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On Secrecy: A Perspective from the Division of Labor

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On Secrecy: A Perspective from the Division of Labor

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Abstract

A broad discussion has examined whether democratic deliberation should occur in public or behind closed doors. Some scholars argue that public deliberation ensures citizens can monitor representatives' and the government's behavior, while others argue that deliberation's quality is ensured through closed meetings. This thesis offers an alternative perspective on this issue by analyzing the roles and responsibilities of citizens and governments from a division of labor perspective. It argues that democratic deliberation in closed meetings is justified.

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Introduction

The issue of governmental publicity, specifically the degree to which democratic deliberation processes should be disclosed to the public, is an important topic in contemporary democratic politics. This issue directly impacts how effectively citizens can hold their representatives and politicians accountable and affects their efficiency. On the one hand, transparency in government decision-making helps ensure that representatives and politicians can be held accountable by allowing citizens to see and evaluate their actions. This not only strengthens democratic oversight but also enables citizens to participate effectively by making judgments. On the other hand, full transparency can have adverse effects. An excessively transparent political environment places politicians and representatives under public scrutiny, compelling them to cater to public sentiments or to carefully manage their public image. This can lead political representatives to engage in political behaviors aimed at short-term popularity rather than long-term rational governance and public interest. Such pandering or performative politics inevitably harms the independence, efficiency, and public-oriented nature of decision-making.

Therefore, democratic societies must strike a balance between governmental transparency and the efficiency and independence of governmental decision-making processes. While transparency enables effective democratic accountability, excessive openness can undermine rational governance and lead to short-term, populist-oriented decision-making. Consequently, the essential question facing democratic politics is not simply a binary choice between transparency and secrecy but rather how to achieve a suitable balance that ensures democratic accountability without sacrificing governmental efficiency and rational decision-making.

Different philosophers have approached the issue of governmental transparency and secrecy from distinct theoretical perspectives. One prominent advocate of publicity is Kant, who emphasizes the “principle of publicity,” arguing that all governmental actions and policies must withstand the test of publicity. According to

Kant: “All the actions, relative to the right of another, whose maxim is not susceptible of publicity, are unjust.” (Kant, 1939:59) Kant’s justification thus centers primarily on the inherent moral value of the publicity principle itself.

Other philosophers also endorse the principle of publicity, but their arguments rely more on its practical consequences rather than its intrinsic moral value. For example, some argue that adherence to the publicity principle can effectively prevent government corruption and abuses of power while also enhancing citizens’ democratic supervisory capacity, thereby increasing governmental legitimacy and accountability.

In contrast, other scholars justify governmental secrecy by highlighting the potential negative consequences of transparency. They argue that transparency may induce politicians and democratic representatives to cater to short-term public sentiments and preferences, thereby undermining the rationality and quality of political decision-making. For instance, Dennis Thompson writes that if democratic policies were made public, they could not be carried out as effectively or at all (Thompson, 1999: 182). A certain degree of secrecy or closed deliberation can protect the independence of governmental decision-making, enabling politicians and representatives to pursue long-term interests and public reason more effectively.

Therefore, the debate surrounding publicity versus secrecy involves a wide range of discussions across multiple perspectives, including moral values, practical consequences, and efficiency, rather than being limited to any single theoretical perspective. Undoubtedly, all these arguments provide valid explanations and justifications for the government’s public or secret actions, helping people to understand them.

However, in addition to these perspectives, another approach worth exploring is based on the division of labor to understand political behaviors. The discussion begins with an examination of the roles of the government, citizens, and their representatives in a democratic society, followed by an analysis of the various obligations and duties associated with these roles. By distinguishing these responsibilities, we can gain

insight into political behaviors, specifically examining why some actions are kept secret and the justification for such secrecy. Therefore, it is essential to conduct a thorough analysis of the role of citizens within democratic societies, particularly examining their associated rights and responsibilities. In such societies, individuals assume various roles, ranging from government officials to ordinary citizens, each carrying distinct obligations and entitlements that shape their behaviors and objectives. To effectively fulfill their responsibilities, individuals must adopt measures appropriate to their assigned roles. By clearly defining the roles and objectives of specific individuals or groups, we can better comprehend their motivations and the rationale behind the actions they pursue. Consequently, this framework enables deeper insights into political behavior, particularly regarding the decisions to adopt transparency or maintain secrecy in various circumstances.

The aim of this thesis is to shift the focus from examining the moral value or outcomes of political behavior to investigating the roles and responsibilities of the government, citizens, and representatives as a basis for addressing the issue of publicity. This analysis will examine the responsibilities that the government should uphold in a democracy and how these responsibilities contribute to the legitimacy of its secrecy. Additionally, it will examine the role of citizens in a democratic society, their corresponding responsibilities, and the degree of transparency of government action they actually require. It will then discuss how citizens can hold their representatives and politicians accountable. Additionally, it is also essential to examine the representative mechanisms adopted by modern democratic societies. In most contemporary democratic societies, citizens cannot directly and comprehensively participate in governance or decision-making processes; instead, the representative system serves as the primary mechanism through which citizens exercise political rights. Within this system, the accountability mechanisms between politicians and the public play an important role.

My thesis unfolds as follows. In the first part, I will analyze the theories of Simone Chambers and Brian Kogelmann on secrecy and transparency. Their theories discuss

the need for secrecy from different perspectives. By analyzing their theories, the issue of publicity and secrecy can be better understood. In the second part, I will build on Thomas Christiano's theory on citizenship to discuss the division of labor in democratic politics, arguing, with Christiano, that the primary duty of the citizen is to determine the basic aims of the society, while the responsibility of the politicians and representatives lies in adopting the appropriate policies to achieve these aims; due to the difference in their respective duties, it provides a legitimizing basis for secrecy. In the third and fourth parts, I discuss in detail how the secrecy of political acts can be legitimate and further explore how the accountability of representatives can be addressed in the presence of secrecy.

