# Leading in the Gray: UN Peacekeeping and Civil-Military Relations in Rwanda and Angola

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**Introduction**

The United Nations holds the unenviable position of having perhaps the most important mission of humanity and often not enough resources to accomplish it. Founded on the belief that international peace could be achieved through the cooperation of the world's governments, the UN Security Council has been handed responsibility for some of the most intractable conflicts around the world. From Rwanda to Bosnia and beyond, the most tangible tool and maybe the most recognizable manifestation of this global assembly is the Blue Helmet of the UN Peacekeeper.

UN Peacekeeping Operations, hereafter UNPKO, have attracted the world's hopes and critiques. They are typically *ad hoc* and reactive: the Security Council solicits military units from member states under the authority of the Secretary-General, and this force is given a mandate to mediate a crisis between or within states. These UNPKO are often assigned mandates that require an exceptional leader, able to manage technical expertise for election monitoring or moral courage for crimes against humanity, to name just two examples. Although the composition of UNPKO has varied over time and between missions, there has been one constant: they rely on the cooperation of leaders and units assembled from around the world, often on short notice, and usually operating in unfamiliar environments. Clearly, there are many structural challenges within UNPKO beyond their utopian mission of achieving international peace. The importance of the UN mission, however, demands that the challenges in UNPKO be studied. There is a self-evident moral imperative that resources spent on the prevention of violations of human rights, for example, are resources well spent. There is one structural challenge in UNPKO that has been understudied: civil-military relations.

On the surface, there are characteristics of UNPKO that indicate certain aspects of civil-military relations may function differently than in a typical, national context, and so deserve closer attention. The UN has no final authority to punish errant soldiers, as a typical civilian government might; short of charges before the International Court of Justice, these soldiers are more likely to be handled by their own government at home. Instead of a national legislature, the process to change the mission or even secure funding of UN peacekeepers requires debate at the highest level of international politics. These examples show the potential in UNPKO for study as a unique civil-military space. The operations charged with the protection of human rights should

be executed as well as possible; this execution relies on a rigorous understanding of the many moving parts within such operations.

**Agenda**

First, the author will outline the development of UNPKO and their fundamental principles. This will justify the focus on the 1990s, post-Cold War era of UN peacekeeping. A literature review of research on UN peacekeeping will reveal that most authors take a statist or institutionalist stance to explain the UN's ability to undertake effective peace operations. In other words, the prevailing perspectives explain peace operations through the influence of member states and/or the UN Secretariat. Instead, this thesis will focus on the senior decision-makers "on the ground," namely the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (the chief civilian officer of the operation) and the Force Commander or Chief Military Observer (the top military officer). This thesis will compare civil-military relationships between these two leaders in the 1994 United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) with the 1991-1997 United Nations Angola Verification Mission II/III (UNAVEM II/III), respectively. The research question at the heart of this thesis is: what factors determine the health of civil-military relationships in UN peacekeeping operations?

To answer this question, this thesis will conduct a comparative qualitative case study based on one of the most prominent theorists in the field of civil-military relations, Peter Feaver's "agency theory." This theory will structure the analysis of archival primary source research, combined with recent interviews conducted with the Force Commander of UNAMIR, Roméo Dallaire.[1] This analysis will enable the author to compare the respective relationships of these two missions, considering how their differences influenced the mission outcomes. The thesis will conclude with a series of reflections. First, on how civil-military relations appeared and impacted UNPKO in Rwanda and Angola. Then, this thesis will argue for the exploration of a theoretical gap at the intersection of peacekeeping and civil-military studies.

[1] Cameron G. Thies, "A Pragmatic Guide to Qualitative Historical Analysis in the Study of International Relations," *International Studies Perspectives* 3, no. 4 (November 2002): 351–72.

**Methodology**

Rwanda and Angola provide a compelling pair of case studies to study civil-military dynamics in UNPKO. Rwanda was an extreme case of the ethical questions of democratic civil-military norms. The Force Commander, General Dallaire, warned his civilian superiors of an imminent genocide but was repeatedly held back from intervention. UNAMIR stalled under operational frictions and a split between Dallaire and his SRSG, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh. As the history will show, this rift worsened to open disobedience from the Force Commander – directed to the moral end of protecting innocent lives. When faced with genocide and given a lawful order to withdraw his troops, Dallaire refused and took matters into his own hands. Reflecting later, Dallaire said he wasn't thinking of how he may be punished for disobeying a lawful order, only following the instinct produced by his "ethical framework and values" from his military and personal background.[2] Should Dallaire have not had the autonomy to deny his civilian chiefs and intervene in a crime against humanity? UNAMIR exemplifies the most difficult questions at the heart of democratic civil-military norms.

A comparative case study is most fruitful when the two cases at hand are expected to be substantively different in the relevant variable. UNAMIR had a dysfunctional, or at least a difficult, civil-military relationship. The record on UNAVEM, on the other hand, has not revealed a significant civil-military friction. Despite facing some of the same operational obstacles as in Rwanda, the UNAVEM SRSGs Anstee and Beye were able to command their missions. As with any two UNPKO missions, there will inevitably be differences. However, the two missions invoked many of the same regional dynamics; both missions suffered from weak mandates and insufficient resources; and they both occurred under Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and during the historical moment of post-Cold War UNPKO expansion. UNAVEM is the most comparable UN mission to UNAMIR that differs in its senior civil-military relationship and therefore is the most appropriate second case study in this comparative pair.

*Feaver's Agency Theory*

[2] Romeo Dallaire, "When Humanity Fails," *Manitoba Law Journal* 37, no. 1 (2013): 16.

To structure the comparative analysis of the civil-military dynamics in UNAVEM and UNAMIR, this thesis takes Peter Feaver's "agency theory" of civil-military relations. A thorough review of the field of civil-military literature is beyond the scope of this study, but a brief explanation of the central themes therein will justify the following methodological approach.

Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* has structured the civil-military theoretical paradigm since its publication in the 1950s, and his name remains one of the most recognizable even to those outside of his academic field. The most significant challenger to Huntington's work was Morris Janowitz, whose central claim was that the civilian and military spheres were converging, not remaining distinct. Where Huntington structurally analyzed democratic institutions, Janowitz adopted a sociological lens, finding similarities between the military and civilian cultural roles. At the turn of the century, Feaver found neither Huntington nor Janowitz adequately analyzed "the day-to-day political management" of the military. To fill this gap, in 2003, Feaver published his alternative model.[3]

In *Armed Servants*, Feaver introduced the "agency theory" of civil-military relations. Inspired by the field of economics' principal-agent literature, Feaver built from the assumptions that (1) the civilian principal contracts the military agent to use force in their defense; that (2) the civilian principal wants to maximize military efficiency while minimizing the dangers of delegation; and that (3) the military agent has its own preferences for what should be done, and that these do not necessarily align with the principal. The principal has two types of goals for this civil-military arrangement: functional and relational. The functional goals include whether the military is doing what the civilian has asked it to do; whether the military is working to their fullest extent towards this; and whether the military is competent to fulfill the civilian's wishes. The relational goals include whether the civilian is making substantive key policy decisions; whether the civilian determines which decisions are delegated, and which are maintained at their level; and whether the military is avoiding behavior that undermines civilian supremacy, even if such behavior would fulfill the civilian's functional goals. These are the "success criteria" for a democratic civil-military relationship.[4]

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[3] Peter Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 8–10.

[4] Feaver, 54–62.

Feaver applied his agency theory in the form of a "war game," in which the civilian principal and military agent have respective ends and means. The civilian's interests are captured in the above functional and relational goals. Feaver assumed the military agent to have three sets of preferences: regarding policy, they want to minimize needless casualties and prefer offensive/preventative action; from an impulse of honor or respect, the military subordinates to the civilian to live up to norms of democratic legitimacy; and the military wants to minimize civilian interference or oversight. The civilian principal has two sets of actions through which to manage the principal-agent relationship: oversight and punishment. In brief, Feaver's list of oversight mechanisms included (in ascending order of intrusiveness): contract incentives (exchanging autonomy for obedience); screening and selection; "fire alarms" (third party reporters); institutional checks (like a civilian secretariat); "police patrols" (active monitoring and investigations); and most intrusively, revising the delegation (when the civilian overrides the existing agreement to take a typically military decision). Feaver's list of civilian punishment mechanisms included (also in order of assertive authority): restrictive monitoring (such as audits); budget cuts; forced retirement or discharge without benefits; the military justice system; and extralegal action, ranging from verbal rebuke to Stalinist purges. In Feaver's strategic, hierarchical interaction of civil-military relations, the "game" is therefore as follows: the civilian principal sets the conditions for its contract, the military decides whether to "work" or "shirk," and the civilian principal responds by adjusting its monitors and/or applying its punishments.[5]

Feaver's agency theory is particularly well-suited for the study of civil-military dynamics in UNPKO. The guiding question in this study is one of military autonomy. UN peacekeepers operate far from headquarters in New York, and even within missions peacekeepers must often disperse. Agency theory is interested in how the civilian principal balances this autonomy without losing control. However, this study is also interested not just in material but in ethical considerations – is civilian control of the military desirable, specifically in the case of UNPKO? Feaver asked the same question, structuring agency theory to include both the institutional lens of Huntington and the sociological-normative lens of Janowitz.

To characterize and then compare the civil-military relationships between the SRSG and FC/CMO in UNAMIR and UNAVEM, respectively, this study will rely on Feaver's agency

[5] Feaver, 75–96.

theory. The empirical research will enable the assessment of how well each mission's chief civil-military relationship met Feaver's functional and relational goals. Where the research exposes that one of these goals was not met, this study will use Feaver's civilian and military preferences to explain why the military component did not align its actions with the civilian principal. Then, Feaver's list of civilian monitoring and punishment mechanisms will structure an analysis of the response of the civilian principal to an uncooperative military agent. This process will result in the explanation of the civil-military relationships at the heads of UNAMIR and UNAVEM. The study will conclude by comparing the two relationships and identifying which key differences resulted in the dysfunctional relationship of UNAMIR and the successful relationship of UNAVEM.

