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Blue Helmets as Legitimation Currency: Conditional Effect of Regime Change on UN Peacekeeping Contributions

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**Universiteit
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Master Thesis

Blue Helmets as Legitimation Currency: Conditional Effect of Regime Change on UN Peacekeeping Contributions

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Abstract

United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (PKOs) rely on voluntary personnel contributions from its member states. While existing research has extensively examined economic and geostrategic factors influencing personnel commitments, the role of domestic political dynamics, particularly regime change, remains underexplored. This thesis investigates how regime change affects a country's decision to contribute personnel to PKOs. Building upon theories of international legitimacy and the joint product model of peacekeeping, this study argues that new regimes may increase personnel contributions as a strategy for legitimation. Moreover, this effect is expected to be significantly moderated by the regime's domestic stability, while the regime transition type is not expected to condition the effect. By employing a dynamic Difference-in-Differences research design on panel data from 1996 to 2018, this quasi-experimental study ensures more robust causal inferences and allows for uncovering temporal patterns of the effect in the years after regime change. The results suggest that following regime change, only states with high domestic stability substantially increase their UNPKO contributions. Additionally, this effect appears temporarily and with a delay of around seven years. Lastly, the study provides evidence that regime transition type moderates the effect of regime change on UNPKO contributions.

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1. Introduction

In the context of increased publicity of armed conflict in the past years, during one of his speeches, United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Guterres emphasized that “now more than ever, the world needs the United Nations — and the United Nations needs peacekeeping” (UN, 2025). This statement is supported by the fact that the UN is the largest global provider of security through international peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in the past several decades (Sandler, 2017). However, to carry out the PKOs the UN depends on voluntary personnel contributions from its member states. Even though peacekeeping provides the international community with peace and stability, providing important public benefits, variations exist in the extent and frequency of contributions across countries. Traditional rational choice models suggest that states should minimize their commitments due to the free-rider problem, yet empirical evidence demonstrates sustained and significant personnel contributions (Duursma & Gledhill, 2019). This discrepancy has led to extensive scholarly debate on the motivations behind peacekeeping commitments.

Existing research has primarily examined static country-specific factors (e.g., economic capacity, military size, geopolitical interests) that drive personnel contributions (Bove & Elia, 2011; Gaibullov et al., 2015). While these studies have provided valuable insights, they have largely overlooked the role of domestic political dynamics, particularly the effects of regime change on peacekeeping contributions. Therefore, as they can fundamentally alter a state's foreign policy incentives, shaping its engagement with international institutions and personnel contributions to PKOs (Gasiorowski, 1996), changes in domestic politics such as regime change require detailed empirical investigation in the context of UNPKOs which aims to be addressed by this paper.

This thesis investigates how regime change influences a country's decision to contribute personnel to PKOs. While some studies have touched upon related concepts, suggesting that leadership turnover drives changes to UNPKO contributions and that democratisation might increase contributions (Passmore, 2022; Passmore & Oestman, 2023), this study is a comprehensive inquiry into whether new regimes, and under what conditions, use peacekeeping as a tool to gain legitimacy. Specifically, the study aims to answer the following research question: What is the effect of regime change on UNPKO contributions? Additionally,

the analysis tests the potential moderating effects of domestic stability and regime transition type on this main effect.

To answer this question, this study employs a dynamic Difference-in-Differences design, using panel data on regime change and peacekeeping contributions from 1996 to 2018. By integrating insights from the joint product model of peacekeeping (Sandler, 1998, 2017) and theories of international legitimacy (Victor, 2010; Levin, 2023), this study aims to provide a more comprehensive understanding of how domestic political transitions shape peacekeeping contributions. The findings of this research contribute to both peacekeeping scholarship and policy debates by shedding light on how regime change and political instability affect burden-sharing in peacekeeping. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for the UN which seeks to ensure a substantial and steady supply of personnel for future peacekeeping missions.

2. Literature review

2.1. Peacekeeping operations

Peacekeeping operations (PKOs) represent a powerful instrument employed by the international community in their effort to manage conflict and build sustainable peace in areas affected by war. UNPKOs are established by the UN Security Council (UNSC), with the consent of the parties involved in the conflict, and typically involve military, police and civilian personnel from the contributing countries (UN Peacekeeping, 2025a). While traditional peacekeeping often included troops and police to ensure cease-fire, modern UNPKOs are more complex and often include mandates for providing humanitarian aid and rebuilding institutions in conflict-torn areas. Therefore, such operations often involve more civilian personnel, alongside military and police, helping institution- or nation-building efforts (Sandler, 2017).

Alongside UNPKOs, since the 1990s there has been an increase in non-UN operations. However, this paper focuses on UNPKOs, due to their global scope, the standardised institutional framework governing state contributions, and the large amount of available and transparent data on contributions which allow for robust data comparison across a wide range of UN member states. As of today, the UN deployed 71 operations, with more than 2 million

participants from 125 countries having served in those operations. Meanwhile, 11 of these PKOs are currently active. Geographically, UNPKOs have been deployed predominately in Africa and the Middle East, due to the number of conflicts requiring international intervention in these regions. The size of these missions varies, ranging from missions with only a few observers to complex missions with over 15,000 personnel covering diverse mandates and territory (UN Peacekeeping, 2025b).

A crucial institutional feature of every UNPKO since 1973 is the voluntary basis of personnel contributions. Once the UNSC mandates an operation, the UN Department of Peace Operations plans the operation and requests specific personnel. States then make contributions on a voluntary basis (Sandler, 2017). Because no state is obliged to contribute any troops, police or civilian personnel, the question of why states contribute to UNPKOs produced rich academic literature on what motivates states to contribute to peacekeeping. While states can contribute to UNPKOs in different ways, including financial and logistical, most existing studies focused on the deployment of personnel (Duursma & Gledhill, 2019). This thesis continues that practice by investigating exclusively personnel contributions, as it constitutes a more comparable, politically visible and costly form of PKO contributions.

2.2. Motivations for Peacekeeping Contributions

The literature on what motivates states to contribute personnel to PKOs is extensive and considers a wide range of factors that might be influential in explaining state motivation for personnel contributions. These factors generally fall among four different categories: state capacity, geostrategic interests, economic incentives and domestic political factors.

