining their doctorates from the rest of the world (IMF, 2021). The IMF also provides data about the number of staff that hold a masters degree and where they obtained these degrees. There are 1299 staff members that hold a master's degree with 49.7% of staff having obtained their degree from the U.S, followed by 10.2% having obtained their degree from the U.K, 5.9% from the regions of SSA, MENA and China, and 34.3% from the rest of the world.

Apart from permanent staff, the IMF also hires contractual staff. The total number of contractual staff is 672 which equates to 19.2% of total staff. This number can be further divided between support staff and professional staff. Contractual support staff number 381 individuals or

56.7% of total contractual staff and contractual professional staff number 291 or 43.3% of total contractual staff. As far as support staff between the grades A01 to A08 are concerned, U.S nationals make up 18.5% of total staff support followed by Chinese nationals that amount to 10.9% of total support staff. The rest of the contractual support comes from all around the globe with India the third highest contributor of support staff at 23 individuals or 3.4% of the total contractual support staff (IMF, 2021). As far as the contractual professional staff numbers are concerned, the U.S contributes 67 individuals with the second highest contractual professionals staff coming from India which is 19 individuals. The rest of the contractual professional staff comes from the rest of the world (IMF, 2021).

As far as recruitment of staff is concerned, the IMF's articles of agreement stipulate several conditions upon the Managing Director in regards to the staff of the IMF. Section 4b of Article 12 of the agreement puts the Managing Director at the helm of the IMF and responsible for the organisation, appointment and dismissal of the staff (IMF Articles of Agreement, Section 12, Article 4b). Section 4c of Article 12 of the agreement alludes to the international character of the IMF bureaucracy and states that staff "in the discharge of their functions, shall owe their duty entirely to the Fund and to no other authority"(IMF Articles of Agreement, Section 12, Article 4c). Section 4d of Article 12 of the agreement instructs the Managing Director to recruit staff on a as wide as possible geographical basis whilst securing the highest standard of efficiency and technical knowledge (IMF Articles of Agreement, Section 12, Article 4d).

As far as recruitment practices are concerned, the IMF recruits staff through various channels. The recruitment of support staff is divided into three streams, namely the Research Assistant Program (RAP), Research Assistants and Administrative and Specialized Assistants (IMF, 2019). The requirements to be accepted into the RAP are the attainment of a bachelor's

degree in any preferred field such as computer science, economics and statistics. There is also a minimum GPA requirement for the RAP. The IMF states that it recruits as geographically broadly as possible when hiring for the RAP (IMF, 2019). The requirements to apply for a research assistant role are the attainment of a bachelor's degree in a preferred discipline such as computer science, economics, mathematics or statistics and a minimum of two years or relevant experience. The educational requirements for an administrative and specialised assistant role are similar, however there is no fixed requirement on the duration of prior work experience (IMF, 2019).

As far as recruitment practices for experienced professional roles are concerned, the IMF hires professional staff of four different kinds, namely experienced economists, short term experts, through the externally financed appointees (EFA) and specialised appointees program (SPA) and specialised career stream professionals (IMF, 2019). The academic requirements to be hired as an experienced economist are a doctorate with three to ten years of relevant experience or a masters degree with seven to fourteen years of relevant experience. The IMF also stipulates that to be hired as an experienced candidate, a candidate must have worked at a central bank, ministry of finance or international financial institution (IMF, 2019). To be hired as a short term expert, the IMF does not detail any specific academic requirements, however it is experience whether governmental or in academia that is most crucial. Short term experts are usually deployed on missions of one or two weeks with a team or on stand alone missions of up to a month. These short term professionals do not have to exclusively work for the IMF but need to be available when the IMF calls for their expertise (IMF, 2019). The Externally Financed Appointees program is a program in which the IMF invites an expression of interest from member states and then allocates a number of slots per country. The names for hiring are put

forward by the Executive Director of a country or a grouping of countries. Each Executive Director is allowed to recommend three names out of which one is chosen. The IMF conducts panel interviews to choose the most qualified candidates. As far as the background of candidates applying for the EFA program is concerned, candidates are required to be a public sector official, have a graduate degree and have at least four years of relevant experience (IMF, 2019). For the SAP program, candidates are recommended by member countries or their executive director. Priority is given to candidates from Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) countries. Candidates that are nominated must be a mid-career government official, hold a postgraduate degree and have relevant experience in a public financial institution, economic ministry or university (IMF, 2019). Professionals hired in the specialised career stream are hired to fulfil the requirements of all the administrative domains within the IMF such as communications, legal, security and travel domains. Candidates applying for the specialised career stream are expected to hold a university level education and work experience related to the respective stream that they are applying to (IMF, 2019). The IMF also hires experts in fields that have recently grown in importance and will be especially important in the future such as the domains of climate change, digital money and technological advancement (IMF, 2019).