**Literature Review**

The United Nations Security Council is authorized to settle disputes between parties that endanger international peace under Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter.[6] A brief history of the development of these "peacekeeping missions" will demonstrate why the 1990s are an appropriate period of focus. "Peace operations" are deployed to aid some stage of conflict resolution, typically mediation, implementation, and/or enforcement.[7] UNPKO were heavily defined by the dynamics of the Cold War. Most conflicts implicated the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union, each holding a veto on UNSC resolutions. Despite many vetoed operations, early UNPKO began to establish the norms of what would be called "classical peacekeeping."[8]

Classical peacekeeping enshrined three norms of UNPKO. Dating back to the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) deployed by Secretary-General Hammarskjöld to address the 1956 Suez Crisis, these principles sought to protect the young UN from criticism of bias and/or neo-imperialism. The norms of classical peacekeeping are: (1) consent of the parties; (2)

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[6] "United Nations Charter" (United Nations, 1945), https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text.

[7] Joachim A. Koops et al., eds., *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 13.

[8] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping* (New York, NY: United Nations, 1992).

impartiality; and (3) use of force only in cases of self-defense, never as an offensive military operation.[9] The website for UN Peacekeeping still lists these principles as the bedrock of UNPKO today.[10] Classical peacekeeping mostly intervened between sovereign states, building space for a political settlement between two organized military forces that had declared a ceasefire and expressed a mutual interest in peace.[11]

After the end of the Cold War, UNPKO no longer had to survive the veto bottleneck. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali identified in his 1992 *Agenda for Peace* that the UN stood at a watershed moment: the new age of peacekeeping reached "matters beyond military threats" to include famine, disease, poverty, and more.[12] The UN Secretariat met this new age with a quantitative and qualitative swell in UNPKO. No longer delimited competitions between two sovereign militaries, the end of the 20th century saw a rise in civil wars and ethnic conflicts with terrible consequences. By 1990, almost 90 percent of war-related deaths were civilians.[13] For UNPKO, the 1990s was a time of experimentation and challenge, as norms of classical peacekeeping confronted new battlefields.

Faced with new multidimensional demands and morally wrought conflict environments, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali built a new bureaucracy. Before, UNPKO were centrally handled by a small office answerable directly to the Secretary-General. In 1992, Boutros-Ghali formed the Department of Political Affairs (the "political" arm) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (the "operational" arm), dually responsible for UNPKO.[14] The Cold War "classical peacekeeping" missions were primarily composed of and led by military figures (alternatively called Force Commanders, FCs; or Chief Military Observers, CMOs). Boutros-

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[9] Silke Weinlich, *The UN Secretariat's Influence on the Evolution of Peacekeeping: The Internationalization of Security Politics* (Basingstoke New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 20, https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137309358.

[10] United Nations, "Principles of Peacekeeping," United Nations Peacekeeping, n.d., https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping.

[11] Weinlich, *The UN Secretariat's Influence on the Evolution of Peacekeeping*, 23.

[12] Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping*, 7.

[13] Dennis Jett, "Why Peacekeeping Fails," *Middle East Policy* 26, no. 1 (Spring 2019): 92.

[14] Herman Salton, *Dangerous Diplomacy: Bureaucracy, Power Politics, and the Role of the UN Secretariat in Rwanda* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 4–5.

Ghali's missions often included a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), a civilian chief of mission that reported to him.[15] These rapid transformations and expansions in UNPKO make the 1990s a favored time for studies of the mechanics of peacekeeping operations. What does existing literature say about the civil-military dynamic of the leaders of these UNPKO at this pivotal moment?

Much of the scholarly literature has explained the dynamics of UNPKO not through civil-military relations perspectives, but through structural analysis of the UN writ large. Generally, scholars conducting structural analysis of UNPKO may be divided into three camps: the first contends that UNPKO are subordinate to state influence; the second, that UNPKO outcomes are determined by structural incapabilities of the UN; and the third, that UNPKO are decided by the UN's search for agency in international politics. Those scholars that have recently addressed civil-military relations in UNPKO are relatively few, and they have focused on the impact of UNPKO on the civil-military norms of participating peacekeeping units and their political systems at home.

Some scholars have taken a state-first approach to explaining UNPKO. A case study exemplifying this perspective is the UN Protection Force deployed to prevent ethnic cleansing during the 1992-1995 Bosnian War. Burg and Shoup's seminal 1999 work on the international response to the Bosnian Genocide largely sidelined the UN as a responsible actor. Instead, these scholars assigned blame to the national policymakers, without whom a "political-military solution" capable of ending the violence was impossible. UNPROFOR, to Burg and Shoup, delayed the states' use of direct force.[16] Another scholar in this category is Honig, who examined the failure of UN Safe Zones in Bosnia. In his analysis, UN strategies failed due to the reluctance of states to use force; without their support, the UNPROFOR was left handicapped.[17] The criticism that state support is the most important variable has echoed in both Rwanda and Angola. However, focusing on the member states over the UN limits understanding of the influence of the UN Secretariat or the Security Council.

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[15] Weinlich, *The UN Secretariat's Influence on the Evolution of Peacekeeping*, 24.

[16] Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention* (Armonk (N.-Y.) London: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), 398–404.

[17] Jan Willem Honig, "Avoiding War, Inviting Defeat: The Srebrenica Crisis, July 1995," *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management* 9, no. 4 (2001): 200–210.

A second group of scholars agrees that the UN lacks the power to manage UNPKO but considers internal or structural limitations to be more explanatory. Chesterman's 2007 history of UN Secretaries-General named them both the "world's diplomat" and "commander-in-chief" of peacekeepers, yet these leaders hold few formal powers and must court the powerful states. These authors broadly agreed that the position's most certain impact was as a norm entrepreneur and secondarily as leader of the Secretariat.[18] The latter is where the UNSG might drive UNPKO, but here returns the idea of UN structural incapacity. Blume et al. considered the Secretariat to be managerially short-changed by its political nature: in their analysis, UNPKO are conducted according to a template, within a bureaucracy that worsens resource limitations.[19] The bureaucratic element is frequently cited as an aggravating factor in the problems faced by UNPKO. Salton's 2017 history of the Rwandan Genocide laid blamed a divided UN Secretariat. Salton held that Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's DPA and DPKO were riven by a power struggle tied to Boutros-Ghali's suspicions of the influence of the uncontested United States over the DPKO.[20]

Scholars have paid much attention to the structural limitations of UNPKO. In addition to his bureaucratic theory, Salton examined the division of peacekeeping missions into "operational" and "political" departments as symptomatic of a conceptual confusion between peacekeeping and peacebuilding.[21] In the multidimensional conflicts of the 1990s, the line between war and peace was often blurred.[22] Thakur, writing at this time of ill-fated UN operations, considered the failure of the UN in Somalia to exemplify another aspect of conceptual confusion in UNPKO. Thakur believed that UNOSOM demonstrated the problems of using a "peacekeeping by consent" mission for more aggressive "peace enforcement," worried it

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[18] Simon Chesterman, ed., *Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 4–12.

[19] Till Blume et al., eds., *The Management of UN Peacekeeping: Coordination, Learning, and Leadership in Peace Operations*, A Project of the International Peace Institute (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2022), 2–3, https://doi.org/10.1515/9781626376014.

[20] Salton, *Dangerous Diplomacy*, 3–4.

[21] Salton, 4.

[22] Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping*, 32.

would erode the tenuous credentials of this valuable organization.[23] Many skeptics would say that the successfulness of "classical peacekeeping" was never the point. Dennis Jett, career US ambassador, that the UN Charter was designed to halt interstate wars of territorial conquest – similar to Weinlich above – and that its growing insufficiencies in the face of complex intrastate wars were ignored by policymakers that wanted a conveniently weak scapegoat.[24] In the opinion of this second group of scholars, the critical lesson of UNPKO is that, in their current articulation, they (and/or their parent organization) are structurally handicapped.

There is a third group of scholars that believed UNPKO are important measures for the UN to achieve agency as an international actor. Newman discussed UNPKO as both a symptom and a driver of UN independence, determined in large part by the Secretary-General. More "activist" Secretaries-General like Hammarskjöld, who drew the criticism that he was operating "his own army," used UNPKO to "challenge national sovereignty."[25] Hall and Woods maintained this focus on the Secretary-General in their article on the role of executive leaders in international organizations. Although bounded by legal-political, resource, and bureaucratic constraints, Hall and Woods found that certain UN Secretaries-General were able to navigate around those obstacles to shape the Secretariat and UNPKO.[26]

Other scholars within this third group have focused on the autonomy of peacekeepers themselves. To them, UNPKO leadership has operated with unique autonomy due to the Secretary-General pursuing greater latitude for the UN beyond its member states' restrictions. Weinlich studied the evolution of peacekeeping from 1989-2014, particularly the failures of key UNPKO in the early 1990s. Responding to these failures, the Secretariat pushed institutional review to professionalize peacekeeping and to preserve the legitimacy (and therefore survival) of the UN in a unipolar world order.[27] Drohan found this philosophy at the inception of UNPKO.

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[23] Ramesh Thakur, "From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The UN Operation in Somalia," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 32, no. 3 (1994): 387–90.

[24] Jett, "Why Peacekeeping Fails," 90–93.

[25] Koops et al., *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, 176, 180-82.

[26] Nina Hall and Ngaire Woods, "Theorizing the Role of Executive Heads in International Organizations," *European Journal of International Relations* 24, no. 4 (December 2018): 865–86.

