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The Role of Human Rights NGOS as Watchdogs over International Human Rights: A Comparative Analysis of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch Advocacy Mechanisms During the 2015 Migrant Crisis

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The Role of Human Rights NGOs as Watchdogs over International Human Rights

A Comparative Analysis of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch Advocacy Mechanisms During the 2015 Migrant Crisis

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Abstract

Despite the efforts, refugees who have fled to the EU, still face violations to their political and civil rights (UNHCR, 2021). In a result, governments and public institutions require external bodies to oversee their work in order to ensure that Human-Rights are protected Human rights (Dzwonkowska-Godula's, 2019). HRNGOS, being watch dogs, opt for advocacy mechanisms to hold governments accountable, as stipulated through out literature, limited by confounding variables: Throughout literature, this role of the confounding variables in relation to the role of HRNGOs as watchdogs has been limiting, especially in relation to one another. To understand the role of the confounders on the choices of advocacy and the role of HRNGOs as watchdogs particularly towards governments and making comparisons between existing HRNGOS a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) will be conducted on the cases of Amnesty International and Human-Rights Watch in light of the 2015 refugee crisis. Although the role of watchdogs in terms of expertise does not differ amongst HRNGOs, their roles in acting as whistle-blower, pressures and influencers differs significantly. While outside strategies tend to warn, pressure and influence governments vis-à-vis the citizens, inside lobbying tends to warn, pressure and influence governments directly. However, coincidingly with literature, the results presented that although HRNGOs tend to use a mixture of inside and outside lobbying, they often are specialized in on strategy

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List of Abbreviations

NGO	<i>Non-Governmental Organizations</i>
HRNGOS	<i>Human Rights Non-Governmental Organizations</i>
EU	<i>European Union</i>
UDHR	<i>Universal Declaration of Human Rights</i>
UN	<i>United Nations</i>
AI	<i>Amnesty International</i>
AIE	<i>Amnesty International European Institutions Office</i>
HRW	<i>Human Rights Watch</i>

1. Introduction

Almost two-thirds of the world's refugees are stranded in long-term refugee camps, battling for survival in inhospitable environments (O'Brien, 2016). Nonetheless, the international community has attempted to welcome and relocate refugees all over the world (Gill, 2018), including in the EU, which faced a massive influx of Sub-Saharan/Mediterranean African refugees that started in 2015 (PEW Research, 2018). Refugees are individuals who have been forced to flee their home due to social, environmental or political reasons, and often without warning (International Rescue Committee (IRC), 2018). Despite the efforts, refugees who have fled to the EU, still face violations to their political and civil rights (UNHCR, 2021). Consider the well-known EU-Turkey agreement, which consists of agreements reached between EU member states and Turkey. This agreement entails relocating refugees who are illegally entering the EU, to Turkey, with the EU providing financial assistance to Turkey in developing appropriate refugee facilities and provides evidence Human-Rights violations against refugees (Amnesty International, 2017). Rather than opening their borders to all, including refugees, the EU has chosen to keep them restricted and negotiate with the rights of refugees in order to prevent them from further entering the EU, and thus opening a box off processes and policies that lead to systematic abuses of refugees (Amnesty International, 2017).

While the EU has responsibilities to protect Human-Rights (Cohen, 2009; Kumar, 2018; Neff, 2017; Nickel, 1993), these standards have often been vaguely defined and contested (Reed, 2007; Hoover, 2012; McInerny-Lankford, 2009; Sprio, 1997), resulting in a lack of consideration or reference to international Human-Rights obligations. The Universal Declaration of Human-Rights (UDHR), which stipulates both fundamental and basic Human-Rights agreements, is the source of most formal Human-Rights agreements, including the European Convention on Human-Rights. Additionally, decision-makers are opaque and non-participatory, making it difficult for citizens to demand and secure accountability (OHCHR, 2018). The fact that the OHCHR believes “much still needs to be done to ensure that economic, social and cultural rights can be legally claimed and adjudicated” (OHCHR, 2018, para2).

Because of this nearly half of the world leaders are still systematically abusing Human-Rights (Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2007). Repressive leaders often adopt these laws instrumentally in order to gain the related benefits (OHCHR, 2007; Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2007). This instrumental implementation over time could lead to a process of moral consciousness rising, institutionalization and habituation (Risse et al, 1999; Hafner-Burton &

Tsutsui, 2007), and in turn encourages behavioural changes whereby protection and sanction mechanisms for Human-Rights are no-longer present (Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2007). Governments' political accountability mechanisms are unable to identify violations due to fundamental flaws in international human-rights regimes (Khotami, 2017; Bellamy, 2022; McNeil & Malena, 2010; Kleiman, 2021; Sprio, 1997; Yimenu, 2011).

As a result, governments and public institutions require external bodies to oversee their work in order to ensure that Human-Rights are protected Human rights (Dzwonkowska-Godula's, 2019). The role of watchdog is particularly important here. Watchdogs ensure accountability by closely monitoring the activities of governments, industries, and public institutions, and notifying the public and these institutions when policies or processes are incompatible with the public good (Dzwonkowska-Godula's, 2019). This said, while there are corporatist watchdog systems, where bodies such as ombudsmen encourages promotion of Human-Rights and thus democracy through discovering and transforming group preference through "probing violations and joint problem solving" (Hunold, 2001, pg.160), there are also pluralist watchdogs which work on a basis of self-interest and works by maximizing their interests in a political arena "characterized by conflict" (Hunold, 2001, pg.160). Human Rights-based non-governmental organizations (HRNGOs) being one of them. Here, HRNGOs hold an important role in monitoring social reality and therefore pushing for change in a competitive sphere, allowing the protection of rights at all levels. This is because HRNGOs are organizations that have a priority in seeking to defend the same rights for all members of the society and aim to keep the overall political process as transparent and legitimate as possible.

Because HRNGOs are independent of governments, how they advocate determines their ability to hold governments accountable. Advocacy is a strategy for influencing policies or processes within a political, economic, or social institution (Carpenter, 2007). This said, advocacy mechanisms, as stipulated through out literature, limited by confounding variables: The organizational architecture, which include architectures include "informal culture and expectation and formal structures and systems" (Brown et al, 2012, pg.1098) and funding-relations, which refer to the relations held between the HRNGO and its funding sources. throughout literature, this role of the confounding variables in relation to the role of HRNGOs as watchdogs has been limiting, especially in relation to one another. Therefore, this research has attempted to answer the main research question: What are the roles of HRNGOs as watchdogs during the 2015 Refugee Crisis, and how are they influenced by the confounding variables (organization architecture and funding-relations)?