Chapter 5: Empirical Analysis

As far as the bureaucracy of the IMF is concerned, the concept of IPAs is helpful. To recap, IPAs are “hierarchically organised groups of international civil servants with a given mandate, resources, identifiable boundaries, and a set of formal rules of procedures within the context of a policy area” (Knill and Steinebach, 2022, p.2). The IMF most definitely fulfils the conditions set out by Knill and Steinebach as it consists of a bureaucracy that is hierarchically

organised, that is international in nature, has a mandate from the member states, quotas as resources, identifiable boundaries i.e. the financial realm of this world and formal rules and procedures which are also present. Now that it is clear that the bureaucracy and the internal workings of the IMF can be categorised as an IPA, it makes sense to assess as to how much influence this particular IPA possesses. In light of Knill and Steinebach's classification of IPAs into administrative styles, the IMF's IPA is an entrepreneurial IPA, due to having low internal challenges and high external challenges. As far as the question of the ability of the IMF's IPA to affect policy output is concerned, the work of Ege and colleagues guides us. Political contestation and the complexity of problems is what allows IPAs to affect policy outputs. In the case of the IMF, programmatic complexity is very high leading to the IMF using expertise based approaches to influence policy. Programmatic complexity denotes the degree of difficulty in addressing a problem because of its underlying requirements for context-specific knowledge or technical expertise (Ege et al 2021; Busch and Liese, 2017; Johnson and Urpelainen, 2014). Political contestation is low because the IMF is mostly engaged with states that possess weak financial structural capacity and hence there is little appetite for powerful states to politically contest the work of the IMF's IPA since it does not affect them directly. In terms of procedural strategies, IPAs often collaborate with like minded stakeholders. In terms of the matrix presented by Ege and colleagues, the IMF's IPA finds itself under scenario two in which political contestation is low whereas programmatic complexity is high. This means potential to influence policy output is fairly high and expertise based strategies are most prevalent. This result is also visible in the discussion of the core functions of the IMF, further in this analysis section.

Looking at the educational background and hiring procedures for the professional staff of the IMF makes it abundantly clear that they are experts. Experts are defined as individuals that

hold technical expertise, are at the forefront of knowledge production in their fields, hold qualifications that certify them as experts or form part of epistemic communities that diffuse expert knowledge (Haas 1992, Barnett and Finnemore 1999, Litzet Monnet, 2017, Liese et al 2021 and Busch et al, 2021). As far as the types of expert authority are concerned, the empirical evidence shows that the IMF possesses de jure expert authority because of its formal mandate and powers enshrined in documents such as the Articles of Agreement. To recap, de jure expert authority is expert authority that is formal and visible through hard evidence such as documents and formal legal structures. This is in contrast to de facto expert authority that is sociological in nature and is informal (Busch et al, 2020).

As far as the core functions of the IMF are concerned, two of the three functions require the IMF to be an expert and at the same time also act as proof of the expertise of the IMF. These functions are monitoring and capacity building. Monitoring member states' economies for structural faults automatically marks the IMF as an expert because no one else is doing it, leading to the IMF's monopoly over this knowledge. It can be argued that states do have their own statistical offices which track indicators in the economy and are able to provide a concrete picture of the economy, however this argument is negated by the fact that individual countries only track their own economies whereas the IMF simultaneously tracks the economies of all 190 members, leading to insights and data that no other state or IO on the planet possesses. As to the matter of capacity building, capacity building is only possible because of the IMF's expertise. Countries work with the IMF because they are unable to build this capacity themselves owing to them not having the expertise to build this capacity. The third function of the IMF i.e. financial assistance, cannot be classified under the umbrella of expertise because it can be replicated by

other entities whether that be rich countries (e.g. USA) or other supranational organisations (e.g. EU).

