THE DYNAMIC OF ROLES IN A COALITION

A case study on the roles of organisations in coalitions focussed on influencing policies related to the Cluster 6 industry going green.

Abstract

This thesis investigates the roles played by organisations within coalitions influencing the policy subsystem related to the Cluster 6 industries in the Netherlands going green. Drawing on Hula's (1999) coalition role framework and Timmermans et al's. (2019) lobby coalition theory, it aims to identify how organisations interact and allocate resources to impact policy outcomes. It does so by using a qualitative case study in which document analysis and semi-structured interviews with representatives of Foundation Cluster 6, IPO, and NetbeheerNederland are combined.

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List of Abbreviations

ACF: Advocacy Coalition Framework
CBS: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek/Central Bureau for Statistics
CCS: Carbon Capture and Storage
CES: Cluster Energy Strategy
CH_4: Methane
CO_2: Carbon Dioxide
DIVIT: Dialoog Infrastructuur voor Industrie in Transitie
DSH: DataSafeHouse
ETS: Emissions Trading System
EU: European Union
EZK: Economische Zaken en Klimaat/Economic affairs and Climate
FME: Trade association for Technological Industries
FNLI: Trade association for the Food and Drink processing industries
FTE: Full Time Equivelant
GHG: Green House Gasses
H_2: Hydrogen
IPO: Interprovinciaal Overleg
KGG: Klimaat en Groene Groei/Climate and Green Growth
KNB: Koninklijke Nederlandse Bouwkeramiek
lCES: National Cluster Energy Strategie Cluster 6
m^3: Cubic meters
MIEK: Multiple Year Programme Infrastructure Energy, and Climate
nMIEK: National Multiple Year Programme Infrastructure Energy, and Climate
NDA: Non-Disclosure Agreement
NPVI: Nationaal Programma Verduurzaming Industrie/National Programme Decarbonisation of Industries
NRK: Nederlandse Rubber- en kunststofindustrie
pCES: Provincial Cluster Energy Strategy
pMIEK: Provincial Multiple Year Programme Infrastructure Energy, and Climate
RES: Regional Energy Strategie
SER: Social Economical Council
TNO: Dutch Institute for the Application of Natural Science Research
TSO: Transmission System Operator
VA: Vereniging Afvalbedrijven
VEMW: Vereniging voor Energie, Milieu en Water
VNG: Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeenten
VNCI: Vereniging van de Nederlandse Chemische Industrie
VNO-NCW: Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen – Nederlands Christelijk Werkgeververbond.

1. Introduction

In an increasingly complex society, policies attempt to provide guidance and the ability to navigate a diverse set of issues. Since said policies are only made by humans, a human factor of failure will remain. As our capacities as individuals are limited, policymakers may turn to partners. Providing the object of study of this thesis; coalitions.

Over time coalitions have become a key factor in the process of policy formulation and have been acknowledged as such by many different fields related to policyforming. Fields such as international relations, public administration, public affairs, political science, and even management studies have described coalitions in different forms. However one factor that all fields agree on is that said coalitions attempt to influence policyforming to further the coalition's agenda.

In this thesis an example of the complexity and needs for coalition in the process of policy formulation is shown through the case study of the decarbonisationof the cluster 6 industries. In this case study complex regulations related to infrastructure, competitiveness, and decarbonisationprovide too complex of a problem to be solved by one organisation.

Through a study of administrative coalitions and the acknowledgement of different scientific fields a theoretical starting point will be provided. From that theoretical starting point a basic understanding of roles within coalitions will be presented. However, with this theoretical background an attempt will be made to clarify that there are complexities within roles in coalitions that aim to impact the policy formulation. This thesis will therefore aim to deepen the understanding of said complexity of roles.

By understanding the complexities of roles within coalitions, a better insight will be gained into the motivations behind (collective) actions of coalitions. This will create a better understanding of the pathworks of policyforming and the functioning of coalitions in this process.

This thesis aims to provide that better understanding by acquiring the theoretical knowledge of scientific fields such as international relations, public administration and public affairs in relation to roles in coalitions. In order to utilize these insights by projecting them onto the case study of the "main" coalition aiming to decarbonize the cluster 6 industries. This coalition exists out of the foundation cluster 6, the grid operators represented by NetbeheerNederland, and the provinces represented by the Interprovinciaal Overleg. Through these three 'umbrella' organisations, there is a full coverage of the active players that hold an important role in the policy formulation related to decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries. This will be shown in depth further on in this thesis.

By testing this case study a look will be had at how these organisations act in relation to one another, how they stay on top of each other in their collective goal of influencing national policy formulation, and avoiding that a disbalance exists in terms of contribution towards the collective goal. This study aims to provide a theoretical insight into the dynamic of roles in a coalition and the individual motives that influence this dynamic of the coalition. It will do so through the dynamic of the "main" coalition, that aims to decarbonize the Cluster 6 industries. By doing so this study adds to the theoretical field of interest groups through application of current theoretical knowledge onto practice and opening the door to future research.

1.1. Research question: Roles in coalitions?

To further identify the complexity of roles in coalitions the question “what roles do organisations play in the main coalition attempting to influence policy formulation in relation to environmentalising the Cluster 6 industry in the Netherlands?”, will be answered.

The Cluster 6 industry is the collective of industrial production locations spread throughout the Netherlands that geographically fall outside of the five larger industrial clusters of the Netherlands. Due to the fact that the Cluster 6 industries fall outside of the five larger clusters, the Cluster 6 plants tend to fall in more regional areas. The Netherlands has around 450 Cluster 6 locations, of which around half is obligated to parttake in the EU-ETS system for purchasing emission rights. A Cluster 6 plant is a production plan that uses large amounts of energy. To have the definition of a Cluster 6 plant, a minimum of 1 million m3 of natural gas, or 10 GWh of electricity is used every year (Foundation Cluster 6, 2025).

For the Cluster 6 industry to transition to a new energy carrier, a drastic change in infrastructure is needed. These infrastructural changes come at a high price. Due to the distances that need to be covered, the prices for infrastructure increase. With the cluster 6 usually being further away from the main energy infrastructure, the decarbonisationof the Cluster 6 has become a complicated matter (Foundation Cluster 6, 2025).

The choice of testing the diversity of roles within coalitions based on the case of the Cluster 6 industry in the Netherlands is an easy one. The struggles of “going green”, that the Cluster 6 industry comes across are a showcase of our increasingly complex society. Next to said complexity, there is a clear attempt by the different layers of government in the Netherlands to provide guidance on this issue by formulating suitable policies.

With the importance of coalitions and their potential impact on the formation of policies regarding the environment in the Netherlands it is of importance to understand the roles that coalitions might play. The research question “what roles do organisations play in the main coalition attempting to influence policy formulation in relation to environmentalising the Cluster 6 industry in the Netherlands?” provides a starting point to identify the roles played in the coalition that aims to environmentalise the cluster 6 industries.

To achieve answering this research question the following subquestions will be answered: “What are the type of roles that organisations can play in coalitions?”, “What are the organisations that make up the ‘main’ coalition?”, “What is the motive for coalition members to partake in the coalition?” “What is the added value of a stakeholder meassured in committed resources?”, “How near are the coalition members to the policy making process?”

By applying the theoretical background related to coalitions onto the casestudy of environmentalizing the cluster 6 industries, this thesis will answer abovementioned research question as well as the individual subquestions. This will provide an understanding of the complexities that are at play in coalitions.

1.2. Relevance and expected practical application

Eventhough the existence of coalitions and the output of coalitions has been studied across different fields, only little practical knowledge is available in regard to the roles played by organisations within such coalitions. This thesis attempts to adress that gap in the context of the Cluster 6 industry in the Netherlends, where decarbonisationefforts present a multi-level policy challenge.

In regard to the theoretical contribution this thesis will strive to deepen the theoretical knowledge of roles in coalitions throught the case study of the decarbonisation of cluster 6 industries in the Netherlands. With this knowledge a theoretical contribution can be made to the field of studies related to interest groups, as it will provide a case study in which coalitions can be studied and the dynamics of roles can be identified.

The practical contribution of this thesis is directly linked to insight in the lobby coalition and the role of the studied organisations in this coalition, which aims to decarbonize the cluster 6 industries in the Netherlands. This will provide a valuable insight for policymakers and trade associations to further the policy issue by basing their lobbying movements according to the positioning of the organisations tested.

2. Theoretical perspective on Coalitions

Coalitions attempting to influence policies have been studied in different scientific fields, resulting in a wide array of theories recognizing coalitions in some kind of way. In this study the focus will be on coalitions as studies by international relations, public administration, as well as public affairs. This study leaves out political coalitions, as it focusses on administrative processes. Alongside the insight into what coalitions are the following chapter will provide an understanding regarding what roles can be played in coalitions by organisations.

2.1. International relations

In international relations coalitions are described as epistemic communities by Haas (1992). According to the definition provided by Haas (1992), “An epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.”. Such a community acquires a position of influence within the policyforming process when policymakers are confronted with unfamiliarity or uncertainty (Haas, 1992).

In order for an epistemic community to succesfully utilize said influence Haas claims that the professionals parttaking in the epistemic community there needs to be some shared similarities, resulting in a similar agenda. Haas (1992), claims that these similarities exist out of: “a shared set of normative and principled beliefs.”, “Shared causal beliefs, derived through analysis”, “A shared notion of validity”, and lastly a “a common policy enterprise”. Abovementioned would result in a shared vision on a policyfield, providing a shared agenda to push for, this is where Haas furthered the research on epistemic communities as done by Marx and Holzner (1979). These epistemic communities, as presented by Haas (1992), thus are a vehicle – or coaltion -to influence (international) policy coördination.

2.2. Public administration

In public administration one of the most dominant theory’s in regard to coalitions is presented by Sabatier (1988), namely the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). Sabatier’s ACF has been furthered over time and still remains to be a theory of impact within public administration (Jenkins-smith & Sabatier, 1994; Jenkin-Smith & Weible, 2025).

The Advocacy Coalition Framework showcases a world in which subsystems are characterized by clashing coalitions (Jenkins-Smith & Weible, 2025). These clashing coalitions are built up through different sets of beliefs related to a policy subsystem. Some of these beliefs are seen as “deep core” beliefs, these are persistent and unlikely to ever change (Sabatier, 1988). Others are seen as “policy core” beliefs, providing a focus point, usually related to what the policy ambition should be (Sabatier, 1988). Lastly there are “secondary beliefs”, these beliefs are changeable if they are disproven (Sabatier, 1988).

These coalitions, attempt to advance the policy subsystem in line with their own beliefs (Jenkins-Smith & Weible, 2025). Under the ACF it has been shown that gaining support of key authorities, as well as support from the public are key factors in advancing the policy subsystem accordingly (Jenkins-Smith & Weible, 2025).

The Advocacy Coalition Framework presents an everlasting battle between two coalitions, that are both attempting to influence the policy formulation process in subsystems of the relevant policy field. Recognizing the existence of coalitions and the role that they play in furthering the policy (sub)field (Jenkins-Smith & Weible, 2025).

2.3. Public affairs

The field of study entirely dedicated to the influencing of policies – public affairs - provides a theoretical definition of lobby coalitions: “a cooperation between organisations, groups or individuals in which knowledge, capital and social support are used collectively to represent the interests that fit the collective agenda.” (Timmermans et al., 2019, 269).

Next to providing a clear definition of what a coalition is and what goal it strives after - influencing policy -, the theory provides an explanation for the use of coalitions. It does so by making the distinction between “hindering” and “transition” coalitions, additionally providing the distinction between reactive and proactive coalitions (Timmermans et al., 2019, 280-283).

With these distinctions it manages to relate the coalition types to specific sorts of issue identifying issues as either routine cases or wicked problems (Timmermans et al., 2019, 283). It relates the sort of coalition based on several distinctions on both the issue side as well as the coalition side. Examples are the complexity of the stakeholder field, the clearness of the issue definition and whether the coalition is permanent or suddenly formed and whether it has constant access to knowledge, capital and social support or that this changes (Timmermans et al., 2019, 283).

Timmermans (2019), does not only recognize and therefore prove the existence of coalitions influencing policy formulation, but provides a practical application to recognize the goals and identify the actions of coalitions.

Junk (2024) underlines that “public affairs is usually a team sport” and opens the door to expected complexity within coalitions. This complexity according to Junk (2024, 177) is hard to uncover, partially due to there being different understandings of what coalitions are across studies in public affairs. By having attention for other fields like international relations and public administration, next to public affairs, this thesis aims to – partially – overcome the problems Junk (2024, 177-178) describes in relation to achieving practical application.

