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(Un)Desired Voices: Organized Indonesian Indo's Aspirations Surrounding the 1955 Elections and Transitional Period

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**(Un)Desired Voices:
Organized Indonesian Indo's Aspirations Surrounding the 1955 Elections and
Transitional Period**



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Introduction

After registrations for the first Indonesian elections opened in May 1954, a small political party, mostly composed of Indos, named the Persatuan Indonesia Nasional (National Indonesian Unity, PIN), announced its participation. They were pursuing legal assimilation and cultural integration into the project of Indonesia. However, one month later the PIN flipped their stance. PIN leaders argued that there were too many parties with similar aims. Hence, the PIN should work together instead of participating. Yet again in March 1955, PIN leaders announced their participation in East Java. They stated that this was the best way to accelerate integration and assimilation, while explicitly rejecting the idea of participating as a minority party. This was because “*de jure*”, vice chairman Hage later explained, there were no minorities in Indonesia.¹

Generally, the first national Indonesian elections of 1955 have been heralded as the pinnacle of Indonesian democracy since they were held.² Voter participation was high and optimistic, while the results adequately reflected to population’s political preferences according to American and Indonesian observers. Voters held high expectations for Indonesia’s future, among others regarding the end of the perceived transitional period after the Round Table Conference (RTC). However, there has been limited research in this context about the societal participation of minorities, like those of Chinese, European, and Arab descent, during this period. The temporary constitution guaranteed a minimum quota of seats for these three groups in parliament and the to be established Konstituante (Constituent Assembly). Thereby, Indonesian leaders continued to institutionalize a form of colonial societal participation that was intertwined with certain perceptions regarding foreign descent groups. This inspired intricate debates and practices regarding the position of foreign descent groups in Indonesia versus the so-called “indigenous” Indonesians. For example, what moved the PIN’s wobbly stance in their attempt to navigate these different debates and practices in Indonesian society?

Consequently, the main focus of this study is on the aspirations and worldviews of organized Indonesian Indos during the 1950s regarding their participation in Indonesian society. How and why did Indos organize and attempt to claim space in society for themselves? What aspirations and views did Indos deem important for what reasons? What structures enabled or limited their activism? To what extent did colonial heritages influence these debates and practices?

¹ “PIN Oost-Java over de minoriteitsgroepen,” *De Locomotief*, 13 February, 1956.

² Herbert Feith, *The Indonesian Elections of 1955* (Cornell University, 1957), 49-50.

This thesis aims to engage with two debates in historiography, namely those of Indos and ‘Indonesianness’ in the 1950s. First, this thesis departs from dominant historical narratives on Indos in Indonesia to recover the worldviews of Indonesian Indos. These have largely been ignored, erased, or replaced through (partial) epistemic violence.³ Second, the aim is to interact with scholarship of the Indonesian 1950s to question how Indonesian Indos engaged with, mobilized, or modified ‘Indonesianness’ and to enable their visions of an Indonesian future.

Regarding the historiography of Indos, academic dominant narratives have largely been derived from the postcolonial afterlives of those who chose to move from Indonesia, whereas those who chose to live in Indonesia have received little attention.⁴ Their voices, epistemologies, and worldviews have to different extents been denied, erased, or replaced in dominant historical narratives. Spivak has conceptualized this phenomenon as “epistemic violence”. Epistemic violence occurs when certain kinds of knowledge are legitimized over other epistemologies while (violently) erasing or replacing the latter.⁵ The emerging stereotype of the *warga negara* (citizen) during the 1950s became an important tool in epistemic violence to differentiate these Indos from *Indische Nederlanders* and so-called “indigenous” Indonesians. Furthermore, many Dutch citizens initially associated *warga negara* with being an opportunist or traitor for abandoning their ‘Dutch father’. Moreover, many Dutch and Dutch-oriented Indos perceived maintaining Dutch citizenship as the only logical choice after Indonesian independence. New labels were introduced during the late 1950s, like *achterblijvers* (stragglers) and *spijtoptanten* (regretters). These referred to struggling, poor, and elderly Indos in Indonesia, who remained against their will in a foreign, hostile society because of their poverty, lack of choice, and third-party manipulation. Over time, these stereotypes have become largely synonymous and highly influential in shaping the portrayal and study of Indonesian Indos.

These narratives are rooted in the earliest academic studies of Indos. “Founding father” and Indo Paul van der Veur’s highly regarded dissertation on Indo socio-political group forming and his later articles argued that Indos had strong Dutch orientations and enjoyed the many benefits of Dutch citizenship. Van der Veur contrasted this to the “relatively few reasons” to

³ For a more in-depth discussion see the researcher’s unpublished tutorial essay written in preparation of this thesis. Max Rooyackers, “A Postcolonial Reflection on Indonesian Indo-Europeans in Dominant Historical Narratives in the Netherlands and Indonesia” (Tutorial Essay, Leiden University, 2025).

⁴ Rooyackers, “Postcolonial Reflection,” 7-8.

⁵ Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ““Can the Subaltern Speak?” revised edition, from the ‘History’ chapter of Critique of Postcolonial Reason,” in *Can the Subaltern Speak? Reflections on the history of an idea*, ed. Rosalind C. Morris (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 35-37.

continue living in the archipelago.⁶ Dutch Indos have generally presented the choice for Dutch citizenship as the only logical choice. They contrasted it to the forced, illogical, or opportunist choice for Indonesian citizenship. Narratives by Van der Veur and Dutch Indos concluded that conflict, poverty, isolation, lack of choice, and manipulation of the *achterblijvers* forced them to be stuck in a foreign, hostile society. These narratives have also been circulated to different extents by Wassenaar-Jellesma's 1969 research, Ellemers and Vaillant's 1985 migration study, De la Croix' 1997 book, Meijer's 2004 study, Rijkschroeff and Kwa's 2011 publication, Jacobson's 2018 dissertation, and Indisch Herinneringscentrum's 2023 overview of migration.⁷ The researcher's pilot study into the portrayals of Indos in Indonesia argued that they have been viewed as 'Dutch colonials'. Indos have been analysed as Dutch citizens in frames and research questions related to the Dutch late colonial era. Generally, such research emphasized why Indos moved away from Indonesia with the (implicit) notion that Indo postcolonial afterlives in Indonesia were impossible.

The shock of the violent, uprooting decolonization has already been connected to forms of nostalgia regarding the late colonial era.⁸ The researcher argued in his pilot study that this is also connected to the portrayal of Indonesian Indos and their subsequent gap in academic studies. Regarding these portrayals, Annemarie Cottaar and Wim Willems challenged in 1984 the highly positive conclusions of assimilation through analysing Indo assimilation and Dutch portrayals influenced by ethnocentrism and racial superiority from the late colonial era to the 1960s.⁹ Earlier research, like Kraak's 1957 government-sponsored research, Wassenaar-Jellesma's 1969 account of the repatriation, and Van Amersfoort's 1974 overview of

⁶ Paul W.J. van der Veur, *Introduction to a Socio-Political study of the Eurasians of Indonesia* (Dissertation, Cornell University, 1955), 391-417; Wim Willems, "De wetenschappelijke stand van zaken over Indische Nederlanders," in *Indische Nederlanders in de ogen van de wetenschap*, ed. Wim Willems (Leiden: Centrum voor Onderzoek van Maatschappelijke Tegenstellingen, 1990), 13.

⁷ H.C. Wassenaar-Jellesma, *Van Oost naar West. Relas van de repatriëring van 1945 tot en met 1966* (Den Haag: Staatsdrukkerij, 1969); 75-80, 83; J.E. Ellemers and R.E.F. Vaillant, *Indische Nederlanders en Gerechtvaardigden* (Muiderberg: Dick Coutinho, 1985), 126-128; Humphrey de la Croix, *Indië herinnerd en beschouwd. Sociale geschiedenis van een kolonie (1930-1957)* (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij KJBB, 1997), 100-102; Hans Meijer, *In Indië geworteld, de twintigste eeuw. De geschiedenis van Indische Nederlanders* (Bert Bakker, 2004), 313-316, 372; B.R. Rijkschroeff and G.A. Kwa, *Spijtoptanten en Achterblijvers* (Onsbos, 2011), 48; Liesbeth Jacobson, *'The Eurasian Question'. The colonial position and postcolonial options of colonial mixed ancestry groups from British India, Dutch East Indies and French Indochina compared* (Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2018), 183-189; Indisch Herinneringscentrum, *De Atlas van de Oversteek: naoorlogse migratie vanuit Indonesië naar Nederland* (Zutphen: Walburgers, 2023), 77.

⁸ Sarah de Mul, "Nostalgia for Empire: 'Tempo doeloe' in contemporary Dutch literature," *Memory Studies* 3, no. 4 (2010): 425; Andrew Goss, "From Tong-Tong to Tempo Doeloe: Eurasian Memory Work and the Bracketing of Dutch Colonial History, 1957-1961," *Indonesia* no. 70 (2000): 28-30; Tom van der Geugten, "Het zelfbeeld van Indische Nederlanders," *Jambatan, Tijdschrift voor de Geschiedenis van Indonesië* 8, no.1 (1990): 8-9.

⁹ Annemarie Cottaar and Wim Willems, *Indische Nederlanders. Een onderzoek naar beeldvorming* (Den Haag: Moesson, 1984), 9-12.

assimilation, concluded that the socio-cultural assimilation of Indos went very smoothly.¹⁰ This critical view of Indos in Dutch narratives has been cemented by the yearly *Indische* study days between 1989-2004, which included new scholars like organizer Willems and established ones like Van Der Veur. These scholars aimed to address the many gaps in historiography on Indos while advocating new, identity-focused approaches. Willems, Bruin, Cleintaur, Doorn, and Van der Veur discussed the state of academia on Indos mainly through theories of identity in the first published volume in 1990. This inspired a drastic increase in academic and societal output on Indos.¹¹ However, these narratives have only been partially decolonized. While various studies have delved into the portrayals of Dutch Indos and forms of colonial nostalgia, these have not been extended to include Indonesian Indos.

There is an overlap between Dutch socio-political historical research and migration studies regarding portrayals of Indonesian Indos, but also regarding frames and questions. Generally throughout Dutch academic studies, if the temporal frame has been extended to the postcolonial era, then this is often done to explicitly or implicitly explain *why* Indos moved to the Netherlands. De la Croix' 1997 study ended in 1957, when most Dutch citizens were expelled from Indonesia, while Meijer's 2004 book and Liesbeth Jacobson's 2018 comparative migration dissertation ended in the 1960s, when the last so-called *spijtoptanten* were allowed to move to the Netherlands.¹² Furthermore, the Dutch government sponsored the writing of the long-term social-political history of the *Indische Nederlander* (Dutch Indo), which resulted in three in-depth publications between 2001 and 2004 by Willems, Ulbe Bosma, Remco Raben, and Hans Meijer.¹³ Lizzy van Leeuwen's 2008 analysis of Indo cultural expressions in the Dutch postcolonial discourse argued that Indo postcolonial debates have largely been avoided and depoliticized.¹⁴ Over time, these studies have increasingly focused on 'Dutch' settings, frames, and perspectives, while postcolonial angles have been limited to analysis of forms of colonial nostalgia built upon idealizations of the late colonial era, compared to the violent decolonization and migration.

¹⁰ J.H. Kraak, *De repatriëring uit Indonesië. Een onderzoek naar de integratie van de gerepatriëerden uit Indonesië en de Nederlandse samenleving* (Den Haag: Instituut voor Sociaal Onderzoek van het Nederlandse Volk, 1957); Wassenaar-Jellesma, *Repatriëring*; J.M.M. van Amersfoort, *Immigratie en minderheidsvorming. Een analyse van de Nederlandse situatie 1945-1973* (Alphen aan de Rijn: Samsom, 1974), 86.

¹¹ Wim Willems (ed.), *Indische Nederlanders in de ogen van de wetenschap* (Leiden: Centrum voor Onderzoek van Maatschappelijke Tegenstellingen, 1990); Wim Willems, "Wetenschappelijke stand," 12-13.

¹² Meijer, *In Indië geworteld*; De la Croix, *Indië herinnerd en beschouwd*; Jacobson, *The Eurasian Question*'.

¹³ Wim Willems, *De uittocht uit Indië, 1945-1995* (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2001); Ulbe Bosma and Remco Raben, *De oude Indische wereld. De Geschiedenis van Indische Nederlanders 1500-1920* (Bert Bakker, 2003); Meijer, *In Indië geworteld*.

¹⁴ Lizzy van Leeuwen, *Ons Indisch Erfgoed, Naoorlogse Strijd om Cultuur en Identiteit. Herziene Druk* (Zutphen: Walburgpers, 2024), 17, 26-29, 355.

Indonesian historical research on Indos has been influenced by a similar narrow focus on the late colonial era and the view that Indos are essentially ‘Dutch colonials’.¹⁵ Works that go beyond the temporal scope of the colonial era, like works on beauty standards, the entertainment industry, or revolution propaganda, only describe Indos without analysing Indo voices, thoughts, or worldviews.¹⁶ Only a small number of biographies exist of Indonesian Indos, with most of them about the national hero and lieutenant Pierre Tendean, who was killed during the 1965 coup attempt.¹⁷ However, Tendean’s cultural Indo formation was largely removed by writers as they equated it with Dutch colonialism.¹⁸ The researcher of this thesis was formed in this Indonesian strand of historiography, where he has tried to recover some of the Indonesia-oriented Indos during the late colonial era and revolution.¹⁹ This is continued here on a more critical, in-depth note.

Lastly, academia outside Indonesia and the Netherlands has been less influenced by these circulated frames and narratives. Hewett’s 2016 oral history dissertation on postcolonial Indonesian Indo communities studied their identity and memory.²⁰ One chapter was devoted to historical narratives in transnational Indo communities. Hewett analysed memories of colonial nostalgia and the negative trauma of war and discrimination among Indos in the Netherlands and Indonesia, which turned out to be radically different.²¹ However, only the memories of

¹⁵ Some examples focusing on Indo-Europeans or *Indische* culture are Susanto, *Kanonisasi Budaya, Masyarakat Indis Surakarta di Tengah arus pergolakan budaya* (Surakarta: Selaklali, 2023); Tedy Hernawan, *Dalam bayang-bayang modernitas. Orang-orang Indo di Kota Magelang pada Akhir Masa Kolonial* (Bangkalan: Penerbit Terang, 2021); Pradipto Niwandhono, *Yang ter(di)lupakan. kaum Indo dan benih nasionalisme Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Djaman Baroe, 2011); Djoko Soekiman, *Kebudayaan Indis dari zaman Kompeni sampai Revolusi* (Depok: Komunitas Bambu, 2011).

¹⁶ Muhammad Yuanda Zara, “Attracting and Educating ‘New Citizens’: Indonesian Public Discourse on the Integration of Indo-Europeans Into Indonesian Society During the Dutch-Indonesian War (1945-1947),” *ASEAS-Advances in Southeast Asian Studies* 15, no. 1 (2022): 61-85; Didit Widiatmoko Suwardikun, “Wajah Indo dalam Iklan Tahun 1950an,” *Panggung* 26, no. 2 (2016): 128-138; Luh Ayu S. Prasetyaningsih, *The Maze of Gaze: The Color of Beauty in Transnational Indonesia* (Dissertation, University of Maryland, 2007), 124-127; Aquarina Priyatna Prabasmoro, *Becoming White: Representasi Ras, Kelas, Feminitas dan Globalitas dalam iklan Sabun* (Yogyakarta: Jalasutra, 2003), 27.

¹⁷ Biographies of other Indonesian Indo-Europeans are rarely written as academic works. See for example Clift Sangra, *Sisi lain perjalanan hidup legenda ratu horor Indonesia Suzzanna* (Yogyakarta: Madani Kreatif, 2024); Nurul Azizah, *Cornelia “Corry” Mudzakar: Srikandi Islam dan Perempuan Pergerakan* (Surabaya: Pustaka Indis, 2020); Willy A. Hangguman, *Johny Indo, Tobat dan Harapan* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1990); Lala Bonnie, *Doris Callebaut, Aktris “Inem Pelayan sexy”* (Jakarta: Karya Baru, 1977).

¹⁸ Abie Besman and others, *Sang Patriot, kisah seorang pahlawan revolusi. Biografi resmi Pierre Tendean* (Jakarta: Kompas, 2019), 80; Ahmad Nowmenta Putra dan Agus Lisna, *Jejak Sang Ajudan* (Yogyakarta: LeutikaPrio, 2018), 23; Masykuri, *Pierre Tendean* (Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1983), 1.

¹⁹ Max Rooyackers, “Membangun jembatan antara ‘sana’ dan ‘sini’: pergerakan Indo-Eropa nasionalis 1923-1942,” in *Refleksi Historiografi Indonesia: Kumpulan Essay Ilmiah tentang Sejarah Lokal dan Sosial*, ed. Muhamad Azari Ramadan (Surabaya: Pustaka Aksara, 2022); Max Rooyackers, “Makna Islam bagi orang Indo-Eropa nasionalis pada awal masa kemerdekaan Indonesia,” *Bandar Maulana: Jurnal Sejarah Kebudayaan* 29, no. 2 (2022): 67-91.

²⁰ Rosalind Louise Hewett, *Indo (Eurasian) Communities in Postcolonial Indonesia* (Dissertation, Australian National University, 2016), v-vi.

²¹ Hewett, *Indo (Eurasian) Communities*, 93-117.

Indos in the Netherlands have shaped popular historical consciousness and academic studies, while those in Indonesia have not. Besides Hewett, earlier oral research by Huisman-Carels in 1990 regarding *spijtoptanten* and by Annink in 1992-1993 about Indonesian Indos families questioned to what extent these Dutch Indo narratives conform to Indonesian Indo experiences.²²

Therefore, this thesis reengages with literature on Indonesian Indos from the 1950s in order to depart from and build upon these. These were studies by Van der Veur, Justus van der Kroef, and Elisabeth Allard on Indo socio-political challenges.²³ This thesis aims to contribute to more inclusive and critical academic studies by focusing on different questions through other frames and portrayals. This thesis enriches findings of the aforementioned studies discussing migration, as some of the Indonesian Indos discussed here eventually moved to the Netherlands. Recovering the worldviews and agency of Indonesian Indos is intertwined with confronting epistemic violence and colonial legacies in the dominant historical narratives among Dutch Indos and parts of academia. Analysing hopes, visions, expectations, dialogues, and more is a departure from most previous studies, which largely focused on conflict, despair, poverty, and migration among Indos in Indonesia.

Scholarly attention towards the 1950s in Indonesia, what Ruth McVey called the “disappearing decade”, had until 1992 largely been limited to socio-political studies in the framework of Cornell University’s Modern Indonesia Project, like Herbert Feith and Daniel Lev. During the late Soeharto years, scholars and activists mobilized studies of the 1950s to criticize the authoritarian New Order regime. These included Adnan Buyung Nasution’s dissertation discussed Indonesian worldviews, democracy, and human rights by analysing the

²² Sylvia Huisman-Carels, “Indische mensen in Indonesië,” *Jambatan, Tijdschrift voor de Geschiedenis van Indonesië* 8, no.1 (1990): 52-54; Carol Annink, “Orang Indo en Indonesian-Dutch: Indische Nederlanders in Indonesië en de Verenigde Staten van Amerika,” in *Het onbekende vaderland. De repatriëring van Indische Nederlanders (1946-1964)*, ed. Wim Willems and Leo Lucassen (Den Haag: Sdu Uitgeverij, 1994), 149; Carol Annink, *Learning Minority Status: A Qualitative Study of the Educational Experiences of Indonesian-Dutch People* (Dissertation, Ohio State University, 1993), 236.

²³ Paul W.J. Van der Veur, “The Eurasians of Indonesia: castaways of colonialism,” *Pacific Affairs* 27, no. 2 (1954): 124-137; Paul W.J. Van der Veur, “Eurasian dilemma in Indonesia,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 20, no. 1 (1960): 45-60; Justus M. van der Kroef, “Social conflict and minority aspirations in Indonesia,” *American Journal of Sociology* 55, no. 5 (1950): 450-463; Justus M. van der Kroef, “The Eurasian Minority in Indonesia,” *American Sociological Review* 18, no. 5 (1953): 484-493; Justus M. van der Kroef, “The Indonesian Eurasian and his culture,” *Phylon* 16, no. 4 (1955): 448-462; Elisabeth Allard, “Laporan sementara tentang penjejidikan kemasjarakatan dari golongan Indo-Eropah yang dilakukan di Bogor tahun 1953,” *Bahasa dan Budaya* 3, no. 4 (1955): 3-22; Elisabeth Allard, “Laporan sementara tentang bagian kedua penjejidikan dilapangan atas susunan kemasjarakatan orang-orang Indo-Eropah di Indonesia 1953,” *Bahasa dan Budaya* 3, no. 5 (1955): 27-40; Elisabeth Allard, “Laporan sementara bagian tentang penjejidikan sosiologis dilapangan mengenai susunan kemasjarakatan orang-orang Indo-Eropah di Indonesia,” *Bahasa dan Budaya* 5, no. 2 (1956): 12-29.

1956-1959 Konstituante.²⁴ David Bouchier and John Legge's 1994 volume on Indonesian democracy, with American and Indonesian contributors, further reviewed the perceived failures of the liberal democracy period. They aimed to change popular perceptions of the 1950s and criticize the New Order by analysing the democratic nature, various circulating visions of Indonesian society and 1950s politics.²⁵

McVey explained in 1994 why the 1950s came to be regarded as a chaotic failure of parliamentary democracy by many Indonesians, especially the New Order regime, and international academics. McVey argued that the period was an important foundation for New Order politics.²⁶ Adrian Vickers argued in 2008 that the importance of the 1950s was also in the then ongoing process of the "modern nation-state's formation", beyond the scope of national politics and democratization.²⁷ In response, Henk Schulte Nordholt delved deeper into the 1950s dynamics and complexities in 2011 to highlight how themes of national identity, culture, nation-state building, modernity, and class were intertwined.²⁸ Schulte Nordholt argued that out of three different perceptions of Indonesia in the 1950s, as identified by Taufik Abdullah's 2009 study of Indonesian nation-building between 1945 and 2004, it was the power struggle that became central in dominant narratives and perceptions of the decade.²⁹

Schulte, Jennifer Lindsay, and Maya Liem emphasized in 2011 and 2012 the importance of cultural terms and ideas of culture in constructing 'Indonesianness' and the Indonesian nation-state.³⁰ Bart Luttikhuis applied a similar approach in his 2014 dissertation on 'Europeanness' in the twentieth-century Dutch East Indies and how non-Europeans mobilized various of its conceptualizations.³¹ This thesis draws on these studies to examine how Indo organizations sought to claim space in Indonesian society by mobilizing certain

²⁴ Ruth T. McVey, "The Case of the Disappearing Decade," In *Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s*, eds. David Bouchier dan John Legge (Monash University, 1994), 3. Later also republished as Ruth T. McVey, "Kasus Tenggelamnya sebuah Dasawarsa," in *Antara Daerah dan Negara: Indonesia Tahun 1950-an. Pembongkaran narasi besar integrasi bangsa*, eds. Sita van Bemmelen and Remco Raben (Jakarta: KITLV, 2011), 18-36; Adnan Buyung Nasution, *The aspiration for constitutional government in Indonesia: a socio-legal study of the Indonesian Konstituante 1956-1959* (Dissertation, Utrecht University, 1992), ix-1.

²⁵ David Bouchier and John Legge (ed). *Democracy in Indonesia. 1950s and 1990s* (Monash University, 1994).

²⁶ McVey, "Disappearing Decade," 5.

²⁷ Adrian Vickers, "Mengapa tahun 1950an merupakan zaman penting untuk Indonesia," in *Perspektif Baru Penulisan Sejarah Indonesia*, eds. Henk Schulte Nordholt, Bambang Purwanto, and Ratna Saptari (Yogyakarta: Obor, 2008), 68.

²⁸ Henk Schulte Nordholt, "Indonesia in the 1950s: Nation, modernity, and the post-colonial state," *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 167, no. 4 (2011): 386-404.

²⁹ Schulte Nordholt, "Indonesia in the 1950s," 396; Taufik Abdullah, *Indonesia Towards Democracy* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2009), x,

³⁰ Schulte, "Indonesia in the 1950s," 388-394; Jennifer Lindsay, "Heirs to World Culture 1950-1965: An Introduction," in *Heirs to World Culture: Being Indonesian 1950-1965*, ed. Jennifer Lindsay and Maya H.T. Liem (Leiden: KITLV, 2012), 2-6.

³¹ Bart Luttikhuis, *Negotiating Modernity: Europeanness in late colonial Indonesia, 1910-1942* (Dissertation, European University Institute, 2014), 6.

conceptualizations of ‘Indonesianness’. Certain expressions of modernity, unity, and Indonesian values were incorporated, both to strengthen their Indo voices and to truly become Indonesian. As noted by Luttikhuis, be it ‘Europeanness’ or ‘Indonesianness’, either inherently meant confronting some ‘Other’ which contrasted it.³² This direction builds further upon studies of Indonesia, which approached ‘culture’ as a myriad of overlapping conceptualizations intertwined with forms of political and social interventions, as identified by Tod Jones in 2005.³³

To some extent, academics have traced Indonesian debates and practices trying to define ‘Indonesianness’. These include Lindsay and Liem’s 2012 volume, with contributions like Els Bogaerts’ analysis of intellectual magazines, Agus Suwignyo and Rhoma Dwi Aria Yuliantri’s 2018 newspaper-based research, and Rahman’s 2018 analysis of cookbooks.³⁴ These studies have established that links exist between ‘Indonesianness’ in politics, culture, and societal participation. However, there has been limited research into how and why this influenced the participation of marginalized groups, like the designated foreign descent minorities. There are exceptions regarding the Chinese descent group, partially because contemporaries and Cornell researchers deemed their influence strong in the economy and national politics.³⁵ Most notable are Leo Suryadinata and his studies on Chinese Indonesian identifications, who has argued that Soeharto’s assimilationist policy towards the Chinese descent group differed from Soekarno’s tolerant policy.³⁶

Furthermore, this thesis also engages with Cornell University researchers on Indonesian society in the 1950s, like Herbert Feith and Daniel Lev. These researchers primarily analysed contemporary socio-political Indonesian conditions to sharpen USA government policies and have strongly influenced academic and popular perceptions of Indonesia in the 1950s.³⁷ Generally, these studies have focused on perceived major political forces and events through

³² Luttikhuis, *Negotiating Modernity*, 5.

³³ Tod Jones, *Indonesian Cultural Policy, 1950-2003: Culture, Institutions, Government* (Dissertation, Curtin University, 2005), 5-9.

³⁴ Els Bogaerts, “‘Whither Indonesian culture?’ Rethinking ‘culture’ in Indonesia in a time of decolonization,” in *Heirs to World Culture: Being Indonesian 1950-1965*, eds. Jennifer Lindsay and Maya H.T. Liem (Leiden: KITLV, 2012), 224-225; Suwignyo, Agus, and Rhoma Dwi Aria Yuliantri, “Praktik Sosio-Kultural sebagai Bentuk Kewargaan Masyarakat Tahun 1950an: Melihat Kembali Historiografi Kebangsaan dalam Bingkai Non-negara,” *Patrawidya* 19, no. 1 (2018): 15; Fadly Rahman, “Kuliner sebagai Identitas Keindonesiaan,” *Jurnal Sejarah* 2, no. 1 (2018): 48-49.

³⁵ See for a partial overview Mary Somers Heidhues, “Studying the Chinese in Indonesia: A Long Half-Century,” *Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 32, no. 3 (2017): 601-633.

³⁶ Leo Suryadinata, *Peranakan Chinese identities in the globalizing Malay Archipelago* (ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2022), 233-234.

³⁷ Jean Gelman Taylor, “A History of Indonesian History,” in *Producing Indonesia. The State of the Field of Indonesian Studies*, ed. Eric Tagliacozzo (Cornell University, 2014), 167.

American models and perspectives, while cultural analysis was included to a lesser extent.³⁸ Feith's 1957 monograph was the first in-depth analysis of the main parties and their campaigns during Indonesia's 1955 elections.³⁹ Feith incorporated these conclusions with other findings in his 1962 political history and system analysis of constitutional democracy between 1949 and 1957.⁴⁰ Lev's influential 1964 study on the transition from constitutional democracy to Guided Democracy similarly analysed major political events reshaping Indonesian political systems.⁴¹

The study of Indos, 'Indoness', and 'Indonesianness' is relevant as trends in scholarship of the 1950s have increasingly turned towards 'Indonesianness'. This trend followed a shift from major political forces to regional or local history, like Sita van Bemmelen and Remco Raben's 2011 volume.⁴² Reengaging with the existing body of literature on the 1950s is important to review how the so-called 'foreign descent minorities' actively engaged with certain circulating visions of Indonesian futures. They carefully mobilized certain conceptualizations of 'Indonesianness' to press their aims and claim space in their own envisioned Indonesian futures. Their perceptions of the major events studied by Feith, Lev, and others provide important embeddings for deeper analysis, engagement, and comparison with major national forces. This study aims to write a more inclusive historiography of Indonesia in the 1950s, while further analysing how different groups mobilized and were impacted by conceptualizations of 'Indonesianness'.