Part I. Chambers's and Kogelmann's Theory

1. Chambers's Theory

As noted in the previous part, in democratic politics, publicity both secures citizens' right to know about the actions of their representatives and subjects those representatives to public oversight, thereby safeguarding the public interest and preventing corruption. At the same time, secrecy can enhance the quality of democratic deliberation, as specific sensitive issues are often difficult to discuss openly under full transparency. Thus, democratic governance must strike a balance between transparency and secrecy: it needs transparency to enable effective public scrutiny, while preserving a degree of secrecy to allow for in-depth, candid policy discussions.

When democratic deliberations occur in a public context, participants tend to shift from reasoned debate to performative appeals aimed at securing public approval, thereby undermining the depth of arguments and the deliberative quality. Conversely, moving deliberation into closed settings may enhance rational discussion by shielding participants from public pressure. In these spaces, political actors can more freely express their views and adjust their positions in response to argument, fostering deeper, more considered decisions. However, such secrecy can also exclude the public from meaningful participation, raising concerns about the democratic legitimacy of the outcomes.

To better understand the issue, Simone Chambers introduces the distinction between public reason and private reason, providing a more systematic account of how publicity affects democratic deliberation. *Public reason* refers to reasons that can be accepted by all those affected by a policy and that are suitable for justification in public settings. This form of reasoning respects diversity while structurally enhancing deliberative quality, as it compels participants to transcend particularistic interests and engage in deep, generalizable argumentation (Chambers, 2004:390).

However, Chambers also warns that public reason can devolve into *plebiscitory reason*. Under intense media scrutiny and electoral pressure, political actors may abandon complex reasoning in favor of simplified, emotionally charged rhetoric that appeals to the public (Chambers, 2004:389). Then those arguments maintain the surface appearance of public justification but lack what she called the “Socratic” depth of genuine deliberation. In such cases, the public sphere becomes a stage for image management and emotional mobilization rather than a space for critical exchange.

In order to enhance the quality of democratic deliberation, it is common for democratic deliberation to be moved to closed-door meetings, thus avoiding public scrutiny. In such secret settings, participants are free from the pressures of public expectations and engage in more candid discussions that lead to more substantive policy judgments. However, such settings also carry the risk of excluding accountability. Without the pressure to justify decisions to a broader audience, representatives may rely more heavily on *private reason*—arguments based on sectarian values, special interests, or culturally specific worldviews that lack general appeal (Chambers, 2004:391).

In such contexts, representatives may act as players, focusing on reaching agreements rather than providing publicly justifiable reasons. While the results of these negotiations may be efficient and technically competent, they often do not adequately represent the interests of all parties. As Jon Elster points out, on the one hand, “secrecy tends to induce bargaining, and publicity to induce argument.” (Elster, 1995:252) And arguing is better than bargaining because it encourages participants to argue in terms of the public interest. On the other hand, “private settings are better than public settings because they leave less room for precommitment strategies and overbidding” (Elster, 1995:250).

So, how can deliberative quality be preserved without sacrificing democratic legitimacy? Chambers argues that *plebiscitory reason* is an unavoidable feature of

mass democracy, but one that can and must be constrained through procedural norms (Chambers, 2004:398).

In public spheres, she advocates for the development of clear rhetorical standards, which she refers to as *deliberative rhetoric* (Chambers, 2004:402). These standards should prioritize the content of arguments over performative appeal, enabling citizens to evaluate political speech based on its arguments and public relevance. At the same time, the political literacy of citizens must be strengthened so that they are less easily manipulated and better able to recognize genuine public causes. In this way, the impact of *plebiscitory reason* is diminished, and the flaws of the public sphere are contained. And in closed-door deliberation, Chambers emphasizes the importance of *pluralism*. Even if the public is not directly involved, the diversity of perspectives must be reflected within the deliberative body (Chambers, 2004:405). Ensuring the presence of multiple views and interests can prevent domination by narrow elites and foster more representative outcomes. This would diminish the influence of private reason in closed-door deliberation and make it more likely that its participants would base their discussions on public interest.

Elster maintains: “the process ought to contain elements of both secrecy and publicity. With total secrecy, partisan interests and logrolling come to the forefront, whereas full publicity encourages grandstanding and rhetorical overbidding. Conversely, secrecy allows for serious discussion, whereas publicity ensures that any deals struck are capable of withstanding the light of day.” (Elster, 1998:117)

Chambers suggests that in the public sphere, it is desirable to utilize *public reason* while preventing the influence of plebiscitory reason, while in the secret sphere, it is desirable to try to represent a variety of viewpoints and prevent private reason from dominating. Only by coordinating these dimensions can democracy simultaneously uphold legitimacy and sustain the quality of political judgment.

In summary, Chambers introduces the concept of plebiscitary reasoning to highlight the risks posed by public deliberation under intense media and popular

pressure. She argues that to preserve the quality and legitimacy of democratic deliberation, closed-door discussions should incorporate a diversity of perspectives.

