Post-war refugee relief: Dutch NGOs and the IGCR/IRO, 1945 – 1952

Research Master Thesis

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Cover picture: Romanian refugee children in the harbour of Amsterdam, waving goodbye before their departure for Haifa, Israel, 06-10-1948. The children had been trained as pioneers in Apeldoorn.¹

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Abstract

Between 1945 and 1952, Dutch non-governmental organisations (NGOs) closely cooperated with intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) to administer aid to refugees. Making use of a case study approach, this thesis scrutinises the cooperation between four NGOs and the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR) and the International Refugee Organisation (IRO). How and why did NGOs and IGOs join forces to effectuate refugee relief? It turned out that interdependence played an important role: NGOs were reliant on the financial support from IGOs, whilst IGOs needed the ‘grassroot’ expert knowledge of NGOs. NGOs also distributed IGO support to the refugees and mediated on behalf of the refugees. In return, IGOs provided NGOs with legal assistance and advice. Moral arguments and preventive considerations (keeping the refugees on the right path and the fear for unwished precedents) played a lesser role in fuelling NGO-IGO cooperation. All in all, this thesis provides a first insight in the unstudied activity of Dutch relief NGOs directly after the war. The case studies are conducted against the backdrop of an extensive and inconclusive debate on NGOs and their role in the establishment of the modern humanitarian refugee regime.
List of abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Arolsen Archives</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGSA</td>
<td>Association for German and Stateless Anti-Fascists</td>
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<td>AJDC</td>
<td>American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee</td>
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<td>AoR</td>
<td>Apostolate of Reunification</td>
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<td>C Cow</td>
<td>Committee for Children Orphaned due to War</td>
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<td>CCR</td>
<td>Catholic Committee for Refugees</td>
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<td>ERCH</td>
<td>Ecumenical Refugee Committee Holland</td>
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<td>FJC</td>
<td>Foundation Five hundred Jewish Children</td>
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<td>IGCR</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees</td>
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<td>IGO</td>
<td>Intergovernmental organisation</td>
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<td>IISH</td>
<td>International Institute for Social History</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<td>IND</td>
<td>Immigration- and Naturalisation Services</td>
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<td>IRO</td>
<td>International Refugee Organisation</td>
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<td>ITS</td>
<td>International Tracing Service</td>
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<td>JCQ</td>
<td>Jewish Cultural Quarter</td>
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<td>JJC</td>
<td>Jewish Coordination Committee</td>
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<td>KVP</td>
<td>Katholieke Volkspartij</td>
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<td>LoN</td>
<td>League of Nations</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>National Archives</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OVT</td>
<td>Onvoltooid Verleden Tijd</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>Partij van de Arbeid</td>
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<td>RSCN</td>
<td>Refugee Service Committee for the Netherlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>RVD</td>
<td>Rijksvreemdelingendienst (predecessor of the IND)</td>
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<td>SU</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCS</td>
<td>Transnational civil society</td>
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<td>UA</td>
<td>Utrechts Archief</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNRRA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>VDB</td>
<td>Vrijzinnig-Democratische Bond</td>
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<td>WCC</td>
<td>World Council of Churches</td>
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Introduction

Although non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) wield considerable authority in modern migration governance, their relationship is largely neglected by social and political scientists. Schrover, Vosters and Glynn have stated that ‘part of the literature on NGOs is descriptive, has strong moral overtones, is a-historical and policy driven.’ Moreover, studies merely focus on the influence of NGOs on IGOs, while other forms of interaction receive no attention. This is unfortunate, for more critical research on the competition and cooperation between NGOs and IGOs could serve to explain the origins and the functions of their complex relationship. Historians can deliver an important contribution to this research, for the role of NGOs in migration governance stretches back at least 150 years.

The goal of this thesis is to historicise migration governance. Governance is here defined as the process of governing by governments and other organisations (including NGOs and IGOs) through laws, norms, and discourse. Governance differs from government in that it focuses less on the state and its institutions and more on social practices, decision making and interaction among actors.

As the largest forced human displacement in European history, the refugee crisis following the Second World War (1945 – 1952) provides a complex and rich case to scrutinise the mechanisms and policies undergirding modern migration governance. At an unprecedented scale, IGOs like the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR), the United Nations Rehabilitation and Relief Administration (UNRRA) and the

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3 Schrover, Vosters and Glynn, ‘NGOs and West European migration governance’, 8.
6 M. Bevir, Governance: a very short introduction (Oxford 2013) 1; Schrover, Vosters and Glynn, ‘NGOs and West European migration governance’, 2-3.
International Refugee Organisation (IRO) were active in the repatriation, resettlement and rehabilitation of millions of refugees. From their part, national and international NGOs contributed by providing essential logistical and practical support. Together, IGOs and NGOs played a key role in alleviating and eventually solving the crisis. As historian Daniel Cohen noted, this post-war form of refugee relief transcended the traditional notions of charity and philanthropy. Moreover, it paved the way for our modern humanitarian refugee regime, administered by the United Nations (UN) and reliant on NGOs and IGOs.

Not everything changed with the formation of this new regime. National governments in continental Western-Europe - however weakened and disorganised due to occupation and war - remained to play a leading role in the governance of migration. As soon as their sovereignty was restored, the governments directed their principal attention to the reinstitution of border control. In their attempt to repatriate and resettle refugees, IGOs and NGOs were thus compelled to reach agreements with separate national governments. From their part, the governments often lacked the logistical and administrative means to deal with the ‘superfluous and unwanted’ refugees and displaced persons (DPs). IGOs and NGOs did possess these means, which left governments with no other option than cooperation.

IGOs, NGOs and governments are the three principal actors in contemporary migration governance. By scrutinising the different factors pushing them towards or away from each other and by historicising their complex relationship - especially between IGOs and NGOs - the following question is raised: Why did NGOs and IGOs closely cooperate to solve the post-war refugee crisis?

Four Dutch case studies serve to explain why close cooperation was necessary to effectuate refugee relief. The NGOs involved in these cases are the Catholic Committee for Refugees (CCR), the Quakers/Ecumenical Refugee Committee Holland (ERCH), the Foundation Five hundred Jewish Children (FJC) and the Association for German and

Stateless Anti-Fascists (AGSA). It was decided to include these NGOs, as the official historian of the IRO, Louise Holborn, marked them as the main Dutch partners of the IGCR/IRO.\(^\text{11}\) The background and goals of these NGOs differed considerably, creating points of interest for a comparative analysis. The CCR was the main Catholic refugee relief NGO in the Netherlands. It received support from both the Catholic Church and the IRO to aid and monitor thousands of (Polish) refugees. The Protestant Quakers provided very extensive and well recorded aid to Jewish refugees in the Netherlands. As an experienced relief organisation, this ‘Society of Friends’ was one of the first to cooperate with the Dutch branch of the IGCR/IRO. The ERCH, which was created by the Dutch Reformed Church, later provided relief to ‘hard-core’ (unwanted) refugees. The FJC was not the main Jewish NGO active in the Netherlands, but was a temporarily created foundation with a very specific and intriguing objective: the training and resettlement of 500 Jewish pioneer children. To accomplish this, it relied on extensive IGO support. Finally, the AGSA was included because it was an ‘ethnic’ NGO: it lobbied for the rights of (Jewish-)German refugees residing in the Netherlands. The IRO supported this lobby.

**Theorising NGOs and IGOs in migration governance**

Before any historical question is answered, it should be made clear what this research defines as ‘NGOs’ and ‘IGOs’. As for the latter term, a consensus seems to be reached within literature: IGOs are organisations created by official treaties for subjects which cannot be properly dealt with by individual states.\(^\text{12}\) The World Bank and the UN are two of the most prominent examples. Although these organisations are devised and sponsored by states, they should not per se be seen as extensions of state power.\(^\text{13}\) Rieko Karatani convincingly showed that the UN and the International Labour Organisation

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\(^{11}\) Holborn, *The International Refugee Organisation*, 164. The activities of the Jewish ORT Holland, also specifically mentioned by Holborn, are not analysed in this thesis.

\(^{12}\) Ahmed and Potter, *NGOs in international politics*, 76; Schrover, Vosters and Glynn, ‘NGOs and West European migration governance’, 4.

\(^{13}\) Ahmed and Potter, *NGOs in international politics*, 75-82.
(ILO) did clash with the government of the United States (US) over questions of migration governance in the direct post-war period.\(^\text{14}\)

Defining NGOs is harder, because they have caught the attention of scholars relatively late. The NGO as a subject of academic interest was only gradually embraced from the 1980s onwards. As scholars expected that NGOs would fill an important gap after public expenditure cuts and privatisation, they started to examine the organisational structure and functioning of these organisations. Due to this novelty in the social sciences, finding macro-level comparative data on NGO types, activities and resources is difficult.\(^\text{15}\) This is further complicated by the diversity of these types and the variety of everyday processes NGOs are involved in.\(^\text{16}\)

In its broadest definition however, NGOs are (negatively) defined as organisations that are not established by an (inter-)governmental agreement. This broad definition includes non-state actors which are disregarded in this thesis, such as profit-seeking corporations, political parties, trade unions and sports clubs.\(^\text{17}\) Because of the strong reliance on Schrover, Vosters and Glynn’s article, it was decided to use the same selection criteria for NGOs in this thesis: non-state organisations ‘that work in the field of migration, and which seek to promote specific goals (such as migrant protection) or to influence policies (for instance liberalising migration restrictions).’\(^\text{18}\) It should be noted that alternate terms for NGOs, especially in the aftermath of the Second World War, included ‘private-voluntary organisations’ and ‘voluntary societies’. Later, ‘non-profit organisations’ and ‘the third sector’ were also used.

Providing relief and support in a purportedly impartial way, NGOs have added a dimension to migration governance.\(^\text{19}\) Sometimes they replaced or reinforced the role played by governments. In other instances, NGOs successfully criticised official proceedings or came up with competing plans and actions of their own.\(^\text{20}\)

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\(^{17}\) Schrover, Vosters and Glynn, ‘NGOs and West European migration governance’, 3.

\(^{18}\) Ibidem, 3-4.

\(^{19}\) Ibidem, 1.

\(^{20}\) Ahmed and Potter, *NGOs in international politics*, 57-70.
Observing these actions, scholarly debate has been extensively and inconclusively involved in questions of ‘how to describe the interaction between NGOs and (inter)governmental organisations’ and ‘how to measure NGO influence in these interactions?’ Most scholars agreed on the denunciation of the realist worldview, which included ideas of political economy, far reaching state power and international relations. These traditional political terms, in which the nation state is accorded a central role, proved to be ill-suited for NGO research. When consequently asking to what extent NGOs attained authority, legitimacy and influence vis-à-vis governments, authors diverged in their approach. Multiple factors and terms have been suggested by authors.

First of all, and most importantly for this thesis, Schrover, Vosters and Glynn coined three types of NGO authority: expert authority, moral authority and logistical authority. They stated that these types of authority ‘enable NGOs to play a role in shaping policies and determining practices’ NGOs have expert authority when they know the rules and laws and have access to crucial information and statistics. When NGOs wield this expert authority, IGOs are tempted to cooperate with them. NGOs can also use their moral authority. This happens when they claim to be champions of human rights and protectors of (victimised) refugees. Thirdly, NGOs have logistical authority when they effectively organise relief activities and reach out to large numbers of refugees. In the post-war setting of this thesis, logistical authority could potentially be an important factor, as governments were weakened and IGOs needed practical support to effectuate their relief activities. On the usage of authority types in this thesis, the section ‘material and method’ expands.

Another factor of importance in NGO-IGO interaction is ‘corporatism’. This term is used by Martens, as she deemed that NGOs and IGOs are increasingly ‘incorporated into each other’s activities and governance’. Martens observed that NGOs are influential, precisely because they resemble IGOs and are, on all levels, deeply involved in their activities. Applying her theory to this thesis, it would mean that the NGOs in question could (effectively) cooperate with the IGCR/IRO, because their goals and strategies, for

21 Ibidem, 9-12.
22 Schrover, Vosters and Glynn, ‘NGOs and West European migration governance’, 7.
23 Ibidem, 7.
reasons to be described in the analysis, were closely interwoven with those of the IGCR/IRO.

Another used term is ‘constructivism’. Ahmed and Potter stated that through persuasion, norms setting and advocacy NGOs can construct ideas and identities to which IGOs can choose to live up. This concept gives considerable attention to the persuasive power of NGOs: through communication and lobbying, governmental partners can be swayed.25 This term is less relevant for this thesis, because the Dutch NGOs in question were relatively small and often depended on other, American or Vatican based, organisations. Operating solitarily and on small refugee groups (often consisting of several hundred, sometimes several thousand refugees), the Dutch NGOs often lacked persuasive power when confronted with IGOs administering aid to millions across the European continent.

Hilhorst has significantly contributed to the debate with her anthropological approach.26 She defines NGOs not as things but as everyday processes, which explains her use of the term ‘NGO-ing’. The organisations and their employees are continuously confronted with a multitude of forces within changing regimes. NGO employees therefore have to make many decisions, which can create incompatible commitments and contradictions. In order to measure NGO cooperation with IGOs and governments, Hilhorst proposes to study the relation between NGOs and the discourse in which they operate, whereby a special focus must be put on ‘agency’.27 However, this is an empirical approach which does not fit well with archival limitations. Agency and especially NGOing are hard to reconstruct in letters, requests and (financial) reports.

Finally, when analysing NGO-IGO interaction, it should be noted that a distinction between secular and Christian NGOs is also important. Ferris named two distinctive elements: first of all, Christian NGOs are, due to their religious nature, driven by a compassion which transcends social and political borders. Faith has the potential to strongly bind people together. Secondly, the constituency of religious NGOs often differs from their secular counterparts. Christian NGOs, especially those closely linked to Churches, often have large numbers of adherents. This means that they wield

25 Ahmed and Potter, NGOs in international politics, 12-15.
26 D. Hilhorst, The real world of NGOs.
considerable moral authority and easily sway public opinion. In the mid-twentieth century Netherlands, this was still very much the case. Due to ‘pillarisation’, the Catholic Church and numerous branches of the Protestant Church still dominated public and political life in large parts of the country. Confessional Dutch NGOs thus had a moral advantage over their secular counterparts when exerting influence over both governments and IGOs.

The (ir)relevance of the post-war crisis in NGO theory

Historical NGO research often deals with questions of chronology. Debate has centred around one pivotal question: from which moment did NGOs become durable partners and competitors of (inter)governmental organisations? The significance of ‘the NGO moment’ during the 1940s and early 1950s, is especially contested between historians. As this debate directly affects this thesis, it is important to have a glance at the different points of view.

First the champions of 1940s significance. As mentioned earlier, Cohen concluded that post-war IGOs and NGOs played an important role in the establishment of the modern refugee relief regime. He viewed the 1940s as an important moment of change in NGO-IGO activity. Although they were less explicit about its significance, Schrover cum suis labelled this period as one of expansion and inclusion, in which the cooperation and the interdependence between IGOs and NGOs grew. O’Sullivan, Hilton and Fiori - although denouncing the popular assertion that humanitarian refugee relief is a product of the 1940s and the beginning of Cold-War rivalry - identified the period as a moment of considerable acceleration in humanitarian relief. Both the ambitions of NGOs and the scale of their activities rapidly expanded in the wake of official intervention.

31 Schrover, Vosters and Glynn, ’NGOs and West European migration governance’, 21-22.
Yet not all authors agreed on the importance of the 1940s. In fact, some were dismayed by the relative amount of scholarly attention that this period received and called out for an equal focus on other periods.\textsuperscript{33} Paulmann for instance spoke about ‘three points of conjunctures’: the aftermath of WWI, the 1960s/1970s and the 1990s. According to him, these were the three major periods in which humanitarian relief underwent substantial change. For the 1940s, he noted:

‘In terms of the history of humanitarian aid, World War II can be seen as a sort of extension of the experience gained after World War I rather than the beginning of a new period. [...] This was true at the level of international organisations such as the UN and its specialised organisations, as well for the relief efforts by international NGOs and aid agencies such as Oxfam or CARE, which were firmly anchored in nation-states.’\textsuperscript{34}

This same view can be distilled from Thomas Davies’ \textit{A new history of transnational civil society}. Davies looked at transnational civil society (TCS), the metaphorical arena in which international NGOs operate, and concluded that it underwent three cycles of development. Within this cyclical pattern, the 1940s were placed in between the ‘internationalist breakthrough cycle’ of the 1920s and the ‘new social movement cycle’ starting in the 1960s. Davies reckoned that there were no major differences in humanitarian relief services after both World Wars: American based NGOs dominated relief services bound for Europe, while other parts of the globe were deemed irrelevant.\textsuperscript{35}

How is it possible that authors have made completely different claims on the relevance of the 1940s in humanitarian relief and governance of migration? The answer, as is often the case in history, lies in the focus of their research. Explaining long-term changes in NGO activity, Paulmann and Davies were right to note that the NGOs of the 1940s were not very different from the NGOs twenty years earlier. Their rash


\textsuperscript{34} Paulmann, ‘Conjunctures in the history’, 226-227.

\textsuperscript{35} Davies, \textit{NGOs: a new history}, 123-124.
comparison of the League of Nations (LoN) with the UN, in which the latter is presented as a mere improved and durable version of the former, is largely correct. However, in their analyses they overlooked the partnership between NGOs and IGOs as a factor of change. Whilst the member states of the LoN provided no budget for relief services, its High Commissioner for Refugees did not officially coordinate relief services and relief was provided to groups instead of individuals, twenty years later the UNNRA and the IRO received large budgets, provided relief on an individual basis and coordinated a network of NGOs that provided services that were no longer labelled ‘relief’, but ‘rehabilitation’. In essence, again through the words of Cohen, NGOs and IGOs created an alternative welfare state for refugees and displaced persons.36

Although other periods certainly deserve proper attention by historians interested in humanitarian relief and the governance of migration, one of the starting points of this thesis is the acknowledgement that the 1940s formed the period in which a durable and lasting partnership between NGOs and IGOs developed.