In Junk (2024, 178-184) there are multiple descriptions of how coalitions can be formed, most interestingly – in relation to the case study of the cluster 6 industries – is the institutionalized cooperation structures, and more importantly so the prove she portrays for the effectivity of “umbrella” organisations. According to Junk (2024, 180-181) and based on Albareda (2020), and Albareda and Braun (2019), umbrella organisations can have better access to decisionmakers when organised professionally.

Although Junk (2024 179-180) claims that in policy formulation not one lobby organisation will overcome all, she also notes that there are cases in which the lobbying will be mobilized mainly or even exclusively through one side. Additionally, she states that this could result in the development of a new “side” that picks up later (Junk, 2024, 188). This shows that lobbying within a policy issue is an evermoving subject.

Abovementioned theories all conclude that coalitions in fact do exist, even though there might be certain differences on parts of the theories presented, existence is not drawn into question. The theories above show that coalitions aim to impact policy through both hindering as furthering transitions and exist out of a collective effort. So far, this collective effort has been studied, whereas the relation of the individual role played by a coalition’s member to the definition of a collective goal has been left untouched. This study will aim to provide an insight into this relation by applying the existing theoretical knowledge of roles in coalitions onto the case study of the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries.

2.4. Participants in coalitions

Within a policy issue a coalition can be formed of stakeholders, however not all stakeholders may have as active of an issue as other stakeholders do (Timmermans et al, 2019, 289-290). This can be seen as an indication of the role that a stakeholder plays in a coalition, mostly related to how active a stakeholder will partake (Coombs, 2002), according to Coombs (2002), the closer a stakeholder finds itself to the centre of the policy issue, the more active it will act within that issue. In a clearly defined stakeholder field this is easier to identify than in an overcrowded one (Timmermans et al, 2019, 290).

2.5. Roles in coalitions

Hula (1999) provides three categories to categorize stakeholders in a coalition structure. He divides coalition members in the groups "coalition core", "coalition players", and "peripheral" (Hula, 1999). He defines the coalition core as "made up out of founders and research-rich stakeholders", according to Hula this core group aims to achieve broad strategic goals (Hula, 1999). This core group has a notable willingness to spend resources to promote overall legislative victory (Hula, 1999). The "players" can be seen as experts with an interest in shaping specific parts of the legislation, and a high willingness to spend resources to achieve success. According to Junk (2024, 187) this is the only way of impacting lobbying success on an individual actor level. Lastly the "peripheral" group or better so called "tagalongs" takes part for other benefits rather than legislative success. These tagalongs, according to Hula (1999), are generally in agreement with the coalition's goals, however there is a low willingness to use significant resources for the coalition's success.

Hula (1999) presents his categorization of roles within coalitions based on three factors, "the issue importance", "organizational goal", and most importantly "degree and type of resources". Additionally, Hula (1999) describes "time commitment" as a factor outside of resources, whereas it can also be seen as a resource. In this presentation these resources play an important role, but to acquire enough influence scale is an important factor. Therefore "core members" do need the "specialists" and "tagalongs" to partake in the coalition.

This is best explained by the Resource Dependency Theory by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). In this theory Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) speak of coalitions/organisations (Parsons, 1956; Perrow, 1970; Perrow, 1972), using resources to guarantee a continued existence. However, more importantly so Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), claim that coalitions are constantly engaged in an exchange of resources. Since not all organisations contribute equally as much a disbalance in power arises, due to the interdependence of organizations. This interdependence arises when a coalition partner provides a significant amount of the resources needed, however this partner also needs the other coalition partners to increase the likelihood of success. This core member beliefs to increase the likelihood of victory with size and diversity (Hula, 1999).

Even though there is an interdependence amongst coalition partners it is undeniable that there is a disbalance of power in coalitions as presented by Hula (1999). With resources playing a key part in the role of a coalition partner, the amount of influence shifts towards partners providing more resources towards the coalition (Hula, 1999; Emerson, 1962; Blau, 2017; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Godwin et al., 2011).

2.6. Organisations

In this study, "organisations" are seen as formalised entities. These entities have structures, mandate, and resources to participate in a collective policy process as players such as mentioned by Hula (1999). Organisations thus are a "means to an end" to achieve strived

after goals (Pfeffer and Salncik, 1978; Parsons, 1956). Additionally, the organisations studied are seen as 'umbrella' organisations, as presented by Junk (2024, 180-182). The choice of focussing on these umbrella organisations is motivated through research that has shown an improved access to policymakers for umbrella organisations rather than individual organisations (Fraussen et al., 2015; Junk, 2024, 180-182).

2.7. Conceptual framework

This thesis builds further on the theoretical works of Timmermans et al. (2019), Junk (2024) and Hula (1999) to deepen the understanding of the complexity in roles that are played by organisations in coalitions. This thesis will do so through the operationalisation of the conceptual definition of roles in coalitions and test this definition by applying it onto the case study of the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries. When speaking of "roles within coalitions" in this thesis there will be referred to the framework that has been presented by Hula (1999), describing the different roles in a coalition as "coalition core", "coalition players", and "peripheral/tagalongs" (Hula, 1999). For the conceptualisation of "coalitions" this thesis will refer to the definition as presented by Timmermans et al. (2019, 269): "a cooperation between organisations, groups or individuals in which knowledge, capital and social support are used collectively to represent the interests that fit the collective agenda.". The organisations possible contribution will be identified through the indicating dimensions of 1. Organisational Type, 2. Access to policy formulation, and 3. Resource base. Whereas the conceptual roles of "Core", "Player", and "Tagalong", will be identified through indicating dimensions of 1. Leadership and Coordination, 2. Contribution of resources, and 3. Symbolic alignment. Through these indicating dimensions observations can be made regarding the behaviour within the coalition.

3. Method of Research

3.1. Data collection

To answer the research question: “what roles do organisations play in the coalition(s) attempting to influence the policy outcome in relation to environmentalising the Cluster 6 industry in the Netherlands?”, a qualitative case study approach will be used to acquire a deeper insight in the positions of the separate parties playing a part within the policy issue. This will provide a deeper understanding of the role that organizations play within coalitions. The main form of data collection for this research will be through document analysis of policy documents and/or publications provided by NetbeheerNederland (and the grid operators organised under NetbeheerNederland), IPO (and the provinces organised under IPO), and Foundation Cluster 6 (and the trade associations that it represents). To come to a clear and complete answer on the presented research question this study adopts an interpretivist paradigm, hoping to gain a deeper understanding of the interactions among coalition actors (organisations). An overview of the documents used for the analysis can be found under appendix A.

The interviews will be taken from policy makers responsible for the policies of their organisation on the Cluster 6 industries. These interviews will take around forty minutes to an hour and will be had with the senior policy makers of the to be sampled organisations.

The interviews are taken with permission for the use of this study from: Strategic advisor and policymaker (Foundation Cluster 6), Strategic advisor industrial clients from (Enexis/NetbeheerNederland), Strategic Advisor and Coordinator industrial sector (IPO). All interviews were done in an online teams meeting, for the duration of around one hour. For the comfort of the participants the interview was done in Dutch. The recordings and transcripts that were used for the analysis are available as attachments.

The choice for these specific functions is motivated through the fact that these individuals are the responsible individuals for the topic of energy in relation to the industrial sector within their respective organisations. Since the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries are mostly impacted by a change of energy carrier, which falls under the portfolio of these policymakers, these individuals are the best match for this study. Additionally, this choice is motivated through the access the researcher has to these policymakers, this access does not reach to the executive level. Therefore, in future research an ‘executives’ study could be a valuable addition.

The reason why these three organisations are used as key stakeholders is due to their roles in the debate of environmentalising the cluster 6 industries. NetbeheerNederland (the grid operators) are responsible for providing the infrastructure that is needed to transition to a new energy carrier, the provinces are responsible for the spatial planning, as well as the long-term vision for how the energy system in its broad sense should function, and the Foundation Cluster 6 represents the interests of the Cluster 6 industry.

3.2. Case study

The Cluster 6 industry has been chosen as a case study due to its critical part in obtaining the environmental goals set for 2030, 2040, and 2050. Additionally, the access to key players partaking in the ‘main’ coalition striving to achieve the decarbonisation of this sector. Aside from that the case study and organisations studied match the description of institutionalized cooperation structures (Junk, 2024, 180-182). This makes that there is both a relevant practical as a relevant theoretical motive to further research this case study. If the industrial sector does not transition to a new energy carrier there is no chance of obtaining the goals set

by the Paris treaty (Green Deal Industrial Plan, 2023). The Cluster 6 industry has additional challenges as they are not in an optimal geographical location to undertake action, next to that the industrial processes differ tremendously amongst the fields of industry that are part of the Cluster 6 (Foundation Cluster 6, 2025). Due to the geographical spread of cluster 6, the differences in industrial processes among cluster 6, and the goals presented by the EU to lower CO_2 emissions, the case of the Cluster 6 industry "going green" can be seen as critical (Foundation Cluster 6, 2025). Especially, since its nature is complex and its future uncertain (Foundation Cluster 6, 2025). Further on in this study more context will be provided related to the case study.

3.3. Data analysis

To identify organisations and their possible contribution in the case study, document analysis and structured interviews will be applied. The analysis will be done through the following indicators and with these data sources:

Dimension	Indicator	Data sources
Organisational type	Public vs Private policy maker Implementing organisation	Official website, Policy documents
Access to policy formulation	Direct involvement in policy discussions regarding the decarbonisationof the cluster 6 industreis, role in advisory platforms, public statements	policy documents, records, position papers.
Resource base	Access to funding, knowledge, or time	publications, reports, semi-structured interviews.

To assess the role played by an organisation within a coalition the following indicators will be applied on the three organisations tested:

Role Type	analytical dimension	indicators	data sources
"Core"	leadership and coordination	initiates coalition actions; formulates key messages; calls the coalition together, initiates projects positively impacting the coalitions goal.	Media outputs, meetings, semi-structured interviews, policy documents.
"Player"	resource contribution	provides technical knowledge, lobbying support, contribution of general resources based on resource base.	reports, policy papers, publications, semi-structured interviews.

“Tagalong”	Symbolic alignment	expression of endorsement without major participation or investment of resources, participation yet not actively.	public communications, publications, reports, policy briefs, participation reports, semi-structured interviews.

The roles of organisations will be assigned based on qualitative coding of actor statements and document evidence. The presences of the indicators as shown under the analytical dimension will be the main coding criteria.

The coding will be based on the amount seen of each individual role, in the case of more indicators pointing towards a “core” role rather than a “player” or “tagalong” role, the “core” role will be identified as the role played by the relevant organisation. This will happen based on colourcoding abovementioned indicators in the transcripts of the interviews, and the identification of relevant publications by the organisations. The colourcoding will be visible in the attached transcripts.

3.4. Validity, reliability and ethics

To assure that the research will provide valid and reliable outcomes there will be triangulation between the document analysis and the semi-structured interviews with representatives of the respective organisations (Foundation Cluster 6, IPO, NetbeheerNederland). After final interpretations of these interviews the interpretations will be presented to the participants of the interviews. Additionally potential biases of the researcher will be reflected on as part of the discussion.

3.5. Feasibility and Limitations

To assure the feasibility of this research within the limited time, a reflection will be made of only three organisations reflecting different coalitions, namely Foundation Cluster 6, IPO (Interprovinciaal Overleg), and NetbeheerNederland. However additional organisations and or coalitions that could add to the research done would be the individual grid operators, provinces, and trade associations.

Due to the restriction in time further research is not possible, otherwise it would be a valuable improvement to not just interview a representative of each of the abovementioned organisations but make a division between directors and policymakers and interview both. This would provide a deeper insight into the nuances of the roles played by these organisations in lobby coalitions, as the policymaker may inform the director of everything, yet the director might decide to take a different route at the executive table.

4. The decarbonisation of cluster 6 industries in the Netherlands

4.1. What is cluster 6?

The definition of a cluster 6 company is seen differently throughout different layers of government. At the national level the cluster 6 is defined as EU-ETS obligatory companies that are geographically placed outside one of the five industrial clusters[1]. Due to the company falling outside of one of the industrial clusters there is a larger impact of the one organisation on the energy infrastructure.

4.1.1. Definition of cluster 6

However, on a regional level the definition of cluster 6 organisations is slightly less narrow. The provinces acknowledge a company to be part of the cluster 6 if the company uses at least one million cubic meters of natural gas a year and falls outside of the geographical locations tied to one of the five industrial clusters. The provinces argue that if an organisation uses more than one million cubic meters of natural gas (CH_4), the impact of the company in terms of CO_2 emissions is tremendous and a severe impact would be made if this would be reduced to zero. In combination with the regional grid operators the formulation has become even more specific resulting in the final 'regional' definition for the Cluster 6 industries. The grid operators added to the definition that if a company uses > ten GWh a year of electricity the company is also part of the cluster 6. This is the definition used in this paper as both grid operators and provinces play a key role in the research.