Geostrategic Interests

Realist theories of international relations suggest that the state is more likely to contribute to UNPKO when this directly serves its geostrategic interests. This includes preventing negative spillovers from conflict in neighbouring countries, such as refugee influx, disruption of economic activity or spread of conflict (Bove & Eilia, 2011; Uzonyi, 2015). Additionally, peacekeeping contributions can be used as a tool for regional power projection, demonstrating

the state's capabilities and willingness to strongly engage in the region (Rugger & Meiske, 2017). Therefore, for many states peacekeeping is seen as a tool for enhancing regional influence and protecting national security.

State Capacity

To participate in UNPKOs, the state needs to have the capacity. In this sense, the size of the country's military and the budget allocated for the military are seen as important factors for UNPKO contributions (Victor 2010; Bove & Elia, 2011). This is because states with larger militaries have more capacity to contribute in terms of personnel. However, they also have more sea vessels, aircraft and other infrastructure required to transport troops to often far-away locations, as well as logistical and operational capacities for deployment.

Economic Incentives

For many developing countries, economic incentives are crucial motivation for UNPKO contributions. Since the UN provides sizeable reimbursements for personnel who participate in peacekeeping operations, many developing countries make money by contributing, as their costs of deploying personnel are significantly lower than the amount of reimbursement (Gaibullov et al., 2015). Thus, peacekeeping has become a lucrative business for many of the poorer countries. As such, a country's relative wealth is an important predictor of contributions (Victor, 2010).

Domestic Political Factors

Lastly, the literature suggests that domestic politics determine UNPKO contributions in two different ways. Firstly, institutional features of democracy seem to constrain large contributions (Duursma & Gledhill, 2019). Since democratic governments are responsive to the electorate, they are reluctant to provide large-scale contributions due to potential casualties that might not sit well with the electorate. Furthermore, the effect seems to be particularly large with elections on the horizon. Secondly, states with hostile civil-military relations might use PKOs as a distraction for disloyal military officers (Albrecht, 2020). The threat of government turnover by the military is reduced by ensuring that a substantial part of the military and its leaders are abroad and by allocating UN reimbursement to meet the military's economic grievances.

Although these studies are not directly related to regime change, they show how domestic factors are important in understanding motivations for UNPKO contributions.

2.3. The Effect of Regime Change on Peacekeeping Contributions

One domestic political factor that has been understudied so far in the context of UNPKOs is regime change. Regime change assumes the replacement or significant transformation of a country's governing structures, institutions, and leadership, leading to significant shifts in political authority and decision-making processes (Geddes et al., 2014). Therefore, regime change is a broader category that covers different events, without specifying the type of regime this change brings about nor the mechanisms by which the change happens. While most of the existing international relations literature focuses either exclusively on democratisation (Huntington, 1991) or autocratisation (Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019), this paper investigates the effect of regime change itself. This is because all states that experience regime change are characterised by the need to legitimise their rule.

Major foreign policy shifts happen rarely, when they do happen, they are often the product of leadership change and domestic restructuring. This might happen simply due to new leadership having different ideological views or seeking different alliances compared to the previous regime. However, when such changes to the regime happen, the governing model of the state changes (Hermann, 1990). This often requires redefining priorities since the new regime relies on support for its survival on groups different from the previous regime. Therefore, to meet the new requirements, regime change often features changes in foreign policy.

The effect of regime change on UNPKO contributions is underdeveloped. However, Passmore and Oestman (2023) touch upon related some related concepts. In their study, they find that states make larger changes to their contributions to peacekeeping operations in the wake of a leadership turnover. This evidence shows support for the argument that significant disruptions in domestic politics affect UNPKO contributions. However, it provides no indication of whether there is a consistent effect of such turnover on contributions nor about the direction of

this effect. Passmore (2022), applying civil-military relations literature to UNPKO contributions, studies the effect of democratisation and suggests that it might drive new democracies to increase their contributions. However, no comprehensive study exists exploring the dynamics of regime change on UNPKO contributions.

A shared feature of virtually all new regimes is that they all must earn their recognition as equals in the international system. Therefore, new regimes seek international legitimation from other states (Victor, 2010; Wiener, 2020). To this end, UNPKO Contributions are often seen as an effective tool for gaining international legitimacy. For instance, in the 2000s Portugal wanted to improve its international standing, and the strategy it pursued was to increase contributions to increase legitimacy by shouldering its part in contributing to peace and stability within the UN system (Ceo Pinto, 2014). Similarly, when states of Latin America started democratising in the 1980s, they wanted to signal to the international community that these regimes were indeed new entities committed to being valuable members of the international community (Velázquez, 2013). Therefore, the literature suggests that the role of international legitimacy for UNPKO contributions might be significant.

Given the critical role that regime change plays in reshaping state behaviour, the absence of literature exploring its effect on UNPKO contributions is notable. Especially in the context of the need for international legitimacy for new regimes after political disruptions. Therefore, to address this gap in the literature this paper attempts to answer the following research question: What is the effect of regime change on UNPKO Contributions?

2.4. Conditionality of Regime Change Effect

An important addition is examining factors that might condition the effect of regime change on UNPKO Contributions. Not all states that experience regime change might be affected in the same way. Therefore, this paper includes two moderating variables: domestic stability and regime transition type.

Domestic Stability

One of the things that is crucial for military deployment abroad is state capacity. Theories focusing on this emphasise how domestic instability can undermine state capacity. Domestic stability represents the absence of political instability or fragmentation and associated political violence (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). In states with high instability, the government often has limited financial, personnel and organisational capacity to significantly engage in international affairs because it is preoccupied with domestic conflict. On the contrary, states that are domestically stable possess the capacity to give attention to their foreign policy objectives, potentially through UNPKOs as well.

While no empirical research has been conducted specifically on the effect of UNPKO contributions, Arnaudov's (2024) case study on North Macedonia, clearly illustrates the issue. It points out how internal political instability and associated security risks inhibit state capacity. This lack of capacity is potentially reflected in UNPKO contributions, as in 2023 for instance North Macedonia contributed only 3 personnel in 2023, landing in 109th place out of 126 (UN Peacekeeping, 2025b).

Regime Transition Type

Another potentially important moderator could be the regime transition type. Countries experiencing regime change can often experience associated regime transition. For instance, when the South African Apartheid regime ended in 1994, the country transitioned to democracy (Seidman, 1999). Therefore, regime transition refers to a change in regime type from democracy to autocracy or vice-versa. However, this transition does not happen in all states that experience regime change (Gasiorowski, 1996). Many countries that experience regime change were autocracies before and stayed autocracies post-regime change.