Lastly, this study is characterized by various limitations, as the mostly male-dominated organizations discussed are not representative of all the circulating worldviews among Indonesian Indos. The temporal frame remains largely limited to the 1950s and early 1960s, following the existence of Indo movements. Contemporary Indos estimated that these organizations represented over a quarter of all Indonesian Indos directly through membership or votes.⁴³ While membership or voting for such organizations does not necessarily equate to full support of an organization's ideas and actions, these organizations were still influential in shaping the outlooks of Indonesian Indos through interaction. Therefore, the circulated and

³⁸ Herbert Feith, "History, Theory, and Indonesian Politics: A Reply to Harry J. Benda," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 24, no. 2 (1965): 307; Harry J. Benda, "Review: Democracy in Indonesia," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 23, no. 3 (1964): 449-450.

³⁹ Feith, *The Indonesian Elections*, 1.

⁴⁰ Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Cornell University, 1962), xi.

⁴¹ Daniel S. Lev, *The Transition to Guided Democracy in Indonesia, 1957-1959* (Cornell University, 1964), 1.

⁴² Sita van Bemmelen and Remco Raben, "Sejarah Daerah tahun 1950-an dan Dekonstruksi Narasi Besar Integrasi Nasional," in *Antara Daerah dan Negara: Indonesia Tahun 1950-an. Pembongkaran narasi besar integrasi bangsa*, eds. Sita van Bemmelen and Remco Raben (Jakarta: KITLV, 2011), 1;

⁴³ "Kontaktlichaam Europese minderheid," *Indische courant voor Nederland*, February 4, 1956.

debated worldviews of these movements form an important segment within the spectrum of Indonesian Indo outlooks.

Regarding the use of ‘Indo-European’ or ‘Indo’, this thesis defines them as people sharing certain cultural practices through either mixed ancestry or other social and cultural links in the Indonesian archipelago, which resulted in people identifying with such labels. While a term like *Indische Nederlander* exists for Indos in the Netherlands, the same does not apply to those in Indonesia. A myriad of terms are in circulation, like *kaum Indo* (Indo people), *orang Indo-Eropa* (Indo-Europeans), *golongan ketjil Eropah* (European minority), *warga negara Indonesia keturunan Eropa* (Indonesian citizens of European descent), and *orang Indonesia tidak asli* (non-indigenous Indonesians). Academics have similarly used different terms, like the English term ‘Eurasian’ by Van der Veur, ‘Indo’ by Hewett, ‘Indonesian-Dutch’ by Annink, or Huisman-Carel’s proposal for ‘European Indonesians’.⁴⁴ The term ‘Indo’ would fit best in this context, as it became the most used term by and for Indos in Indonesia during the 1950s. The downside is that the term is less familiar compared to the colonial-era label Indo-European.

Still, the label Indo-European was changed after independence into *Indische Nederlander* in Dutch circles, as Meijer has pointed out that the European legal status was no longer applicable.⁴⁵ While a separate legal European label continued to affect Indonesian Indo’s for some time, it would be preferable to speak of ‘Indos’ because of the aforementioned reasons. As Hewett stated, a term like *Indische Indonesian* would not make sense, as no Indonesian Indo identified themselves as *Indisch*, but rather as Indo.⁴⁶ Huisman-Carel’s proposition for ‘European Indonesians’ was based on their European genealogical, cultural, and historical backgrounds rather than legal status, which would create different notions of ‘European’ and therefore be confusing.⁴⁷ Therefore, the use of labels like ‘Indonesian Indo’ and ‘Dutch Indo’ refers only to their citizenship. Lastly, it should be noted that this thesis follows the dominant contemporary spelling, thus *rakjat* instead of *rakyat*.

This thesis analyses a variety of primary sources to answer the central research question regarding the aspirations and worldviews of Indonesian Indos. The primary sources, which are limited in number, are divided in several main categories. These are journals and articles from Indo organizations (*Onze Stem, PINcet, De Kern, Suara Kita*), voices from Indo organizations in the Dutch and Indonesian national archives, published writings by Indo organization leaders,

⁴⁴ Veur, “Eurasian Dilemma,”; Hewett, *Indo (Eurasian) Communities*; Annink, *Learning Minority Status*; Huisman-Carels, “Indische mensen,” 49.

⁴⁵ Meijer, *In Indië geworteld*, 304.

⁴⁶ Hewett, *Indo (Eurasian) Communities*, 3.

⁴⁷ Huisman-Carels, “Indische mensen,” 49.

and lastly, newspaper articles accessed through the digital archive Delpher, Leiden University Library, and Jogja Library Center. Newspapers were equally important for movement leaders to engage with other Indos. The method of analysis discusses both the form and content of these writings. The choice of language, words, contents, shape, tone, and forms of writing are all included in the analysis to make sense of why and how Indos expressed and engaged with certain ideas.

The structure of this thesis follows a largely chronological analysis of the activities, space-claiming, and developing ideas among different groups of Indos. The first chapter studies the consolidation of Indo movements and their main ideas on assimilation and integration between 1950 and 1954. The second chapter analyses how the discussed Indo movements aimed to achieve these ideas by engaging with conceptualizations of ‘Indonesianness’ and the ‘transitional period’. The third chapter follows how Indos and Indonesians struggled over representation during the long election period between 1955 and 1957. How and why did ‘Indoness’ and ‘Indonesianness’ influence the desirability of certain voices over others? The fourth chapter analyses how the post-election fallout and rise of young Indo intellectuals reshaped Indo movements, engagement with ‘Indonesianness’ and ‘Indoness’, and achieving the end of the ‘transitional period’.

Chapter 1. Indo Organizations on Participation in Indonesia, 1949-1954

This chapter aims to analyse the ideas of the main emerging movements during the early 1950s, which were the colonial era Indo-Europeesch Verbond (IEV), the revolution era Indo Nationale Partij (INP), and the Federasi Penghapus Minoriteit (FPM), the latter which pursued total assimilation of minorities or the so-called *penghapusan* thought. Why did dominant thinkers within these movements envision what ideas of integration and assimilation in what ways? Why did they identify what issues as important to campaign about? This question is addressed by looking more closely at the main ideas and thought that leaders circulated in Indo and other Indonesian circuits, which are analysed from their respective publications in journals, like IEV journal *Onze Stem*, newspapers, books, and archival collections.

Social and political movements between 1949-1954

The Japanese occupation and revolution periods were very disruptive to the Indonesia-oriented Indo movements. Before, Indos had been largely absent or excluded by Indonesians from the colonial-era nationalist debates. Meanwhile, nationalist Indos, like E.F.E. Douwes Dekker, P.F. Dahler, and J.E. Teeuwen, all passed away between 1940 and 1950. Nationalist Indo movements, like Indonesia Merdeka (Free Indonesia, 1946-1947) and Douwes Dekker's bloc, dissolved themselves after intra-Indo clashes over partial or total assimilation. Afterwards, visions of and movements for postcolonial Indo lives in Indonesia were largely back to square one when the Dutch military offensives had ended in 1949.

The late 1949 RTC agreements settled that Indos with provable, colonial-era European judicial status were granted Dutch citizenship. They received the choice to reject this in favor of Indonesian citizenship between December 1949 and December 1951. The RTC agreement annulled the 1946 Indonesian citizenship law, which some Indos had used to become Indonesian. Indos who opted did mainly so for ideological or sentimental reasons, while other factors were related to work, family, or outside pressures.¹ Opting had great consequences, as the so-called 'head of the family' decided the whole family's citizenship, which included the wife and underage children. Furthermore, some Dutch Indos treated optants with disrespect as they viewed them as traitors to the Dutch crown. They sent optants "annoying letters" and

¹ Richard N. Voorneman, "Het dilemma voor Indische Nederlanders van december 1951," *Jambatan, Tijdschrift voor de Geschiedenis van Indonesië* 8, no.1 (1990): 32.

Indonesian black hats (*petji*), which nationalists often wore.² Dutch Indos especially ridiculed those vocally supporting Indonesian citizenship as traitors and outcasts.

Rijkschroeff and Kwa estimated that the 13.739 forms for Indonesian citizenship equaled around 45.000-50.000 people, rightfully questioning Van der Veur's calculations of around 31.000-33.000 persons.³ The difference is based on the multiplier applied to these forms, as Rijkschroeff and Kwa analyzed the usual size of Indo families around the time. Their numbers are similar to the IEV, which stated that roughly 40.000-50.000 Indos became Indonesian.⁴ Nonetheless, these are without the unknown number of people who automatically received Indonesian citizenship and never had the choice of opting. These included mixed descent families headed by fathers without European judicial status or received after 1920, Indo families whose documentation was lost or destroyed between 1942 and 1949, plus any others not recognized as European by law. Hewett's 2016 oral history analysis noticed that "many Indos who remained were the children of Indo or Dutch mothers and Indonesian men", thus making it difficult to conclude the true size of the group.⁵

This group organized itself in different ways, whereas some involved themselves on a national stage by joining nationalist parties, like the Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party, PNI), or moderate nationalist and religious ones like the Reformed Parkindo and Catholic Partai Katholik. Few joined Islamic parties like Masjumi, as only a few Indos had converted to Islam. Most Indos remained Catholics or Protestants. While there seemingly was almost no support for the Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party, PKI), some joined the Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party, PSI), and a small group who supported the Partai Buruh (Worker's Party).⁶ There were also other ways of organizing, like family and church networks. Still, such Indos generally did not meddle in public political affairs.⁷ Administrative church organizations had more leading Indo figures compared to the political church parties, which had none.⁸ Nonetheless, the largest group decided to organize through Indo organizations during the early 1950s. Most Indos in these organizations had

² "De Indo, niet WN, heeft hier geen toekomst," *Java-bode*, 5 February 1952.

³ Rijkschroeff and Kwa, *Spijtoptanten en Achterblijvers*, 134-141. This is also similar to Van der Kroef's estimation in "Minority Problems in Indonesia, II," *Far Eastern Survey* 24, no. 11 (1955): 169.

⁴ "Mayor Polak over de Indische Nederlander," *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad*, March 1, 1954; "Het I.E.V. en het Staatsburgerschap," *Het Nieuwsblad voor Sumatra*, February 18, 1953.

⁵ Hewett, *Indo (Eurasian) Communities*, 123.

⁶ Pengangkatan anggota-anggota DPR, no. 2447, RA.8.C. Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (ANRI), Jakarta, Indonesia.

⁷ Only a few Indos achieved moderate positions within the Parkindo and Partai Katholik, as can be learned from their internal party structures during the 1950s. J.C.T. Simorangkir, *Sejarah Parkindo* (Jakarta; Yayasan Komunikasi, 1989).

⁸ For example, the lawyer A.L. Fransz was the secretary of the National Council of Churches.

(former) ties to the colonial-era IEV. Overall, these Indo organizations were embedded within the nationalist Indonesian political thought.

Meanwhile, the other official minority groups, the Chinese and Arab descent, similarly organized through organizations that were implicitly based on socio-cultural formations. These included the Arab descent Badan Konperensi Bangsa Indonesia Turunan Arab (Indonesian Arab Descent Conference Body, BKBITA) and Chinese descent Partai Demokrat Tionghoa Indonesia (Chinese Indonesian Democratic Party, PDTI), which fused with other Chinese descent movements in 1954 to become the Badan Permusjawaratan Kewarganagaraan Indonesia (Advising Body for Indonesian Citizenship, Baperki). Others joined political parties, like the influential Abdul Rahman Baswedan of the BKBITA, who joined Masjumi despite his strong nationalist outlook.⁹ PDTI board members joined parties like the PSI, PNI, and Partai Katolik.¹⁰ Hence, organizing was primarily based on group formations, nationalist ideologies, and religious backgrounds for either minority group, which frequently overlapped.

The many ‘PINs’ and political fragmentation

The first Indo movement that gained traction after 1949 was the Indo Nationale Partij or Partai Indo Nasional (National Indo Party, INP-PIN). The Blijvers-Concentratie and the Indo Nationale Partij (INP) had merged and established the party on 7 July 1949. Indos in Japanese prisoner camps had founded the Blijvers-Concentratie, while Indo youth in the Netherlands had established the Indo Nationale Partij.¹¹ Johan Paul Snel (1917), who had left the Dutch East Indies from a young age and studied economics in Rotterdam, was a leading figure within the INP and INP-PIN. He was the chair of the Netherlands IEV youth branch before leaving the organization over its passive stance towards Indonesian independence, similar to other INP youth.¹² Snel, F. Werbata (1917), and G.J. Claessen (1914) established the INP on 25 April 1948. The INP growth was a direct consequence of the IEV’s vague course on independence.¹³

⁹ Huub de Jonge, *In Search for Identity: The Hadhrami Arabs in the Netherlands East Indies and Indonesia (1900-1950)* (Leiden: Brill, 2022), 77.

¹⁰ Maya H.T. Liem and Ing Lwan Taga-Tan, “Between ideology and experience; Siauw Giok Tjhan's legacy to his daughter Siauw May Lie,” *Wacana, Journal of the Humanities of Indonesia* 18, no. 1 (2017): 79.

¹¹ Telegram, 27 January 1950, Stukken betreffende de activiteiten van de Indo Nationale Partij (Partai-Indo-Nasional), no. 1676. Toegang nummer 2.04.127, BZK-Centrale Veiligheidsdienst en Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst / Open dossiers, Nationaal Archief (NA), Den Haag, the Netherlands.

¹² Agus Daruch, *De nationalistische beweging onder de Indo-Europeanen* (Ministerie van Voorlichting RI, 1957), 94; Ch. Verkuylen. *Het verbond verbroken: het Indo-Europees Verbond in de nadagen van Nederlands-Indië, 1945-1949: een studie over Indo-europeanen en regeringsbeleid* (Nijmegen: n.p., 1985), 104.

¹³ Ch. Verkuylen. *Het verbond verbroken: het Indo-Europees Verbond in de nadagen van Nederlands-Indië, 1945-1949: een studie over Indo-europeanen en regeringsbeleid* (Nijmegen: n.p., 1985), 104.

Former Indonesia Merdeka leader and INP-PIN member Agus Daruch argued that these Indos had been in contact with Indonesian students during World War Two and were influenced by their pro-independence ideas.¹⁴

Snel's ideas on 'Indonesianness', assimilation, and integration were primarily based on legal homogeneity and cultural heterogeneity. Snel was seemingly inspired by discussions with Indonesian students on unity in diversity. Snel argued that differences between Indos and 'indigenous' Indonesians existed because of religion, culture, and socio-historical developments.¹⁵ Snel argued that Indos were a *suku* (ethnic group) like the Javanese and Batak people. All ethnic groups should achieve a united nationalist consciousness and cultural synthesis regarding their differences in politics, culture, society, and the economy.¹⁶ For Snel, obtaining this consciousness was enough to become Indonesian. Snel interpreted synthesis as tolerance for diversity, like the slogan *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (unity in diversity). The modern democratic state, based on law and the Pantjasila, was to support this process and be evaluated based upon it. Snel envisioned Indo movements to advise the government on Indo issues.

During the 1949 RTC, Snel represented the INP-PIN. Indonesians and Dutch members included Snel because of his different ideology and claims of Indo support in Indonesia beyond the estimated 300 INP-PIN members at the time.¹⁷ Only Snel favored passive Indonesian citizenship with the optional choice for Dutch citizenship. All other Indo participants, including the IEV, supported the reverse. Snel did not achieve concrete results in Den Haag. Still, Indonesian nationalists noticed his vocal campaigning and awarded him a seat in the temporary parliament.

After settling in Djakarta, Snel drafted the INP-PIN's political program based on legal assimilation and socio-cultural synthesis. The government initially maintained the colonial law on landownership, which prohibited citizens of European, Chinese, and Arab descent from owning land. Also, the temporary constitution differentiated between citizens of foreign descent and indigenous descent. Therefore, Snel campaigned to achieve legal assimilation, while he argued that Indo ways of life should be retained, like speaking Dutch.¹⁸ Only then, Snel hoped, would Indos be seen as equal and discrimination would stop. The INP-PIN, which was open to all and claimed to be a national party, promised to liquidate itself when the goal of legal equality

¹⁴ Agus Daruch is the Indonesian name of A.W.F. de Roock, who was in 1946-1947 influential in establishing the Indonesia Merdeka organization for Indonesia-oriented Indo-Europeans in Yogyakarta. He was also a friend of J.P. Snel and member of the INP. Daruch, *nationalistische beweging*, 95-98.

¹⁵ "Partai Demokrasi Indo," *Nieuwe Courant*, 15 July 1950.

¹⁶ "De politieke partijen in Indonesië (iv)," *De Vrije Pers*, 18 July 1950.

¹⁷ Veur, *Introduction*, 381.

¹⁸ Daruch, *nationalistische beweging*, 94; *Kepartaian di Indonesia*, 374.

would be achieved. Snel's party program argued that "there was no need for minorities in Indonesia".¹⁹ Still, most Indonesians and Indos viewed the INP-PIN as a minority party with minority aims.²⁰

Snel identified himself with liberal nationalists. He joined former PNI member Djody Gondokusumo's Partai Rakjat Nasional (PRN) faction. Opponents labelled the PRN as "capitalist nationalists", which was created as a protest against the PNI.²¹ Snel supported the economic and nationalist ideas of the PRN, for which he was appointed as its secretary in parliament. Furthermore, the PRN was closely involved in legal matters in parliament, which corresponded with Snel's aims. Djody Gondokusumo was involved in citizenship law drafts and became Minister of Law between 30 July 1953 and 11 August 1955. Snel and Claessen also established an advising body for Indo issues within the PRN party organization.²²

Indo unity soon shattered over disagreeing views on integration and assimilation. Opponents established the Federasi Penghapus Minoriteit (Minority Abolition Federation, FPM) on 1 April 1950 as an unifying body for political Indo movements.²³ A.E. Schmidgall Tellings (1914-1997) was its leading figure. He grew up in Semarang, where he went to the mixed Algemeene Middelbare School. His mother had been a well-known social figure in organizing activities for the poor as a local board member of the IEV women's branch. This formation seemingly influenced his anticolonial mindset.²⁴ Schmidgall Tellings was a talented linguist who soon mastered Indonesian and Japanese during World War Two. He used this in his work for the Japanese and Indo families paid him to trace their family trees to avoid imprisonment.²⁵ Schmidgall Tellings rejected the IEV's Dutch orientation and strongly supported Indonesian independence. He joined the INP in 1947 when he was an Indonesian language student in Djakarta.²⁶ Meanwhile, he became an influential PNI member and joined its central board.²⁷

¹⁹ *Kepartaian di Indonesia*, 374.

²⁰ The INP was grouped separately in overviews of Indonesian parties based on nationalist, Marxist, and religious ideologies. *Kepartaian di Indonesia* (Djakarta: Kementerian Penerangan Republik Indonesia, 1951), 374-375; S. Wongsowerdojo, *Susunan Pemerintahan* (Djakarta: Penerbit Mahabarata, 1952), 48.

²¹ Feith, *Constitutional Democracy*, 162.

²² "Indo-commissariaat," *Java-bode*, 21 April 1951.

²³ "Tot opheffing der minderheden," *De Locomotief*, 4 July 1950.

²⁴ A.E. Schmidgall Tellings, "Rascriterium op universiteiten," *Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad*, 10 October 1941; "Overgang HBS en AMS," *De Locomotief*, 28 May 1934; "IEVVO afdeeling Semarang," *Algemeen Handelsblad voor Nederlandsch-Indië*, 7 August 1933.

²⁵ NEFIS document no.3089, A.E. Schmidgall Tellings over zijn werkzaamheden tijdens de oorlog, no. 4418. Toegang nummer 2.10.62, Inventaris van het archief van de Marine en Leger Inlichtingendienst, de Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service en de Centrale Militaire Inlichtingendienst in Nederlands-Indië, Nationaal Archief (NA), Den Haag, the Netherlands.

²⁶ "Naar Gapki-Congres," *Nieuwe Courant*, 15 July 1949.

²⁷ "PNI's Schmidgall Tellings over uitspraak Augustin," *Het nieuwsblad voor Sumatar*, 27 May 1953.

Schmidgall Tellings and FPM members, most of whom were ex-INP-PIN and ex-IEV members, introduced the so-called *penghapusan* (abolition) thought. Schmidgall Tellings was inspired by some nationalists calling for the Indo to *melebur* (melt) into Indonesian society during the Japanese occupation and Dahler's and Douwes Dekker's views on assimilation.²⁸ Schmidgall Tellings argued strongly against being "Indo" as a colonial construct and term. He aimed to abolish anything hindering total homogeneous assimilation.²⁹ Schmidgall Tellings based his strategy on stimulating interaction, fostering *rasa persatuan* (feelings of unity), and politico-cultural education through house visits, published writings, Indonesian language courses, and social gatherings.³⁰ The FPM published its own journal named *Putra Negara* (son of the land), which only had one edition.

Schmidgall Tellings published a translated and commented radio speech by the head of the *Bagian Minoritet* (Minority Department) of the Ministry of Domestic Affairs in West Java about the state and future of Indonesia. Schmidgall Tellings' publication was in Indonesian and Dutch, showing his understanding that some Indos still used Dutch, yet that Indonesian was the future. He argued that Indo movements had to unify Indos and help them accept "Indonesian thinking" to abolish the minority status and achieve complete Indonesian unity.³¹

Meanwhile, Snel and his right-hand Claessen had left the INP-PIN over disagreements over socio-cultural integration or assimilation. They established a two-man party, the *Partai Demokrasi Indo* (Democratic Indo Party, PARDI) in Djakarta. The only difference with the INP-PIN was the emphasis that Indo formations should be maintained.³² Claessen and Schmidgall Tellings' friendship, as both were Indonesian-language students in Djakarta, paved the way for a cooperative body with Snel. Despite their different ideas on assimilation, they formed the *Front Nasional Indo* (National Indo Front, FRONI) on 9 November 1950.³³ This united front campaigned against minority laws and supported "fundamental human rights and freedoms" to accommodate different ideas on Indo assimilation. Soon, Schmidgall Tellings left the FRONI to work with the INP-PIN instead after clashing with Snel. The FPM and INP-PIN

²⁸ Schmidgall Tellings' wartime collection includes some notes on an article calling for Indos to melt into the Indonesian masses, which he clearly supported. No. 4418, 2.10.62, NA; J.A. Lefeber, "Het antwoord van de Federasi Menghapus Minoriteit," *Onze Stem*, 30 September 1950.

²⁹ "GIWI wordt GERWI," *Het Nieuwsblad voor Sumatra*, 5 August 1950.

³⁰ R. Djerman Prawirawinata and A.E. Schmidgall Tellings, *Menuju Kesatuan Bangsa* (Bandung: Federasi Penghapus Minoriteit, 1950), 3-5; F.J. Vodegel and B. Umar Watson, "Goedkope Propaganda," *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad*, 3 June 1953.

³¹ FPM added to this that former IEV chair Wermuth was deceitful in this regard, as he had moved to the Netherlands despite preaching for Indonesian orientations. Djerman Prawirawinata and Schmidgall Tellings, *Menuju Kesatuan Bangsa*, 35, 39, 49.

³² "Partai Demokrasi Indo," *Nieuwe Courant*, 15 July 1950.

³³ "Front Nasional Indo opgericht," *De Locomotief*, 13 November 1950.

merged in April 1951 to become the Partai Indo Nasional Penghapus Minoriteit (National Indo Party - Minority Abolition, PIN-PM).³⁴

The PIN-PM was mostly influential in name as the largest Indo party with limited popular support. The PIN-PM tried to establish an even larger united body with the IEV. This failed over the IEV's wish to retain 'Indoness' and the PIN-PM's aim to abolish it.³⁵ Meanwhile, Snel tried to join established nationalist parties, but struggled to rise in their ranks.³⁶ In a turn of events, the influential Indo Hoyer in Malang declared his support for Snel. Hoyer and Indos in rural East Java strongly desired legal assimilation for land ownership. Consequently, Snel reestablished the Indo Nationale Partij with a large, new backing.³⁷ A year later in May 1952, Snel rebranded it as the Persatuan Indonesia Nasional (PIN) to negate the impression of Indo exclusivity.³⁸

Over the next two years, the PIN-PM's influence and membership waned. Schmidgall Tellings, who had joined the PNI's main party board, had been convincing Indos to leave the PIN-PM for national parties like the PNI.³⁹ Membership of Indo organizations was unnecessary, exclusive, and hindered the abolishing of the minority status. Hence, the PIN-PM bled dry except for those believing in political participation as Indos. Soon, the *penghapusan* thought temporarily disappeared from the Indo movements. Snel's PIN absorbed the PIN-PM remnants around mid-1953, marking the end of the fragmentary political movements.⁴⁰ Snel continued to pursue legal assimilation and a citizenship law with his main political base in Malang. Other members also benefited from the PIN's prominence, like J.T. Kouthoofd, who joined the Surabaya city council, and Claessen, who joined the Biro Irian (Papua Bureau) in 1954.⁴¹

The IEV reborn

The Indo-Europeesch Verbond (IEV) had been the major social, economic, cultural, and political body of Indos to convey their aspirations and problems to the colonial government from the 1920s until the Japanese occupation in 1942. The organization was established in 1919

³⁴ "Fusie tussen twee grote Indo-groeperingen een feit," *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad*, 26 April 1951.

³⁵ "Fusie tussen twee grote Indo-groeperingen een feit," *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad*, 26 April 1951.

³⁶ "Een kleine operatie," *Onze Stem*, 10 April 1952.

³⁷ "Wrijving in gelederen Indo warga negara's," *Java-bode*, 31 May 1951; Daruch, *nationalistische beweging*, 98.

³⁸ "INP hield congres in Malang," *De Vrije Pers*, 3 May 1952.

³⁹ "PNI's Schmidgall Tellings over uitspraak Augustin," *Het Nieuwsblad voor Sumatra*, 27 May 1953; "Standpunt PNI t.a.v. minoriteiten-beweging," *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad*, 18 June 1954.

⁴⁰ F.J. Vodegel and B. Umar Watson, "Goedkope Propaganda," *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad*, 3 June 1953; "PIN en PIN-PM weer samen," *De Vrije Pers*, 29 April 1953.

⁴¹ "Voorlopige raad gekozen," *De Vrije Pers*, 4 December 1950; "President Soekarno installeerde het Biro Irian," *Java-bode*, 4 March 1954.

and was based on the main principles of maintaining a privileged colonial group. The IEV aimed to prevent “drowning” in the Indonesian masses while struggling against perceived discrimination from the Dutch upper layers in colonial society. Therefore, the IEV was generally oriented towards ‘Europeanness’. Various representatives were active in municipality councils and in the Volksraad (People’s Council), adding to the IEV’s prestige and presence.

The Japanese occupation halted all IEV activities, leading to a sudden collapse of the organization. The IEV board was reestablished in October 1945 after Japan's surrender, while other long-time members revived local branches throughout early 1946. Lawyer W. Augustin reestablished the first branch in Surabaya, followed by ir. F.L.H. Dessauvagie in Bandung, and eventually the larger Batavia area. Historian Verkuylen has argued that the IEV during the revolutionary period differed little from its prewar principles and activities. Initially, the IEV remained active in municipal councils and the federal parliaments like Pasundan and East Indonesia, with a vague course. IEV leaders feared exclusion by Indonesians, which led to a slow shift in orientation, complicated by strong internal criticism. Only after Indonesian governmental pressure did revolution-era IEV leaders declare their support for Indonesia on 24 August 1949. IEV leaders claimed around 8000 members before the war and 4000 in 1947, while historian Van der Veur estimated that fewer than 2000 remained in late 1949. Most members rejected the new direction. Still, the IEV’s RTC delegation strongly defended passive Dutch nationality and a five year period for choosing Indonesian citizenship.

In short, the organization was in disarray because of its vague, at times contradicting, activities when longtime member and entrepreneur Richard Eugen Weiss (1897-1974) replaced former chair E.D. Wermuth, who had led the RTC delegation. Weiss was an IEV veteran who had slowly worked his way to the top and was backed by the colonial-era IEV faction that had sympathies for Indonesian independence. These included senior members like Augustin and Dessauvagie. These IEV leaders viewed their organization, and Indos in general, as a bridge between East and West. They argued that Indos had distinct cultural traits as a group, like the Dutch language, mixed cultural lifestyles, Christian faiths, and Western family names.⁴² Weiss was defensive of Indo colonial lifestyles, more than Snel’s PIN. Weiss only called upon Indos to politically and ideologically align with Indonesian nationalism and learn the unifying Indonesian language.⁴³ Like Snel, Weiss explicitly stated that Indos were an ethnic group with their own interests.