4.1.2. Cluster 6 energy use in perspective

The impact of a company using either > one million cubic meters of natural gas or > ten GWh of electricity a year, on the energy infrastructure is prodigious. For reference a gas usage of one million cubic meters is the equivalent of the total gas usage of 1250 households for a year (Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek [CBS], z.d.). For electricity the impact is even larger, the equivalent of 10GWh could power > 5300 households for a year (Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek [CBS], z.d.).

Such numbers in terms of energy use tend to only be achieved in the process industry where raw materials are turned into products (usually semi-fabricated materials). In the industrial process raw materials are permanently formed into the new product which after completion is usually impossible to dissect back into the raw material again (Noroozi & Wikner, 2017). This happens by extensively putting the material through actions that create a chemical or physical response, often these responses need large amounts of energy to be 'triggered' (Noroozi & Wikner, 2017).

4.1.3. Economic impact cluster 6

The economic impact of a cluster 6 company tends to be influential for regional and/or local economies. Not only is the company itself a large producer, but it also needs a lot of services; think of building, engineering, transport, financial management, technical support etcetera. this creates economic traffic in a region and can create a flourishing local or regional economy.

[1] Rotterdam-Moerdijk, Noordzeekanaalgebied, Chemelot, Zeeland, and Noord-Nederland

4.2. The need to go green: Trickle down of the EU Green Deal Industrial Plan

Under the Green Deal goals have been formulated to reduce emissions to stop – or better said – slow down climate change (European Union, 2023). One of the most important metrics used for slowing down climate change is the output of CO_2 emissions (European Union, 2023). The direct result of this is that the reduction of CO_2 emissions is one of the key goals under the EU green deal (*The European Green Deal*, 2023). However, the EU Green Deal is an incredibly large plan with focus points on industrial reform, a fair transition, circular economy, climate neutrality, competitive green industries, and the financing of it all (*The European Green Deal*, 2023).

4.2.1. Carrot vs. Stick for Cluster 6

For the cluster 6 industry only two of these focus points are relevant. Namely the focus on industrial reform, as well as the focus on making European industries competitive when 'green'. These two focus points can also be identified as "the stick" vs "the carrot".

The Stick

The stick being the focus on industrial reform, under this focus point the EU Emission Trading System (ETS) saw life (*About The EU ETS*, 2023). The EU-ETS turns carbon emissions into a commodity that can be quantified in capital (*About The EU ETS*, 2023). The goal of this is to decrease the amount of 'carbon rights' to assure that the price of emitting emissions goes up over time, hoping to trigger innovative behaviour in industries, assuring that they are going towards a net-zero form of production (*About The EU ETS*, 2023). If an organisation that is ETS obligatory decides not to move towards a "green" form of production, they will be obligated to pay for their emissions (*About The EU ETS*, 2023). The "stick" is thus a measure put in place by the EU to trigger innovation, but also to punish pollution.

The Carrot

However, in some industries the "green" technologies still need to be developed, created, or improved for industrial use. For these cases there is the "carrot". The carrot exists out of stimuli to increase the pace of innovation, lower the costs of producing "green", and assuring that economies do not reach a bottleneck in which reducing emissions is the cause for economic downfall. One of the most important "EU carrots" for the cluster 6 are stimuli packages under the clean industrial deal that provide the means to assure an acceleration of electrification, solve the physical challenges for grid operators, and the efficient use of energy carriers (*Clean Industrial Deal*, 2023). The total amount mobilised in funds for this is a 100 billion (*Clean Industrial Deal*, 2023).

The European regulations, like the ETS and The Green deal, make that there is a need for "going green" for the cluster 6 industries in the Netherlands. The Green Deal has been adopted by the Netherlands and currently the Netherlands is aiming to achieve being climate neutral by 2050. Which is legally needed through the EU Climate Law (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2021). The Green Deal has thus trickled down to domestic affairs. Domestically in the Netherlands the Green Deal Industrial Plan is 'executed' by the 'Nationaal Programma Verduurzaming Industrie' (NPVI) (*Nationaal Programma Verduurzaming Industrie*, 2024).

4.3. What is the impact of decarbonizing the cluster 6 industries on the energy infrastructure?

It has been established that the cluster 6 industrial sector makes use of large quantities of energy, most commonly in the form of electricity or natural gas (CH_4). These energy carriers are regulated in the Netherlands, which means that there are legal appointments for organisations that are allowed to transport electricity and gas. The organisations that are allowed to do so are the regional and national grid operators, the law that it is organised under is the energy law.

4.3.1. Systemic choices

The previous systemic choice was for natural gas; this was largely given in due to the finding of large gas fields in the late 40's early 50's (*Historie van Aardgas en Aardolie | Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij*, 2024). This resulted into a transition from coal to natural gas. A part of that transition was creating the infrastructure throughout the country to transport natural gas from the Dutch gas fields (*Historie van Aardgas en Aardolie | Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij*, 2024). The previous systemic choice was made due to the abundance in terms of availability of natural gas (*Historie van Aardgas en Aardolie | Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij*, 2024). The new systemic choice will partially be made based on a need of reducing CO_2 emissions. (Den Ouden et al., 2018)

4.3.2. Impact on competitiveness

However, when it comes to industrial production other factors than just CO_2 reductions play a role. The most important one is based on the cost price of the good produced and more importantly the impact that the cost of energy has on the cost price of the produced good. The cluster 6 industries operate in energy intensive industries and compete with international markets (*Cluster 6-Bedrijven - Cluster 6*, 2025). The result of this is that the prices are as low as possible, however it creates a situation in which – if the cost of energy is too high - an industry won't be able to continue production at the location. Resulting in a loss of local economic growth and stability (*Nationaal Programma Verduurzaming Industrie*, 2024).

4.3.3. Impact on the industrial process

Another factor that is important for the cluster 6 industry is the impact of the different energy carrier on the production process. A chemical reaction induced by Hydrogen (H_2) rather than methane (CH_4) results in a different sort of heat, which may impact the product outcome. If the outcome is impacted too severely, H_2 might leave a product that is unacceptable for prospect clientele, leaving the option of "going green" through H_2 impossible.

This leaves a search for an energy carrier that can meet the criteria in a similar manner as natural gas did, so plenty of volume, the right price, and suitability to continue production of goods as we know now.

With the large amounts of energy that are needed by the cluster 6 industries in relatively remote areas, where domestic energy use is relatively low, it is key to assure that the infrastructure is tailored to the needs of the cluster 6 industries. Therefore, the impact of the cluster 6 on energy infrastructure in remote areas is tremendous (Interview, NetbeheerNederland).

4.4. What are the governance structures that impact the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries?

As previously shown the cluster 6 is impacted due to the Green Deal and the European Climate law. The Green Deal and European Climate law have set the goal for climate neutrality, leaving the EU members to start drawing up plans to achieve said goal (European Commission, 2023).

4.4.1. National level

In the Netherlands one of the programmes drawn up to achieve this goal is the NPVI. This programme must provide the road map of how the industries in the Netherlands transition to a new energy carrier. The NPVI provides the strategic plan in which is described what must be done to assure that – with the right private investments – the industries can meet the goals set by the EU.

The NPVI identifies 5 routes relevant for the Dutch industries existing out of (*Routekaart NPVI van Grijs Naar Groen - Nationaal Programma Verduurzaming Industrie*, 2025):

1. Electrification
2. Hydrogen
3. Carbon capture & storage
4. Circular resources
5. Energy- and process efficiency.

To follow the track of "going green" under any of these five routes the NPVI also identifies three preconditions existing out of (*Routekaart NPVI van Grijs Naar Groen - Nationaal Programma Verduurzaming Industrie*, 2025):

1. Space, living environment, and permits
2. Infrastructure
3. Investment climate.

If these preconditions are not in order, it is impossible to achieve climate neutral industries according to the NPVI (*Routekaart NPVI van Grijs Naar Groen - Nationaal Programma Verduurzaming Industrie*, 2025).
In these preconditions we also find the next two organisations that are impactful to achieve the goal set by the EU to decarbonize the industrial sector, namely the regional government as well as the grid operators. The reasons why these organisations become of such importance is due to the entry into force of the energy law as well as the "nota ruimte" (*Routekaart NPVI van Grijs Naar Groen - Nationaal Programma Verduurzaming Industrie*, 2025).

4.4.2. Regional government

Under the House of Thorbecke, regional governance is organised under provinces in the Netherlands. The provinces have their own responsibilities and can - in many cases - decide on matters by themselves (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2025). Their core business is related to the spatial planning, under this responsibility the provinces decided where industrial areas can come, what physical infrastructure goes where, and what part gets reserved for nature (*Wat Zijn de Taken van de Provincie? - ProDemos*, z.d.). Additionally, provinces are superintendent for environmental regulations, meaning they are

tasked with the oversight on whether environmental regulations are complied with by – among others – industries (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2025). Outside of the spatial planning and control tasks related to environmental regulations, provinces play an important role in promoting green energy and making sure that there is plenty of production of green energy (*Wat Zijn de Taken van de Provincie? - ProDemos*, z.d.). The outcome of this, is that provinces have a vision on how they will be powered in the future. In said vision they describe the use of energy in the future, what energy carrier is used for what goal, and how their province transitions towards a green us of energy. The cluster 6 industry plays an important role in making that vision reality, as they are often the largest energy users in a region.

Overall provinces provide a large amount of the parameters for the cluster 6 industry to produce at specific locations. Provinces point out the space, within what environmental boundaries the cluster 6 must operate, and what energy will be used in the future (Gedeputeerde Staten Overijssel, 2024).

4.4.3. Grid operators

The grid operators are responsible for the technical feasibility of policy regarding the electricity and gas infrastructure (Netbeheer Nederland, 2019). Aside from the division in terms of policy an important factor is the actual realisation of the infrastructure needed for the cluster 6 industries (Netbeheer Nederland, 2019). As mentioned before the cluster 6 industries need large amounts of energy in remote areas of the Netherlands. This often means that the necessary infrastructure is put in place solely for the cluster 6 industries (Interview, NetbeheerNederland). Normally this would not be justifiable due to the high costs of infrastructure, however in the electricity and gas law of the Netherlands (Ministerie van Klimaat en Groene Groei, 2024), the responsibilities of the grid operators are described. One of the responsibilities is that anybody should have the possibility to access the public electricity and gas grids. This means that the grid operators are obligated to fulfil the needs of the cluster 6 industries, if the price is paid (Ministerie van Klimaat en Groene Groei, 2024). Grid operators thus carry a large amount of the responsibilities when it comes to the electricity and gas infrastructure which is described as one of the preconditions for the industries to decarbonize their industrial processes (Ministerie van Klimaat en Groene Groei, 2024). Their legally appointed role makes them a key player in achieving the climate goals as set by the EU (Ministerie van Klimaat en Groene Groei, 2024).

In this chapter the context has been provided surrounding the policy issue of the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries. The chapter has provided the definition of cluster 6 that is used in this thesis, the scale of cluster 6 organisations, the legal and policy motivations to act, the impacts of the cluster 6 industries going green, as well as identifying policymakers that play impact the cluster 6 industries continuance in a green economy.

5. The “main” coalition

In the following chapter an identification will be made of the organisations taking part in the ‘main’ coalition aiming to impact the policy formulation related to the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries. This chapter will identify the organisations taking part in the “main” coalition as well as showcase the motives of the individual organisations to take part in the coalition.

5.1. A coalition of the willing to decarbonize the cluster 6 industries

With a better understanding of the context presented above a clear problem has been presented regarding the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries. This challenge is taken up by a coalition of the willing, which aims to see these industries transition to a new energy carrier and maintain an important economic position. In the following part an identification will be made of the coalition’s goal, motives of stakeholders, and the importance of the participation of these stakeholders. This will provide the necessary background to understand the role analysis of the coalition’s direct stakeholders.

The coalition of the willing addresses the issue of environmentalising industries that fall under the definition of cluster 6. As presented above the dilemma of cluster 6 is found in the complexity and costs of providing these industries with the necessary infrastructure, whereas these industries do have a large impact on the regional economy. Normally, if the business case does not work, the infrastructure would not be put in place, however the cluster 6 industries have a European motivation as to why they do need the infrastructure for green energy. Namely, the legal obligation – under the EU Climate Law – to lower the number of emissions emitted by their production facilities. Although this legal obligation does not instantly make the market efficient enough for the ‘business case’ to work.