[27] Weinlich, *The Un Secretariat's Influence on the Evolution of Peacekeeping*, 27–29, 31-37.

Focusing on Hammarskjöld's "Summary Study" reporting on the UNEF's experiences, Drohan found that Hammarskjöld did not formalize the principles that later scholars retrospectively considered the inviolable tenets of "classical" or "traditional peacekeeping." Instead, UNPKO were designed to be *ad hoc* to maximize the Secretariat's independence in the face of Cold War competition.[28] Drohan later expanded on this study of UNPKO as a long-term push for UN Secretariat autonomy, theorizing a symbiotic relationship between US military assistance and the emerging "U.N. military apparatus" that powered UNPKO during the Cold War.[29] The above scholars considered UNPKO the UN Secretariat's lever for international autonomy. In this reading, the peacekeepers are encouraged to operate with wide latitude and flexibility, because excessive standardization historically meant integration with the military force of one superpower or another.

There is clearly a rich scholarly body of work on the development and characteristics of UNPKO. However, the number of scholars studying the nexus of civil-military relations and UNPKO is much smaller, developing as its own sub-field only recently. Sotomayor's 2014 *The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper* sought to debunk the assumption that the militaries of developing countries (increasingly the majority contributors of troops to UNPKO) adopt democratic civil-military values during their service as peacekeeping contingents. Focusing on the militaries of Latin American countries, Sotomayor argued that such organizational reform "at home" is rare and relies on a military open to the potential changes offered by peacekeeping socialization.[30] Zaman and Biswas studied Bangladesh's participation in UNPKO, concluding that this involvement has contributed to democratic domestic civil-military reform.[31] Adhikari and Albrecht respectively published similar articles on the impacts of international peacekeeping on domestic civil-military relations. Adhikari focused on Nepal, concluding that despite the UN's

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[28] Brian Drohan, "Retaining Flexibility: Dag Hammarskjöld, the 1958 Summary Study, and the History of UN Peacekeeping," *Global Governance* 29 (2023): 119–35.

[29] Brian Drohan, "U.S. Military Humanitarianism and the United Nations," *Modern American History* 7 (2024): 103–8.

[30] Arturo C. Sotomayor, *The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper: Civil-Military Relations and the United Nations* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014).

[31] Rashed Uz Zaman and Niloy Ranjan Biswas, "Bangladesh's Participation in UN Peacekeeping Missions and Challenges for Civil-Military Relations: A Case for Concordance Theory," *International Peacekeeping* 21, no. 3 (2014): 324–44.

lack of prioritizing respect for civilian supremacy in the contributing countries, UNPKO may have variable impacts on the role of the military in domestic politics. For example, the participation in UNPKO offered the Nepal Army a chance at international legitimation amidst chaotic political transformations in Nepal.[32] Albrecht studied Tunisia as a case study of UNPKO as "a form of diversionary foreign policy making," linking this process to domestic civil-military relations. Albrecht found that sending officers abroad obstructs coup attempts, subsidizes military budgets, and can contribute to the corporatization and depoliticization of the national officer corps.[33] The scholars studying UNPKO as a place for civil-military transformation have focused on the potential impact on the peacekeeping units themselves and/or their domestic politics.

This literature review of UNPKO has revealed a gap in the field of study. Most scholars have not explicitly addressed civil-military relations in UNPKO. Instead, many have taken a larger perspective of the UN as being fundamentally dependent on member states or structurally handicapped in the pursuit of effective UNPKO. Others have studied UNPKO as the Secretariat's means to achieving UN agency as an autonomous international actor. Those scholars that have recently addressed civil-military relations in UNPKO are relatively few, and they situate their paradigm on the impact of UNPKO on civil-military relations at home. This thesis contributes to the growing sub-field of civil-military relations in peacekeeping by filling this gap and improving the understanding of civil-military dynamics within UNPKO themselves. Here, civil-military relations are treated as a crucial variable. This new perspective enables us to challenge the assumption that UN missions operate on the basis of democratic CMR, allowing for research into who was really making the key decisions on the ground.

## Historiography

### *Rwanda*

[32] Monalisa Adhikari, "Breaking the Balance? The Impact of Peacekeeping Deployments on Civil-Military Relations," *International Peacekeeping* 27, no. 3 (2020): 369–94.

[33] Holger Albrecht, "Diversionary Peace: International Peacekeeping and Domestic Civil-Military Relations," *International Peacekeeping* 27, no. 4 (2020): 586–616.

As with many 20th-century African conflicts, the 1990-1994 Rwandan Civil War has deep roots in colonial history. Alison Des Forges' 1999 report for the Human Rights Watch helpfully summarized the background of the ethnic dimension behind this tragedy. The words "Hutu" and "Tutsi" originally referred to class divisions, with Tutsis being elite pastoralists and Hutus being cultivators. Although Tutsis and Hutus generally married within their occupational fields, these group assignments were still relatively fluid before the German colonization of Rwanda in the late 19th century and its transfer to Belgium after the First World War. To consolidate power over Rwandan agriculture, the Belgian administration systematically removed Hutus from positions of power and justified Tutsi control through a myth of Tutsi racial supremacy. The colonial administrators concretized the division between Hutu and Tutsi with ethnic identity cards: by the 1930s, 15% of Rwanda self-identified as Tutsi, 84% as Hutu, and the remaining 1% as Twa (another minority group). These methods of Belgian indirect rule through installed Tutsis laid the groundwork for postcolonial ethnic violence in Rwanda.[34]

After the Second World War, Rwanda became a UN trusteeship under continued Belgian administration. Ethnic violence escalated in 1959, leading to Belgian installation of Hutu authorities and a national referendum in 1961 that overwhelmingly supported a formally independent republic to be led by the Parmehutu party. These events would become known as the Hutu Revolution. Reprisals continued against Tutsis, many of whom fled to neighboring countries and would challenge the Hutu Rwandan government over the following decades. Internal dissension in this republic resulted in a 1973 military coup led by General Juvénal Habyarimana, establishing a single-party state dominated by the *Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement* (MRND), a Hutu government empowering military elites. Agitations for greater representation would later lead to the return of political parties (although Habyarimana retained control), often characterized by responses to the continued Tutsi incursions from expatriate communities, mainly in Uganda; this Tutsi expatriate organization would become the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).[35]

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[34] Alison Des Forges, *"Leave None to Tell the Story:" Genocide in Rwanda* (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 31–37.

[35] Des Forges, 40–79.

The RPF had launched several attacks on Hutu-controlled Rwanda since the Tutsi flight after the Hutu Revolution, but the major 1990 attack reaching the capital, Kigali, marked the beginning of the Rwandan Civil War. The Rwandan Government Forces (RGF) successfully defended Kigali, but the RPF continued guerilla fighting and maintained control of northern Rwanda from their base of operations across the Ugandan border. Habyarimana's government encouraged Hutu "self-defense" against Tutsis – targeting civilian Tutsis within their communities – by paramilitary and militia groups such as the *Interahamwe*, the youth wing of the MRND.[36] Ethnic cleansing of Tutsis in Rwanda led to a renewed RPF attack in February 1993. By this point, the Civil War had taken a devastating toll on the Rwandan economy and the MRND and RPF were driven to the negotiating table, resulting in the signing of the Arusha Accords in August 1993. Arusha would provide for a broad-based transitional government (BBTG) representing the span of Tutsi and Hutu parties until elections could be held, as well as the integration of the two armies and repatriation of Tutsi populations. The United Nations was invited to oversee the implementation of the Arusha Accords, although both sides had reservations about the chance of success and continued arming (notably, Hutu extremist paramilitary organizations and government representatives ordered large numbers of machetes to prepare for renewed local attacks on Tutsis).[37] The United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was organized to ensure the success of the Arusha Accords.[38]

The Rwandan Genocide was characterized by a rapidly escalating chain of events. Still, the record shows that the Force Commander, General Roméo Dallaire, warned the DPKO early and often of the high risk of mass ethnic violence against the Tutsis of Rwanda.[39] The UN response to Dallaire's warnings will be explored in detail later. On 6 April 1994, Habyarimana's plane was shot down by either RPF or Hutu Power elements of the government – this remains disputed. In the roughly 100 days from 7 April 1994 to mid-July, the RGF, *Interahamwe*, and other Hutu Power organizations murdered up to a million Tutsis (estimates still vary) as well as

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[36] Benjamin A. Valentino, "Ethnic Mass Killings: Turkish Armenia, Nazi Germany, and Rwanda," in *Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20th Century* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).

[37] Here, Dallaire's account disagreed with Des Forges': Dallaire maintained the RPF was "unanimous" in its support of Arusha (Dallaire, Shake Hands With The Devil, 66).

[38] Des Forges, *"Leave None to Tell the Story:" Genocide in Rwanda*, 60, 110-134.

[39] Michael Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).

moderate Hutus.[40] Men, women, and children were abused and murdered by machete- and machine gun-wielding soldiers and paramilitary citizens moving between villages, organized by radio.[41] The international community evacuated their nationals but refused to intervene in the killings.[42] Afraid of losing more peacekeepers, the UNSC reduced UNAMIR and restricted Dallaire from aggressive action against the *génocidaires*.[43] Broadly, the end of the genocide was due to RPF battlefield victory. The UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda functioned from 1994-2015 to pursue justice against those considered most responsible for the genocide, but the sheer scale of the violence led to a total restructuring of Rwandan society – the ramifications of which are still playing out today.