⁴² “Het antwoord van de Federasi Menghapus Minoriteit,” *Onze Stem*, 30 September 1950.

⁴³ “Cultuur,” *Onze Stem*, 1 September 1954.

Weiss frequently circulated the term “*overgangstijd*” (transitional period), inspired by the general Indonesian discourse for the post-revolution period for nation-state building, to address the transitional period for the Indo to become an Indonesian Indo. Initially, Weiss offered little concrete information on the IEV’s view on assimilation and integration. He wanted to consolidate the chaotic IEV first. Weiss’s interpretation of Indo integration largely focused on stopping discriminative treatments of Indos, passing the citizenship law, and granting land ownership. Different from the PIN and FPM, Weiss argued it was desirable to uphold the minority status for some time. Weiss strongly argued for halting outspoken political activities, inspired by Augustin and rising member J.B.A.F. Mayor Polak (1905-1982), who had been a senior colonial official in Bali and parliament member, first of the federal state East Indonesia and then the Indonesian parliament.⁴⁴ Mayor Polak had already argued in 1948 that Indonesians viewed direct political involvement as attempts to uphold exclusive minorities, which could limit the IEV’s activities.⁴⁵ Still, Weiss’s apolitical course still involved much politics. He strongly criticized Indo political parties for participating as Indos, while he supported Mayor Polak as the IEV’s representative in the temporary parliament. Weiss often printed Mayor Polak’s speeches and parliamentary inquiries in the IEV journal *Onze Stem*. This showed how entangled Weiss viewed these political activities with the IEV.

Weiss realized that the IEV’s survival was not guaranteed, as the diminished membership forced the closing of the women, youth, and some local branches in 1950. He established a committee in February 1950 to review the IEV’s regulations, which was made up of himself and other senior members. Resultingly, Weiss introduced a new course on the *overgangperiode* that was propagated after a central meeting in June 1950. The main focus was on education and social work, which explicitly rejected political activities.⁴⁶ With this reorganization, Weiss hoped to claim space in Indonesian society to address Indo issues.

Weiss had focused in 1950 on consolidating the disarrayed organization, while he wanted to look forward in 1951. Arguments for reorganizing the IEV instead of establishing a new, similar-but-different organization were mostly based on financial reasons. The IEV still maintained sizeable assets in terms of buildings and money, despite that Indonesians had seized much land and buildings.⁴⁷ Nonetheless, journalists circulated strong rumours about the end of

⁴⁴ Verkuylen, *Verbond Verbroken*, 189.

⁴⁵ Verkuylen, *Het Verbond Verbroken*, 150.

⁴⁶ “Bijzondere scholen voor de minderheden in overgangstijd,” *Nieuwe Courant*, 29 March 1950; “Geen politiek, onderwijs hoofdzaak,” *Nieuwe Courant*, 6 June 1950.

⁴⁷ “Grote activiteit van het hoofdbestuur IEV,” *De Vrije Pers*, 9 June 1950.

the IEV over disagreements on its future course.⁴⁸ Still, the March 1951 congress went smoothly. Weiss's consolidation had succeeded and most Dutch-oriented Indos had already left.⁴⁹ The IEV branch in the Netherlands was the last to leave at the congress, as their push for dividing the treasury had failed.⁵⁰

The 1951 congress mandated Weiss's course, including that from March 1951 only Indonesian citizens were accepted as members, that only apolitical activities were allowed, and that the name was changed into the Indo Eenheids Verbond or Gabungan Indo untuk Kesatuan Indonesia (United Indo Association, IEV-GIKI, used hereafter).⁵¹ Soon, Weiss withdrew any remaining municipal council representatives because of his apolitical course.⁵² Going forward, the IEV-GIKI's core leadership was made up of influential, elderly branch leaders, like Weiss, Augustin (Surabaya), A.A.M. Lapré (Semarang), Mayor Polak (Djakarta), Dessauvague (Bandung), and with some other rotating members (Figure 1).



Figure 1. “Our historical congress of 1951”. The participants stand, while Dessauvague and the board (Augustin, E.L. van Naerssen, Weiss, A. Meyer, Lapré, and Mayor Polak) sit.⁵³

⁴⁸ “Wordt het IEV ontbonden?” *Nieuwe Courant*, 14 December 1950.

⁴⁹ Various IEV branches in the Netherlands had left the IEV by then over its Indonesian course, “Afscheiding IEV,” *Java-bode*, 27 June 1950.

⁵⁰ Afterwards, this group formed the Vereniging Indische Nederlanders (VIN) in 1951. “IEV Nederland scheidt zich af,” *Nieuwe Courant*, 29 March 1951.

⁵¹ “Opening IEV jaarcongres,” *Nieuwe Courant*, 27 March 1951.

⁵² “Jaarvergadering van het IEV,” *De Vrije Pers*, 19 May 1952.

⁵³ Dessauvague was not an official board member, but his prominent seat in the middle of the table next to chairman Weiss shows his influential position. *Herdenkings-nummer 35-jarig bestaan Gabungan Indo Untuk Kesatuan Indonesia* (Bandung: Stadium, 1954), 41.

Afterward, the IEV-GIKI began rebuilding everything that was lost over a period of nine years. Weiss used the IEV's colonial history to configure his new course focused on Indonesian futures. Weiss argued that education was the top priority, like during the colonial era. Soon, many Indonesians, especially government officials, knew and appreciated the IEV-GIKI for their education efforts.⁵⁴ For example, the Kantor Urusan Peranakan dan Bangsa Asing (Office for Mixed Descent Citizens and Foreigners, UPBA) of the Ministry of Domestic Affairs, which had replaced the Bagian Minoritet, documented the needs of the foreign descent minorities. For this, the UPBA only approached the IEV-GIKI in December 1951.⁵⁵ Furthermore, the Ministry of Education promised to hand over schools and subsidies to support the IEV-GIKI's education wing.⁵⁶ Local civil and military authorities attended important meetings of local branches, while national authorities similarly attended the bi-annual conferences.⁵⁷ Weiss met with Soekarno, and later with other cabinet leaders, to present a memorandum with thirteen points in June 1952 (Figure 2).⁵⁸ In conclusion, the IEV-GIKI was in closer contact with government officials compared to the PIN, which worked mainly through PRN networks and parliament. Indonesians viewed the IEV-GIKI as neutral and apolitical, which enabled Weiss's activism and ability to claim space in Indonesian society.

⁵⁴ *Herdenkings-nummer*; 6-20.

⁵⁵ The Bagian Minoritet was at this point transformed into the UPBA. "Principiële vragen tot het IEV gericht," *De Vrije Pers*, 6 December 1951.

⁵⁶ "Negen scholen voor IEV," *De Vrije Pers*, 9 August 1951.

⁵⁷ "Helpende hand aan de Indo passend in nationaal belang," *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad*, 21 April 1952.

⁵⁸ "President Soekarno ontving het IEV," *Java-bode*, 6 June 1952; Memorandum Gabungan Indo untuk Kesatuan Indonesia tentang masalah kewarganegaraan. 4-7 Juni 1952, no. 1023. RA.8.C Sekretariat Negara: Kabinet Perdana Menteri 1950-1959 Jilid II, Arsip Negara Republik Indonesia (ANRI), Jakarta, Indonesia.



Figure 2. Discussion on citizenship issues concerning Indos, 5 June 1952. From left to right: W. Augustin, R.E. Weiss, and Soekarno.⁵⁹

IEV-GIKI membership grew during Weiss's course. Membership rose from 700 in late 1951 to 1000 in 1953, while new branches were established.⁶⁰ This growth accelerated in 1952-1953, as many Indos joined to place their children in IEV-GIKI schools.⁶¹ Seemingly, most joining members were new to the IEV-GIKI. Friends of IEV-GIKI members, not rejoining members, established these new branches. The major branches of Surabaya, Djakarta, Bandung, and Semarang also grew over time, especially after 1953, while the Malang branch was not reestablished due to local Indos preferring the PIN.⁶² Moreover, the Bandung and Semarang branches were struggling with limited activities, while IEV-GIKI finances in general were under pressure. Also, a short dispute embroiled the Djakarta branch and Weiss over accusations of corruption. Afterwards, the Djakarta branch supported Weiss and expelled its own board, after which Mayor Polak was re-elected as local chair in January 1954.⁶³ Soon, the Djakarta branch

⁵⁹ Kunjungan Ketua I.E.V. (Indo Europe Vereniging) R.E. Weiss dan Komisariss I.E.V., W. Augustin di istana : Ketua Indo Europe Verneiging (I.E.V.) Tn. R.E. Weiss (tengah) dan Komisariss I.E.V., Mr. Augustin (paling kiri) bertemu Presiden Soekarno (paling kanan) di istana untuk menanyakan pendiriannya tentang "Kewarganegaraan Indonesia keturunan Eropa" dalam hal pendidikan, kedudukan, dan pegawai negeri, no. 6269. Foto Kempen RI Jakarta 1952, Arsip Negara Republik Indonesia (ANRI), Jakarta, Indonesia.

⁶⁰ Meijer, *In Indië geworteld*, 323; "Groeï van ons ledental," *Onze Stem*, 10 October 1952.

⁶¹ "Van hart tot hart," *De Kern*, 15 September 1956.

⁶² *Herdenkings-nummer*, 89.

⁶³ "Djakarta en ons onderwijs," *Onze Stem*, 10 August 1953; "HB Mededelingen," *Onze Stem*, 1 March 1954; "Royement," *Onze Stem*, 1 April 1954.

grew again and published their local magazine “De Kern” from February 1954.⁶⁴ The Surabaya branch remained the largest, most active branch, and was the only one to reestablish IEV-GIKI scouting and youth branches. Social activities ranged from playing bridge, youth parties, celebrating Sinterklaas, to holding bazaars for the poor, which largely continued colonial era ways of interactions in Indo bubbles.⁶⁵

Relations between the IEV, PIN, and FPM were tense, especially after their attempts to create unified political bodies in the 1950s had failed. Weiss had allowed Dessauvague to approach the Indo parties to establish such a body, like Snel and Schmidgall Tellings had tried together. All these attempts failed over different views on integration and assimilation.⁶⁶ Afterwards, Weiss denounced Snel’s PIN and Schmidgall Tellings’ FPM because of their alleged aim to “reject the right of the Indo to live as a minority in Indonesia” and their *penghapusan* thought.⁶⁷ IEV leaders like Mayor Polak, Augustin, and Weiss criticized the Indo parties whenever they could, like in letters to the government, in newspapers, and in the 1954 commemoration issue of *Onze Stem*.⁶⁸

Concluding Remarks

Indo movements were highly fragmentary during the early 1950s until some stability was achieved around 1953. Schmidgall Tellings’ *penghapusan* thought had somewhat disappeared, as few supported his perceived radical ideas. Weiss and Snel’s defensive course of Indo formations gained popularity in their pursuit of different degrees of legal assimilation. Whereas Snel aimed for total legal assimilation, Weiss argued for partial legal assimilation, as he wished for the special minority status to be upheld for some time. Both argued against cultural assimilation. Initially, Weiss’s allegedly neutral, apolitical course and focus on education made many Indonesians look more favourably at the IEV-GIKI, compared to Snel’s PIN, which worked with certain political factions like the PRN. The IEV-GIKI maintained many aspects of its colonial-era organizational life. Weiss only gradually reoriented the IEV-GIKI towards Indonesian futures, as the IEV-GIKI’s colonial history continued to inspire Weiss.

⁶⁴ *Herdenkings-nummer*, 90.

⁶⁵ “IEV bazaar,” *De Locomotief*, 9 November 1953; “IEV bazaar op 6 november 1954,” *De Vrije Pers*, 3 November 1954; “Bridgetournooi vordert,” 19 August 1952;

⁶⁶ Verkuylen, *Verbond Verbroken*, 189.

⁶⁷ “Indo-Europese minderheid,” *Onze Stem*, 15 July 1950.

⁶⁸ *Herdenkings-nummer*, 1; Surat-surat Ketua GIKI dengan Menteri dalam Negeri soal perwakilan WN turunan Eropa dalam perundingan masalah Irian, 1952, no. 2418. RA.8.A, Sekretariat Negara: Kabinet Perdana Menteri 1950-1959 Jilid I, Arsip Negara Republik Indonesia (ANRI), Jakarta, Indonesia.

Chapter 2. The Aspects of the Transitional Periods

This chapter analyses how Snel's PIN and Weiss' IEV-GIKI embedded their discussed ideas on integration and assimilation in Indonesian and Indo discourses and practices. They seemingly often framed ideas and issues related to integration, assimilation, and 'being Indonesian' in the context of a transitional period. Why did what notions of a transitional period come to be and why did who circulate what conceptualizations? Why did they perceive what issues as an essential part of this timeframe and why did they pursue what ways to address these issues? How did they perceive the relationship between 'Indoness' and 'Indonesianness' in this regard? The answers are recovered from PIN and IEV-GIKI voices, and to a small extent objects, from sources in *Onze Stem*, newspapers, the Indonesian state archives, and the Dutch National Archives' collections on the IEV-GIKI's education.

Amplifying voices and performing 'Indonesianness'

At the heart of the movements introduced in chapter one were what Indos and other Indonesians generally named the "*overgangperiode*", "*masa peralihan*", or transitional period in meetings, newspapers, and *Onze Stem*. They circulated different concepts, which changed over time, of what characterized this timeframe. Indo organizations justified their existence on their understandings of the transitional period, which was largely based on their ideas on assimilation and integration. This was embedded in the larger project of building the Indonesian nation-state, wherein other Indonesians viewed the assimilation of 'foreign descent minorities' as an important component.

Therefore, many Indo viewed that the transitional period's hurdles were intertwined with obtaining 'Indonesianness' through certain discourses and practices. They believed that they would become full Indonesians and be accepted as such by other Indonesians in this way. Indos relating to, using, or modifying 'Indonesianness' was not merely showmanship or camouflage to blend in. It was also about what they genuinely thought was to 'be Indonesian'. Indos used nationalist movements and figures as important examples in this regard, like the PNI and president Soekarno. Indos experienced the uniting power of performing 'Indonesianness' as strong enough to support their gradual integration into society during the transitional period. For example, Ernst Utrecht, once an influential IEV-GIKI and PNI member, argued that

Soekarno's 1950s campaign for Irian Barat (West Papua) ensured Indonesia's continued cohesion and fostered nationwide unity.¹

The government viewed the designated minorities as not being Indonesian *yet* during the transitional period. The government argued that these minorities had different needs that required special regulations and legal clauses. The government incorporated these as explicit temporary measures in the temporary constitution and other bills, to identify and differentiate the designated foreign descent citizens.² Various governmental circles aimed to "harmonize" these groups with 'indigenous Indonesians' during this transitional period, which was explicitly stated as part of the nation-state project.³ They established the Bagian Minoritet, which later became the UPBA, at the Ministry of Domestic Affairs to support this aim by documenting the foreign descent groups for government policy-making.

One important temporary clause in the constitution granted six guaranteed Indo seats in parliament, which were initially occupied between 1950-1956 by Snel (PIN and PRN), Mayor Polak (IEV-GIKI and PSI), Augustin (IEV-GIKI and PNI), G.R. Schmitz (IEV-GIKI and Partai Katholik), W.M. Nieuwenhuysen (PIR), and E.F.E. Douwes Dekker.⁴ The government had appointed some for supporting Indonesian independence, like Snel and Douwes Dekker, or their membership of regional parliaments during the federal period, like Augustin and Mayor Polak. However, only four seats were filled for most of the period (Figure 3, 4, 5, and 6). Augustin had rejected his seat in early 1950, while the cabinet replaced Douwes Dekker, who passed away in 1950, with the elderly, little-known IEV-GIKI member J.L.W.R. Rhemrev in November 1954.⁵

¹ Caldwell, Malcolm and Ernst Utrecht, *Indonesia: An alternative history* (Sydney: Alternative Publishing, 1979), 83; Ernst Utrecht, *Soekarno-Soeharto: Indonesië's dekolonisatie dreigt te mislukken* (Odijk: Sjaloom, 1969), 36.

² Undang-Undang RIS, no. 7, 1950. Pasal 58.

³ Djerman Prawirawinata and Schmidgall Tellings, *Menuju Kesatuan Bangsa*, 33, 35.

⁴ "Welke vertegenwoordigers zitten voor Pasundan?" *De Locomotief*, 18 February 1950; "Mr Augustin bedankt als lid parlement," *De Vrije Pers*, 21 April 1950.

⁵ "Mr Augustin bedankt als lid parlement," *De Vrije Pers*, 21 April 1950.



Figures 3, 4, 5 & 6. From left to right: J.P. Snel, J.B.A.F. Mayor Polak, G.R. Schmitz, and W.M. Nieuwenhuysen.⁶

Parliamentary factions had long debated Douwes Dekker's alleged political faction, which they eventually decided was the Partai Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia (Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations Party, Masjumi). Masjumi was a large, influential party that used Islamic teachings as its ideological foundation. Only a few Indos followed Islam, and even fewer were Masjumi members. Still, Schmitz and Mayor Polak requested Masjumi to appoint another Indo, to which Masjumi agreed, seemingly securing its public image for the upcoming elections.⁷ The different, unstable coalitions had refused all other requests to fill empty Indo seats, seemingly to avoid disturbing the delicate balance of power.⁸ As a whole, the appointed members largely represented nationalist and religious factions with more moderate ideas about assimilation and integration.⁹ Snel and Mayor Polak were highly active, representing the PIN and IEV-GIKI respectively, who used their positions to amplify their organization's voices.

Many Indos deemed declaring and often repeating their support for Indonesia's claim on Irian as one way of being Indonesian. The Dutch had retained this colonial possession and helped uprooted Indos to move there. Snel was the only Indo who had protested this at the RTC.¹⁰ Soekarno used the Irian struggle to increase Indonesian unity. His vocal campaign and Dutch rejection increasingly damaged Indonesian-Dutch relations.¹¹ Dutch Indos in Indonesia defended the Dutch claim, which reflected negatively on Indonesian Indos, despite their support

⁶ *Kami Perkenalkan* (Djakarta: Kementerian Penerangan Republik Indonesia, 1954), 102, 106; *Kami Perkenalkan* (Djakarta: Kementerian Penerangan Republik Indonesia, 1952), 66, 91.

⁷ "Enquête bij Economische Zaken zou uitgestrekt veld bestrijken," *De Vrije Pers*, 8 October 1954.

⁸ Memorandum Gabungan Indo untuk Kesatuan Indonesia tentang masalah kewarganegaraan. 4-7 Juni 1952, no. 1023. RA.8.C 1023 Sekretariat Negara: Kabinet Perdana Menteri 1950-1959 Jilid II, Arsip Negara Republik Indonesia (ANRI), Jakarta, Indonesia.

⁹ Douwes Dekker had very strong ideas about total assimilation, which had inspired the FPM, yet he passed away before being able to convey these aspirations in parliament.

¹⁰ "Snel tegen intimidatie," *Java-bode*, 9 November 1957.

¹¹ Hans Meijer, *Den Haag-Djakarta. De Nederlands-Indonesische betrekkingen 1950-1962* (Utrecht: Aula, 1994), 139-140, 259.

for Indonesia. All Indo parties explicitly repeated the Irian claim in their political programmes.¹² All European descent representatives in parliament signed a similar statement in August 1950, when the IEV explicitly announced its support for the Irian claim too.¹³ Minority representatives joined a delegation to the Netherlands the same year to negotiate and present a unified Indonesian front.¹⁴ PIN and IEV-GIKI discourses in *Onze Stem*, newspapers, and at congresses very frequently criticized the Dutch government for continuing colonialism and deceiving Indos to move to Irian and live in poverty there.¹⁵

Partaking in the campaign strongly implied that Indos were part of this all-Indonesian body that defended Indonesian claims. Hence, Indo organizations took assertive actions to seek inclusion. The PIN submitted a proposal to the government in December 1954 to form an Irian government branch and exchange prisoners to “show action instead of just words”.¹⁶ One of the four main points at the national IEV-GIKI congress in 1953 was that Indos should be further involved in “returning Irian to Indonesia”.¹⁷ Soekarno established the Biro Irian (Papua Bureau) in 1954 to accelerate the campaign and initially invited Weiss to join. This shows that Indonesians wanted to include Indos too in this project. Weiss rejected, arguing that the IEV-GIKI was apolitical, but stated that any other IEV-GIKI member would be free to participate as an individual.¹⁸ Consequently, Soekarno appointed Snel’s right-hand Claessen. Later, the PIN also joined a mass meeting in Surabaya with many major parties to speech about Irian and the RTC agreements.¹⁹ While Snel celebrated these small successes, some IEV-GIKI leaders felt left out.²⁰ The *Indonesian* claim and the *Indo* opportunity for smoother integration motivated these Indos, while they paid little attention to the *Papuan* people’s voices. The Dutch government and Indo support for continued colonialism added more complexity to the matter, as Indonesian Indos did not want to be confused with Dutch loyalists.

¹² “De politieke partijen in Indonesië,” *De Vrije Pers*, 18 July 1950; “Twee Indo-groepen over Irian,” *De Locomotief*, 20 November 1950; “De centrale partijleiding van de Persatuan Indonesia Nasional,” *De Nieuwsgier*, 6 November 1953.

¹³ “IEV en Nieuw-Guinea,” *Nieuwe Courant*, 28 August 1950.

¹⁴ “Rondom de Missie Irian,” *De Locomotief*, 7 October 1950.

¹⁵ Wim Augustin, “Natuurlijk gaan eigen staatsburgers boven ieder ander,” *De Vrije Pers*, 31 December 1952; “Reacties op de rede van president Soekarno,” *Java-bode*, 12 November 1952.

¹⁶ “PIN vraagt uitwisseling van politieke gevangenen,” *Java-bode*, 20 December 1954.

¹⁷ “Vier belangrijke resoluties aangenomen,” *Het Nieuwsblad voor Sumatra*, 1 June 1953.

¹⁸ Letter, 10 May 1955. Stukken betreffende wijzigingen van de statuten van de “Stichting Indo-Eenheids-Verbond, no. 65. Access number 2.27.01.01, Inventaris van het archief van de Raad voor Sociale Aangelegenheden in Indonesië, 1954-1958, Nationaal Archief (NA), Den Haag, the Netherlands.

¹⁹ “Massabijeenkomst in Surabaya,” *Het Nieuwsblad voor Sumatra*, 3 March 1955.

²⁰ “President Soekarno installeerde het “Biro Irian”,” *Java-bode*, 4 March 1954; “Onze weg is gericht op vorming van een Indonesische natie,” *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad*, 9 May 1955.

Indos had more difficulties in deciding their stance on the RTC agreements and the Indonesian-Dutch Union, as Indonesian protests increased when bilateral relations deteriorated. Most Indos wished for warm, bilateral relations because of their own mixed ties.²¹ Mayor Polak argued that the economic burdens and Dutch influences were undesirable. Still, he argued that both sides should adopt constructive attitudes to address this problem, rather than collectively mobilizing “sentimental language”.²² Meanwhile, Snel argued from late 1950 that any unfair agreements should be annulled immediately and that Indonesia should leave the Union.²³ Parliament agreed to leave the Union in February 1956, after which Mayor Polak left the room in protest, stating that “now was not the right time”.²⁴ Clearly, this was a more sensitive, intimate topic compared to campaigning for Irian.

Regarding support for national governments, Weiss and Snel generally quickly supported newly established cabinets. Weiss explicitly called for “a strong government in line with the president’s order”.²⁵ Seemingly, Indos were aware of Soekarno’s powerful position above the clashing cabinets and as a symbol of ‘Indonesianness’. Hence, Weiss always vocally defended and supported Soekarno to frame and position the IEV-GIKI close to him.²⁶ Weiss argued that Indonesian leaders had to bring peace, order, stability, and unity for the prosperity of Indonesia and the “small” Indo group.²⁷ This double emphasis shows how Weiss, aware of the limited influence and security that Indos could provide for themselves, sought to embed the Indo group within a strong, unitary state.²⁸ The violent so-called Bersiap period during the early revolution, when many Indos experienced violence and intimidation by certain Indonesian groups, continued to haunt many. Some feared repeated violence if instability and discrimination again increased.²⁹ While Weiss and IEV-GIKI members emphasized that the government had to be strong and were more open to any form of government, Snel instead emphasized the importance of law, democracy, and the Pantjasila.³⁰ He argued that a strong legal basis would ensure the safety of Indos, as he stated that democracy essentially forbade

²¹ “Mentaliteit,” *Onze Stem*, 1 February 1954.

²² “Persstemmen uit Oost-Java,” *Het Nieuwsblad voor Sumatra*, 10 February 1954; “Reacties op de rede van president Soekarno,” *Java-bode*, 12 November 1952.

²³ “PIN heeft nieuw partijbestuur,” *De Vrije Pers*, 16 September 1954; “Nationalisatie en discriminatie,” *Nieuwe Courant*, 4 October 1950.

²⁴ “Laatste nieuws,” *De Nieuwsgier*, 29 February 1956.

²⁵ “Kabinetsformatie,” *Onze Stem*, 10 April 1952; “Naar de stabilisatie van Indonesië,” *Onze Stem*, 10 November 1952.

²⁶ “De president aan het woord,” *Onze Stem*, 10 Mei 1952.

²⁷ “Kabinetsformatie,” *Onze Stem*, 10 April 1952; “17 augustus 1952,” *Onze Stem*, 10 August 1952.

²⁸ J., “Iets over de daerah autonomie,” *Onze Stem*, 10 August 1952.

²⁹ “Snel tegen intimidatie,” *Java-bode*, 9 November 1957; “Verenigen of verdrinken: op onderwijsgeboed zal de Indo-Europeaan eigen boontjes moeten doppen,” *De Locomotief*, 31 July 1950.

³⁰ “Opening IEV jaarcongres,” *Nieuwe Courant*, 27 March 1951.

discrimination by ensuring equal participation.³¹ Weiss also shared such views repeatedly, but mostly because of Soekarno, who called for the Indos to become “patriots and democrats”.³²

Indos also mobilized language to perform ‘Indonesianness’, generally inspired by discourses tied to nationalist and revolutionary values. For example, Snel would start any Indonesian letters to the government with the greeting “*MERDEKA!*” (freedom), which was a well-known shout from the revolution era.³³ The Gerakan Kaum Indo WNI Angkatan 1945 (Movement of the 1945 generation Indonesian Indos, Angkatan ’45), to be discussed in the next chapter, used the same language. For some, this was to blend in as equal nationalist revolutionaries, like Snel, or to emphasize their revolutionary spirit and contributions, like the Angkatan ’45. Weiss generally avoided using terms directly related to the armed revolution, seemingly because of the Bersiap violence. Overall, many Indonesians and Indos viewed using the Indonesian language as already performing ‘Indonesianness’.

This also inspired code-switching, as Weiss used nationalist terms, like *perjuangan* (struggle), in Dutch articles to show his alignment with nationalist ideologies.³⁴ More frequent was the use of family terms like *saudara* (brothers and/or sisters) by Snel, Weiss, and others in newspapers, *Onze Stem*, meetings, and letters to address fellow Indos and Indonesians. Weiss preferred such language, as the IEV-GIKI deemed itself part of the larger Indonesian family. Furthermore, Weiss deemed maintaining Indo and Christian family values important. Other Indonesians shared such language, like officials in Bandung welcoming Indos as “members of our big family in the house of Indonesia”, or president Soekarno, who stated that “he was the *bapak* (father) of the Indos too”.³⁵ Furthermore, IEV-GIKI members embedded these family notions in educative slogans in the *Onze Stem* margins and physical objects, like a sign in the Surabaya clubhouse, which was often rented by Dutch Indos for events (Figure 8). Hence, Indos aimed such use of language towards Indos and other Indonesians to emphasize their ‘Indonesianness’ and connect it with their own ‘Indoness’.

³¹ This viewpoint was strongly emphasized in Snel’s short-lived Democratic Indo Party (PARDI), “De politieke partijen in Indonesië,” *De Vrije Pers*, 18 July 1950.

³² *Herdenkings-nummer*, 3.

³³ Konstituante Republik Indonesia. *Risalah Perundangan. Tahun 1957. Djilid V. Sidang ke-3. Rapat ke-56 sampai ke-64* (n.d.), 24; Panitia Pemeriksaan: surat-surat/laporan tanggal 1952 - 1957 tentang pengangkatan, pengunduran calon untuk menjadi anggota DPR, no. 945. RA.11 Arsip Tekstual Sekretariat Negara: Kabinet Presiden RI 1950-1959, Arsip Negara Republik Indonesia (ANRI), Jakarta, Indonesia.