2. Kogelmann's Theory

Unlike Chambers, who focuses on the analysis of private reason and public reason in different contexts in the discussion of secrecy and publicity, Brian Kogelmann offers an alternative perspective for understanding secrecy in democratic politics. He pointed out that political equality is an ideal of democracy (Kogelmann, 2021:39). However, in practice, transparency often enables wealthy individuals and interest groups to monitor and influence legislators, thereby resulting in political inequality. Drawing on what he called the exchange theory (Kogelmann, 2021:42), he explains how financial and informational advantages are transformed into disproportionate political influence under transparent systems, thereby marginalizing the voices of ordinary citizens. To address this structural imbalance, Kogelmann advocates for mechanisms such as secret voting and closed deliberation. These mechanisms are designed to encourage legislators from external pressures and enable them to make decisions that focus on the public good. While secrecy may reduce accountability, he emphasizes it is necessary in promoting political equality and safeguarding democratic legitimacy.

According to Kogelmann, political equality is fundamental to democratic politics. If a democratic system is to be considered legitimate, it must not only ensure the formal right of every citizen to vote but also guarantee that all citizens substantively possess equal political influence (Kogelmann 2021: 36). However, in reality, factors such as wealth and access to information often lead to political inequality. For instance, economically privileged groups can leverage their financial resources to support specific politicians, thereby expanding their influence over political decisions. Likewise, groups with greater access to political information can more effectively shape policy outcomes compared to the public.

He analyzes the causes of political inequality in two ways. The first is the influence of campaign contributors, whose financial support grants them privileged access to legislators and enables them to influence the policymaking process through informal political exchanges (Kogelmann, 2021: 41). Instead of buying votes directly, contributors try to influence politics in other ways, such as getting support for or against bills in committees, adding helpful changes to legislation, or shaping which issues are discussed. Transparency facilitates these exchanges by allowing contributors to monitor whether legislators are fulfilling these implicit commitments (Kogelmann, 2021: 43–44). This increases legislators' dependence on wealthy contributors, thereby creating an incentive for them to serve the interests of contributors rather than the broader public. Meanwhile, ordinary citizens, lacking the financial means and monitoring capacity, are excluded from this process. Thus, rather than ensuring equal accountability, transparency entrenches unequal access to political influence and reinforces political inequalities.

However, the implementation of secrecy mechanisms, such as maintaining legislators' voting records and deliberative behavior secretly, can diminish the capacity of interest groups to oversee whether politicians have acted in accordance with their preferences. While secret voting prevents external actors from using vote tracking to enforce political loyalty, secret deliberation allows representatives to discuss candidly and change their minds without worrying about public criticism or pressure from contributors. By reducing the negative effects of money on decision-making, secret voting and secret deliberation ultimately promote genuine political equality (Kogelmann 2021:43).

Another cause of political inequality is the asymmetry of information (Kogelmann 2021:45). In democratic systems, interest groups often have access to more political information than the public, allowing them to exert pressure on politicians. An example cited by Kogelmann is the National Rifle Association (NRA), which systematically evaluates legislators' positions on the Second Amendment. Through scorecards and ratings, NRA members are better informed about politicians' voting

records on gun control than the average constituent (Kogelmann 2021:45). This information asymmetry enables the NRA to pressure legislators into supporting its agenda, even when such policies do not align with the preferences of the broader public.

If legislative proceedings, including votes and deliberations, were kept secret, interest groups like the NRA would no longer be able to track which legislators support or oppose specific policies. This would reduce the influence of interest groups, allowing politicians to make decisions based on public interest and rational judgment, rather than fearing retaliation from powerful lobbies.

Through these mechanisms, secrecy enables politicians to perform their duties more freely, thereby protecting political equality between interest groups and ordinary citizens and further advancing the ideal of political equality.

This section analyzes the respective theories of Chambers and Kogelmann, each of whom offers a distinct perspective on the role of secrecy in democratic politics. Through this analysis, we gain a better understanding of the problem of secrecy. Next, I will discuss the division of labor in democratic politics, primarily drawing on Thomas Christiano's theory of citizenship. I will then build on this analysis to address the issue of secrecy. Finally, I will further discuss the issue of accountability, examining the mechanisms that should be adopted to ensure democratic accountability.

Part II. The Division of Labor

The section will begin with an explanation of Plato's theory of the division of labor as presented in *The Republic*. This theory is considered a heuristic. It will then discuss the division of labor in democratic politics, drawing primarily on Thomas Christiano's theory.

By inquiring into the essence of "justice," Plato discusses how the roles of citizens and rulers might be delineated within an ideal city-state. A review of Plato's relevant theories provides the theoretical foundation and essential conceptual groundwork for the subsequent in-depth analysis of the roles of citizens and government, and their interactive mechanisms, in a democratic society.

In Book II of *The Republic*, Plato notes that a society, in order to sustain itself, must secure a reliable supply of essentials such as food and clothing (Plato 2000:51). Producing these necessities requires specialized labor, including agriculture and various handicrafts. Consequently, distinct social roles—farmer, tailor, blacksmith, and so forth—inevitably emerge. Plato goes on to emphasize the necessity of division of labor: if a farmer devotes himself exclusively to farming, he can produce larger quantities of higher-quality crops. By contrast, if he also attempts to take on other professions (such as tailoring), his divided attention will reduce efficiency and lower product quality (Plato 2000:51). By the same reasoning, tailors should concentrate on making garments and blacksmiths on forging metal.

According to Plato, the division of labor is essential for the state to function well. By allowing each person to perform their duties, the division of labor safeguards the state's order and lays the foundation for its development. This concept remains valuable even in today's democratic society. Democracy requires a division of labor. For example, policymakers, constitution writers, and negotiators each have their roles to play. This division of labor is essential for democratic politics to operate in an orderly manner. In the following analysis, I will discuss the division of labor theory in more depth and address the issue of secrecy.