The coalition of the willing deems it necessary to – regardless of the business case – have the cluster 6 industries transition to a new energy carrier. Therefore, the coalition attempts to provide a helping hand towards the cluster 6 industries, by attempting to influence policy relevant to the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 on a national level. Thus, the receiving party of the lobby efforts undertaken by the coalition can be seen as the national government, both politically as the administration. (Timmermans et al., 2019, 305-334) The timeframe related to this is becoming increasingly pressing with the news of industries moving away to other European countries (NOS Nieuws, 2025) (*Rapport Wennink - de Route Naar Toekomstige Welvaart*, 2025). However, the full achievement of “green” industries is not expected up until 2050 – or by critics well after 2050.

The primary goal of the coalition is the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries. However, the motivation behind that goal is much more important. As stated above the coalition deems it necessary to have the cluster 6 transition to a new energy carrier. Part of the motivation for having that goal comes through the EU Climate law, but there are also other motives at play such as the economic impact of the cluster 6 in regional economies, the usage and thus cost efficiency of energy infrastructure in remote locations, as well as production security for now and the future. These motives provide secondary goals for the coalition’s members such as achieving a cost competitive production economy, providing green energy carriers for the cluster 6 industries, and having a better insight in the planning of infrastructural expansion by grid operators (Interview, NetbeheerNederland) (Interview, Stichting Cluster 6) (Interview, IPO). In that regard there is a clear diversification possible in terms of long - and short-term goals of the coalition.

In the long term the coalition wants to see a "green" cluster 6 with an industrial process that is net zero in terms of Green House Gasses (GHG) emissions (*Routekaart NPVI van Grijs Naar Groen - Nationaal Programma Verduurzaming Industrie*, 2025). For that to be the case there needs to be plenty of availability of green energy carriers that can be used to produce the demanded products (*Routekaart NPVI van Grijs Naar Groen - Nationaal Programma Verduurzaming Industrie*, 2025). This can be in the form of electricity, hydrogen, green gas, or biogas, all these carriers have their own benefits and downsides (*Routekaart NPVI van Grijs Naar Groen - Nationaal Programma Verduurzaming Industrie*, 2025). These benefits and downsides are not just regarding cost of the energy carrier, but also in terms of policy and absolute availability. Additionally, these energy carriers each have their own challenges when it comes to transport and the necessary infrastructure for transport.

To achieve this long-term goal, the short-term goals are more focused on gaining additional insight in the challenges that each of these energy carriers pose to meet the criteria of going green (Interview, Stichting Cluster 6). These insights are needed to deduce the gap between the cost of running a green form of production for cluster 6 industries in the Netherlands versus the market price charged for internationally produced goods that do not have to stick to the EU regulations regarding production. Based on these insights, a plan can be formed to assure that the cluster 6 industries can still compete on European and world markets. Such a plan could either limit the inflow of goods coming from outside the EU, lower the costs of "green" production, or increase the costs of "fossil" production.

5.2. The organisations in the coalition of the willing

The stakeholders of this coalition are both public as private actors, as the coalition exists out of the provinces and the grid operators, as well as the foundation cluster 6 which are representatives of the cluster 6 industries (NPVI, z.d.). In this coalition both the provinces as the grid operators are commonly represented by their respective umbrella organisations (IPO and NetbeheerNederland), however in some cases the provinces or grid operators play an individual role as their goals might differ from their equals. The foundation cluster 6 is build up out of nine different trade associations,[2] these trade associations all represent an industrial sector that exists outside of the 5 known industrial clusters in the Netherlands.[3]

The coalition acts towards the national government represented by the Ministry of Climate and Green Growth (KGG), this puts the ministry in the receiving role (Timmermans et al., 2019, 305-334). Due to their receiving role the Ministry has not been further studied as a coalition partner, even though the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 fits with the Ministry's goal of achieving the environmental goals set by the EU.

These three stakeholders (Foundation Cluster 6, NetbeheerNederland, IPO) participate in the coalition because they share the same goal, namely achieving the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries (NPVI, z.d.). However, their motives for participation differ strongly from each other.

5.2.1. Cluster 6 industries | Foundation cluster 6

For the cluster 6 industries – and therefore foundation cluster 6 – the motivation is clear, as private organisations they need to make a profit to continue existence. Just like any other

[2] VNCI (Chemic), FNLI (Food), VNP (Paper), VNG (glass), KNB (Brick), VA (Recycling), FME/Metaal Nederland (Metal), NRK (Rubber), NLdigital (Data), ElementNL (Oil/Gas).
[3] E.g. VNCI: Chemical sector

entity they must oblige to relevant regulations that are put in place, both by EU lawmakers as national lawmakers. Regulations such as the EU Climate Law and national regulations such as the climate agreement can impact their competitiveness both in- as outside the EU, which overtime might impact their profitability. To avoid said loss of profitability the cluster 6 industries might benefit from cooperating with governments to create a situation in which they can produce "green" without damaging the current competitive playing field. For the cluster 6 industries there is a direct incentive to partake in the coalition, namely avoiding a loss of profits in the future.

5.2.2. Grid Operators | NetbeheerNederland

The motivation for grid operators does not find itself in economic results or CO_2 reduction. The motivation for grid operators to participate in the coalition is related to two factors. 1. Their legal obligation to facilitate a connection to the electricity and gas infrastructure (Ministerie van Klimaat en Groene Groei, 2024), and 2. The impact of the cluster 6 industries on the energy infrastructure (Interview, NetbeheerNederland).

The first factor is regulated in article 23 of the electricity law – which has recently become the energy law - (Ministerie van Klimaat en Groene Groei, 2024). This article calls for the obligation of a grid operator to provide anybody that requests access to the grid operated by the operator, with a point of access in a reasonable term (Ministerie van Klimaat en Groene Groei, 2024). This however has become increasingly complicated over time, especially due to the electrification of industrial processes (Interview, NetbeheerNederland). Due to this electrification – at times – the needed amount of electricity exceeds the amount of electricity that can be transported at that point in time (Interview, NetbeheerNederland). Since grid operators are also legally obligated to keeping the grid up and running - with disruptions being punished by fines - limitations arise regarding the ability of grid operators to facilitate expansions of the electricity transportation to one specific location (Ministerie van Klimaat en Groene Groei, 2024). However, these expansions are key for the electrification of the cluster 6 industries.

For grid operators there is a legal obligation to facilitate, which they are limited to do at current times, being left with a problem that they cannot solve by themselves under the current policies and laws regarding electricity transport (Ministerie van Klimaat en Groene Groei, 2024) (Interview, NetbeheerNederland). The grid operators thus need help to create a situation in which they can execute the task that they are legally obligated to fulfil.

In this the second factor comes into play, namely the impact of the cluster 6 on energy infrastructure. With the cluster 6 industry being energy intensive, and the cluster 6 being spread out across the country, the cluster 6 industries is responsible for around 30% of the total energy infrastructure underground (Interview, IPO). That provides a chance of balancing the grid, because that 30% could leave a large distortion on the electricity or gas grid in the case that they decide to move towards hydrogen or biogas. This could result in investments of the grid operators becoming worthless, with no chance of ever seeing any returns. The reasoning behind this is that if a grid operator has invested into expanding the electricity grid to facilitate in a region where a cluster 6 organisation is active, that currently relies heavily on electricity to produce, but then makes an investment decision that changes the energy carrier

used in production to e.g. hydrogen, the investment for expanding the electricity grid would not be necessary anymore (Interview, NetbeheerNederland).

Thus, if the grid operators can plan their investments – partially – based on the decarbonisation plans of the cluster 6 industries, the grid operators might avoid making infrastructural investments that will never see a return (Interview, NetbeheerNederland). Therefore, the grid operators have a strong motivation to partake in the coalition that deems the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries as necessary, because by partaking the grid operators can plan accordingly.

5.2.3. Provinces | IPO

The motivation for provinces to partake in the coalition follows from the output the cluster 6 industries generate. As a cluster 6 organisation produces, this brings economic upside to a region. Local inhabitants work at the factory, make money and likely spend a large amount of that locally. Next to workers, other businesses will provide services for the factory, also making money and spending that – partially – locally. This cycle continues and grows a local and regional economy. In the case that a cluster 6 organisation disappears, local workers will be out of a job, and some local companies might lose an important customer resulting in them going out of business (Provincie Overijssel, 2024). This leaves economic downturn behind, which is negative for a provincial government, especially for its political leaders, since voters won't be pleased with the state of the province resulting in no re-election.[4] Thus, political leaders task the administration to work towards a future in which the industries can continue to grow and exist in the province, creating jobs and boosting the regional economy as seen e.g. Overijssel (Gedeputeerde Staten Overijssel, 2024) (Provincie Overijssel, 2024). The administration finds that infrastructure, cost of energy, and access to green carriers are important issues for these industries resulting in them partaking in the coalition, as they cannot provide all the priorly mentioned factors by themselves (Gedeputeerde Staten Overijssel, 2024).

5.3. Importance of participating stakeholders

These three stakeholders all carry their own motivation as to why they would participate in a coalition that wants to evironmentalise the cluster 6 industries. Aside from their motivation these stakeholders bring something to the table as well. The provinces have jurisdiction over policy fields such as spatial planning of industrial locations as well as permits for emissions (*Wat Zijn de Taken van de Provincie? - ProDemos*, z.d.). The grid operators have the technical knowledge and executional power to transport regulated energy carriers as well as do research to other energy carriers that might provide a solution overtime for the cluster 6 industries (Netbeheer Nederland, 2019). The cluster 6 industries have the technical knowledge to identify what energy carrier works for their production processes and are responsible for making the investments that will lead to the actual emission reductions (Interview, Stichting Cluster 6). This shows that the public organisations are responsible for

[4] Another motivation could be the reduction of CO_2 emissions, depending on the political motivation of the elected official.

creating the playing field, whereas the private sector will make the actual impact, claiming that this can only be done in the right playing field.

5.3.1. Motivation for excluding municipal stakeholders (VNG)

Apart from the Foundation cluster 6, grid operators, and provinces another stakeholder – as identified by the NPVI – would be the union of municipalities (VNG) (NPVI, z.d.). The municipalities are a stakeholder through the fact that they are responsible for the designation of areas for companies. this is an important part in regard to spatial planning (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2024). Overtime more space might need to be designated for the decarbonisationof the cluster 6 industries, meaning that municipalities would come to play a role in the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries (Interview, NetbeheerNederland). However, for now there is no direct role for municipalities in achieving the coalition's goal of decarbonisation of the cluster 6 as space is the lesser issue, compared to availability of green energy carriers and innovative reduction methods (Interview, Stichting Cluster 6). At this point in time the role of municipalities is not relevant enough to be of impact in this study, however as claimed in Junk (2024, 188), this could change overtime.

6. Results: Insight into the roles played

The results of the data collection and analysis are presented below split out in six separate sections. Each of these sections will review the three organisations taking part in the 'main' coalition, Foundation Cluster 6, regional grid operators under Netbeheer Nederland, and IPO. In the first section of this chapter the organisational type will be pinpointed, in the second section their added value will be identified, in the third section the access to policy formulation will be shown, and in the fourth section the roles played by the organisations will be determined.

6.1. The organisational types

This section provides an insight into what sort of organisation – each of the three organisations that play a role in the main coaliton – is.

6.1.1. Foundation Cluster 6 | Collective of nine trade associations

Foundation Cluster 6 is a public-private cooperation put in place to partake in the National Program Environmentalising Industries (NPVI) which is currently under supervision of the Ministry of Climate and Green Growth (KGG) yet was started by the Ministry of Economic Affairs (EZK) in collaboration with nine trade associations (Stichting Cluster 6, z.d.). With the "Clusterregisseur Cluster 6" the Foundation Cluster 6 has a acquired a formal position for the regional industries at the policy making table (Interview, Stichting Cluster 6). Foundation Cluster 6 focusses on signalling problems rather than implementing solutions (Interview, NetbeheerNederland, Interview, Stichting Cluster 6)

6.1.2. Netbeheer Nederland | Collective of Regional and National Grid Operators

National and regional grid operators are private organisations with public shareholders; the national government is therefore the majority shareholder for TenneT and Gasunie (national grid operators) and the provinces and municipalities for regional grid operators. In the liberalization of the energy markets in the Netherlands, which was completed in 2004, grid operators became legally independent and obtained their legal duties (Rijksoverheid, 2024). National and regional grid Operators are collectively represented in policy formulation in the organisation Netbeheer Nederland. However, there is a strong split between the national grid operators and the regional grid operators in terms of policy needs.[5]

The regional operators are tasked with providing and maintaining the grid that transports electricity and methane in a safe and reliable manner (Ministerie van Klimaat en Groene Groei, 2024). Even though these are the most used forms of energy, the grid operators are not tasked with the transport of energy, solely with the transport of electricity and natural gas (methane or CH_4) (Interview, NetbeheerNederland). Aside from that limited task formulation, the regional operators are additionally tasked with providing a safe and reliable grid for now, but also for in the future (Ministerie van Klimaat en Groene Groei, 2024) (Interview, NetbeheerNederland).