**Literature**

Historians who have dealt with the post-war refugee crisis only scarcely looked at the cooperation between NGOs and IGOs. This is interesting, because scholars like Louise Holborn and Julius Elias, who themselves had been active in the relief services, noted the magnitude and the indispensability of the cooperation between the different organisations. As Elias put it: ‘The voluntary agency rendered particular and personal the necessarily general and impersonal services provided by the public, national or international organisation.’37 Holborn added that ‘rarely, if ever, has a closer and more effective partnership between statutory and voluntary agencies been achieved than the co-operation of IRO and its associated voluntary agencies.’38

As official historians of the UNRRA and the IRO respectively, Woodbridge and Holborn were the first to write histories of the organisations. Their works contained

38 Holborn, The International Refugee Organization, 145.
detailed information on budget spending, refugee numbers, organisational issues and the involvement of NGOs. Due to their minuteness, the works are still relevant for historians today. However, the histories were biased. They tended to project both organisations as successful and effective projects, which by overcoming hard labour and harsh conditions eventually saved the continent from disaster.39

The IGOs were largely forgotten for 30 years. When the interest in refugee and DP history emerged in the 1980s, studies of the UNRRA and IRO regained scholarly importance.40 However, only during the last decade historians have truly discerned and criticised the IGOs.41 In sharp contrast with the positive post-war accounts, modern research has put particular focus on the flaws and shortcomings of both organisations. Writing on the UNRRA, Salvatici for instance made clear that staff and field workers were badly trained and generally unprepared for the task. Moreover, as was conventional in humanitarianism, refugees were infantilised: they were eligible for assistance, but were not entitled any rights.42 From a political perspective, Reinisch fittingly remarked that UNRRA was most of all an American enterprise, created on the one hand by idealists who believed in a ‘new chance’ after the LoN failure, and on the other by economists and politicians with imperialistic visions. American dominance, coated with a layer of ‘transnationalism’, hampered UNNRA activities, especially in Soviet dominated Central and Eastern Europe.43 For the IRO, similar histories were produced. This organisation, tasked with resettling ‘the last million’ of refugees, was mockingly called ‘the largest travel agency in human history’.44 Although IRO eventually succeeded in resolving the refugee crisis, Persian revealed that corruption and fraudulent activities were not eschewed within the implementation of its tasks.45

While the above-mentioned historians focussed on IGOs, others conducted exclusive and intensive research on the involved NGOs. Confessional NGOs have received the bulk of attention, presumably because they were most predominant in the field.\(^{46}\) For instance, the role of the Catholic and the British Churches in Occupied Germany, along with the actions undertaken by their affiliated organisations, have been well studied.\(^{47}\) The remarkable story of the chapel truck priests, documented by Sterken, sheds a clear light on the activities of Catholic priests who toured the war-ravaged countries in trucks in order to reach out to the people in need of religious assistance. By sharing their Christian compassion as true missionaries, representatives of the Catholic Church believed that faith was the best defence against a resurgence of national-socialism and the spread of communism.\(^{48}\)

Secular NGOs involved in the post-war refugee crisis have received less attention. Partially because there were relatively fewer secular NGOs, partially because famous NGOs like the International Committee of the Red Cross were criticised for their role during the War and were ill-equipped to deal with the crisis.\(^ {49}\) Nonetheless, an excellent example of a case study is Wieters' analysis of the NGO ‘Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe (CARE) and its transformation from a temporary relief organisation into a humanitarian enterprise in the aftermath of war. Close attention is given to organisational reforms, economic considerations and support from the US government.\(^ {50}\) Most importantly is Wieters' remark on the strong bonds between NGOs like CARE and (inter)governmental institutions. Contrary to what the literature often suggests, or seems to suggest:

‘Most (American) agencies were far more interconnected to governments, institutionally, politically and economically, than historical and


\(^{48}\) Sterken, “‘The chapel truck is coming’”, 65-67, 75-80.


contemporary discourse would have it. Just as economic relations after 1945 did not bring about the end of government supervision for private business, the humanitarian non-profit sector also became increasingly integrated and more entwined with governmental organisations and international players.\textsuperscript{51}

Here, the important process of NGO-IGO integration (Marten’s corporatism) is finally touched upon again. As we have seen, this was already mentioned by the historians who had witnessed the post-war refugee crisis themselves. Nevertheless, research on NGO-IGO integration was neglected by subsequent historians. They either analysed IGOs from a critical perspective, or poured all their attention in minute and descriptive studies of particular NGOs. While both literatures produced interesting results, the overall interconnection was lost. Following Wieters, this thesis shifts back the focus to the growing financial, political and logistical ties of NGOs and IGOs. It therefore leads the way for other historians interested in this period.

If we look at the Dutch literature focussing on migration governance during the European post-war refugee crisis, yet another picture emerges. Here, studies have mostly focussed on government policy. One of the most pivotal contributions was made by Berghuis, who for the first time shed light on the considerations of various departments of state: were they to be generous towards DPs and refugees, as was morally expected, or had they to be harsh, fearing a dangerous precedent would be created? This was especially true for the post-war years, during which a severe housing crisis and the destruction of internal infrastructures dominated the debate?\textsuperscript{52} Walaardt addressed this dilemma as well. He pinpointed the different factors which played a role in the assessment of individual refugees. What arguments did civil servants, the media and concerned citizens use?\textsuperscript{53} Within policy studies, some specific groups of refugees and DPs have received more attention: Soviet citizens and German POWs who were to be repatriated, Dutch men held captive in the Soviet-Union because of their pro-German

\textsuperscript{51} Wieters, ‘Reinventing the firm’, 117.
\textsuperscript{52} Berghuis, \textit{Geheel ontdaan van onbaatzuchtigheid}.
affiliation and DPs whom the Dutch government recruited in the DP camps.\textsuperscript{54} ‘Black Tulip’, the partially executed plan to expel 25,000 German citizens from the Netherlands, has also been covered.\textsuperscript{55} From all studies, Schrover’s and Walaardt’s analysis of DP recruitment comes closest to addressing government-IRO contacts.\textsuperscript{56} This leaves ample room for a study which centres on IGO-NGO cooperation and which discerns the complex relationship with government officials and their policies.

\section*{Method and material}

To answer the question why close NGO-IGO cooperation was of utmost importance in solving the post-war refugee crisis, an in-depth analysis was conducted. A deductive top-down approach provided four ‘types of consideration’ which serve to explain why NGOs and IGOs decided to work together to effectuate refugee relief. These considerations were based on the types of NGO authority and were extended by additional literature and bottom-up results during the research process. The considerations of both NGOs and IGOs were analysed.

The four types of consideration were: (1) the logistical/expert consideration (do organisations need information or resources from each other, are they reliant on (legal) expertise or past experience from partners);\textsuperscript{57} (2) the economic consideration (do organisations need to share the costs of refugee care-taking, do they need to cooperate to provide adequate shelter and jobs to refugees, do NGOs need to convince IGOs to invest in their projects);\textsuperscript{58} (3) the moral/humanitarian consideration (is cooperation desirable due to a shared moral responsibility, does shared action conform to ideas of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{54} G.T. Witte, \textit{Een verre vijand komt naderbij. De diplomatieke betrekkingen van Nederland met de Sovjet-Unie 1942-1953} (Kampen 1992); F.H. Postma, \textit{De repatriëring van Sovjetonderdanen uit Nederland, 1944-1956} (Amsterdam 2003); Walaardt and Schrover, ‘Displaced persons’.
\item \textsuperscript{56} Walaardt and Schrover, ‘Displaced persons’.
\item \textsuperscript{57} Holborn, \textit{The International Refugee Organization}, 127-128; Schrover, Vosters and Glynn, ‘NGOs and West European migration governance’, 194.
\item \textsuperscript{58} Berghuis, \textit{Geheel ontdaan van onbaatzuchtigheid}, 240-241; Walaardt and Schrover, ‘Displaced persons’, 425.
\end{itemize}
Christian benevolence);\textsuperscript{59} and (4) the threat/prevention consideration (do organisations work together to counter the threat of communism and Nazism, does shared action prevent idleness and immoral behaviour among refugees, will it prevent the occurrence of unwished precedents).\textsuperscript{60} Marten’s ‘corporatism’ never disappears from the conceptual-analytical background, as it turned out that the goals, functions and considerations of the NGOs and IGOs in question were often very similar, blurring organisational differences and a clear picture of interdependency.

The consideration-analysis was applied in four case studies. Through case studies, light can be shed on both macro- and micro developments in post-war migration governance. As Wieters’ article and Hilhorst’s book have convincingly shown, analysis through example goes beyond the study of laws, policies and models.\textsuperscript{61} In this thesis, each case study showcases the activities of a particular NGO on behalf of a specific group of refugees. The NGOs in question are the earlier mentioned CCR, Quackers/ERCH, FJC and AGSA. After each NGO is introduced, the extent of cooperation with the IGCR/IRO is determined and analysed. Considerations regarding ‘how and why should we cooperate?’ were the prime object of this analysis. In some cases, the odd involvement of government officials was taken into account and incorporated in the analysis. In the concluding chapter, all considerations were ordered and assessed in one table.

To conduct the case studies, most material was provided by (1) the IGCR/IRO archive in the National Archives (NA). This archive contains information on the contacts of the Dutch IGCR/IRO representative and his efforts to solve the refugee crisis. It has rarely been used by historians and holdsvaluably and extensive information on the communication of the IGCR/IRO with the Dutch government and particular NGOs. The material consists foremost of memos, letters, (financial) requests, organisational and budgetary overviews and personal registration and eligibility documents. Relevant newspaper articles and photographs sporadically accompany these documents.\textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{60} Witte, Een verre vijand, 75-77, 132-133; Berghuis, Geheel ontdaan van onbaatzuchtigheid, 240; Buscher, ‘The great fear’, 204-224; Walaardt, “Het paard van Troje”, 69.
\textsuperscript{61} Hilhorst, The real world of NGOs, 3-6; Wieters, ‘Reinventing the firm’, 118, 127-128.
\textsuperscript{62} National Archives (NA), archive inventory 2.05.31, archive of the Dutch delegate to the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (ICR), 1945-1947; representative of the IRO in the Netherlands, 1947-1953.
Other sources included (2) the archive of the Naturalisation- and Immigration Service and its predecessors, part of the Ministry of Justice;\textsuperscript{63} and (3) the online accessible Arolsen Archives (AA), a rich source of information on the fate of 17.5 million individuals, most of them victims of the Nazi regime.\textsuperscript{64} For the purpose of this thesis, the AA provided a more detailed account of the background and (post-)war trajectories of relevant refugees. Originally, it was planned to consult (4) local archives which contained detailed information on the NGOs in question. These were the archives of the AoR in the Catholic Documentation Centre (CDC) of Radboud University Nijmegen, the ERCH in the Utrecht Archives (UA), the FJC in the Jewish Cultural Quarter (JCQ) in Amsterdam and the AGSA in the International Institute for Social History (IISH), located in the same city.\textsuperscript{65}

However, during the research and writing process, which lasted from January until May 2021, archives were closed due to Covid-19 restrictions. The local archives could not be consulted and were thus not included. From the archive of the Ministry of Justice, notes from previous research could be used in the cases of the CCR and the AGSA. Information from this analogue archive would also have been useful in the cases of the ERCH and the FJC. Fortunately, the IGCR/IRO archive and the AA were both fully digitalised. No inconveniences were encountered when making use of these two sources.

**Structure**

This thesis is divided into five chapters. First of all, an introductory chapter describes the setting of the post-war refugee crisis. Where did the refugees come from? How and why did IGOs and NGOs administer aid to them? And how did the Dutch government respond to the crisis? The answers to these general questions are based on the existing

\textsuperscript{63} NA, archive inventory 2.09.5026, Ministry of Justice, policy archive of the Immigration and Naturalisation Service and its predecessors, 1945-1955.

\textsuperscript{64} Arolsen Archives (AA), https://collections.arolsen-archives.org/search/, as late as 22-02-2021.

\textsuperscript{65} Catholic Documentation Centre (CDC), archive inventory 926, Action Meeting Eastern Churches, 1926-2004; The Utrecht Archives (UA), archive inventory 1545, Foundation Ecumenical Aid to Churches and Refugees, 1952-2000; Jewish Cultural Quarter (JCQ), inventory number D012270, archive from the legacy of Jozef Rakower (1896-1981) concerning the transport of ‘500 children’ to accommodate refuge for Polish and Romanian children, October 1946 until September 1947; International Institute for Social History (IISH), archive inventory ARCH01529, collection Association for German and Stateless Anti-Fascists, 1942-1946.
literature. In the next four chapters, the elaborate analysis of source material centres around the case studies. The first of these chapters focuses on the CCR, the second on the Quakers/ERCH, followed by the third on the FJC and the fourth on AGSA. The chapters are thus ordered according to NGO and denomination. There is no chronological logic in this order. By shedding light on the operational history of individual NGOs, the diverse and cooperative nature of post-war refugee relief is discerned.
Chapter 1: resolving the post-war refugee crisis

Before an elaborate analysis of the cooperation between Dutch NGOs and the involved IGOs could be given, it is necessary to describe the ‘arena’ in which all organisations acted. By making use of the extensive literature, this chapter introduces the reader to the complexity and size of the post-war refugee crisis. First of all, the humanitarian aftermath of war is discussed. Who were the DPs and refugees and where did they come from? Then the focus shifts to the IGCR, UNRRA and IRO. What mandates did these organisations have to resolve the crisis? What contribution did NGOs deliver to this effort? Finally, the Dutch government’s migration policy is reviewed.

After the war: DPs, Heimatvertriebene and refugees

At the end of the Second World War, an estimated 30 to 40 million civilians and soldiers were displaced due to Nazi persecution and actions related to the war. Already before the invasion of Normandy, Allied military planners had devised the label of ‘DP’ for civilians forcefully or involuntary displaced due to war activities and willing but unable to return to their home. This was a rather general label for a group which was primarily marked by its heterogeneity. DPs included concentration camp survivors, forced laborers from all over Europe, as well as Balts who had fled from Soviet occupation. In practice, certain groups of POWs were also viewed as DPs.

The Allies had to deal with an approximated ten to twenty million DPs. Most of these DPs returned relatively quickly to their pre-war locations of residence, either by themselves or with the assistance of UNRRA and the military. After September 1945, still 1.2 million DPs dwelled in the Western occupation zones of Germany. By this time it became gradually known that repatriates destined for Eastern-European countries, especially the Soviet Union (SU), were not welcomed heartily. In fact, the communist

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establishment mistrusted civilians and POWs who had toiled in German captivity. A fear of ‘Nazi and Western containment’ was combined with the harsh assumption that these people had been traitors. This fuelled violent reprisals in an atmosphere of mistrust. 69 Stories were told of repatriates who were executed upon disembarkment. Upon their return, women who had formerly conducted forced labour in Germany were immediately transferred to the Far-East, where they had to continue their arduous slave labour in the gold mines of Kolyma. 70 It is estimated that 20 percent of all eastern bound repatriates were either shot or deported to gulags. 71 Faced with these atrocities, Western authorities refused the repatriation of reluctant DPs to countries which were under the Soviet sphere of influence. This angered the SU. 72

Further complicating the crisis in 1945, at least twelve million Germans formed a specially treated group of refugees which were not deemed ‘DP’. They had either fled in advance of the Soviet army, or had been forcefully expelled from their homes in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia and territories formerly belonging to the Third Reich. Most of these refugees, called Heimatvertriebene (homeland expellees), were women and children. During their expulsion they were exposed to violence, ill-treatment, starvation and disease. As a consequence, hundreds of thousands perished, while the survivors found it hard to find a refuge in war-torn Western Germany. 73 Often, they were confronted with great resentment by the locals. 74 Further increasing the difficulty of their situation, UNRRA and IRO were officially not mandated to take care for these refugees. As former enemies, ethnic Germans were officially excluded from the rehabilitation- and aid programmes, as well as other privileges and rights guaranteed by the UN to victims of war. 75

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The third and last major group of refugees were the so-called ‘neo-refugees’. These people, primarily Poles, Ukrainians and Czechs, had fled from their home countries after the end of the war. Fearing the new communist governments, they claimed they were susceptible to persecution due to religious, social and political reasons. Polish and Romanian Jews for instance, lucky to have survived the Holocaust, were threatened by pogroms and anti-Semitic discrimination and violence. Polish and Ukrainian nationals living in the Galician borderlands were resettled as part of the ethnic homogenisation schemes. Often, this effort of national reconstruction went along with excessive violence and destruction. After the Prague Coup of 1948, 25,000 Czech students and intellectuals left the country and departed for the Western Occupation zones.

Although not all new refugees were ‘bonafide’ – some had been Nazi-collaborators whilst others simply went west for economic reasons – they were presented as genuine political refugees: fleeing persecution and opting for relief and resettlement in safe (Western) countries. The IRO Constitution of December 1946 had already marked ‘fear based on reasonable grounds of persecution because of race, nationality, or political opinion’ among the legitimate objections to repatriation. This ensured that the arrival of the new refugees, although troublesome from a logistical point of view, would be effectively dealt with by Western organisations and countries, who could present themselves as moral champions over the Soviets. By the summer of 1948, the 700,000 remaining DPs and the ‘neo-refugees’, of whom 900,000 would come West between 1948 and 1951, were thus merged together in the category of ‘political refugee’ or ‘stateless refugee’.

Ballinger has warned that historians should be very cautious ‘not to mistake the object of their analysis – the codification of the legal definitions of the refugee – with their unit of analysis’. Legal definitions of ‘DP’ and ‘refugee’ have always been partial and

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designed to serve state policy. In the post-war period of 1945 – 1951, the UNNRA and the IRO have used many labels to describe those to whom they administered relief and resettlement: DPs, political refugees, stateless refugees, European voluntary workers and migrants. Yet, these broad labels have not covered other large groups of (ineligible) refugees, also on the move in this period: Italian and Dutch repatriates who had left the dismantled colonies. Although this ex-colonial group is not included in this thesis, it is chosen to use the term ‘refugee’ for DPs, Heimatvertriebene and neo-refugees alike. This way, terminology is simplified, whilst all ‘units of analyses’ – the men, women and children struggling to make a living in a foreign country - are properly addressed according to the 1951 UN definition of the refugee, which was, in practice, a product of the immediate post-war crisis:

‘A refugee is a person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence […] is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.’

**Intergovernmental action: UNRRA, IGCR and IRO**

Already from 1941 onwards, post-war planners in the United Kingdom (UK) and the US proceeded from the assumption that the mistakes of the First World War and the interwar years were not to be repeated. The failure to see the relationship between international reconstruction and stability had led to grievous consequences. Therefore, the devastated European continent should not only receive short-lasting emergency aid,

84 Persian, ‘Displaced persons’, 481.
85 Ballinger, ‘Entangled or “extruded”’, 368-369.
86 UN, Convention relating to the status of refugees, signed in Geneva on 28-07-1951, article 1, A2.
but also lasting and constructive support in the form of reconstruction and rehabilitation programmes. To counter large-scale population displacement, which was viewed as a primary threat to international security and lasting peace, the UNRRA was founded in 1943. 44 countries signed its mandate.\textsuperscript{88} It was, as US president Roosevelt made clear, the first step in ‘put(ting) into practical effect the United Nations’ common determination to build for the future a world of decency and security and peace.’

Besides the creation of UNRRA, the activities of the IGCR were expanded during the war. The IGCR had been established as a committee in 1938, following the Convention of Evian on the resettlement of (Jewish) refugees from Nazi-Germany. Largely defunct due to the absence of funds and concrete government support, the IGCR failed to provide support to the refugees. After tide of war had turned, the IGCR received increasing financial support from the Allied countries. It was officially tasked with the resettlement of Jewish-German refugees who had fled before and during the war.\textsuperscript{89} Between 1945 and 1947, the IGCR would be the main IGO active for Jewish refugees in the Netherlands. Her tasks were then taken over by the IRO.