In *The Rule of the Many*, Thomas Christiano systematically explores citizens' responsibilities and rights in a democratic society from the standpoint of "democratic equality." He argues that citizens take part in politics not only out of self-interest but also under the influence of moral factors; they actively contribute to collective self-rule and public deliberation (Christiano 2018:151). Citizens spend time, resources, and energy in furthering the legitimate interests of others and the community's shared goals, taking part in a collective project of self-governance. However, no society should place demands on its citizens that exceed their realistic capacities; otherwise, such excessive burdens risk undermining both citizens' willingness to engage and their sense of identification with public life.

Building on this view, Christiano discusses the role of citizenship in political decision-making at three levels: first, identifying what contribution citizens have a right to make to the political decision-making process; second, explaining what distinctive activities are important to the exercise of this right; and third, outlining what standards on those distinctive activities citizens ought to be able to satisfy (Christiano 2018:166). Christiano points out:

In our own society, the process of collective decision-making includes a variety of people with different roles. Legislators make laws and policies. Administrators decide how to carry out those laws in particular circumstances. Political parties organize around ideas about what laws ought to be made by the legislators and attempt to inform legislators and citizens about what the best laws and policies are. Interest groups also organize around ideas and interests and attempt to inform as well as pressure legislators and administrators to adopt certain policies and laws and to carry them out in certain ways. (Christiano, 2018:166-167)

It is precisely this division of roles that allows for the smooth formulation and execution of public decisions.

Then the question would be, what role do ordinary citizens play, or what contribution do citizens make in this system of division of labor? On the one hand, there are constraints in professional knowledge, time, and energy, and citizens often

cannot deeply engage in the more technical or specialized aspects of policymaking. On the other hand, citizens engage in daily affairs that relate to justice or equality, and these experiences provide a basis for citizens to participate in democratic policy. Christiano proposes a “choice of overall aims model,” arguing that citizens’ primary task is not to decide specifically how a public policy should be carried out but rather to determine *what kind of society* they want (Christiano 2018:167). Citizens should consider the overall needs of society and help decide on overall aims, such as universal healthcare, economic efficiency, and other key public priorities (Christiano 2018:167). Once citizens have reached a consensus on these fundamental values and aims, the government needs to figure out how to achieve those aims. The corresponding means, such as technical pathways, funding plans, or expert assessments, are best left primarily to government agencies, specialists, and political parties to develop and implement. If the government could genuinely achieve the aims decided by citizens, it would be properly fulfilling its duties.

It’s important to note that “means” and “aims” are not always clearly separated, as the process and the outcome can sometimes overlap (Christiano, 2018:170). In public policymaking, citizens are concerned with both outcomes and the means of achieving them. For example, citizens want to reduce the crime rate while respecting individual privacy. They do not want to lower the crime rate through unrestricted surveillance of personal lives. Thus, citizens not only select the aims they wish to see realized but also specify how these corresponding policies should be implemented, imposing certain principled constraints on the policymaking process (Christiano, 2018:170). Moreover, policy goals may come into conflict with one another (Christiano, 2018:171). For example, reducing taxes could interfere with improvements to public transportation and road infrastructure. In such instances, the steps taken to achieve one goal may impede progress on another. Policy formulation is therefore not merely about setting multiple goals, but also about prioritizing and balancing them. Citizens must weigh the importance of each goal, not merely about setting various goals, but a

value-consistent overall framework that guides the selection and implementation of specific policies (Christiano, 2018:171).

The “choice of basic aims model” has its own unique advantages compared with normative pluralism. The basic normative pluralist position is that citizens ought to have decision-making power in those areas where they are directly materially affected (Christiano, 2018:172). Citizens know more about their interests and expertise and know less about others. Thus, they will often underestimate the importance of others’ interests and overestimate the significance of their own interests (Christiano, 2018:173). By contrast, Christiano’s model explicitly requires all citizens to hold ultimate decision-making authority on matters crucial to society as a whole (Christiano 2018:175). This enables society to determine its overall aims and make decisions that consider everyone's interests.

Christiano further distinguishes two main political activities in which citizens engage: deliberation and pressure. These activities help citizens choose the basic social aims. (Christiano 2018:178). Pressure is the activity by which citizens promote their preferences in democratic decision-making through various means (e.g., voting, organizing political parties), and it embodies the adversarial element of democracy, especially in cases where differences of opinion are difficult to bridge. Based on such an activity, citizens can engage in a process of discussion and deliberation for mutual learning and understanding (Christiano 2018:178). Through such rational dialogue, different groups can mutually comprehend and reconcile competing perspectives, ultimately arriving at social aims. Christiano emphasizes that “pressure” should be largely directed toward selecting overall social aims (Christiano 2018:179). When pressure is applied without sufficient public deliberation, it can easily devolve into confrontation.

While citizens need to determine what they want for their society, this task is far from straightforward. If the goals put forth by citizens are nothing more than vague slogans, like “pursuing social justice” without specifying its meaning or implementation, then the government will struggle to develop corresponding policies.

Therefore, citizens must ensure that their proposed aims are articulated clearly and backed by sufficient reasoning or justification (Christiano 2018:188). They must also be prepared to subject these goals to others' challenges and criticisms within the context of public deliberation. Only when citizens place their own positions in dialogue and defense, integrating the interests and values of diverse groups and presenting well-reasoned arguments, can those goals earn broader recognition for their legitimacy and viability through competition and exchange.