After democratic transitions, states often exhibit a shift towards multilateralism and international cooperation, as they align their behaviour with norms of the international system such as peaceful conflict resolution (Doyle, 1986). Autocracies, however, are assumed to approach foreign policy from a more realist perspective, with an emphasis on regime survival (Weeks, 2012). Therefore, while autocracies are less committed to international norms, they

seem willing to contribute to UNPKO due to strategic reasons of improving their image globally or even challenge Western influence.

While the research on regime transition type in the context of UNPKO contributions is lacking, Passmore's (2022) study finds that new democracies increase UNPKO contributions. Based on this, he suggests that only new regimes transitioning from autocracy to democracy increase their contributions. However, since his study analyses only samples with new democracies and makes no comparison to new regimes that transitioned to autocracy or new regimes that did not experience regime type transition, such conclusions cannot be inferred.

Overall, while the existing literature contains some suggestions on how the effect of regime change on UNPKO contributions might be moderated by domestic stability and regime transition type, it provides no empirical evidence on this effect nor a theoretical framework on the conditionality of the main effect. Thus, in addition to the main research question, which explores the effect of regime change on UNPKO Contributions, this study aims to understand what factors might explain the potential difference in how regime change affects states by testing the moderating effect of Domestic Stability and Regime Transition Type.

3. Theoretical Framework

3.1. Joint product model

An important conceptual remark about peacekeeping is that it can be seen as a joint product, as it is neither a pure public good nor a pure private good. Instead, it provides both public and private benefits to states (Sandler, 2017). The primary objective of peacekeeping is to provide international peace and security. This aspect can be seen as a global public good (GPG), as it is a non-rival and non-excludable benefit for the international community (Sandler, 1998). This means that the consumption of international peace and security by one does not limit the capability of the other to consume it and that individuals cannot be excluded from consuming it (Kaul, 2012). In the context of the GPG, states are tempted to free-ride, meaning they seek to enjoy the benefit of international peace and security without contributing to its provision, i.e. contributing personnel to PKOs. This creates a collective action problem, where if all states behave rationally and free-ride, the GPG is not provided (Gauibalev et al. 2009).

On the other hand, peacekeeping provides various private, contributor-specific, benefits to states which contribute personnel to PKOs. These private benefits include UN reimbursements, in-field training for soldiers, ally favours, increased trade opportunities, regional stability, foreign direct investment international prestige, and increased legitimacy (Sandler, 2017). Since the public good aspect of UN peacekeeping incentivises states to free-ride, these private good aspects, which do not suffer from the collective action problem seem, to be crucial for overcoming free-riding in peacekeeping personnel contributions. Therefore, if states can reap private benefits from peacekeeping, they are more likely to contribute to UNPKOs. This study focuses on legitimation as a potentially crucial private benefit of UN peacekeeping in the context of new regimes.

3.2. Regime Change and Seeking International Legitimacy

The main theoretical assumption of this study is that regime change, defined broadly as a significant disruptive change to the state's governing structure and leadership, creates an acute need for legitimation, both internationally and domestically (Wiener, 2020). The common feature of all new regimes, regardless of the specifics of the governance model that this change brought or the mechanism by which this change happened, is the pressure for legitimation. New regimes lack international legitimacy since they need to prove to the international audience that they can effectively run the state and can be a reliable peer in cooperation and negotiations. Domestically, new regimes face the pressure to prove to the domestic audiences they can govern effectively and in favour of the groups on whose support they rely. Therefore, legitimation is crucial for the survival of all new regimes as it establishes solid foundations for beneficial relations with international and domestic actors.

In this context, legitimacy is viewed as the private good of peacekeeping that all new regimes need. Peacekeeping is then used as a tool for obtaining legitimacy and contributions to UNPKO can be seen as a “currency” used to pay for legitimation. In seeking to obtain legitimacy, new regimes utilise UN peacekeeping contributions through several distinct mechanisms.

First, new regimes might use UNPKO contributions as a tool for signalling alignment with international norms. Peacekeeping contributions are powerful signals in international politics

for showing commitment to established norms and being a responsible member of the community by providing public goods of peace and security (Harrison, 2004). By signalling such commitment new regimes get recognized as legitimate actors that govern the state. Such signalling might be especially important in states whose previous ruling regimes had a negative reputation or for new regimes that came to power through illicit means.

Signals of commitment, however, are not always genuine. New regimes often face shortcomings regarding high standards of good governance. This includes abuse of human rights, brutal suppression of opposition or lack of rule of law. Such states may use UNPKO contributions as a divertive diversionary tactic (Levin, 2023). By visibly contributing to international peace, states often try to improve their legitimacy and reduce the negative impact of their governing practices on the international image.

Lastly, international legitimacy can also be leveraged to improve domestic legitimacy. Improved international legitimacy comes with benefits such as increased participation in international organisations and fora, improved bilateral relationships and a stronger negotiating position. This can be utilised to show the effectiveness of the regime's foreign policy and its international respectability to domestic audiences, which improves the regime's legitimacy at home. Additionally, improved international legitimacy often comes with material benefits, such as foreign aid, increased investment and security assistance. These benefits can then be used to provide goods to domestic audiences, bolstering legitimacy.

Overall, the primary theoretical expectation of this thesis is that in the event of regime change, new regimes face acute pressures for legitimisation. New regimes then seek to obtain legitimacy internationally and domestically, by strategically increasing their contributions to UNPKOs. However, the effect of regime change may not be immediate but appears with a short delay. This is because new regimes often first prioritise necessary internal policy changes, power consolidation, and establishing needed state capacities, to then form and implement foreign policy strategy (Haggard & Kaufman, 1994). Additionally, this effect may be temporary. The acute pressures for legitimisation created by regime change can diminish over time, as the state either gains legitimacy or the opportunity window to prove its intentions and capabilities passes (Beetham, 2012). This could annul the effect regime change had on UNPKO contributions in the beginning, returning to contributions pre-regime change under the influence of more structural factors. Based on these insights, the following hypotheses are formulated:

H1: New regimes contribute more to UNPKOs in the years after the regime change.

H2: The effect of regime change appears with delay and is temporary.