The regional grid operators are, at the base of their assigned task, an implementing organisation and not a policy maker (Interview, NetbeheerNederland). However, as the regional operators need to provide future proof grids, a need for influence on the policy formulation has arisen to assure the plannability that is needed to create future proof grids

[5] As the Cluster 6 industrial plants tend to only deal with Regional Grid Operations, especially in relation to policy needs, this research focusses on the Regional Grid Operations, rather than covering the field of National Grid Operations as well.

(Interview, NetbeheerNederland). Therefore (regional) grid operators balance on the line between being an implementation organisation as well as being a policy maker.

6.1.3. Interprovinciaal Overleg (IPO) | Collective of Provinces in the Netherlands

The 12 provinces of the Netherlands are collectively organised under the umbrella organisation IPO (*Over het IPO - Interprovinciaal Overleg*, 2025). This collective is organised as an association with a formal board, which is advised by both political as administrative advisory committees, and formally checked by the 24 members of the association during the general meeting (*Over het IPO - Interprovinciaal Overleg*, 2025) (Interview, IPO). These members are elected officials of the regional parlements, which are chosen by their peers to represent the regional interests at this association, making it an indirect part of the democratic process (*Over het IPO - Interprovinciaal Overleg*, 2025). The IPO organisation, is thus a public organisation, based on democratic principles.

The IPO organisation is responsible for the collective lobby interests of provinces towards the national government (Interview, IPO), commonly aimed towards the policymaking tables. It aims to do so by providing insights into communal knowledge flowing from the provinces towards The Hague. This collective is supported by around 50 FTE (Interview, IPO).

Even though the IPO organisation is no policymaker, it does influence policy on both a regional as national level. It does so on a regional level by providing regional policy - and decision makers with additional knowledge and providing insights from other provinces (Interview, IPO). On a national level it aims to impact policymaking by providing insights into the regional workings and impacts of policy (Interview, IPO). IPO is by no means an implementing organisation and only has limited capacity for executional tasks.

6.2. Resource base

This section provides an insight into the possible contribution of resources by the coalition's members and therefore identifies the potential added value of the stakeholder.

6.2.1. Foundation Cluster 6

The foundation Cluster 6 has access to knowledge, time and money to improve the pace of environmentalising the regional industry (Interview, Stichting Cluster 6). the organisation of the foundation exists to support the clusterregisseur in their task to represent the cluster 6 industry, additionally the foundation cluster 6 takes it upon themselves to provide insight into the transition plans for the cluster 6 industry, link companies and public organisations together, and providing help in the case- and custom approach organised by KGG.

Originally the Foundation cluster 6 was funded by the trade associations as well as the ministry of EZK (Interview, Stichting Cluster 6). On top of this funding the provinces paid for the pCES as a final product providing insight into the necessary infrastructural developments (Interview, Stichting Cluster 6: 0:30).

Currently the only funding in cash received by the Foundation comes through the ministry of KGG as stated by the interviewee: "at this point in time the Ministry of Climate and Green Growth finances the Foundation" (Interview, Stichting Cluster 6: 0:30). The trade associations provide in-kind support in terms of knowledge, connections, physical locations etc., but no more direct cash injections (Interview, Stichting Cluster 6, 1:48).

There is access to knowledge to work towards the goal of environmentalising the cluster 6 industry, however there is only a limited amount of cash and therefore time available (Interview, Stichting Cluster 6, 3:11). This results into the fact that the foundation needs to make choices in terms of what they can and cannot do (Interview, Stichting Cluster 6, 5:08).

6.2.2. Regional Grid Operators | Netbeheer Nederland

The regional grid operators have access to knowledge – both technical as policy-wise – as well as time and money to allocate towards the shared goal of environmentalising the cluster 6 industry (Interview, NetbeheerNederland).

For the regional grid operators, it is not so much a question of whether they can allocate the resources, as they are available, it is more so the question of whether it is suitable to do so within their role (Interview, NetbeheerNederland). The use of resources must be justified under the legal responsibilities that are assigned to grid operators. This legal responsibility assigns the task to grid operators to provide a safe and reliable grid for the distribution of electricity and gas (Interview, NetbeheerNederland) (Ministerie van Klimaat en Groene Groei, 2024). As the industrial sector is one of the largest users of electricity and gas, an argument can be made for the fact that investment decisions of the grid operators should take the industries needs into consideration (Interview, NetbeheerNederland). To an extend this has always been the case as grid operators need to make multiyear plans for which the industry must provide an outlook that covers the next decade.

Next to the financial means the grid operators have a monopoly on knowledge of the grids and the use of their grid, especially since a lot of data regarding large energy users – as the cluster 6 industries are – is under NDA with the customers of the grid operator (Interview, Stichting Cluster 6). The data of energy use is protected as it can be related to production numbers (Interview, Stichting Cluster 6). However, grid operators are open to sharing knowledge when needed, especially since they do not want to be the bottleneck for the decarbonisation of the industrial sector (Interview, NetbeheerNederland).

In relation to resources in the form of time, a similar discussion arises as it does with

financial resources. For grid operators it must be beneficial to their legal responsibility. Meaning that grid operators ought to be critical of what they do and do not participate in, in terms of policymaking (Interview, NetbeheerNederland). An example of what is relevant is the process for national prioritization of certain infrastructure projects, an example of what is less so relevant is what support should be given to ETS-obligatory companies (Interview, NetbeheerNederland).

6.2.3. Provinces | Interprovinciaal Overleg (IPO)

The IPO organisation has access to time and knowledge to further the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries; however, cash is a more limited resource for the umbrella organisation of the provinces (Interview, IPO). Limited amounts for small bits of research are less so of an issue, but coordination of executionary programmes remains to be for the individual provinces (Interview, IPO). Due to there being no executionary tasks for the IPO, there is no need for substantial budgets to be able to execute plans. The execution of plans can be done, and financially supported, by the provinces themselves (Interview, IPO).

As stated, IPO does have access to time and knowledge. IPO provides a dedicated advisor for the coordination of policy formation through IPO related to the decarbonisation of the industrial sector (Interview, IPO). The decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries also falls within this portfolio. By providing a dedicated advisor IPO assures to be directly involved in and have the time allocated to impact the policy formulation related to the decarbonisation of the cluster 6.

Next to time, IPO has valuable knowledge when it comes to how inner workings of government function. Due to their years of experience IPO has a fundamental understanding of the functioning of the Dutch national government, this helps IPO to be effective in influencing policies before they have been written and formalised. IPO is less so a partner when it comes to the technical knowledge that is needed for the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries, but evermore so an important partner for navigating the inner workings of the national government (Interview, NetbeheerNederland M).

On top of the resources IPO provides by itself, it can – to an extend – count on the resources of the provinces (Interview, IPO). Especially when it comes to knowledge this is an important resource for IPO. Through the individual provinces IPO has access to the technical knowledge of policies that IPO itself misses.

IPO has access to resources and has dedicated resources for the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries (Interview, IPO). There is however not an endless number of resources available through IPO. On some occasions this leads to tension due to expectations of partners in the coalition. An example of this is related to the recent action plan cluster 6 2.0, for which IPO could not express support due to a change in resources (NPVI, 2025b).

6.3. Distance to the policy formulation

This section answers the question: how near the coalition members in the policymaking process are to decision making. This provides a deeper understanding of the potential added value a stakeholder brings.

6.3.1. Foundation Cluster 6

The Foundation Cluster 6 is an important stakeholder for the Ministry of Climate and Green Growth in the formulation of policies regarding energy infrastructure, mostly because they represent a large and important group of stakeholders. That is the reason why they have permanent representation in the steering committee of the Nationaal Programma Verduurzaming Industrie (NPVI) with a "clusterregisseur". The "clusterregisseurs" are seen as the representative of the industrial clusters, there is one "regisseur" for every cluster, five for the geographical clusters and one for the Cluster 6 industry (NPVI, 2025) (Interview, Stichting Cluster 6). The steering committee of the NPVI is made up of the Minister of KGG, the secretary of state of Infrastructure and Water management, public leaders of the grid operators (both national as regional), and other representatives of public national organisations such as IPO, VNO-NCW, and the VNG (NPVI, 2025). This steering committee is responsible for the strategic choices made within the NPVI.

The steering committee has an additional sounding board that is made up out of social organisations, trade associations, implementing organisations, the grid operators (both national as regional), and the six industrial clusters represented by their respective organisations (NPVI, 2025).[6] The Foundation Cluster 6 is also represented in this sounding board, through the representation of the six industrial clusters (NPVI, 2025).

Outside of the steering committee and its sounding board the Foundation Cluster 6 has made the product of the national cluster energy system for the decentralised industry and afterwards the provincial cluster energy system (pCES) (*Publicaties - Cluster 6*, 2023) (Stichting Cluster Zes, 2025). The pCES was commissioned by provinces to gain insight in the necessary energy infrastructure for the cluster 6 industry, this has provided direct input for provinces their strategic energy plans (Gedeputeerde Staten Overijssel, 2024).

The foundation cluster 6 thus finds itself nearby policy formulation tables that are related to the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries, especially through the direct access to a minister as stated by the interviewee: "There is a Minister taking a seat at the table" (Interview, Stichting Cluster 6, 7:15). However, the position of the foundation is often not formalised, and solely as an advisor to provide insights into the needs of the cluster 6 industries. (Interview, NetbeheerNederland)

[6] Full list of organisations: The 6 industrial clusters, VNCI, VEMW, VNO-NCW, FME, NVDE, TNO, VNG, IPO, RVO, DCMR, Tennet, Gasunie, Energie Nederland, Invest International, Invest-NL, Natuur en Milieu, Klimaat en Energiekoepel, Ministerie van Klimaat en Groene Groei, Ministerie Infrastructuur en Waterstaat.

6.3.2. Regional Grid Operators | Netbeheer Nederland

The regional grid operators are represented in the steering committee of the NPVI; this happens by proxy through one of the regional grid operators. Currently that seat is covered by the CEO of Enexis (NPVI, 2025).

Next to the NPVI steering committee the grid operators carry an important role in the Dialogue on Infrastructure for Industry in Transition (DIVIT) process. This process exists out of four dialogues (*Dialoog Over Infrastructuur Voor Industrie in Transitie (DIVIT)*, 2025):

1. Data gathering and validation
2. Check of concept scenario's
3. Dilemma and bottlenecks
4. Explain and feedback.

The grid operators are closely tied to the DIVIT process. The grid operators provide the funding for the organisation (DataSafeHouse) that is in the lead for the dialogue regarding data validation (Interview, NetbeheerNederland). The grid operators themselves are in the lead when it comes to the dialogue regarding the concept scenarios, as after the data validation the grid operators make the concept scenario's that will be checked during dialogue 2 (*Dialoog Over Infrastructuur Voor Industrie in Transitie (DIVIT)*, 2025). In dialogue 3 the grid operators will need to be informed of other developments that could impact the infrastructural plans and therefore their scenario's (*Dialoog Over Infrastructuur Voor Industrie in Transitie (DIVIT)*, 2025). Where in dialogue 4 the grid operators are in the lead again to inform impacted parties and gather feedback (*Dialoog Over Infrastructuur Voor Industrie in Transitie (DIVIT)*, 2025).

In the DIVIT process, impactful choices regarding infrastructure will be made and it is a self-learning system, meaning that the outcomes of this process will be used to improve the policy that solidifies the DIVIT process (*Dialoog Over Infrastructuur Voor Industrie in Transitie (DIVIT)*, 2025).

The regional grid operators/NetbeheerNederland are of importance in multiple policy formulation tables, such as the NPVI, DIVIT, and indirectly to the pMIEK/nMIEK. This shows that the distance of the grid operators to the forming of policy related to the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries is – to say the least – close.

6.3.3. Provinces | Interprovinciaal Overleg (IPO)

IPO is represented at the steering committee of the NPVI, just like the grid operators and Foundation Cluster 6. This means that, like the other stakeholders, the provinces are directly involved in the policymaking regarding the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries.