In this process, citizens must actively listen to voices from different backgrounds and experiences. Whether they are ordinary workers, immigrants, or members of minority communities, every group's interests must be understood and acknowledged on a rational basis. Through comparing and weighing multiple perspectives, citizens can gradually form a deeper understanding of society, moving toward a more consensus-driven democratic decision that balances both justice and efficiency. This is why Christiano emphasizes that the democratic process relies not solely on pressure but also on public deliberation, so that citizens may establish basic goals with clear meaning and grounded in both reason and inclusivity. Only in this way can a democratic society reach genuine harmony and stability.

Corresponding to citizens in a democratic society is the role of the government and its agencies. While the citizen's core duty is clarifying what collective aims society should pursue, the government is responsible for choosing and implementing specific methods to realize these aims. More precisely, it is people such as political representatives, legislators, administrators, and other political groups who take measures to realize the aims chosen by citizens.

Therefore, the relationship between these governmental bodies or political representatives and citizens must be discussed carefully. Christiano discusses two models of government as an agent:

The legislative, the administrative, and the informal parts of the political system, such as political parties and interest groups, decide on the necessary means for achieving the citizens' ends. They are completely subservient to the wishes of the

electorate with regard to their aims. But they have discretion to choose how to realize the citizens' aims. In this model, the government acts as the citizens' trustee inasmuch as the government chooses means in accordance with its own expert judgments. The citizens do not contribute here; they leave these choices to the government for the most part. Conversely, the government is to act as delegate inasmuch as it is charged with advancing the aims that the citizenry decides upon; the government has no discretion on this matter. (Christiano 2018:171)

But there are substantive views that differ in whether the government is regarded as a trustee, a delegate, or both (Christiano 2018:213). According to Christiano, it should be a combination of the two. Precisely: "parties in a legislative assembly have the functions of *delegates* to citizens with regard to the aims of society and *trustee* to citizens with regard to the means for achieving these aims and the compromises necessary to resolve disagreements over the aims." (Christiano 2018:201) Thus, when it comes to achieving the aims set by citizens, the government has the autonomy to formulate policies and make trade-offs. When necessary, i.e., when citizens cannot agree on their aims, the government also has the autonomy to use its expertise to help them compromise and reach an agreement. However, when citizens have clearly expressed the basic aims of society, the government should be a delegate who strictly enforces these aims rather than adjusts them based on its own judgment.

Here I would like to discuss this issue in further detail, drawing on Pablo da Silveria's theory. DaSilveria discusses different models of political representation in a democratic environment: (a) "Representation as mandate" model, in which the representative is a transmission device that facilitates the aggregation of preferences. Representative is just express his constituents' will; (b) "Representation as controlled autonomy" model, in which the representative can make decisions based on his or her own judgment but must justify his choices; (c) "Representation as delegate" model, which emphasizes that citizens are free to choose their representatives, who have full autonomy in decision-making. The representative must protect the security and well-being of constituents. Then, citizens only need to be concerned with the outcome of

representatives' performance (DaSilveira, 2003: 10-11). Although DaSilveria uses the word "delegate" when discussing the third mode of representation, this is not the same as Christiano's usage. For DaSilveria, the delegate means that the government has full autonomy of decision, as long as it can protect the safety and well-being of its citizens. The government is not required to justify its actions or involve citizens in decision-making processes.

Considering the government as an agent, on the one hand, the government must respect the aims chosen by citizens and cannot act just based on its own opinion. Therefore, the "representation as delegation" mode is not appropriate. On the other hand, the government or representatives are not expressing citizens' will; they must formulate policies that achieve the aims chosen by citizens. Then it is not "representation as mandate."

In contrast, the "representation as controlled autonomy" mode has its own merits with respect to the division of labor. DaSilveria argues that there is a double demand for a representative with controlled autonomy: "First, her actions must be restricted to a set of previously defined procedures that are well known by the constituents. Second, she must be capable of providing an *ex post* justification of her own behavior that is satisfactory to the constituents." (DaSilveira, 2003: 11) When considering the division of labor, I believe that, since citizens choose the aims of society, attention should be given to whether the government follows those aims rather than the procedures. As long as the government is acting to achieve set aims, it should be up to the government to decide which course of action to take and which procedures to follow. But I agree that the government should provide an *ex post* justification for its actions. This is primarily to enable the government to justify its actions and demonstrate that it is working towards achieving set aims, rather than acting on its own desires.

In some cases, even when the government takes appropriate measures to achieve certain aims chosen by citizens, unforeseen circumstances can cause the results to differ from the intended outcome. In this case, focusing solely on the results could

create the false impression that the government is not doing anything or neglecting the aims of citizens, when in fact it is doing its best to fulfill its responsibilities. Thus, such an ex post justification provides an opportunity for the government to explain its “failures” (i.e., the failure to achieve aims), which could improve citizens’ understanding of the government’s actions. This understanding is necessary for maintaining the government’s credibility and facilitating the implementation of policies and measures in the future.

In summary, I would like to adopt the terminology to describe the role of the government in the division of labor framework. The government should be viewed as agents of *controlled autonomy*. In more detail, there are also two demands at this point, as follows: First, regarding the aims of society, the government should act in full accordance with the aims decided upon by the citizens. In this respect, they act as delegates of the citizens and cannot exercise their own judgment or autonomy. Second, when citizens’ aims are unclear or they hold different views on the aims, the government may deliberate with the citizens to help them establish their aims. Additionally, regarding measures to achieve the aims, the government has the autonomy to formulate policies and take measures to achieve the aims. But they must provide an ex post justification to citizens. In this respect, they act as trustees of the citizens, exercising their own judgment and autonomy.