3.3. Domestic Stability as Moderator

While all new regimes may be seeking legitimacy, not all regimes have the state capacity to seek legitimation through UN peacekeeping. In the existing literature on UNPKO contributions, state capacity factors such as military size and relative wealth are recognised as important determinants for UNPKO contribution (Uzonyi, 2015). However, the capacity of new regimes to contribute to UNPKOs is acutely constrained by domestic stability. Such states often experience domestic instability due to factors like significant political fragmentation, widespread civil unrest and internal armed conflict (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). In such a context, new regimes face more immediate domestic threats to the survival of the regime and prioritise addressing these issues over obtaining international legitimation. The financial, military and human resources of the regime in states with high instability, as well as the political attention is directed at domestic consolidation of power. This potentially limits the ability of such states to contribute personnel to UNPKOs. On the other hand, new regimes that operate in the context of relatively high stability possess a higher capacity to contribute to peacekeeping. They are significantly less occupied with addressing internal crises, which can allow them to direct attention and resources to pursue foreign policy objectives, including contributing to UNPKOs. Therefore, the effect of regime change on UNPKO contributions is expected to be stronger, and potentially only present, in states with higher domestic stability:

H3: The effect of regime change on UNPKO contributions is stronger (or only present) in states with high domestic stability.

3.4. Regime Transition Type as Moderator

Contrary to the domestic stability moderator which has not been discussed in the existing literature in the context of the regime change affecting UNPKO contributions, the existing studies suggest that regime that the regime type that emerges from regime change might moderate its effect on UNPKO contributions. Specifically, that new democracies might be

particularly inclined to increase their UNPKO contributions as they want to strengthen domestic political institutions and reduce the risk of military interference (Passmore, 2022). Conversely, new autocracies are expected to produce more varied contributions (Levin, 2020).

Despite these suggestions, the expectation that this study develops is that the overarching need for legitimation shared by all states that experience regime change drives the change in UNPKO contributions regardless of the regime transition type. Despite their differences, the fundamental disruption of the established governing model creates a pressing challenge for new regimes to gain acceptance and validation (Harrison, 2004). Therefore, if new regimes utilise UNPKO contributions as “legitimation currency”, this transaction should be available to new regimes regardless of the regime transition type. The new regimes that experience different transition types might diverge on their UNPKO contributions in the long-term (Lebovic, 2004), but in the immediate period after regime change new regimes are expected to be mainly addressing the acute need for legitimacy in their foreign policy conduct. Therefore, while acknowledging the different regime transition types could theoretically lead to different UNPKO contributions in the long run, the expectation for the immediate period in the years after regime change is that regime transition type does not have a significant moderating effect:

H4: The effect of regime change on UNPKO contributions is not conditional on regime transition type.

4. Methodology

4.1. Research Design

The main aim of this study is to understand the causal effect of regime change on the state’s subsequent contributions to UN peacekeeping operations. Estimating this effect from panel data is challenging because regime change is not randomly assigned, it is an infrequent event that occurs at different times in different countries and the countries experiencing regime change might inherently differ from those that do not. Comparisons such as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression would potentially produce biased results due to its inability to account for trends in UNPKO contributions prior to regime change and adequately control for

time-invariant country characteristics, such as geographic, historical and deep socio-cultural factors, that correlate both with Regime Change and UNPKO Contributions (Wooldridge, 2023). Similarly, such regression cannot adequately account for broader time-specific trends that affect all states.

To more effectively isolate the causal effect of *Regime Change* on UNPKO Contributions in this context, this study employs a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) design. While OLS models can also include fixed effects to control for unobserved factors to some degree, DiD leverages these fixed effects in more useful manner that enriches this study with quasi-experimental robustness. The DiD design compares the change in UNPKO Contributions in states that experienced regime change (treatment group) to states that did not experience regime change at all or not yet (control group). Two-way fixed effects are crucial for increased robustness of DiD, since it includes country-fixed effects that account for all time-invariant country-specific factors that might confound the relationship. Simultaneously, it includes year-fixed effects that account for all temporal trends affecting all countries (Wooldridge, 2023). Since employing these fixed effects accounts for the heterogeneity and temporal trends, the core DiD logic extracts the treatment effect from the remaining variation, attributing the different change in UNPKO Contributions between the treatment and control group to regime change. These features make DiD a more robust research design for testing causal effects over a simple OLS model, particularly when the treatment is not randomly distributed, such as in this case.

In addition to the baseline DiD framework, this study employs dynamic DiD design, also known as event study design, for three important reasons. First, the key assumption of DiD design is that the treatment and control group would have parallel trends of UNPKO Contributions if it were not for the regime change. Event study design allows to investigate this assumption by estimating coefficients before regime change happens to identify if the groups statistically differed. Second, since the effect of Regime Change might appear with delay, be temporary or unfold gradually, event study design provides another useful feature (Li & Strezhnev, 2024). Dynamic DiD estimates multiple coefficients for each year relative to the event year. This way, the analysis allows for a more robust and nuanced understanding of effects, in contrast to the average post-treatment effect. Third, since regime change occurs in different years among countries over the observed period, standard DiD would produce biased estimates as it would use already-treated countries as a part of the control group for later-treated countries (Sun & Abraham, 2021). However, using newer dynamic DiD design incorporated

in R package “*fixest*” (Berge et al, 2021) allows to account for staged adoption, thus ensuring that cohort treated in a specific year is only compared to control group which includes never- or not yet-treated countries. Overall, dynamic DiD with two-way fixed effects ensures a rigorous framework for analysing the effect of Regime Change on UNPKO Contributions and understanding how this effect unwraps over time.

4.2. Data Sample and Variables

The analysis is conducted on the panel dataset based on the dependent variable (DV): UNPKO Contributions data (Perry & Smith, 2019). The sample includes 2770 country-year observations of 102 countries over the period from 1996 until 2018, as in 1996 the earliest data on Domestic Stability becomes available and after 2018 there is no comprehensive data on Regime Change. To create a unified country-year panel dataset, data for the main independent variable and all control variables from their original datasets were merged with the DV dataset.

Dependent Variables

To capture produce more robust and nuanced findings, this study attempts to capture different aspects of UNPKO contributions by analysing three distinct DVs: (1) *Participation Count*, (2) *Participation Dummy* and (3) *Total Contributions*. *Participation Count* refers to the number of UNPKOs that the state contributed personnel to each year. *Participation Dummy* is a binary variable with the value “0” if the country did not contribute to UNPKO and “1” if it did. Lastly, *Total Contributions* refers to the total number of personnel that the country contributed to UNPKOs each year, including troops, police and civilian staff.

The DVs Participation Count and Total contributions were treated with logarithmic transformation due to several reasons. First, logarithmic transformation addresses the issue of the skewness of the data, which makes the distribution more appropriate for linear modelling. Second, it allows for a more intuitive interpretation of the coefficients as percentage changes. Third, the analysis showed that logarithmically transforming the variable significantly improved the plausibility of the parallel trends, which is crucial in the DiD event study.