³⁴ “Een huwelijk,” *Onze Stem*, 10 October 1952.

³⁵ “Helpende hand aan de Indo passend in nationaal belang,” *Algemeen Indisch dagblad*, 21 April 1952; “Hai Kaum Indo, ketahuilah, aku bapakmu pula,” *Pedoman Rakjat*, 13 March 1956.



Figure 7. “Remain a child of your land” at the IEV-GIKI clubhouse in Surabaya.³⁶

Furthermore, Indos used symbols to ‘harmonize’ Indo and Indonesian signs, like the revamped IEV-GIKI logo after March 1951 (see Figure 8). Weiss kept Indo parts of the old logo, like the IEV letters and slogan, and added Indonesian signs, like the slogan’s translation into the ‘national language’ and the five symbols of Soekarno’s Pantjasila state ideology. Weiss thus aimed to fuse ‘Indonesianness’ and ‘Indoness’ together, which was predominantly inspired by nationalist thought. IEV-GIKI leaders viewed Soekarno, the Indonesian language, the Indonesian national anthem, and Pantjasila as symbols of Indonesian unity that had to be integrated into Indo lifestyles.³⁷ The IEV-GIKI incorporated Soekarno’s portrait and the Pantjasila symbol during meetings and congresses, like the 1955 congress (Figure 9).

³⁶ “Wat en hoe?” *Tong Tong*, 30 October 1968.

³⁷ It is interesting to note that, generally, Dutch Indos held extremely negative views of Soekarno in contrast to the Indonesian Indos. “Geestesverwarring,” *Onze Stem*, 15 October 1954.




Figure 8. The IEV-GIKI symbol.³⁸



Figure 9. The 1955 IEV-GIKI congress opening.³⁹

Lastly, Indos practiced unity by cooperating with Arab and Chinese descent organizations. They mostly worked together during the early 1950s by submitting several resolutions to protest the enshrined minority conceptions. The Chinese PDTI, the Arab

³⁸ *Herdenkings-nummer*.

³⁹ Congressist, "Congres Caleidoscoop," *Onze Stem*, 28 May 1955.

BKBITA, and PIN-PM also protested together against the registrations of foreign descent citizens.⁴⁰ The Panitia Persamaan Hak-Hak Warganegara Indonesia (Committee for Equalizing Indonesian Citizen Rights), made up of Malang-based Chinese, Arabs, and Indos, like Hoyer of the PIN, submitted a similar protest.⁴¹ Large organizations, like the IEV-GIKI, BKBITA, and PDTI, rarely worked together as inter-minority solidarity was low and their leaders agreed that each group had their own, separate group aims.⁴² They had even less attention for other, marginalized groups which were not officially deemed as minorities, like the Indian descent group in Sumatra and colonized Papuans in Irian.⁴³

In 1954, most Chinese organizations, like the PDTI, merged into the Badan Permusjawaratan Kewarganagaraan Indonesia (Advising Body for Indonesian Citizenship, Baperki). Initially, the Baperki portrayed itself as an Indonesian, rather than an exclusive Chinese organization. This attracted some PIN and IEV-GIKI Indos, of whom some became branch board members, like C.S. Richter, J.F.G. Steyn, E.F. Wens, and Schmidgall Tellings.⁴⁴ Weiss reacted positively to the Baperki's founding, as he explained both that double membership was allowed and the Baperki's core ideas in detail. Weiss was content with the Baperki's apolitical stance and promise to promote their members to existing parties, rather than participating directly.⁴⁵ Little Indo-Chinese cooperation occurred, like the PIN and Baperki's visit in June 1954 to inquire into foreign descent registrations at the immigration office in Surabaya.⁴⁶ Hence, despite overlapping aims and principles, few were interested in coordinated campaigns.

⁴⁰ Surat dari golongan turunan kepada Perdana Menteri soal pendapat golongan kecil tentang pendaftaran WN Turunan Asing, 1952, no. 2405. RA.8.A Sekretariat Negara Kabinet Perdana Menteri 1950-1959 Jilid I, Arsip Negara Republik Indonesia (ANRI), Jakarta, Indonesia.

⁴¹ Pertemuan Umum WNI di beberapa daerah Jatim: resolusi-resolusi tanggal 7 - 16 Desember 1952 tentang persamaan hak-hak WNI, disertai dengan lampiran, no. 611. RA.11 Arsip Tekstual Sekretariat Negara: Kabinet Presiden RI 1950-1959, Arsip Negara Republik Indonesia (ANRI), Jakarta, Indonesia.

⁴² This view was explicitly agreed upon during the discussions over the guaranteed minority seats for the 1955 elections, which is discussed in chapter three.

⁴³ The Persatuan W.N.I. Keturunan India (Association of Indian descent citizens) requested guaranteed representation like the Chinese, Arab, and European descent groups, which the government rejected. No. 945, RA.11, ANRI.

⁴⁴ Andy Suryadi, *Baperki, Jalan Terja Integrasi Tionghoa di Indonesia* (Universitas Negeri Semarang, 2018), 37; Yulita Fonda, *Aktivitas Sosial Politik Yap Tjwan Bing, tahun 1932-1963* (Bachelor Thesis, Universitas Sebelas Maret, 2015. Bachelor Thesis, Universitas Sebelas Maret, 2015), 59.

⁴⁵ "Wat is en wat wil de Baperki?" *Onze Stem*, 1 June 1954.

⁴⁶ "Registratie facultatief voor W.N.'s via passief stelsel," *Java-bode*, 21 June 1954.

The perceived aspects of the various conceptualised transitional periods

Indo leaders initially focused on convincing other Indos to opt for Indonesian citizenship. They and the government argued that identifying who were Indonesian citizens was the first step in strategizing the transitional period and preparing for the elections.⁴⁷ The IEV-GIKI convinced the Indonesian government to delay drafting citizenship and naturalization laws until after the opting period.⁴⁸ The government and many other Indonesians were quite passive in this process. They argued that they only wanted Indos who genuinely supported Indonesia. The government rejected Snel's request to intensify Indonesian campaigning for Indos in the Netherlands. Nonetheless, Snel held social and informative meetings and was the only one who argued for extending the opting period.⁴⁹ Indonesian authorities strongly rejected this. They argued that Indos had been given enough time to decide. Meanwhile, the IEV-GIKI campaign only really gained traction after the March 1951 congress. Before, the IEV-GIKI journal *Onze Stem* had generally presented the choice for citizenship as personal.⁵⁰ The congress mandated Weiss's moderate course and started campaigning for Indonesian citizenship through articles, interviews, and radio speeches in late 1951.⁵¹

These Indo leaders imagined the transitional period's second stage as the time to end negative forms of discrimination, like the laws on land ownership, citizenship, naturalization, and forms of everyday discrimination, and achieve their respective goals on integration and assimilation.⁵² They regarded parliament as an important stage to familiarize others with their aims and campaign for these. Indo leaders deemed the citizenship and naturalization bill most urgent. The IEV-GIKI and PIN interacted intensively with government officials and politicians to convey their aspirations for the upcoming citizenship and naturalisation bill. They wished for struggling Dutch Indos, who relied on financial aid, to be able to become Indonesian citizens. This would help them to find work more easily and help them realize that Indonesia was their true home.⁵³ Weiss presented it largely as a question of *when* they would naturalize, which would also reaffirm IEV-GIKI members that they had made the right choice and quell

⁴⁷ "RIS-staatsburgerschap dient voor 27 augustus 1951 aangevraagd," *Het Nieuwsblad voor Sumatra*, 12 May 1950.

⁴⁸ "Overgangsregeling voor de naturalisatiewet?" *De Vrije Pers*, 17 January 1952.

⁴⁹ "Warganegara's in Nederland niet aan lot overgelaten," *Het Nieuwsblad voor Sumatra*, 25 October 1951; "Indo-Europeanen moeten niet 'domweg afwachten,'" *Het Nieuwsblad voor Sumatra*, 15 November 1951.

⁵⁰ "Over het aanvaarden van het Indonesisch staatsburgerschap," *Onze Stem*, 31 January 1950.

⁵¹ "Het brandende vraagstuk van het warga-negaraschap," *De Vrije Pers*, 25 September 1951; "Het tijdstip nadert!" *Onze Stem*, 10 October 1951.

⁵² "Warga negara-schap thans alleen via naturalisatie," *Java-bode*, 17 January 1952.

⁵³ Meijer, *In Indië geworteld*, 303-305, 345; "Mayor Polak over de Indische Nederlander," *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad*, 1 March 1954; "Feestelijke herdenking in clubgebouw te Surabaya," *De Vrije Pers*, 19 July 1954; Commentator, "De Nederlandse-Indo nog steeds in de branding," *Onze Stem*, 1 January 1954.

doubting voices. Furthermore, Weiss argued that it would be their final chance to either return to or leave Indonesia, as the government would possibly expel these many foreigners.⁵⁴ The IEV-GIKI and PIN shared general expectations that the citizenship bill would be passed in early 1953.⁵⁵

Therefore, Weiss presented a memorandum in June 1952 to the government. Weiss primarily argued for a flexible citizenship and naturalization law. Weiss rejected any notion of future double citizenship.⁵⁶ The other points of the memorandum largely referred to colonial views and to claim space in Indonesian society. Weiss subscribed to the colonial view of Indos as primarily working as government officials. Weiss argued strongly against discrimination against Indo officials through lower wages, wrong salary scales, or stolen positions, while naturalizing and employing experienced Indo officials would benefit the state. Next, Weiss requested financial support to reinstate their colonial farming program and schools. Other points were aimed at claiming space in society, as Weiss asked for Indo businesses to be recognized as 'national' ones, to acknowledge the IEV-GIKI as an apolitical movement, for police and army members to possibly become members, to fill empty Indo parliament seats, to appoint Indos to national committees, to increase the circulation of knowledge about Indos, and lastly, to place Indo advisors directly below the premier.

Snel's PIN submitted its own citizenship law draft to the government in August 1953 to speed up and help direct the process.⁵⁷ Snel had based the draft, which argued for a new opting period, on the 1946 Indonesian citizenship law. This law included an opting period for the designated foreign descent.⁵⁸ Mayor Polak, Snel's nemesis, criticized him for changing his stance from the RTC discussions, when Snel rejected any opting period.⁵⁹ Snel's draft and PRN connections helped him to join the parliament committee tasked with drafting the citizenship and naturalisation law.⁶⁰ The committee's process was slow, despite general expectations that

⁵⁴ Commentator, "De Nederlandse-Indo nog steeds in de branding," *Onze Stem*, 1 January 1954; "In Nederland 600 doorgangshuizen voor Indo's," *Java-bode*, 19 February 1952.

⁵⁵ "Voorbereiding van wet op het staatsburgerschap," *De Vrije pers*, 29 August 1953; G.J. Claessen, "Staatsburgerschap," *De Vrije Pers*, 5 September 1953; "Nationaliteitswet zal nu niet lang meer op zich laten wachten," *De Vrije Pers*, 31 Oktober 1953.

⁵⁶ Memorandum Gabungan Indo untuk Kesatuan Indonesia tentang masalah kewarganegaraan. 4-7 Juni 1952, no. 1023. RA.8.C 1023 Sekretariat Negara: Kabinet Perdana Menteri 1950-1959 Jilid II, Arsip Negara Republik Indonesia (ANRI), Jakarta, Indonesia.

⁵⁷ "Ontwerpwet op staatsburgerschap," *Het Nieuwsblad voor Sumatra*, 5 August 1953; "Indonesische staatsburgerschap voor hiergeborenen," *De Nieuwsgier*, 22 August 1953.

⁵⁸ Undang-Undang Kewarganegaraan, no. 3, 1946.

⁵⁹ J.B.A.F. Mayor Polak, "Indonesisch Staatsburgerschap," *De Nieuwsgier*, 27 August 1953; C. van Caspel, "Indonesisch Staatsburgerschap," *De Nieuwsgier*, 29 August 1953.

⁶⁰ "Voorbereiding van wet op het staatsburgerschap," *De Vrije pers*, 29 August 1953; G.J. Claessen, "Staatsburgerschap," *De Vrije Pers*, 5 September 1953; "Nationaliteitswet zal nu niet lang meer op zich laten wachten," *De Vrije Pers*, 31 Oktober 1953.

the bill would be passed in early 1953. Eventually, the government delayed the bill until after the elections. The IEV-GIKI and PIN strongly regretted this after their high expectations and intensive lobbying for a quick passing.⁶¹

The Indo organizations perceived discrimination, in its broadest sense, as another crucial issue of the transitional period's second stage.⁶² They justified their existence explicitly on unequal treatments in law, politics, the economy, and society. They mainly targeted visible legal clauses, as they quoted the constitution's clause prohibiting different rights and obligations between citizens. Meanwhile, the colonial law on land ownership continued to prohibit foreign descent groups from owning land. Snel and Weiss viewed this law as highly important, especially as the IEV-GIKI aimed to realize its colonial ideal of an Indo farmer group, while Snel's base in Malang supported him because of his explicit goal of legal equality. Eventually, the government temporarily resolved the issue in early 1952 with an emergency clause that allowed foreign descent citizens to own small plots of land, much to Weiss' satisfaction.⁶³

Weiss and Snel had less success in campaigning against other forms of discrimination, like the hurtful registrations of foreign descent citizens. The government regulated that they had to be registered separately by the UPBA. The UPBA also published the so-called *kartu kuning* (yellow card) or *surat terang an kewarganegaraan Indonesia* (STKI, proof of Indonesian citizenship) for foreign descent citizens only.⁶⁴ The Ministry of Economy also demanded businesses and cooperations to track how many employees were "indigenous Indonesians" or "Indonesian citizens".⁶⁵ The ministry deemed those of foreign descent as "economically strong", justifying withholding the privileges and government support given to national businesses of the "economically weak". The ministry obligated non-national businesses to include "indigenous" Indonesians. Still, the foreign descent minorities held just a few collaborative actions, as intergroup solidarity was low, while the government collectively and explicitly differentiated all of them from other Indonesians in multiple ways.⁶⁶

These forms of discrimination largely originated from narrow nationalist understandings of 'Indonesianness', race, and colonial anxieties. Some of these seemingly targeted the Chinese descent group explicitly. Yet these equally impacted and confused all three designated foreign

⁶¹ "Vier belangrijke resoluties aangenomen," *Het Nieuwsblad voor Sumatra*, 1 June 1953; "Vertrouwen PSI in kabinet is zeer "gering"," *Java-bode*, 8 September 1953;

⁶² "Discriminatie van de Indo-WN over de gehele linie," *Java-bode*, 8 April 1952.

⁶³ "De Indo, niet WN, heeft hier geen toekomst," *Java-bode*, 5 February 1952.

⁶⁴ Surat residen Madura kepada presiden RI 1955 berhubungan urusan biro penyelesaian golongan kecil, no. 882. RA.11 Arsip Tekstual Sekretariat Negara: Kabinet Presiden RI 1950-1959, Arsip Negara Republik Indonesia (ANRI), Jakarta, Indonesia.

⁶⁵ "De warga negara's van vreemde afkomst," *Het Nieuwsblad voor Sumatra*, 27 March 1953.

⁶⁶ "PIN bezoekt immigratiedienst," *De Vrije Pers*, 17 June 1954.

descent groups. The nationalist discourse of ‘us versus them’ resulted to a great extent in differentiating Indonesians from non-Indonesians. All Indonesians practically agreed that Europeans, Chinese, and Arabs were not *asli* (indigenous) Indonesians because of their genealogical and cultural formations. This created confusion when officials used terms like *bangsa* Indonesia, which was often interpreted as similar to the term *asli* (indigenous). For example, some officials registered foreign descent citizens as foreigners in forms and census. These officials considered *bangsa* to refer to genealogical and cultural dimensions, and not the legal dimension. The UPBA circulated a letter in 1954 among all officials to correct and reaffirm that foreign descent citizens were also *kebangsaan* Indonesia.⁶⁷ Snel protested against similar incidents in appointing civil servants or accepting students, as some officials rejected any foreign descent candidate for not being *bangsa* or *asli* Indonesia.⁶⁸ The UPBA’s task, which was documenting both the foreign descent groups and actual foreigners, further reflected and cemented the views of the foreign descent citizens being closer to foreigners than Indonesians.⁶⁹

Discrimination against Indos outside government circles fluctuated, as the structural foundation was there. Changes in Indonesian-Dutch relations also influenced this. Indos complained that Indonesian anti-Dutch sentiments and agitations could not always separate the Dutch Indo from the Indonesian Indo, because they looked the same. This caused both groups to be subjected to the same public intimidation and discrimination.⁷⁰ Seemingly, distrust and suspicion were more widespread in major urban areas. There, relations between Indos and others had been tense from the colonial era over political orientations, European privileges, and cultural differences.⁷¹ Furthermore, some Indonesians punished Indos and others over the colonial *sana* (there) versus nationalist *sini* (here) discourse and cooperation versus non-cooperation discourse, as many Indos had supported the colonial government.⁷² In response, the PIN and IEV-GIKI argued that practicing discrimination was to continue colonialism, as the Dutch colonial government had systematically treated groups differently.⁷³

⁶⁷ Komite Warga Semarang kepada Kepala Negara RI: surat tanggal 30 Juni 1952 tentang rencana UU pendaftaran bangsa asing dan warga negara turunan asing supaya ditinjau kembali, disertai surat pengantar, no. 609. RA.11 Arsip Tekstual Sekretariat Negara: Kabinet Presiden RI 1950-1959, Arsip Negara Republik Indonesia (ANRI), Jakarta, Indonesia.

⁶⁸ “Discriminatie?” *De Vrije Pers*, 9 November 1951.

⁶⁹ Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri, no.4, 1955. Tentang lapang pekerdjaan, susunan, dan pimpinan Kementerian Dalam Negeri.

⁷⁰ “Over enige belangrijke en nog steeds actuele vragen,” *Onze Stem*, 15 November 1954.

⁷¹ “Ernstige crisis werd dankzij de Bondsvoorzitter overwonnen,” *De Vrije Pers*, 18 May 1953.

⁷² “De Warga Negara van Europese origine in Indonesië,” *Het nieuwsblad voor Sumatra*, 22 February 1952; K.W.A., “De Indo-Europese minderheid in de RIS,” *Onze Stem*, 28 February 1950.

⁷³ “Discriminatie gevaar voor samenleving,” *Nieuwe Courant*, 19 October 1950; “Vier belangrijke resoluties aangenomen,” *Het Nieuwsblad voor Sumatra*, 1 June 1953.

Weiss argued that three groups actively enabled discrimination.⁷⁴ First, some Dutch nationals actively undermined Indonesian Indos by smearing their name.⁷⁵ Second, some Indonesians distrusted all Indos and also threatened their participation in society. Lastly, Weiss blamed Dutch Indos in Indonesia who refused to become Indonesian citizens. Their explicit Dutch loyalty impacted perceptions of Indonesian Indos. Weiss also blamed some Indonesian Indos, who portrayed themselves as better Indonesians and better nationalists than other Indos.⁷⁶ Meanwhile, Mayor Polak argued that the government was most influential and active in discriminating against the so-called “new citizens”. He argued that the government had an exemplary role in justifying and continuing structural forms of discrimination.⁷⁷

Lastly, these Indo leaders viewed a third, crucial issue as part of the transitional period, which was Indo mentalities and orientations. Weiss, Snel, and others argued that Western perspectives should partially be reoriented towards the East, as both were historically and culturally part of ‘Indoness’.⁷⁸ IEV-GIKI leaders predicted that Indonesians, like Soekarno, would increasingly incorporate Western values into the creation of the national culture and economy.⁷⁹ They deemed Indos fit to participate actively in this process with their mixed formations and mastery of English and Dutch.⁸⁰

Moreover, Weiss and Snel argued that colonial views and reliance on European privileges had to be abandoned to adapt the ‘national consciousness’ and support the nation-state building process.⁸¹ The first part referred to ideas of group exclusiveness, looking down on other Indonesians, and fostering an aversion to work. They explained the second part as fostering Indonesian solidarity and national unity. They viewed transitional education as the most effective tool to support this process by educating and shaping Indo youth.

⁷⁴ “Perjuangan naar drie kanten,” *Onze Stem*, 10 February 1953.

⁷⁵ “Bijeenkomst met de onderwijs-sectie van het parlement,” *Onze Stem*, 10 April 1952.

⁷⁶ Opmerker, “De arrestaties,” *Onze Stem*, 1 April 1954; “Over enige belangrijke en nog steeds actuele vragen,” *Onze Stem*, 15 November 1954.

⁷⁷ “Discriminatie van de Indo-WN over de gehele linie,” *Java-bode*, 8 April 1952.

⁷⁸ “Nieuw IEV bestuur Soerabaja,” *Nieuwe Courant* 13 February 1950; “Het IEV in andere banen,” *Nieuwe Courant*, 10 March 1950. “Helpende hand aan de Indo passend in nationaal belang,” *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad*, 21 April 1952.

⁷⁹ This aligned with Soekarno’s early views that there was no national culture yet, which had to be created. *Indonesia, madjalah kebudayaan, nomor kongres* 1, no. 1-2 (1950): 17.

⁸⁰ “Verenigen of verdrinken: op onderwijsgeboed zal de Indo-Europeaan eigen boontjes moeten doppen,” *De Locomotief*, 31 July 1950; “De schoolgelden worden verlaagd,” *Nieuwe Courant*, 25 January 1951; “Principiële vragen tot het IEV gericht,” *De Vrije Pers*, 6 December 1951; R. Tannenbaum, “Wim Ploegmanschool,” *Onze Stem*, 10 August 1953.

⁸¹ “De Warga Negara van Europese origine in Indonesië,” *Het Nieuwsblad voor Sumatra*, 22 February 1952.

Transformative education

Weiss was the first to connect the IEV-GIKI's colonial education wing to the general need for primary schools. Historian Agus Suwignyo argued that the Indonesian education system during the 1950s was dealing with a struggling, chaotic infrastructure of buildings, policies, and personnel after years of war, while the general demand for education surged.⁸² Indo families struggled to place their children in preferably Dutch-language schools. Meanwhile, the government announced that only Indonesian-language schools would be subsidized from early 1950.⁸³ Therefore, Weiss established transitional elementary schools to teach Indo youth Dutch, Indonesian, and Indonesia-oriented knowledge of history, geography, and biology.⁸⁴ Both languages were taught with the same intensity for six years. Teachers taught in Dutch for the first three years and switched to Indonesian afterwards.⁸⁵ The IEV-GIKI schools aimed to "transform" (*omvormen*) graduates to be able to fully participate in and contribute to society with their mixed Western and Eastern formation.⁸⁶ Weiss chaired the colonial-era IEV education foundation, later the Perkumpulan Perguruan GIKI, which managed these schools.

In July 1950, the IEV-GIKI accepted the Ondernemersbond's invitation to join the Stichting Nederlands Onderwijs (Dutch Education Foundation, SNO). This Dutch-oriented organization of businessmen, like the Dutch government, aimed to help fund Dutch language education and address the needs of Dutch citizens in Indonesia. Weiss and the SNO reached a compromise over the IEV-GIKI's Indonesian orientation. The SNO wanted more Dutch-language schools, while Weiss desperately needed funds.⁸⁷ The SNO differentiated Dutch-language schools based on their Dutch or Indonesian orientation to accommodate Weiss, as only the IEV-GIKI operated transitional or *concordante* schools. The SNO construction meant that Weiss's expenses were paid for, while any IEV-GIKI student fees were transferred to the SNO.

Establishing schools was difficult because buildings, equipment, and especially bilingual teachers were expensive to obtain and maintain. Meanwhile, Weiss wished that school

⁸² Agus Suwignyo, "A vast expansion, yet a sorry infrastructure: A paradox of the decolonization of Indonesian education, c. 1950s," *Lembaran Sejarah* 17, no. 1 (2021): 50.

⁸³ "De keuze van lagere school," *Onze Stem*, 15 February 1950; "Het IEV onderwijs," *Onze Stem*, 31 March 1950.

⁸⁴ "Hoe staat het met het 'blijvers' onderwijs?" *Onze Stem*, 15 August 1950.

⁸⁵ "De keuze van lagere school," *Onze Stem*, 15 February 1950.

⁸⁶ "Onderwijs voor het blijverskind," *Onze Stem*, 15 July 1950.

⁸⁷ "Insp. van Onderwijs: de scholen gaan op 1 augustus open," *Nieuwe Courant*, 26 July 1950; "Het IEV-onderwijs," *Nieuwe Courant*, 28 July 1950; Hans Meijer, "'Dweilen met de kraan open.' De stichting Nederlands Onderwijs in Indonesië, 1950-1961," *Leidschrift* 21, no. 2 (2006): 118.

fees were as low as possible to accommodate large families with small incomes.⁸⁸ The IEV-GIKI board frequently reported on their education efforts in *Onze Stem* while asking for donations. Weiss and Augustin often clashed with the SNO's leadership over the high student fees and education orientations.⁸⁹ Still, the IEV-GIKI only effectively left the SNO in 1952, after the Indonesian government had promised subsidized teachers and nine extra schools in Surabaya, Djakarta, and Bogor.⁹⁰ Afterwards, Weiss immediately lowered the fees.⁹¹ Nonetheless, the government would only hand over three schools after one and a half years, while only the Djakarta elementary schools received financial support.⁹² The influential, rich Ondernemersbond increasingly undermined the IEV-GIKI by intentionally stealing teachers with better contracts, defaming IEV-GIKI schools, and drastically lowering fees to bankrupt the IEV-GIKI schools.⁹³

Nonetheless, Weiss managed to operate a large number of schools after 1952 (Table 1). Limited Indonesian support made Weiss accept the Dutch government's offer for large subsidies through a secret scheme, because the total collapse of IEV-GIKI schools was imminent. The Dutch government motivated this offer with the 1952 Werner commission report. This report was established to give advice on the future of Dutch Indos who remained in Indonesia after the opting period.⁹⁴ Werner had argued that Indos with limited prospects had to be Indonesianized instead of being brought to the Netherlands. Hence, they shared Weiss's aim to reorient Dutch Indos towards Indonesian futures, while the SNO rejected Indonesian-oriented education.⁹⁵ Weiss did not want the Indonesian government to know because this could complicate Indonesian subsidies. Thus, the Dutch government proposed to provide funds through the SNO. Weiss agreed on the condition that the SNO would have no input at all. Therefore, Weiss left the vocational Zaalbergschool in Surabaya in the SNO as a front to obtain

⁸⁸ See the *Onze Stem* education edition which discussed all the education problems in detail. *Onze Stem*, 10 august 1953.

⁸⁹ "Jaarvergadering van het IEV," *De Vrije Pers*, 19 May 1952.

⁹⁰ "Negen scholen voor IEV," *De Vrije Pers*, 9 August 1951; Letter, 25 September 1952. Stukken betreffende de behandeling van aangelegenheden met betrekking tot het verlenen van subsidie aan het Indo Eenheids Verbond in Indonesië, no. 797. Access number 2.14.74, Inventaris van het archief van de Centrale Directie Internationale Betrekkingen en taakvoorgangers van het ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen, 1945-1987, Nationaal Archief (NA), Den Haag, the Netherlands.

⁹¹ Letter, 20 April 1954. No. 797. Access number 2.14.74, NA.

⁹² G.A. Loth, "De IEV-scholen," *Java-bode*, 3 November 1952.

⁹³ Letter, 7 November 1950. Briefwisseling betreffende het onderwijs vanwege het Indo-EenheidsEuropees-Verbond (I.E.V.), no. 761. Access number 2.20.30, Stichting voor Nederlands Onderwijs in Indonesië, Nationaal Archief (NA), Den Haag, the Netherlands; Report by H.J. van Riet, 28 May 1954. No. 797. Access number 2.14.74, NA; Bestedingsplan jaar 1954-1955. No. 797. Access number 2.14.74, NA; Letter, 2 October 1953. Onderwijs van het Indisch Eenheids Verbond (IEV), 1953 – 1957, no. 939. Access number 2.27.02, Ministerie van Maatschappelijk Werk, Nationaal Archief (NA), Den Haag, the Netherlands.

⁹⁴ Nota, 12 April 1955. No. 797. Access number 2.14.74, NA.