In this section, I have discussed the tasks of citizens and the duties of the government, as well as the relationship between the government and citizens. Through this, I explained the details of the division of labor. Next, I will argue in defense of the secrecy of democratic deliberation processes based primarily on the analysis of the division of labor.

Part III. On Secrecy

The former sections provide a detailed discussion of the division of labor between citizens and government in a democratic society. The role of citizens in a democratic society is to decide and choose the overall aims of society, ensuring that these aims are clear and realistic. Meanwhile, the measures and policies to achieve these aims fall under the responsibility of the government. The central point of this section is based on the view of the division of labor to explore the issue of secrecy in the democratic deliberation process.

Although there are some scholars, Simone Chambers, for example, has argued that while democracy does require a certain degree of division of labor between policy framers, negotiators, constitutional writers, and so on, on the one hand, and the general public on the other, this division of labor should not exclude citizens from substantive deliberations about the issues all together (Chambers, 2004: 397). Nevertheless, this part attempts to justify secrecy in the democratic decision-making process from the perspective of the division of labor theory, thereby offering an alternative perspective to understand the behavioral patterns of governments and legislatures. Since the previous section discussed how Kogelmann justifies secrecy in voting, this section focuses on the secrecy in democratic deliberation processes.

As I have previously mentioned, when it comes to aims, the government (the agent) must act in full accordance with the citizens, which means acting in alignment with the aims they have chosen. The government can exercise its own judgment and autonomy only when it acts as a trustee in the pursuit of citizens' interests. Therefore, justification for secrecy in the democratic deliberation process will come from two sides. (a) First, it must be argued that secrecy does not impede the government's accountability when the government acts as a delegate, particularly when acting in accordance with the citizens' chosen aims. (b) Second, it must be justified that secrecy does not prohibit the accountability of the agent when the government acts as a trustee.

It is easier to justify secrecy when the government acts as a trustee. When the government acts as a trustee, it acts in the best interest of citizens. The government has the autonomy and discretion to formulate policies and take appropriate measures to achieve citizens' aims. At this point, citizens do not intervene in the government's deliberative and decision-making processes; they leave those processes entirely to the government. Because citizens demand the fulfillment of aims rather than transparency of the decision-making process, citizens hold the government accountable based on results rather than process. Secrecy in the democratic deliberation process does not undermine this requirement, as it does not affect citizens' ability to judge the results of the policy and hold the government accountable. Once these policies, laws, and measures have been formulated or implemented, citizens can judge whether they have achieved their chosen aims.

As I mentioned earlier, when governments act as trustees, they have autonomy in making decisions but must provide an *ex post* justification to citizens. This requirement enables citizens to understand the reasons behind government decisions, thereby helping them understand the government's actions and policies in terms of their outcomes. Then, it ensures citizens hold the government accountable. Obviously, secrecy in the democratic process does not affect this behavior and thus does not impact the government's accountability to the citizens.

Now, I would like to address the other argument: how can secrecy be justified when the government acts as a delegate? This argument is slightly more complicated because, when acting as a delegate, the government must act based solely on the will of the citizens and the aims they have decided upon. To ensure this, transparency seems necessary, i.e., the government's decision-making process should be open to citizens so they can assess the agents' behavior during the deliberation process and determine whether the agents acted in accordance with the citizens' will and aims. While this requirement may seem to conflict with secrecy at first, I will argue that it does not impede the accountability of the agent, even if the government is required to act as delegates. Next, I will argue this issue from two perspectives.

First, I would argue that it is not feasible to judge whether representatives have acted in accordance with the interests of the citizens by merely observing their behavior and arguments during the democratic deliberation process. More precisely, even if the democratic deliberation process is kept secret, it does not affect citizens' judgments. In other words, secrecy does not impede accountability.

When citizens demand openness in democratic deliberation processes, they assume that representatives' behavior during these processes, such as arguing or voting, will directly reflect their intentions. Thus, by observing their representatives' behavior, citizens can deduce their intentions and judge whether their representatives are acting in their interests. However, in my view, disclosure merely facilitates citizens' analysis of representatives' actions and helps them judge whether their interests are being considered. This is not substantially different from judging whether citizens' interests are being considered based on the results of democratic deliberation. In other words, citizens can judge whether representatives defend citizens' interests by examining the outcome of democratic deliberation because the outcome reflects the collective's overall decision. If the policy outcome contributes to achieving the citizens' aims, then their interests are being served. Conversely, if the policy outcome does not achieve the citizens' aims, then their interests are not being served. Secrecy in the democratic deliberation process does not prevent citizens from knowing the policy outcomes and from judging whether their interests are being considered. Therefore, secrecy does not affect agents' accountability to the citizens.

Democratic deliberation can be understood analogously to an individual's process of reasoning. In this analogy, the primary focus is on the conclusions ultimately reached rather than on the internal mental steps taken. Just as one can evaluate a person's beliefs or intentions based on the results of their reasoning rather than the details of their mental deliberations, the public can also evaluate the validity of democratic decision-making by examining its outcomes. Specifically, the extent to which resulting policies advance the interests of citizens is a meaningful basis for judgment. Thus, secrecy does not impede representatives' accountability.