*Angola*

Rich in coffee, oil, diamonds, and much more, Angola was destined to attract colonial attention. The first Portuguese presence in this region is dated to 1483, and Angola remained a center of the colonial system for centuries, with nearly half of all Africans sold into slavery passing through Angola. The Angolan War of Independence against the Portuguese began around 1961, fought by three main movements: the Marxist-Leninist People's Movement of Liberation of Angola (MPLA); the anticommunist/separatist National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA); and the anticommunist Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), led by the prominent Jonas Savimbi. After the Carnation Revolution overthrew the colonial regime in Portugal, Angola gained its independence in 1974. However, the three independence movements quickly began to fight each other, seeking outside support. The Angolan Civil War began in 1975, pitting the FNLA and UNITA (backed by the United States, apartheid South Africa, and

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[40] Joshua James Kassner, *Rwanda and the Moral Obligation of Humanitarian Intervention* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012).

[41] Roméo Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (London: Arrow, 2003), 280–81.

[42] Samantha Power, "Rwanda: 'Mostly in a Listening Mode,'" in *"A Problem From Hell:" America and the Age of Genocide* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2002).

[43] Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, 290; Des Forges, *"Leave None to Tell the Story:" Genocide in Rwanda*, 630.

Zaire) against the MPLA (backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba), which claimed the Angolan seat of government from Luanda.[44]

The Angolan Civil War was prolonged and characterized by decades of outside military aid.[45] The country's wealth and strategic relevance to the increasingly important South Africa meant that any peace in Angola would be linked to a broader regional solution – the independence of Namibia from South Africa. Once the Cold War thawed in 1988, this pathway to peace began to clear: South Africa and Cuba agreed to withdraw their troops from Namibia and Angola, respectively, by 1991. To monitor this withdrawal, the UNSC deployed the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM). This small military observer mission successfully confirmed the withdrawal of Cuban troops ahead of schedule.[46] However, sporadic fighting continued between UNITA and MPLA until the Bicesse Peace Accords in May 1991, mediated by Portugal. Bicesse provided for a ceasefire, cantonment of troops, and integration of the FALA (UNITA forces) and FAPLA (MPLA forces) into the neutral Angolan Armed Forces (FAA); the "triple zero" of zero military aid from the United States, Soviet Union, and any other powers; and once disarmament had succeeded, Bicesse outlined free and fair elections to decide the new government.[47] The peace process would be led by the Joint Political Military Commission (CCPM) of UNITA and MPLA representatives, advised by the UN. This advisor mission became UNAVEM II, led by SRSG Margaret Anstee from the UK.[48]

By the time of the elections in September 1992, the demobilization process was badly behind schedule, leaving three armies simultaneously active in Angola.[49] Over 90% of Angolans participated in free elections, resulting in the MPLA's incumbent Dos Santos slightly ahead of

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[44] Paul Julian Hare, *Angola's Last Best Chance for Peace* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 3–7.

[45] Adam Lockyer, "Foreign Intervention and Warfare in Civil Wars," *British International Studies Association* 37 (2011): 2337–64.

[46] Margaret J. Anstee, "Angola: The Forgotten Tragedy," *International Relations* 11, no. 6 (December 1993): 495–511.

[47] Evans J. Gareth, *Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990's and Beyond* (St. Leonards, NSW, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1993).

[48] Margaret J. Anstee, *Orphan of the Cold War* (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 8–15.

[49] Margaret J. Anstee, "The UN in Crisis?," *Medicine, Conflict, and Survival* 17, no. 1 (2001): 17–24.

UNITA's Savimbi, but with a small enough margin to require a second round of voting. After the vote, however, MPLA supporters massacred UNITA supporters in Luanda, both sides claimed electoral irregularities, and fighting resumed.[50] Spread thinly across the large country, UNAVEM II consolidated its posts and tried to bring the two sides to negotiate, culminating in the May 1993 Abidjan talks. However, the two sides insisted on guarantees of more armed UN peacekeepers before they would sign a ceasefire, and the UNSC refused to guarantee peacekeepers until a ceasefire was signed. The negotiations failed, and the fighting resumed.[51] Maître Alioune Blondin Beye of Mali took over as SRSG as UNAVEM II was reduced to a small mission intended to keep pushing for mediation. Beye hosted the Lusaka talks in November 1993, and after months of negotiations over issues of military disarmament and representation of UNITA in a new government. Under the Lusaka Protocol of October 1994, there would be a much stronger UN authority over the peace process: the SRSG would chair rather than advise the CCPM, confirming demobilization before allowing the elections to continue.[52]

Worried about the fragility of the Lusaka Accords and conscious of the MPLA and UNITA's requests for an increased peacekeeper presence, the UNSC authorized UNAVEM III under the leadership of Beye and Force Commander General Sibanda of Zimbabwe, in February 1995. This mission, on a similar mandate as UNAVEM II, reached a peak level of 7,000 military personnel in July 1995 – these peacekeepers were dispersed across Angola to confirm that UNITA and MPLA would observe the ceasefire and follow the scheduled demobilization.[53] Both sides held mutual suspicion of secret armies in the many rural areas of Angola or across the border in UNITA-friendly Zaire.[54] Still, in April 1997, SRSG Beye brought UNITA and MPLA to swear in the new Government of National Unity and Reconciliation (GURN) sharing power

[50] Mary Spear and Jon Keller, "Conflict Resolution in Africa," *Africa Today* 43, no. 2 (June 1996): 121–38.

[51] Alex Vines, "One Hand Tied: Angola and the UN" (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, June 1993), 14–20.

[52] Hare, *Angola's Last Best Chance for Peace*, 13–76.

[53] Margaret J. Anstee, "What Price Peace?," *Round Table (London)* 87, no. 346 (April 1998): 227–33.

[54] Ian S. Spears, "Angola's Elusive Peace," *International Journal (Toronto)* 54, no. 4 (1999): 562–81.

and acknowledging Savimbi as opposition party leader.[55] In July 1997, the UNSC downgraded UNAVEM III from a peacekeeping mission to an observer mission under the name MONUA. However, by August 1997, UNITA revealed maintained military forces and renewed attacks on government forces as well as MONUA personnel. Continued UN efforts failed to bring another ceasefire, and in February 1999, the UNSC dissolved MONUA. Angola would not see peace until MPLA forces killed Savimbi in 2002 and UNITA agreed to lay down its arms.[56]

**Empirical Research**

This section will diagnose the respective civil-military relationships between the chief civilian and military officials in UNAMIR and UNAVEM. In both operations, structural limitations of UNPKO placed tensions on the Force Commanders – torn between their military ethos and a uniquely flawed system of operations. These tensions undermined the civil-military dynamic. As the following will show, the key difference between Angola and Rwanda was the behavior of the SRSG in the face of the structural flaws of UNPKO.

In Rwanda, SRSG Booh-Booh did not sufficiently advocate on the behalf of Force Commander Dallaire, nor did he build a good working relationship. Without Booh-Booh taking the right actions, the tensions eventually led to a dramatic failure of the civil-military norm. In Angola, SRSGs Anstee and Beye successfully advocated for their operational leaders and proactively positioned themselves as the leaders of UNAVEM II and UNAVEM III, respectively. There was no failure of the CMR dynamic as in UNAMIR, and the difference was in the actions of the top civilian leadership.

*Rwanda*

General Dallaire traveled to Kigali in mid-1993 to design a mission that would aid the RGF and RPF in fulfilling the Arusha Accords and prevent violations of human rights; Dallaire

[55] Margaret J. Anstee, "The Role of International Mediators in Conflicts," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 14, no. 2 (2001): 70–79.

[56] Hare, *Angola's Last Best Chance for Peace*, 78–146.

gave this mission the name "UNAMIR." The first SRSG fell sick, meaning that for the first months of UNAMIR, Dallaire occupied both roles – Force Commander and mission lead.[57] Despite his commitment to engage both sides, Dallaire reported on 9 November 1993 that the absence of an SRSG was preventing the mission from capturing "the subtle trends evolving within the capital."[58] He later wrote that he was caught off-guard by the "distortion of the double-talk" of politics and needed someone to handle that unfamiliar world.[59] The situation reports (SITREPs) echoed this frustration: on 23 November, Dallaire requested that the incoming SRSG meet with the president to investigate the latter's erroneous claims of Ugandan border skirmishes, himself exasperated and confused. The same trend continued in Uganda, where Dallaire reported on 13 December that he had "lost patience with all these… obvious stalling tactics" used on occasion to obstruct the UN.[60] In late November, Dallaire's requests for political leadership were answered.

On 8 November, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali announced to the Security Council his appointment of Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, former Minister for External Relations of Cameroon, as his Special Representative. SRSG Booh-Booh would lead UNAMIR "in the field and exercise authority over all its elements."[61] Initially, Booh-Booh struck Dallaire as "the right man for the job"– a seasoned diplomat familiar with regional politics – but their relationship soon soured. Dallaire criticized Booh-Booh as bringing "nothing new" and only having assumed leadership of UNAMIR due to the "highly politicized" selection of SRSGs. Dallaire recorded that Booh-Booh did not build trust between the RGF and RPF, and isolated Dallaire from the debates around the formation of the new government – this approach was clearly ineffective.[62] Their rocky personal

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[57] Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, 56–78.

[58] S-1062-0003-0001-00001, (United Nations Archives, October 26, 1993), 69, Office of the Force Commander - Code cables incoming, United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) (1993-1996), https://search.archives.un.org/s-1062-0003-0001-00001.

[59] Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, 61.

[60] S-1062-0004-0006-00001, 30, 40-41.

[61] S-1062-0003-0001-00001, 174.

[62] Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, 51, 114-123.

relationship left the two ill-equipped to interrupt the formation of an unhealthy civil-military dynamic.

The first step of the empirical analysis is to assess where the civil-military relationship did not meet its goals – functional and relational. There are two functional questions relevant to this case: whether the military agent is doing what the civilian principal has tasked – both "what" to do and "how" to do it; and whether the military component as an organization is competent to achieve its tasks. Beginning with the question of competence will best reveal the structural issues inherent to UNPKO that weighed on General Dallaire and damaged the CMR dynamic of UNAMIR.