The brunt of refugee relief in Europe was borne by the UNRRA. During and after the liberation of occupied Europe, its personnel established hundreds of ‘DP camps’. Most of the camps were situated in Germany, Austria and Italy. Each was run by a small team, often consisting of American and British volunteers.\textsuperscript{90} Although essential team tasks included the provision of housing, feeding, clothing and education, the main goal was repatriation. Much of UNRRA’s time and energy went into convincing DPs to return to their homes and arranging the departures.\textsuperscript{91} From this point of view, it is understandable that volunteers and officers alike wondered about the durability of the project when repatriation was halted in 1946. At first, volunteers had presented themselves as saviours of the exhausted and dehumanised refugees. Now they wondered what had to be done with the ‘passive’ and ‘unstable’ refugees, crowding the camps with little hope and no future perspective.\textsuperscript{92}

\textsuperscript{88} Ibidem, 264.
\textsuperscript{90} Salvatici, ‘Help the people’, 428-429.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibidem, 436-438.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibidem, 438-445.
Neither the UNRRA nor the military authorities were capable of helping the refugees who were unwilling to go home. Western politicians, both at the governmental and inter-governmental level, became aware of the need of a new organisation.\textsuperscript{93} They envisioned a UN-based specialised agency, which through collaboration with national governments was to take over responsibility for the refugees and, most importantly, was ‘to facilitate the resettlement and re-establishment in other countries of individuals and family units [...] and the promotion and execution of projects of group-resettlement or large scale resettlement.’\textsuperscript{94} When in the summer of 1947 the IRO, as the first official UN-created IGO was to be called, inherited the DP camps, it started on the massive task of screening refugees on their origins and war-time activities. After resettlement deals with individual governments were negotiated and struck, refugees were then transported to their new destination via transit-camps. There, they boarded one of the many ocean liners of the IRO (provided by the US Navy).\textsuperscript{95} Main countries of destination were the US (329,000 resettled refugees), Australia (182,000), Israel (132,000) and Canada (123,000).\textsuperscript{96}

Although Holborn claimed that national governments were primarily motivated by humanitarian and political ideals, in reality they tried to recruit refugees which were deemed most useful for their economies. Unskilled farmhands, miners, certain skilled labourers like mechanics and carpenters and nurses were most wanted. Preferably, they had to be single and young. Religious and ethnic background also played a role.\textsuperscript{97} Consequently, elaborate selection and recruiting schemes were conducted, which Soviet observers mockingly called ‘a real slave trade’, of which ‘the IRO was the main purveyor of cheap labour for the capitalist countries’.\textsuperscript{98}

This comparison is inappropriate, yet the IRO went far to arrange resettlement for its dependents. Vocational training centres were opened in close proximity to the refugee camps. In these centres, refugees could attend foreign-language courses or learn

\textsuperscript{93} Holborn, \textit{The International Refugee Organization}, 21-24.
\textsuperscript{94} United Nations (UN), \textit{Constitution of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) (Lake Success 1946)}, Article 2, part 1, section b.
\textsuperscript{95} Ibidem, 371-377; Persian, ‘Displaced persons’, 490-491.
\textsuperscript{96} Holborn, \textit{The International Refugee Organization}, 433 (Annex 40).
\textsuperscript{97} Ibidem, 365; Cohen, \textit{In war’s wake}, 105-108, 113-118; Walaardt and Schrover, ‘Displaced persons’, 416-419.
\textsuperscript{98} Persian, ‘Displaced persons’, 494.
trades such as carpentry, metalwork, welding and sewing.\textsuperscript{99} Intellectuals for instance, who had low resettlement chances, learned to be mechanics and brick layers.\textsuperscript{100} Training centres could be big. In Arolsen for instance, 700 refugees were completing courses at the same time. Refugees themselves were also involved as teachers or administrative personnel.\textsuperscript{101}

By re-labelling the refugees as ‘labour migrants’ and presenting them as ‘hard working’, ‘energetic’ and ‘freedom loving’, the IRO improved the chances of migration.\textsuperscript{102} On the whole, this strategy was successful. In the beginning of 1951, there were only 11,000 refugees of the so-called ‘hard core’ left. By negotiating ‘humanitarian deals’ with countries, and by sponsoring resettlement, the IRO managed to dissolve the hard core. In December of the same year, when IRO had closed down almost all of its camps and had ceased its activities, there were only 352 individuals for whom no satisfactory arrangement had been made.\textsuperscript{103}

**NGOs and the relation with IGOs**

The *Charter of the United Nations*, signed in 1945, acknowledged the indispensability of the NGO.\textsuperscript{104} Whereas before the war NGOs had already cooperated with branches of the LoN, they were now officially recognised as vital partners and incorporated in internationally coordinated refugee relief. Although the debate regarding the importance of this ‘NGO moment’ is inconclusive, IGOs and NGOs created a working relationship which would prove to be durable.

What kinds of NGOs were active during the post-war refugee crisis? Elias distinguished three categories or groups. The main group of NGOs were those organised along religious denomination. It was estimated that about 90 percent of all cash, goods,
and personnel placed at the disposal of refugees was provided by or through them. The most important Catholic NGOs were the War Relief Services and Caritas Internationalis. Their Protestant counterparts were the Refugee Commission of the World Council of Churches and the Church World Service, whilst Jewish organisations were represented amongst others by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (AJDC). The second group consisted of NGOs formed along national or ethnic lines by emigrant societies. These NGOs had the specific purpose of helping their fellow countrymen. In the Netherlands, The Polish Catholic Association, the Hungarian Club and the AGSA were most notable. Finally, there were specialised NGOs with an international character. They concentrated on special categories of people, for instance students, intellectuals and children. World Student Relief and the International Student Service closely cooperated with Dutch universities to assist refugee students.

When she remarked why NGOs like these were so important for the IRO, Holborn stated the following:

‘The private charitable organisations were able to contribute material and spiritual assistance to the international refugee work: they had funds at their disposal and could offer the services of their specialised and often highly trained staff; they had experience acquired in earlier relief organisations and a thorough knowledge of the complexities of public assistance and alien legislation; they were familiar with local conditions in communities where refugees were to be placed and enjoyed the moral support of the people in a position to offer homes to refugees; and last, but not least, they had confidence of their refugee clientele and could appeal to old beliefs and traditions they shared with them, thus facilitating their adjustment to a new life.’

107 Holborn, The International Refugee Organization, 147.
In this quote, the three main types of NGO authority are clearly listed.\textsuperscript{108} When the NGOs rendered their various services to refugees in the DP camps, they could count on the experience of their staffs and their knowledge on how to fitfully deal with difficult situations (expert authority), they could communicate and work easier with the refugees, for they often had a common religious or national connection (moral authority) and they could deliver various services, such as educational training, recreational and community activities, counselling, legal aid and individual emigration assistance, because they had the funds and the personnel at their disposal (logistical authority).\textsuperscript{109}

From their part, NGOs could benefit greatly from cooperation with IGOs. The IRO could grant NGOs recognition and status, alongside material resources such as facilities. The IRO also had its own budget, with which it could sponsor the activities of approved NGOs.\textsuperscript{110} But perhaps most importantly, the IRO had a strong moral and political mandate, being the first operating UN agency. Ordained with the important task of relieving Europe from its post-war humanitarian crisis, and mainly sponsored and guided by the US and the UK, the IRO could rely on a strong position at 'the negotiation table'.\textsuperscript{111} This was reinforced by the IRO’s shipping capacity and its intermediary role between refugees, NGOs and governments. NGOs could, with the help of IRO representatives, address pressing issues to government officials. Although this strategy was not always efficient, it provided a regulated way of communication.\textsuperscript{112} Agenda-setting and leverage politics, the process in which networks seek to gain moral or material leverage over more powerful actors, were new possibilities for the relatively minor NGOs which were working together with the post-war IGOs.\textsuperscript{113}

Before the specific case studies on NGO-IGO cooperation are conducted, it is necessary to provide a short description of the Dutch post-war setting. The

\textsuperscript{108} Schrover, Vosters and Glynn, ‘NGOs and West European migration governance’, 7.


\textsuperscript{110} Holborn, The International Refugee Organization, 150, 161.

\textsuperscript{111} United Nations (UN), Constitution of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) (Lake Success 1946), Annex II, budget and contribution for the first financial year, 16. The shares of the UK and US amounted to 60 percent of the budget reserved for administrative and operational expenses of the IRO.


\textsuperscript{113} Ahmed and Potter, NGOs in international politics, 43-44.
considerations and priorities of the government, faced with a dire economic situation, alleged overpopulation and a housing crisis, should be taken into account.

The Dutch government: post-war challenges and migration governance

When the Netherlands was fully liberated in May 1945, the country had been occupied by the Germans for five years. The occupation had been accompanied by deprivation, devastation and deportation. During the last year of the war, the Netherlands had been divided by a front line. After the dust of war had settled, it became clear that 500,000 houses were damaged or destroyed, as well as a substantial portion of farms and companies. Factory machinery, as well as trains and buses, were confiscated by the Germans. This rendered most of the infrastructure useless. During the war’s final winter, the densely populated west of the country was hit by a famine, because food production and distribution had been disrupted. It is estimated that between 230,000 and 330,000 Dutch civilians died during the war. Among them were 105,000 Jews, Sinti and Roma. They were killed in Nazi concentration- and extermination camps. Another 250,000 Dutch civilians had either voluntarily or forcefully toiled in Germany’s industry. After hostilities had ceased, they started to trickle back to the Netherlands. Another estimated group of 17,000 to 22,000 Dutch men who had served in the German armed forces was still somewhere in Eastern Europe. It was not known how many of them had been captured by the Soviets and transported to labour camps in the Far East. In the post-war years, the Soviet refusal to release them would provide a serious complication for Dutch politicians and foreign policy. Finally, in the biggest colony of the Netherlands, The Dutch East Indies, a large-scale armed revolt had broken out. Determined to restore order, the government had troops drafted and dispatched. During the next four years, armed conflict would increase the burden on the war-torn metropole. Eventually 400,000 people repatriated from the East Indies.

114 Berghuis, Geheel ontdaan van onbaatzuchtigheid, 12-13.
116 Berghuis, Geheel ontdaan van onbaatzuchtigheid, 13.
117 Postma, De repatriëring van Sovjetonderdanen, 256.
118 Witte, Een verre vijand, 158.
Four Dutch cabinets governed the Netherlands between 1945-1952, all of which consisted in majority of the socialist party (Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA) and the catholic party (Katholieke Volkspartij, KVP). Main tasks included the reconstruction of infrastructure and industry, the reduction of the housing shortage and the persecution of collaborators and traitors. To avoid the return of pre-war unemployment, which was seen as a dangerous source of extremism and communism, the government prioritised the creation of jobs.120

Due to these internal challenges, emigration was deemed as an effective way of solving overpopulation and the housing crisis; in the post-war years the government sponsored the emigration of 400,000 people.121 Furthermore, building on sentiments of revenge and seeking to compensate for the war damages, the Dutch state started the deportation of all 25,000 German nationals in the Netherlands. Operation Black Tulip was only partially executed, because newspapers, churches and NGOs successfully reframed revenge into pity and compassion for innocent Germans. The US and UK, on whom the Netherlands was heavily dependent, had also condemned the deportations.122

The official immigration policy was stirred towards 'strict prevention'. After June 1945, when the Dutch state started to regain control over its borders, it immediately tried to keep them closed. Government officials closely screened foreigners which had expressed the intention to resettle. Often these foreigners were disappointed.123

Turning to the relationship with the IRO, the Netherlands had signed its constitution and was thus, at least on paper, determined to resolve the refugee crisis in Central Europe.124 The government was also pushed by George Marshall, the US Secretary of State, who threatened to halt American aid to European governments which did not comply with the IRO goals. Walaardt and Schrover guessed that the threat of losing US aid was an important stimulus for the Dutch government to cooperate with the IRO.125

120 H. Obdeijn and M.L.J.C. Schrover, Komen en gaan: immigratie en emigratie in Nederland vanaf 1550 (Amsterdam 2008) 265.
121 Walaardt and Schrover, 'Displaced persons', 419.
123 Berghuis, Geheel ontdaan van onbaatzuchtigheid, 32-33, 37.
124 Holborn, The International Refugee Organization, 590.
125 Walaardt and Schrover, 'Displaced persons', 433-434.
Still, when IRO started ‘to sell’ its refugees, the Netherlands responded relatively late compared to Belgium and the UK. In 1947, it was decided to select 8,000 refugees, of whom 3,500 had to be men and 4,500 women. They had to be single, skilled workers without any criminal or political antecedents. Miners, textile workers, maids and nurses were preferred, because these were deemed most necessary for economic recovery. Selection committees went to DP camps in 1947 and 1948. In the end, only 3,904 refugees came, of whom 25 percent returned to the camps within two years. It turned out that other countries had already selected the most ‘suitable’ refugees. In the Netherlands, employers could often not use the refugees, while newspapers and bureaucrats stressed the failure of the selection scheme and the possible threats the refugees posed.

Sub-conclusion

When describing the post-war refugee crisis, a complicated picture arises. First of all, the millions of refugees who arrived in the Western occupation zones of Germany had many different origins and background stories. Yet, they were bound together by their fear for persecution in their countries of origin and their hope for a better life in the West. The refugees were primarily sheltered and aided by the IGCR, UNRRA and IRO: IGOs which fell under the Western sphere of influence. Their goal was to resolve the refugee crisis, first through repatriation and later resettlement. To successfully operate, the IGOs were both dependent on NGOs and national governments. These governments, including the Dutch, were foremost occupied with their own recovery and the repatriation of fellow citizens. This undermined their willingness to take in their share of the refugees. Nonetheless, governments were morally and politically obliged to cooperate with the IRO. Moreover, they needed the expertise of IGOs and NGOs in the implementation of policies and the administration of refugees. Through the following four cases the significance of post-war NGO-IGO cooperation in The Netherlands is scrutinised.
Chapter 2:
The Catholic Committee for Refugees

The first analytical chapter focuses on the efforts and activities of the CCR. There are three reasons why this NGO is highlighted in this chapter. First of all, the Catholic Church and its various affiliated NGOs, including the CCR, felt morally responsible for the vast majority of refugees residing in the Netherlands. NGOs themselves estimated that 80 percent of these refugees were of Catholic denomination.128 Secondly, the case of the CCR exemplifies the post-war establishment of a new refugee relief regime. The CCR’s cooperation with the IGCR and the IRO perfectly showcases the new interwovenness of NGOs and IGOs in the Netherlands. Thirdly, Catholic NGOs like the CCR proved to be very influential, because they were backed by powerful patrons and had the advantage of reaching out to co-religionists, including Catholic ministers in the cabinet. The first part of this chapter introduces the reader to Catholic refugee relief during the 1940s and touches upon some mentionable successes. The origins and aims of the CCR are then linked to this background. The chapter continues by describing the CCR’s activities and the aid it received from the IRO. In the end, a concise case analysis is reiterated.

Catholic refugee relief before, during and after the war

Throughout Dutch history, Catholic organisations have played an important role in relieving those who were oppressed, expelled and in want. The nature and size of these relief activities varied according to time and the nature of crises. In the mid-1930s, a renewed need for refugee support presented itself. Between 1933-1938, 25,000 Jews and a small number of political dissidents fled from Nazi Germany to the Netherlands, where they found temporary refuge.129 The Catholic Church felt morally responsible for the wellbeing of the refugees in distress.

128 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, Catholic Committee for Refugees (CCR), letter from the CCR to the IRO, 27-1-1949.
Representing the Church, the Dutch-Indonesian politician and geologist Jos Schmutzer founded the Catholic Committee for Refugees (not to confuse with the post-war CCR) in 1937. Through Church collections and public fundraising, the Committee raised 300,000 guilders to help German and Austrian refugees, as well as Spanish refugees fleeing from the civil war. In 1938, a second NGO was created by Schmutzer, The International Catholic Bureau, which facilitated and sponsored the emigration of the refugees.\footnote{NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, concise overview of the activities of the Catholic Church in favour of Catholic refugees in the Netherlands, from 1936 until 1951, section 1, 'In the years before the war'.}

When the Germans occupied the Netherlands, both NGOs were liquidated. Schmutzer was arrested and deported to Germany. The personnel of the organisations refrained from a continuation of the activities. Refusing to stand by and do nothing, Alfonse Herzog took over the responsibility for illegal refugee care. In close cooperation with archbishop, later cardinal, Johannes de Jong of Utrecht and the U.S. based International Catholic Committee for Refugees, Herzog managed to provide refugees with food and underground shelter until the liberation in 1945.\footnote{NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, concise overview of the activities of the Catholic Church in favour of Catholic refugees in the Netherlands, from 1936 until 1951, section 2, 'Support to refugees from May 1940 until May 1945'.} Entering back into legality, he renamed his organisation the ‘Service for Victims of Religious Persecution’. Financial support was provided again by the U.S., but now via a representative from the War Relief Services N.C.W.C.\footnote{NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, concise overview of activities of the Service for Victims of Religious Persecution, part of the Dutch Episcopate, May 1945 – May 1946, 12-6-46.} Herzog’s Service provided material support for 120 Yugoslavian, Polish and Ukrainian refugees, as well as 400 Nazi camp survivors and 40-50 stateless refugees.\footnote{NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, report of Sark’s visit to Herzog, 9-12-1946.}

On the one hand, post-war Dutch Catholic relief found itself in a strong position: The KVP was part of the government, Cardinal De Jong had become an influential wartime hero and patron of Catholic refugees, whilst politicians and the population flocked around Christianity as a moral antidote against Nazism and Communism.\footnote{Witte, Een verre vijand, 132-133; Buscher, 'The great fear', 208-209.} On the other hand, the Dutch government enforced its restrictive migration policy and introduced its harsh stance towards refugees and stateless persons. Whilst some groups of refugees
were sure of residence – Polish mineworkers and demobilised soldiers of the Allied armies – others were threatened with illegality and deportation. This included many of the Catholic and Jewish German refugees. A multitude of Catholic organisations, including Herzog’s Service, the War Relief Services and the Bishop’s Aid for Victims of War, provided legal counselling, as well as financial aid to the refugees.

With De Jong’s support and approval from the Catholic ministers of Justice, Kolfschoten (KVP) and later Van Maarseveen (KVP), organisations could achieve unexpected results. A good example is provided by the Apostolate of Reunification (AoR). The Apostolate was founded by Dutch priests who wished to restore the bonds with the Greek and Ukrainian Catholic Churches. These had become nominally independent after schisms with the Roman Church. Main goals of the AoR were to re-establish friendly contacts with members of the Eastern Churches and to provide them with financial and religious aid. In the Netherlands, public awareness was raised through lectures and fundraising. The AoR had a sizeable membership base of 189,000 in 1946.

Through active lobbying with De Jong, Van Maarseveen and even the Vatican, the AoR managed to obtain residence permits for specific categories of refugees. When receiving word from 59 Ukrainian-Catholic seminarians which were trapped in a German DP camp in 1947, the AoR decided that they should be welcomed in a new seminary in the Netherlands. After deliberation and an extensive exchange of letters, the seminarists were allowed entrance into the Netherlands by the personal approval of

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136 As becomes clear from three examples: NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, letter from WRS representative for the Netherlands, Edward Harold, to IGCR HQ, 13-4-1946; NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, concise overview of activities of the Service for Victims of Religious Persecution, part of the Dutch Episcopate, 12-6-46; NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, letter from Bishop’s Aid for War Victims to the IRO, 11-11-1946.
137 Catholic Documentation Centre (CDC), archive inventory 473, AoR, inventory number 569, letters from and to presidents of the AoR, letter from treasurer Haastert to the board, 02-04-1928; Utrecht Archives (UA), archive inventory 449, Archbishopric Utrecht, 1853 – 1967, inventory number 68, AoR, 1926-1966, statutes of the AoR, 1926.
139 This is detailly described in my bachelor thesis: Roos, ““Behouden en barmhartig”, 33-44.
Van Maarseveen. The AoR also successfully intervened in the case of six Ukrainian students. This was all the more surprising, as the Dutch government would have unconditionally refused the entrance of ‘unwanted’ refugees like seminarians and students according to its policy. The example of the AoR showed that a well-organised Catholic NGO could use its religious contacts to alter government policy.

In small ad-hoc cases Catholic NGOs might have been successful lobbyists, but they could not use the same tactics to arrange support for bigger groups of Catholic refugees residing in the Netherlands, or wishing to enter the country. A more durable solution could only be achieved via regulated contact with involved government officials. From June 1946 until the end of 1951, this contact passed via the representative of the IGCR and the IRO, mr. H. Sark. He was appointed by the Dutch government to support refugees residing in the Netherlands falling within the IGCR/IRO mandate.

Sark would quickly become the mediator between Dutch NGOs, the involved IGOs and the government. He was able to allot NGOs with government and IRO money, as well as supporting them with legal counselling and advice. Sark was not authorised to issue legal documents, such as residence permits and non-enemy declarations. In close cooperation with Sark, the Dutch government could regulate contacts with the NGOs, as well as control the financial support destined for these organisations. This meant that NGOs like Herzog’s Service would first have to establish favourable contacts with Sark if they wished to receive support from the IRO and the government.