However, provinces are not just directly involved with the policymaking directly related to the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries. Many other policy fields – often closely linked – are also influenced by provincial policymakers. Examples of this are spatial planning, regional economy, water management, nature, and environment. These policy fields create the setting in which the cluster 6 industries operate. Through these policy fields provinces decide where the cluster 6 can open a production facility, it decides how it is supported by policy, decides what measures they must undertake to get rid of used water, and most importantly the provinces decide how much they are allowed to pollute and within what parameters. The impact of provincial policymaking is significant on the operations of the cluster 6 industries and their environmentalisation.

The provinces have access to both "the stick" as "the carrot" to kickstart the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries. The stick comes in the form of lowering the

amount of allowed pollution when permits are up for renewal. The carrot comes in the form of what support a province can provide its industries in terms of facilitating infrastructure, easing permit processes, and making transition plans with the industries to which both industries and government(s) commit themselves.

Apart from the policy fields that the provinces are responsible for and the position provinces hold in the NPVI steering committee by proxy the provinces will be responsible for one of the dialogue's that will take place under DIVIT (*Dialoog Over Infrastructuur Voor Industrie in Transitie (DIVIT)*, 2025). As previously explained this process will exist out of four separate dialogues, with the grid operators being responsible for two out of four parts of the entire process. Like the grid operators, the provinces have taken up the responsibility to take up a part of DIVIT (*Dialoog Over Infrastructuur Voor Industrie in Transitie (DIVIT)*, 2025). The provinces will be responsible for Dialogue C, Dilemma's and Bottlenecks. Dialogue C will identify challenges out of other policy fields – such as spatial planning - that impact the development of infrastructural projects within provinces (*Dialoog Over Infrastructuur Voor Industrie in Transitie (DIVIT)*, 2025). Based on evaluations and regional insights of the grid operator, province, and foundation cluster 6, priorities will be made as to what projects have priority and which other plans might need to be temporarily paused (*Dialoog Over Infrastructuur Voor Industrie in Transitie (DIVIT)*, 2025). The final outcomes of dialogue C will be a clear insight in potential bottlenecks, as well as a strategic prioritization of projects per region (*Dialoog Over Infrastructuur Voor Industrie in Transitie (DIVIT)*, 2025). This is directly tied to other governmental plans such as the provincial multiple year programme infrastructure, energy and climate as well as the national multiple year programme infrastructure, energy and climate (*Dialoog Over Infrastructuur Voor Industrie in Transitie (DIVIT)*, 2025).

The provinces have both direct as indirect influence in the policy formation related to the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries. This shows that the proximity of the provinces in relation to the policy formulation is incredibly close.

6.4. The roles played by the coalition's members

In the following section the roles played by coalition's members will be identified. This identification will be made for the "core", "player", and "tagalong" role as provided by Hula (1999).

6.4.1. Leadership and Coordination (Core)

This section of identifications will show an insight into where the coalition's members play a "core" role, indicated by proactivity in coordinating and/or leading efforts that positively impact the coalition's goal.

6.4.1.1. Foundation Cluster 6

The foundation cluster 6 has played an important role in the formulation of policy regarding the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries. This role shows leadership and coordination in relation to signalling the needs of the industrial sector this is indicated by their strategic function. This strategic function is confirmed in (Interview, Stichting Cluster 6, 5:08) in which the interviewee claims: "in principle the foundation should not function in the operational level, but more so in the strategic level that is relevant for policy formulation.".

The foundation cluster 6 has had a coordinating function when it comes to identifying the needs of the cluster 6 industries. This coordination is indicated through the actions they have undertaken by firstly setting up a national cluster energy strategy focused entirely on the industries that fall outside of the scope of the five industrial clusters. This national document better known as lCES, provided the first insight into the needs of the remaining industries (Stichting Cluster Zes, 2025).

The lCES provided a first insight into the needs of the cluster 6 industries in terms of what their plans were for going green, however these plans provided insufficient insight into what would be needed over time in terms of infrastructure (Stichting Cluster Zes, 2025). To gain a better insight the foundation cluster 6 provided a regional version of the lCES better known as the provincial Cluster Energy Strategy, or pCES (Interview, Stichting Cluster 6, 36:15).

The pCES was a cooperative action between participating provinces - that footed the bill - and the foundation Cluster 6 that coordinated the research (Interview, Stichting Cluster 6, 34:36). This document provided a better insight for governments into the needs of the Cluster 6 industries up to a regional level. The foundation cluster 6 can be noted as the initiator of both the lCES as well as the pCES (Interview, Stichting Cluster 6, 34:36).

Aside from formal documentation such as the pCES and lCES the foundation cluster 6 aims to draw political attention towards the decarbonisation of cluster 6 industries. It recently did so by organising a debate in preparation of the parliamentary elections, providing upcoming parliament members to profile themselves on the topic of environmentalising the cluster 6 (*Regionale Industrie: Bloeien of Snoeien?* 2025). This has already proven valuable as, even after the elections have taken place additional political attention has gone towards the cluster 6. An example of this is the motion by P. Groot and H. Jumelet requesting insight into what industrial companies currently cannot obtain access to the electricity grid whereas this would be socially or economically beneficial (*Voorzienings- en Leveringszekerheid Energie*, 2025). Both parliament members took part in the debate: Regional Industries; flourishing or cutting back? (*Regionale Industrie: Bloeien of Snoeien?*, 2025).

The abovementioned actions – coordinated by the foundation cluster 6 – focus on providing insight into the cluster 6 for decisionmakers. The foundation cluster 6 takes a leading role in providing that insight. By taking in that position, they have created a role for themselves in which they are seen as the organisation that identifies the needs for the cluster

6 industries and signals these needs towards decisionmakers at different governmental levels. Therefore, they uphold a coordinating role regarding the setting of the agenda related to the policy formulation for the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries.

6.4.1.2. Regional Grid Operators | Netbeheer Nederland

The grid operators have a coordinating role when it comes to the technical planning for the public electricity and gas grids. Partially this role comes through their legal obligations through which the grid operators are assigned to plan and futureproof the grids. The impacts of the cluster 6 on the public grid is – with 30% of total transport capacity reserved for cluster 6 – significant (Interview, IPO). The expectancy is that if these industries move towards electrification the electricity grids will have to be redesigned and tailored towards a more demanding cluster 6 (Uitvoeringsoverleg Industrie et al., 2021) (Interview, NetbeheerNederland). Due to this, the grid operators are actively involved in the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries, since it will impact their operations incredibly (Interview, NetbeheerNederland).

The grid operators actively move to provide insight in the technical limitations that come into play if the cluster 6 industries decarbonize and only use electricity (Interview, NetbeheerNederland). By publishing policy concepts – based on the technical situation – that should quicken the decarbonisation based on a pace that the grid operators can keep up with. An example of this is the report: choices for an integral energy system (NetbeheerNederland, 2025), this report calls for a different way of prioritizing who gets access to the public grid first. This publication by the umbrella organisation of grid operators (NetbeheerNederland), proves that the grid operators take an active role in making the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries possible by aiming to change the policies that put the preconditions in place (NetbeheerNederland, 2025).

The preconditions have a direct impact, but the grid operators do not just look at the current state of things. Due to their responsibility for a futureproof grid, there is an additional focus on innovation to keep up with future demand. An example of such innovation is the solutions presented by the grid operators in the steering committee NPVI that occurred on the 18th of December 2025. During this committee the grid operators have presented seven projects that were ready for decision-making, all aimed to futureproof the grids and assure that there is dedicated green energy transport capacity for the industrial sector. Four out of these seven measures are directly impacting the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries. These measures are focussed on de-risking green investments, providing an infrastructural fund, creating safe havens for industries in the regions, and quickening the procedures for permits (NPVI [Werkgroep Vliegwiel Verduurzaming Industrie], 2025). The grid operators play a key role in the formulation of these plans, however, deem it as a collective effort in which the grid operators coordinate and foot the bill (Interview, NetbeheerNederland).

Aside from the publications and project plans made by the grid operators aiming to positively impact the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries. The grid operators have a coordinating role in the DIVIT Dialogues A and B (*Dialoog Over Infrastructuur Voor Industrie in Transitie (DIVIT)*, 2025). For Dialogue A the data will be gathered and validated by an external organisation, namely the DataSafeHouse or DSH (*Dialoog Over Infrastructuur Voor Industrie in Transitie (DIVIT)*, 2025). The DSH is reliant on the validation of the data by the grid operators, as they have the monopoly on – and therefore all the insight – into the transportation of energy (*Dialoog Over Infrastructuur Voor Industrie in Transitie (DIVIT)*, 2025). This places the grid operators in an important position at the start of the DIVIT process. Although at a first glance it does not warrant a “coordinating” function in dialogue A for the grid operators. The perspective on coordination changes with the insight that the bill for the DSH is paid by the grid operators rather than the national government (Interview,

NetbeheerNederland). So, even though DSH is formally appointed to coordinate dialogue A, the grid operators play a more important role than is presented in DIVIT (*Dialoog Over Infrastructuur Voor Industrie in Transitie (DIVIT)*, 2025) (Interview, NetbeheerNederland). Through both picking up the bill as well as the need for validation of the data with the grid operators, the grid operators occupy the centre of dialogue A in the DIVIT process, providing them with the possibility to dictate the first two fases of the DIVIT process (*Dialoog Over Infrastructuur Voor Industrie in Transitie (DIVIT)*, 2025).

In Dialogue B grid operators are directly in the lead. During this dialogue the grid operators are tasked to place the concept scenarios for the future of the energy grids over the cluster energy strategies as created by the industries (*Dialoog Over Infrastructuur Voor Industrie in Transitie (DIVIT)*, 2025). The goal of this is not to find the overlap, but mostly to find the gaps and act accordingly to adjust the concept scenarios to a more suitable situation for the industries. Due to the legal responsibilities of the grid operators, as well as the monopoly on knowledge of the grids, the grid operators are in the lead for the coordination of this dialogue (*Dialoog Over Infrastructuur Voor Industrie in Transitie (DIVIT)*, 2025).

In both Dialogue A as B in the DIVIT process, the grid operators hold a coordinating role. This shows the – coordinating – involvement of the grid operators in the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries. The DIVIT process will dictate the infrastructural investments for regulated energy carriers, made for the industrial sector. As this is one of the most important preconditions for the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries, the grid operators hold a key role in the policy formulation related to achieving the goal of the coalition: environmentalising the cluster 6 industries.

6.4.1.3. Provinces | Interprovinciaal Overleg (IPO)

The IPO organisation, and by proxy the provinces, play an important role in the coordination of Dialogue C of the DIVIT Process (*Dialoog Over Infrastructuur Voor Industrie in Transitie (DIVIT)*, 2025). In this dialogue the goal is to obtain a deep understanding of the preconditions related to the infrastructural plans as well as the decarbonisation plans of the industries under the Cluster Energy Strategies (CES) (*Dialoog Over Infrastructuur Voor Industrie in Transitie (DIVIT)*, 2025). During this dialogue the strategic choices that have been made by regional governments regarding energy, spatial planning, and social priorities, will be considered, resulting in a more complete image of the possibility of success for the plans made by the grid operators as well as the industrial clusters (*Dialoog Over Infrastructuur Voor Industrie in Transitie (DIVIT)*, 2025).

Apart from Dialogue C and the coordinating role IPO takes in this dialogue, the IPO organisation does not take in a leadership position when it comes to the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries.

Despite that some individual provinces attempt to take in a more proactive role when it comes to the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries. Examples of this are the Province of Noord-Brabant with their approach called the “Grote Oogst”, which partially focusses on the cluster 6 industries (Provincie Brabant, 2025). The Province of Utrecht which is proactively acquiring insight in the wants and needs of their cluster 6 industries (Interview, IPO). Leaving the Province of Overijssel which aims to decarbonize the cluster 6 industries in its province through the “gebiedsgerichte aanpak cluster 6”, which solely focusses on the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries (Stichting Cluster 6 et al., 2024). IPO does take a proactive role in supporting these initiatives, by aiming to acquire resources for the provinces for furthering these approaches, nevertheless there is no direct involvement of IPO in these executionary programmes (Interview, IPO).

6.4.2. Resource Contribution (Player)

This section of identifications will show an insight into where the coalition's members play a "player" role, indicated by providing support in terms of resources, this can be done through providing (technical) knowledge, time, investments, or active lobby support.