The first structural flaw of UNPKO that damaged the CMR dynamic is the unique nature of operating a multinational force on a peacekeeping mission. UNPKO take loaned troops in units typically no larger than a battalion (approximately up to 1000) troops. UNAMIR naturally lacked unified "doctrine… concept of operations, interoperability of ammunition, equipment, and so on."[63] This meant that national contingents would typically be assigned to different sectors to minimize operational friction. Which unit was assigned to a certain sector heavily weighed on the success of the UNAMR mission within. The quality of the units varied widely. Dallaire admitted his frustrations with the Bangladeshi military observers (MILOBs) that would speed through Rwanda fearing an ambush, providing no useful intelligence on weapons caches that would soon be used for atrocities.[64]

Quality disparities also extended to a national contingent's supplies. Dallaire reported on 23 November 1993 that the Tunisian contingent was "handed over to UNAMIR with no equipment nor vehicles nor radios and only pistols" – this unit was assigned to the demilitarized zone along the Rwandan border with Uganda. Apparently, the "only way to solve" this lack of equipment was for a Tunisian officer to petition his government, as the UN was incapable of supporting them.[65] Where the multinational force combined, specifically the headquarters

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[63] Roméo Dallaire and Jason Musteen, Interview at La Pocatiere, Canada, September 18, 2023, https://t3caabc5a2c28c51f.starter1ua.preservica.com/portal/en-US/collection/sdb%3ASO%7C369bcdb3-8e70-405c-a459-977b14908b34.

[64] Dallaire and Musteen.

[65] S-1062-0004-0006-00001, (United Nations Archives, November 8, 1993), 43, Office of the Force Commander - Code cables outgoing, United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) (1993-1996), https://search.archives.un.org/s-1062-0004-0006-00001.

element, other issues arose. The lack of language capabilities was a critical problem for UNAMIR: Dallaire recalled the duty officers "didn't even speak English or French" and couldn't understand the radio transmissions.[66] A cable dated 25 April 1994 notes UNAMIR had gained "the capability to monitor news broadcasts in Kinyarwanda," the local language in Rwanda – meaning that for nearly one year of operations, UNAMIR still did not have someone in its headquarters fluent in the local language.[67]

The issues with the multinational force extended beyond their unreliable supply and quality. *Who* was assigned a task meant more than their tactical capacity. For example, the RPF wrote the UN in October 1993 to protest the inclusion of Togolese infantry, complaining that "Togolese troops are better known for their rejection of democracy and for their brutality than for their military know-how."[68] The deployment of a Belgian battalion with UNAMIR spread concerns amongst Rwandans, considering their colonial history. A SITREP dated 16 November 1993 recorded the Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs speaking over the national radio to alleviate these fears, "stressing that the various contingents… are under the sole commandment of the United Nations and not… their respective governments."[69] Unfortunately, this was not entirely true.

Another issue of the multinational force was command authority. The Bangladeshi Army Chief of Staff called Dallaire to insist their unit be exempt from dangerous missions, leading Dallaire to write that Bangladesh "had only deployed its contingent for selfish aims" – free training, saving costs on military pay, and to keep UN-provided equipment.[70] Each contingent would "answer first to their own headquarters" in their home nation before following an order from the Force Commander, meaning Dallaire was further restricted in how he could deploy his

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[66] Roméo Dallaire and Michael Geheran, Interview at West Point, New York, October 21, 2021, https://t3caabc5a2c28c51f.starter1ua.preservica.com/portal/en-US/collection/sdb%3ASO%7Cc00e6df0-8a8a-4d50-8768-f258e6320a19.

[67] S-1062-0004-0003-00001, (United Nations Archives, April 6, 1994), 47, Office of the Force Commander - Code cables outgoing, United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) (1993-1996), https://search.archives.un.org/s-1062-0004-0003-00001.

[68] S-1062-0003-0001-00001, 116.

[69] S-1062-0004-0006-00001, 51.

[70] Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, 205.

limited force.[71] Disputes would be excessively escalated; for example, an anonymous source within UNAMIR contacted the Belgian ambassador in February 1994 to criticize the patrolling schedule of UNAMIR troops in Kigali. Responding to the ambassador, Dallaire expressed frustration that there was no "consultation between those informing you and ourselves on the ground" – he had no chance to address their concerns before the issue became international.[72]

The other unique structural issue in UNPKO is the problem of logistics. As Dallaire summarized, "the UN is a pull system, not a push system" – meaning instead of the conventional military system where supplies are continuously "pushed" forward as needed, they had to be "pulled," or formally requested. Because the UN has no strategic stocks of supplies, they contracted each request to third parties, which took months and led to pointless friction: for example, UNAMIR received flashlights but hadn't requested batteries.[73] Everything from vehicles to radios was either missing, inoperable, or unsecure. A 16 November 1993 SITREP about the logistical crisis warned that they "cannot respond to any emergency at this time at all."[74] Dallaire later wrote that the "civilian UN logistician, and not the operational commander, has the power."[75] The Field Operations Divisions Acting Director admonished Dallaire on 12 November 1993 for not following these unfamiliar channels, through which the director asked that Dallaire "invariably; repeat invariably" route further requests.[76] The UN must draw on a much smaller budget than a national government, and the effort to cut costs was expressed throughout all the archival material. As tensions increased through March and countries began seeking to evacuate their nationals, many requested help from UNAMIR – to which the DPKO ordered Booh-Booh and Dallaire to first and "urgently seek a written commitment… regarding the reimbursement" of any costs incurred during the evacuation.[77]

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[71] Dallaire and Musteen, Interview at La Pocatiere, Canada.

[72] S-1062-0003-0001-00001, 44.

[73] Dallaire and Musteen, Interview at La Pocatiere, Canada.

[74] S-1062-0004-0006-00001, 54.

[75] Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, 100.

[76] S-1062-0004-0006-00001, 49.

[77] S-1062-0003-0001-00001, 48–50.

The budgetary and logistical problems of UNPKO handicapped UNAMIR operations. One of the main UNAMIR efforts in Kigali was to disarm the civilian populace – for example, a SITREP dated 17 March 1994 reported five Rwandans arrested for possessing 73 grenades and 30 kilograms of rifle ammunition.[78] The UNAMIR component assigned to coordinate efforts with the Rwandan gendarmerie was called CIVPOL – only approximately 50 officers. Considering the paramilitary nature of the Rwandan police force, Dallaire called for the integration of CIVPOL within his command, but the CIVPOL chief "nurtured a close professional relationship with the SRSG" who allowed him to retain his separate bureaucracy despite redundancies.[79] This CIVPOL unit confronted an overwhelming amount of violence in the months leading up to the outbreak of genocide. A SITREP from 19 March reported things were "mainly calm," then listed: a Tutsi beat to death by a mob; a firefight between bandits; and a child shot and killed in the crossfire of another crime. Their standard for "calm" indicates that they expected high levels of daily violence. The CIVPOL suffered from their lack of integration with the rest of UNAMIR: weekly SITREPs from 1 January to 30 March 1994 complained without answer about a lack of military maps, vehicles, guards, radios, and battery chargers for the few radios they had – these radios also shared frequencies with the military component, leading to overlapping chatter.[80] As the violence escalated in early 1994, UNAMIR's logistical problems worsened. The civilian logisticians required to submit requests to New York evacuated to Nairobi, leaving Dallaire with nearly no communications to UN HQ as the crisis deepened.[81]

To review: the military component of UNAMIR suffered from structural issues inherent to UNPKO, namely the nature of commanding a multinational force and the inefficient, politicized, and underfunded logistical bureaucracy. Frustrated with these limitations, General Dallaire began to replace missing essential capacities – bending and breaking civil-military

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[78] S-1120-0060-0002-00001 (United Nations Archives, February 15, 1994), 27, Office of the Executive Director - Daily situation reports (SITREP), United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) (1993-1996), https://search.archives.un.org/s-1120-0060-0002-00001.

[79] Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, 159.

[80] S-1120-0060-0002-00001, 6, 23, 77.

[81] Roméo Dallaire et al., Interview at La Pocatiere, Canada, July 11, 2024, https://t3caabc5a2c28c51f.starter1ua.preservica.com/portal/en-US/collection/sdb%3ASO%7C595bf502-23a7-4869-8452-8af4de5a143f.

boundaries. As a peacekeeper, Dallaire was not permitted an intelligence section; the Cold War powers had blocked the development of what they suspected to be an international spy agency.[82] Dallaire "created a fifth column of observers" which he has, in recent interviews, described in detail. Despite knowing this to be "totally illegal," Dallaire "with [his] own money paid for information" to build a small network in Rwanda.[83] In January 1994, this effort produced an anonymous government contact going by "Jean-Pierre" who warned of plans to commit mass murder of Tutsis using arms caches distributed across Rwanda.[84] Dallaire had been pushing Booh-Booh to warn the UN of the growing risks in Rwanda, but Dallaire's contributions "were being watered down" and his warnings neutered.

Knowing the importance of his information, Dallaire decided to go around Booh-Booh "inappropriately" to pass his concerns unfiltered to Boutros-Ghali's military adviser.[85] Responding on 3 February 1994 to Dallaire's request to take action on weapons recovery, the DPKO called his plans "somewhat ambitious" and warned that UNAMIR "cannot repeat cannot take an active role" in the search for arms – only advising and monitoring the government in policing itself.[86] Later, when Dallaire found caches on the government side of the ceasefire line, Booh-Booh "felt that this was inappropriate" and biased. Again, the UN prevented Dallaire's raids for fear of breaching neutrality.[87] Functionally, the civil-military relationship was facing significant problems: Dallaire's force was isolated from important decisions and suffered from structural issues that obstructed his ability to address the growing crisis before him. Concerned, he began to break UN rules regarding intelligence collection and reporting. This introduces the relational goals of the civil-military relationship. The relational standards are: whether the

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[82] Anstee, *Orphan of the Cold War: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992-93*, 537.