The origins and aims of the CCR

After Sark had entered into service of the IGCR in June 1946, contacts were established between him and two representatives of Catholic NGOs. The first of the representatives

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143 Berghuis, Geheel ontdaan van onbaatzuchtigheid, 39.
was Herzog. The second was the Catholic priest Van Hussen, who had also assisted refugees during the war and was now a spokesman for the Bishop’s Aid for Victims of War. This NGO helped 420 Catholic refugees, composing 150 families of whom 50 were stateless. Both men delivered the same kind of aid to refugees, albeit being part of separate organisations. They also occasionally worked together, for instance when they visited Camp Mariënboseh, a deportation centre for German nationals, stateless persons and unwanted refugees. To Sark they had filed a shared report on the desperate situation of the camp inhabitants.

The NGOs of Herzog and Van Hussen were both acting in service of the Dutch bishops of the Catholic church, from whom the organisations received financial aid and patronage. To avoid double work and competition, cardinal De Jong wished to create one central refugee relief NGO. Under one umbrella, the Catholic Church could coordinate its refugee relief activities efficiently and create one central dataset in which the information of all Catholic refugees was to be gathered. The cardinal might have been influenced by Sark, who preferred to communicate with one central NGO per religious group. As he had already privileged the JCC and Quackers to represent the Jewish and Protestant refugees respectively, he also desired to work with one Catholic NGO representing all refugees adhering to that faith. This ‘one NGO per religious group strategy’ was not new: the Dutch Ministry of Internal Affairs had also exclusively cooperated with three confessionally driven refugee relief NGOs before the war.

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144 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, letter from Service for Victims of Religious Persecution to IGCR, 16-6-1946.
145 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, letter from IGCR HQ to Sark, 23-8-1946.
146 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, overview of the activities of the Service for Victims of Religious Persecution, addendum by Van Hussen, 12-06-1946.
147 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, confidential report on the visit of Van Hussen and Herzog to Camp Mariënboseh, October 1946.
148 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, letter from Bishop’s Aid for Victims of War, 11-11-1946.
149 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, constitutional document of the CCR, 6-6-1947, ‘to-do list’ point 3, page 1-2.
150 As becomes clear from: NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, writings on the meeting invitation letter sent from the IGCR to CCR, 4-2-1947.
151 NA, archive inventory 2.04.58, Inventory of the archive of the Ministry of Internal Affairs: care for German refugees, 1938-1942, 1.2 committees, archive entry 9, regarding the costs of caretaking and housing refugees with the Committee of Special Jewish Interest in Amsterdam, the Protestant Committee for Those Expelled due to Race and Religion in Amsterdam and the Catholic Committee for Refugees in Utrecht, 1938-1940.
The centralised Catholic Committee for Refugees (CCR) was formed on the 7th of November 1946 at the behest of De Jong. Initially it was called the Bishop’s Committee, but it was renamed and reconstituted as the CCR in June 1947. Each representing one of the Dutch bishoprics, five clergymen were part of the Committee. Van Hussens, representing the bishopric of Haarlem-Amsterdam, would be secretary and spokesman.\footnote{NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, letter from Van Hussen to IRO, 11-11-1947.} Herzog became director of the CCR. In practice, Herzog would continue his personal guidance of the necessary relief activities, but now on a larger scale and with the full support of the Catholic church.

The CCR’s main goal was ‘to deliver the needed material and moral support to Catholic refugees, which due to reasons of religion or war, as well as on the basis of principle grounds, had to leave their homeland and for grave reasons were unable to return.’\footnote{NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, constitutional document of the CCR, 6-6-1947, page 1.} Although members of the committee acknowledged that some of the refugees were taken good care off – especially the refugees living in refugee communities in the Netherlands and those receiving employment – concerns were raised about individual Catholic refugees. They were often living in non-Catholic parts of the country, did not speak the language and were prone to lose their religious and moral compass. War and subsequent life in the camps, where most refugees had lived in an allegedly hostile all-male climate, had roughened and barbarised the male refugees.\footnote{NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, constitutional document of the CCR, 6-6-1947, 'In what regard do the refugees need support', page 1, 'II. What should we do for these people', 'B. Cultural', page 3.} Therefore, the Committee deemed it necessary to set-up local committees throughout the country, led by local priests, which first had to gather information about the refugee’s background and whereabouts. This information was then passed on to Herzog, who in consultation with the Committee would provide the adequate religious, financial or social support for the refugee in question. The local priest would make sure that the provided support reached the refugee.\footnote{NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, constitutional document of the CCR, 6-6-1947, ‘to-do list’, page 1-2, ‘II. What should we do for these people’, page 2-4.
The Committee would also maintain the necessary contacts with representative Sark on behalf of the refugee.\textsuperscript{156} This would be secretary Van Hussen’s responsibility. The CCR’s exchange of letters, requests and financial overviews with the IGCR/IRO provides an insight in the activities of the Committee and the working relationship with Sark.

**Providing Catholic support within the IGCR/IRO mandate**

Straight from the beginning, the IGCR supported the CCR foremost with financial contributions. Sark demanded that the CCR provided regular budgetary overviews. To be eligible for aid, an independent accountant also had to monitor the expenditures of the organisation. The CCR did comply with these requirements.\textsuperscript{157} In December 1946, the CCR received a first check of 8,630 guilders from the IGCR to support stateless refugees. Some specific purposes were mentioned: 800 guilders were to be used for the education of refugees in a Catholic vocational training centre in Voorhout, whilst 620 guilders were used for the maintenance of a specific family.\textsuperscript{158} Although the sources are not entirely clear, it is most likely that a part of the money was used for the provisioning of clothes for deportees in Camp Mariënboesch.

An important acknowledgment of the CCR’s legitimacy was the invitation for a general meeting with Sark, also attended by representatives of the JCC and the Quackers in February 1947. During this meeting, Sark stipulated the government’s immigration policy to the organisations and discussed a trajectory for future cooperation.\textsuperscript{159} It would mark the beginning of a regulated form of support to individual refugees.

The first case-specific requests centred around legal advice and counselling. An example is given by a Polish refugee who had contacted Sark and asked for mediation. In 1937 he had fled to the Netherlands. He had received emigration aid from Schmutzer’s

\textsuperscript{156} NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, constitutional document of the CCR, 6-6-1947, ‘to-do list’ point 4, page 1.

\textsuperscript{157} NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, letter from IGCR to CCR, 03-01-1947.

\textsuperscript{158} NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, letter from CCR to IGCR, 31-12-1946.

\textsuperscript{159} NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, invitation from IGCR to CCR, 4-2-1947.
committee. Consequently, he was granted a residence permit for Brazil in 1941, but due to war activities he was unable to go. Now he was repairing sewing machines for his living. He was not content with this, for he had been former university student and claimed to speak six languages. Sark, knowing that Herzog had maintained a database with the files of individual refugees, asked the CCR whether the organisation could provide him with any possible information about the background and antecedents of the man.\textsuperscript{160} The CCR provided this information from its database.

The other way around, the CCR could also approach Sark for legal advice. A group of stateless Austrians, recipients of Catholic aid, had been informed by the Dutch government that they could apply again for Austrian citizenship. However, the stateless Austrians did not want this, either because they had settled in the Netherlands and/or because they did not want to return to the country where they had been persecuted by Nazi-authorities. If the Rijksvreemdelingendienst (RVD, alien and naturalisation service) would take measures against the refugees, the CCR wanted to know whether there was any international law protecting them. If the former Austrians were allowed to stay, the CCR wanted to know whether they could apply for temporary government subsidies.\textsuperscript{161}

In early and mid-1947, other such informative requests from the CCR to Sark concerned possible IGCR subsidies for the transport of refugees as well as specific individual cases.\textsuperscript{162}

The exchange of letters and requests was shortly halted in July 1947, when the IGCR’s mandate ended. The IRO took over its tasks and responsibilities. Sark, however, remained in function as representative of the Dutch government. He reassured NGOs like the CCR that this organisational change was but a formality which would not harm the current fruitful partnership.\textsuperscript{163}

\textsuperscript{160} NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, letter from IGCR to CCR, 6-2-1947.
\textsuperscript{161} NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, letter from CCR to IRO, 16-2-1947 and IGCR answer from 26-2-1947.
\textsuperscript{162} NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, letters from IRO to CCR, 26-3-1947, 22-4-1947, report from Sark’s visit to the CCR, 21-5-1947.
\textsuperscript{163} NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, letter from IGCR to CCR, 17-6-1947.
Indeed, the mutual need for information, as well as the need for financial support, remained unaffected in specific individual cases. When refugees, eligible for IRO support, would not receive any financial support from the Dutch government, the CCR would contact Sark for the provision of contributions. These would be paid from a specific IRO budget for ‘after-care’ and transferred on a monthly basis. Varying from case to case, the refugee in question could receive his or her money in cash or could use it for vocational training, medical care or repatriation.

From July 1947 until June 1951 the IRO would provide the CCR with these monthly contributions. How would one apply for this aid? First, the CCR would inform the IRO that there was a refugee in need for extra support. To determine whether a refugee was eligible for aid, Sark would send the CCR a so-called ‘CM/1’ application. These forms would be filled out by the refugee and sent back to the IRO. If everything was alright, the IRO would then sponsor the refugee via the CCR for an agreed length of time. If any changes occurred in the situation of the refugee, albeit financial, relational or residential, the CCR would inform the IRO of these changes. The Catholic organisation also needed to submit monthly financial reports about its activities. The reports enabled Sark to check whether the money was righteously spent. All in all, ‘the monthly contributions scheme’ led to an extensive exchange of letters, requests and reports between both organisations.

In 1949, the CCR was operating at its height. The organisation provided aid to an estimated 2,500 refugees. 80 percent of these refugees were Polish, complemented by smaller groups of Germans, Austrians, Czechs, Hungarians, Yugoslavs, Latvians and

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164 Two examples: NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, letters from CCR to Sark 11-7-1947 and 22-7-1947.
165 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, letter from CCR to IRO, 9-6-1947.
166 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, overview of subsidies December 1948, send from CCR to IRO, 27-1-1949 and overview of subsidies January 1950, send from CCR to IRO, 25-1-1950.
168 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, letter from CCR to IRO. accompanied by 18 CM/1 applications, 9-12-1947.
169 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, letter from IRO to CCR, 9-2-1949.
Lithuanians. Next to the board members and local Church representatives, fifteen new pastors were active. They were hired from the refugees’ ranks, because they spoke the same languages and had remained in close contact with the refugee community. The clergyman provided pastoral and social care. They also toured the country to lead mass celebrations during the Lent period leading up to Easter.

Because Polish refugees made up the vast majority of Catholic aid-recipients in the Netherlands, the CCR, in close cooperation with the Polish Catholic Association, the Catholic Church and the IRO, provided extra support for this group. A special magazine 'Polak w Holandii' (The Pole in Holland) was designed and distributed with IRO money. Sark wished that the refugees would eventually settle smoothly in the Netherlands. He had received troublesome reports from Southern Limburg, the principal mining area where many Poles worked. Local pastors warned for immoral behaviour, impoverishment and communist agitation. For both Sark and the Catholic organisations involved, mutual cooperation was of greatest importance. By exchanging the latest reports and information, and combining their budgets, the IRO and the CCR would ensure that the refugees were kept in check, as well as that Catholic aid and influence reached as many refugees as possible. It was a win-win situation.

As mentioned before, the cooperation between the IRO and the CCR lasted until 1951. By 1950 the IRO entered its final year of active service. Sark’s position as Dutch representative was to become vacant when the United Nations High Commissioner for

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170 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, letter from CCR to IRO, 27-1-1949.
171 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, letter from CCR to IRO, 27-1-1949; NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 111, After-care for Polish DPs by the CCR, overview of the eleven designated rayons for Polish refugee aid in the Netherlands.
172 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 111, overview of spiritual recollections by the Polish priests in March-April 1948, part of a letter from The Polish Catholic Mission in the Netherlands to Bishop Huibers of Haarlem, 7-1948.
173 Within the IRO archives, the special entry 111 'After-care for Polish DPs by the CCR' testifies of this support: NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 111.
174 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 111, letter from IRO to CCR, 17-12-1948, pages 1-2; NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, concise overview of the activities of the CCR on behalf of Catholic refugees in the Netherlands from 1936 until 1951, 25-7-1951, page 3.
175 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 111, copy from a letter written by CCR board member Colsen (pastor in Brunssum) to superior (of the CCR?), directed to Sark, 15-7-1948. Also of interest in this regard: NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 111, article published by the national communist newspaper De Waarheid, 'A fifth column in the Netherlands (II), Catholic Commission and Anders-Poles will take care of education...', 13-10-1948.
Refugees would take over responsibilities. Some members of the CCR board were convinced that the organisation’s activities should seize as well. Sark protested against this thought. As long as there were still non-naturalised Catholic refugees in the Netherlands, they would need support vis-à-vis the myriad of government officials. The Catholic Church, in Sark’s opinion, also needed a strong and centralised office for its refugee relief operations. It was, according to him, important that NGOs like the CCR would do their best to strengthen the cooperation between Geneva - the principal seat of the UNHCR - and the Netherlands.

In July 1951, two months before the Dutch IRO branch was disbanded, the CCR sent its final report ‘Catholic Aid to refugees between 1936-1951’ to Sark. A special category was dedicated to the support received from the IGCR/IRO. This support was praised. ‘...the burden of the Committee was immensely relieved by the great willingness and important support which the IRO-bureau offered us for our disposal.’ The IRO contributed a total of 55,768 guilders for the CCR’s aid to refugees. This money was used for the medical care, vocational training, emigration costs and cash assistance of needy refugees. Moreover, 10,300 guilders were used for the publication of the Polish magazine and the purchase of books and (sport)clothing. The CCR thanked Sark for his invaluable efforts and his exceptional professionalism.

From his side, Sark thanked the CCR for ‘its contribution to the history of refugee relief services in the Netherlands’. As a final ‘goodbye’, Sark sent an extensive list, mentioning the names and addresses of refugees, to the CCR. This way, he transferred the ‘mandate’ over these refugees to the CCR. This meant that the organisation would take over responsibility over these refugees and maintain contacts with them. Rather surprisingly, it is not entirely clear until when the CCR existed. In the Catholic CDC

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176 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, letter from IRO to CCR, 12-7-1950.
177 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, letter from IRO to CCR, 12-7-1950.
178 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, concise overview of the activities of the CCR on behalf of Catholic refugees in the Netherlands from 1936 until 1951, 25-7-1951, page 3.
179 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, concise overview of the activities of the CCR on behalf of Catholic refugees in the Netherlands from 1936 until 1951, 25-7-1951, page 3.
180 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, letter from IRO to CCR, 7-8-1951.
181 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, letter and added list, from IRO to CCR, 14-9-1951.
archives there is an indication that the CCR was still active in 1955, shortly before the arrival of Hungarian refugees.\textsuperscript{182}

**Case analysis: shared interests**

After restoration of power, Dutch-Catholic NGOs active in the field of refugee relief could be powerful influencers. Particular refugees, like Ukrainian seminarists and students, received unexpected access to the Netherlands with the help of the AoR and powerful patrons. The bulk of Catholic refugees did not benefit from this protection. For those already present in the Netherlands and in need of financial aid and legal protection, a more regulated way of IGO-NGO cooperation had to be established.

The Dutch IGCR/IRO representative and the CCR managed to aid thousands of Catholic refugees between 1946 and 1951. Applying the four types of consideration, why was this working relationship so successful? To begin with, both involved parties needed each other information and logistical expertise. The CCR maintained an elaborate dataset on individual refugees, whilst representative Sark received the latest IRO information on Catholic refugees entering the Netherlands. Sark needed the CCR’s network of local priests and its close connection with the Church to reach and assess certain refugees. The CCR, on its part, needed Sark on matters of legal counselling and support vis-à-vis government officials.

When looking at the economic aspect, both organisations decided to share the costs of refugee caretaking. Via the IGCR and IRO, funds became available for specific refugees under guardianship of the CCR. Stateless and ill refugees, and those applying for vocational training were aided this way. The IRO subsidies for the Catholic-Polish refugee community were another welcome relief for the CCR. Because both organisations strove for the same goal – the relief of needy refugees and their smooth integration in Dutch society – the IRO investments in the CCR were a win-win situation.

When discussing the large Polish refugee community in the Netherlands, another shared interest became apparent. The Catholic Church, the Dutch government and Sark

\textsuperscript{182} CDC, Archive of M.D. Lam, entry LAM-17, correspondence regarding the CCR, 1955.
were all worried about the possible threat posed by these refugees. They supposed that the difficult situation of the Poles and their war-time past may provoke sinful idleness, amoral behaviour and communist sympathies. Therefore, it was a mutual interest to closely supervise the refugees. Close adherence to the Catholic faith was a welcome ‘supervision’ tool, as all involved parties deemed that it could prevent the spread of communism and idleness. Threat was thus an incentive for close cooperation.

Finally, interests diverged from a moral/humanitarian point of view. Where the CCR genuinely pressed for extensive care for all Catholic refugees in need, Sark and the Dutch government were keen on limiting the amount of aid recipients. For them, economic arguments and national benefit played an equally important, or in case of the Dutch government, a bigger role. It showed that universal Christian care had its limits.

To conclude, it could be stated that a strong mutual interest fuelled the cooperation between the IGCR/IRO and the CCR. Sark’s remark on the preferred continuation of support between the CCR and the UNHRC reveals that the post-war refugee regime was beginning to solidify itself. This case has reinforced the view that NGO-IGO cooperation formed an increasingly important part of migration governance in the middle of the twentieth century. The next cases showcase the working relationship between NGOs and the IGCR/IRO under different religious and contextual circumstances.
Chapter 3: Quakers and the ERCH

Just as their Catholic counterparts, Dutch-Protestant NGOs proved to be an important partner of the IGCR/IRO. The often mentioned example of post-war Protestant support is the case of the Russian Mennonites.\footnote{See for instance: Berghuis, Geheel ontdaan van onbaatzuchtigheid, 39-42; Obdeijn and Schrover, Komen en gaan, 318-319.} In February 1946, 400 Mennonites entered the Netherlands by the unauthorised approval of a local border guard. The refugees claimed to be of Dutch ancestry, as their ancestors had originated from the northern provinces of the Netherlands in the sixteenth century.\footnote{Berghuis, Geheel ontdaan van onbaatzuchtigheid, 39-40.} The Dutch IGCR branch was tasked with the verification of this claim. Aided by a team of genealogists, Sark discovered that, generally speaking, the Mennonites were right.\footnote{NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 13, Mennonites: request of Russian Mennonites for emigration support to Paraguay based on their Dutch ancestry, 1946-1947, report on the Dutch origin of the Russian Mennonites who have recently emigrated to Paraguay.} Negotiating with the Protestant priest Hylkema - the predominant protagonist of the group - and The Mennonite Central Committee, the Dutch government accepted a transit for the refugees to Paraguay. This country was willing to take them in. In January 1947, the Mennonites left by an ocean liner for South-America.\footnote{NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 13, letter from Aide aux Emigrés to the Dutch representative of the IGCR, 24-7-1946; NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 13, letter of IGCR HQ to the Dutch representative of the IGCR, 7-2-1947.}

Due to its uniqueness, the Mennonite case has received an ample amount of attention from historians. The post-war activities of other Protestant NGOs, more regulated and arguably more impactful, are lesser known. For instance, the Dutch branch of the Society of Friends (Quakers) provided valuable and extensive support to a wide array of refugees: (baptised) German-Austrian Jews and ‘non-Catholic refugees’. From all NGOs covered in this thesis, the Quakers maintained the most elaborate and most profound working relationship with the IGCR/IRO. The ERCH, which was closely tied to the Dutch Synod of Reformed Churches, provided support for the same categories of refugees, at least on paper. In reality, the ERCH was twice approached by Sark to deal with specific groups of refugees: Russian members of the Orthodox Church residing in the Netherlands and elderly and handicapped refugees, part of the so-called ‘hard-core’.
In this chapter, the cooperation between the IRO and the Quakers/ERCH is reconstructed and analysed. The same analysis is applied on the question why this cooperation was so important. The specific goal of this case is twofold: it shows both the profoundness of cooperation (Quakers) and IRO’s dependence on NGO support (ERCH). In the end, the sub-question is raised whether there were any noticeable differences between the Protestant and Catholic NGOs working with the IRO.