Treatment Variable

The *Regime Change* variable was constructed by combining two indicators: significant leadership change and substantial shift in regime type. First, the indicator for leadership change is based on the Change in Source of Leader Support (SOL) data, which captures major changes of leadership, i.e. the changes of leadership where “the subset of societal groups whose support allows a leader to retain and exercise power is different from the subset of societal groups whose support allowed the leader’s predecessor to retain and exercise power” (Mattes et al., 2016). For this study, only such leadership change in autocracies was coded as significant leadership change, since in democracies change in SOL regularly occurs without regime change. Second, the indicator for a substantial shift in regime type was operationalised using the Polity Score, an index of regime type that ranges from -10 (full autocracy) to 10 (full democracy). Specifically, cases with the change of 5 or more on the Polity Score, in either direction, compared to the previous year were coded as having a significant shift in regime type. Finally, the treatment variable of *Regime Change* was operationalised as a binary variable with the value “1” (regime change) if a country experienced either significant leadership change or a substantial shift in regime type, otherwise variable is coded as “0” (no regime change).

To capture the dynamic effect of regime change, variable *Event Time*, which presents the relative time from regime change for each country, was created. First, the year of treatment was identified for each country that had regime change in the observed period. Then, the *Event Time* variable was calculated by deducting the year of treatment from the observed year. Moreover, to handle potential noisy estimates from event times far from the regime change, this variable was binned. Periods of 5 and more years before the event were grouped into the $t=-1$ category, while periods of 12 and more years after the event were grouped into the $t=+12$ category. The category $t=-1$ serves as the reference category since data just before the event is the most relevant for examining the effect this event had on the DV.

Moderators

To test the moderating effect of domestic stability on the relationship between *Regime Change* and UNPKO Contributions, countries were grouped into three categories based on their domestic stability. The *Domestic Stability* variable is operationalised from the Political

Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism Index, which measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and politically motivated violence (World Bank, 2025a). Countries are grouped in tertiles: Low, Medium and High, based on the lagged value of this index.

To investigate the moderating effect of the type of regime transition that occurs from regime change, countries that experienced change are grouped into three categories. Categories were constructed by comparing the regime type (Democracy or Autocracy) in the year before the regime change to the regime type in the year after the regime change. Based on this comparison, countries were grouped into “Autocracy to Democracy”, “Democracy to Autocracy” and “Autocracy to Autocracy”. Never-treated countries serve as the control group in the analysis.

Control Variables

The models also include four control variables. Firstly, the existing literature suggests that the country’s wealth affects its contributions to UNPKOs (Bove & Elia, 2011). Therefore, *GDP per Capita* is included as a control variable to account for economic incentives that can drive states into contributing to UNPKOs. Low-income countries are often overrepresented in UNPKOs, since for them participation includes significant economic advantages, including reimbursements for personnel that often outweigh the costs of deployment and no-cost military training. This variable is expressed in standardised current US dollars (World Bank, 2025b). However, the logarithmically transformed version of the variable is used in the analysis to reduce skewness and allow for interpretation as percentage changes.

Military Size is another crucial variable that affects UNPKO contributions. It significantly influences the state’s capacity to contribute to missions since they can absorb personnel loss and meet the operational demands associated with troop deployment to often far-away territories (Bellamy & Williams, 2013). This variable is operationalised as military expenditure, which includes all expenditures on the armed forces in current US dollars (World Bank, 2025b). This variable is also logarithmically transformed for normalising distribution and more intuitive interpretation.

The political context in which the state operates is also important for UNPKO contributions. *Regime Type* often shapes foreign policy priorities and domestic constraints that are key factors

for making decisions on contributions (Lebovic, 2004). This variable is based on data from the Polity Score, which is an index that ranges from -10 (full autocracy) to 10 (full democracy) (Marshall & Gurr, 2020). Regime Type is a binary variable, where cases with a value of 1 or more on Polity Score were assigned value “1” (Democracy), else value “0” (Autocracy). Moreover, the variable was lagged for one year to control for political system characteristics of the state without risking endogeneity problems that would potentially occur without lagging.

Lastly, to account for the institutionalised behaviour related to PKO contributions, the model also includes lagged variables of UNPKO Contributions for one year before treatment. Similar to other policy areas, change happens less often than not. Path dependency is strong in UNPKO contributions, as countries do not make radical changes each year but tend to follow established institutionalised behaviour related to contributions (Bellamy & Williams, 2014).

5. Results

5.1. Average Effect of Regime Change on UNPKO Contributions

The first step in the analysis investigates the average effect of Regime Change on UNPKO Contributions, across all treated countries, relative to their pre-event baseline and compared to countries that did not experience regime change. Figure 1 displays the estimated coefficients for each year relative to the regime change. The inspection of pre-event coefficients shows that they all hover around zero and their confidence intervals overlap with zero. This suggests that the parallel trends assumption was not violated. In the years after regime change, however, a statistically significant positive effect emerges. While the post-event years initially suggest no statistically significant effect, at 8th year after regime change seems to positively affect UNPKO Contributions. However, the results suggest that the effect is temporary as it diminishes afterward.

Figure 1:




Table 1 presents the coefficients and standard errors for each of the time points relative to the event and control variables. These results confirm the positive, statistically significant effect of regime change several years after the event, specifically in the 8th and 9th years. In the period when the regime change happened and until 7 years after, the analysis provides no evidence that regime change produced a change in UNPKO participation count, compared to the year before the regime change, relative to countries that did not experience regime change. However, eight years after the regime change, states on average increased their UNPKO participation count by approximately 12.4%, relative to the year before the regime change and control countries, holding other factors constant ($\beta = 0.124$, $p < 0.01$). Although the effect peaked at 8th year, it was still statistically significant in 9th year when states, on average, increased their UNPKO participation count by approximately 10.0%, compared to the year before regime change, relative to countries that did not experience regime change, holding other factors constant ($\beta = 0.100$, $p < 0.05$). From year 10 onward the effect is not statistically significant anymore. While this effect at years nine and eight is not large in its overall magnitude, the statistical significance during this two-year period suggests an apparent impact of *Regime Change*.