In order to answer this research question, a in depth theoretical framework will be established in identifying the key roles HRNGOs hold as watchdogs, identifying their key mechanisms used to hold governments accountable and identifying the existing literature on the role of the confounding variables. Thereby creating a well-rounded framework of different sources of explanations. In order to do this, a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) has conducted comparing two well established HRNGOs that are predominately present in the international Human-Rights arena, Amnesty International and Human-Rights Watch. To conduct this, both HRNGOs will be analysed in depth in terms of their advocacy mechanisms, their organizational architecture and their funding relations. This attempted to answer the second research question: How do Amnesty International and Human-Rights Watch differ in terms of their role as watchdogs and their confounding variables? To see whether the confounding variables influence the roles of watchdogs, it is essential to compare two organizations that hold differences in organizational architecture and funding relations. This will allow for further establishment of HRNGOs roles as watchdog. While HRNGOS play a significant role as watchdogs, it is important to see to what extent they are influenced by their confounding variables, which are organizational architecture and funding relations.

2. The Role of HRNGOs as Watchdogs

There are challenges in implementing procedures where Human-Rights violations are identified and accounted for, this is because of the vague adaptation of Human-Rights legislation (Khotami, 2017; Bellamy, 2022; OHCHR, 2007). This can be explained by the fact that citizens are unable to gain access in the decision-making arena (Brinkerhoff & Wetterberg, 2015; Edwards, 2017; Sarker et al, 2021). Citizens are the first-hand experiencers and/or witnesses of Human-Rights violations, and therefore, in terms of accounting for Human-Rights, play a crucial role (McNeil & Malena, 2010; Brinkerhoff & Wetterberg, 2015; Edwards, 2017). Citizens have few channels where they can seek redress for violations of these laws (Denedo et al, 2017; Spiro; 1997; McNeil & Malena, 2010). Even more-so, citizens have no access to the formal auditing process (Brinkerhoff & Wetterberg, 2015; Edwards, 2017). While citizen participation encourages both the opinions on the protection of Human-Rights and evaluates the actions of governments (Brinkerhoff & Wetterberg, 2015; Joshi & Houtzager, 2012; Sarker et al, 2021), citizens have no actual say in the policy outcome (McNeil & Malena, 2010; Marcel, 2015).

Because of the absence of Human-Rights accountability at the citizen level, HRNGOs have attempted to fill this accountability gap (Collison et al, 2005; van Tuijl, 1999; Denedo et al, 2017; Hayman, 2017; Marie-Clark, 1995; Marcinkute, 2011). This is because HRNGOs act as mediating bodies who receive complaints and research violations on behalf of the citizens; then, bring it to the political decision-making sphere (Richard, 2009; Shea, 2016; Convergne; 2016; Davies, 2019; Ackerman, 2005; Marie-Clark, 1995; Lai & Hamilton, 2020; Dieng, 2001). This requires HRNGOs to have contact with both policymakers and the public. This does not only enhance democratic participation but also fosters a relationship with policymakers and the public (Junk, 2016).

Human-Rights non-governmental organizations (HRNGOs) are seen as watchdogs in the protection and promotion of human rights. HRNGOs' role differs from that of social service providers (Struyk, 2003; Michalak, 2014; Marcinkute, 2011; Graffeo, 2010; Swed, 2018) since they monitor social reality (Dzwonkowska-Godula, 2019) and control the state by encouraging social change, and thus protecting Human-Rights (Goel & Tripathi, 2010). HRNGOs as watchdogs work independently from the government since their primary function is to control the government (Knodt & Junemann, 2008; Buzogany, 2018; Marcinkute, 2011). The relationship between the government and HRNGOs is polarized since the HRNGOs are “legitimately concerned with undermining authoritarian regimes” (Knodt & Junemann, 2008, p. 262). Here the key goal is to enforce democracy through the protection of Human-Rights (Knodt & Junemann, 2008).

Dzwonkowska-Godula's (2019) describes HRNGOs as watchdogs who monitor social-reality and collect data on human-rights, allowing them to expose and document violations of standards of rights (Dzwonkowska-Godula, 2019). Here they act as early warning systems that hold governments accountable for their violations and convince these actors and the citizens to change their views, processes or policies on these issues (Dzwonkowska-Godula, 2019). By holding this role HRNGOs can control the behaviours of the governments and therefore uphold the rights and interests and articulate the needs to certain social groups that may be facing Human-Rights violations and satisfy the violated (Dzwonkowska-Godula, 2019). While monitoring social reality is crucial for HRNGOs as watchdogs, Dzwonkowska-Godula (2019) also suggests that HRNGOs advocate for changes in the monitored social reality.

Although Dzwonkowska-Godula (2019) suggest that these can be used exclusively, HRNGOs often opt for the use of all of these functions, however, do so in different extremities. HRNGOs are crucial sources of expertise (Hilton et al, 2013; Tanaka, 2011; Tornquist-Chesnier, 2004), which constitute the first function of an HRNGO. This is because they have the ability to communicate with those that are violated, can often become situated in the area where violations are taken place, and has resources such as public actors, journalists, lawyers, citizens, foundations and other NGOs (Tornquist-Chesnier, 2004; Hilton et al., 2013). HRNGOS are put at the forefront of information, implying that HRNGOs act as actors on behalf of human rights. With the information they gain through monitoring, HRNGOs often publish a monstrosity of publications in different forms.

The second function of a HRNGO as a watchdog is their role of being whistle-blowers¹ in the public-sphere (Dzwonkowska-Godula, 2019). Here HRNGOs have the responsibility of alarming, intervening, and reacting to violations and threats of a governments or public institution (Dzwonkowska-Godula, 2019; Daggett, 2002). HRNGOs use the bottom-up 'fire-alarm-mechanisms' (Ackerman, 2005; Dzwonkowska-Godula, 2019; McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984). This ensures that public institutions are warned when problems are about to occur and pay particular attention to areas where there is a lot of societal concern (Ackerman, 2005). This may include activities such as demanding disclosure about certain information (Dzwonkowska-Godula, 2019).