[83] Dallaire and Geheran, Interview at West Point, New York; Dallaire and Musteen, Interview at La Pocatiere, Canada.

[84] Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, 142.

[85] Dallaire and Geheran, Interview at West Point, New York.

[86] S-1062-0003-0001-00001, 76.

[87] Dallaire and Geheran, Interview at West Point, New York.

civilian principal is the one making substantive policy decisions; and whether the military is avoiding decisions that would undermine long-term civilian supremacy.

Dallaire's frustration with the impotent UNAMIR and the failure of Booh-Booh to develop trust with the belligerents in Rwanda led to a breakdown in the relational component of their civil-military dynamic. Dallaire had already developed connections with the major stakeholders on each side, having commanded the mission before Booh-Booh's arrival. Dallaire recalled that when important figures felt "they were getting nowhere with the SRSG, they would talk to me."[88] This dynamic became further entrenched when the conflict escalated, and communication between the political leadership ceased; Dallaire continued to mediate between the two militaries.[89] For several weeks, Dallaire worked around Booh-Booh to fulfill the role of diplomat and political mediator. The impact of this is exemplified in the significant incident report from 7 April 1994, in which Dallaire described hour-by-hour the events after the fatal crash of President Habyarimana's plane. Between 8:30 PM and 1:00 PM the following day, Dallaire had: established contact with the RPF, traveled to the RGF Army Headquarters, met with the heads of the military and the gendarmerie, liaised with the French government, and negotiated the release of UNDP personnel that had been taken hostage in the chaos. In that time, Booh-Booh kept to his home and only held a couple of meetings with whichever personnel Dallaire was able to shuttle to him.[90]

Perhaps Booh-Booh should not be blamed for avoiding the risks of moving around during a rapidly evolving crisis, but his lack of mobility compared to Dallaire demonstrated how leadership had relocated to the Force Commander. Dallaire recalled that Booh-Booh spent the next week of the crisis in a hotel room, scared and "loaded to the gills" until "we got rid of him" – in official recollection, Booh-Booh left to coordinate a regional African response, but this effectively took him out of decision-making in Rwanda.[91] Although appointed to be the chief of

[88] Dallaire and Musteen, Interview at La Pocatiere, Canada.

[89] Dallaire et al., Interview at La Pocatiere, Canada.

[90] S-1062-0004-0003-00001, 128–33.

[91] Dallaire and Musteen, Interview at La Pocatiere, Canada, 2024; Dallaire et al., Interview at La Pocatiere, Canada.

UNAMIR, Booh-Booh's failure to build trust and position himself as a mediator for the RPF and RGF left him unable to assert his authority as civilian principal.

With Dallaire taking command of the mission, the break-down of the civil-military norm in Rwanda continued. As the DPKO attempted to interpret the mandate in the face of rapid changes, the rules of engagement became steadily less clear. After the plane crashed, France, Belgium, and other countries interceded to evacuate their nationals. On 9 April, the DPKO wrote Dallaire with guidance on UNAMIR's role in the evacuations: "you should make every effort not… to act beyond your mandate but may exercise your discretion to do so." Five days later, the DPKO sent another message that "in the abnormal circumstances prevailing, [standing orders] may be overridden at the discretion of the SRSG and FC, for humanitarian reasons."[92] Dallaire later said that once the genocide began, he considered his mandate to be "over" – but this became license for him to "take upon myself the decision to move my troops or not," and act more aggressively in an attempt to save lives.[93] Meanwhile, however, the Security Council had turned against UNAMIR. A record of their informal proceedings dated 13 April showed that the most powerful voices on the Council – the United Kingdom, France, the United States – had decided that the UN had no place in Rwanda. At most, they would leave "a 'small skeletal' operation to show the will" of the Council, rather than exercising that will to save Tutsis. Russia "approvingly spoke of" this as "the 'Angolan option,'" referencing the recent retraction of UNAVEM II after the failure of the Bicesse Accords.[94] By the end of April, the UN Secretariat was exploring options to withdraw UNAMIR entirely. At this moment, the civil-military dynamic broke.

The breakdown of the civil-military norm in UNAMIR reached its pinnacle when General Dallaire directly denied an order from the UN Secretary-General. The Belgian contingent had withdrawn in mid-April after the murder of ten peacekeepers. A letter from Boutros-Ghali to the Belgian president dated 13 April pleaded for them to reconsider and made

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[92] S-1062-0002-0006-00001 (United Nations Archives, April 6, 1994), 86, 136, Office of the Force Commander - Code cables incoming, United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) (1993-1996), https://search.archives.un.org/s-1062-0002-0006-00001.

[93] Dallaire and Geheran, Interview at West Point, New York; Dallaire et al., Interview at La Pocatiere, Canada; Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, 291.

[94] S-1062-0002-0006-00001, 108–10.

clear that if their unit withdrew, the entire mission would be compromised.[95] With no political will in the Security Council and the DPKO's reluctance to stake the reputation of UNPKO on a sinking ship, Boutros-Ghali called Dallaire and ordered him to withdraw UNAMIR from Rwanda.[96] Dallaire refused. After repeating this exchange, Boutros-Ghali hung up and his chief of staff called, warning Dallaire that he had "become a rogue commander" for disobeying a legal order – and telling him that "if things go catastrophic… you will be held accountable."[97] With no legal right to command, Dallaire went to his remaining subordinate contingent commanders and made a personal appeal for them to stay. Some agreed, and UNAMIR continued against its mandate until the Security Council succumbed to international pressure and agreed to reinforce their rogue commander.

By the standards of Feaver's agency theory, the civil-military dynamic at the head of UNAMIR had failed. Having seen how this dynamic broke down due to the structural issues of UNPKO and the failure of its civilian leader to intercede, the next question to ask is why Dallaire bent the CMR dynamic to the point of open disobedience. Feaver's military preferences provide a clear answer. The first set of preferences regarding policy outcomes explain that military leaders generally prefer offensive action to capitalize on the preventative advantage. Dallaire demonstrated this through his repeated requests for more proactive action against the arms caches. The second set of preferences explain why the military subordinates to the civilian willingly: because the civilian authority is considered legitimate, and this subordination is the honorable decision. This preference is shown not to be lacking in Dallaire: his career with the Canadian military notwithstanding, his requests for an SRSG in late 1993 and his repeated statements in his SITREPs, autobiography, and interviews proved his acknowledgment of the positionally legitimate authority held by Boutros-Ghali and therefore Booh-Booh. Feaver described another unique preference of the military agent that explains Dallaire's actions most completely: the "special moral competence." In volunteering to sacrifice themselves and navigate frequent ethical dilemmas, Feaver wrote that leaders in the military ethos assume a certain moral responsibility that obscures the civilian's authority and "bolsters the hand of a

[95] S-1062-0002-0006-00001, 118–19.

[96] Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide*.

[97] Dallaire et al., Interview at La Pocatiere, Canada.

military agent" should they choose to disobey.[98] This explanation matches Dallaire's recent interviews, where he said that Boutros-Ghali's order "was legally right but it was morally wrong" – he was obliged to disobey it.[99]

Following the Feaver methodology, this thesis has diagnosed the civil-military relationship in UNAMIR as dysfunctional and explained Dallaire's decisions to resist legitimate civilian authority through the "special moral competence" of the military ethos. The next step is to assess the decisions of the civilian principal to see how or whether it was able to reassert its authority. By the list of civilian monitoring and punishment mechanisms available in a conventional democratic civil-military relationship, the UN was lacking options to maintain civilian authority. The most relevant monitoring mechanisms in the UNPKO context are the rules of engagement and mutual institutional checks. When exercised in UNAMIR, each of these mechanisms were proven to be weak. The DPKO's muddled guidance that gave him latitude to break standing orders according to his moral judgment. Although commendable, this is still a failure of the principal to exercise controlling authority. The mutual institutional checks were present in the civilian secretariat fueling Dallaire's headquarters as well as the independent CIVPOL, but neither organization prevented Dallaire from innovating new (and illegal) capacities like his intelligence group. When the logisticians evacuated, Dallaire turned to the supply lines of the contingent units like the Ghanaian battalion – the lack of support from these parallel institutions did not restrict Dallaire's operational capacity.

The UN also lacked most of the punishment mechanisms normally available to civilian authorities. As the Force Commander is selected to lead a mission on a temporary basis, the DPKO was unable to use material disincentives relating to pay, discharge, or audits. The UN lacks a military justice system. This was a frustration for Dallaire – for example, when two Belgian soldiers "quarrelled [sic] over a woman in a local Disco" the night of 3 December 1993, the only recourse was to repatriate them to Belgium, removing from Dallaire the ability to independently enforce standards of conduct on his troops.[100] That the UN lacked the ability to

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[98] Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*, 63–69.

[99] Dallaire et al., Interview at La Pocatiere, Canada.

[100] S-1062-0004-0006-00001, 14; Dallaire and Musteen, West Point Center for Oral History Interview at La Pocatiere, Canada.

punish its military commanders also protected Dallaire from direct consequences when he refused to follow Boutros-Ghali's order to withdraw. As a counterexample, Feaver cited the removal of the General MacArthur from command in Korea when MacArthur publicly criticized President Truman's policies.[101] Dallaire's disobedience was more severe, and yet produced no consequences – instead, he kept UNAMIR in Rwanda long enough for the Security Council to buckle and reinforce the mission. The only punishment mechanisms evident were the shrinking of UNAMIR (effectively a budget cut) and the informal loss of access to a civilian leader. The former indeed restricted Dallaire's operational abilities, but as proven when he "went rogue," some contingent units agreed to follow him regardless of UN authorization – weakening the effectiveness of a budget cut. The latter mechanism was shown as Booh-Booh isolated Dallaire from the decision-making process before the conflict erupted in April, but this was also ineffective as Dallaire maintained more extensive contacts and remained influential in the negotiations regardless of the SRSG. Either way, neither of these mechanisms were clearly used as a punishment for military disobedience – only that they were the sole feasible options for UN civilian punishment responses.