⁹⁵ Codetelegram, 7 July 1954. No. 797. Access number 2.14.74, NA.

subsidies.⁹⁶ Indonesian authorities, like most IEV-GIKI members, never found out about this construction, despite frequent suspicion about why Weiss maintained relations with the SNO.⁹⁷

Weiss used this financial stability and freedom to establish junior high schools and kindergartens in response to parent requests.⁹⁸ Some of these parents deemed the numerically few Indonesian schools as inferior.⁹⁹ Weiss did not design these schools as transitional, which used the national curriculum in addition to Dutch as an optional course. Furthermore, Weiss established vocational, technical courses in Bandung to produce specialized workers able to live independent, urban, middle-class lifestyles.¹⁰⁰ The Dutch subsidies were crucial for these highly expensive technical studies because of the needed equipment and materials for practice.

At first, the Dutch government blindly trusted the IEV-GIKI with its money. Soon, the Dutch requested detailed plans to justify Weiss's high spending. Dutch officials grew more critical and denied further financial support from 1954 for any IEV-GIKI high schools and planned shipping industry schools, which they argued were not transformative in nature and in line with the Werner report.¹⁰¹ Consequently, Weiss cut half of the high schools, while Dutch subsidies for vocational schools were continued (Table 1). Weiss closed other schools over struggles to obtain bilingual teachers, like the Djakarta vocational school in late 1954.¹⁰²

⁹⁶ Letter, 29 March 1954. No. 797. Access number 2.14.74, NA; Codetelegram, 15 October 1953. No. 797. Access number 2.14.74, NA.

⁹⁷ Letter, 20 April 1953. No. 797. Access number 2.14.74, NA.

⁹⁸ Bestedingsplan 1953-1954. No. 797. Access number 2.14.74, NA.

⁹⁹ Letter, 20 April 1953. No. 797. Access number 2.14.74, NA.

¹⁰⁰ Memorandum Radioschool, 1 August 1953. No. 797. Access number 2.14.74, NA.

¹⁰¹ Letter, 27 August 1954. No. 797. Access number 2.14.74, NA.

¹⁰² "Onderwijs in Indonesië," *Onze Stem*, 1 September 1954.

City/Year	1949-1950	1950-1951	1951-1952	1952-1953	1953-1954	1954-1955
Surabaja	1 junior high	1 elementary	1 elementary	2 elementary	2 elementary	2 elementary
	1 vocational	1 junior high	1 junior high	1 junior high	1 junior high	1 junior high
		1 vocational	1 vocational	1 senior high	1 senior high	1 vocational
				1 vocational	1 vocational	1 kindergarten
Bandung	-	1 elementary	1 elementary	2 elementary	2 elementary	2 elementary
		1 vocational	1 vocational	2 vocational	3 vocational	2 vocational
				1 junior high	1 junior high	1 kindergarten
					1 kindergarten	
Djakarta	-	-	-	3 elementary	3 elementary	3 elementary
				1 junior high	1 junior high	1 junior high
					1 vocational	1 kindergarten
Semarang	-	1 elementary	1 elementary	1 elementary	1 elementary	1 elementary
						1 kindergarten
Bogor	-	-	-	1 elementary	1 elementary	1 elementary
Total	2 schools	6 schools	6 schools	2244 students	+2350 students	2475 students
				16 schools	19 schools	17 schools

Table 1. Numbers and types of IEV-GIKI per school year.¹⁰³

Dutch Indo views regarding the IEV-GIKI were mixed. Some labelled them as *afvalligen* (apostates) and *landverraders* (traitors) and preferred the SNO Dutch-oriented schools.¹⁰⁴ Other appreciated Weiss's accommodating fee policy, which made many poor, Dutch parents opt for IEV-GIKI schools (Table 2). Weiss's personal and ideological feud with the SNO led to him frequently and strongly denouncing the latter. He argued that the SNO perpetuated Dutch colonialism by maintaining that Indos should be separated from Indonesians. The SNO made Dutch Indos increasingly "attached" and dependent on their Dutch passports, and by stimulating anti-Indonesian views.¹⁰⁵ Weiss pointed out that SNO alumni struggled in Indonesian high schools because they lacked the required Indonesian knowledge and language. The Dutch government backed Weiss because the Werner report dictated that Indos should be prepared for Indonesian futures.¹⁰⁶ Dutch officials lamented how negatively Dutch Indo parents viewed the IEV-GIKI only because they were supposed "traitors" as "former Dutch

¹⁰³ "Een laatste vermaan aan de Indo niet-Indonesisch staatsburger," *De Vrije pers*, 12 March 1954; Congressist, "Congres Caleidoscoop," *Onze Stem*, 28 May 1955; No. 797. Access number 2.14.74, NA.

¹⁰⁴ Allard, "Penjelidikan kemasjarakatan di Bogor," 9; Letter, 2 October 1953. No. 939. Access number 2.27.02, NA.

¹⁰⁵ Letter, 2 October 1953. No. 939. Access number 2.27.02, NA.

¹⁰⁶ Codetelegram, 19 October 1953. No. 939. Access number 2.27.02, NA.

nationals”.¹⁰⁷ Both hoped that many Dutch Indos would become Indonesian after the naturalization law was passed.

Meijer has argued that Indonesian Indos were less interested in IEV-GIKI schools compared to the other, supposedly superior SNO. Ten percent of the IEV-GIKI children were Indonesian Indos in elementary schools and twenty percent in secondary education institutes.¹⁰⁸ Meanwhile, Indonesian Indos made up on average less than a quarter of all IEV-GIKI students, while around half of the students were Dutch nationals (Table 2). Furthermore, each time the SNO established new schools, IEV-GIKI students left. During this school fee feud, most parents just preferred which school was the cheapest, as children moved multiple times.¹⁰⁹ Therefore, Weiss pressed the Dutch government to force the SNO to stop expanding.¹¹⁰ Instead, the Dutch government proposed subsidies for each Indo student regardless of nationality. Weiss rejected, because Dutch funding for Indonesian Indo students would imply that the IEV-GIKI was an extension of the Dutch government.¹¹¹

Between 1953 and 1955, student numbers grew by four percent per year. The gradual decline of other Dutch and Chinese schools, Dutch students leaving Indonesia, and improving IEV-GIKI schools influenced this growth.¹¹² Furthermore, the IEV-GIKI’s colonial-era education was well-known for its quality among Indos and Indonesians, while the IEV-GIKI continued to stand out because of its Dutch language courses. The remaining Dutch students were from families that earned too much to receive SNO subsidies, yet too little to afford schooling at Dutch-oriented SNO schools. Thus, Indonesian Indo, Chinese descent, and other Indonesian student numbers increased over the years, while Dutch student numbers slowly decreased.¹¹³

School type	Indonesian Indo		Dutch Indo		Chinese		other Indonesians	
Elementary	477	25%	401	21%	480	24%	590	30%
Secondary	68	17,5%	127	31,5%	63	16%	136	35%
Technical	16	10%	96	58%	22	13%	32	19%

Table 2. Students divided according to their backgrounds, 1952-1953.¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁷ Letter, 29 May 1954. No. 939. Access number 2.27.02, NA.

¹⁰⁸ Meijer, “stichting Nederlands Onderwijs,” 126-127.

¹⁰⁹ Letter, 20 April 1953. No. 797. Access number 2.14.74, NA.

¹¹⁰ Letter, 29 March 1954. No. 797. Access number 2.14.74, NA.

¹¹¹ Letter, 29 March 1954. No. 797. Access number 2.14.74, NA.

¹¹² Congressist, “Congres Caleidoscoop,” *Onze Stem*, 28 May 1955.

¹¹³ Congressist, “Congres Caleidoscoop,” *Onze Stem*, 28 May 1955.

¹¹⁴ Financial report 1952-1953. No. 797. Access number 2.14.74, NA.

Many appreciated the IEV-GIKI's achievement in education. Despite their deep feud, the Snel would repeatedly praise the IEV-GIKI's achievements in education.¹¹⁵ Snel also established his own education foundation, Pintar (Smart), which would never open a school because of these many difficulties.¹¹⁶ National and local authorities were more appreciative. Over time, they viewed the IEV-GIKI primarily as an educational foundation, rather than a socio-cultural organization.¹¹⁷ These officials held high views of the IEV-GIKI's contribution in addressing the many problems of the national educational infrastructure.

Still, Weiss's efforts in education were also explicitly tied to claiming space in society and not just addressing Indonesian and Indo problems. Weiss lamented that the IEV-GIKI was not as influential as other groups and minorities, like the Chinese descent group's influence in the economy.¹¹⁸ For example, he failed to purchase the *Vrije Pers* newspaper because of limited IEV-GIKI funds. Weiss's strong focus on expanding education should be seen in this same context of expanding the influence of the Indo group. The IEV-GIKI leadership gained and spent goodwill earned with education to make Indo voices heard, like asking for schools, subsidies, but also later during the elections to obtain Indo seats for IEV-GIKI members.

Concluding Remarks

Indo organizations did their best to 'talk the talk and walk the walk' on how to be Indonesian. Weiss and Snel argued that 'Indonesianness' and 'Indoness' could overlap by combining both in Indo organizational lifestyles. Initially, many Indonesians and Indos argued that Indos lacked 'Indonesianness'. Weiss and Snel aimed to address this by absorbing certain aspects of discourses, practices, symbols, and thought, which they and other Indonesians deemed as characteristic of 'Indonesianness', combined with their ideals of integration and assimilation. They wished to pursue these aims in a limited time frame, which they dubbed the transitional period, which they embedded in Indonesian understandings of a transitional period for nation-state building and assimilation of the foreign descent groups. This helped many Indos to integrate, assimilate, and claim space in society as Indos and Indonesians. They did this by mixing what they perceived as 'Indoness' with aspects of what they deemed 'Indonesianness'.

¹¹⁵ J.P. Snel, "Isolatie van de Indo," *De Nieuwsgier*, 12 November 1954.

¹¹⁶ "Ter Bevordering van het Vakonderwijs," *De Nieuwsgier*, 23 March 1954.

¹¹⁷ See for example the many letters from Indonesian authorities in *Herdenkings-nummer*, 6-20.

¹¹⁸ Letter from Weiss, 26 February 1954. No. 797. Access number 2.14.74, NA.

Chapter 3. *De Stoelendans*: struggling with representation, 1955-1957

This chapter analyses why and how Indos engaged with Indonesian society during the long election period, which stretched from the campaigning period until the moment the cabinet appointed the last Indo representatives. Why did Indo movements and other Indonesians desire what kind of engagement and voices as representation for the designated foreign descent minorities? What enabled or hindered this for what reasons? Therefore, this chapter analyses struggles over how Indos and Indonesians mobilized ‘Indoness’ and ‘Indonesianness’ are central to this chapter, following the thought of IEV-GIKI and PIN leaders, over the reasoning of the IEV-GIKI, PIN, Badan Kontak, and Angkatan ’45 behind proposing certain Indo candidates, and over Indonesian views on Indos, ‘Indoness’, and ‘Indonesianness’. Their voices in journals like *Onze Stem*, *De Kern*, and *PINcet*, government collections at the Indonesian National Archives, newspapers, and Indonesian voices in state archives, newspapers, and other works describing Indos.

Election preparations and ways of campaigning

For many Indonesians was the promise of elections an important prospect in Indonesian nation-state building from the early revolution in 1946.¹ Many Indonesians initially viewed that a modern Indonesian state had to be modelled on European democracy models. Hence, successfully holding the first national elections would mark a big success. The elections would be held for a definite parliament, as Indonesians deemed the initial one temporary because they had not been elected. There would also be elections for the constituent assembly, the *Konstituante*, which would draft a definite constitution to replace the one. While the stakes were high, many of the initial parliament members were reluctant to accelerate election preparations. Many members represented small factions poised to lose at the elections, while the consolidation of the administration and rebellions further slowed this project.² The parliament succeeded in placating the disgruntled army command after their 17 October 1952 demonstration aimed to dissolve parliament by rushing election preparations.³ Indonesian newspapers circulated increasingly heightened expectations and hopes for a strong, stable, anti-corruption government to replace the corrupt, bickering, and crises-ridden temporary

¹ Herbert Feith, “Towards Elections in Indonesia,” *Pacific Affairs* 27, no. 3 (1954): 236

² Feith, “Towards Elections,” 245.

³ Feith, “Towards Elections,” 248; Feith, *Indonesian Elections*, 3.

parliament.⁴ Various researchers, like Herbert Feith and Taufiq Abdullah, have analysed the elections' main participants and rules.⁵ However, their analysis has not been extended to official – and unofficial – minority groups with separate aims besides or embedded within what they perceived as general Indonesian aims.

During the election bill debates in 1953, parliament members debated long over how guaranteed minority seats should be filled. The Wilopo cabinet rejected various requests to abolish the minority seats. Subsequently, various speakers put forward proposals on how any empty seats would be filled after the elections. Mayor Polak was dismissive of such efforts, stating that these were useless because the election winners would ultimately decide how to fill the seats.⁶ He, like many others, presumed that no Indo would be elected due to numerical few Indo voters. Furthermore, parties would likely place Indos low on their candidate lists to try to secure their appointment as additional members afterwards.

Initially, the cabinet wanted the election winners could appoint minority representatives based on their party affiliation.⁷ Snel protested because non-political organizations should be able to propose candidates. Furthermore, he proposed that members should be appointed in accordance with each minority group's wishes, because the Chinese, European, and Arab descent representatives all had different views. Eventually, they reached a vague commitment to “fulfil the wishes of each group when appointing representatives for empty seats”.⁸ Mayor Polak was happy with this compromise, because at least Indos would be heard, even if the government was not obliged to fulfil their wishes.⁹ This was a minor victory to have ensured that Indo voices would be heard, despite the possibility of the election winners dividing seats among themselves.

Mayor Polak played a controversial, important role during the long election period, as he would increasingly oppose Weiss over time. Mayor Polak was a well-educated, former career colonial official in Bali. There he turned to Buddhism and married, before moving to Djakarta during the late revolution. Mayor Polak was the only board member who was to participate in the elections. He had been a representative of Sjahrir's socialist, Western-oriented PSI from the

⁴ Feith, *Indonesian Elections*, 5.

⁵ Feith, *Indonesian Elections*; Feith, *Towards Elections*; Abdullah, *Towards Democracy*; Lev, *Transition to Guided Democracy*.

⁶ Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Republik Indonesia. *Risalah Perundingan. Tahun 1953, Jilid 2. Rapat ke-70 sampai ke-80* (n.d.), 949.

⁷ Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat, *Risalah Perundingan. Tahun 1953*, 928.

⁸ *Undang-Undang Pemilihan*, no. 7, 1954, Pasal 136.

⁹ Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat, *Risalah Perundingan. Tahun 1953*, 950.

revolution until he withdrew in May 1955 due to his deteriorating health.¹⁰ His outspoken, critical activism in parliament made prominent PNI members strongly dislike him. Still, this did not impact Mayor Polak's prominent position within the IEV-GIKI. Mayor Polak and Weiss configured the movement's stance on the elections.

Mayor Polak, Weiss, and other senior IEV-GIKI leaders started to disseminate information on the elections from mid-1954. At that time, official preparations gained momentum. Mayor Polak argued that the IEV-GIKI did not participate in the elections because it would be a big mistake to participate *as* Indos. Rather, they should participate as Indonesians, because this would not damage public perceptions of their political assimilation as Indonesians.¹¹ The Baperki initially followed a similar stance, which reversal in late 1954 made Indos like E.F. Wens and Schmidgall Tellings decide to leave.¹² Mayor Polak strongly urged IEV-GIKI members to actively participate as Indonesian candidates and voters of national parties and not minority ones like the Baperki and PIN, which had both registered as participants. He argued that the elections were decisive for the Indo's future, as chaotic elections could spiral into greater chaos and democracy's disappearance. Mayor Polak argued that this threatened the well-being of "our small, weak group", which was realism, not defeatism.¹³ Mayor Polak and Weiss rarely discussed the transitional period in relation to the elections. They viewed successful elections and a resulting strong, stable government as crucial foundations for ending the transitional period.

Mayor Polak and Weiss gave lectures, wrote articles, and placed reminders in the margins of *Onze Stem* to mobilize IEV-GIKI members to vote (Figure 10). Figure 10 shows the sense of urgency and carefulness that Mayor Polak and Weiss wished to convey to members. They criticized passive stances on the elections and participating as Indos, like "politieke avonturiers" (*political adventurers*), which referred to Snel's PIN. They argued that Indos had to actively make sure as Indonesians that a just, wise, and stable government was to be formed for the Indo's integration and protection. Furthermore, Mayor Polak and Weiss gave practical

¹⁰ Seemingly, Mayor Polak had been somewhat close to Sjahrir from the revolution period because John Legge interviewed him for his research into Sjahrir's 1945-1949 following. John Legge, *A Study of the following recruited by Sutan Sjahrir in Occupation Jakarta* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1988), 141; "Drs. Mayor Polak," *De Nieuwsgier*, 7 May 1955.

¹¹ I.E.V.-er, "Iets over de benoemingen van leden voor de Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat R.I. en de Constituanten," *Onze Stem*, 1 June 1954.

¹² Yulita Fonda, *Yap Tjwan Bing*, 59.

¹³ I.E.V.-er, "Iets over de benoemingen van leden voor de Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat R.I. en de Constituanten," *Onze Stem*, 1 June 1954; "Causerie van JBAF Mayor Polak over 'de komende algemene verkiezingen', 30 mei 1954 in Ad Huc Stat gebouw Djakarta," *Onze Stem*, 1 June 1954.

information to act upon, instructing members to register with local leaders (*lurah*) and informing them of the voting process itself.



Figure 10. Election propaganda in the margins of *Onze Stem*.¹⁴

In 1954, Mayor Polak and Weiss criticized a newly passed amendment to the election bill, which stated that votes for unelected minority candidates were to be recorded separately.¹⁵ They believed the amendment would motivate minorities to participate as minorities, rather than as Indonesians. Mayor Polak and Weiss aimed to secure the seats after the elections. They expected that Indo seats would remain empty, in which case the new coalition would surely listen to the largest Indo organization to fill these. The May 1955 IEV-GIKI congress authorized Weiss and Mayor Polak to draft a proposal with candidates if empty seats remained, which went against Weiss' apolitical course.¹⁶ Mayor Polak defended this new course by explaining that the elections were an issue for the Indonesian people and their parties, while the eventual appointments of empty seats were a matter of the Indo minority and their movements. Hence, he argued that the IEV-GIKI had to use its Indonesian voice first, before using its Indo one.

The contradicting stance on apolitical activities and preparing to campaign for parliament seats destabilized Weiss's course. Mayor Polak was increasingly able to compromise his course, as he requested two seats for Indo representatives in the Djakarta municipal council. This directly challenged Weiss's 1950 decision to abandon such representation.¹⁷ Other non-IEV-GIKI Indos increasingly criticized Mayor Polak because they deemed his frequent feuds

¹⁴ *Onze Stem*, 1 June 1954.

¹⁵ I.E.V.-er, "Iets over de benoemingen van leden voor de Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat R.I. en de Constituante," *Onze Stem*, 1 June 1954.

¹⁶ Congressist, "Congres Caleidoscoop," *Onze Stem*, 28 May 1955.

¹⁷ "Gemeenteraad van Djakarta," *Het Nieuwsblad voor Sumatra*, 30 June 1954.

with other Indos as polarizing.¹⁸ These included Tjalie Robinson, before he moved to the Netherlands, and Snel, which other Indos found polarizing. This limited the IEV-GIKI's potential to grow and its reputation during this period.

Ideologically, the IEV-GIKI leaned towards the PNI's nationalist thought and popularity, as shown by various articles discussing PNI stances and the prominent position of PNI flowers at IEV-GIKI events (Figure 11). Sending such big flower pieces was aimed at strengthening relations and expressing support.¹⁹ Meanwhile, there were zero articles for the moderate nationalist Christian parties. The IEV-GIKI did not publicly campaign for the PNI, but relations were good between both organizations.



Figure 11. PNI flowers on the left for the 1953 IEV-GIKI congress.²⁰

Meanwhile, Snel and the PIN had decided in May 1954 to participate in the elections in the districts of Java, South Sumatra, and South Sulawesi.²¹ Snel registered as an independent for unclear reasons, but remained the PIN's chair (Figures 12 and 13). Two months later, Snel and the PIN deregistered, arguing that their stances were too similar in relation to the fractured spectrum of nationalist parties.²² Snel argued that these should be working together instead of

¹⁸ G.E. Guerin, "Nogmaals: Indonesisch Staatsburgerschap," *De Nieuwsgier*, 3 October 1955; J.C. Princen, "Vuile was," *De Nieuwsgier*, 17 March 1955; P.J. van Hemert, "Tjali's Piekerans," *De Nieuwsgier*, 4 November 1954.


¹⁹ The PNI orientations would only be strengthened post-elections, see chapter four. "PNI stemmen over de nationaliteitswet," *Onze Stem*, 10 January 1953; "De PNI en de minderheden," *Onze Stem*, 10 March 1953; "De tjabang Bandung van de PNI," *Onze Stem*, 1 June 1954.

²⁰ *Onze Stem*, 30 June 1953.

²¹ Surat-surat mengenai daftar nama dan tanda gambar dalam Pemilu Anggota Konstituante dan DPR, 31 Mei 1954, no. 1112, RA.8.C Sekretariat Negara: Kabinet Perdana Menteri 1950-1959 Jilid II, Arsip Negara Republik Indonesia (ANRI), Jakarta, Indonesia.

²² "P.I.N. neemt niet deel aan verkiezingen," *Het Nieuwsblad voor Sumatra*, 7 July 1954.

competing individually. Therefore, he desired a united Indonesian voice, instead of adding Indo voices to the spectrum of Indonesian parties.



Figures 12 & 13. PIN’s burung lajang-lajang terbang (flying swallow) and Snel’s kilat (thunder).²³

The PIN published its journal *PINcet* from November 1954, which mainly contained Snel’s views on Indonesian affairs and was seemingly aimed at informing Indo voters. The articles were critical of economic discrimination against the ‘non-indigenous Indonesians’, the untransparent parliamentary system with backdoor dealings, the inconsistent foreign affairs policy, which criticized European countries for colonialism but not the Soviet Union or China, and lastly, the flawed law system.²⁴ Prominent Indonesians, like prosecutor Soenario, reacted strongly against Snel’s critiques of the discriminatory law system in February 1955. Snel had argued that discrimination occurred in lawsuits between *asli* and non-*asli* Indonesians, after which Snel ended the *PINcet*.²⁵

Despite this, the PIN registered again in March 1955 for the elections in the East Java district, where most members were based.²⁶ Chair Snel did not participate, but vice-chair Dirk Hage did. This was seemingly a compromise over their conflicting views on participation. Hage, who was a well-known revolutionary and had been the co-leader of the revolutionary Indo organization Indonesia Merdeka, argued that the PIN was a national party based on “the national Indonesian character”. Hage argued that *de jure* minorities did not exist in the

²³ Komisi Pemilihan Umum Kabupaten Cilacap, *Tanda Gambar Peserta Pemilihan Umum 1955*, n.d.

²⁴ “Wat anderen er van zeggen,” *Java-bode*, 15 October 1954; J.P. Snel, “Parlementair stelsel en partijwezen,” *De Vrije Pers*, 9 December 1954; J.P. Snel, “Onze buitenlandse politiek niet altijd even duidelijk,” *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad*, 21 January 1955; J.P. Snel, “Indonesië als rechtsstaat,” *De Nieuwsgier*, 25 February 1955.

²⁵ “J.P. Snel bij djaksa tinggi Soenario,” *Java-bode*, 28 February 1955.

²⁶ “Candidaten der PIN voor verkiezingen,” *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad*, 9 March 1955.

constitution, yet *de facto* discrimination and differentiation occurred.²⁷ Hence, Hage defended the PIN's aim to end discrimination, while emphasizing the PIN's 'Indonesianness' and 'Indoness'. Amongst others, Hage aimed to accelerate Indo assimilation through improved education.

Some other parties included lesser-known Indo candidates. Parties placed them low on the lists to ensure that they were not elected. They aimed for their appointments during the post-election brawl over empty minority seats.²⁸ The PNI listed five Indos, the Partai Buruh four, the Partai Katolik three, Baperki two, the PSI one, and Masjumi one. Only one Indo and IEV-GIKI member, mr. P.W. Blogg, participated individually in Djakarta. Furthermore, the Gerakan Pembela Pantjasila (Pantjasila Defenders Movement, GPP) listed Wens and Schmidgall Tellings, both *penghapusan* Indos of the PNI, for unclear reasons. The PKI and NU had simply no Indo members to list. Similarly, these parties placed Chinese descent candidates low on the lists, while the Arab descent were generally placed higher.

Election results, candidate lists, and group reflections

The long, tense, and hopeful buildup towards the elections turned into what Feith has argued felt like a national celebration. Voter turnout was huge in September 1955 for parliament and December 1955 for the Konstituante, as respectively 91,54 percent and 89,33 percent of the registered voters voted.²⁹ On 8 October 1955, the early emerging picture of the results circulated in newspapers. Various minor parties were wiped out, like Snel's backer PRN.³⁰ Four parties, the PNI, Masjumi, PKI, and NU, which had split from Masjumi, rivalled each other as the big winners. As generally expected, none of the twenty-nine Indos out of 5475 candidates received enough votes.³¹ The PIN received 5681 votes for parliament and around 8060 for the Konstituante in East Java, which was not enough to obtain a seat (Appendix A).³² Soon, Indo organizations started to compile candidate lists for the new parliament. They based their lists on different hierarchies and conditions to motivate why certain candidates were better or more Indo and Indonesian than others.

²⁷ "De Jure is er in Indonesië geen minoriteitspartij," *Java bode*, 13 February 1956.

²⁸ Pengangkatan anggota-anggota DPR, no. 2447, RA.8.C.

²⁹ Feith, *Indonesian Elections*, 39, 49-54.

³⁰ Feith, *Indonesian Elections*, 57.

³¹ Komisi Pemilihan Umum, *Pemilu Indonesia dalam angka dan fakta tahun 1955-1999* (Jakarta: Biro Humas Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 2000), 14; Feith, *Constitutional Democracy*, 429.

³² Pengangkatan anggota-anggota DPR, no. 2447, RA.8.C.

Mayor Polak drafted and submitted the IEV-GIKI list in December 1955 to the government. Weiss was abroad at the time for business and was not involved by Mayor Polak. Mayor Polak unveiled the list publicly after the election results were officially announced in January 1956.³³ Mayor Polak argued that the IEV-GIKI, as the largest Indo organization with real contributions to Indonesian education, should be heard in this process. He largely envisioned a continuance of the current situation. Mayor Polak proposed that Schmitz, Rhemrev, and himself should return to parliament, supported by the younger generation, which included Koot, Wens, and Avé (Table 3). Initially, Mayor Polak wished to include more senior IEV-GIKI leaders, like Augustin, but they abstained because of their health.³⁴ Notably, Mayor Polak did not include Weiss. This led to the Bandung branch protesting and submitting Weiss's candidature themselves because of his perceived important services to the Indo community.³⁵ Mayor Polak had excluded him to consolidate his own influence over the IEV-GIKI. Their tense relationship over the last years worsened during the election preparations over Weiss's apolitical principle and Mayor Polak's supposed "dictatorial style".³⁶

Mayor Polak justified his list by including what he perceived as the two major political groups among Indonesians, which the PNI and Masjumi represented, and among Indos, which were the Parkindo and Partai Katholik (Table 3). He proposed acceptable candidates to receive from within and beyond the Indo group. The candidates' Indonesian party and Indo organization affiliations were aimed at pleasing both groups. Mayor Polak's list for the Konstituante placed a heavier emphasis on proposing many independent and well-known Indo candidates, like Claproth, Cochrane, Dessauvagie, Koks, and Fransz, who was also the only proposed woman (Table 4). Mayor Polak wanted the younger generation to be adequately represented, as he included names like Avé and Utrecht. Still, Mayor Polak included as many independents and well-known Indos as possible, as he had argued before that minority members with party affiliation would always represent party interests over minority ones, which he had seemingly experienced himself when he represented the PSI in parliament.³⁷

³³ Pengangkatan anggota-anggota DPR, no. 2447, RA.8.C.

³⁴ J.B.A.F. Mayor Polak, "De Stoelendans," *Onze Stem*, 15 March 1956.

³⁵ J.B.A.F. Mayor Polak, "De Stoelendans," *Onze Stem*, 15 March 1956; "De Europese Minoriteitsgroep," *De Nieuwsgier*, 25 January 1956.

³⁶ H.L.F. Schornak van der Waag, "Mendjelang pengangkatan wakil2 golongan ketjil Eropa," *Merdeka*, 8 February 1956.

³⁷ "Betreffende de voor de minoriteiten gereserveerde zetels in parlement en constituante," *Onze Stem*, 10 February 1953.