The third function includes HRNGOs exerting pressure on authorities to change either policies or social practices (Dzwonkowska-Godula, 2019). This is facilitated by writing open

¹ Whistle-blowers are individuals or organizations that reports information on public institutions

letters, collecting signatures under petitions or publishing press-releases (Dzwonkowska-Godula, 2019). Further drawing attention to the requests.

The last function of an HRNGO is having active influence on policy (Dzwonkowska-Godula, 2019). Many authors have suggested that a watchdog HRNGO is similar to, if not exactly the same, as an advocacy HRNGO, since they share similar roles (Dzwonkowska-Godula, 2019; Buzogany, 2018; Brown et al, 2012; McPherson, 2015; Steen, 2006). This suggests that advocacy mechanisms are inherently important in understanding the role of HRNGOs in monitoring and changing social reality. HRNGOs use advocacy mechanisms to hold governments accountable by not only monitoring the social reality, but also calling for a change in social reality (Carpenter, 2007; Kelly, 2002; Bauer, 2014; Fernandez-Aballi, 2015; Bauer & Carvalho, 2020). HRNGOs are key sources of information which supports their advocacy work immensely (Chalmers, 2011; Chalmers, 2013b; Kingston & Stam, 2013; Murdie & Pekson, 2012; Gorvin, 2009; Rall et al, 2016).

Carpenter (2007), Keck and Sikkink (1988) have defined how HRNGOs, and other advocacy groups work from a problem initially to framing the issue agenda being advocated. Problems are pre-existing issues that have not yet been defined as an issue. A problem enters the accountability sphere when an HRNGO identifies a human right as an issue of advocacy, HRNGOs take these issues to the sphere of the advocacy campaign where they lobby for a Human-Rights outcome regarding an issue (Carpenter, 2007; Keck & Sikkink; 1998). What Carpenter (2007) suggests here is that HRNGOs decide what becomes an issue based on the “conceptual link between the myriad bad things out there and the persuasive machinery of advocacy politics” (pg.102). This said, HRNGOs are limited in deciding what is salient or not due to their limited resources. In order for HRNGOs to remain impartial and adhere to their mandate, they must ensure that the resources they do have coincide with this (Hendrix and Wong, 2014). Often, we see HRNGOs only accepting a limited amount of external information as evidence for an issue. Therefore, HRNGOs must consider the extremity of the violations and how advocacy can 1) change the opinion and behaviour of the violator and 2) influence the HRNGO positively (Hendrix & Wong, 2014).

Throughout literature, strategies used by HRNGOs have been distinguished between cooperative strategies and adversarial strategies (Brown et al, 2012; Yoori, 2021), or inside and outside lobbying (Junk, 2016; Weiler & Brandli, 2015; de Bruycker & Beyers, 2018; Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2016; Rietig, 2011; Hanegraaff et al, 2016; Colli, 2019; Maloney et al, 1994; Chalmers, 2013b). This distinction as suggested by Brown et al (2012) is useful in understanding the role of HRNGOs in influencing international policy and processes.

Cooperative strategies, also known as insider-lobbying, refers to the tactics used by HRNGOs that enable a direct stream of accountability (Brown et al, 2012). Many HRNGOs engage in providing research and arguments which aim to directly influence political outcomes through direct interaction with decision-makers (Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2017; Junk, 2015; Rietig, 2011; Colli, 2019). HRNGOs using this tactic often meet with decision-makers, responding to consultations, attending events organized by ministers, directly contacting policymakers, publishing reports as response to policies or process conducted by governments and offering expertise (Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2017; Junk, 2015; Rietig, 2011; Colli, 2019; Hanegraaff et al., 2016; Chalmers, 2013a). A key aspect for inside lobbying is information, interests, such as HRNGOS or other external watchdogs are able to provide policymakers with expert knowledge (Junk, 2016; Colli, 2019; Chalmers, 2013a) because of this the interests can more successfully influence the decision-making process, and therefore protect human-rights (Grant, 1999, Weiler & Brandli, 2015).

Adversarial strategies, or outside-lobbying, relates to the activities used by HRNGOs to indirectly hold governments accountable through public mobilization (Brown et al., 2012; Yoori, 2021; Junk, 2016). Outside lobbying tactics consists of mobilizing the public through news media, social media, public events, campaigning, mass protests, petitioning to policymakers, mass email/letter writing campaigns to policymakers, providing general information about violations or policies (Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2017; Junk, 2016; Rietig, 2011; Colli, 2019; Hanegraaff et al., 2016). For HRNGOs who represent the wider population, it is essential to mobilise their membership base and the public regarding the issue at hand (Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2017).

What we see here is each strategy is linked to a Human-Rights logic. For example, inside lobbying is driven by the logic of influence and expertise (Junk, 2016; Rietig, 2011), if HRNGOs lack expertise and influence, they are unable to hold governments directly accountable. This puts the government in the role as the addressee (Junk, 2016). Outside lobbying on the other hand is driven by the logic of reputation and public backing in order to indirectly hold accountable (Junk, 2016; Rietig, 2011). By maintaining their public reputation, HRNGOs can receive public backing, suggesting that lobbying tactics will be addressed to the public (Junk, 2016). While, Weiler & Brandli, (2015) suggests cause groups, including HRNGOS, often lack direct access to policymakers, Brown et al. (2012), Dellmuth & Tallberg (2017), and Colli (2019), suggest that HRNGOS often deviate to a mixture of inside and outside lobbying, therefore opting for a mixture of these two logics. In this sense HRNGOs do not binarily choose its strategies, but often opts for a mixture of both (Colli, 2019). Especially

within the level of the EU HRNGOs opts for tactics addressing policymakers and addressing the public (Dur & Mateo, 2013). Although HRNGOs often specialize in one strategy, level of government target, a mixture of inside and outside lobbying is beneficial in “maximizing the chances of successes” (Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2017, pg.65). This is known as a branch of outside lobbying, known as semi-outside lobbying (Rietig, 2011). While HRNGOS have no real connection to the negotiation scene, they still have the ability to communicate with government delegates on formulations or recommendations for policies by providing draft text (Rietig, 2011).