Table 1: Event Study of The Effect of Regime Change on UNPKO Participation Count (log)

	Coefficient (Standard Error)
Time Point	
Pre-Event	
t-5	0.045 (0.046)
t-4	0.073 (0.066)
t-3	0.038 (0.057)
t-2	-0.004 (0.046)
Event & post-event	
t=0 (Regime Change)	-0.012 (0.045)
t+1	0.022 (0.046)
t+2	0.009 (0.043)
t+3	0.033 (0.046)
t+4	0.025 (0.044)
t+5	0.061 (0.039)
t+6	0.075 (0.046)
t+7	0.055 (0.045)
t+8	0.124** (0.045)
t+9	0.100* (0.045)
t+10	0.068 (0.049)

t+11	0.043 (0.053)	
t+12	0.078 (0.047)	
<hr/>		
Control Variables		
Lagged Contributions (log)	0.835*** (0.015)	
GDP per Capita (log)	0.004 (0.005)	
Military Size (log)	0.015** (0.007)	
Lagged Regime Type	0.039 (0.024)	
<hr/>		
Model Statistics		
N		2,770
Country Fixed-Effects		Yes
Year Fixed-Effects		Yes
Adjusted R2		0.926

Notes: Standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

t=-1 is the reference period for all Event Times.

These results provide some support for the hypotheses 1 and 2. Hypothesis 1 suggests that new regimes contribute more to UNPKOs in the years after the regime change. Since the model that includes *UNPKO Participation Count* as DV shows a statistically significant positive effect, this suggests that *Regime Change* increased the number of UNPKOs state contributes to. However, for the other two DVs: *Participation Dummy* and *Total Contributions*, models did not provide statistically significant results. Furthermore, for the models where the effect was significant, it appeared with delay, 7 years after regime change, and it was temporary, providing support for hypothesis 2. Overall, while analysis of the average effect did not show a significant effect of *Regime Change* for all three of the DVs, the analysis of DV *UNPKO Participation Count* suggests that after some years following regime change, for a temporary period, the state increases the number of UNPKOs it contributes to.

Control Variables


Additionally, it is worth noting that across the different models, while some of the included control variables are significant predictors for UNPKO Contributions, for others the analysis suggests no statistical significance. The control variable which seems to be the most significant predictor of UNPKO Contributions is the *Lagged Contributions* since it was consistently positive and highly significant. For instance, in the model with *UNPKO Participation Count* as DV, approximately 83.5% of the total number of UNPKO missions the state participated in was carried over to the next year, underscoring the significant path-dependency in UN peacekeeping ($\beta = 0.835$, $p < 0.001$). Furthermore, the effect of logarithmically transformed *Military Size* was also statistically significant across all models, however, the size of this effect was small. The model with *UNPKO Participation Count* as DV suggests that a 1% increase in Military Size is associated with an approximate 0.015% increase in UNPKO Participation Count ($\beta = 0.015$, $p < 0.01$). On the contrary, the control variables of logarithmically transformed GDP per Capita and Lagged Regime Type are not statistically significant in the analysed models.

5.2. Moderating Effect of Domestic Stability

This next section of the analysis explored whether the effect of *Regime Change* on UNPKO Contributions is moderated by *Domestic Stability*. This is done by dividing the sample into three subgroups based on their levels of domestic stability: High, Medium and Low. The dynamic effect of regime change on UNPKO Contributions was estimated for each subgroup relative to the baseline contribution in the year before the regime change. The results are based on the sample of 2,244 country-year cases, since about 19% of the sample was lost due to data missingness for the *Domestic Stability* variable.

Figure 2 shows the distribution of coefficients for each of the three subgroups relative to one year before regime change for the DV *UNPKO Participation Count*. The figure suggests that the parallel trends assumption is reasonably met as all pre-event coefficients hover around zero and all the confidence intervals cross zero.

Figure 2:



The inspection of post-event trends shows strong evidence of heterogeneity. States in Low and Medium Stability subgroups show no statistically significant effect of *Regime Change* in the post-event period as their confidence intervals constantly cross the reference line. Such results suggest that regime change does not affect UNPKO Contributions in states with Low and Medium *Domestic Stability*. On the contrary, the coefficient and the confidence intervals of the High Stability group show evidence of a strong and statistically significant effect in the period from 7 years until 10 years after regime change. The difference between the three subgroups is also supported by Wald tests. This joint test for all 17 estimated time points very large and statistically significant distinction of coefficients for the High Stability group from the Low Stability group ($F = 76.1, p < 0.001$). The results are very similar for comparing the High Stability to Medium Stability Group, while the distinction between coefficients for Medium and Low Stability is not significant. These results reveal that *Domestic Stability* is an important moderator in this context, as the analysis suggests that regime change has a positive effect on *UNPKO Participation Count* only in states that are domestically stable.

Table 2 presents the coefficients and standard errors for each time point and control variables. Looking at the coefficients for the High Stability group, the delayed effect of regime change appears at its peak, at 7 years after regime change, driving an approximate 155.3% increase in UNPKO Participation Count ($\beta = 0.938$, $p < 0.001$). At 8 years after the event, the effect size is reduced to an approximate 74.5% increase in UNPKO Participation Count ($\beta = 0.557$, $p < 0.01$). The effect then continues to gradually decrease in size and statistical significance until it is no longer statistically significant from 11 years after regime change onward.

Table 2: Event Study of The Effect of Regime Change on UNPKO Participation Count (log), Moderated by Domestic Stability

	Low Stability	Medium Stability	High Stability
Time Point			
Pre-Event			
t-5 (binned)	0.140* (0.077)	(n.a.)	-0.189 (0.198)
t-4	0.117 (0.088)	(n.a.)	-0.230 (0.199)
t-3	0.063 (0.076)	(n.a.)	-0.243 (0.208)
t-2	0.070 (0.073)	0.183 (0.118)	-0.250 (0.195)
Event & Post-Event			
t=0 (Regime Change)	-0.014 (0.083)	0.181 (0.124)	-0.225 (0.197)
t+1	0.040 (0.071)	(n.a.)	-0.208 (0.193)
t+2	0.028 (0.079)	(n.a.)	-0.232 (0.191)
t+3	-0.063 (0.083)	0.152 (0.107)	-0.202 (0.193)
t+4	-0.027 (0.083)	0.165 (0.169)	-0.242 (0.199)
t+5	-0.039 (0.085)	-0.158 (0.119)	-0.246 (0.193)
t+6	-0.083	-0.163	0.297