The civil-military relationship between the SRSG and the FC of UNAMIR was unsuccessful when judged by Feaver's democratic norms. Frustrated by the structural limitations of UNPKO compared to a conventional or national operation, Dallaire began to break legal boundaries. Booh-Booh proved unable to influence events in Rwanda or reassert civilian authority; the situation worsened to the point of total military independence from civilian consequences. This case identified structural problems with UNPKO, namely with the multinational force command authority and with UN logistics and funding. The case also showed how a military leader tasked with a humanitarian mission without sufficient support may test the limits placed upon them in order to fulfill what they believe to be their ethical duty.

*Angola*

This section identifies the key differences between UNAMIR and UNAVEM that may be responsible for better civil-military relations in UNPKO. Proving that there was no civil-military

[101] Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*, 162–64.

split will require a different use of the archival evidence. This section will search UNAVEM for the same problems observed in UNAMIR, then determine which differences may be responsible for the more functional civil-military dynamic. This section will cover a larger span of time; UNAVEM II and UNAVEM III were two parts of the same peace mission, and UNAVEM III had a much larger military force. This continuity means that the civil-military dynamics established in UNAVEM II should more clearly reflect in the more militarized operations of UNAVEM III. This section will be observing two SRSGs and, between them, four Force Commanders / Chief Military Observers. Therefore, the analysis will focus on the sustained dynamics between these two roles, rather than the previous focus on the personality split between Dallaire and Booh-Booh. This section will show that, despite the same structural issues with UNPKO seen in Rwanda, UNAVEM had a healthier civil-military dynamic due to the leadership of its Special Representatives.

The SRSG of UNAVEM II was Margaret Anstee, a career UN diplomat and the first woman to head a peacekeeping mission. UNAVEM II was originally mandated in May 1991 to oversee the implementation of the Bicesse Accords, but when the Angolan government requested technical assistance with the elections, this mandate expanded, and Boutros-Ghali brought on Anstee to lead the mission in February 1992.[102] Like Booh-Booh, Anstee took charge of a mission that was already operating under a Force Commander. As the following will show, however, she was able to establish herself as a trusted mediator and the undisputed leader of UNAVEM II. Still, after the UNITA leader Savimbi rejected the elections, the fighting resumed, and Anstee retired from UNAVEM II. Her successor is the second SRSG in consideration: Maître Alioune Blondin Beye, former Foreign Minister of Mali. Anstee briefed Beye in New York shortly before he took over a reduced UNAVEM II –the "Angolan option" to be referenced in Rwanda by the Russian UNSC delegation – in July 1993. Anstee recorded that Beye struck her as "extremely amiable" and intelligent, well-suited for the mediation to come.[103]

Beye presided over the Lusaka Accords soon after his arrival, a year-long negotiation process resulting in a ceasefire in November 1994. Learning from the failures of UNAVEM II, the UNSC authorized in February 1995 a larger peacekeeping mission (reaching its peak size of

[102] Vines, "One Hand Tied: Angola and the UN," 13.

[103] Anstee, *Orphan of the Cold War*, 502.

approximately 4,000 troops, MILOBs, election observers, and CIVPOL) – this was UNAVEM III.[104] UNAVEM III oversaw the second round of elections with a larger emphasis on enforcing the quartering of UNITA's military wing and integrating UNITA into the government and unified FAA force. Again, UNITA failed to comply with the peace process, leading to the end of UNAVEM III and its 1997 transition (under a new Secretary-General, Kofi Annan), to MONUA, a small observer mission. Unfortunately, Beye would die in June 1998 in a fatal plane crash en route to talks in Abidjan.[105] Angola would not see peace until UNITA was defeated on the battlefield.

The corroboration of Anstee's records (mainly covering UNAVEM II) with archival evidence from UNAVEM III demonstrates that UNAVEM suffered from the same structural UNPKO issues that plagued UNAMIR. However, Anstee made key decisions as SRSG that mitigated these problems, alleviated the concerns of her FCs, and established herself as the key UN decision-maker in Angola. Beginning with the question of military competence, UNAVEM struggled with the problems inherent to UNPKO: authority over a multinational force and logistics. Although UNAVEM II was smaller than UNAMIR, Anstee still recognized the issues of the UN commanding military authority. Her solution was to turn the autonomy into a strength, empowering subordinate commanders while retaining her own decision-making powers. Frustrated with the DPKO's attempts to centralize decisions in New York, Anstee fought to enable decisions to "be taken on the ground by the person responsible."[106] Angola is much larger than Rwanda, and the UNAVEM II mission was necessarily spread out to provide voters access across vast rural spaces. Taking advantage of the autonomous nature of UN contingent units, each of the donated units would cover a different sector of Angola and operate with significant independence while maintaining communication with UNAVEM HQ in Luanda.[107] This set a precedent for operations in UNAVEM III, when the military force was much larger.

The UNAVEM III SITREPs detailed the arrival of new units in early 1995: each unit was responsible for their own reconnaissance and logistical support. The contingent commanders,

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[104] Hare, *Angola's Last Best Chance for Peace*, 23–87.

[105] Hare, 121–45.

[106] Anstee, *Orphan of the Cold War*, 437.

[107] Anstee, 287.

dividing Angola into Regional Commands, would meet monthly with the Force Commander and senior headquarters staff to ensure their autonomous operations were integrated into the whole mission. The SITREPs regularly featured these conferences, showing the open exchanging of views and collective planning.[108] Anstee also made efforts to advocate for her CMO. For example, when Major General Unimna departed from UNAVEM II in December 1992, it was decided that Brigadier General Nyambuya would replace him on a temporary basis. The DPKO was anxious over his inappropriately junior rank, but Anstee personally testified to his leadership elsewhere in UNAVEM and ensured his appointment. Later, Anstee again supported Nyambuya when the UN Military Adviser disagreed with his strategy in Angola, questioning how someone "all those thousands of miles away" could know better than her experienced commander on the ground.[109]

Regarding logistics, UNAVEM operations were also strained. The chief electoral official from UN HQ visited UNAVEM II and, confronting Regional Commanders, said that unlike "military men" that would fit resources to the job, they must fit the job in Angola to the resources. This philosophy would echo in the lack of support for UNAVEM II provided by UN supply. Anstee would regularly consult senior military leaders to identify their needs, then advocate for them internationally: Anstee sourced everything from tents to uniforms from governments rather than wait on UN provisions.[110] Anstee and Beye both advocated to enable their military component's missions. A SITREP from 21 May 1996 noted the visit of the UN Military Adviser and DPKO Chief of Staff to UNAVEM III. Instead of obscuring the realities on the ground (as Booh-Booh was criticized to have done in Rwanda), Beye "highlighted the difficult conditions" of UNAVEM team sites across Angola and urged his superiors in New York to support them.[111]

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[108] S-1829-0035-0001-00001 (United Nations Archives, April 3, 1995), 47, 81, 143, Management and Integration - Reporting to United Nations Headquarters, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Office of the Under-Secretary-General (OUSG) (1992-present), https://search.archives.un.org/s-1829-0035-0001-00001.

[109] Anstee, *Orphan of the Cold War*, 337–44.

[110] Anstee, 39, 65.

[111] S-1829-0032-0004-00001 (United Nations Archives, April 25, 1996), 205, Management and Integration - Reporting to United Nations Headquarters, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Office of the Under-Secretary-General (OUSG) (1992-present), https://search.archives.un.org/s-1829-0032-0004-00001.

SRSGs Anstee and Beye routinely advocated for their CMOs/FCs and mitigated the operational drawbacks of UN multinational force and logistical systems. Their work preempted the challenges to the functional goals of the civil-military relationship that strained Dallaire and Booh-Booh in UNAMIR. However, Anstee and Beye made a more impactful difference in achieving the relational goals of the civil-military relationship. Throughout UNAVEM II and UNAVEM III, their personal leadership would determine that final authority rested in the SRSG rather than the military component. They achieved this through the integration of mission components (contrasted with the frustrations of the isolated CIVPOL in Rwanda) and deliberately building a good working relationship with their CMOs/FCs.

One of the clearest examples of SRSG leadership continuing from UNAVEM II through UNAVEM III is the integration of the three mission components – civilian, military, and police. Early in UNAVEM II, Anstee established the routine of weekly meetings with the leadership of each of the three components. This was intended to provide them situational context from her perspective (as she was also meeting with Observer States, UN officials, and the political leadership of each side) and to establish a "team spirit" that would encourage better integration in actual operations.[112] Beye expanded this precedent in UNAVEM III, continuing the regular meetings that became the header of each weekly SITREP sent back to the DPKO.[113] Beye also organized a Civilian Security Management seminar in Luanda, with the stated aim of creating "an effective integrated security communication between all the three components" and to coordinate standard procedures between civilian, military, and police operations.[114] Anstee's leadership philosophy, embraced by Beye, reflected in shared operations throughout UNAVEM III. For example, a 3 July 1995 meeting brought together a prominent FAA Commander and the UNITA Deputy Police Chief, hosted by the CIVPOL Regional Commander and MILOBs. Instead of siloing police and military matters, the CIVPOL commander and the MILOBs were able to discuss more comprehensive (and effective) cooperation.[115] This cooperative dynamic

[112] Anstee, *Orphan of the Cold War*, 170.

[113] S-1829-0035-0001-00001, 3.

[114] S-1829-0032-0006-00001 (United Nations Archives, February 1, 1996), 24, Management and Integration - Reporting to United Nations Headquarters, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Office of the Under-Secretary-General (OUSG) (1992-present), https://search.archives.un.org/s-1829-0032-0006-00001.