Within this mixture of inside and outside lobbying Dzwonkowska-Godula (2019) classifies three categories of actions that HRNGOs use. These include legal, political and nonviolent (social) actions (Dzwonkowska-Godula, 2019). Legal actions include undergoing legal proceedings in hopes of a judicial ruling from the countries supreme court or the European court of Human-Rights (Dzwonkowska-Godula, 2019). This encourages changes in existing laws or unjust regulations by bringing the public and the government into awareness of the legal implications of the violations taken place (Nowicki & Fialova, 2000). Political actions consist of creating alliances with national and international politicians through pressuring parliamentarians for changes in their voting behaviours or influence governments directly, such as through the council of Europe or the UN to change legal systems or processes (Dzwonkowska-Godula, 2019). These are done through shadow reports that describe and diagnose information from government reports and documenting case violations of the law to hold governments accountable (Nowicki & Fialova, 2000). The last action Dzwonkowska-Godula (2019) suggests is through civic non-violent actions. These aim at encouraging civic pressure on authorities to enforce changes to Human-Rights protection and promotion. This includes conducting information campaigns through petitions, marches or other public mobilization or placing direct collective pressure such as nonviolent actions against governments through mass submissions of applications or complaints in order to paralyze institutions (Nowicki & Fialova, 2000). Non-violent civil action, however, is more prominently used in outside lobbying.

2.1. Confounding Variables to Watchdog Work

This said, many authors have pointed out the influences of institutional features when it comes to choices of advocacy. According to various authors (i.e.: Brown et al, 2012; Bloodgood, 2010; Scott, 2008; Moore & Stewart, 1998; Chaqués-Bonafont & Muñoz Márquez, 2016; Weiler & Brandli, 2015; Metin, 2017; Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2017; Junk, 2016), HRNGOs are influenced by their governance decisions in shaping their organizational architecture and in turn how they carry out their strategies and actions.

HRNGOs Organizational architectures are divided between the regulative and normative dimension as proposed by Scott (2008). The regulative dimension elaborates on the way in which power is allocated among insider groups, which is known as governance (Scott, 2008). In short, the regulative dimension entails the rules each HRNGO follows in defining its strategies, policies, mandate and relationship between members (Scott, 2008). The normative dimension suggests that HRNGOs also obtain beliefs, ethics and principles and how they aim to pursue them (Scott, 2008). This normative dimension is an influence on choices of advocacy since it sets the foundation of the overarching objective of the HRNGO (Checkel, 2017). Often these organizations are bound to their mandate, which can in some-cases, be limiting (Junk, 2016). Therefore, the norms that come out of that mandate are portrayed through advocacy mechanisms and can be limited (Scott, 2008; Junk, 2016). For example, more service based HRNGOs work with the government while advocacy based HGNOs work against the government (Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2017).

HRNGOs architecture ranges from a centralized structure to loosely connected networks (Brown et al, 2012); this said, most HRNGOs have a general assembly of members and constituents, international boards that oversee the work of international secretariates and an international secretariate who coordinate the transnational work (Brown et al, 2012; Chaqués-Bonafont & Muñoz Márquez, 2016). Here a distinction can be made between a federation, confederation, a network and a support organization (Brown et al, 2012). Federations have a strong centralized unit that set out strategies and protect their 'brand' (Brown, et al, 2012). International secretariates within federations often have the responsibility for setting the agenda, supporting member development and intervening to help members with difficulties (Brown et al, 2012), however have no means of controlling the members. Here the international secretariate is allocated with power in order to pursue more effective work.

Confederations are characterized by a similar structure, however, maintain less central coordination and more autonomy among members (Brown et al, 2012). Here the level of work is divided more evenly amongst the members. A network brings various autonomous organizations that share a mandate, information and goals in order to develop a joint action at a large scale (Brown et al, 2012). Lastly, support organizations provide specialized support to movements or social services. However, in reality, HRNGOs work as hybrids of these types of architectures (Brown et al, 2012).

Brown et al (2012) stipulate the fact that depending on the organizational architecture of an HRNGO, the choice of adversarial and cooperative (inside/outside lobbying) will differ as well. Networks and support organizations typically opt for collaborative advocacy, since they often work directly with the governments, no matter what norm they hold within its organization (Brown et al, 2012). Federations and confederations on the other hand are more prone to using a mixture of both collaborative and adversarial strategies across various different levels (Brown et al, 2012).

Many HRNGOs such as Amnesty International and Human-Rights Watch have consultative status in the United Nations (UN), this allows HRNGO to play a prominent role during UN proceedings and promote their visions on Human-Rights promotion and protection. This implies they often work alongside or in some cases for the UN as this allows their opinions to be presented to a wider audience. This does not only allow them to gain access to the insider policy-making arena, but also allows them to use insider tactics to push their agenda into the sphere of the UN (Martens, 2006). Here, consultative status differs from special status to general status. General status is where organizations gaining status within the UN based on shared interests, while special status suggests organizations that are granted status based on some shared interests (Martens, 2006).

Furthermore, within HRNGOs members play an important part in advocacy, since they are the faces and producers of advocacy campaigns (Chaqués-Bonafont & Muñoz Márquez, 2016; Brown et al, 2012; Bloodgood, 2010; Moore & Stewart, 1998). According to Srinivas (2022), there are three types of membership models: the exclusive model which constitutes a small number of members or organizations who pays an up-front fee and on-going amount to fund the HRNGOs research; Single-tier model, where HRNGOs have a single level membership where individuals or organizations have identical responsibilities; and the multi-tier membership model which constitutes a variety of members who pay fees based on the

country's location (Srinivas, 2022). This said, the membership style is highly determined on the size and scale of the HRNGO (Srinivas, 2022; Davies, 2019). This is because in some cases HRNGOs work strictly internationally or nationally, but in other cases HRNGOs work at different levels of operation where there are various dimensions present (Vakil, 1997; Cousins, 1991; Davies, 2019). Here a distinction can be made between funded and non-funded membership bases. Where the single-tier models constitute as non-funded, the multi and exclusive membership model constitutes as funded-membership.