**IRO’s trusted helper: the Society of Friends**

The Quakers have formed an undogmatic Christian fellowship since 1649. Inspired by the works of Jesus Christ and suspicious of Church hierarchy and organisation, Quakers believe that only a complete reformation of the faith can effectuate a return to the original Scripture and will of God. According to their ideas, God’s will and presence is revealed through every human being. This way, every man and woman is ‘illuminated’.\(^{187}\) The Quakers’ international fellowship is called ‘The Society of Friends’. In essence, members of The Society strive for universal peace, cooperation and friendship. This becomes clear from the following passage, a part from ‘the message to friends and fellow-seekers’, as dictated during the general Quaker conference of 1920:

‘Christ’s way of freedom replaces slavish obedience by fellowship. Instead of an external compulsion he gives an inward authority. Instead of self-seeking we must put sacrifice; instead of domination, co-operation. Fear and suspicion must give place to trust and the spirit of understanding. Thus shall we more and more become friends to all men and our lives will be filled with the joy which true friendship never fails to bring. Surely this is the way in which Christ calls us to overcome the barriers of race and class and thus to make all humanity a society of friends.’\(^{188}\)


\(^{188}\) M.E. Hirst, *The Quakers in peace and war. An account of their peace principles and practice* (London 1923) 525.
Because the Quakers actively pursued individual liberty and friendship throughout the ages, they have delivered important contributions to humanitarian causes. Within the abolitionist movement they have played an important role. The same is true for the international pacifist movement in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.\(^\text{189}\) During and after the First World War, the Quakers provided aid to ‘those in distress’: foremost refugees and wounded soldiers.\(^\text{190}\) Twenty years later, the Society of Friends closely cooperated with the IGCR, UNRRA and IRO to deliver aid and help to refugees. Financial and material aid packages, collected through private donations, were sent from the American and British Quaker branches to their European counterparts.\(^\text{191}\)

A Dutch quaker branch existed since the seventeenth century. It is unclear how many members this branch had in 1945, but they could not have been very many. The international movement never attracted large numbers of adherents. Anno 2009 the worldwide membership base is estimated to be 210,000, with most Quakers living in the United States.\(^\text{192}\) Notwithstanding their small number, the Dutch Quakers were resolved to provide the necessary aid to refugees after the Second World War. Due to its strong ties with the UK and US branches, and building on its image as an experienced aid-provider, the Dutch Quakers soon became a trusted partner of IGCR/IRO representative Sark. In close cooperation with him, they would administer aid to foreign refugees already residing in the Netherlands. Just as the CCR and JCC would eventually be the principle Catholic and Jewish partners of the IGCR/IRO, the Quakers would obtain the same status representing the Dutch-Protestant share of refugee relief.

Soon after the war had ended, the Dutch Quakers started to provide aid to stateless Germans, including former Jewish refugees and deserters from the German armed forces. The aid recipients included 14 adults and 26 children, of whom most were orphans. The Quakers deemed that stateless Germans were the most needy group. Because of their statelessness they were not protected, nor aided by any national institution. Moreover, because the average Dutch workman would not distinguish between ‘bad’ and ‘innocent’ Germans, many of the adults had lost their jobs. The

\(^{190}\) Hirst, *Quakers in peace and war*, 493-522.
children were in a perilous position as well, because they had no family to rely on. At this stage, the Quakers requested the IGCR HQ in the UK to sponsor its refugee relief activities. The IGCR agreed. This proved to be the beginning of an intensive working relationship which lasted until the dissolution of the IRO in 1951.

After his investiture in June 1946, Sark took over contacts with the Dutch Quakers from the IGCR HQ. Before long, he was approached by the Quaker treasurer. The IGCR still had to transfer 4,000 of the promised guilders. ‘As we rely foremost on private gifts and donations to conduct our relief work’, the treasurer wrote, ‘you can imagine that it is very hard for us to reserve such an amount of money.’ Having sent the first invoice in May, the Quakers received this urgently needed money only in September.

Because it was in the interest of both parties involved, a form of regulated compensation was devised. It was decided that the Quakers would file a monthly report, which mentioned each refugee, the kind of support received by this refugee and the amount of money which the Quakers had spent for this support. Before a new refugee was included in the support scheme, Sark had to give his personal approval. During negotiations with the Quaker board, it was decided up to which amount the IGCR would compensate the costs for individual refugees. Sark often wished he could support the Quakers with more means, but he was tied to his own budget. This compensation scheme closely resembled the monthly contribution scheme of the CCR.

193 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 23, The Society of Friends (Quakers), declaration of aid for refugees, 1945-1951, overview of children receiving aid, sent from Quakers to the IGCR HQ, 19-11-1945; NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 23, overview of adults receiving aid, sent from Quakers to the IGCR HQ, 13-2-1946.

194 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 23, financial reports on aid distribution to the stateless Germans, sent from the Quakers to the IGCR HQ, 19-1-1946, 3-4-1946, 28-6-1946; NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 23, letter from Quakers to the Dutch IGCR representative, 22-7-1946.

195 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 23, letter from Quakers to the IGCR, 22-7-1946.

196 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 23, letter from Quakers to the IGCR, 23-9-1946.


198 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 23, letter from Quakers to the IGCR, 27-12-1946; NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 23, letter from Quakers to the IGCR, 6-1-1947; NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 23, letter from the IGCR to Quakers, 17-5-1947.
In the period from late 1946 to mid-1950, the IGCR/IRO’s financial support fluctuated between 1,000 and 2,000 guilders per month. The expenditures were often tied to ‘medical care’, ‘vocational training’, ‘clothing’, ‘preparation for emigration’, ‘personal loans’ and ‘cash assistance’. In December 1946, when records showed the greatest number of refugees being aided by the Quakers, 50 men, 40 women, 15 boys and 12 girls received a form of support. This group slowly diminished with the passing of time, as the Quakers did not provide support to the later arriving neo-refugees from Eastern Europe.

For the German Jews and non-Catholic refugees however, the Quaker board also provided additional material support. In August 1946 Sark had received an unspecified amount of American clothes destined for refugees residing in the Netherlands. He needed organisations like the Quakers to distribute the clothes. Sark informed the Quakers and asked if they could use any of the clothes for their dependents and if they could contact other organisations which might have any interest in the clothes. In their reply, the Quakers stated that they had already received their own batch of clothes from the American Society of Friends. Nonetheless, they would very much like to equip some of their children with clothes and shoes from the IGCR. As to Sark’s second question, the board replied that it had approached Herzog’s Service for Victims of Religious Persecution (chapter two) and the AGSA (chapter five). If these organisations provided lists of addresses, the Quakers could distribute the clothes to the refugees.

A second form of material support was provided through the ‘Quaker Bureau’ in Amsterdam. This was the office from where the Quaker board operated. The building also functioned as a temporary shelter for urgent cases. Refugees would receive three meals a day, as well as a bed for the night. It is not clear whether any other form of material support was provided via the Bureau.

200 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 23, notes written during the visit of Ms. Hofmann (Quakers) to the IGCR, 11-12-46.
201 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 23, letter from Quakers to the IGCR, 12-8-1946.
202 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 23, letter from Quakers to the IRO, 5-10-1948.
Certain refugees benefitted extensively from the IGRC/IRO services provided by the Quakers. Former Jewish dentist Fritz Marcus, born in Breslau in 1889, had fled from Nazi persecution.\(^{203}\) Having survived the war, he wanted to open a new dental practice in the Dutch town of Bussum in 1948. Because the Quakers and Sark deemed that this project had a high chance of success, they were willing to provide Marcus with two loans. A loan of 500 guilders was provided for the naturalisation of the dentist and his wife.\(^ {204}\) A second loan of 1500 guilders would be used to furnish the new practice. The Quakers and Sark also pleaded in favour of Marcus’ skills during their talks with the director of the Society of Dentists.\(^ {205}\) It was decided that Marcus would repay his loans from January 1949 onwards. This, he did.\(^ {206}\) Other extraordinary cases of Quaker support included financial contributions for the emigration of four refugees to Australia, a loan of 1,300 guilders for a recently divorced woman and the extensive educational and medical caretaking of stateless children.\(^ {207}\)

**Close-up: Quaker support for refugee children**

Twenty-six refugee children were among the first to receive extensive support from the Quakers. Almost all children had German-Jewish parents. Before the war, they had fled to the Netherlands, where they had gone into hiding during the occupation. Tragically, the parents of the children did not survive the war, which left the children alone and in a difficult situation. With the Nazis out and danger removed, the children were lucky to catch the attention and compassion of the Quakers. They were taken in by foster parents, some of which were Quakers themselves.\(^{208}\) From 1945 onwards, these parents looked after the children as their guardians. They made sure that the children received food and shelter, as well as a proper education and the needed medical care. Eventually,

\(^{203}\) AA, 1.2.4. various organisations, ‘M’, reference code 1242013, Fritz Marcus.
\(^{204}\) NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 23, letter from Quakers to the IRO, 12-6-1947.
\(^{205}\) NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 23, letter from Quakers to the IRO, 1-3-1948.
\(^{206}\) NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 23, letter from Quakers to the IRO, 5-1-1948.
\(^{207}\) NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 23, letter from Quakers to IGCR HQ with list of children, 19-11-1945.
the children were either capable of taking care of themselves, or were sent to special Quaker schools (in the US) or pedagogical institutions.209

To partially cover the costs, the foster parents could rely on funds provided by the Quaker board. The board asked for compensation from the IGCR. These compensations were granted.210 ‘Het Comité voor Oorlogspleegkinderen’ (Committee for Children Orphaned due to War, CCOW) also granted financial support, albeit temporarily in 1946 and 1947.211 Two examples provide an insight in the children’s background, the support they received and the role of the IGCR/IRO.

The first foster child was Eva Pestachowsky. As the second of two daughters, she was born to Jewish parents in Berlin in 1927. Her father died before the war. Her mother decided to send the two daughters to the Netherlands, which happened in March 1939.212 Eva would stay in The Hague with friends of her mother.213 As her sister Ruth was five years older, she applied for an apprenticeship as a nurse. She moved to Apeldoorn, where she was trained at the Jewish psychiatric centre ‘Het Apeldoornsche Bos’ (see also chapter four).214 In January 1943, the Nazis deported all 1200 patients and 50 members of the institution’s personnel. With Ruth among them, they all perished in Auschwitz within a month.215 Eva’s mother was deported to the same extermination camp, where she was murdered in April 1943.216

When the war was over, Eva emerged out of hiding. She was now seventeen and scarred by the war and the loss of her family. At this point, she was taken in by ms.

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209 Three examples: NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 23, accounts of March 1948 ‘Peter Kernke’ sent from Quakers to the IRO, 3-1948, accounts of April 1948 ‘Peter Oppenheimer’ sent from Quakers to IRO, 4-1948, accounts of July 1948 ‘Herbert Francl’ sent from Quakers to IRO, 7-1948.
210 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 23, accounts stateless children over the period January 1 – March 31 from Quakers to IGCR HQ, 3-4-1946.
213 AA, 1.2.4. various organisations, ‘P’, reference code 1242016, Eva Pestachowsky.
214 AA, 1.2.4. various organisations, ‘P’, reference code 1242016, Ruth Pestachowsky.
215 Gelders Archief, entry 0207A, entry number 16626, death certificates of the civil servant of the municipality of Apeldoorn, certificate number 515, Ruth Pestachowsky (deceased on 28-2-1943), 24-7-1952.
216 AA, 6.3.3, ITS case files as of 1947, tracing request concerning Edith Pestachowsky, letter from Wilhelm Pokorny to search department of the AJDC, undated, probably 4-1946.
Spaander, a Quaker member who lived at the Herengracht in Amsterdam.\textsuperscript{217} By the intervention of her hostess, she was able to integrate in the Netherlands and attend school. Every month, ms. Spaander received 10 guilders from the IGCR and CCOW for Eva’s education and clothing.\textsuperscript{218} Because Eva was psychologically struggling with her war experience, she had to undergo psychotherapeutic sessions in November and December 1946. These were for 50 percent (20 guilders) funded by a friend of Eva’s deceased mother. However, the Quaker board approached Sark and asked whether he would be willing to cover the other 20 guilders. He agreed.\textsuperscript{219} The amounts may not have been that big, but ms. Spaander constantly received financial support from the Quakers between September 1945 and April 1948.\textsuperscript{220} Eva was then released from Quaker caretaking.

Little is known about the remainder of Eva’s life. She married a Jewish man from Amsterdam. They moved to Leiden, where Eva became a professional sculptor and painter. However, the wartime horrors kept troubling her mind. She was unable to recover from the mental suffering and committed suicide in 1966, aged 39.\textsuperscript{221} Some of her works are showcased in the Dutch Jewish Historical Museum.\textsuperscript{222}

The story of Peter Kernke forms the second example. He was born in Germany in 1933. His father was an ‘aryan’ German, his mother an American citizen. His father joined the German armed forces and fought at the Eastern Front. Already before the war, Peter’s parents had divorced. For reasons unknown, his father broke off any communication with him, whilst his mother returned to the US. Peter remained behind

\textsuperscript{217} NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 23, letter from Quakers to IGCR HQ with list of children, ‘10. Eva Pestachowsky’, 19-11-1945.
\textsuperscript{218} NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 23, letter from Quakers to the CCOW, 30-1-1947; NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 23, letter from Quakers to the IGCR, 23-4-1947.
\textsuperscript{219} NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 23, letter from Quakers to the IGCR, 27-12-1946; NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 23, financial overview of the children, December 1946, sent from Quakers to the IGCR, 6-1-1947.
\textsuperscript{220} Earliest recorded support: NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 23, recapitulation, Quaker expenditure on aid for children, September 1 – April 1, 28-6-1946; Latest recorded support: NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 23, monthly account sent from Quakers to the IRO, April 1948, 14-8-1948.
\textsuperscript{221} Erfgoed Leiden en Omstreken, archive 1005, inventory number 154, death certificates of the civil servant of the municipality of Leiden, 1966, certificate number 943, Eva Pestachowsky (deceased on 6-8-1966), 9-8-1966.
and eventually ended up in the Netherlands after the war. It was not known whether his father was still alive and willing to care for him. As he could not join his mother immediately, Peter was first fostered by the family Schuilenburg, and later the family Beckering, both living in Amstelveen. There, he attended mulo (lower secondary school) in anticipation of a possible reunion with his mother in the US. The Quakers mediated with Sark on Peter’s behalf.223

For their guardianship, the families Schuilenburg and Beckering received 75 guilders per month, a considerable sum of money.224 Next to this monthly IGCR/IRO fund, they also received financial compensation for Peter’s new clothes and shoes.225 In August 1946, Peter went to a foster family on the island of Terschelling to spend his holidays there. This holiday, which cost a total of 114 guilders, was also paid by the IGCR.226 In anticipation of Peter’s eventual migration to the US, the IRO subsidised all administration and communication costs, including the visa fee of 30 guilders, photocopies and telegrams.227

By May 1947, when Peter had been supported for two full years, the Quakers informed Sark that they insisted on sending the boy to his mother, who looked forward to seeing her son again. However, Sark responded that the travel costs to the US were not to be compensated by the IGCR. Frustrated, the Quaker secretary wrote that ‘their (the refugees’) fellow Jews at the JCC received all support.’ Why would non-Jews in the same position, especially children, not receive the funds to migrate to the States? This question had already been asked before, and the secretary already knew the answer: the IGCR was not mandated to compensate the travels costs of non-Jews to the US.228


224 Earliest recorded support: NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 23, recapitulation, Quaker expenditure on aid for children, September 1 – April 1, 28-6-1948; latest recorded support: NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 23, financial overview of February 1948, 1-3-1948.


226 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 23, letter from Quakers to the IRO and accompanying financial overview of August 1947, 2-9-1947.

227 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 23, letter from Quakers to the IGCR, 22-5-1947.
The situation changed by the end of 1947. Peter had received a scholarship for a Quaker school in the US. By March 6 of the following year, his ship left for New York.\textsuperscript{229} It is unknown who financed his transit, most probably the Quakers themselves and/or Peter's mother. The IRO did only contribute insofar the above mentioned administration and communication costs were involved. Rather surprisingly, Sark was willing to pay 107 guilders for a new set of clothes, which Peter could wear during his journey.\textsuperscript{230} Hardly anything is known about Peter's arrival in the US, let alone the remainder of his life. He died in McDonough, Georgia, in 2013.

The two examples have shown how a combined NGO-IGO effort was set up to help orphaned and distressed children. Through the care of foster parents, the Quakers tried to normalise the children’s lives. This effort would have been impossible if the IGOS did not financially contribute. Especially in Peter's example, the IGCR/IRO provided considerable sums of money to support his foster parents. The examples have also shown that the children's cases were assessed on an individual basis. Extraordinary expenses were distributed accordingly. As Eva received contributions for her psychotherapy sessions, Peter was lucky to have his holiday to Terschelling and his emigration preparations fully compensated by the IGCR/IRO.

On IRO's request: the ERCH

The Society of Friends was not the only Protestant refugee relief NGO active in the Netherlands during the immediate post-war period. The Ecumenical Refugee Committee Holland (ERCH), representing the Dutch Reformed Church, also played a role as caretaker for all non-Catholic refugees. The ERCH was constituted in 1948.\textsuperscript{231} Three factors led to its constitution. First of all, the Dutch Reformed Church had set-up the Inter-Church Reconstruction Committee. As this body was responsible for the Protestant contribution to reconstruction work in the Netherlands, it was only a matter of time

\textsuperscript{229} NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 23, accounts of March 1948, ‘Peter Kernke’, 3-1948.

\textsuperscript{230} NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 23, financial overview of March 1948, 14-8-1948.

\textsuperscript{231} NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 105, Foundation Ecumenical Aid to Churches and Refugees, Dutch department of the Committee of Interchurch Aid and Service to Refugees, 1947-1952, letter from ERCH to the IRO, 3-5-1948.
before it was approached by both distressed Protestant refugees and IRO representative Sark. They sought for support and cooperation respectively. This happened remarkably late, in the summer of 1947. To deal with the refugees and IRO’s request for cooperation, the constitution of the new ERCH seemed adequate. Secondly, the Dutch Reformed Church had set up a similar committee before the war. Just as its Catholic and Jewish counterparts, this committee, named The Protestant Committee for Those expelled due to Race and Religion, had been active in the care-taking for refugees fleeing from Nazi Germany. As such the post-war ERCH could be seen as a continuation of Protestant relief activities. Thirdly, the World Council of Churches (The WCC) was formed by representatives of 147 Churches in Amsterdam in 1948. Seeking to work together on a multitude of subjects, the WCC was also concerned with ‘the refugee problem’ and its solution. It therefore raised a body concerned with this problem: The Ecumenical Refugee Commission. The ERCH would function as the Dutch department of this Commission.