Second, I will justify secrecy when the agent acts as a delegate by drawing on Dorota Mokrosinska's theory on the democratic legitimacy of state secrecy. She first noted that "arriving at a policy program that implements the policy goal is a matter of collective action; thus, we are talking about [individual] accountability for the outcome of collective action." (Mokrosinska, 2024:99) Since the achievement of policy goals is usually the result of collective action, she argues that whether secrecy impedes accountability must be determined by whether individuals can be held accountable (Mokrosinska, 2024:99). And there are two models of attributing responsibility to the individuals of a collective: (a) the *equal responsibility* model and (b) the *proportional responsibility* model (Pasternak, 2011:190).

Under the equal responsibility model, all members are equally accountable for the outcome, regardless of their individual contributions. Therefore, accountability remains intact even if voting or arguing behavior is concealed due to secrecy because there is no need to identify the specific actions of individual members (Mokrosinska, 2024:99).

However, under the proportional responsibility model, the situation becomes more complex. This model assigns responsibility based on each member's contribution to the final decision. For example, it requires knowing whether a particular vote was pivotal. When the legislative process is conducted in secrecy, such information becomes inaccessible, making it difficult or impossible to determine each individual's level of responsibility. Thus, under this model, secrecy poses a barrier to individual accountability.

Nevertheless, Mokrosinska offers an important alternative. She argues that when secrecy is necessary to protect the legislature's ability to make decisions, such as ensuring effective deliberation or avoiding deadlock, accountability should shift from individuals to the collective (Mokrosinska, 2024:100). The responsibilities of the collectives have been discussed by, for example, Philip Pettit, who argues that when a group can act independently and make decisions, it should bear responsibility (Pettit, 2007: 172). Mokrosinska argues that if the collective is treated as a single responsible

body, then all members should be held equally accountable for the outcome (Mokrosinska, 2024:100). Since all members have equal status, this form of collective accountability functions similarly to the equal responsibility model. Consequently, secrecy does not undermine accountability.

In summary, according to the division of labor, citizens are responsible for choosing the overall aims of society, while the government is responsible for achieving those aims. Whether the government acts as a delegate or trustee, secrecy does not impede the government's accountability. In the next section, I will discuss the mechanisms that can help citizens hold the government accountable.

Part IV. On Accountability

Accountability is an important part of democracy, especially when democratic deliberations are taking place behind closed doors, and it ensures that those who make decisions and formulate policies, particularly politicians and representatives, are held responsible for the consequences of their actions. Within the framework of the division of labor, citizens decide the overall aims of society, and politicians are responsible for formulating and implementing policies to achieve those goals. The relation between citizens and government is not completely independent, even though the division of labor is clear.

As I have noted earlier, first, regarding the aims of society, the government should act in full accordance with the aims decided upon by the citizens. In this respect, they act as delegates of the citizens and cannot exercise their own judgment or autonomy. Second, regarding measures to achieve the aims, the government has the autonomy to formulate policies and take measures to achieve the aims. Additionally, they must provide an *ex post* justification to citizens. In this respect, they act as trustees of the citizens, exercising their own judgment and autonomy. Therefore, in this section, I will address the issue of the government's accountability from these two demands.

When the government acts as a delegate, it is important to elect representatives and politicians who will likely act in accordance with the will of the people. Then the question is who the most suitable representatives are to formulate policies and make decisions in closed-door processes that will achieve the people's aims. Here, I discuss how to achieve this by drawing on Jane Mansbridge's discussion on *gyroscopic representation*.

For gyroscopic representation, the most important point is that:

In this model of representation, voters select representatives who can be expected to act in ways the voter approves without external incentives. The representatives act like gyroscopes, rotating on their own axes, maintaining a certain direction, pursuing certain built-in (although not fully immutable) goals. (Mansbridge, 2003: 520)

Generally, citizens in this representation model choose people who are, as James D. Fearon describes, a “good type”, with several characteristics: (a) a candidate with similar policy preferences, (b) being honest and principled (hard to buy off), and (c) being skilled (Fearon, 1999: 68). While these characteristics are not the only ones to which citizens pay attention when choosing a representative, they are important. Those who are elected are most likely to act in the interests of the citizens and in accordance with their aims only when these requirements are fulfilled. Under these conditions, their future behavior is predictable for citizens (Mansbridge, 2003: 521).

The gyroscopic representation relies on citizens’ ability to assess a representative’s internal motivations, such as conscience and principles, at election time. Unlike traditional models, which rely on promises or electoral incentives to control representatives, this mechanism depends on representatives’ internal motivations and self-discipline. This establishes predictability. Thus, candidates must be honest with those citizens, and citizens must be able to judge a candidate’s character, principles, and likely future behavior (Mansbridge, 2003: 521).

To better align the gyroscopic representation model with the division of labor theory, two important modifications should be emphasized. First, the model focuses on selecting representatives with similar preferences, particularly choosing individuals whose inclinations can reliably be predicted to align with the citizens’ *aims*. This requirement is the most important feature. In other words, the election process must prioritize identifying candidates whose values and motivations deeply align with the citizens’ chosen aims. A representative can only be trusted to act in accordance with citizens’ goals when their internal motivations match those goals. Although the original model of gyroscopic representation mentioned this as well, I believe it should be emphasized more to ensure that elected representatives act in accordance with the citizens’ goals.

This perspective must be revised under the division of labor framework. In this framework, representatives should be held accountable for their achievements in realizing the goals set by the citizens. Since representatives’ primary responsibility is

to take measures to fulfill the citizens' aims, their accountability must ultimately be to the citizens. Thus, this model must incorporate mechanisms that evaluate whether representatives have adhered to the citizens' goals, rather than merely whether they have acted in accordance with their own beliefs.