This brings us to the implications of funding and funding relations within HRNGOS and its implications to choices of advocacy (Scott, 2008; Edwards & Hulme, 1996; McDonough & Rodriguez, 2020; Goncharenko, 2019; Srinivas, 2015; Reith, 2010; Hohn, 2012; Chaqués-Bonafont & Muñoz Márquez, 2016). Srinivas (2015) developed a continuum in which NGOs gain funding. This varies from external to internal funds. External funding consists of donor funding, project funding, online funding or fund-raising events, and membership fees (Srinivas, 2015). Internal funding is done through investments from fixed deposits, financial investments, trust funds, endowment funds (Srinivas, 2015). These are typically not project Human-Rights but instead are used for the long-term maintenance of the HRNGO (Srinivas, 2015). Finances that come between this continuum, as Srinivas (2015) suggests, are income generating activities that constitute a mixture of both internal and external sources of funding and consist of membership or subscription fees, publications, micro-enterprising, including volunteer staff, training, and consultancy.

External funds such as membership fees, donations have fundamental influence in choices of advocacy (Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2017; Colli, 2019, McDonough & Rodriguez, 2020; Fritz, 2020). For example, membership-fees affect the choices of strategy in the sense that HRNGOs relying on these fees should seek accountability through outside lobbying as this encourages mobilisation of its members, however at the same time need to maintain influence on policy (Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2017; Colli, 2019). Because membership bases who do not have to pay fees do not face similar limitations, they have the ability on focusing more on inside lobbying tactics (Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2017). It can be further argued that the choice of outside-lobbying with membership-fee based HRNGOS also constitutes as calling for more financial resources (Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2017). Thus, if they were to opt to inside lobbying or cooperative strategies only, it would lose its membership base and therefore also their financing.

Donations are received by pooled donor mechanism, privation foundations or bilateral governments (McDonough & Rodriguez, 2020). Therefore, the donations they receive are crucial, no matter what the interest is in donating. Here a distinction needs to be made between restricted and unrestricted donations. Donations without donor restrictions, which are funds that are able to be used in general operations have no particular restriction or requirement in spending (Fritz, 2020). There are donors that are contributing the catalytic funding which constitute short term immediate advocacy activities rather than long term outcomes such as organization capacity strengthening (McDonough & Rodriguez, 2020). Here the funding is used for quick advocacy action on Human-Rights topics (McDonough & Rodriguez, 2020). Donations with donor restrictions, which are funds that are subject to the restrictions such as being spent on the functioning of a HRNGO or a project (Fritz, 2020). The restrictions can either be temporary or placed until the donation giving has elapsed (Fritz, 2020). Typically, we see unrestricted donations contributing to core funding (McDonough & Rodriguez, 2020; Fritz, 2020), which consists of funding to support the administrative operations such as paying salaries, rent or programmatic work; this is essential for HRNGOs since they do not constantly have the fundraise to finance these things (Esplen, 2016; McDonough & Rodriguez, 2020). It can contribute to better ownership by giving recipients better control over resource allocation (McDonough & Rodriguez, 2020). Endowment funds are an example of restricted donations and are received for the general running and institutional processes of the HRNGO.

HRNGOs are increasingly becoming accountable to their donors, this is because often the organization has limited means of funding and therefore need to behave according to the donor to maintain these donations (Reith, 2010; Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Goncharenko, 2019; Hohn, 2012). However, HRNGOs become too affiliated with these donors, they may lose reputation vis-a-vis the government and other political actors, making them less influential (Parks, 2008). Foreign donor funding particularly raises suspicion amongst domestic actors especially due to concerns of foreign manipulation (Parks, 2008). This can be similarly said if HRNGOs are funded by governments. Since usually the agendas of HRNGOs and Governments contradict, major obstacles appear in the effectiveness and roles of HRNGOs since they have to work in line with the interests of the governments. Here HRNGOs may end up 'over-accounting' the needs to multiple demands (Edwards & Hulme, 1996), this suggests donors have some sense of power in donating to HRNGOs, however the power does not stem from giving financing, but instead is received based on the relationship between the HRNGO and the donor (Edwards & Hulme, 1996). Genuine donor-relationships emphasize

participation, learning, transparency and reciprocity; however, these types of relationships are rare (Edwards & Hulme, 1996).

Although the understanding of each element is present throughout research, it is necessary to conduct further research on why these elements may interact with one another. Therefore, this research aims at answering the following research question: *What is the role of HRNGOS as watchdogs during the 2015 European Migrant crisis, how is this influenced by their institutional features?* In attempting this, it is crucial to compare how two different HRNGOs, namely Amnesty-International and Human-Rights Watch are seeing how the confounding variables play a role. This will allow the answering of the second research question: *How do Amnesty International and Human-Rights Watch compare in their role as watchdogs?*

3. Research Design

To understand the role of the confounders on the choices of advocacy and the role of HRNGOs as watchdogs particularly towards governments and making comparisons between existing HRNGOS a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) will be conducted. This method is ideal due to the limited time frame of the present study². All data is be sourced from online databases, such as Jstor or ScienceDirect³. In addition, to establish an understanding of HRNGOs as watchdogs, any work that constitutes HRNGOS as service providers is be disregarded. This is validified through the triangulation of different sources (Nightingale, 2009; Toshkov, 2016). Triangulating sources entails the use of different resources to explain one aspect of a concept (Nightingale, 2009; Toshkov, 2016). In the present study this includes sources from HNGOS, journal articles, and sources from varying organizations, institutions or news outlets⁴. This will allow for a well-rounded vision of the aspect of the HRNGO and will reduce possible biases from emerging in their conceptualization (Nightingale, 2009; Toshkov, 2016; Bhandari, 2022; Colli, 2019). Such as selection and publication bias.

The case is Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights-Watch (HRW). These two HRNGOS are mostly similar in design, since they are both Human-Rights orientated organizations that have no external agendas except protecting and promoting Human-Rights

² From January 2022- June 2022

³ See reference list

⁴ See reference list

(Amnesty International, 2021c; Amnesty International 2021g; Amnesty International; 2022a; Human-Rights Watch, 2022b; Human-Rights Watch, 2022g; Human-Rights Watch, 2020a) and they follow their legal requirements of being 1) formally non-governmental; 2) has a non-profit aim; 3) does not use or promote violence; and 4) has a formal existence with a statute and democratic and representative structure (Lindblom, 2005). However, they differ in institutional features such as organizational architecture and funding-relations.