Sark’s request in the summer of 1947 had centred on emigration aid for Jewish refugees who had converted to Protestantism and wanted to settle in the US. The Quakers were foremost occupied with stateless Jewish refugees and deemed it not their business to finance the emigration of converted Jews. Therefore, Sark hoped that the Dutch Protestant Churches might be willing to cooperate in this matter. In the letter, two individual cases were also mentioned: a Hungarian protestant family which resided and a German DP camp but wished to move to Amstelveen, where the family had a friend willing to pay for their maintenance, and the wife of a former German MP who had fled to the Netherlands before the war and now needed financial contributions to treat the cancer from which she suffered.

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232 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 105, urgent request letter from Hungarian Presbyterian Church representative Alexander Nagy, directed to Protestant Church leaders in the West, 30-6-1947; NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 105, letter from the IRO to the Inter-Church Reconstruction Committee, 21-8-1947.
233 NA, archive inventory 2.04.58, Inventory of the archive of the Ministry of Internal Affairs: care for German refugees, 1938-1942, 12 committees, archive entry 9, regarding the costs of caretaking and housing refugees with the Committee of Special Jewish Interest in Amsterdam, the Protestant Committee for Those Expelled due to Race and Religion in Amsterdam and the Catholic Committee for Refugees in Utrecht, 1938-1940.
234 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 105, letter from ERCH to the IRO, 3-5-1948.
235 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 105, letter from the IRO to Baron van Tuyll van Serooskerken, secretary of the Inter-Church Reconstruction Committee, 21-8-1947.
The reply from the Inter-Church Reconstruction Committee was evasive for all requests. For the converted Jews there were no funds. The American Protestant Churches might be willing to finance their migration, the letter stated. As to the individual cases, no help could be provided for the moment. The Committee followed the policy of the Protestant Church: only in ‘certain concrete emergency cases the Churches would consider providing aid.’ The two cases were not deemed as serious and ‘concrete’ enough by the Committee. The reply suggested that local branches of the Churches could be contacted by Sark if he wished to aid the refugees in question.\textsuperscript{236}

This reply characterises the post-war refugee relief efforts of the ERCH and the Protestant Churches in general. Individual refugees were not aided by a cooperation between the ERCH and the IRO. If any problematic individual cases occurred, they were dealt with by local Church authorities. In the IRO archive, this becomes clear from the fact that there are hardly any requests from the ERCH on behalf of individuals. From 1948 until 1950, only nine refugees sporadically received financial assistance from the IRO via the ERCH, whilst only one person received (legal) aid from Sark on his emigration plans to Australia.\textsuperscript{237} The other way around, the IRO still contacted the ERCH on several occasions when it needed Protestant support. It is in these group cases, ‘Orthodox Russians’ and ‘old-aged and physically handicapped refugees’, that the ERCH proved willing to cooperate.

In September 1948, a Russian refugee named Sjiskin approached the Dutch Ministry of Internal Affairs. He explained that he was the spokesman of a group of 23 Russian-Orthodox refugees - men, women and children - who had fled from the SU out of fear for persecution and now lived in the province of Limburg. Because they had fled, they deemed that repatriation to the SU would mean imminent death. Most of the male refugees were semi-skilled labourers: mechanics, electricians and tractor-drivers. Sjiskin made clear that the group wanted to emigrate to Argentina, South-Africa or Australia: as far away from the SU as possible. He also believed that the Soviet Military Mission in the Netherlands, the office occupied with the repatriation of Soviet citizens, was tracking the

\textsuperscript{236} NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 105, reply from Van Tuyll van Serooskerken to the IRO, 28-8-1947.

\textsuperscript{237} Two examples of financial support: NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 105, letter from the ERCH to the IRO, 27-10-1949, letter from ERCH to the IRO, 29-6-1950. The case of legal advice: NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 105, letter from ERCH to the IRO, 15-5-1950.
refugees. This made the situation urgent. If only the Dutch government could provide the funds necessary for further migration, the families would repay their debts as soon as they had secured a new living.238

Not willing and not able to constructively reply to this request, the clerks of the Ministry forwarded the letter to Sark. He, on his turn, sent a copy of the request to the ERCH. As these ‘non-Catholic’ refugees were a category for which the ERCH was formally responsible, Sark asked the organisation whether it could start an inquiry into the background of the refugees and especially the reason and timing of their migration to the Netherlands. This way, it could be determined whether the refugees were eligible for IRO support.239

It took the ERCH four months until a report was handed back to Sark. Mrs. Schiff, the secretary of the ERCH board, had employed a social worker to visit the Russians. Not all of them were still residing in the Netherlands: four had left for an unknown destination. Those who had stayed behind, had answered that their past had been tough. The group had escaped from the grasp of the Russian armed forces in Germany in 1945. Now most of them had found work again, but life was simple and pitiful. The social worker had also made up valuable individual reports, which were submitted to Sark. It seemed that seven more Russians, previously not mentioned by Sjiskin, also wanted to emigrate. If Sark gave his permission, the ERCH would also create individual reports on them.240 Unfortunately, the ultimate fate of the Russians is unknown. Yet their case showed that the ERCH could be useful to the IRO as a mediator and a provider of information.

Another case in which the ERCH proved cooperative was the group of hard-core refugees. Throughout Europe, approximately 25,300 refugees were still not dealt with by June 1950. These were foremost old aged and handicapped refugees, as well as their accompanying family members.241 As the IRO would cease its activities towards the end of that year, both involved NGOs and the IRO were worried about the fate of this

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238 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 105, urgent request letter from P. Sjiskin to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 3-9-1948.
239 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 105, letter from the IRO to ERCH, 10-11-1948.
240 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 105, letter from ERCH to the IRO, with accompanying list of seven Russian who also wanted to migrate, 24-2-1949.
241 Holborn, The International Refugee Organisation, 482.
group. Through negotiations, the IRO managed the admission of 106 old-aged refugees in the Netherlands during the fall of 1950. A pledge for the admission of 200 more refugees by the Dutch government followed after queen Juliana (r. 1948 – 1980) had shared her worries on the treatment of the hard-core group. The queen had also petitioned US president Truman to be more compassionate with the refugees. The hard-core refugees destined for the Netherlands were to arrive in late 1951 and 1952.

As the WCC was involved as one of the main voluntary agencies willing to aid the aged hard-core, the ERCH was to cooperate in the maintenance of the refugees arriving in the Netherlands. Procedures went as follows: the IRO selected the refugees in the remaining camps after they had undergone a medical check and an interview. If they were fit for transport, they were moved to nursing homes in the Netherlands. After their arrival, the ERCH would manage the administration of the refugees and would make sure they were properly cared for. Per refugee, the ERCH received a budget of 500 US dollar. After the IRO’s liquidation, the Refugee Service Committee for the Netherlands (RSCN) took over the charge of funding the resettlement of the refugees until the ‘hard-core’ was dissolved. For this, it used left-over grants from the IRO. Egbert Emmen, who was also a board member of the ERCH, became the RSCN chairman: a sign of the grown interwovenness of both institutions.

Throughout 1952, the ERCH informed the RSCN on the old-aged and handicapped refugees, especially after a member of the group had deceased. One of the last documents in the ERCH-IRO archive shows that the NGO was busy preparing the arrival

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243 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 119, correspondence of queen Juliana with president Truman concerning the institutional hard core, letter from Committee of Interchurch Aid and Service to Refugees (formerly named ERCH) to the IRO, 21-8-1951.
244 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 119, letter from queen Juliana to US president Truman, 11-9-1951; NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 119, letter from IRO HQ to the RSCN, 11-10-1951.
245 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 105, letter from the Committee of Interchurch Aid and Service to Refugees to the IRO, 8-12-1950; NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 148, collected personalia of some old aged from Trieste and Hungary, 1948-1950; NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 155, old aged, residence of group 1 and 2 from 7-11-1950 onwards.
246 Holborn, The International Refugee Organisation, 562.
247 Two examples: NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 105, letter from the Committee of Interchurch Aid and Service to Refugees to the RSCN, 25-3-1952, letter from the Committee of Interchurch Aid and Service to Refugees to the RSCN, 23-8-1952.
of 40 old-aged Mennonite refugees in late 1952. There were no refugees of this category in West-Germany, therefore the ERCH inquired whether the Dutch government would allow the admission of refugees from East-Germany. By this time however, the IRO was long gone and the UNHCR had taken over responsibility. The ERCH, renamed ‘Committee for Interchurch Aid and Service to Refugees’, remained active as one of the main Dutch-Protestant aid and relief NGOs until 2001. Since then it has been active under the name ‘Church in Action’.

**Case-analysis: differences and similarities**

The Dutch-Protestant effort to relief and support refugees was marked by the significant operational differences between the two most involved NGOs. On the one hand, the Quakers provided diverse and extensive support to individual refugees directly after the end of the war. On the other hand, the ERCH, closely tied to the Protestant Churches, refrained from support to individual refugees. Instead, it slowly expanded services to groups of refugees, foremost ‘hardcore’ old-aged, from 1948 onwards.

All in all, the working relationship between the Quakers and the IGCR/IRO was marked by profound trust and efficiency. Because, (1) the Dutch branch of the Society of Friends cooperated with the US and UK branches, (2) these branches provided modest yet significant financial and material support and (3) the international Quaker movement had a good reputation as a humanitarian relief provider, Sark was assured that he was working with a trusted and experienced partner. Next to the Dutch Quakers’ modest economic capabilities and favourable reputation, its logistical ‘grassroot’ expertise – communicating with the refugees and knowing their whereabouts and background stories – contributed to a strong and effective partnership with the IGCR/IRO. Logistical expertise eased the IGCR/IRO’s job of identifying and maintaining the refugees. An example of this is given by the fact that the Quakers regularly supplied Sark with detailed (financial) reports on individual refugees.

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248 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 105, letter from the Committee of Interchurch Aid and Service to Refugees to the RVD, 20-11-1952; NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 105, letter from the Committee of Interchurch Aid and Service to Refugees to the RSCN, 20-11-1952.
By allocating significant financial resources to the Dutch Quakers, Sark ensured that an important part of the refugees under his mandate received the support it needed. It is remarkable that Sark provided almost no legal advice in his written communication. This indicates that the refugees under Quaker guidance were unproblematic and/or that the Quakers themselves had been well informed about government regulation and legal procedures. A third possibility would be that legal advice was discussed during personal meetings, but this seems unlikely for some sort of written testimony - a note, remark or report – would have touched upon this. All in all, logistical/expert and economic considerations are most relevant when considering why the Quaker-IRO relationship was so effective and relatively unproblematic.

The ERCH’s relation with the IRO was less amiable and close. Material in the archives suggests that it was foremost the IRO that sent requests for help to the ERCH. When the old-aged hardcore group was addressed in 1950, the ERCH got truly involved as an executor of the IRO’s plans. The close contacts between the ERCH and the RSCN indicate that both organisations had entered a sphere of narrow cooperation and interdependence. The IRO/RSCN needed the ERCH for its executive capabilities – the administration and distribution of old-aged refugees in nursing homes across the country – while the ERCH needed the IGO’s money to be able to do this. As it was the Dutch government’s (foremost queen’s) humanitarian wish to allow more old-aged refugees to be taken care of in the Netherlands, it was the ERCH which in practice managed the execution of this wish (moral/humanitarian considerations).

When comparing the Quaker and ERCH cases to the CCR case, some notable differences can be mentioned. The CCR and the IRO were afraid that the Polish Catholic refugees might be exposed to idleness, with all its negative and amoral consequences. This fear cemented their strong cooperative relationship. In the cases of the Protestant NGOs, the fear of this threat was absent. Mutual interest was defined by the humanitarian wish to end the suffering of refugees affected by war. The Protestant NGOs needed the IGCR/IRO foremost as a provider of financial resources. The steady provision of information and legal advice from the IRO, defining an important part of the support received by the CCR, was almost completely absent in their cases. The IGCR/IRO, on the other hand, could use the Protestant NGOs as mediators and executives of its own policy.
Reasons for the striking differences between the Catholic and Protestant NGOs are linked to (1) the constitution of the refugee group being helped (mineworkers and adults vs. children and old-aged), (2) the size of the refugee group (thousands vs. hundreds) and (3) government ties (strong Catholic ties vs. weak Protestant ties). Apparent similarities are the reliance on own networks (Catholic Church, Society of Friends, Dutch Reformed Church) and the strong Christian/moral conviction to provide help to those in distress.
Chapter 4: Foundation Five hundred Jewish Children

Although the vast majority of Jews residing in the Netherlands had been deported and murdered during the war, Dutch-Jewish NGOs played an important role in solving the post-war refugee crisis. Dutch Jews were often determined to undo – as far as physically possible - the consequences of Nazi crimes. Through a multitude of NGOs, they would try to build up a new community and strive for recovery of the Jewish (inter)national heritage. This chapter focuses on the activities of such an NGO: the FJC.

The Dutch FJC was established as a foundation to facilitate the temporary residence of Jewish refugee children in Het Apeldoornsche Bos, the earlier mentioned psychiatric centre. Between October 1947 and October 1948 almost 450 children dwelled in this complex, accompanied by guardians and nurses. Thereafter, they left for the newly formed state of Israel as pioneers. Housing, clothing, feeding and educating 500 children was a costly business, for which the FJC counted on IGCR and IRO support. Throughout the chapter, the vital cooperation between the IGOs and the FJC is analysed, as well as the Dutch government’s share in the remarkable story of the children. The case of the FJC is unique, because the foundation needed to acquire extensive financial and logistical assistance throughout its short existence. As the FJC was a Jewish foundation, it is also important to investigate how the perception of Jews as victims and survivors of the Holocaust affected cooperation. A special, non-archival, source for this chapter is provided by the radio programme Onvoltooid Verleden Tijd (OVT, Unfinished Past Tense). In September 1996 this programme created a short series on the history of the children.249

Pioneers for Palestine

Wishing to end the Jewish diaspora, Zionist followers of Theodor Herzl (1860-1904) dreamt of an independent state of Israel. With the Balfour Declaration of 1917, the

British government had promised to facilitate the creation of such a new state. Although the British did not wholly keep their word and created their own protectorate in Palestine, they did allow a limited form of Jewish immigration into the protectorate during the Interbellum. Jewish-Zionist organisations throughout Europe recruited people willing to immigrate towards Palestine. With their guardians’ consent, children were selected and trained by youth organisations to become pioneers in the newly established kibbutzim. Often this meant that children would work as farmhands, apprentices and housemaids, whilst learning Hebrew and accustoming themselves to Jewish traditions. In the Netherlands, a well-known example of a pioneer centre was the Joods Werkgdorp (Jewish labour village) in the Wieringermeerpolder. Here, 300 refugee children from Germany and Austria were educated at the same time between 1934 and 1941, when the village was closed by the authorities and the majority of its residents deported and killed.

Soon after the war had ended, the newly established Foundation for Education and Emission of Palestine pioneers ‘Hachsjarah en Alijah’ preferred a continuation of the Wieringermeer labour village and petitioned the Dutch government. Unfortunately, there were not enough suitable Jewish children in the Netherlands left to populate the village and the government was unwilling to allow foreign children, most likely refugees, to fill the empty places. However, the government proposed the foundation of a new, but smaller village in Midwolda. This village would accommodate 70 pioneers. The ‘Hachsjarah en Alijah’ agreed and soon acquired financial support from the head of the IGCR, Sir Harold Emerson, who had recently visited the Netherlands and proved willing to contribute 5,000 pounds to the construction of the new village, as long as one-third of its inhabitants would constitute of stateless refugee children.

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250 For example: NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the ICR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 3, Foundation for Training and Emission of Palestine Pioneers, First year overview of Hachsjarah en Alijah, page 13, division of chaweriem and chaweroth along job education, 03-11-1946.
251 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the ICR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 14: Midwolda, education of Jewish children as Palestine pioneers in the Wieringermeerpolder, 1946-1947, undated copy of a petition from the Hachsjarah en Alijah to the minister of Agriculture and Finances, page 1.
252 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the ICR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 14, undated copy of a petition from the Hachsjarah en Alijah to the minister of Agriculture and Finances.
253 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the ICR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 3, first year overview of Hachsjarah en Alijah, page 6, Wieringen; NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the ICR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 14, letter from Hachsjarah en Alijah to IGCR representative Sark, 28-04-1947.
254 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the ICR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 14, letter from the Hachsjarah en Alijah to IGCR representative Sark, 05-12-1946.
Throughout 1946 the preparations for the Midwolda village had been going in full swing, when Hachsjarah en Alijah had to change its plans again in early 1947. An important request of major Jewish NGOs in the Netherlands, including the Joodse Coördinatie Commissie (Jewish Coordination Committee, JCC affiliate of the AJDC) was granted by the Dutch government. In the request, aimed at the ministers of Justice and Social Affairs, the NGOs warned the government that something had to be done about the faith of Jewish children in DP camps in Germany and Austria. These children are ‘threatened by physical, mental and moral suffering’, they wrote. If the government were to allow 500 children to be temporarily sheltered and educated in the Netherlands, the Jewish community would take care of their residence, as well as the necessary funds.\textsuperscript{255} The timing of the request coincided with an appeal from the newly formed, but not yet operative, IRO aimed at Western governments. In its appeal, the IRO urged the governments to accept more refugees.

Contrary to its restrictive policy, the Dutch government decided that 500 Jewish refugee children were allowed to enter the country for a maximum of three years. After their stay, the children were to leave for Palestine.\textsuperscript{256} The large number of children is surprising, as the government had decided to only accept 50 Jewish adult DPs on the same humanitarian grounds in the fall of 1946.\textsuperscript{257} On the other hand, the Dutch government had also allowed the temporary shelter of (sickly) foreign children via the ‘National Committee for Emission of Dutch Children 1945’. Between 1947 and 1949, this Committee fostered a total of 10,000 foreign children in two specially designed camps in Limburg.\textsuperscript{258}

News of the admission was welcomed by the Hachsjarah en Alijah and the Jewish child care NGO ‘Le-Ezrath Ha-Jeled’, which were both tasked with the execution of the 500-children plan. To efficiently prepare the selection and arrival of such a large group, the FJC was founded by the two NGOs.

Besides the FJC, several other Jewish actors were directly engaged in the plan. First of all, the AJDC and the JCC provided financial support for the refurbishment of Het

\textsuperscript{255} NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the ICR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 10, FJC, request from the Dutch Jewish community leaders to the ministers of Justice and Social Affairs, 31-12-1946.
\textsuperscript{256} OVT, Het spoor terug, tussenstop Apeldoorn: op weg naar het Beloofde Land, part 1, minute 14.
\textsuperscript{257} Walaardt and Schrover, ‘Displaced Persons’, 423.
\textsuperscript{258} NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the ICR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 4, report of the liquidation of the National Committee for Emission of Dutch Children 1945, 17-2-1949.
Apeldoornsche Bos. As the giant complex was emptied and no patients were left (the patients and staff had been deported during the war, see chapter 3), it could render no more service as a psychiatric centre. The Jewish organisations decided that it would be the ideal place to both function as a shelter for the 500 children and as a training site for the future pioneers.259

The Child and Youth Immigration Bureau of the Jewish Agency for Palestine was tasked with the selection of the children. At first, selection took place in German and Austrian DP camps. However, it soon became clear that there were almost no suitable children in these camps. It was decided that recruitment had to take place in Romania, because there were relatively many Jewish war survivors in that country.260 Eight Romanian-Zionist youth organisations, varying from left-wing socialist to conservative orthodox, provided their respective share of children, as well as the accompanying wardens and teachers.261 Before an account is given of the children’s journey to the Netherlands, their residence in Apeldoorn and their subsequent departure for Israel, the involvement of the IGCR and IRO is touched upon.