	(0.100)	(0.188)	(0.379)
t+7	-0.129	-0.224	0.938***
	(0.126)	(0.207)	(0.207)
t+8	-0.094	-0.049	0.557**
	(0.129)	(0.108)	(0.223)
t+9	-0.311	0.007	0.466**
	(0.195)	(0.113)	(0.220)
t+10	-0.043	-0.147	0.428*
	(0.155)	(0.116)	(0.230)
t+11	-0.191	-0.285	-0.200
	(0.141)	(0.218)	(0.245)
t+12 (binned)	-0.189	-0.240	-0.288
	(0.138)	(0.145)	(0.305)
<hr/>			
Control Variables	(Coefficients from single interaction model)		
<hr/>			
Lagged Contributions (log)	0.646***		
	(0.057)		
GDP per Capita (log)	-0.000		
	(0.011)		
Military Size (log)	0.025*		
	(0.018)		
Lagged Regime Type	-0.052		
	(0.059)		
<hr/>			
Model Statistics			
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N	2,244		
Country Fixed-Effects	Yes		
Year Fixed-Effects	Yes		
Adj. R2	0.924		
<hr/>			

Notes: Standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

t=-1 is the reference period for all Event Times. (n.a.) indicates the coefficient for that specific group/time combination was not estimated in the model output (due to no observations).

While Table 2 shows that the coefficients for a few time points in the Medium Stability group are missing due to a lack of data for these specific time-country combinations, this does not invalidate the pattern observed using coefficients that were estimated. More importantly, the complete and clear patterns of High and Low Stability groups show a clear contrast between the two groups, which forms the primary evidence for the moderating effect of *Domestic*

Stability. Overall, the analysis provides evidence in support of hypothesis 3 which expects that the effect of *Regime Change* on UNPKO Contributions is stronger in states with high domestic stability. However, contrary to what the hypothesis expected, regime change seems to not affect UNPKO Contributions in states with Low and Medium Stability. The effect, therefore, seems to be conditional on the stability of the state in which regime change occurs.

Furthermore, the models that account for the moderating effect of *Domestic Stability* also provide evidence that strengthens support for hypotheses 1 and 2. Firstly, in addition to domestic stability being a significant moderator for DV *UNPKO Participation Count*, dividing the sample into tertiles based on domestic stability also suggests that *Regime Change* affects *UNPKO Contributions Size*, contrary to what the average effect model showed. This suggests that the average effect model was misleading and that, by being put in the same sample, states with Low and Medium stability masked the positive and significant effect of *Regime Change* in states with High Stability. However, while the effects of Regime Change on both *UNPKO Participation Count* and *UNPKO Contributions Size* DVs were statistically significant, the effect remained insignificant for *UNPKO Participation Dummy*. Secondly, after including the Domestic Stability moderator in the models the effect size of *Regime Change* substantially increased. When comparing the time periods in which the effect peaked in the average effect model with the model that includes the *Domestic Stability* moderator, the former estimates a 12.4% increase in *UNPKO Participation Count*, while the latter estimates a 155.3% increase, compared to one year before regime change. This is a substantial increase in the effect size. Therefore, accounting for the moderating effect of *Domestic Stability* not only provides evidence of the conditionality of the main effect, which was expected by hypothesis 3 but also provides stronger support for hypotheses 1 and 2.


5.3. Moderating Effect of Regime Transition Type

The last part of the analysis explored if the effect of *Regime Change* on UNPKO Contributions is moderated by *Regime Transition Type*. For this the sample was divided into three subgroups based on the type of regime transition that occurred with regime change: “Autocracy to Democracy”, “Democracy to Autocracy” and no transition “Autocracy to Autocracy”. Category “Democracy to Democracy” was not included in the analysis because in the observed period regime change occurred only in two democracies that stayed democracies after regime

change, therefore an accurate estimate for this group could not be calculated. Compared to the sample in the average effect model, the sample for this model is reduced by around 17% due to data missingness for the Regime Transition Type variable. The sample for this part of the analysis is 2,301 country-year cases.

Figure 4 shows the comparative dynamic effect of *Regime Change* on the *UNPKO Participation Count* for three *Regime Transition Type* subgroups. The inspection of pre-treatment reveals that the coefficients for all three groups are situated around zero and their confidence intervals consistently cross zero. This suggests that the assumption of parallel trends was not violated.

Figure 4:



Furthermore, the inspection of post-event trends provides evidence in support of hypothesis 4. The coefficients in post-event years for all three subgroups are relatively similar and their confidence intervals consistently cross each other, suggesting that *Regime Transition Type* is not a significant moderator. This finding is supported by Wald tests, which suggest that the

differences of estimates between the three groups are not statistically significant. Regarding the main effect of *Regime Change* on all three subgroups, although the confidence intervals marginally cross zero for year 8 in this model, this is due to the somewhat reduced sample size compared to the main average effect model and does not invalidate the effect of regime change on UNPKO Contributions suggested by previous models. Moreover, the evidence is very similar for the other two DVs: *UNPKO Contribution Size* and *UNPKO Participation Dummy*, adding to the robustness of this finding. Overall, the evidence suggests that the *Regime Transition Type* does not lead to different paths regarding UNPKO Contributions following regime change.

6. Discussion

6.1. Interpretation of Results

The results of the average effect model, with all countries pooled in a single sample, suggest that regime change has a positive effect on the UNPKO Participation Count. This is in line with the formulated expectations based joint on product model of peacekeeping (Sandler, 2017) and theories of international legitimacy (Victor, 2010; Levin, 2023). Furthermore, this effect was found to be delayed and temporary. First, while the effect was not statistically significant in the years immediately after regime change, from the 8th year the analysis shows results that are statistically distinguishable from zero. This delay is potentially caused by the need for internal consolidation that all new regimes face. As the new regimes often suppress the institutions and policies set up by the previous regime, it often takes time to create new institutions, effectively collect and allocate financial resources, train or manage human resources and formulate policy (Paris, 2009). Therefore, new regimes often need some time to build up the capacity needed to contribute to UNPKOs, which explains the delay in the main effect. Second, while the effect peaks in the 8th and 9th year after regime change, by year 10 the effect is no longer statistically significant. The temporary nature of the effect might be explained by the acute need for legitimation after regime change. As international and domestic audiences are most interested in observing the behaviour of a new regime right after the new regime seizes power, the pressures for legitimation are often most intense in the several years

after regime change (Beetham, 2012). Therefore, there seems to be a narrow window of opportunity after regime change for states to use UN peacekeeping contributions as “legitimation currency”. As sustaining the increased levels of UNPKO contributions is costly, without the need or opportunity to secure the private benefit of legitimation through UNPKO contributions, states might return to pre-regime change levels of contributions, determined by more structural factors. Overall, the average effect model showed that regime change is expected to increase the *UNPKO Participation Count*, although with a delay and temporarily.