To narrow down the material, data considering either refugees, migrants or asylum seekers will be considered. This is because, for example, HRW has a subsection of ‘refugees and migrant rights’(Human-Rights Watch,2015). Although the peak of the refugee crisis happened in 2015 significant events happened outside of that year that were significant for the crisis to happen and how the EU’s response to the crisis (UNICEF, 2021; European Parliament, 2017). Because of this, the study constitutes the years from 2014 to 2017. This provides coverage of all events leading to the crisis (UNICEF, 2021), the crisis itself and offers perspectives on the response of the EU member states to the crisis by looking at the after-affect, especially in light of the EU-Turkey Deal. This also allows for an analysis of HRNGOs role in advocating for change.

Analysing this data consists of content analysis. This entails categorising themes and ideas which correspond to existing theories (Lou, 2022), such as advocacy actions and type of membership base, internal power structure and funding sources and dependencies. Each HRNGO undergoes an analysis based on the advocacy strategies of inside and outside lobbying (Junk, 2016; Thiel & Ucarer, 2014; De Bruycker & Beyers, 2018; Brown et al., 2012; Huberts, 1989; Grant, 1999, Weiler & Brandli, xxx) 1) the actions which include legal, political and non-violent actions (Nowicki & Fialova, 2000; Dzwonkowska-Godula, 2019) and the 2) institutional features including regulative and normative dimension, type of architecture, status and 3) membership and financial resources, types of funding, donor relations (Lou,2022; Toshkov, 2016). AI will undergo an analysis on its organizational architecture, its funding and its funding relations and then an analysis of AI advocacy mechanisms will be made in regard to the 2015 migrant crisis⁵. The same thing will then be done for HRW, followed by a comparison between AI and HRW based on their aforementioned strategies and mechanisms and compare to see how these may influence their functions as watchdogs (Dzwonkowska-Godula, 2019). This method allows for inferences to be made by analysing semantic

⁵ The 2015 Refugee crisis will the scope of research as this will narrow the policy topic for both HRNGOs.

relationships of the key concepts (Lou, 2022; Toshkov, 2016). It therefore allows establishing correlations and patterns yet also revealing differences in different contexts. This is crucial for this research project since it will allow for us to understand the influence of the institutional features on how they act as watchdogs, not only the instruments used.

QCA enables the discovery of relations between various combinations of explanatory variables (Institutional features) and outcome (accountability mechanisms) (Toshkov, 2016; Colli, 2019). Because the possibility of there being significant differences in the two causal conditions, and how they correspond with one another, it is appropriate to conduct a fuzzy set approach to QCA⁶. This entails have a comparison of differences in similar systems. Implying that there is no set answer or expectation when analysing the data, and instead will look at how the differences can be explained (Toshkov, 2016; Colli, 2019). It entails looking at set-relations. This ensures nuanced levels of measurements (Toshkov, 2016; Colli, 2019) and allows for more flexibility and a more valid measurement since the two HRNGO cannot be described in a binary manner (Toshkov, 2016; Colli, 2019). QCA is beneficial for this research paper since it allows for an in-depth analysis of each HRNGO and therefore patterns and set relations across the two cases will be simpler to identify (Toshkov, 2016; Colli, 2019). Here the aim is to establish whether institutional features are both a necessary and sufficient condition (Toshkov, 2016) for the choice of accountability mechanisms and thus to see how this influences their role as watchdogs. This enables an understanding difference in very similar political and social settings, enabling an understanding of the causal conditions of HRNGO advocacy mechanisms.

QCA has limitations in certain areas: there is the possibility of measurement error and random variability, because the number of the cases are small, it is often difficult to filter out noise and average out random measurement errors (Toshkov, 2016). Therefore, sticking to the timeframe, HRNGOs and concepts are essential. It needs to be considered that any generalization made from QCA is dubious (Toshkov, 2016), this is unless the accounting is done retrospectively which is what is being done in this research. Therefore, these limitations need considering when making conclusions. This will be controlled by focusing on the accountability mechanisms of AI and HRW used during the 2015 European Refugee Crisis.

⁶A fuzzy set allows elements have partial degrees between 0-1, meaning that there does not have to be one standard 'correct' answer; instead, there are multiple combinations of answers (Colli, 2019)

This will control the issue topic both HRNGOs are accounting for, therefore exposing the mechanisms used by the HRNGOs instead of their topic choice.

4. Empirical Findings

This part of the paper is to bring these concepts into reality by applying them to international HRNGOs, namely Amnesty-International and Human-Rights Watch. This is crucial in understanding whether the confounding variables are a causal condition to the use of advocacy mechanisms. Therefore, the next sections will attempt to answer the following research sub-questions: 1) What stance do the AI and HRW take during the refugee crisis; 2) What are the advocacy mechanisms used by Amnesty-International and Human-Rights Watch in protecting and promoting Human-Rights during the 2015 Refugee Crisis? ; 3) What are the key features of AI and Human Right Watch organizational architecture and funding-relations?; and 4) How do AI and HRW compare with one another in terms of organizational architecture, funding-relations and accountability mechanisms?

4.1. Amnesty-International: 2015 European Refugee Crisis

The rights of refugees are a leading area of focus for Amnesty International (AI) (Amnesty-International, 2021b); therefore, are crucial players in the protection of refugees. They have focused on Human-Rights violations committed against these individuals in both their home countries and countries where they have sought asylum (Amnesty-International, 2021b). AI believes that the problem is not the number of refugees, but instead of the underlying reasons why refugees are fleeing, and the unrealistic ways politicians are responding (Amnesty-International, 2021b; Amnesty-International, 2022b). AI believes that the EU has adopted restrictive and punitive asylum rules, in addition, they strongly believe that there is a ‘tremendous’ amount of human suffering caused by the EU turkey deal (Amnesty-International European-Institutions-Offices, 2019a).

AI maintains three general aims in protecting and promoting the rights of refugees: 1) the procedure for both examining requests and at airport and borders are adequate to identify migrants at risk; 2) that control measure for entry are not used in such a way that violates migrants in obtaining access to asylum; 3) that if migrants or refugees are detained, they are

given a prompt, fair and individual hearing before a legal authority (Christiansen & Dowding, 1994; Amnesty International, 2021b).