**Acquiring IGCR/IRO support**

Although the Jewish organisations petitioning the Dutch government had stated that they would be able to cover all costs for the 500-children scheme, the financial reality was different. The refurbishment of Het Apeldoornsche Bosch was estimated to cost 388,000 Dutch guilders, or 78,000 Sterling pounds. Included in this sum were the costs of educational material, as well as new clothes for the children.262 Excluded were the costs of the daily alimentation. And although only healthy children were selected in Romania, some of them would need medical care as well as new glasses.263 And what

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259 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the ICR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 10, FJC, rapport from FJC to the IRO, 27-05-1947, 3-4.
260 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the ICR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 10, FJC, rapport from FJC to the IRO, 27-05-1947, 2; NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the ICR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 10, FJC, letter from the Child and Youth Immigration Bureau to the IRO, 20-08-1947.
261 OVT, Het spoor terug, tussenstop Apeldoorn: op weg naar het Beloofde Land, part 1, minutes 11 and 12.
262 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 10, FJC, budget sent from JCC to the IRO, 19-03-1947.
263 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 10, FJC, first budget of the medical check after the arrival of the children, sent from JCC to the IRO, 27-11-1947.
about the transport costs? Who would pay for that? Out of financial need, which at some points turned into desperation, the FJC and the JCC approached representative Sark. Because both villages at Wieringermeer and Midwolda had not been realised, and the money that Emerson had promised to contribute was still unused, the Jewish NGOs believed that this money could now be used for other projects, hinting at the Romanian children.264

Sark, who needed to give his approval for the disposition of the 5,000 pounds, was not sure whether the children were part of the IGCR/IRO mandate. From January to November, elaborate yet confusing debates unfolded, both between Sark and his superiors and between Sark and the Jewish NGOs.265 The written communication centred mostly around three questions 1) Was the IGCR/IRO obliged to pay the 5,000 pounds? 2) Could the children be classified as ‘bonafide’ refugees and were they thus part of the IGCR/IRO mandate? 3) If so, were the Jewish organisations able to make use of IRO repatriation funds, as well as a loan to maintain the children?

Regarding the 5,000 pounds, the FJC received the money in early 1947 on condition that it would be spent on the refurbishment of the complex and would benefit refugee children.266 Regarding the matter of the mandate, answers were less clear. Sark had its doubts, but was guaranteed by the Jewish organisations that the children were genuine refugees. A letter from the Romanian Red Cross, confirming the refugee background of children, reassured Sark.267 He was, on behalf of the IRO, willing to negotiate a 15,000 pounds loan as well as a monthly upkeep of 10 pound per child.268 However, because the Jewish NGOs were not certain who would repay the loan and the

264 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 10, FJC, IRO in response to JCC request of 25-11-1947, 13-01-1947; The JCC, as well as the State, wanted the children to be mandated by the IGCR/IRO, as becomes clear from: NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the ICR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 10, letter from FJC to the IRO, 21-01-1947.
265 Three examples of Sark’s communication with his superiors are: NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 10, FJC, internal IGCR/IRO letters dated 30-01-1947, 01-03-1947 and 01-04-1947; Three examples of communication between Sark and the Jewish organisations are: NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 10, FJC, letter from Jewish Agency for Palestine to the IRO, referring to Romanian Red Cross investigation, 20-08-1947.
266 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 10, FJC, letter from IRO HQ to Sark, 01-03-1947.
267 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 10, FJC, letter from Jewish Agency for Palestine to the IRO, referring to Romanian Red Cross investigation, 20-08-1947.
268 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 10, FJC, letter from the IRO to JCC, 20-08-1947; NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 10, FJC, telegram from IRO HQ to Sark, 30-08-1947.
IRO HQ started to meddle itself actively in the affair, the negotiations were thwarted.269 The HQ had investigated the 500-children scheme and concluded that the project was entirely devised and planned by the Jewish NGOs. This meant that IRO would refrain from further financial cooperation.270 Rather confusingly, the IRO also decided that the US-based AJDC could make use of a special IRO Repatriation Fund to finance the resettlement of the children. There would be no specific financial help from the IRO, but through a generic fund, administered by the AJDC, the Dutch-Jewish NGOs could count on international financial support for the scheme.271 In March 1948 Sark informed the JCC and the FJC that he could only assist the children with his legal protection and his political influence.272 The training of the children in Het Apeldoornsche Bos was already in full swing by that time.

The children in Het Apeldoornsche Bos

As soon as the Jewish NGOs had received ‘green light’ from the Dutch government, they started their search and selection of suitable children. As mentioned before, there were not enough suitable Jewish children in DP camps in Germany and Austria. Nonetheless, it was decided that one group of 32 orphaned German Jews, residing in Berlin, would be included in the 500-scheme.273 All other selected children were to be of Jewish-Romanian descent. An undefined number of the children was orphaned. With their parents these children had lived in Transylvania and Bessarabia, Romanian territories which were occupied during the war. Their parents had died there due to the persecution of Jews. The other part of the Romanian children was not orphaned nor refugee. Their parents wished them to become pioneers. Making use of their connections with the local Zionist youth organisations, they ensured that their children were also

269 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 10, FJC, letter from the IRO to AJDC, 11-11-1947.
270 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 10, FJC, letter from IRO HQ to Sark, 24-11-1947.
271 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 10, FJC, letters from the IRO to AJDC, 05-12-1947 and Sark to JCC, 16-03-1948.
272 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 10, FJC, letter from the IRO to JCC, 16-03-1948.
273 As becomes clear from: NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 10, FJC, letter from FJC to the IRO, 16-06-1947.
The inclusion of these children is surprising, because they did not match the picture of ‘the child perishing in the DP camp’, as depicted by the JCC when petitioning the Dutch government. In total, 415 Romanian children and 41 adults, acting as teachers and guides, would come to the Netherlands.

Before their departure, they were all provided with temporary residence permits by RVD officials. For every child a questionnaire had to be filled in. After the basic questions on name, age, birth place and nationality, two declarations had to be signed before the child could be admitted. First, a doctor had to declare the child was in good shape, both physically and mentally. Thereafter, the FJC had to declare its full responsibility regarding the costs of the child’s stay. Under whatever circumstances, the Dutch government would not be liable for the children.

Although the refurbishment of Het Apeldoornsche Bos was not yet finished, the issuing of the entry-permits in late summer 1947 meant that the children could enter the country. After a train journey of three weeks, including a stopover in Prague for a medical check, the group arrived in Apeldoorn on the 22nd of September. Dutch newspapers and radio coverage framed the children more as Holocaust victims than as pioneers. A newsreel pointed out that the ill-looking children were welcomed with food. By this media attention the Dutch government was portrayed as benevolent.

Immediately after their arrival, the children received new clothes and the necessary medical assistance. Each youth organisation was allotted its own quarters, where the children slept and ate. A new daily routine was quickly introduced: education in the morning and excursions or playtime in the afternoon. Special attention was given

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274 OVT, Het spoor terug, tussenstop Apeldoorn: op weg naar het Beloofde Land, part 1, minutes 8, 15-16.
275 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 10, FJC, overview from the Romanian Red Cross to The Jewish Agency of Palestine, 12-08-1947.
276 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 10, FJC, questionnaire for ‘request admission and temporary residence in the Netherlands’, created by FJC in cooperation with the Dutch government and the IRO. All individual applications are present in this entry.
277 OVT, Het spoor terug, tussenstop Apeldoorn: op weg naar het Beloofde Land, part 1, minute 25.
to Hebrew lessons. The daily village routine was led and surveyed by personnel from the FJC.


The 14th of May 1948 would mark an important date for the Jewish children in Apeldoorn. Shortly before the British mandate in Palestine would end, Zionist leaders declared the State of Israel an independent nation. The long awaited homeland was finally established, at least on paper. The declaration of independence would trigger the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, from which the Israelis would eventually emerge victorious. In Het Apeldoornsche Bos the children were gathered on the complex’ football field, where they were informed about the news from Israel. Celebrations followed as well as a holiday trip to Amsterdam. With the British out, the Jewish immigration restrictions into Palestine were lifted. This meant that the children’s residence in Apeldoorn would not last the full three years.

As expected, the involved Zionist organisations wished to move the children towards the newly founded State. Plans for the children’s departure were drafted soon after the declaration of independence. The FJC was aided by the Israeli government,

281 OVT, Het spoor terug, tussenstop Apeldoorn: op weg naar het Beloofde Land, part 2, minutes 21-22.
which had bought a former Dutch banana-transport ship and paid for its subsequent transformation into a passenger ship. The vessel, renamed Negbah, was to traverse between the ports of Amsterdam and Haifa. Its official inauguration was attended by representatives of Dutch-Jewish NGOs as well as Sark, who had received a special invitation.

Its maiden voyage took place on the 6th of October 1948. On board were 379 children of the FJC, as well as 45 of their guides and wardens. Between 35 and 40 children - the sources are conflicting about this number - would remain behind. They were either too young (beneath the age of twelve) or were not deemed ready for departure. Some of them were ill. Sark promised the FJC that the IRO would compensate the medical costs of these children until they had recovered.

When the bulk of the pioneers arrived in Haifa, their dreams and imaginations of ‘beautiful Israel’ were soon dashed. The country was barren, instead of green and lofty, and war was omnipresent. Already before the boat had docked, the children could hear the roaring of artillery. Upon their disembarkation, the children were separated and dispersed among kibbutzim in safer parts of the country. Their residence in Apeldoorn, as well as the caretaking by Dutch-Jewish NGOs, had ended. Their new lives in Israel had begun.

Case analysis: the prime example of post-war refugee governance?

The story of the 500 Jewish children is remarkable, especially when taking the restrictive immigration policy of the Dutch government into account. The activities of

282 OVT, Het spoor terug, tussenstop Apeldoorn: op weg naar het Beloofde Land, part 2, minutes 26-27.
283 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 10, FJC, invitation from FJC to the IRO, 28-08-1948.
284 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 10, FJC, letter from FJC to the IRO, 17-10-1948.
285 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 10, FJC, letter from FJC to the IRO, 14-09-1948; OVT, Het spoor terug, tussenstop Apeldoorn: op weg naar het Beloofde Land, part 3, minute 3.
286 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 10, FJC, letter from FJC to the IRO, 03-03-1949; NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 10, FJC, letter from the IRO to Foundation Jewish Social Work (administrator of the IRO TBC funds), 14-05-1949.
287 OVT, Het spoor terug, tussenstop Apeldoorn: op weg naar het Beloofde Land, part 3, minutes 8-14.
the FJC proved to be a big success for Dutch-Jewish organisations, which were quickly able to mobilise their network and their resources. By providing the necessary care and shelter, the FJC could relieve a part of the children from their plight, whilst also training them to become pioneers for Palestine. The continuation of this training programme was an important part of the post-war revival of the Dutch Jewish community.

The Dutch government and the IRO also profited from the scheme. The government, foremost, could claim that it responded to international pressure. By taking in 500 refugee children, the Dutch government showed its humanitarian good-will and its resolution to solve the refugee crisis. Behind the scenes however, it turned out that the government only accepted admission if the FJC promised to be (financially) responsible for the children. Moreover, the children had to leave the country within three years. This way the scheme did not create a dangerous precedent. The Dutch government reaped all benefits: no financial costs and responsibility, yet positive media attention and political gain.

With no government to turn to, the Jewish organisations sought relief from the IGCR and the IRO. Although the NGO-IGO cooperation in this case was marked by long debates, confusion and regular disappointments, the IGCR and IRO did provide some important aid to the FJC. Based on humanitarian grounds and counting on the logistical expertise and competence of the FJC, IRO’s aid consisted primarily of loans and financial compensation. A first fund of 5,000 pounds ensured that the FJC could start the refurbishment of Het Apeldoornsche Bos. Later IRO funds and loans were provided via the AJDC to the JCC and FJC. Once again, this case has shown that NGO-IGO cooperation was foremost fuelled by economic arguments, yet humanitarian considerations (Jewish suffering, children relief) and preventive precautions (short lasting project, children pose a lesser threat) did play an important role.

Taking Cohen’s statement on ‘the modern humanitarian refugee regime’ in mind, the case of the FJC provided an excellent early manifestation of this regime. Characteristic were the leading role of NGOs, the close cooperation with IGOs like the IRO and the ‘minimal effort, maximum profit’ mentality of the Dutch government.
Chapter 5: The Association for German and Stateless Anti-Fascists

The final case study features the secular AGSA. In contrast to the previous NGOs, the AGSA was formed along national lines. During its brief existence the association advocated the rights of ‘good’ Germans, whether they were still in possession of German citizenship or had been deprived of it by Nazi authorities. Most members were Jews which had fled from persecution before the outbreak of the war. Between 1945 and 1947, they were threatened to be expelled from the Netherlands. In this chapter, the object of analysis is the effort of the AGSA board to acquire residence permits and non-enemy declarations for its refugee members. What arguments did the AGSA use in favour of its members vis-à-vis government officials and, most importantly for the general purpose of this study, why and how did the association cooperate with the IGCR/IRO? This final investigation adds to the previous findings, as the cooperation in this case was not marked by relief or financial assistance, but foremost by advocacy and counselling.

Origins, membership and aims

The presence of ‘undesirable’ Germans became the first post-war migration problem for the Dutch government.288 As already described in the introduction, the government made use of a strong revanchist and anti-German sentiment to prepare the unconditional deportation of all 25,000 Germans living in the Netherlands. Already in August 1945, the Catholic minister of Justice, Kolfschoten (KVP), had drawn up a general plan.289

The group of targeted Germans was by no means homogenous. Due to its favourable geographical location and its demand for labour, the Netherlands had always attracted German immigrants. In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, these immigrants would work as miners, housemaids, merchants, journeymen or seasonal...

288 Berghuis, Geheel ontdaan van onbaatzuchtigheid, 25.

69
farmhands. Some of them stayed in the Netherlands. They opted to remain German citizens and, due to Dutch nationality laws, passed their citizenship onto their children, thus constituting a group of ‘permanent aliens’. They were joined by Jewish refugees and political refugees fleeing from Germany to the Netherlands during the 1930s. These refugees were deprived of their German citizenship by the Nazis. As described in earlier chapters, some went into hiding during the war. After the hostilities ended, survivors were unwilling to return to a devastated and hostile country. They could not easily become Dutch citizens, whilst they did not prefer to recover their German citizenship. They were trapped in the Netherlands.

The Dutch government, not having the means and will to discriminate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ German, insisted on the legitimacy of the deportations. After a year of preparations, police began to round up German civilians in September 1946. The deportees were lifted from their beds in the early morning. They were told that they could only take a limited number of belongings. The officers confiscated the rest. Arriving by train or by bus, the Germans were first gathered in camps close to the border. From here their definite expulsion would be prepared.

Newspapers compared the deportations with wartime razzias: Nazi raids in which Jews had been targeted. Soon, public opinion started to shift in favour of the Germans. Influential representatives of the Catholic Church denounced the deportations, whilst members of parliament criticised the arbitrary deportation of ‘good Germans’ and addressed the bad conditions in the camps. Already before the first deportations took place, it became apparent that the British military authorities in the adjacent German occupation zone objected to the expulsions. They were already very occupied with the administration of refugees streaming in from the east. Faced with critique from all sides,

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291 Boogaarts, “‘Weg met de Moffen’”, 334-335; NA, archive inventory 2.09.5026, IND, 1945-1955, entry 320, AGSA, letter of Amsterdam police investigator Stoet to Grevelink, head of the RVD, 13-11-1945.
292 Boogaarts, “‘Weg met de Moffen’”, 340-341.
294 Ibidem, 264-266.
the Dutch government had to cancel most of its plans in 1947-1948. In the end, only 3,700 Germans were forcefully deported.295

During the first post-war years, the Germans refugees were not passively awaiting their imminent deportation. Some of them united in associations like the AGSA. The origins of this NGO stretched back to the wartime occupation. On the 30th of May 1944 it had been secretly founded as the *Interessengemeinschaft antifaschister Deutscher in den Niederlanden* (Interest Group of Anti-Fascists Germans in the Netherlands). The founders despised national-socialist ideology and denounced the warmongering of their fellow countrymen. The initial membership base of the group consisted of communist resistance fighters and deserters from the German armed forces. An illegal newspaper, simply called *Mitteilungen* (Notifications), was distributed among the members. There is hardly any information about the wartime activities of the group.296

When the Netherlands was fully liberated in May 1945, the name of the *Interessengemeinschaft* was amended. With the title of AGSA, it became clear that the 'anti-fascist' element was supplemented by an emphasis on 'statelessness'. This corresponded to a drastic change in the membership base. The former communist core had left for the Soviet controlled parts of Germany. It was replaced by a broader group of adult men and women of German descent. Members presented themselves foremost as 'Jews', 'social-democrats', 'liberals' and 'non-aligned'. Roughly half of them, 170 out of 385, did not possess the German nationality anymore.297 To secure the position of these (stateless) Germans, the main goal of the AGSA board was to acquire residence permits and prevent deportation. Therefore it had to prove the wartime inculpability of its members vis-à-vis government officials and win public support.298

Advised by three influential figures – Gerard Slotemaker de Bruine (the scientific head of the socialist Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiderpartij), Willem Sandberg (director of the Stedelijk Museum) and Marie Anne Tellegen (head of the Cabinet of the Queen) –

297 NA, archive inventory 2.09.5026, IND, 1945-1955, entry 320, AGSA, letter of Amsterdam police chief to the attorney general, 24-11-1945.
298 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the ICR and IRO, entry 18, AGSA, programme of the AGSA, points 3 and 4.
the board drew up a legal constitution for the association. It also secured the aid of the JCC and Herzog's Service for Victims of Religious Persecution which would respectively provide assistance to the Jewish and Catholic members of the association.  

Because anti-German sentiments were widespread, it was difficult to diffuse the image that some Germans had refused to collaborate with the Nazi authorities. The AGSA board did all it could to present the NGO as an anti-fascist organisation. A questionnaire had to be filled in by aspiring members. The questions centred around the personal background of the applicant, wartime activities, ties with German organisations and future plans.  

Especially the following question was of importance: ‘Reflecting on your activities before and during the war, how could you proof that you are an anti-fascist?’ The board expected members to be politically inactive and willing to support the democratic foundation of the Netherlands.  

The Mitteilungen, now published legally if paper was available, informed members on the government’s migration policy, the precarious situation in Germany and relevant news. It also announced free events, including lectures and debates, which members could attend. The future of Germany and the question of denazification were central points of discussion. All in all, the board did its utmost best to present the AGSA as a reliable and legitimate organisation of anti-fascists Germans.  

The quest for residence permits 

The Bureau Nationale Veiligheid (National Security Office), the first post-war Dutch secret service, became aware of the AGSA’s existence in August 1945. It was surprised to find an active ‘German-led’ organisation so soon after the war. Immediately prime-
minister Schermerhorn (VDB), minister of Justice Kolfschoten (KVP) and the RVD were warned. At first, the Security Office believed that the AGSA was led by communist agitators, but within a fortnight it changed its view and stated that the AGSA was created by the Nazis as a cover-up for the continuation of fascist activities in the Netherlands.304

The RVD, keen to live up to a strict policy, informed the minister of Justice that the AGSA might be declared illegal if it was proven that members of the organisation were politically active. A law from 1855 stipulated that foreigners were not allowed to be members of a political association, nor were they allowed to create one themselves on Dutch soil.305 Having received this information, Kolfschoten urged the head of police in Amsterdam - the town where the NGO was formally located and most of its members lived - to start an investigation. Were the stateless AGSA members politically active, who were the leaders and what were the NGO’s goals?306

In early October, before an official investigation report was submitted, Kolfschoten made up his mind. The Security Office had supplied him with membership lists, which were deemed very useful. The minister now wrote to the RVD that it would be of valuable use to the Dutch government if the association was allowed to exist. After all, ‘dissolving the association would only be beneficial if the stateless members could be individually checked and surveyed by government officials’ and Kolfschoten knew that neither his department, nor the RVD did possess the means to do this. As the AGSA did possess valuable information about its members, it could potentially be used to keep the undocumented Germans in check.307 As long as it remained politically inactive and would prove useful for the government, the association held the (secret) approval of the Ministry of Justice.308


306 NA, archive inventory 2.09.5026, IND, 1945-1955, entry 320, AGSA, letter from the RVD to the Ministry of Justice, 02-10-1945.