Institutional design is a key domain through which states have been able to curtail the expert authority of the IMF. As an example, despite having extensive expertise, the fact that the EB of the IMF can be overruled by the BoG of the IMF is an example of blatant and direct curtailment of the expert authority of the IMF. Furthermore, the BoG as a representative of member states still retains some important decision making powers that the member states have been unwilling to transfer to the IMF. These powers include the approval of quota increases, the allocation or cancellation of special drawing rights (SDR), approving the admission of new member states, initiation withdrawal proceedings against a member and amendments to the articles of agreement and by-laws (IMF, n.d). Moreover, the BoG is informally advised by the G7 and the G20 grouping of countries and by two ministerial committees whose members are appointed by states (Lamady, 2008) meaning that the decisions of the IMF are likely heavily influenced by the input from states.

Another clear example of the state curtailment of the IMF's expert authority within the domain of institutional design are the rules for a change in the respective quotas that each member state is allocated. This is important because the quota of a country is directly proportional to its voting power. According to the IMF, any change in quotas requires a supermajority of 85% from the total voting power within the IMF (IMF, 2023b). Considering the fact that the U.S holds 16.95% of the total voting power within the IMF (IMF, 2021a), it is clear evidence that the U.S holds an effective veto in the domain of quotas and as a result of this the voting power within the IMF since the both are interlinked. Quotas are also important in the context of the functioning of the EB of the IMF. The decisions of the EB are usually consensual,

however voting takes place in the case of a disagreement (IMF, 2021). Within the EB, voting power is allocated on the basis of quotas which once again shows that countries with the highest quotas exercise disproportionate power. These are examples of state curtailment of an IO's expert authority because the IMF cannot change the quotas or voting power even if it determines through its expertise that a change in quotas would be beneficial for the functioning of the IMF as well as for the fulfilment of its mandate. The U.S is clearly cognizant of the power that it holds in regards to quota realignment and a recent example of this is the rejection of China's argument for an increase in its quota owing to its meteoric economic rise in the last two decades, this wish for quota realignment was rejected by the U.S which argued for an increase in funding at the current quotas (Pandey, 2023).

Although institutional design is a key domain through which states have been able to curtail the expert authority of the IMF, there are certain elements of institutional design through which the IMF is able to retain and possibly expand its expert authority. The first element through which the IMF is able to retain and possibly expand its expert authority is centralization. Centralization refers to the dissemination of information by a single entity and is usually associated with reduced bargaining and transactional costs (Koremenos et al., 2003). The IMF creates and maintains several databases which detail various aspects of the global economy and about the economies of member states. The second element of institutional design through which the IMF is able to retain and possibly expand its expert authority is flexibility. Flexibility refers to an institution's ability to deal with unanticipated events or shocks (Koremenos et al, 2003). An example of the IMF dealing with an unprecedented event was its response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Over a 100 countries requested financial assistance in the wake of the pandemic and the IMF responded through various mechanisms such as emergency funding, grants for debt

relief, the adjustment of existing loan agreements, policy advice and increased capacity development (IMF, 2020).

As far as staffing within the IMF is concerned, the evidence suggests that this is a meritocratic process with vast representation among the member states of the IMF and does not contribute to curtailment of the IMF's expert authority. The U.S providing the most staff among all member states to the IMF is a phenomenon that is explainable. First of all as far as the recruitment of support staff is concerned, the IMF hires most of the support staff locally meaning the chances of an American national being hired are higher than recruitment from other members because of the location of the IMF's headquarters being within the U.S. A more perplexing phenomenon is the high number of staff that attained their education at an American educational institution. This can be partially explained through the work of Frey and Eichenberger who conducted a comparative study on the differences between economics as a discipline in Europe and the U.S (Frey & Eichenberger, 1993). According to Frey and Eichenberger there are several aspects in which American and European economic education differs. First of all, the academic market is much larger in the U.S than in Europe. Secondly, the American market is highly focused on the theoretical study of economics rather than policy formulation (Frey & Eichenberger, 1993). Furthermore, the American market judges a researcher's quality based on the quantity and quality of published articles (Frey & Eichenberger, 1993). Another interlinked aspect that is important here is the concentration of editorial power within economics journals. Academics affiliated with U.S academic institutions hold vastly more editorial power in the economics academic publishing realm than academics affiliated with institutions in other countries (Ubilava et al., 2021). An example of this concentration of editorial power within the U.S is the fact that the states of California, Massachusetts and Illinois each have individually more editorial power than Asia, South America, Africa and Australasia