AI draws its focus on the legal responsibility to uphold their protection in human rights, namely with reference to: the UDHR, article 14 which states that everyone has the right to seek and enjoy asylum from prosecution in other countries (United Nations, 1948; Amnesty International, 2021b); UN Refugee Convention which protects migrants from being returned to countries where they are at risk of being persecuted (UN General Assembly, 1951; Amnesty International, 2021b); and the 1990 Migrant Workers Convention, protecting migrants and their families (UN General Assembly, 1990; Amnesty International, 2021b). AI stands behind the Fundamental Rights of the EU (Amnesty International European Institutions Offices, 2019a), especially about the European crisis.

4.1.1. Amnesty International: Advocacy Mechanisms

AI takes a leading role in conducting research and shares this research through organized campaigns aiming to protect and promote Human-Rights (Bardarova et al., 2010). They initiate their work from the lack of consideration of Human-Rights in law and from visible and announced Human-Rights abuses (Bardarova et al., 2010). They aim to improve the lives of people globally. Because of its mass-membership size, AI can work with and for its member, enabling the protection of civil and political rights as mentioned under the UDHR. Through their campaigns, AI can pressure public opinion and governments through various forms of advocacy tools such as (Bardarova et al., 2010), protests, UrgentActions, reports, periodicals, and submissions to the UN and the Council of Europe. To hold the government accountable, AI campaigning entails coordinating a public relations strategy, international legal efforts, and public participation (Buchanan, 2002; Marie-Clark, 1995). This puts pressures on AI to achieve both a mixture of calm and measured tones (Ron, 2007) and recognize that the Human-Rights violations are emotional topics that are often politically engaged, often questioning the actions of AI (Ron, 2007).

During the 2015 European Refugee Crisis, AI established the I-Welcome campaign (Amnesty International, 2022b). This was in response to a survey commissioned by AI which asked more than 27,000 people in twenty-seven different countries their attitudes about refugees (Gill, 2018; Amnesty International, 2022b). However, contrary to what the EU and other governments believe their citizens want, more than two thirds of respondents stated

governments should do more (Gill, 2018). Although the focus of the campaign was for leaders all over the world, AI also drew Human-Rights attention to the role of the EU in protecting and promoting refugee rights. On the webpage they had stated that many European countries make risky agreements that prevent people from coming at all, leaving thousands of people with no choice but to risk their lives crossing the Mediterranean (Amnesty International, 2022b), with a hyper link to a press release titled ‘EU-Turkey Deal: A shameful stain on the collective conscience of Europe’ (Amnesty International, 2017b). Implying direct accountability towards the EU and its member-states.

With this campaign, AI was able to point out the unwillingness of governments all over the world to fulfil the demands of their citizens and voters (Amnesty International, 2022b). The ‘Welcome’ slogan emerged on social media and became a trending status and was something AI could leverage (Gill, 2018). The I-Welcome campaign does not only bring the government’s unwillingness and lack of efforts to light, but it mobilizes citizens and public actors to take a less Human-Rights approach to protecting the rights of refugees. On the website of I-Welcome, AI states that since politicians are unable to protect human rights, ‘we’ have to (Amnesty International, 2022b) implying that citizens are better off at protecting refugees by welcoming them. AI stimulates this by stating on the campaign’s webpage: “Join the movement of people uniting to welcome refugees in their own ways. Whether it is by adding your voice to a petition, acting locally, or something unique to you (Amnesty International, 2022b). Furthermore, AI gives advice on how citizens can sponsor the welcoming of refugees, enabling sufficient resources for citizens to take personal action, even if it is at a smaller scale.

This approach of ‘welcoming’ (Gill, 2018) is present throughout various advocacy mechanisms used by AI, however, takes different forms and holds different intentions. The I-Welcome Campaign has led to the initiation of AI based demonstrations and protests held by AI members and activists in front of different member-state parliaments (Amnesty International, 2022b). For example, in 2015 AI demonstrated in The Hague (Netherlands) by placing hundreds of “welcome” doormats in front of the parliament calling for Prime Minister Rutte to show more leadership by accepting the redistribution of refugees in Greece, Hungary and Italy (NL Times, 2015) ; in 2016 they held a ‘life jacket protest’ in response to the lack of consideration of Human-Rights in the EU-Turkey deal, by placing 28 life-jackets (one for each member-state) on tripods with the text displayed “don’t trade refugees” in front of the EU parliament in Brussels (Amnesty International, 2016a) ; and in 2017 a symbolic protest was held on the Greek Island of Lesbos where activists were ‘captured’ under a net further symbolising the welcoming of refugees (Amnesty-International Canada, 2017) These protests

do not only portray the efforts of AI in initiating civil pressure initiatives, but also the importance of AI's large membership and activist base.

Besides general calls for action through campaigns, AI also calls for citizens to complete more Human-Rights actions. These are presented in their UrgentAction campaigns. UrgentAction Campaigns are a small but direct effort to making a direct change by saving the lives of "acutely endangered people (Amnesty International, 2007). An UrgentAction is launched when AI notices a form of intervention which are linked to arbitrary arrests, death threats, disappearances, torture or executions (Amnesty International, 2007). Therefore, UrgentActions are a call for citizens to send appeals, write letters, emailing or tweeting public officials (Amnesty International, 2007) and to prevent governments from arbitrarily arresting a refugee.

During 2014 to the end of 2017 there were approximately 30 Urgent Action announcements about the refugee crisis. The topics concerned Human-Rights Human-Rights violations towards Human-Rights individuals such as: Noori, the 21-year-old Syrian refugee who has been illegally detained (Amnesty International, 2017a); and the two Syrian refugees M.F and J.B which could not legally be granted asylum (Amnesty International, 2016d). While all UrgentAction campaigns name and shame the EU and its member states for executions, arbitrary arrests or other interferences in the refugees' rights and freedoms, the key purpose of these UrgentActions is to bombard public actors that are committing violations, vis-à-vis citizens through mass letter writing. Overall, UrgentActions during the 2015 European Refugee Crisis, intended to protect individuals that were unlawfully determined or tortured, with only few really pin-pointing to the implications of general refugee rights.

While AI takes a strong stance in promoting civil action, they also turns to means of expertise in the hopes of changing both public opinion as well as governments and the UNs opinions (Bardarova et al., 2010). This is seen by their use of research reports. AI's role as experts stems from the fact that they are a body that heavily investigates and researchers' Human-Rights violations. Over all levels of operation there are experts that do accurate, cross checked research into Human-Rights violations by governments; to do this, they monitor violations of Human-Rights through official and unofficial news media, local groups, governments, and independent observers (Clark, 199; Amnesty International European Institution Offices, 2019a). In some scenarios AI conducts primary research by sending a fact-finding mission, sending lawyers (volunteers) to observe trials and interviewing witnesses (Amnesty International, 2002). Once the research at all levels has produced and verified, the information is published to its members and the public. Overall, they maintain a strong stance

in impartiality during research since this encourages better and clearer investigations of Human-Rights violations against refugees (Amnesty International, 2002).