307 NA, archive inventory 2.09.5026, IND, 1945-1955, entry 320, AGSA, letter from the Ministry of Justice to the Amsterdam chief of police.

308 NA, archive inventory 2.09.5026, IND, 1945-1955, entry 320, AGSA, letter from the Ministry of Justice to the RVD, 08-10-1945, notes written by minister Kolfschoten on the letter from 02-10-1945.

In November and December, an officer of the Amsterdam police and a local attorney general gathered information about the AGSA. They soon concluded that many members, including those of the board, had been part of the Dutch resistance and were thus ‘bonafide’ Germans. Only one ‘dangerous exception’ was found in the member Curt Wallbach, who was a member of the Scientific Bureau of the Communist Party and board member of the Party’s trade union. Further bolstering their positive image of the NGO, the investigators learned of the support which the board had received during its legal constitution. The anti-fascist goals and the strict screening of aspiring members also convinced the investigators that the AGSA was politically neutral. Not surprisingly, the outcome of the investigation proved to be in the association’s favour. In January, the attorney general of Amsterdam reported to Kolfschoten that the AGSA was a legal association, which could not be forbidden.

Although the Security Office shadowed all activities of the AGSA and the RVD remained suspicious, 1946 would prove to be a successful year for the board members of the AGSA. As head of the RVD, Jan Grevelink was directly responsible for the documentation of foreign and stateless Germans. Officially the deportation of all Germans residing in the Netherlands was still scheduled to take place, but Grevelink already knew that the Allied authorities in the German Occupation Zones would never allow deportation without a pre-selection between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Germans. Only collaborators with family in Germany could be deported, whilst the ‘good’ Germans had to be officially registered. Therefore, when he was approached by the AGSA board in May, he allowed them to send a delegation to the RVD headquarter to discuss a possible granting of residence permits. Other meetings followed in August and September.

Unfortunately, transcriptions of the meetings are not present in the archives. However, the AGSA board informed its members of the meetings with the RVD during the general assembly in September 1946. At first, the situation had seemed tense. An officer from the RVD had warned the board members that ‘you Germans should be grateful, because we could have deported all of you back to Germany in May 1945 if we

309 NA, archive inventory 2.09.5026, IND, 1945-1955, entry 320, letter from Amsterdam police chief to the attorney general, 24-11-1945, 1-3.
311 Boogaarts, “Weg met de Moffen”, 337-338.
312 NA, archive inventory 2.09.5026, IND, 1945-1955, entry 320, AGSA, letter from the RVD to the AGSA, 09-05-1946.
wanted, and you would not have been able to take your belongings with you. No Englishman would have complained at that time.\textsuperscript{313} However, the officer also guaranteed them that all ‘good’ Germans would certainly receive residence permits. This, he estimated, would correspond to roughly a quarter of the 18,000 Germans still present in the Netherlands. They would obtain their permits after all collaborators had been identified and deported. In the meantime, the RVD was busy categorising the Germans. Together with a specially created government committee they would decide which categories were to be deported.\textsuperscript{314}

In the light of this categorisation, an important breakthrough was achieved in December 1946. For the first time, Grevelink approached the AGSA’s board directly and requested a complete list of members who had stayed in the Netherlands before the 10th of May 1940 and had proven to be loyal to the Dutch government.\textsuperscript{315} The board did not hesitate. Within one month, nine pages full with names and addresses of ‘good’ Germans arrived on the desk of Grevelink.\textsuperscript{316} During the next general assembly, which took place in January 1947, the board proudly presented this achievement. The board members regarded the request as a sign of recognition from the state and an upcoming distribution of residence permits. One of the reasons why this had not happened earlier was the understaffing of the RVD. ‘We’, the board members wrote, ‘have done more than our best, and if there are still stateless people awaiting their residence permits, it was certainly caused by the fact that there was no German government and no international policy on how to get them (the stateless refugees) back.’

To establish a clear overview of the position of its members, and to bolster their provision of information to the RVD, the board distributed an inquiry in which members were asked to categorise themselves. Members were separated along three questions: (1) if someone was a refugee or a migrant, (2) when someone had migrated or fled, and (3) if one had rendered (involuntary) service to the Nazi occupiers. Table I. provides an overview of the categories.

\textsuperscript{313} NA, archive inventory 2.09.5026, IND, 1945-1955, entry 320, AGSA, report on the general assembly of the AGSA, 26-09-1946, 3.
\textsuperscript{314} NA, archive inventory 2.09.5026, IND, 1945-1955, entry 320, AGSA, report on the general assembly of the AGSA, 26-09-1946, 1-3.
\textsuperscript{315} NA, archive inventory 2.09.5026, IND, 1945-1955, entry 320, AGSA, letter from the RVD to the AGSA, 02-12-1946.
\textsuperscript{316} NA, archive inventory 2.09.5026, IND, 1945-1955, entry 320, AGSA, list of all members residing in the Netherlands before May 1940 who had been loyal to the Dutch government, 02-01-1947.
Table I. Categorisation of members by the AGSA board

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>German nationals and stateless persons who live in Amsterdam and fled from Germany after January 1 1933 because of political, racial or confessional reasons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>German nationals and stateless persons part of group A but who do not live in Amsterdam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>German nationals and stateless persons who were already residing in the Netherlands before January 1 1933.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>German nationals and stateless persons who migrated to the Netherlands between January 1 1933 and May 10 1940 and did not flee from Germany because of political, racial or confessional reasons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>German nationals and stateless persons who migrated to the Netherlands after May 10 1940.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>German nationals and stateless persons part of group A or B, but who were forced by the German authorities to serve the occupying forces in whatever way possible.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SA, archives of the ISS, dossier number 236, part of an important notification for members who still do not have a residence permit, 07-07-1947.

The members belonging to groups A-B-C-D were expected to receive residence permits as soon as the RVD had processed their personal files.

**IRO involvement and the dissolution of the AGSA**

Although German citizens were legally excluded from IGCR and IRO assistance, Germans who had fled from the Nazis and were deprived of their passports were included in the mandate of the IGOs. As half of the AGSA members were stateless, the AGSA board approached Dutch IGCR/IRO delegate Sark for counselling in April 1947. After a brief exchange of letters, publications, and *Mitteilungen*, Sark was convinced of the
association’s purpose and effectiveness. The AGSA mainly needed his council on the matter of non-enemy declarations and refugee passports, as well as his thoughts on the question whether families, internationally separated, could be united. In response to their requests, Sark allowed board members to visit him in person and discuss these matters.

At least on three points, IRO aid would prove useful for the AGSA. First of all, Sark used his contact with government officials to gain information on relevant procedures and regulation. For this matter, he also asked support from the General Headquarter of the IRO. After having received the necessary information from his sources, he clarified the procedures to the board members and told them what was best to do. The board members were very pleased with this information, which enabled them to constructively communicate with the RVD. Secondly, Sark made use of his network to bolster support and sympathy for the AGSA’s activities. Thirdly, he provided direct support for individual members of the association, especially three members which were denied entry-permits into the German Occupation Zones. Within both the RVD and the IRO archives, there is no evidence indicating direct contact between Grevelink and Sark as far as the AGSA is concerned. Unfortunately, this makes it hard to determine if government officials were influenced by Sark and if they valued the collaboration between the IRO and the AGSA.

Nevertheless, the fruitful IRO support and the RVD’s willingness to provide residence permits led to the accomplishment of AGSA’s goals. In the summer and

317 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the IGCR and the IRO, entry 18, AGSA, letter from AGSA to the IRO, 17-04-1947, attached is Mitteilungen 6, April 1947; NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the ICR and the IRO, entry 18, AGSA, letter from AGSA to the IRO, 16-05-1947, attached are Mitteilungen, May 1947, and the constitution of AGSA.
318 As becomes clear from: NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the ICR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 18, AGSA, letter from AGSA to the IRO, 10-07-1947.
319 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the ICR and the IRO, entry 18, AGSA, letter from the IRO to AGSA, 23-05-1947.
320 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the ICR and the IRO, entry 18, AGSA, letter from the IRO to AGSA, 12-06-1947; NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the ICR and the IRO, entry 18, AGSA, letter from the IRO to AGSA, 21-06-1947; NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the ICR and the IRO, entry 18, AGSA, letter from the IRO to AGSA, 27-06-1947; NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the ICR and the IRO, entry 18, AGSA, letter from the assistant executive secretary of the IRO to IRO delegate Sark, 11-12-1947; NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the ICR and the IRO, entry 18, AGSA, letter from the IRO to AGSA, 30-12-1947.
321 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the ICR and the IRO, entry 18, AGSA, letter from the IRO to Mr. Myer-Cogen, Mr. E. Bogen and Dr. P. Weiss, 29-12-1947.
322 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the ICR and the IRO, entry 18, AGSA, letter from AGSA to the IRO 23-01-1948; NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the ICR and the IRO, entry 18, AGSA, letter from the IRO to AGSA, 27-02-1948.
autumn of 1947, most members finally received their long-awaited residence permits and non-enemy declarations. In November of the same year, the dissolution of the AGSA was declared during a general assembly. The board informed the RVD that the position of its members was now sufficiently consolidated: ‘There is no more need to represent the collective interests of anti-fascist stateless Germans in the Netherlands.’ The board thanked Grevelink, as well as Sark, for their generous cooperation and supportive attitude towards the members of the NGO.

Case analysis: explaining AGSA success

During its short existence of two and a half years, the AGSA was able to achieve its goals. Whilst deportation to Germany loomed over its (stateless) German members in 1945, most of them had received non-enemy declarations and residence permits by late 1947. The partial failure of Operation Black Tulip and the Dutch government’s inability to deport these Germans definitely contributed to the success of the AGSA. There was no other option than the registration of German foreigners. From internal government communication, it became clear that minister Kolfschoten valued the AGSA because he correctly predicted that the association would be a useful partner. Indeed, the AGSA delivered valuable information on (stateless) Germans and made sure that these Germans were screened when civil servants were unable to do so (logistic/expert and threat/prevention considerations). The economic aspect was not important in this case, because the Germans already provided for themselves, or were assisted by other NGOs of religious denomination. Morally speaking the AGSA had a disadvantage: although it presented itself as an anti-fascist association, government officials categorically mistrusted Germans. The Dutch presented themselves foremost as victims, robbing ‘good’ Germans of their moral claim. Notwithstanding its usefulness to the Dutch government, the AGSA was seen as a threat and an unwanted precedent by the RVD and

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324 NA, archive inventory 2.05.31, Dutch delegate to the ICR and the IRO, 1947-1953, entry 18, letter from AGSA to the IRO, 01-12-1947, 1-2; NA, archive inventory 2.09.5026, IND, 1945-1955, entry 320, AGSA, letter from AGSA to the RVD, 20-11-1947.
the Security Office. Throughout its existence, and even after its dissolution, secret agents shadowed members of the association.

Strictly speaking, this case was not that useful for the analysis of NGO-IGO cooperation. It turned out that this cooperation was not as elaborate and complex. There was also no evidence of any communication between the IRO and the Dutch government on AGSA activity, further indicating the minor involvement of the IRO. Nonetheless, Dutch IRO delegate Sark provided the AGSA board with valuable support in its quest for residence permits. His information and expertise indirectly accelerated the registration processes and thus the dissolution of the AGSA. At least in this regard, the NGO-IGO cooperation proved to be useful for all partners involved. This chapter has shown that financial contributions did not necessarily have to be the main part of IGCR/IRO support for NGOs.
Conclusion

Current research on NGO-IGO cooperation is incomplete, biased and in disagreement. An historical compendium on this type of cooperation is absent as well. ‘Grand scheme’ historians have tried to analyse and periodise developments in historical migration governance, but until now an inconclusive debate has provided unsatisfactory outcomes. One point of contention is the importance of the 1940s in the size and nature of NGO-IGO cooperation. Whilst this thesis does not provide key answers to solve the bigger debate, it does provide a highly detailed and elaborate analysis of the partnership between IGOs and NGOs in the 1940s setting. By asking the question ‘why NGOs and IGOs closely cooperated to solve the post-war refugee crisis?’, and by conducting case study analyses on four Dutch NGOs, this thesis plugged a gap in our knowledge on historical NGO-IGO cooperation and provided a practical example of why the 1940s were important in the genesis of the modern humanitarian refugee regime.

Analysis was conducted on four NGOs, which all differed in goal, denomination and membership base. Four types of consideration - (1) logistical/expert, (2) economic, (3) moral/humanitarian and (4) threat/prevention – served to explain why NGOs and IGOs had to work together to effectuate refugee relief and obtain their goals. The results are presented in ‘Table II’.

Analysis showed that economic considerations (2) played a major role in the decision of NGOs to work together with the IGCR and the IRO. The availability of large amounts of (US) cash through these IGOs provided a unique chance. The Dutch government, like its Western-European counterparts, was weakened and its population impoverished. NGOs like the Catholic CCR, the Protestant Quakers/ERCH and the Jewish JCC needed financial support from the IGOs to sponsor all sorts of relief activities. Medical and material aid, cash assistance and emigration costs were often indirectly paid for by the IGOs. Financial support was not necessary for the AGSA, as this NGO only wished to obtain residence permits for its members.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Logistical/ Expert</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Moral/ humanitarian</th>
<th>Threat/ prevention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CCR</strong></td>
<td>Mutual need for each other’s information and logistical expertise leads to strong cooperation.</td>
<td>Shared costs of refugee caretaking fuelled cooperation, as IGCR/IRO deemed it a good investment</td>
<td>CCR’s sense of responsibility for all refugees is not shared by the IGCR/IRO, which is limited by budget and mandate</td>
<td>Both CCR and the IGCR/IRO feared the threat posed by Polish refugees, close cooperation to counter the threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ERCH/Quakers</strong></td>
<td>The IGCR/IRO was reliant on the logistical expertise and knowledge of both NGOs.</td>
<td>Both NGOs needed financial contributions from the IGCR/IRO to administer aid to the refugees.</td>
<td>Queen Juliana’s humanitarianism enabled Dutch IRO to finance ERCH activities. IGO budgets limit the size of cooperation.</td>
<td>No fear for possible threats and unwished precedents ensures cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FJC</strong></td>
<td>The FJC provided all logistical expertise. The IGCR/IRO, as well as the government, provided minimal support.</td>
<td>For a successful execution of the 500 children scheme, IGCR/IRO funds were indispensable.</td>
<td>IGCR/IRO support and government approval were based on the moral belief that Jewish NGOs deserved extra support.</td>
<td>The three year time span ensured governmental actors that no dangerous precedent occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AGSA</strong></td>
<td>IRO supported the AGSA with valuable legal and logistical advice on procedures, contributing to the NGO’s success.</td>
<td>No financial aid was distributed via the IGCR/IRO.</td>
<td>AGSA members were morally viewed as victims by the IRO. Dutch government was less lenient.</td>
<td>AGSA was seen as a threat by the Secret Services. The Ministry of Justice and IRO were confident that the NGO was bonafide.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Logistical support and expert knowledge (1) proved to be the other capital reason for cooperation. In the Quakers/ERCH and JCC cases, the IGCR/IRO was reliant on the grassroot knowledge of the NGOs, as well as their invaluable position as intermediaries and distributors of aid to refugees. In the CCR case, interdependence on each other’s information marked cooperation. Detailed lists and reports were exchanged between Sark and the CCR board to check the background of individual (Polish) refugees and monitor the behaviour of aid recipients. The IRO made use of the Catholic network to reach refugees. In the final case, the IRO provided legal advice to the AGSA board, while the board on its turn provided the suspicious Dutch government with valuable information. This secured the existence of the NGO which had to cautiously deal with widespread anti-German sentiments.

From the moral/humanitarian (3) and threat/prevention (4) perspectives it turned out that IGO considerations could vary extensively between cases. As expected, the NGOs presented themselves as moral saviours. In the JCC case, the IGCR/IRO fully supported this claim, as the Jews had been prime victims of the Nazi regime. In the CCR and Quaker/ERCH cases, representative Sark shared the NGO’s moral responsibility, especially when German Jews and children were involved, but explicitly stated that not everyone could be assisted as his budget was limited. This influenced the size of cooperation. Due to Queen Juliana’s compassion for hard-core refugees, the ERCH and the IRO were able to provide support to 200 old aged refugees. Like all other NGOs, the AGSA was insisting on its moral cause – emphasising the ‘good’ and ‘anti-fascist’ past of its members. It won IRO support, but struggled to convince the authorities.

From the point of threat/prevention, the Dutch government mistrusted the AGSA. IRO support for the AGSA, however, was of a limited and legal nature. Government mistrust did not affect this support. In the cases of the Quakers/ERCH and FJC, the absence of fear reinforced the fruitful NGO-IGO cooperation. By negotiating maximum time spans (three year stay of the Jewish children) or fixed budgets (500 US dollar per hard-core refugee) the IGCR/IRO and the Dutch government were assured that the aid for refugees would remain limited. Finally, the CCR case revealed another aspect: if both the NGO and the IGO feared the possible threat posed by ‘idle and faithless refugees’, this shared fear could bolster closer cooperation to counter the threat.
Answering the main question, it could be stated that the involved NGOs and IGOs were foremost logistically and financially reliant on each other. This mutual need cemented cooperation and assured the effectuation of refugee relief. Subsequently, questions of morality or threat influenced the extent of cooperation. Although perhaps better described as ‘secondary’ considerations, they could have a major impact on the realisation of relief. Corporatism might have also played a role, as the goals and strategies of the involved NGOs and representative Sark - reaching the needy and victimised refugees and alleviating their burden via regulated support and close supervision - were very similar. The interdependence of NGO and IGOs, as well as the nature and profoundness of relief activities, marked the 1940s as a decade in which the establishment of the modern refugee relief system was, if not completed, seriously accelerated.

In the end, this thesis has delivered three important contributions. First of all, it has successfully historicised migration governance by scrutinising the interaction between NGOs and IGOs during the aftermath of the Second World War. Secondly, it has elaborated on the current literature by bridging the gap between NGO and IGO focused studies. For the Dutch literature on post-war migration, it has shown that historians should include NGO-IGO activity in their analyses. It would be a step forward if Dutch historians complemented their government-based studies with the amply available material on non- and intergovernmental organisations. Thirdly, the approach of this thesis proved that the study of NGO activity could potentially yield interesting results on the effectuation of refugee relief and ‘behind-the-scenes’ decision-making. Such results do not only contain a historical value: the tripartite structure of NGOs-IGOs-governments is still intact and shaping present socio-political debate on migration, human rights and volunteerism.

As this research purely focussed on specific cases of IGO-NGO cooperation, further detailed research is needed on the activities of Dutch NGOs. Following Wieters’ example, a study on the organisation of these NGOs might lead to fresh insights on the post-war professionalisation of relief activities and the establishment of the ‘humanitarian charity market’. Eventually, empirically based studies will provide the knowledge to transcend theoretical inconclusiveness.
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