The following models that account for the moderating effect of domestic stability revealed that the average effect models, however, mask significant heterogeneity. Regime change has a significantly different effect on UNPKO contributions depending on the level of state’s domestic stability, as the average effect is found to be driven entirely by the new regimes with high domestic stability. For highly stable states, regime change drives a large and statistically significant increase in UNPKO contributions from the 7th until the 10th year after the event. Conversely, countries with low and medium stability that experienced regime change showed no statistically significant change in UNPKO contributions. These findings strongly support the expectation that domestic stability is a crucial moderator for the main effect of regime change. These findings are additionally in line with the broader literature on state capacity, emphasizing the inability of the state to dedicate resources and attention to foreign policy goals, considering more immediate domestic threat to regime survival (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). While the literature on UNPKO contributions recognises the importance of state capacity factors such as military size (Bove & Eilia, 2011; Uzonyi, 2015), this analysis provides strong evidence that more attention should be paid to domestic stability in the context of capacity. Domestic stability is, therefore, a crucial moderator for the effect of regime change on UNPKO contributions.

Lastly, the models that included regime transition type as a potentially significant moderator did not show any statistically significant difference between the three subgroups. This evidence suggests that whether regime change is accompanied by autocratisation, democratisation or no transition in regime type, makes no difference for changes in UNPKO contributions that follow. This evidence is informative in two ways. First, it is in line with the broader literature on the effect of democracy on UNPKO contributions, which has in recent years moved away from the assumption that democracies contribute more to UN peacekeeping (Duursma & Gledhill, 2019). Second, specifically in the context of how regime change affects UNPKO contributions, the dominant assumption in the literature suggests that only new democracies increase their

UNPKO contributions following transition (Passmore, 2022). However, this analysis conducts the first large-N comparison and finds no evidence that regime transition type is a significant moderating factor. Therefore, the analysis suggests new regimes contribute more to UNPKOs regardless of regime transition type.

Finally, while the analysis found evidence that regime change increases DVs *UNPKO Participation Count* and *UNPKO Total Contributions*, the analysis provides no evidence that regime change affects the third DV, *UNPKO Participation Dummy*. This suggests that while regime change can increase the number of UN peacekeeping missions the state contributes to and the number of personnel they contribute, it does not affect the country's decision to start contributing to peacekeeping if it did not contribute before regime change nor to pull out of UNPKO completely if it was contributing before regime change. This is potentially due to high political, financial and administrative barriers to contributing to UN peacekeeping. Such decision is often based on long-term fundamental foreign policy, established alliances and capacity and thus less receptive to change by regime change (Bellamy & Williams, 2013). Instead, for the states that already participate in UN peacekeeping, making changes to the intensity of existing contributions seems to be more responsive to the immediate effect of regime change. These findings are consistent with the existing literature, which suggests that the decision to contribute and the decision on contribution levels concern two different decision-making processes and are influenced by different factors (Bove & Eilia, 2011; Uzonyi, 2015).

6.2. Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research

Despite the insights this study provides into the complex and dynamic effect of regime change on UNPKO contributions, certain limitations need to be addressed. Firstly, while the dynamic DiD method is in many ways suitable for obtaining robust and nuanced findings for this study, one downside is that it cannot properly address multiple regime changes in a single country over the observed period. Therefore, if a country experienced more than one regime change, the methodology employed in this study focuses only on the first regime change. This should not be a major issue given that there were only 18 countries in the observed period that experienced more than one regime change. However, such cases could involve more complex

effects than were captured by this study. It would, therefore, be beneficial for future research to employ a method that could capture the dynamics of repeated treatment.

Secondly, it is important to note that the reduced sample when accounting for *Domestic Stability* and *Regime Transition Type* moderators, compared to the average effect models, could potentially bias the findings. Since the samples were reduced due to data unavailability of the two moderating variables, if the missing data is not random it could distort the estimated effects. While further inspection of data revealed no clear pattern in the cases with the missing data that would suggest a particular bias, further research could benefit from more complete data on these two variables for testing the robustness of these results.

Lastly, while this study theorises that the increase in UNPKO contributions driven by regime change occurs as new regimes leverage UNPKO contributions as “legitimation currency” and the findings are consistent with this, further research should attempt to test this mechanism more directly. For instance, future studies could test whether UNPKO contributions significantly increase legitimacy of new regimes. Additionally, exploring potential alternative drivers for increasing UNPKO contributions in new regimes such as normative commitments of new leadership or purely domestic considerations could be beneficial, as more qualitative inquiries could potentially provide more detailed insight into the process of decision-making regarding UNPKO contributions in a post-regime change context.

7. Conclusion

The main purpose of this paper was to investigate the effect of regime change on UNPKO contributions and to explore how this effect is conditioned by domestic stability and regime transition type. To empirically test this, a dynamic DiD research design was employed on a panel dataset from 1996 until 2018. The overall results suggest that holding everything else constant, countries that experience regime change substantially increase the number of UNPKOs they contribute to and the number of personnel they contribute to UNPKOs. Importantly, this effect is both delayed and temporary as it seems to appear 7 years after regime change and gradually diminish over time. Moreover, even though the existing literature expected regime change to increase UNPKO contributions only in states that democratised in

the process, this paper finds no evidence that the effect of regime change is conditioned by regime transition type. Instead, what seems to be a crucial moderating factor is domestic stability, as only new regimes with high stability possess the capacity to increase their contributions.

This study offers valuable insights to policymakers. International actors such as the UN looking for short-term personnel contributions for carrying out PKOs could turn their attention to new regimes that are potentially willing to increase their contributions in an effort to gain legitimacy. However, emphasis should be placed on new regimes that operate in stable domestic environments, as this appears to be a crucial prerequisite for new regimes' ability to effectively translate legitimation-seeking aspirations into concrete UNPKO contributions. Additionally, this study emphasises the importance of domestic stability for the provision of public goods. While it is widely acknowledged that negative consequences of domestic instability on state capacity impede the provision of public goods domestically (Besley & Persson, 2009), this study highlights that domestic stability is crucial for enabling the state to contribute to global public goods, particularly peacekeeping. Therefore, in the context of new regimes, domestic stability emerges as a crucial factor not only for effective internal governance but also for international engagement and contributions to global governance.

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