combined (Ubilava et al., 2021). This shows that the U.S is the epicentre of theoretical economic research making it the ideal location for any aspiring economics student to pursue their studies and get noticed in the field. This explains why so many of the professional staff at the IMF attained their education from U.S institutions. This also proves that the high number of staff in the IMF with an American education are there because of their expertise in the field of economics. This view is further solidified by looking at the recruitment philosophy and practices of the IMF. The Articles of Agreement stipulate the MD of the IMF to recruit on as wide a geographical basis as possible (Articles of Agreement, Article 12, section 4d) combined with the fact that the key factors in the IMF's recruitment policy for different positions are education and relevant experience. It has been suggested that states try to set up national fiefdoms in multilateral organisations to further their own interests (Kleine, 2013), I suggest that the educational background and staffing within the IMF can be considered as an example of an ideological fiefdom where although individuals vary in terms of geographical and national diversity, they overwhelmingly hold the same ideas and education, making it hard for individuals with a different ideological mindset or education to enter the IMF irregardless of their nationality. This finding is important because it highlights that states can influence and curtail the expert authority of IO's without direct intervention. The idea of epistemic communities by Peter Hass is similar to what the author has proposed here, however the idea of epistemic communities focuses on factors such as members of the epistemic community having shared normative and causal beliefs (Haas, 1992) whereas the author suggests that educational background and a link to a particular theoretical ideology is what differentiates the idea of ideological fiefdoms from the idea of epistemic communities. To further clarify, the idea of epistemic communities does not incorporate notions of educational background and recruitment within its definition.

As far as unilateral influence within the IMF is concerned, there is clear evidence that the U.S is able to exert unilateral influence. As the largest contributor to the IMF's budget (IMF, 2021a), the country holding the highest voting power (IMF, 2021a) and the country with the highest percentage of staff (IMF, 2021) the United States enjoys a special relationship with the IMF. It has been alleged that the United States uses this privileged position to unilaterally influence the decision making of the IMF. Various scholars have established that countries voting alongside the United States within the U.N and its security council receive preferential treatment from the IMF in the form of reduced conditionality (Barro and Lee, 2005, Vreeland, 2005, Dreher and Jensen, 2007, as cited in Dreher et al, 2006). Another example of the IMF being used as a tool by the U.S came in the context of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. According to leaked documents, the Pakistani government agreed to supply weapons to Ukraine in exchange for an IMF bailout (Hussain & Grim, 2023). These examples cement the notion that the U.S exerts unilateral influence on the IMF.

As far as the matter of collusion is concerned, that is extremely difficult to capture owing to its hidden and informal nature and is impossible to completely capture unless IMF staff is interviewed. However there are some indications that collusion might be present. The BoG of the IMF is informally advised by the G7 and G20 groupings of countries which can be linked to the research of Dijkstra (2017), who argues that collusion between states and the secretariats of IO's may occur if they share preferences (Dijkstra, 2017).

Chapter 6: Conclusion

This thesis has investigated state curtailment of IO's expert authority with the use of the IMF as a case study. Specifically, this thesis investigated the mechanisms through which states

curtail the expert authority of IO's and studied the case of the IMF using these mechanisms. Despite providing IO's with various powers such as funds and legal authority, states can find themselves displeased by the behaviour of IO's. IO's can exhibit a culture of unaccountability (Heldt, 2018) and can also engage in undesirable bureaucratic behaviour (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999) that forces states to act to curtail the expert authority of IO's.