6.4.2.1. Foundation Cluster 6

As shown in the previous chapter the foundation has a certain coordinating role regarding the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries. According to the role indicators an active contribution of resources can be expected.

In the chapter regarding the resource bases of the stakeholders in the coalition, it has become clear that the foundation cluster 6 has access to time and knowledge but is limited regarding money (Interview, Stichting Cluster 6). The foundation cluster 6 contributes its financial means towards time that is then used to quicken the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries (Interview, Stichting Cluster 6). The foundation cluster 6 does not have access to financial means that could be seen as sufficient to fund executionary undertakings (Interview, Stichting Cluster 6). So, the use of the financial means of the foundation cluster 6 is used by "buying" time (Interview, Stichting Cluster 6).

The foundation cluster 6 uses time to further the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries. It does so by providing active input at policy tables related to the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries, e.g. the steering committee of the NPVI, the Sherpa committee of the NPVI, regional energy visions, and provincial infrastructural prioritizations such as the pMIEK (Interview, Stichting Cluster 6). Additionally, the foundation cluster 6 has direct ties with the trade associations of the cluster 6 industries, providing them with access to the industrial organizations in a way that governments do not have (Interview, Stichting Cluster 6). This provides them with additional knowledge and insight into the cluster 6 industries.

This combination of knowledge and time is the contribution of the foundation cluster 6 towards the coalition's goal of environmentalising the cluster 6 industries. Apart from the additional time, that is bought to work towards the goal, there is no financial contribution. However, the foundation cluster 6 leverages the means of other coalition partners to make sure action is undertaken, e.g. pCES.

6.4.2.2. Grid Operators | Netbeheer Nederland

The grid operators play a pivotal role in the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries as the grid operators carry the responsibility of organising key preconditions. In the previous chapter it has been shown that grid operators therefore – to an extend – have a coordinating role in parts of the activities undertaken by the coalition.

In the chapter "resource base" it has become clear that the grid operators have resources in terms of money, time and knowledge. These resources are not just available for the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries but are dedicated to assuring that the grid operators can fulfil their legal duties (Interview, NetbeheerNederland). Nonetheless, working towards the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 fits in the strategic goals for the grid operators. Resulting in the fact that they actively put money, time and knowledge to use for the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries (Interview, NetbeheerNederland).

The grid operators dedicate time and knowledge towards the coalition's goal through their participation in policymaking processes such as DIVIT and partaking in the steering committee of the NPVI (Interview, NetbeheerNederland). They provide plans working towards solutions that fit not only their strategic goals, but also other organisations their goals (NetbeheerNederland, 2025). Examples of this are the "safe haven" and the derisking of environmental investments, as presented in the NPVI steering committee that took place on the 18th of December 2025 (NPVI [Werkgroep Vliegwiel Verduurzaming Industrie], 2025).

Alongside the resources in terms of time and knowledge that the grid operators pour into the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries, there is direct investments into the preconditions for the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries as well. By investing in the operability and expansion of the electricity grid, the grid operators directly invest into the opportunity of the cluster 6 industries their electrification (Interview, NetbeheerNederland). Despite that this might not be the core goal of grid operators when making these investments the outcome is the same.

As previously indicated, the grid operators maintain a monopoly concerning the technical insights of the public grids. A resource that is vastly important to further and quicken the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries (Interview, IPO M). However, coalition partners claim that clear insights into the technical side of the public grids remain unavailable (Interview, IPO M).

The grid operators, like foundation cluster 6 provide a large amount of their resources in attempt of achieving the coalition's goal, albeit not always directly aimed at the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries. Nevertheless, they can be seen as an active member of the coalition attempting to decarbonize the cluster 6 industries, however unlike the foundation the grid operators do not pick up a coordinating role if there is no clear benefit towards their strategic goals of meeting their legal obligations.

6.4.2.3. Provinces | Interprovinciaal Overleg (IPO)

As stated in the chapter "resource base", IPO has access to time and knowledge, however the umbrella organisation of provinces does not have access to money to facilitate execution of projects in any meaningful manner (Interview, IPO).

Nonetheless IPO can be described as an active contributor towards the coalition that aims to decarbonize the cluster 6 industries, this is through their contribution in terms of time and knowledge. As stated in the resource base IPO provides a dedicated advisor on for the workgroup environmentalising industries (Interview, IPO). This workgroup works together to find consensus among provinces on an administrative level prior to providing the definite input for the steering committee NPVI. This showcases that on different levels the provinces are actively participating in the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries, which proves a time commitment (Interview, IPO).

Additionally, the provinces provide valuable knowledge in this workgroup directing IPO towards the most beneficial path for provinces in relation to the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries. By providing this knowledge IPO is directly providing the coalition with policymaking information, to which plans can be adapted. This is invaluable for the cluster 6 industries, as through this process they can sort towards the most suitable transition not just based on their industrial process but also based on the policy choices that either are or will be made.

Next to these regional insides, IPO remains to be a fountain of knowledge on how to navigate the complicated process, that we know as influencing policy in The Hague (*Over het IPO - Interprovinciaal Overleg*, 2025). Due to their longstanding position in The Hague, they prove to be an asset for setting out lobby strategies to impact the policy making related to the decarbonisation of cluster 6. Consequential to other partners in the coalition being less experienced in the process of policy influencing, IPO has obtained an active role in the coalition to help map out the most suitable strategy in The Hague (Interview, NetbeheerNederland N).

Lobby efforts aside, some provinces also directly work towards a clean industrial sector in their province, where this was already a goal for the provinces with one of the five industrial clusters being geographically located in their province, it has become one for provinces like Overijssel, Brabant, and Utrecht (Gedeputeerde Staten Overijssel, 2024)

(Provincie Brabant, 2025).

Overall IPO can be seen as an active contributor, not just by putting in resources of their own, but also by being a catalyst for acquiring regional resources to help decarbonize the cluster 6 industries.

6.4.3. Symbolic alignment (Tagalong)

In the previous sections of identifications there has been strong indications of active participation of all stakeholders of the coalition that are studied under this research. In view of that regard this chapter will briefly summarize relevant developments in which parties may show a more inactive participation.

6.4.3.1. Foundation Cluster 6

As indicated in the previous chapters foundation cluster 6 has a sort of leadership role within the coalition. Aside from the activities previously mentioned, there is no formalised role for the foundation cluster 6 in the action plan cluster 6 2.0 or the DIVIT process. In both processes they play a role, however in neither of them is the function of the foundation cluster 6 formalised or made explicit. As both processes do support the goal the foundation strives after, they have confirmed support for both plans.

For the foundation one of the reasons for not having a formalised role in either process outside of pre-existing functions, is mainly due to constraints in resources. This makes that there is not enough capacity to fulfil a larger position within the coalition than currently done.

There is no indication from the other coalition partners that there is a ‘tagalong’ role in current time for the foundation cluster 6, however coalition partners do foresee that overtime, there might not be a need for the current function (signalling) of the foundation cluster 6 (Interview NetbeheerNederland) (Interview IPO).

6.4.3.2. Regional Grid Operators | Netbeheer Nederland

The grid operators fulfil a large role within the coalition that aims to decarbonize the cluster 6 industries. Due to their knowledge on monopoly and their legally binding obligations there is currently no indication of symbolic support towards this cause. this may change in time, when the preconditions have been put in place and the ‘actual’ decarbonisation needs to progress. This will be the responsibility of industrial companies themselves.

The grid operators recognize that there is a larger role for them in current times, despite that the grid operators remain to be critical to what responsibilities they do pick up. The other coalition partners also see an important role for the grid operators, mostly due to the monopoly and legal obligations they have around their task. Overtime, if the preconditions necessary to decarbonize the cluster 6 industries a shift might occur.

6.4.3.3. Provinces | Interprovinciaal Overleg (IPO)

Even though IPO does not maintain a leading role as indicated in the chapter “leadership and coordination”, it is not possible to place them in the “tagalong” category either. As shown in the previous chapters IPO does bring a multitude of resources to the table in knowledge as in time. Therefore, they can be seen as an active player.

Apart from that there is no symbolic engagement through IPO as there must be consensus among twelve provinces prior to IPO undertaking any public step. This process is often deemed as too complicated for symbolic support and would be seen by many provinces as a waste of time.

Partners in the coalition recognize the efforts made by IPO in their contribution of resources, however foundation cluster 6 mentions that they do not in all cases see IPO as an

active partner in the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries. This is related to the strategic vote IPO has made regarding the action plan cluster 6, as this directly costed provinces financial means meant to decarbonize industries. Albeit explainable, it was not appreciated by the foundation cluster 6 as it has been deemed unreliable. The grid operators however do recognize the efforts made by IPO for both provincial as well as national matters when it comes to environmentalising the cluster 6 industries.

7. Conclusions: Identification of the roles played

7.1. The coalition's goal and the preconditions

Based on the results in the chapter above the conclusion can be drawn that all players have been active in the coalition that aims to decarbonize the cluster 6 industries. The motivation that leads to the active contribution differs per stakeholder. Due to these different motivations, a difference in role can be seen. The motivation for the foundation cluster 6 is directly related to their core task, representing the cluster 6 industries in the policy formulation process. The motivation for grid operators is directly tied to their legal obligations to keep the grid up and running as well as futureproof. Lastly the motivation for provinces finds itself in both a need to implement and facilitate EU and national regulations regarding the decarbonisation of industries, as well as a political desire to create a flourishing economy.

Due to these different motivations for actively participating in the coalition, the actions undertaken by the stakeholders are partially motivated because of their own "subgoals". Meaning that provinces or grid operators, organisations with many strategic goals, take part in the coalition's actions due to it benefitting other strategic goals next to the coalition's goal of environmentalising the cluster 6 industries.

Before categorising the roles of organisations, it is important to note that an organisation can play two separate roles, based on two categories, namely: 1. the role played for the preconditions and 2. The role played towards the coalition's goal. In the following part the stakeholders studied, will be categorised based on the indicators that have been presented in the results. These will be separated into the two categories "preconditions" and "coalition's goal".

7.2. Foundation Cluster 6

The Foundation Cluster 6 holds a proactive role in the coalition that aims to decarbonize the cluster 6 industries. Most of the activities of the foundation cluster 6 are focused on signalling the needs and wants of the cluster 6 industries.

7.2.1. The role played for the preconditions

In relation to the preconditions for the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries, the foundation cluster 6 their role is best described as "player". The foundation provides resources, mostly related to time and knowledge of the industries wants and needs. However, their strategic goal is not to fix the electricity grid, it is directly focused on the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries. The foundation participates wherever it can but due to limited resources their capacity to play an active role in setting the preconditions is limited. An example of this is the role the foundation played in the forming of the DIVIT process.

7.2.2 The role played for the coalition's goal

The foundation cluster 6 can be seen as a core player in the coalition aiming to decarbonize the cluster 6 industries. As previously mentioned, the core goal of the foundation cluster 6 is to forward the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries. The actions of the foundation cluster 6 provide clear indications of both initiating action: taking initiative and executing the lCES and pCES, as well as gathering and leveraging resources: the action plan cluster 6 2.0. Both are strong indicators of a leadership/coordinating role in the coalition, therefore making them a core player in the coalition.

7.3. Grid Operators | Netbeheer Nederland

The grid operators play an active role in the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries; however, this is not due to it being their core strategic goal. The grid operators do not just play a role in the policy formulation but are of utmost importance for the executionary tasks that come with the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries and the preconditions that set the scene for said environmentalisation.

7.3.1 The role played for the preconditions

As shown in the results the grid operators play an important role in the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries. However, most of their activities are tied to the preconditions needed for electrification of the cluster 6 industries. This overlaps with the legal obligations that grid operators have regarding the functioning of the public grids. The grid operators invest drastic amounts of resources into assuring that they continue to meet the legal obligations they face. This – albeit indirectly – sets the preconditions for the cluster 6 industries to electrify their production process.

The grid operators invest in two ways towards the preconditions, the first one is direct investments in the necessary infrastructure, providing regions with expansions of the current electricity grid. The second is supporting and formulating lobby messages, aiming to influence policy in such a way that the grid operators will be able to ramp up the pace of investments made.

Concerning the role played by the grid operators with respect to the preconditions, there are clear indications of the grid operators having a leadership/coordinating function. Therefore, the grid operators have a "core" player role in the coalition when it comes to the preconditions that are needed for the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries.