By adopting this gyroscopic representation model, we can effectively meet the two previously mentioned demands for the agent. First, the government (the agent) acts as a delegate, which requires it to act in accordance with the citizens' aims. This condition is met because, in the gyroscopic representation model, the chosen representatives are those whose future actions are predicted to align with the citizens' chosen aims. Second, when the government acts as a trustee. In the gyroscopic representation model, the elected representatives are emphasized as principled and skilled; they have the capabilities to act on their own judgments while adhering to the citizens' chosen goals. As such, they have the autonomy to formulate policies and make decisions. Overall, this mode of gyroscopic representation aligns well with the division of labor framework and meets the agent's requirements within it.

Finally, in response to the government's *ex post* justification to citizens, I would like to address this issue by referencing Kogelmann's discussion of testimonial accountability.

The public exhibits Testimonial Accountability with respect to a secret deliberative body if and only if members of the body release statement to the public explaining, justifying, and criticizing the body's decision (Kogelmann, 2021: 77). Even when a policy fails to achieve its intended goals, if political representatives or the government can later articulate the rationale and considerations behind the decision, the public can still gain an understanding of the logic behind decision-making. In cases where good intentions lead to harmful outcomes, testimonial accountability enables responsibility to be assessed not only by results but also through a more comprehensive moral and rational evaluation.

Within the framework of the division of labor, I believe two points are particularly important when citizens hold their governments and representatives accountable for

policy outcomes. First, the policy outcomes themselves are important because they allow citizens to see whether the chosen aims are being achieved. Second, the logic and reasons behind the policy formulation are important.

Regarding the second point, it is also necessary because the government can justify its actions, especially when its policies and measures have not achieved the desired results, precisely when they do not meet the citizens' aims. As we have argued, the government (the agent) has the autonomy to formulate policies and laws, and these actions can take place behind closed doors. Ideally, these formulated policies will fulfill their intended purpose and produce satisfactory results. However, there are times when formulated policies do not achieve citizens' goals. This is not necessarily because citizens' interests are not considered or because representatives do not formulate measures in line with citizens' goals. It may simply be that the policy fails due to too much resistance in practice or for some other unpredictable reason. This justification demonstrates to citizens the logic behind the policy and indicates that their interests and the aims have been considered.

I suggest that the ex post justification is necessary for the division of labor, especially when the government acts as a trustee. This can help citizens hold the government accountable. Citizens evaluate the government's actions based on the results of its policies. They also understand the logic behind the government's policies and actions, through the justifications provided, which makes their understanding of the government's actions more complete. Such an ex post justification improves the accountability mechanism within the framework of the division of labor.

In summary, two mechanisms are essential for ensuring representatives' accountability within the framework of the division of labor. One is the gyroscopic representation model, which makes the behavior of the elected representatives predictable and ensures they act in accordance with the aims decided by the citizens. This model also grants the representatives autonomy to formulate policies and make decisions to achieve these goals effectively. The other is testimonial accountability, which enables the government to justify its policies and actions. Thus, when

democratic deliberation takes place behind closed doors, citizens are able to hold the government accountable for its actions. By combining these two mechanisms, the accountability mechanism is complete under the division of labor framework.

Part V. Conclusion

This thesis presents a discussion of secrecy in democratic deliberation processes, justifying secrecy based on the theory of the division of labor. The thesis is primarily based on an analysis of the roles and responsibilities of citizens and the government in democratic politics and discusses their respective behavioral patterns in the democratic process. Drawing on Thomas Christiano's theory, I argue that the task of the citizen is primarily to choose a society's basic aims, while the government formulates policies to achieve them. Therefore, the government's accountability to the citizens should focus on the results of policies rather than the processes of formulating them. Governments have autonomy in policy formulation; it is thus justified for democratic deliberative processes to take place behind closed doors.

In the first part, I discuss the theories of Simone Chambers and Brian Kogelmann. Chambers proposes a distinction between public reason and private reason to understand public and secret deliberation. This distinction provides a meaningful perspective on the issue of secrecy. Kogelmann argues that secrecy is better able to achieve political equality in a democratic society than publicity. Their theories are extremely informative when discussing the secrecy of democratic deliberation. Therefore, I introduce their arguments to provide background for the later parts.

Then the second part analyzes the division of labor in a democratic society, drawing on Christiano's theory. Based on his analysis of the role of citizens in democratic societies, I argue that the duty of the citizen is primarily to choose the overall aims of a society, while the government's duty is to formulate policies to achieve them. And I emphasize that regarding the aims of society, the government should act in full accordance with the aims decided upon by the citizens. Additionally, regarding measures to achieve the aims, the government has the autonomy to formulate policies and take measures to achieve the aims. But they must provide an ex post justification to citizens.

Based on the above analysis, I defend the secrecy in democratic deliberation processes from two perspectives. When the government acts as a trustee, I argue that citizens hold the government accountable for policy outcomes. Secrecy in democratic deliberation does not affect this demand. As for the government acting as a delegate, I draw on Dorota Mokrosinska's theory. Through two models of accountability, the equal responsibility model and the proportional responsibility model, I suggest that even if the government acts as a delegate, secrecy does not impede the government's accountability.

Finally, I examined the issue of accountability within the framework of the division of labor. I suggest that two mechanisms are essential, one is the gyroscopic representation model, which makes representatives act in accordance with the aims decided by the citizens. And the other is testimonial accountability, which enables the government to justify its policies and actions. By combining these two mechanisms, the accountability mechanism is complete under the division of labor framework.

In summary, I believe closed deliberations offer unique advantages to democratic societies. They can enhance the quality of deliberation without undermining democratic legitimacy and without impeding citizens' ability to hold the government and representatives accountable.

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