[115] S-1829-0035-0001-00001, 42.

extended down to the local level: the SITREP from 2 July 1996 detailed joint patrols conducted by UN military personnel and CIVPOL officers, noting that their combined experience was securing "general freedom of movement for civilians" across Angola.[116] The critical lesson from the success of this thorough civil-military integration is that Anstee and Beye were able to achieve positive working relationships across the mission by taking the initiative themselves: in terms of the agency theory methodology, this is the civilian principal maintaining authority to delegate decision-making throughout their organization.

Although clearly in charge of their missions, Anstee and Beye would empower their CMO/FCs, from inclusion into important meetings to affording them opportunities to take important diplomatic steps with their military connections. Anstee frequently recorded traveling with her CMO, General Nyambuya, to conduct joint meetings with the MPLA and UNITA. However, they would also make separate and "parallel efforts through military and political channels" to effect changes in the position of one side or the other.[117] Beye continued to express this trust in his FCs. In mid-June 1996, Beye took his FC, General Sibanda, on a three-day visit to Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique to build regional support for the peace process.[118] When Beye departed for other trips alone, the FC would take over as mission chief, but Beye would appoint an Acting SRSG to fulfill the civilian and diplomatic roles – in this way, he would simultaneously empower his military counterpart without blurring responsibilities.[119] At other times, Beye's FC would conduct diplomacy through military channels alone. On 8 February 1996, General Sibanda met with General Matos, Chief of Staff of the FAA, to attempt to further cooperation between the government and UNITA military forces. The FC was able to dissuade General Matos of his distrust of UNITA's commitment to demobilization and even agree to joint FAA/UNITA demining activities, leaving the General "more receptive to… accommodating

[116] S-1829-0032-0004-00001, 40.

[117] Anstee, *Orphan of the Cold War: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992-93*, 351, 362.

[118] S-1829-0032-0004-00001, 69.

[119] S-1829-0035-0001-00001, 135.

UNITA."[120] Anstee and Beye both successfully built good working relationships with their CMO/FCs, aligning their chief military leaders with their intent as SRSGs.

The final way that Anstee and Beye accomplished the relational goals for a positive civil-military relationship was to take personal responsibility for the dangers of the mission. When some MILOBs were reluctant to take flights into risky areas and argued that this level of danger was beyond their mandate, Anstee herself took such journeys and cajoled them for not doing their duty.[121] Beye, too, set an example with a "leading from the front" mentality. The archived SITREPs illustrated the extent to which diplomatic movements in Angola were due to Beye's personal efforts. On 26 April 1996, the SRSG traveled deep into UNITA territory to meet with Savimbi, liaising between the UNITA leader and Observer States while himself persuading Savimbi to commit to quickening the peace process.[122] Ambassador Paul Hare, the US Special Envoy in Angola, attended this meeting with Beye as he did many other throughout UNAVEM III. Hare later wrote that Beye "was indisputably in command of the negotiations," bringing a "relentless intensity" as well as clarity to often "arcane" settlement talks.[123] Another example of Beye's stamina as diplomatic chief of UNAVEM III was his schedule for 7 February 1996. On this day, Beye met with the Russian Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs to call for Russian support; the heads of all UNAVEM components planning the extension of the mandate; separately with representatives from UNITA and the government; the European Commissioner to request financial aid; and the delegations to the Joint Commission, the main vehicle for bilateral peace negotiations.[124] The picture from these archival and secondary sources is of an SRSG following Anstee's model of indefatigable commitment to the peace process. The result for both leaders was twofold: that they gained the trust of important stakeholders in the peace process; and that they positioned themselves as the center of UNAVEM operations, taking responsibility and authority in their mission.

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[120] S-1829-0032-0006-00001, 87–89.

[121] Anstee, *Orphan of the Cold War*, 436.

[122] S-1829-0032-0004-00001, 246.

[123] Hare, *Angola's Last Best Chance for Peace*, 23–35.

[124] S-1829-0032-0006-00001, 104–5.

In characterizing the civil-military relationships of UNAVEM II and UNAVEM III, the narrative produced by the UN archives and eyewitness testimony naturally centers around the two SRSGs, Anstee and Beye. The prominence of these two figures in the documents from Angola attests to their leadership in their respective missions. Despite suffering from the same systemic logistical and multinational issues, as well as the fluid (and often insufficient) mandates produced by the UNSC, the civilian leaders at the head of UNAVEM were able to adapt and overcome. Through their efforts to address the concerns of their military components in a flawed bureaucracy, to integrate their various components through a philosophy of mutual trust and leadership presence, and to position themselves as the center of the peace process, Margaret Anstee and Maître Beye prevented the degradation of the civil-military dynamic.

**Comparison**

This thesis asked: what factors determine the health of civil-military relationships in UN peacekeeping operations? Both case studies demonstrated that UNPKO suffer from unique structural flaws: logistical and supply issues, multinational command authority, and inflexible or obscure mandates. Although issues of supply and mission clarity are ubiquitous considerations in military operations, the absence of strategic stores and contract-reliance of the UN logistical bureaucracy as well as the decision-making process in the UNSC to produce or change a mandate render these issues sufficiently specific to UNPKO. Taking from Feaver's agency theory, this thesis has determined that a military leader, raised in the ethos of "mission first" and with the expectation of a special moral duty, may find themselves tested by these unfamiliar structural flaws. When given responsibility of a humanitarian mission, a Force Commander may be specially tempted to bend or break the rules of the civil-military arrangement with their Special Representative to fulfill their ingrained moral identity. Additionally, the use of Feaver's agency theory to determine how civilian authorities can "course-correct" a degrading civil-military relationship revealed that the UN is significantly lacking in civilian monitoring and punishment mechanisms.

The most significant qualitative difference between UNAMIR and UNAVEM was in the quality of their Special Representatives. In the case of UNAMIR, Booh-Booh did not build a good working relationship with his military counterpart, Dallaire. Booh-Booh also did not

effectively mitigate the structural issues with UNPKO or advocate for Dallaire's operational needs in the sometimes Byzantine (and newly expanded) UN bureaucracy. Finally, Booh-Booh did not position himself successfully as the primary leader in the Rwandan peace process – having lost trust with the RPF and not remained mobile enough to influence events on the ground, Booh-Booh ceded diplomatic leadership of UNAMIR to Dallaire. In the case of UNAVEM, both SRSGs succeeded on all three conditions. The triangulation of their personal testimony, the records of their peers, and archival mission documents revealed that Anstee and Beye exercised more proactive, personal, and organizing leadership to deploy and control UNAVEM. They advocated for their military components, mitigating their concerns with the structural drawbacks of UNPKO. Anstee and Beye each diplomatically positioned themselves as the heart of the peace process, and therefore the indisputable leader of the UN presence in Angola. They took command while building positive relationships with their Force Commanders. This comparative case study indicates that if the Special Representative is sufficiently capable, they can preempt the challenges to the health of the civil-military relationship that arise from issues organic to UNPKO.

**Conclusion**

These findings prompt reflection on our expectations for UNPKO and identify a theoretical gap at the intersection of civil-military relations and peacekeeping. The conclusion that there are structural flaws in UNPKO naturally leads to the question of reform. The goal of this reform would be that someone raised in a conventional democratic military organization could "plug in" to the UN system and do their job as usual – but is it possible to transform UNPKO to resemble a "normal" military force? Regarding logistics, an operational commander would likely prefer a "push" organization – one where supply needs are anticipated and the UN maintains stores of mission-critical equipment, like radios and vehicles. However, logistical requires either a new source of funding or more regular funding by member states – considering that in 2024, only 152 of 193 member states paid their budget assessments in full (and that the United States, one of the largest economies, did not), this does not seem like a reliable pathway

for reform.[125] Changes to the nature of multinational command authority would suggest that member states surrender control of their donated units – this also seems unlikely, and if implemented would probably reduce state interest in troop contribution.

If the structural issues of UNPKO are likely to remain, the next question is how to consider the consequent challenges to democratic civil-military relations norms within these operations. The value of the UNAMIR case study is that the civilian authority refused to support the humanitarian mission, and if this legitimate authority was able to override its military agent, more Rwandans would have needlessly died. As Dallaire put it, it was a moral but illegal or, in the terms of democratic civil-military relations, an unethical outcome. The moral outcome was the result of the failure of the democratic civil-military norm. But can or should the UNPKO system be structured around this outcome, turning into the tide of military authority?

That this question can be asked is the contribution of this thesis. However, more work needs to be done to answer it. After the Cold War, Peter Feaver found that neither Huntington nor Janowitz provided a satisfactory theory to answer his questions, so he wrote agency theory. In the same vein, this thesis shows that a new theory for civil-military relations research is needed. Where else can the civilian authority be at a loss for control mechanisms while the military authority is also weakened because of the structure of their force? When the civil-military relationship is contingent on interpersonal relationships and the qualities of leadership more than coercive tools of governance, how does it function differently? Conventional democratic civil-military theories assume some degree of structural support on which the civilian principal can call. In UNPKO, there is no monolithic civilian organization, no guardrails for the relationship. Here, the civil-military relationship is much more reliant on the variable character traits of the SRSG. A new civil-military theory that could capture these dynamics would open a valuable trove of lessons from the span of UN missions.

Studying the role of civil-military relations in UN peacekeeping operations has value for both scholars and practitioners. This thesis represents a new avenue of research available for studies ranging from a similar historical case study to organizational research intended to improve UN operations today. When the cost of poorly understood operations is measured in

[125] General Assembly of the United Nations, "Contributions Received for 2024 for the United Nations Regular Budget," Committee on Contributions, December 30, 2024, https://www.un.org/en/ga/contributions/honourroll_2024.shtml.

human lives, there is a moral obligation to search for new perspectives. Civil-military relations in UN peacekeeping deserves a new look.

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