7.3.2. The role played for the coalition's goal

As for the role played by grid operators related to the coalition's goal of environmentalising the cluster 6 industries, there is a different position. The grid operators provide both lobby support as technical knowledge, which is needed for the coalition, nevertheless the grid operators do not pick up as active of a role in coordinating the lobby messages or projects that are directly related to the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries. Regardless of the coordinating function, or more so the lack thereof, the grid operators do provide many resources that benefit the coalition's goal of environmentalising the cluster 6 industries. Both in their direct investments for the grid, as well as the knowledge and time the grid operators invest in the policy formulation in for example DIVIT. therefore, they can be labelled as a "player" when it comes to the role played for the coalition's goal.

7.4. Provinces | IPO

IPO plays an active role in the coalition, albeit in a more supportive role rather than a coordinating one. IPO mostly plays an active supporting role when it comes to development of lobby strategies and policy formulation.

7.4.1. The role played for the preconditions

In the results it has been presented that IPO actively contributes to 'setting the scene' for the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries. IPO is aware of the role provinces play in this process and because of that awareness actively provides its services towards the coalition's goal. Despite the active contribution of resources towards the coalition's goal IPO does not take in a coordinating role regarding the preconditions needed to decarbonize the cluster 6 industries. Even though IPO takes up the coordinating role in dialogue C of DIVIT, this is not enough to identify IPO as a core player, especially since other stakeholders uphold a far more

active role in the entire process of DIVIT. Therefore, based off the indicators, IPO can be categorised as a player in the coalition in relation to their role played for the preconditions.

7.4.2. The role played for the coalition's goal

The role played by IPO regarding the coalition's goal does not differ from the role IPO plays in relation to the preconditions. IPO can be seen as a player in the relation to the coalition's goal of environmentalising the cluster 6 industries as well. The indicators have shown that IPO actively contributes knowledge and time towards the coalition's goal, whereas there is barely any coordination and or leadership regarding working towards said goal. Even though IPO continues to acquire resources for the provinces to work on the goal of environmentalising the cluster 6 industries, it does so more through linking provinces with other stakeholders in the coalition. Overall IPO provides knowledge, time and connections with regional governments, therefore providing important resources for the coalition's goal, but not coordinating the use of these resources. Therefore, IPO can be identified as a player regarding the role IPO plays in achieving the coalition's goal.

7.5. Overview of roles based on motive

In a simplified manner the roles played by the three organisations can be shown as in table 1. This simplification bases itself on the distinction of motives for the coalition's members to act. Table 1 shows that there is a dynamic relation between role played by organisations and the motive for the individual organisations.

Table of roles played by organisations based on motive	Role played for the preconditions	Role played for the coalition's goal
Foundation Cluster 6	Player	Core
NetbeheerNederland	Core	Player
IPO	Player	Player

Table 1; Roles played by organisations based on the

8. Discussion: A dynamic coalition

8.1. The key findings

For the case study of the decarbonisation of the Cluster 6 industries in the Netherlands the complexity of roles within a coalition can be retraced to 2 major indicators. The first one being the preconditions for the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries, and the second one being the direct goal of the coalition; the decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries.

All three organisations play an active role in the decarbonisation of the cluster 6, however there are differences among the coalition members in terms of activity. This places the foundation cluster 6 as well as the grid operators in a "core" role in this coalition, whereas IPO fits better into a "player" role.

There are signs of coordination and leadership by the Foundation cluster 6 through lCES and pCES as well as coordinating collective lobby efforts through the organisation of an election debate. There is a clear indication of available resource contribution towards the coalition's goal through both time as well as knowledge regarding the cluster 6 industries.

There are signs of coordination and leadership by the grid operators through DIVIT, as well as the coordination of publications aiming to influence policies. Next to leadership and coordination in efforts contributing to the coalition's goal, the grid operators actively contribute resources towards the coalition. The grid operators do so in terms of both knowledge and time in the policy formulation process, as well as in direct investments to work towards a situation in which the preconditions for which the grid operators are responsible are met.

Only limited signs can be found of IPO taking a coordinating and leadership role, only in the DIVIT process a part of the coordination falls towards IPO. Part of this can be explained through limited capacity, as well as the individual decision making of provinces. nonetheless IPO is an active member of the coalition mostly due to the resource contribution. IPO actively contributes time and knowledge towards the coalition's goal, both in terms of lobbying strategy as in terms of technical knowledge regarding policy fields.

So, to answer the research question in brief: "what roles do organisations play in the main coalition attempting to influence policy formulation in relation to environmentalising the Cluster 6 industry in the Netherlands?". The Foundation Cluster 6 plays a "core role" in terms of the coalition's goal, however plays a "player" role in relation to the preconditions for the decarbonisationof the cluster 6 industries. The grid operators have a "player" role in relation to the coalition's goal, however play a "core" role related to the preconditions for the environmnetalisation of the cluster 6 industries. IPO plays the role of "player" in both the preconditions, as well as for the coalition's goal. In neither instance IPO can be placed as a leader for the coalition.

Lastly an explanation for the lack of a "tagalong" in this coalition can be explained through the case selection, as the three organisations that were studied can be seen as both "players" or "core players" depending on the focus, no tagalong was studied. This can be explained through the dependent dynamic that is shown amongst these three organisations. Through watching each others contributions, and assuring that the individual organisations contribute reasonably in line with their capacities, a certain controlmechanism is upheld with the goal to avoid "tagalong" behaviour. Through such a control mechanism, opportunism of needed coalition partners is avoided.

A possible example of an organisation that could be fitting this role is the organisation that was left out of this research for feasibility purposes, namely the VNG. Further research into potential tagalongs in this case study could identify other organisations as well.

8.2. The interpretation of the findings

The results show that the coalition's members can be identified according to the roles "core", "player", and "tagalong". This provides a basic understanding of the positioning of the different members that take part in the coalition. It shows the activity and motives of the coalition members studied. However, in the application of the theory to this case study a gap has occurred between a coalition's member their role and the individual goal that the coalition's member may have aside from the coalition's goal. The theory of Hula discussing roles within coalitions does not provide a manner to identify and value the individual member their motives.

The theory of Hula (1999) regarding roles in a coalition lack the complexity that is needed in modern day issues. Especially with the complexity of modern-day issues resulting into a wider array of motivations for coalition members to partake in coalition's moving towards a certain goal.

This could improve by a clear measure that provides an insight in the goal as well as the subgoals of a coalition's members. Especially in more complex policy discussions there are often multiple issues that drive organisations towards working together in a coalition that has a goal to reach which is the sum of solution(s) to the issues of its members. As shown by this case study there are clear differences in terms of roles related to preconditions for the decarbonisation as well as the actual decarbonisation of the cluster 6 industries.

Hula (1999) has provided a first insight into roles within coalitions, Timmermans et al. (2019) identifies a complexity in the problems that coalitions deal with, and Junk (2024, 187) claims that individual actors have a significant impact through resource contribution in the cooperation within coalitions. This thesis claims that an individual motive of a coalition's member to partake in a coalition carries a drastic impact on the role that this organisation will play within the coalition, as well as that in practice this role can change depending on these individual motives. This thesis has shown the complexity of roles within coalitions and has proven that in practice the roles within a coalition are more of a dynamic concept rather than a static one, as they can change depending on the individual organisation's goals as shown in figure 1.

8.3. Implications, Practical applications, and Further research

By being able to systematically identify the complex motives that drive the individual organisation's actions in a coalition, it would become possible to – more efficiently – utilize coalition members towards achieving the coalition's goal. On the other hand, by systematically identifying said complex motives an external organisation and/or coalition could aim to divert the original coalition away from its goals. This train of thought would need to be tested on other coalitions that have been formed based on a complexity of issues with coalition members that hold different motivations that lead them to partake in the coalition. If there is a clear overlap in what drives these individual motives it may be possible to uncover complex relationships within coalitions much easier and quicker, which could lead to an easier decision-making process, as in complex situations the decisionmaker would become able to identify the roles that are being played much quicker.

In relation to this case study there are however immediate practical applications for both the coalition's partners, as well as organisations aiming to pivot or use the direction of the coalition. With the insights presented in this study a lobby strategy could be created to impact the direction (positively or negatively) of the coalition towards the future.

The research is limited to the three partners of the 'main' coalition. At this point in time these are the most important players in the coalition, however at a certain point in time the dynamic might chance when the VNG takes in a more active part in the coalition. The

expectancy is that this will change when solutions are becoming more concrete, therefore needing the municipalities more actively than the case is now.

Aside from the potential change in dynamics of the coalition over time another limitation is the fact that only the administrative level of the organisations has provided input. The study could be positively impacted by adding the executive level their insights into the roles and goals of their respective organisations in relation to the 'main' coalition.

Further research for theoretical purposes should be focussed on the motives for coalition's members to partake in coalitions and how this can increase the complexity to find a clear goal for the coalition. For more practical purposes further research should be done to the diverse set of coalitions related to the energy transition grid operators make a part out of. This could provide a deeper understanding of their motivations in many different coalitions and perhaps provide an insight in how these different coalitions impact, and perhaps even slow down, each other.

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Appendix A: Overview of used publications/documents for the analysis

Doc-ID	Afzender / organisatie	Titel	Jaar	Type
D1	Stichting/Foundation Cluster 6	**Landelijke CES / Landelijke Cluster Energie Strategie Cluster 6 (lCES)**	2025	Strategie/rapport
D2	Stichting Cluster 6 + partners (provincie/netbeheerders)	**pCES Overijssel**	2024	Regionale/provinciale strategie
D3	Stichting Cluster 6 (website)	**Wat we doen – Cluster 6**	z.d.	Webpagina
D4	Cluster 6 (website)	**Cluster 6-bedrijven**	2025	Webpagina
D5	NetbeheerNederland	**Keuzes voor een integraal energiesysteem**	2025	Rapport/position paper
D6	NetbeheerNederland	**Basisinformatie over energie-infrastructuur**	2019	Achtergrond-/informatiedocument
D7	Uitvoeringsoverleg Industrie + SER + VEMW + Netbeheer NL	**De industrie- en energietop: een aanbod aan Nederland**	2021	Coalitiedocument/gezamenlijke verklaring
D8	IPO (website)	**Over het IPO**	2025	Webpagina
D9	Provincie Brabant	**Grote Oogst**	2025	Programma/webpagina

D10	Gedeputeerde Staten Overijssel	**Energievisie Overijssel 2050**	2024	Beleidsdocument
D11	Provincie Overijssel	**Nota Regionale Economie 2024–2027**	2024	Beleidsnota
D12	Tweede Kamer (Staten-Generaal)	**Motie Voorzienings- en leveringszekerheid energie**	2025	Parlementair document
D13	NPVI	**Organisatie NPVI (stuurgroep, klankbord, etc.)**	2025	Webpagina
D14	NPVI	**Actieplan Cluster 6**	z.d.	Beleids-/actieplan
D15	NPVI	**Actieplan Cluster 6 2.0**	2025	Beleids-/actieplan
D16	NPVI	**Routekaart NPVI van Grijs naar Groen**	2025	Roadmap
D17	NPVI	**Dialoog Over Infrastructuur Voor Industrie in Transitie (DIVIT)**	2025	Procesbeschrijving/intern stuk
D18	NPVI (Stuurgroepdocument)	**Vliegwiel voor de verduurzaming van de industrie**	2025	intern stuk
D19	NetbeheerNederland	**Formatiebrief, voor een doorbraak in het energiesysteem**	2025	Publicatie/position paper

D20	Collectief van brancheverenigingen; FME, Deltalinqs, EBN, EnergieNederland, KNB, VNP, NedZero, Vemobin, energystorageNL, HollandSolar, NLHydrogen, Port of Rotterdam, VEMW, VNCI, Vereniging Nederlandse Glasfabrikanten (**de IndustrieCoalitie**)	**De energie-infrastructuur: het fundament onder een concurrerend en schoon Nederland**	2025	Coalitiedocument/gezamenlijke verklaring
D21	de IndustrieCoalitie	**een basisindustrie om op te bouwen: nu en in de toekomst**	2025	Coalitiedocument/gezamenlijke verklaring
D22	NPVI	**Verkenning van een energie-infrastructuurfonds voor de industrie**	2025	Coalitiedocument
D23	Stichting Cluster 6	**Verkiezingsdebat - Regionale industrie: bloeien of snoeien?**	2025	gezamelijke uiting
D24	Rijksoverheid	**Ontwikkeling energiemarkt**	2024	intern onderzoeksdocument
D25	Stichting Cluster 6	**Klimaattransitie door de Nederlandse industrie**	2021	Coalitiedocument

Appendix B: Analysis transcript interview Stichting Cluster 6

- Added as PDF

Appendix C: Analysis Transcript interview NetbeheerNederland

- Added as PDF

Appendix D: Analysis Transcript interview IPO

- Added as PDF