No.	Name	Party Affiliation	Reasoning
1	Drs. J.B.A.F. Mayor Polak	Independent	GIKI leader
2	E.F. Wens	PNI	Largest party
3	Drs. J.L.W.R. Rhemrev	Masjumi	Second-largest party
4	J.R. Koot	Parkindo	Largest party for Indos
5	G.R. Schmitz	Partai Katholik	Second-largest party for Indos
6	Drs. J.B. Avé	Independent	GIKI leader

Table 3. Mayor Polak's list for parliament.³⁸

No.	Name	Party Affiliation
1	Drs. J.B. Avé	Independent
2	Mr. P.W. Blogg	Partai Katholik
3	R. Claproth	PRN
4	Ir. Ch. H. Cochrane	Independent
5	Ir. F.L.H. Dessauvague	PIR
6	Mr. A.L. Fransz	Parkindo
7	E.F. Jahn	Independent
8	Dr. J.Th. Koks	Independent
9	Ir. L. O'Brien	Independent
10	Drs. J.L.W.R. Rhemrev	Masjumi
11	Mr. Drs. E. Utrecht	PNI

Table 4. Mayor Polak's list for the Konstituante.³⁹

The second organization that submitted a list was the Badan Kontak Perwakilan Golongan Ketjil Eropah (Contact Body for European Minority Representation, Badan Kontak hereafter). J.C. (Poncke) Princen (1925-2002), C. van Caspel (1926), and Werbata established it on 12 December 1955.⁴⁰ Princen was born in the Netherlands and had deserted during the revolution, while Van Caspel was a prominent PIN member, and Werbata had been influential in the INP-PIN and IEV-GIKI during the early 1950s. Like other Badan Kontak members, they primarily united because of their antipathy towards Mayor Polak's attempt to monopolize

³⁸ Pengangkatan anggota-anggota DPR, no. 2447, RA.8.C; J.B.A.F. Mayor Polak, "De Stoelendans," *Onze Stem*, 15 March 1956.

³⁹ Pengangkatan anggota-anggota DPR, no. 2447, RA.8.C.

⁴⁰ "Kontaktlichaam Europese Minoriteit," *De Nieuwsgier*, 20 January 1956.

representation. Princen, Werbata, and many other Badan Kontak members had left the IEV-GIKI after feuds.⁴¹

Princen, Van Caspel, and Werbata aimed to establish a neutral, central voice for all Indos. They wanted to create a more representative list beyond the IEV-GIKI, which allegedly only represented one-fourth of all Indos.⁴² Princen and Van Caspel met with premier Harahap in October 1955 to reiterate their wish that Indo voices would be heard when appointing additional members.⁴³ They aimed to include all organizations in their list. When they heard of Mayor Polak's list, they immediately invited him. Mayor Polak rejected and argued that his list represented all the different Indo groups.⁴⁴ Still, most of Mayor Polak's opponents supported the Badan Kontak. These included Snel and Claessen, but not the PIN, the rebelling IEV-GIKI Bandung faction, and Schmidgall Tellings, who temporarily revived the FPM to amplify his support. Schmidgall Tellings declared that Mayor Polak's attempt to monopolize representation had to be thwarted and criticized him for utilizing the party affiliation of IEV-GIKI members to press their candidature.⁴⁵

Eventually, the Badan Kontak offered its report to the Indonesian government in late February 1956 with an alphabetical list of candidates representing what they perceived as the four major groups of Indos. They listed twelve names for parliament and twenty-four for the Konstituante.⁴⁶ Princen, Van Caspel, and Werbata had based their lists on what they perceived as the dominant groups among Indos, which were (1) positive assimilation, those who aimed to relinquish their Indo formation in for total assimilation, (2) social segregation, those who wanted minority members themselves to solve social issues related to minorities, (3) cultural synthesis, those who wanted to cooperate with other (ethnic) groups to create strong bonds between minority and majority, and (4) ideological, those who had chosen Indonesian citizenship on reasons beyond historical and economic influences and largely overlapped with

⁴¹ H.L.F. Schornak van der Waag, "Mendjelang pengangkatan wakil2 golongan ketjil Eropa," *Merdeka*, 8 February 1956.

⁴² "Kontaktlichaam Europese minderheid," *Indische courant voor Nederland*, February 4, 1956.

⁴³ "Minoriteitszetels in het parlement," *Het Nieuwsblad voor Sumatra*, 21 October 1955.

⁴⁴ "GIKI tolak berunding," *Harian Umum*, February 7, 1956.

⁴⁵ The GPP also still supported Schmidgall Tellings, J.E. Liefveld, and F.J. Vodegel for parliament. Letter, 3 April 1956, no. 945, RA.11; H.L.F. Schornak van der Waag, "Mendjelang pengangkatan wakil2 golongan ketjil Eropa," *Merdeka*, 8 February 1956; "5 Tjalon Indo dari GP Pantjasila," *Harian Umum*, 25 January 1956; "Adhaesie betuigingen voor 'Badan Kontak'," *Java Bode*, 4 February 1956; "Front Penghapus Minoriteit opgericht," *De Nieuwsgier*, 6 February 1956.

⁴⁶ There is no trace of this report of the Badan Kontak nor any other traces of communication. It seems plausible these have been lost, while there is little indication to believe the Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet used any document of the Badan Kontak to appoint members. At most, some of the Konstituante representatives could have been taken from their list. "Badan Kontak heeft geen kandidatenlijst," *De Nieuwsgier*, 25 February 1956; "Organisatie van Indo's," *Java-bode*, 30 January 1956.

the other groups.⁴⁷ Badan Kontak leaders had based these divisions on their internal mix. This included Schmidgall Tellings' view of total assimilation, Snel's view of separate Indo advice bodies, Weiss' view of maintaining Indo formations, and Princen's position as a non-Indo. The Badan Kontak disbanded after submitting its list in late February 1952.

Third, Hage and the PIN submitted their own list after the elections for parliament and the Konstituante (Table 5). The party seemed to have become less stable, as Snel, Claessen, and Van Caspel had not publicly supported Hage's list. Hage argued to the government that the PIN was a national Indonesian party, while explicitly mentioning that ninety percent of its members were Ind. Hence, Hage underlined the PIN's 'Indoness' and 'Indonesianness'. Furthermore, Hage repeated the PIN's election result to prove that the PIN had real support among Indos (Appendix A). While the Badan Kontak had mostly emphasized the 'Indoness' factor, the PIN and IEV-GIKI also strongly mobilized their candidates' 'Indonesianness' to win Indonesian support. Hage himself was a well-known revolutionary, which supported his 'Indonesianness' to claim an Indonesian Indo seat.

No.	Name	Party position
1	Dirk Hage	PIN vice-president
2	A.M. Hermanus	PIN member
3	J.Th. Kouthoofd	PIN Surabaya branch leader
4	G.E.S. Crawford	PIN treasurer
5	C.L. Paimin Bysterveldt	PIN board member

Table 5. PIN candidate list.⁴⁸

Regarding the PIN's election results, more Indos outside of East Java's major cities, where most Indos lived, had voted for the PIN compared to those living in Surabaya and Malang. This division reinforces social scientist Allard's 1953 analysis of Indos in the rural, Central Java town of Salatiga. Allard noticed that three-quarters of the Salatiga Indos had opted for Indonesian citizenship, which was a much higher percentage of optants than in the major urban areas.⁴⁹ Seemingly, Indos in small towns and villages felt less affected by discrimination and intimidation. Their primary concern was the legal minority status, which prevented them from

⁴⁷ "Badan Kontak heeft geen kandidatenlijst," *De Nieuwsgier*, 25 February 1956.

⁴⁸ Pengangkatan anggota-anggota DPR, no. 2447, RA.8.C.

⁴⁹ Allard, "Laporan sementara tentang penjelidikan sosiologis," 16-17.

freely owning land and operating national businesses.⁵⁰ In contrast, Indos in Surabaya experienced more frequent and more forms of discrimination. In response, they more actively organized with the IEV-GIKI against discrimination. Mayor Polak argued that these Indos voted for parties mixing Christian and moderate nationalist values, like Parkindo and Partai Katholik, followed by other nationalist parties, except the PIN.⁵¹ The IEV-GIKI's aims did not resonate with Indos outside of the cities because of different priorities. The urge to blend in, to seek safety, or to cooperate closely with Christians and nationalists was felt stronger in urban areas. Meanwhile, Indos in rural areas felt freer to explicitly pursue specific Indo issues of equalization at the elections, as reflected in the voting results.

Fourth, Amir Daeng Mattarang and former PIN-PM members established the Gerakan Kaum Indo WNI Angkatan 1945 (Movement of the 1945 generation Indonesian Indos, Angkatan '45 hereafter) in Makassar to weigh in on the seat distribution.⁵² Mattarang, formerly Piet Hein van den Eeckhout, was controversial because of his alleged unpleasant personality and role in the Glodok prison affair during the Japanese occupation, according to Soekarno, Snel, and Wens.⁵³ He had fought during the revolution, which he deemed an important source of pride and legitimacy to involve himself in debating Indo representation.⁵⁴ The Angkatan '45 did not interact much with other Indo organizations. Instead, Mattarang sent many letters and resolutions to the government. Mattarang requested not to fill Indo seats because it would slow their assimilation. If this were impossible, then Soekarno should choose whoever he thought fit to preserve unity and to “gather the Indos around the father of our nation”.⁵⁵ The request shows again the important unifying powers Indos ascribed to Soekarno.

Still, Mattarang submitted various lists with recommendations based on the candidate's “nationalist spirit”, “revolutionary spirit”, and “services in liberating Indonesia” (Tables 6 and

⁵⁰ J.B. Avé noticed how generally mixed descent people were accepted quicker in villages compared to major cities. *Simposium Baperki tentang Sumbangsih apakah jg dapat diberikan oleh Warganegara2 Indonesia keturunan asing kepada pembangunan dan perkembangan kebudayaan nasional Indonesia* (Baperki, 1957), 35-37.

⁵¹ J.B.A.F. Mayor Polak, “De Stoelendans,” *Onze Stem*, 15 Maart 1956.

⁵² The movement was also known as the Panitia Kaum Indo WNI Angkatan 1945.

⁵³ Van den Eeckhout has been held accountable by other Indos for imprisoning hundreds of Indo youth, of whom around eighty died because of the harsh Japanese regulations. Van den Eeckhout was also familiar during the revolution with other Indos like the Indonesia Merdeka leadership, J.P. Snel, and E.F. Wens (who had been his helper at the Japanese bureau for some time), but he fell soon out of favour with Soekarno, Wens, and other Indos because of his personality, who all distanced themselves from Van den Eeckhout. Meijer, *Indië Geworteld*, 215-217, 232, 265.

⁵⁴ Van den Eeckhout had also been one of the mutineers of the warship De Zeven Provinciën in 1933 and had been anti-Dutch from long before the revolution.

⁵⁵ Letter, 23 April 1956, no. 2441 RA.8.C; Letter, Perihal: Pencabutan sokongan pencalonan sdr. E.F. Wens untuk DPR dan Konstituante, no. 945. RA.11.

7).⁵⁶ This was another way of selecting candidates, in favour of the Angkatan '45, but generally focused on who possessed the required 'Indonesianness' to represent Indos. Mattarang argued that few Indos cared for national politics. Hence, Soekarno should not elect Indo representatives for their political affiliations, which would also diminish their independence. Mattarang largely supported the *penghapusan* thought and rejected Indos as a distinct ethnic group. He loathed most Indo organizations for defending the minority status and aimed to diminish their reputation with his meddling. Consequently, Mattarang gave more weight to his interpretation of 'Indonesianness' over 'Indoness' in supporting candidates.⁵⁷ The proposed candidates included perceived revolutionaries outside the Angkatan '45, like Wens, Hage, Schmidgall Tellings, and Avé. Most of the candidates supported the *penghapusan* thought and the PNI's nationalism. Later, Mattarang replaced Wens with Utrecht, because Wens distanced himself from the controversial Mattarang.⁵⁸

No.	Name	Affiliation(s)
1	E.F. Wens	IEV-GIKI, PNI
2	J.F.G. Steyn	IEV-GIKI, Angkatan '45, former INP-PIN
3	S.F. Meyer	Angkatan '45, former INP-PIN
4	H.F.A. Wijnberg	Angkatan '45
5	J.F. Vodegel	FPM, GPP, Angkatan '45
6	D. Hage	PIN

Table 6. Gerakan Kaum Indo WNI Angkatan 1945's list for parliament.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Initially, a limited list of Angkatan '45 supporters was sent, which was later replaced by in-depth lists when the appointments were delayed.

⁵⁷ Letter, 22 February 1956;

⁵⁸ Letter, 17 May 1956, no. 945. RA.11; Letter, Perihal: Pencabutan sokongan pencalonan sdr. E.F. Wens untuk DPR dan Konstituante, no. 945. RA.11.

⁵⁹ Letter, 4 May 1956, no. 945. RA.11.

No.	Name	Affiliation(s)
1	A.E. Schmidgall Tellings	FPM, GPP, PNI
2	F.J. Vodegel	FPM, GPP, Angkatan '45
3	E.F. Wens	IEV-GIKI, GPP, PNI
4	D. Hage	PIN
5	F. Faubel	Angkatan '45
6	Drs. J.B. Avé	IEV-GIKI
7	W. Goller	
8	Mr. A.J.A. Theys	
9	A.N. Liefveld	FPM, GPP
10	J.W.H. Scheffer	
11	F. Sprengers	Badan Kontak
12	G. Hess	

Table 7. Gerakan Kaum Indo WNI Angkatan 1945's list for the Konstituante.⁶⁰

The struggle for representative representation

The immediate election results would not bring the stable government as desired by many Indos and other Indonesians. Ali Sastroamidjojo's second short-lived cabinet only came to power in late March 1956, while the same corruption, bickering, and crises continued. Hence, many Indos and other Indonesians deemed the appointments of minority representatives as likely problematic. Similar concerns rose over the appointment of representatives for Irian Barat. The province had been included in the elections to emphasize Indonesia's claim. The national police warned in their final report of the elections that political parties adhere to the election bills and not corrupt these appointments because this "will be a test for democracy".⁶¹ Such statements were made because of the expectation that the old or new cabinet would divide these seats to solidify their own rule. A few groups still argued that minority seats should be abolished, repeating similar petitions that were made during the 1953 election bill debate in parliament. The PKI, Parkindo, and the Arab descent organization BKBITA argued that this would lead to assimilation and equal rights.⁶² However, ulterior motives also influenced their

⁶⁰ Letter, 4 August 1956, no. 945. RA.11.

⁶¹ Djawatan Kepolisian Negara, *Risalah Pemilihan Umum untuk Konstituante 15 Desember 1955* (n.d.), 15-16.

⁶² "Standpunt van 2 partijen: de Parkindo en de PKI," *De Locomotief*, 6 March 1956; "Minoriteit sudah hapus perwakilan minoriteit di DPR," *Harian Umum*, 13 March 1956.

stances, as all Arab seats had been filled during the elections and the PKI had no Indo and a few Chinese descent candidates.

Still, most parties remained against. They wanted the seats or argued that abolishing them would have broad consequences by effectively recognizing that minority assimilation had been achieved. Soekarno, the PNI, and others supported differentiations between citizens. First, the cabinet was reluctant to abolish one minority, like the Arab descent group, because this would strengthen the Chinese and European minorities calling for similar treatment. Instead, colonial and contemporary fears of Chinese influence and economic domination and discrimination against Chinese descent citizens only increased between 1956 and 1962. For example, parliament member Assaat created a movement to expel all Chinese descent Indonesians because of their alleged exclusivism and economic control.⁶³

Second, Soekarno and the PNI seemingly viewed that continuing this colonial legacy strengthened the development of a united Indonesian national identity. Many of their actions were aimed at this, like the Irian Barat campaign and anti-Western rhetoric. These actions influenced popular perceptions of anyone with Dutch affiliations negatively. Soekarno realized this and the resulting discrimination aimed at Indos. He attempted to address this by increasingly including Indos in his rhetoric and inviting them to meetings, like the March 1956 and March 1957 Indo visits to Soekarno's palace.⁶⁴ Still, Soekarno apparently viewed that differentiating Indo, Arab, and Chinese descent from *asli* Indonesians was a necessary evil to create a united self-identification. Feith argued in his 1962 analysis that such "out-grouping" of minorities served "as aids to [fostering] national solidarity".⁶⁵ This process of making these designated minorities visible to differentiate them extended to Indonesian government practices in archiving. They separated information on 'foreign descent' citizens, like the photos on the front of this thesis, which were titled "citizens of European descent voting" during the 1955 and 1957 elections.⁶⁶

Meanwhile, the PNI had become the largest party after a successful campaign based on "nativism," as Van der Kroef argued in his 1958 analysis of the election. He argued that this nativism was a form of Indonesian nationalism committed to specific Indonesian values of the

⁶³ Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, *Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945-1965* (Cornell University, 1970), 340-346.

⁶⁴ These are further analysed in the next chapter.

⁶⁵ Feith, *Decline of Constitutional Democracy*, 28.

⁶⁶ No. 25255, no. 25308, no.25337, no. 26248, no. 26376. Foto Kempen RI Jakarta 1955, Arsip Negara Republik Indonesia (ANRI), Jakarta, Indonesia; No. 37767, Foto Kempen RI Jakarta 1957, Arsip Negara Republik Indonesia (ANRI), Jakarta, Indonesia.

‘indigenous’ Indonesians.⁶⁷ The PNI’s success from mobilizing and strengthening notions of indigenous ‘Indonesianness’ motivated them to continue doing so. This further enabled their own rising popularity amid the tense competition with other strong political parties. Many Indonesians perceived the boundaries of ‘Indonesianness’ as created by public discourse as vague. In response, Soekarno and PNI leaders explained ‘Indonesianness’ in mainly negative terms to make it easier to comprehend. Van der Kroef and Feith have argued that Soekarno and PNI largely articulated this nativism as anti-Western, which also targeted domestic non-indigenous Indonesians.⁶⁸ Their rhetoric often targeted Western cultural practices, products, and thought. Many Indonesians associated these with Indos, who often embodied certain European physical traits and lived lifestyles with European cultural elements.

Many Indonesians, explicitly and implicitly, positioned the culturally and genealogically hybrid Indos face-to-face with indigenous Indonesians. Indos spoke Dutch, but they also spoke Indonesian. In other words, they visibly embodied the demarcation line between the ‘Indonesian Self’ and the non-Indonesian ‘Other’. Contemporary writers reflected this, like Armijn Pané’s 1947 play *Antara bumi dan langit*, Pramoedya’s 1950 *Di tepi kali Bekasi*, Mochtar Lubis’ 1957 *Senja di Jakarta*, and Nh. Dini’s 1977 *Keberangkatan*.⁶⁹ These writers share that they portray Indo characters as hybrids. On one hand, there are always Indonesian characters in these works who doubt or criticize Indos because of their different formations, Western free sexual lifestyles (*gaya hidup bebas*), and mixed looks.⁷⁰ On the other hand, these Indo characters are all nationalists, speak Indonesian, and can mobilize their ‘Indonesianness’ to participate in society despite different forms of marginalization.

Hence, Soekarno and the PNI further strengthened existing popular Indonesian perceptions of Indos as hybrids embodying and living ‘Indonesianness’ and ‘non-Indonesianness’ to enable their own popularity. Furthermore, they implicitly used ‘the Indo’ as one concrete point of departure to create a stable ‘Indonesian Self’, besides often more abstract ones like various concepts of modernity.⁷¹ As Feith has noticed, Indonesians did not

⁶⁷ Justus M. van der Kroef, “The Trials of Indonesian Democracy,” *The Review of Politics* 20, no. 1 (1958): 72.

⁶⁸ Herbert Feith, “Indonesia’s political symbols and their wielders,” *World Politics* 16, no. 1 (1963): 82, 90; Van der Kroef, “Trials,” 72.

⁶⁹ Mochtar Lubis, *Senja di Jakarta* (Jakarta: Obor, 2025); Nh. Dini, *Keberangkatan* (Pustaka Jaya, 1977); Pramoedya Ananta Toer, *Di tepi kali Bekasi* (Gapura, 1957); Armijn Pané, *Djinak-djinak Merpati dengan Terjita 2 Sandiwara lain* (Djakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1953).

⁷⁰ Figures like Pramoedya’s Nanny, Pané’s Frieda, Lubis’ Dahlia, and Dini’s Elisa are exemplary of these struggles. It is crucial to note that important Indo characters were almost always women and not men. However, this analysis unfortunately falls beyond the scope of this thesis.

⁷¹ Schulte Nordholt, “Indonesia in the 1950s,” and Ruth McVey, “Building Behemoth: Indonesian Constructions of the Nation-State,” in *Making Indonesia*, eds. Daniel S. Lev and Ruth McVey (Cornell University, 1996), 11-25.

differentiate Indos because of their ethnicity, but as this thesis argues, rather their hybridity.⁷² Soekarno and the PNI purposefully continued to make the Indo and their hybridity as visible as possible by structurally differentiating them as *foreign Indonesians* from regular, or indigenous, Indonesians. This way, Indonesians could conclude themselves by looking at Indo bodies and lifestyles that any shared traits, like the Indonesian language, were part of ‘being Indonesian’, while any differences, like big noses and speaking Dutch, were not. Therefore, future crisis-ridden cabinets and Soekarno’s Guided Democracy did not change these minority politics.⁷³

Opponents of Harahap’s cabinet, which had carried out the elections and remained in office until March 1956, successfully pressured Harahap to leave the minority seat appointments to his successor, Ali Sastroamidjojo.⁷⁴ The PIN was very frustrated with this slow process, as Indos could not voice their stances on important matters like the RTC agreements in May 1956.⁷⁵ Ali Sastroamidjojo defended himself by arguing that many factors were involved when the PIN leadership visited him for an explanation a few months later.⁷⁶ This was true because of the vague law stating that “minority wishes had to be fulfilled”, political parties demanding extra seats, and the various Indo organizations submitting conflicting lists.⁷⁷

Eventually, Ali Sastroamidjojo announced to appoint Indo representatives for each perceived ideology, which he argued were nationalists, Christians, and Muslims.⁷⁸ This way, he justified appointing relatively many Indo Muslims and party-affiliated Indos. Thus, the cabinet’s eventual selection of representatives was based on ideological views and party affiliations, rather than their ‘Indoness’ or ‘Indonesianness’. Still, interactions between Mayor Polak and officials of both Harahap’s and Ali Sastroamidjojo’s cabinets in the state’s archives shows that cabinet members were very interested in the IEV-GIKI list. Officials requested at least twenty-eight additional copies to Mayor Polak for internal distribution to other departments for discussion. During the following meeting in late January 1956, officials circled four names on one of these copies to become representatives, which were Wens, Rhemrev, Koot, and Avé.⁷⁹ Cabinet members considered Mayor Polak as a PNI candidate. Still, they preferred Wens for the PNI slot because of his established position and Mayor Polak’s clashes with the PNI during his first term in parliament.⁸⁰ During another meeting in February, officials

⁷² Feith, *Decline of Constitutional Democracy*, 28.

⁷³ Van der Kroef, “Indonesian Democracy,” 70 ; Lev, *Transition to Guided Democracy*, 6-11.

⁷⁴ Feith, *Decline of Constitutional Democracy*, 457-459.

⁷⁵ “Partai Indo Nasional wensn tijdelijke voorzieningen,” *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad*, 29 May 1956.

⁷⁶ “De minoriteitszetel,” *De Nieuwsgier*, 13 July 1956.

⁷⁷ “Minderheden,” *De Nieuwsgier*, 6 December 1956.

⁷⁸ “Pengangkatan golongan ketjil di-mosi?” *Sin Po*, 30 October 1956.

⁷⁹ Pengangkatan anggota-anggota DPR, no. 2447, RA.8.C.

⁸⁰ “Indonesia Raya,” *De Locomotief*, 11 February 1956.

discussed the PIN's list, on which they circled Hage's name.⁸¹ Later, the NU added the name of a little-known Indo, R. du Puy, to the list (Table 8).⁸²

However, the Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Union of Islamic Education, PERTI) and Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (League of Supporters of Indonesian Independence, IPKI) protested the initial list and threatened to pull back their ministers.⁸³ The cabinet, PERTI, and IPKI agreed to replace Avé with Princen, because Avé was replaceable as an independent. Princen was initially a Masjumi candidate, but had switched to the IPKI.⁸⁴ Both PERTI and IPKI were pleased with the Islamic Princen strengthening their factions.

Name	Party	Stream	Proposed by	Organization
E.F. Wens	PNI	Nationalist	Mayor Polak	IEV-GIKI
J.R. Koot	Parkindo	Christian	Mayor Polak	IEV-GIKI
J.L.W.R. Rhemrev	Masjumi	Islamic	Mayor Polak	IEV-GIKI
R. Ch. M. Du Puy	NU	Islamic	NU	IEV-GIKI
D. Hage	PNI	Nationalist	PIN	PIN
J.C. Princen	IPKI	Veterans	IPKI	Badan Kontak

Table 8. List of parliament members for the European descent minority.⁸⁵

The IEV-GIKI reacted somewhat positively to the cabinet's appointed representatives.⁸⁶ The IEV-GIKI Djakarta leadership hoped that the three accepted candidates of Mayor Polak's list would be placed in sections related to cultural or social activities, especially education.⁸⁷ This way, the representatives could improve IEV-GIKI education with government support. The IEV-GIKI was mostly disappointed about Princen's appointment, who was no Indo and had publicly left the organization.⁸⁸ Still, they were pleased with the IEV-GIKI's dominant position in the eyes of the Indonesian public and cabinet.⁸⁹ The cabinet had given the IEV-GIKI between half and three-quarters of all the European descent minority seats, while supposedly a quarter

⁸¹ Pengangkatan anggota-anggota DPR, no. 2447, RA.8.C.

⁸² Feith, *Decline of Constitutional Democracy*, 477-478.

⁸³ "Lijst minoriteitskandidaten aan president voorgelegd," *De Nieuwsgier*, 25 August 1956.

⁸⁴ "Princen lid van het parlement," *De Nieuwsgier*, 31 August 1956; Poncke Princen, *Een Kwestie van Kiezen* (Gouda: BBNC Uitgevers, 1995), 139.

⁸⁵ "Vertegenwoordigers minderheden beëdigd," *De Nieuwsgier*, 6 December 1956.

⁸⁶ "Het parlement," *De Kern*, 15 September 1956.

⁸⁷ "Parlementaria," *De Kern*, 15 December 1956.

⁸⁸ "Verklaring van GIKI," *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad*, 24 September 1956; "Het parlement," *De Kern*, 15 September 1956.

⁸⁹ "Het parlement," *De Kern*, 15 September 1956.

of all Indos were IEV-GIKI members according to critics (Tables 8 and 9).⁹⁰ Still, it seems that many intellectuals joined the IEV-GIKI at some point.

Snel felt disappointed because he deemed the appointed members as no true Indo representatives.⁹¹ He complained that two members represented Islamic parties, while three were Muslims, and none represented the Partai Katholik. Meanwhile, the Indo population was largely split between Catholics, Christians, and only a few Muslims. Snel feared that this would strongly limit the input of Indo movements on a national level, especially because the three Muslim Indos were not well-known Indo representatives. Snel and the Baperki strongly criticized what they argued was the egoistic meddling of political parties that obstructed Indo and Chinese voices.⁹² Snel was cynical of Mayor Polak's list that enabled this meddling, as he had proposed mostly party-affiliated Indos. Nonetheless, the Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet had not even appointed Mayor Polak, who was the list's leader. Furthermore, Snel regretted that Indo support for candidates was not considered, as confirmed by the minister of justice.⁹³

While the Harahap and Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinets had not considered Indo support for candidates, they did consider what wishes Indo organizations submitted in their letters and candidate lists.⁹⁴ Initially, they picked five of the European descent representatives from these lists. They reduced these to four to accommodate the NU, PERTI, and IPKI. Especially their consideration of the independent Avé shows that cabinet members wished to appoint at least one Indo representative without any party affiliation. Their subsequent failure to secure Avé's appointment also shows Ali Sastroamidjojo's failure to ensure such representation and how party affiliations influenced these appointments.

The Konstituante convened for the first time in December 1956, but without any Indo representatives. Again, Snel protested that Indo voices should be weighing in on drafting the new constitution.⁹⁵ The cabinet eventually appointed Indo representatives in March 1958. The cabinet's reasoning and discussion behind this is unclear from the sources. Still, they appointed many independents in the end, including Avé, in contrast to parliament (Table 9). The cabinet seemingly drew candidates from various Indo lists and political parties, as the appointed members included both well-known and lesser-known Indos.⁹⁶ The main source of inspiration

⁹⁰ "Kontaktlichaam Europese minderheid," *Indische courant voor Nederland*, February 4, 1956.

⁹¹ "Vertegenwoordiging minoriteiten," *Java-bode*, 5 November 1956.