Before analysing state curtailment of the IMF's expert authority, this thesis investigated whether the IMF possesses expert authority in the first place. The IMF does indeed possess expert authority because it fulfils the requirements to be categorised as an IPA. In particular, the IMF's IPA finds itself in a position where it deploys expertise based strategies in its functioning due to high programmatic complexity of the issues that it deals with. The functions it performs such as capacity building and monitoring further substantiate the claim that the IMF possesses expert authority. Both capacity building and monitoring require extensive knowledge and this thesis has argued that the IMF holds a monopoly over these domains within the financial realm which is in line with the various ways that expert authority has been defined in academic literature which is as authority that is built upon expertise, information and production of technical and specialist knowledge (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999, Litzet Monnet, 2017). Furthermore, the claim that the IMF holds expert authority is also substantiated by looking at the education and number of professional staff within the IMF. It is also clear to see that staffing is an area within the IMF through which the IMF is able to increase its expert authority mainly through recruitment practices that invite highly specialised individuals particularly in the field of economics but more recently also in other specialist fields such as climate change, digital money and technology, to join the IMF.

After showing that the IMF possesses substantial expert authority, this thesis determined that states are able to curtail the expert authority of the IMF, particularly through the domain of institutional design. First of all, the BoG of the IMF acts as the supreme decision making body and also as a watchdog for states to monitor the activities of the IMF. The BoG of the IMF is able to issue directions to the EB on important matters related to core functions of the IMF such as the admission of new members and issuance and cancellation of SDR's, which is curtailment of the IMF's expert authority. Furthermore, the IMF has been designed in such a way that the most powerful states such as the U.S are able to single handedly decide on matters of structural significance such as quota realignment due to their voting power. A veto is usually associated with IO's such as the UN's security council, however the institutional design of the IMF allows the U.S to have an effective veto in matters related to structural changes within the IMF such as a change in quotas. This substantiates the claim made by Johnson (2013) that states that miss out on attaining control when an institution is being set up pay the price for a long time and those that are able to attain control enjoy the benefits for a long time (Johnson, 2013), as visible from the ability of the U.S to unilaterally veto any realignment of quotas. Despite the vast state curtailment of the IMF's expert authority within the domain of institutional design, there are aspects of institutional design such as centralization of knowledge and flexibility of arrangements through which the IMF is able to retain and expand its expert authority.

This thesis has also found that bureaucracies of IO's can resemble an ideological fiefdom where certain beliefs and qualifications take precedence as seen in the case study of the IMF, where a large number of staff attained an education from economics departments based in the U.S. This finding has important implications for not only the current state of the field but also for future research. The existence of ideological fiefdoms means that states would not need to

overtly curtail the expert authority of IO's but instead can focus on supplying staff to IO's that hold certain viewpoints which are in alignment with the interest of particular states. This finding has great implications for both IO's and states. In the discussion of diversity within IO's, the focus is usually on factors such as gender representation, national representation and equity between rich and poor members of an IO. The ideological fiefdom idea extends the concept of diversity further and may become an area of increased scrutiny in the future. As far as states are concerned, the idea of an ideological fiefdom provides states with another outlet to influence and curtail the expertise of IO's albeit in an informal manner. States can invest in education and training to increase the chances that staff within IO's will hold ideological ideas closer to what particular states believe in.

To conclude, despite the expert authority that the IMF possesses, the vast functions that it performs and its important role in global financial affairs, states are able to curtail its expert authority, particularly the U.S. Despite their proliferation in recent times, IO's still operate in a state centric world where states continue to be the major decision makers.

Future research should focus on studying the informal elements of state curtailment of IO's expert authority. This future research can also focus on informal elements of curtailment such as collusion between member states of the IMF and the secretariat of the IMF or other IO's. Moreover, future research can focus on comparative research of IO's to study state curtailment of IO's expert authority. This future comparative research can also focus on investigating the phenomenon of ideological fiefdoms in IO's. Furthermore future research can also focus on studying the de jure expert authority of the IMF and other IO's.

Limitations

There are certain limitations of this thesis that must be stated here. First of all this thesis has examined only a single case study meaning that the results inferred are not generalizable to the whole class of cases i.e. all the IO's in existence. Furthermore, the idea investigated in this thesis i.e state curtailment of IO's expert authority is hard to measure from a data viewpoint due to the lack of data that details the contributions and influence of every member state of the IMF. It is also pertinent to mention here that this thesis has only investigated formal curtailment and has not investigated informal curtailment.

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