⁹² "Algemene beschouwingen over benoeming vertegenwoordigers minderheden," *De Nieuwsgier*, 1 November 1956; "PIN teleurgesteld," *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad*, 11 September 1956.

⁹³ J.P. Snel, "De Minderheden," *De Nieuwsgier*, 10 December 1956.

⁹⁴ "Grote politieke partijen verdelen minoriteitszetels," *De Nieuwsgier*, 4 August 1956.

⁹⁵ "Europese minderheid en constituante," *Java-bode*, 20 February 1957.

⁹⁶ Unfortunately, it is unclear who the Badan Kontak advised as representatives, but it is possible that a number of their recommendations were followed through.

and influence remained Mayor Polak's list, as reflected in the IEV-GIKI's dominance. Seemingly, the cabinet tried to consider and include more independent Indo voices, rather than divide the seats among political parties, as reflected in the number of independents and small faction members.

Name	Faction Affiliation	Proposed by	Organization
Drs. J.B. Avé	Baperki	Mayor Polak Angkatan '45	IEV-GIKI
Ir. M.J. van Ijzerdoorn	Independent	Van Ijzerdoorn Badan Kontak	IEV-GIKI
Mr. dr. E. Utrecht	PNI	Mayor Polak Angkatan '45	IEV-GIKI
W.E. Claasz	Independent	?	-
J. Th. Kouthoofd	Independent	PIN	PIN
G.R. Schmitz	Partai Katolik	Mayor Polak	IEV-GIKI
Dr. N.S. Kruyt	Parkindo	?	IEV-GIKI
Dr. C.S. Richter	Baperki	?	Baperki
Mr. A.L. Franz	Parkindo	Mayor Polak	IEV-GIKI
Drs. J.W.V. Bär	Independent	?	IEV-GIKI
Drs. J.W.L.R. Rhemrev	Masjumi	Mayor Polak	IEV-GIKI

Table 9. List of Konstituante members for the European descent minority.

Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, Indos and other Indonesians tested the formations of 'Indoness' and 'Indonesianness' during the long election period to achieve their goals. Changing political regimes continued to structurally differentiate Indos from other Indonesians to enable their own popularity and continue shaping a united Indonesian self-identification. Indos were aware of this and party system's instability, wherein Mayor Polak participated by proposing party-affiliated candidates. Indonesians deemed Mayor Polak's candidates most acceptable because of their political affiliations and the IEV-GIKI's large membership and contributions to Indonesian education. Furthermore, they appointed Hage because of the PIN's election performance and Hage's revolutionary background. Hence, the parties desired candidates with a balanced formation of 'Indoness' and 'Indonesianness'. Still, party bickering led to the

appointment of many lesser-known, inactive representatives. This hindered the IEV-GIKI and PIN's ability to benefit from parliament as a national stage to pursue their desired end of the transitional period.

Chapter 4. A new generation takes charge

This chapter analyses new Indo leaders of the IEV-GIKI during the post-election period until what they generally agreed was the end of the transitional period. New, well-educated IEV-GIKI leaders were self-declared Marxist or socialist nationalists like Ernst Utrecht, E.F. Wens, and Jan B. Avé, backed by J.B.A.F. Mayor Polak. They had strong backgrounds in academia and education, where they were highly active. Why did they promote what plans for engaging with changing socio-political formations? How did they perceive ‘Indoness’ and ‘Indonesianness’, and why so? Why did they bring what views to Indo organizations? How did this correspond with the nation-state project and other debates on assimilation by the Arab and Chinese descent? When did they perceive the transitional period as finished for what reasons? After the elections, Soekarno strengthened his grip on the nation-state project to manifest his own vision of Indonesia. Hence, the analysis largely focuses on Indo and Indonesian thought, actions, and experiences, as recovered from their public and personal writings obtained from archives, works, journals, and newspapers, to review how they charted the IEV-GIKI’s course and Indonesian minority politics.

Challenging views on ‘Indoness’ in Indonesia

Most of the old IEV-GIKI leadership, who had been leading local branches since the revolution, had stepped back during the election preparations due to their health and age. These were Augustin of Surabaya, Lapré of Semarang, and Dessauvague of Bandung.¹ Meanwhile, both chairman Weiss and Djakarta chair Mayor Polak left their positions to prevent a larger crisis over their interpersonal fallout during the election period.² Utrecht, who was ideologically closer to Mayor Polak, won the vote for new chair from Weydemuller, who was closer to Weiss’s moderate course.³ The gap in senior leadership meant that Utrecht had much space to redefine the movement, like Wens, who led the IEV-GIKI from 1957. The election shake-up and internal IEV-GIKI crises had paved the way for their emergence and dominance within the organization.

¹ Lapré and Augustin had led their branches for around ten years, while Dessauvague had led his branch for around twenty years. “Bandoeng heeft nieuw bestuur,” *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad*, 23 February 1953; “Een laatste vermaan aan de Indo niet-Indonesisch staatsburger,” *De Vrije Pers*, 12 March 1954; “Ledenvergadering van het IEV,” *De Locomotief*, 4 May 1954.

² “De Crisis in het GIKI/IEV,” *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad*, 10 April 1956.

³ “28^{ste} congres GIKI-IEV,” *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad*, 22 May 1956.

These dominant new leaders, including Avé of the Djakarta branch, were well-educated and had strongly supported Indonesia during the revolution. Avé studied anthropology in Leiden between 1947-1954 before returning to Indonesia. There, he had campaigned for independence as a member of the Indonesian student association.⁴ Utrecht had also campaigned and studied in Leiden, majoring in law between 1947-1952. He was a member of pro-Indonesian movements Rukun Peladjar Indonesia and Indo Nationale Partij.⁵ Wens had sided with the Japanese during the occupation and actively contributed to the revolution.⁶ He and Utrecht identified with the PNI's Marxist-nationalist faction, while Avé was a strong supporter of Indonesian communism.⁷ Mayor Polak, who had been the most influential socialist-nationalist Indo in the IEV-GIKI, continued to support and work with them. During the 1960s, Utrecht praised Mayor Polak and Wens as “militant representatives for all Indos”, showing their intimate and close relations.⁸

These new leaders interacted intensively with the PNI Marxist-nationalist faction, which included Sukarni, Sartono, and Ali Sastroamidjojo. Utrecht and Wens were influential members within this faction.⁹ They, like Avé, leaned towards the PKI too, but rejected what they argued was narrow, dogmatic Marxism.¹⁰ Soekarno's rise to power post-elections enabled the activism and careers of adherents of Marxist and socialist ideologies. This was reflected in government institutions and societal movements, like the PNI, PKI, Baperki, and IEV-GIKI.¹¹ The leaders of these organizations increasingly cooperated between 1956 and 1965. Utrecht played a major role in establishing the Baperki University, where he led the law and economy faculty.¹² Avé and Mayor wrote several series of articles for the Baperki-affiliated newspaper *Republik* on

⁴ Syahrul Hidayat and Kevin W. Fogg, “Profil Anggota Konstituante Drs. J.B. Avé,” accessed 4 November 2025, https://www.konstituante.net/id/profile/BAPERKI_j_b_ave

⁵ Elien Utrecht, “Notes on some aspects of Ernst Utrecht's Life.” In *The Struggle for Development. Essays in Honour of Ernst Utrecht*, eds. Michael Howard and Edward L. Wheelwright (Simon Fraser University, 1990), 4; Telegram 2 May 1950, no. 1676. 2.04.127, NA ; Confidential Report, 4 December 1969, no. 42795. Toegang nummer 2.04.125, Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst (BVD): Persoonsdossiers, Nationaal Archief (NA), Den Haag, Netherlands.

⁶ While it is unclear what Wens did during the revolution, it is clear that the Indonesian government protected him for his services during the late 1950s against accusations of wrongfully obtaining Indonesian citizenship.

⁷ Later, Avé and Utrecht fled Indonesia because of their ideologies when Soeharto violently took power.

⁸ Utrecht, *Soekarno-Soeharto*, 32.

⁹ Elien Utrecht, *Twee zijden van een waterscheiding. Herinneringen aan Indonesië voor en na de onafhankelijkheid* (Amsterdam: Sua, 1991), 97, 193-194; Utrecht, “Notes,” 4.

¹⁰ J.B. Avé, *Peranan Tukar-Budaja Antara Bangsa-Bangsa* (Jakarta: Jajasan Universitas Rakjat, 1960), 27; Artien Utrecht, in conversation with the author, 29 January 2025.

¹¹ Lev, *Transition to Guided Democracy*, 355.

¹² Siauw Giok Tjhan, *Lima Jaman: Perwujudan Integrasi Wajar* (Jakarta: Yayasan Teratai, 1981), 256; Ernst Utrecht, *Pengantar Hukum. Administrasi Negara Indonesia. (cet-5)* (Jakarta: Ichtiar, 1962), 1.

anthropology and history respectively. For example, they wrote about evolutionary theories and anti-colonial struggles in Aceh.¹³

Baperki's Boejoeng Saleh organized a symposium in 1957 on assimilation, nation-state building, and 'Indonesianness'.¹⁴ Boejoeng Saleh invited Avé, Mayor Polak, Baperki's leader Siauw Giok Tjhan, PKI Politburo member Njoto, and other Arab descent, Chinese descent, and Indonesian intellectuals to hold a representative discussion between the so-called designated minorities and majority. Arab descent speakers rejected the invite, seemingly because of the symposium's perceived leftist embeddings, while Indian or Papuan intellectuals were not invited. Avé, who was a main speaker, analysed 'Indoness' by tracing it back to Pieter Erberfeld's and Pattimura's rebellions, when Indos rebelled against the colonial government.¹⁵

Avé found it important to recover Indo pro-Indonesian struggles. He argued that Indos had contributed to Indonesian culture and language through *stambul*, *krontjong*, and literary works. He rejected the idea of one Indo culture because there were too many cultural differences amongst Indos, except for the unifying language of *Indisch* Dutch. Avé emphasized the IEV-GIKI's "crucial effort" to unite Indos and other Indonesians through cultural education coordinated with the government. Avé argued that Indonesians who discriminated against minorities lacked cultural knowledge. He also conveyed these views in the Konstituante. Avé again argued that Indonesians should ban colonial racism from the new constitution, while we should support and develop regional and national cultures.¹⁶

Mayor Polak, who was a debater, supported Avé's exposition and further explained the Indo's history. Mayor Polak argued that the colonial regime had created Indos to support their "capitalist occupation" post-VOC.¹⁷ Mayor Polak stated that Indonesians differentiating Indos was a continued, historical colonial practice because it was primarily based on race. He argued that breaking this practice required coordinated efforts and education, like the symposium. Boejoeng Saleh also largely agreed with Avé.¹⁸ Njoto was a little more critical, recalling Armijn Pané's 1947 play *Antara Bumi dan Langit*, which was written to honour Pané's teacher, the nationalist P.F. Dahler, to argue that race was still a factor that defined 'Indoness'.¹⁹ Pané, and

¹³ J.B.A.F. Mayor Polak, "Sedjarah Tanah Air Kita (XIX)," *Republik*, 2 April 1957; J.B. Avé, "Evolusi dan Ilmu (I)," *Republik*, 22 December 1959.

¹⁴ *Simposium Baperki*, iii.

¹⁵ Pattimura was a Moluccan, but his entourage entailed Indo rebels too. *Simposium Baperki*, 6-8.

¹⁶ Konstituante Republik Indonesia, *Risalah Perundangan, Tahun 1958, Djilid V, Sidang ke-2, Rapat ke-34 sampai ke-40* (n.d.), 2241-2248; Konstituante Republik Indonesia, *Risalah Perundangan: Tahun 1959, Djilid III, Sidang ke-1, Rapat ke-16 sampai ke-27* (n.d.), 888.

¹⁷ *Simposium Baperki*, 21-24.

¹⁸ *Simposium Baperki*, 16.

¹⁹ P.F. Dahler had taught and impressed Armijn Pané during his secondary education at the Algemeene Middelbare School A-1 for Eastern Literature in Solo with his strong Indonesian orientations. *Simposium Baperki*, 33.

in extension the Indo and Indonesian figures in his play, repeatedly and explicitly stated that Indos and Indonesians were different *bangsa* (ethnicity or race).²⁰ Meanwhile, Siauw Giok Tjhan's debate largely focused on achieving legal equality, which Avé and Mayor Polak did not interact with. This seemingly showed they were closer to other Baperki members with stronger views on assimilation, like Boejoeng Saleh.²¹

Wens, Avé, Utrecht, and Mayor Polak viewed education as the best way to try and achieve changes in discrimination and to support the nation-state project by decolonizing and 'Indonesianizing' knowledge. They held important academic positions. Avé was a head lecturer in anthropology at the Universitas Indonesia. Utrecht taught law at various universities. Mayor Polak taught history and sociology in Malang. These three published various works to decolonize, diversify, and Indonesianize knowledge during this period of decolonization, solidarity in line with the 1955 Bandung Conference and the ongoing Cold War.²² Utrecht wrote the first Indonesian-language law handbook titled *Pengantar Dalam Hukum Indonesia*. Utrecht and Avé published a series of working papers that aimed to introduce non-Western academic advances from Mexico and the Soviet Union, to decolonize knowledge, and to address Indonesian needs and perspectives.²³ These Indos attempted to enrich and develop the Indonesian humanities with these outputs.

Avé, Utrecht, and Mayor Polak benefited from the important role of intellectuals in the development of Indonesian nationalism. The great demand for education gave prominent status to those within the field of academia. Generally, Indonesian researchers acknowledged their Indonesian-oriented work, rather than highlighting their Indo formations. Avé was invited as a debater at the first National History Seminar in 1957. He reacted to the working papers on periodization and the famous debate between M. Yamin and Soedjatmoko regarding the philosophical grounds for Indonesian historiography.²⁴ The latter debate's outcome defined Indonesia-centric approaches in historiography for decades.²⁵ Furthermore, he drafted a working paper for the 1959 seminar of the Ikatan Sarjana Sastra Indonesia (Association of

²⁰ Armijn Pané, *Djinak-djinak Merpati dengan Terjita 2 Sandiwara lain* (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1953), 208-214.

²¹ *Simposium Baperki*, 25-31.

²² J.B. Avé, *Rangkaian publikasi-publikasi. Hukum adat dan Etnografi* (Jakarta: Ichtiar, 1961), 31; Mayor Polak, "Beberapa renungan sosiologis-politis," 324; J.B. Avé, *Soal ras dan rasialisme* (Jakarta: Universitas Rakjat, 1959), 72.

²³ Avé, *Hukum adat*, ii-iii.

²⁴ Panitia Seminar Sedjarah, *Laporan Seminar Sedjarah pada tanggal 14 s/d 18 Desember 1957 di Jogjakarta* (Jogjakarta: 1958), 38, 45.

²⁵ Sartono Kartodirdjo, "Historical Study and Historians in Indonesia Today," *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 4, no. 1 (1963): 23; Sue Nichterlein, "Historicism and Historiography in Indonesia," *History and Theory* 13, no. 3 (1974): 264; Kuntowijoyo, *Metodologi Sejarah* (Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana, 2003), 1-22.

Indonesian Literature Graduates).²⁶ Another example was students asking Mayor Polak to publish his historical lecture on contemporary barter in Indonesia, which he did in 1958.²⁷ They deemed this knowledge as relevant and important for ongoing discussions on barter and the PRRI/Permesta rebellion. Lastly, the 1964 Jember Affair also highlighted that Indonesians paid less attention to Indo formations in academia, but were rather interested in their knowledge and ideological formations. Utrecht was the dean of the law faculty. He had outlawed the Islamic student movement HMI at Jember University over his interpretations of Soekarno's policies. In revenge, HMI supporters angrily smeared Utrecht's name by accusing him of being an anti-democratic communist.²⁸ Eventually, Utrecht's opponents had him arrested. However, nobody involved Utrecht's Indo formation during these events.

Avé, Utrecht, and Mayor Polak also explicitly intertwined their academic knowledge output with commentaries on domestic issues. Mayor Polak's 1958 analysis of barter directly addressed ongoing issues of regional autonomy and PRRI/Permesta rebellion. He argued that autonomy and coordination between Java and other regions were needed to develop past colonial economies and historical economic traditions like barter.²⁹ Avé criticized racism, discrimination, and proponents of isolating the national culture against exchanges with other cultures. He aimed to address negative perceptions of foreign descent citizens' cultures. Utrecht incorporated commentaries on politics in his handbooks supportive of Soekarno.³⁰ Support for Soekarno and Indonesian socialism were recurring themes. Mayor Polak and Utrecht viewed Soekarno as "the living personification of unity". They and Avé viewed Indonesian socialism as the key to a prosperous Indonesia.³¹ Often, they structured their arguments on Dutch colonial exploitation to identify negative practices. These included Indonesian discrimination and rejection of regional autonomy.³²

²⁶ Avé, *Hukum adat*, ii-iii.

²⁷ J.B.A.F. Mayor Polak, *Perekonomian Indonesia dan "barter" diluar Djawa disekitar tahun 1850* (Malang: Atoom Bookstore, 1958), 1.

²⁸ Ernst Utrecht, *Peristiwa HMI Jember (Bulan-bulan Mai dan Juni 1964)*, no. 20. Ernst Utrecht Archives, International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam.

²⁹ Mayor Polak, *Perekonomian Indonesia*, 31-32.

³⁰ Fernando Morganda Manullang, "The Purpose of Law, Pancasila and Legality according to Ernst Utrecht: a Critical Reflection," *Indonesia Law Review* 5, no. 2 (2015): 192; Avé, *Peranan Tukar-Budaja*, 3; Avé, *Soal ras dan rasialisme*, 74, 79-83; Mayor Polak, *Perekonomian Indonesia dan "barter"*.

³¹ Manullang, "Purpose of Law," 192; Utrecht, *Soekarno-Soeharto*, 31; J.B.A.F. Mayor Polak, "Imperialisme, kolonialisme, en neo-kolonialisme. De visie van een Indonesiër," *Internationale Spectator* 19, no. 4 (1965): 283-294; J.B.A.F. Mayor Polak, "Beberapa renungan sosiologis-politis," *Basis, tahun ke-11. Oktober 1961 – September 1962*, (n.d.): 321-328; J.B.A.F. Mayor Polak, "Tentang Cultuurstelsel dan penggantinya," *Penelitian Sedjarah* 2, no. 4 (1961): 13-25; J.B. Avé, "Tentang Asal Usul dan Pemakaian Istilah 'Indonesia'," *Bintang Timur Minggu*, n.d.

³² Mayor Polak, "Beberapa renungan sosiologis-politis," 326-327.

Soekarno's call for a homogenous nation to achieve cultural unity strongly reverberated in Indonesia.³³ In response, the IEV-GIKI's leadership aimed to apply this call to the IEV-GIKI, based on their ideas of education, unity, 'Indonesianness', and assimilation. Utrecht started in 1956 to adapt the IEV-GIKI to these popular ideas, continued by Wens from 1957. They challenged Weiss's former course oriented towards very limited assimilation.³⁴ First, they changed the name IEV-GIKI into GIKI (used hereafter) to emphasize that it had cut ties with its Dutch-oriented, colonial past.³⁵ They obligated that the "national unitary language" (Bahasa Indonesia) be used in meetings. They had the organizational regulations and the old IEV song translated into Indonesian as well.³⁶ The government also unintentionally accelerated this process. Wens changed the *Onze Stem* into *Suara Kita* because of the government's ban on Dutch-language newspapers in December 1957. GIKI members increasingly adopted 'Indonesianness' in meeting programmes, like Indonesian-language cabaret and Indonesian dances only (Figure 14).³⁷ The new leaders banned most cultural practices deemed as Western, while they included performances deemed supportive of Indonesian cultural unity.

³³ Imam Bardjo, *Masaalah kewargaan negara Republik Indonesia* (Semarang: Baperki Semarang, 1958), 19-23.

³⁴ This is in contrast to Meijer's source that Utrecht was too polarizing and controversial, as Wens held equally strong and outspoken worldviews. Meijer, *In Indië Geworteld*, 368.

³⁵ "GIKI-onderwijs," *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad*, 24 July 1957.

³⁶ "GIKI/IEV actief op gebied van sociale zorg en scholen," *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad*, 2 August 1956; "Sekitarnja Kongres Ke-XXX," *Suara Kita*, October 1958; "Anggaran Rumah Tangga Tjabang2 GIKI," *Suara Kita*, January 1959.

³⁷ "Ouderavond GIKI," *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad*, 22 October 1956; "Het 1^{ste} Onderwijs-congres," *De Kern*, 15 September 1956.




Figure 14. The Indonesian tari piring at a GIKI event.³⁸

The change in leadership from the elderly, moderate Weiss to the young, assertive Utrecht, Wens, and Avé altered GIKI discourses. Other Indos perceived the new leaders as youngsters. The new leaders agreed and identified themselves with the revolutionary ideals of the *pemuda* (youth). They acknowledged their inexperience but praised their own idealism, enthusiasm, energy, and selfless willingness to make sacrifices. Indonesians generally ascribed these common attributes to the *pemuda*.³⁹ The new leaders were much more active in Indonesian society compared to the older generation, which caused them to pay more attention inwards organizationally. Indos had to adjust and be adjusted to Indonesian futures as full and active members of society. For example, Avé argued that Indos had to master Indonesian, read Indonesian-language newspapers, and visit Indonesian cultural performances instead of enjoying American jazz or sensational films. Soekarno had also called for Indonesians to stop consuming Western culture and banned Western music in 1959 to make Indonesians focus on indigenous culture. The new leaders increasingly incorporated nationalist rhetoric, as Avé argued that watching *wajang* was a rare chance to witness Indonesia's "creative power", which would experience a "renaissance" beyond the Indonesian "nouveaux riches".⁴⁰

³⁸ Albert Kessel, "Herinneringen aan Jakarta," *Moesson*, 15 October 1996.

³⁹ "Het nieuwe afdelingsbestuur van Djakarta Raya en zijn Program," *De Kern*, 15 September 1956.

⁴⁰ J.B. Avé, "Nieuwe Wegen," *De Kern*, 15 September 1956.

Chairman Wens increasingly positioned the transitional period as opposed to *Hollands denken* (Dutch thinking) and colonial ideas. Soekarno had also called for the suppression of *Hollands denken*, which inspired GIKI leaders and other Indonesians, like leaders of the cultural organization LEKRA. Avé planned to hold lectures on Indonesian anthropology and history, including the position of Indos, on topics like the struggle against colonialism. The new leadership's main goal was to foster unity and promote nationalist ideologies among GIKI members. While discrimination remained an important topic, the new focus was inward-looking. The new leaders aimed to assimilate the Indos with the majority.

Utrecht was highly active in academia by lecturing and helping to establish various universities. He used his knowledge to professionalize the education wing by holding special education conferences and reevaluating the schools.⁴¹ He argued that education remained GIKI's most important activity.⁴² The 1956 congress decided that GIKI schools would fully use Indonesian, because this was the unifying language used in Indonesian education. The Dutch language was only taught on Fridays for two hours after school, while the language would only be used in classes to support teaching in Indonesian.⁴³ Utrecht aimed to help address the shortage of schools with GIKI schools. These had slightly cheaper fees and English lessons from fifth grade in elementary schools to support and please Indo families.

Wens continued this focus with positive results.⁴⁴ First, education minister Prijono promised financial support after much GIKI "lobbying in hotel rooms" with education officials.⁴⁵ Second, Prijono recognized the Djakarta transitional schools as national Indonesian *sekolah rakyat* (people's schools).⁴⁶ Subsequently, the 1957 education congress agreed to sever relations with the Dutch education organization SNO. Wens argued that GIKI schools were "100% Indonesian" and preferred to work with the Ministry of Education. Seemingly, the worsening anti-Dutch climate also influenced this decision.⁴⁷ Wens was surprised to learn about

⁴¹ "Contactavond tussen ouders, bestuur en leerkrachten: Onderwijsconferentie besluit nieuwe koers te volgen," *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad*, 10 September 1956; "Het 1^{ste} Onderwijs-congres," *De Kern*, 15 September 1956.

⁴² "GIKI helpt de regering met vorming nationaal onderwijs," *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad*, 23 August 1956.

⁴³ "Uit de school," *De Kern*, 15 December 1956.

⁴⁴ "Van de school," *De Kern*, 15 September 1956.

⁴⁵ "GIKI-congres," *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad*, 12 June 1957; "Het 1^{ste} Onderwijs-congres," *De Kern*, 15 September 1956.

⁴⁶ Abeyasakare argued that the GIKI schools were closed in 1958 because of the ban on foreign language schools, which was not true as they were not foreign language schools. Susan Abeyasakare, *Jakarta, a history. Revised edition* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989), 188.

⁴⁷ Letter, 30 April 1957. No. 797. Access number 2.14.74, NA; Bestedingsplan jaar 1955-1956. No. 797. Access number 2.14.74, NA.

the SNO construction as a front for Dutch government support, which was a well-kept secret, for which he thanked the Dutch politely when liquidating the agreement.⁴⁸

Dutch officials predicted the demise of the GIKI schools. They argued that the great expenses and Wens' plan to halt expensive technical courses, all secondary education, and some badly performing elementary schools as signs of future failure.⁴⁹ However, Indos and other Indonesians successfully pressured Wens to continue secondary education because of the lack of schools. Wens was later able to establish new GIKI junior high schools for GIKI primary school alumni.⁵⁰ Wens was able to let expensive bilingual teachers go because GIKI teachers would only use Indonesian. This seemingly helped the education survive financially. The number of GIKI high schools grew, while all nine elementaries continued to operate. GIKI managed number of nine elementary schools, five junior high schools, one vocational business school, and an unknown number of kindergartens in 1959.⁵¹

Ambivalent treatments: affection and hostility

In 1957, parliament member S.J. Sutan Mangkuto proposed a screening and expulsion of all 'foreign descent citizens'. He deemed them a security threat because of their mobility as Indonesian citizens and foreign loyalties as non-indigenous citizens. Indos and Chinese descent politicians reacted strongly. Snel called Sutan Mangkuto a fascist and equated his statements to Hitler's views on Germans of Jewish descent.⁵² Mangkuto, the anti-Chinese Assaat, and similarly minded Indonesians acted increasingly hostile towards foreign descent minorities after the elections. They were inspired by colonial and contemporary segregation, anxieties, and nationalist views on 'Indonesiannes'. Indonesian-Dutch tensions and popular nationalist nativism further intensified these views after the elections. Many nationalists, like the PNI and Soekarno, had increasingly defined 'Indonesianness' through negative terms. They generally contrasted it to Western values and culture. This influenced Indonesians like Mangkuto to suspect 'foreign descent' citizens in society because of anxieties based on their 'Indonesianness'

⁴⁸ Former chair Ernst Utrecht was unaware of this relationship during his chairmanship. Letter, 20 August 1957. No. 797. Access number 2.14.74, NA.

⁴⁹ Letter, 17 July 1957. No. 797. Access number 2.14.74, NA; Letter, 16 January 1957. No. 797. Access number 2.14.74, NA; Bestedingsplan jaar 1956-1957. No. 797. Access number 2.14.74, NA.

⁵⁰ "Van de school," *De Kern*, 15 September 1956; "GIKI-onderwijs," *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad*, 24 July 1957; "Bogor," *Suara Kita*, 15 January 1959.

⁵¹ "Bogor," *Suara Kita*, Januari 1959; "Sekitarnja Kongres ke-XXX," *Suara Kita*, Oktober 1958.

⁵² Berkas ttg pertanyaan DPR Sutan Mangkuto ttg WN Turunan Asing, 5-7 November 1957, no. 3707. RA.8.A; Direktur Kabinet Presiden kepada Kementerian Kehakiman: surat tanggal 18 Januari 1954 tentang permohonan pencabutan kewarganegaraan Indonesia menjadi warga negara Belanda atas nama J. Buist, dengan lampiran, no. 621. RA.11.

and simultaneous lack thereof. Others with more moderate views, like D.S. Susilo, still underlined that the ‘foreign descent’ citizens were Indonesian because of their citizenship, but otherwise lived as exclusive enclaves.⁵³

In response, other Indonesians showed increased affection by partaking in Indo activities or inviting Indos to Indonesian projects. Soekarno incorporated the Indo and Chinese groups into the nation-state project to reaffirm their position as Indonesian patriots, for which Utrecht later praised Soekarno as the “strongest defender” of the Baperki.⁵⁴ Soekarno was preparing the development of the Monumen Nasional, a national monument as a symbol of Indonesian unity. GIKI member O’Brien helped as an architect, after which Soekarno invited the GIKI to visit his palace on 11 March 1956 to discuss their contribution to the Monumen Nasional. Thus, Soekarno aimed to directly involve Indos in conceptualizing symbols of ‘Indonesianness’.⁵⁵ Wens had helped to arrange the visit because he and Utrecht feared that souring Indonesian-Dutch relations could impact the Indos’ position. They aimed to negate this by physically and ideologically closing the ranks around Soekarno.⁵⁶ Both Wens and Utrecht were close to Soekarno through their similar outlooks and participation in the two highest state bodies, which Soekarno presided.

During the 11 March meeting, Soekarno spoke of Indo nationalists Douwes Dekker and Dahler’s important work for Indonesia and proclaimed to his “*saudara-saudara*” (brothers and sisters) that he “was their *bapak* (father) too”.⁵⁷ In a paternalistic way, Soekarno reprimanded some Indos for changing their names. He argued that Indos should focus on concrete ways to help build an Indonesia free of discrimination instead of hiding away.⁵⁸ GIKI leaders aimed to establish 11 March as the day of the Indo’s integration into Indonesian society and revisited it in 1957 (Figure 15). While the PRRI/Permesta rebellion in 1958 prevented another visit, some, like J.R. Koot, had been moved by Soekarno’s words and experienced it as the next step in ending the “Indo problem”.⁵⁹

⁵³ Susilo D.S. *Assimilasi Menuju Integrasi Bangsa* (Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa, 1964), 1-5.

⁵⁴ Ernst Utrecht stated that Siauw Giok Tjhan (Baperki’s chair) and the Chinese descent group received “the largest support from Soekarno” during the frequent racist attacks. Utrecht, *Soekarno-Soeharto*, 32.

⁵⁵ “President ontvangt te Bogor afgevaardigden Indo-groepen,” *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad*, 12 March 1956.

⁵⁶ J.R. Koot, “Verlossende woorden van de president?” *Onze Stem*, 15 March 1956.

⁵⁷ The original quota was “hai saudara-saudara kaum Indo, ketahuilah aku bapakmu pula”. “Pertemuan ramah-tamah van de Panitia Tugu Nasional met G.I.K.I.” *Onze Stem*, 15 March 1956; “Rede Drs. Mayor Polak,” *Onze Stem*, 15 March 1956.

⁵⁸ Soekarno referred to E.F.E. Douwes Dekker and P.F. Dahler with their original names when discussing their contributions, instead of their adopted ones after the revolution’s start.

⁵⁹ J.R. Koot, “Verlossende woorden van de president?” *Onze Stem*, 15 March 1956; J.R. Koot, “In het heden,” *Tong Tong*, 15 April 1975.



Figure 15. GIKI's visit to Soekarno in March 1957. President Soekarno is at the centre, with E.F. Wens left to him and J.B. Avé on the far left.⁶⁰

Still, Soekarno's discourse and practices continued to enable discrimination and differentiation. His divisive, nativist views on 'Indonesianness' upheld and reaffirmed these. For example, Soekarno's acknowledgement of Indos as a *golongan fungsional* (functional group) during the GIKI's 1957 visit again cemented divides between Indos and other Indonesians.⁶¹ Soekarno and the GIKI celebrated this as a symbol of the Indos' integral part of society. However, this way Soekarno again emphasized their differences from indigenous Indonesians. Soekarno based other functional groups on societal sectors, like farmers, while the unifying aspect of the Indos as a functional group was their foreign, non-Indonesian descent. Interestingly, only the Arab descent group was not declared as a functional group, showing silent acknowledgement of their assimilation, despite that their pleas for minority status abolition were ignored.⁶² Indonesians, regardless of their positive or negative attitudes towards Indos, circulated this double view of Indos as 'Indonesian, but not quite'.

The implicit government policy on 'foreign descent' minorities also reflected this ambivalent view. The UPBA department for foreign descent minorities and foreigners carried out increasingly limited activities. Seemingly, many Indonesians expected these minorities to

⁶⁰ The original year of 1964 in the article is wrong, because P.W. Blogg (far right) left the GIKI in 1957 and the organization was formally disbanded in 1961. "Gabungan Indo Kesatuan Indonesia bij Soekarno," *Moesson*, 15 June 1994.

⁶¹ "Sekitarnya Kongres Ke-XXX," *Suara Kita*, October 1958.

⁶² The Arab descent even submitted a draft of a bill to abolish their minority status, which was rejected. UU darurat tentang WNI keturunan Arab, no. 761. RA.78, Inventaris Arsip Tekstual Departemen Kehakiman Republik Indonesia (1946-1969), Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (ANRI), Jakarta, Indonesia.

adjust to the majority during the transitional period to achieve their imagined culturally homogeneous Indonesia.⁶³ Nonetheless, the government blocked many efforts to ‘Indonesianize’, like Indos and Chinese descent citizens adopting local names or converting to Islam.⁶⁴ The government viewed these as suspicious, “impure”, and confusing. The government wanted people to be able to identify and differentiate them from the *asli* Indonesians.⁶⁵ Hence, minorities had to be recognizable as minorities while adapting to indigenous Indonesian standards at the same time.

Other civil and military officials also felt the need to increase their shows of affection towards the Indo and Chinese descent groups. Soekarno and many ministers flooded the 1958 GIKI congress with supportive letters, as the GIKI also noticed this increased outside attention in 1958.⁶⁶ Brigadier General dr. R. Moestopo insisted on becoming the GIKI’s formal protector in late 1958. He wished to guide the Indos’ “*saamhorigheidsgevoel*” (feelings of unity), while captain Sudarjono advised Indos to contact him in case of any problems in East Java.⁶⁷ They performed these acts of affection to support the nation-state project and improve their own general image and careers.

The increasingly affectionate and hostile treatments made GIKI, PIN, and Baperki leaders turn stronger than before to Soekarno. The PIN wrote several letters to support Soekarno’s *gotong royong* cabinet with advice and requests to abolish discriminatory clauses.⁶⁸ Many GIKI and PIN leaders explicitly supported Soekarno’s Guided Democracy and the return to the 1945 constitution. PIN member Kouthoofd publicly defended these plans in the Konstituante, which had overwhelmingly rejected them.⁶⁹ GIKI member P.W. Blogg, board member of the Partai Katholik, was expelled over his support for Soekarno’s plans.⁷⁰ Utrecht praised Soekarno’s National Council in 1959 for bringing political stability.⁷¹ These Indos deemed Soekarno able to establish a stable, strong government to ensure their own safe

⁶³ Unfortunately, the full archives of the UPBA are not accessible at the moment of writing at the Indonesian National Archives (ANRI) in Jakarta.

⁶⁴ Letter 17 April 1952, no. 606. RA.11.

⁶⁵ This view was even incorporated into some critical literary works on Indonesia in the 1950s, like Mochtar Lubis, *Senja di Jakarta* (Jakarta: Obor, 2025), 113; Gouw Giok Siong, *Warganegara dan orang asing (berikut peraturan2 dan tjontoh2)* (Keng Po, 1958), 113-120.

⁶⁶ “Sekitarnja Kongres Ke-XXX,” *Suara Kita*, October 1958; “Pergantian tahun,” *Suara Kita*, Januari 1959.

⁶⁷ “Brigadir-djenderal Dr. R. Moestopo,” *Suara Kita*, Januari 1959.

⁶⁸ “Reacties op conceptie,” *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad*, 5 March 1957; “PIN,” *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad*, 19 March 1957.

⁶⁹ Konstituante, *Risalah Perundingan, Tahun 1959*, 265; Donald L. Horowitz, *Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia* (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 25.

⁷⁰ “Blogg geschorst,” *Het Nieuwsblad voor Sumatra*, 28 May 1957.

⁷¹ Ernst Utrecht, *Pengantar dalam Hukum Indonesia* (Djakarta: Ichtiar, 1959), 442.

integration into society and to progress the nation-state project.⁷² Therefore, they were brave enough to speak up and make sacrifices, like Blogg, Kouthoofd, and the PIN in general, as Soekarno's plan also limited the role of political parties. However, not all Indos supported this effort. Parliamentary members Princen and Koot joined the Liga Demokrasi (Democratic League), which was the last Indonesian movement against Soekarno's Guided Democracy plans.⁷³

Political observers Daniel Lev and Taufiq Abdullah have agreed that Soekarno's Guided Democracy increasingly put cultural nationalism, anti-colonialism, and nativism at the heart of Indonesian politics.⁷⁴ As analysed above, this resulted in increased and diverse attention for the 'foreign descent' groups after 1957. Yet, Indonesian media attention for Indos seemingly decreased. Newspapers seemingly published fewer articles on Indos after 1957, possibly influenced by the declining Indo movements.⁷⁵ More positively, Indos seemingly experienced less negative attention in society after Dutch Indos had been expelled. This resulted in less day-to-day discrimination towards Indos, despite increased Chinese discrimination.⁷⁶

Still, Indonesian imaginations of and interactions with 'the Indo' continue(d) to be based upon these and entangled with other notions of beauty ideals.⁷⁷ One example is the 1959 public debate of Corry Mudzakkar, wife of rebel Kahar Mudzakkar in South Sulawesi. Indonesian Perceptions diverged between the equivalent of a dominant, heroic rebel leader with Caucasian features and an older, Dutch-oriented housewife, who was not very pretty.⁷⁸ Moestopo, GIKI's protector, emphasized Corry's beauty and 'Indonesianness' as a strong, Indonesian female rebel leader, while the other side instead emphasized Corry's Dutch orientations and denied that she fulfilled Indonesian beauty ideals.

⁷² Lev, *Transition to Guided Democracy*, 64.

⁷³ J.B. Soedarmanta, *Biografi I.J. Kasimo* (Jakarta: Kompas, 2011), 238-241.

⁷⁴ Lev, *Transition to Guided Democracy*, 66; Abdullah, *Indonesia Towards Democracy*, 289.

⁷⁵ Many newspapers had reported on the debates over minority seats, but newspapers like *Suluh Indonesia* and *Republik* published almost no articles afterwards about Indos in general.

⁷⁶ Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, *Indonesian Political Thinking, 1945-1965* (Cornell University, 1970), 340-346.

⁷⁷ The writer's great-uncle, who lives in Bandung and grew up there in the 1970s-1980s, recalls his Indonesian friends making fun of him for his colonial and Dutch (versus Indonesian *pribumi*) heritage, which were notions embedded in these 1950s discourses. Eric Palit, in conversation with the author, 22 March 2025, Bandung, Indonesia.

⁷⁸ "Corry Muzakkar," *Suluh Indonesia*, 12 March 1959.

Transition achieved?

GIKI's active membership decreased from 1956 after its new leadership's course. Most GIKI members were members for education benefits for their children, of whom not everyone appreciated the reduced role of Dutch.⁷⁹ Furthermore, a large dispute rocked the organization when J.R. Koot accused Wens of not actually having citizenship. Koot led the Djakarta faction and was another young protégé of Mayor Polak, but he seemingly had ideological and personal issues with Wens. Wens had opted for Indonesian citizenship in 1946, but it was unclear whether he actually redid this after the RTC agreements.⁸⁰ Ultimately, the Indonesian government protected Wens by ruling that he was a legal Indonesian, despite the unclear reality behind it. Afterwards, Wens expelled Koot's faction. Membership shrank in the major urban areas, but new GIKI branches were established in Malang and Situbondo, while the Palembang branch published its own stencilled magazine.⁸¹

Meanwhile, the PIN seemingly drifted apart over increasingly opposing views on assimilation and integration. Kouthoofd spoke in the Konstituante of Indos who had not disappeared into the homogeneous nation being formed as the "minority problem". PIN chair Snel strongly rejected this idea previously, as he argued for only total legal assimilation.⁸² Like Avé and Mayor Polak, Kouthoofd referred to anti-colonial Indos to emphasize Indo aims for equal treatment and building Indonesia "shoulder to shoulder". Many PIN members increasingly supported the new GIKI leaders' aim for total assimilation, which resonated with the views of Indos beyond major urban areas. This resulted in Malang-based Indos establishing the GIKI Malang branch, which had been the PIN's main base of support.

Snel strongly regretted the GIKI's change on assimilation. He argued that they were "stupid and weak-willed" for wanting to disappear into the majority. Instead, Snel argued that embracing citizenship should be enough to be Indonesian.⁸³ Snel, Princen, Koot, and other former GIKI members, who disagreed with the changing GIKI's assimilation view, established their own similar organization, the Badan Pemusatan Tenaga Indo (Body for Centralizing Indo Powers).⁸⁴ Their effort failed because seemingly most Indos preferred the GIKI's course or had become disillusioned with Indo movements. Soekarno helped the GIKI to cement its

⁷⁹ "Van hart tot hart," *De Kern*, 15 September 1956; Letter, 17 July 1957. No. 797. Access number 2.14.74, NA.

⁸⁰ "GIKI S' baja erkent J.R. Koot niet meer als parlamentslid," *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad*, 18 October 1957.

⁸¹ "Situbondo," *Suara Kita*, January 1959; "Palembang," *Suara Kita*, January 1959.

⁸² Konstituante Republik Indonesia, *Risalah Perundangan, Tahun 1959, Djilid I, Sidang ke-1, Rapat ke-1 sampai ke-9* (n.d.), 264-267.

⁸³ J.P. Snel, "De Minderheden," *De Nieuwsgier*, 10 December 1956.

⁸⁴ "Indo organisatie BPTI opgericht," *Algemeen Indisch Dagblad*, 5 October 1957.

prominence, because he appointed Utrecht to the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly and Wens to the National Council. These were the two newest and most powerful governmental bodies in 1957.⁸⁵

Ultimately, Indos perceived the ends of the transitional periods of integration and nation-state building with mixed feelings. For some, it had been too quick and drastic. Initial leaders, like Weiss, Snel, and Werbata, had argued for a slow and partial transition, characterized by legal assimilation and reinventing separated, colonial lifestyles. Indonesian-Dutch tensions, Soekarno's nativist and unitary views, and shifts in Indo outlooks altered this course. Many urban, Dutch-oriented Indos were disappointed as the GIKI abolished its transitional period's policies. Many Indos left the GIKI after GIKI leaders reduced the role of the Dutch language at schools. Some of them felt defeated over their unfulfilled visions of very limited Indo assimilation for a prosperous future in Indonesia, like Weiss. Many of these Indos migrated to the Netherlands as *spijtoptanten*, a temporary Dutch regulation for Western-oriented Indonesians to (re)obtain Dutch citizenship. It is unclear how many of the roughly 25,000 *spijtoptanten* were Indos who had opted for Indonesia. These *spijtoptanten* included Indos like Weiss, Snel, Werbata, and many others who had supported a moderate assimilation course.⁸⁶

Meanwhile, Indos with stronger Indonesian orientations continued to choose for Indonesia, like Mayor Polak, Wens, Avé, and Utrecht.⁸⁷ They seemingly agreed that Mayor Polak's 1952 prediction that the transitional period would last around ten years was largely fulfilled.⁸⁸ Parliament had passed the citizenship and land ownership laws in 1958 and removed differentiating clauses. This resulted in almost complete legal assimilation. However, the formal expulsion of Dutch Indos meant that these Indos were unable to use the naturalization program.

For others, the transitional period took even longer. One example was Ferry Sonnevile, a secretary of the Jajasan Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa (Foundation for Guiding National Unity). This small organization, made up of mainly Chinese descent citizens, advocated for

⁸⁵ The GIKI had proposed Wens as the single candidate for the National Council. "Indo groep en nationale raad," *Java-bode*, 30 April 1957.

⁸⁶ Indos, Chinese, and other Indonesians who had not been granted a chance to opt for Dutch citizenship between 1949 and 1951 could benefit from this regulation as well. There is no clear data in secondary literature on exact compositions of the *spijtoptanten*. Ellemers and Vaillant, *Indische Nederlanders*, 43; Rijkschroeff and Kwa, *Spijtoptanten en Achterblijvers*, 139-140; Meijer, *In Indië Geworteld*, 444.

⁸⁷ Avé and Utrecht were forced to flee Indonesia after Soeharto's rise to power. In contrast to what Meijer stated, E.F. Wens never migrated to the Netherlands. It seems that he left politics after 1965. Meijer, *In Indië Geworteld*, 378.

⁸⁸ "Discriminatie van de Indo-WN over de gehele linie," *Java-bode*, 8 April 1952.

total assimilation and against the Baperki, while strongly supporting Soekarno.⁸⁹ This assimilation thought overlapped with Schmidgall Tellings and the FPM's *penghapusan* thought aimed at total assimilation. The *penghapusan* thought became popular again during the late 1950s, as Utrecht and Wens also aimed for near total assimilation by replacing Dutch elements with Indonesian ones in the GIKI. Soeharto ended the last hurdle of the transitional period when he officially became president in 1967. Soeharto immediately abolished all foreign descent clauses in the same year of his presidential vows.⁹⁰ Afterwards, Indos no longer circulated terms like 'transitional period' when discussing discriminatory practices and discourses.

Meanwhile, the GIKI had taken its own steps in line with the end of the transitional period. The board decided in December 1958 to move towards formally abolishing the social organization and to turn over all assets to the education foundation. This process, based on the "realization that it was undesirable to continue organizing as an exclusive group", was finalized at the May 1961 congress.⁹¹ Seemingly, a similar process occurred among PIN members, who had largely turned towards Utrecht and Wens' course. While the GIKI was officially open to all, everyone had viewed it as a true Indo organization. Therefore, removing the GIKI organization was one way to reduce visible and outwardly 'Indoness' and move towards a homogeneous, united Indonesian people.

Nonetheless, some minor GIKI leaders continued to be active in the GIKI education foundation, which largely returned to the IEV's old organizational Indo culture. The main differences were that they abandoned outwardly 'Indoness', the transitional period, and national politics, while they reestablished ties with Dutch Indos. Long-time chair dr. M. (Joop) Soetjahjo, a Javanese from Surabaya, was best friends with Tjalie Robinson and active in this small Indo space, as he simultaneously helped to reduce its outward Indo visibility.⁹² Tjalie Robinson and his magazine strongly supported the GIKI, which still exists in 2025, with many donations and articles until at least the late 1990s.

Indos active in industries dominated by Indonesian beauty standards were the only ones to continue promoting their 'Indoness' in public. Indonesian studies of advertisement have shown that Indo and Caucasian women dominated this industry because of Indonesian beauty

⁸⁹ Ferry Sonneville was famous because of his achievements in badminton and had spent most of the 1950s abroad for his economics study in the Netherlands. Jajasan Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa, *Baperki membahayakan W.N.I. "Keturunan Tiong Hoa"* (Djakarta: 1965), 8.

⁹⁰ Keputusan Presiden, no. 240, 1967.

⁹¹ "De GIKI," *Moesson*, 1 April 1978.

⁹² "Dr. M. Soetjahjo," *Moesson*, 1 September 1988.

ideals.⁹³ Biographies of successful Indos in these industries, like horror queen Suzzanna, actor Johny Indo, and actress Doris Callebaut, show that both Indonesian writers and Indo stars contributed parts of their success to their ability to mobilize their visual ‘Indoness’ in relation to these beauty ideals.⁹⁴ Johny Indo’s and Doris Callebaut’s stories also showed their experiences of discrimination over visible ‘Indoness’ in public during their youth and how Indonesians viewed them as very sexy.⁹⁵ Other Indos were successful in their respective industries, seemingly because they were able to distance themselves from associations with ‘Indoness’ in public. They positioned themselves as Indonesians and not as Indonesian Indos. These included various figures like *Basis* editor Dick Hartoko, general Benny Moerdani, lieutenant Pierre Tendean, badminton champion Ferry Sonneville, and jazz legend Jack Lesmana. Their efforts to reduce or amplify ‘Indoness’ largely overlapped with post-elections Indo movements and their ideas on assimilation, integration, and participation.

Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, Utrecht, Wens, and Avé introduced an organizational course that proposed near total assimilation of ‘Indonesianness’. This course shared similarities with Schmidgall Tellings’ *penghapusan* thought aimed at total assimilation. Indos like these three GIKI leaders had great success in integrating into Indonesian society. They were rising members in Indonesian national forums and organizations because of their ‘Indonesianness’. Their ‘Indoness’ initially contributed to this, as Wens and Utrecht were appointed to high positions over their mixed formations and nationalist ideology. Soekarno, Guided Democracy, the general increase of nativist outlooks among Indonesians, and Indonesian double gazes helped Utrecht, Wens, and Avé to succeed in society and Indo movements. Indonesians and Indos gradually decreased visible ‘Indoness’ in public, like scrapped minority clauses and the GIKI’s dissolution. Such developments reflected general sentiments among Indos and Indonesians that what they felt was a ‘transitional period’ was ending. Meanwhile, Snel and others who were against cultural assimilation struggled to integrate. These developments increasingly limited their activism and their imagined Indo futures in Indonesia. Consequently, Snel and other disappointed Indos left for the Netherlands, while Wens, Utrecht, and Avé continued their accelerating careers in Indonesia.

⁹³ Suwardikun, “Wajah Indo,” 128-138; Prasetyaningsih, *The Maze of Gaze*, 124-127; Prabasmoro, *Becoming White*, 27.

⁹⁴ Sangra, *Sisi lain*, 2-3; Hangguman, *Johny Indo*, 23, 28; Bonnie, *Doris Callebaut*,

⁹⁵ Hangguman, *Johny Indo*, 52, 65; Callebaut, 53.

Conclusion

Returning to the two debates of Indos and 1950s ‘Indonesianness’, this thesis has recovered the faces, thoughts, actions, and experiences of many Indos who actively engaged with Indonesian society. This narrative shows a stark contrast with the existing historiography of the Indo group. Researchers have largely limited their scopes to the colonial era or postcolonial afterlives outside of Indonesia. Existing literature, especially Dutch migration studies, has generally portrayed Indos in Indonesia as living in a hostile and poor environment. In response, this thesis has attempted to nuance this dominant narrative by recovering various Indo experiences of the 1950s. These experiences were intertwined with how they navigated being Indo and Indonesian, which is the second debate this thesis engaged. Debates on ‘Indonesianness’ have to some extent been traced already in literature. Still, this study of the Indo group, who had much larger stakes in confronting ‘Indonesianness’, has exposed and analysed fundamental ways of how Indonesians instrumentalized and limited Indonesian identifications. This study has connected these debates and findings on ‘Indonesianness’ with earlier studies on the general political developments of the 1950s through the Indo case study. This case study shows that these highly impacted Indo activism for integration, assimilation, and acceptance as equal Indonesians. Further research will have to point out to what extent these have influenced the campaigning by other groups like the Chinese descent, Papuans, and others in claiming their own space in Indonesian society.

Conflicts, struggles, and cooperations over ‘Indoness’ and ‘Indonesianness’ are a red line throughout this thesis. This thesis argues that there were roughly two clusters of organized Indos. They were mostly divided over whether Indos should retain all their Indo cultural formations or aim to replace most of these with Indonesian ones. Over time, Indos who defended their colonial-era Indo formations felt disappointed with the nativist direction of Indonesian nation-state building and Indo assimilation. J.P. Snel, who led the moderately nationalist Partai Indo Nasional from the late revolutionary period until the late 1950s, is exemplary of this group. Parliament member Snel argued that acquiring an Indonesian and democratic consciousness was enough to be a good Indonesian citizen. Snel argued that Indos were an ethnic group, like the Javanese, and should therefore only achieve total legal assimilation. Snel gradually felt isolated with his increasingly unpopular views during the late 1950s, because many Indos increasingly favoured near total assimilation. Subsequently, Snel and many similarly-minded Indos left for the Netherlands as disappointed *spijtoptanten* during the 1960s.

Meanwhile, GIKI leader E.F. Wens was exemplary of the opposite. Wens had worked with the Japanese occupation and Indonesian revolutionaries, like many other Indo leaders who argued for (near) total assimilation. Wens climbed the PNI ranks, befriended Soekarno, and played a crucial role in reshaping the colonial-era IEV. Wens helped to change the IEV, which initially followed a more moderate course compared to Snel, into the GIKI aimed at near total assimilation. Wens argued that this was largely achieved in 1962, as GIKI leaders agreed to disband the organization. At the same time, Snel was collecting his documents to leave for the Netherlands. Wens and similarly-minded Indos continued to choose to live in Indonesia. This thesis argues that this is an important finding and approach for further studies regarding *spijtoptanten*, to trace and analyze the histories of *spijtoptanten* and non-*spijtoptanten*, and to conclude why Indos stayed or not. The limited migration studies on *spijtoptanten* have mostly been based on limited interviews and governmental *spijtoptanten* archives.

Indonesian views on the three designated foreign descent minorities – which were those of European, Chinese, and Arab descent – both enabled and disabled their participation in society between 1949 and 1965. Popular ideas on race, ethnicity, and nation-state building impacted many Indonesians, which resulted in a double gaze when looking at these three groups. On one hand, Indonesians deemed Indos as Indonesians because of their pro-Indonesian outlooks, Indonesian language, brown skins, and citizenship. On the other hand, Indonesians deemed Indos as foreigners because of their Indo lifestyles, Dutch language, and limited Dutch physical features. Therefore, Indonesians viewed Indos as embodying both ‘Indonesianness’ and ‘Otherness’, which led to both affectionate and hostile Indonesian treatments.

Moreover, this double gaze was intertwined with governmental policies, which regulated that minority members had to be differentiated from so-called *asli* Indonesians. Among others, the government created separate registrations, outlawed minorities from adopting names deemed ‘indigenous’, withheld support for minority-led businesses, appointed special parliamentary seats, and designated minorities as “functional groups” in society. In short, the 1949-1959 cabinets and later Soekarno forcibly institutionalized their societal participation only as Indonesians *of foreign descent*. Indonesian political leaders made their *mixed* Indonesian and non-Indonesian formations as visible as possible, whether this was Indonesian-Dutch or Indonesian-Chinese. This thesis argues that this was in relation to vague understandings of ‘Indonesianness’ in society. Soekarno and other leaders separated the so-called foreign descent Indonesians as a visible marker for Indonesians to realize their own ‘Indonesianness’. Indonesian leaders aimed for ‘indigenous’ Indonesians to deduce the limits of ‘Indonesianness’ by observing the ‘foreign descent’ Indonesians. Similarities, like speaking

Indonesian, were signs of 'Indonesianness', while differences, like having a large nose or a small one, were signs of 'Otherness'. Soeharto's rise to power changed minority politics because he abolished the official foreign minority laws, regulations, and clauses.

This ambivalent view of foreign descent citizens created opportunities and challenges for these three designated, discriminated groups to participate, integrate, and assimilate in society. On one hand, Indonesians pressured Indos to fully assimilate. On the other hand, Indonesians forced them to retain their 'Indoness'. Therefore, Indos succeeded in joining the Irian campaign. Indos deemed their participation as highly important because Indo leaders wanted Irian's inclusion as *Indonesians*, while *Indo* inclusion in this all-Indonesian front stimulated their own integration. Ironically, Indos joined Indonesian practices of exclusion because Indos paid little attention to any Papuan voices. The 1955 elections showed the limitations of participating as *Indonesians*. Indonesian officials, inspired by this double gaze, demanded that Indo candidates for parliament had a balanced mix of 'Indoness' and 'Indonesianness'. Indos who argued that parliamentary voices *as Indos* were undesirable failed to convey their message. They had argued that this challenged Indo assimilation, because it continued to highlight Indos as separate Indonesian entities from the 'indigenous' group. Meanwhile, Indos who desired representation *as Indos* were able to achieve their aims because of the Indonesian demands. Seemingly, these Indonesian treatments, which stimulated overly affectionate and discriminatory treatments, accelerated Indo self-assimilation. Most Indos preferred and succeeded in distancing themselves from their 'Indoness' in public, except in industries affected by Indonesian beauty standards.

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Appendix A. PIN Election Results

The PIN obtained 5681 votes for parliament (see below) and 8066 votes for the Konstituante.

Source: Panitia Pemilihan Indonesia. *Daftar angka-angka hasil pemilihan umum DPR, tahun 1955* (Djakarta, 1955), 6.

No.	Election district	Number of votes
1	Surabaia	114
2	Sidoardjo	79
3	Modjokerto	125
4	Djombang	127
5	Tuban	320
6	Bodjonegoro	289
7	Lamongan	69
8	Madiun	238
9	Magetan	314
10	Ngawi	346
11	Ponorogo	421
12	Patjitan	101
13	Kediri	276
14	Ngandjuk	130
15	Blitar	218
16	Tulungagung	93
17	Trenggalek	91
18	Malang	279
19	Pasuruhan	133
20	Probolinggo	115
21	Lumadjang	134
22	Bondowoso	68
23	Situbondo	410
24	Djember	284
25	Banjuwangi	184

26	Pamekasan	20
27	Sumenap	102
28	Sampang	52
29	Bangkalan	83
30	Kota Surabaia	334
31	Kota Malang	67
32	Kota Kediri	32
33	Kota Madiun	33
	Total:	5681