Research reports are an important aspect of the advocacy strategy of AI. This is because it firstly pressures the government first hand by holding them accountable for their violations or for their lack of recognition of Human-Rights (Hendrix & Wong, 2013) and secondly, it informs the public of the violations and problems itself, but also encourages public opinion on the policy issue and on the government and institutions themselves (Hendrix & Wong, 2013). Research reports come in two forms, general research reports and yearly research reports. While the general research reports present research on Human-Rights cases of violations, the yearly reports summarize all of AI's findings on violations taken place by each country that year. The information found in the general reports are also found back in AI's yearly reports. Both types of reports consist of information of implications and problems that are being faced by the EU regarding problems in EU laws and policy, restrictive border policies and inferences of arbitrary detention⁷. These reports also hold Human-Rights recommendations for the council of Europe, for example: "investigate the Farmakonisi incident and other allegations of collective expulsions" (Amnesty International, 2014); and to European member-states "offer more safe and regular routes to people in need of protection" (Amnesty International, 2016e). While these reports are published online for the public to see and submitted to government officials, therefore sending governments both a direct and indirect message to ensure, respect and realize Human-Rights. Therefore, directly pressuring governments to do take better consideration of human rights.

Although reports are used to indirectly pressure governments into changing their behaviour, AI also contributes to publishing submissions to the Council of Europe and the UN. AI also contributes to litigation submissions, however there were none found during the timespan. These submissions and published enabling AI to lobby its opinions and recommendations into a greater political sphere. In 2016 for example, AI published a submission to the council of Europe pushing EU member states to evaluate Greece's compliance to the European court of Human-Rights (Amnesty International, 2016d) . In 2017 AI published a submission to the UN considering the in-adequate living standards of

⁷ See these examples of UrgentAction Campaigns

<https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur03/2544/2015/tr/>
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur25/004/2014/en/>
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur44/3022/2015/en/>

uncommented refugees in the Netherlands, calling the UN to bring to light that the Netherlands needs to ensure appropriate living standards for refugees and that they develop a human rights-oriented strategy to solve it (Amnesty International, 2017b). Although not frequently used, these submissions are influential in pushing AI's agenda into the political sphere thereby having a more direct means of accountability.

Press releases allows for a mixture of audiences. While they are directed towards the press and news outlets, they are also used to inform and educate citizens and public institutions about the current state of the social reality. Members and its country sector researchers and therefore can push for better decisions and shifting the focus and agenda (Hendrix & Wong, 2013). Between the middle of 2014 and the end of 2017 there were 140 press releases concerning the topic of the migrant crisis and the turkey deal⁸.

4.1.2. Amnesty International: Organizational Architecture

Amnesty International (AI), started as a mass letter-writing campaign towards a narrow scope of 'prisoners of conscience' (Amnesty International, 2021c; Sithole, 2016; Baehr, 1994). As Amnesty international grew, their focus shifted from solely prisoners of conscience to broader Human-Rights issues such as torture, death penalty or disappearances and more recently, the rights of refugees (Amnesty International, 2021b). However, has also maintained their focus on protecting prisoners in general.

AI describes itself as being independent of any political ideology, economic interest, or religion (Amnesty International, 2020). The overall objective of AI is to contribute to the observance of Human-Rights throughout the world as set out by the UDHR (Amnesty International, 2021a). This objective allows for a non-arbitrary value based on universal standards to be held (Baehr, 1994). AI's mandate contributes to the higher goal, namely, to protect the universal human rights. The mandate contributes to the observation of the overall objective (Baehr, 1994). There are two important aspects to the mandate, namely: that AI has the responsibility to promote the UDHR and other Human-Rights instruments and to hold opposition to violations of the rights of individuals to freely express themselves and be free of any discrimination and unethical treatment (Baehr, 1994; Amnesty International 2021a).

⁸ See the Amnesty International's press release archives: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/search/?qresource-type=2143&qtopic=2107%2C2105>

The International Secretariate is AI's main decision-making body, since they conduct research on violations, set the campaign agenda, propose solutions, direct members to different tasks (Waltz, 2012; Martens, 2006). This makes AI a federation since the international secretariate has explicit responsibility in defining the agenda, supporting member development and intervening to help members (Brown et al, 2012). This suggests that AI has a centralized power structure as the international board over-see the international secretariate and therefore have very Human-Rights tasks (Amnesty-International, 2021g; Martens, 2006; Tjäder; Amnesty-International, 2022d).

Within the secretariat the global assembly has the highest power in decision making (Tjäder, 2021). This body consists of different national and international members and have the significant role in approving global strategies and deciding the charter and the policies of AI's work (Tjäder, 2021). Furthermore, they have the responsibility of electing and overseeing the international board (Amnesty International, 2022d).

This said, in order to remain legitimate, AI's international secretariate supported the rise of affiliates in order to expand their national impacts (Brown et al, 2012). These are known as the country sectors. Country sections are local and regional branches of AI which are bound to the international secretariats vision and mission but are completely independent from the international secretariat (NGO Monitor, 2016). Amnesty International Europe (AIE) being one of them. These sections consist of members who come from smaller local groups, individuals and networks that usually work at a more local scale (Amnesty International. 2021f). These groups are also very prominent in the decision-making of as they contribute to national accountability holding (Ashman et al., 2011; Christiansen & Dowding, 1994; Brown et al, 2012).

Furthermore, AI's members (who are also found in the country sectors) play a crucial role since their whole organizational structure is built on its membership. Members are individuals who pay membership fee, on a voluntary basis (Amnesty International, 2021g; Baehr, 1993) and initiate participatory work to maintain the internal structure, mandates, and objectives of the HRNGO (Scoble & Wiseberg, 1974; NGO Monitor, 2016; Waltz, 2012; Bardarova et al., 2010). AI members have the voting powers to decide how the organization is run (Baehr, 1994). However, members of considering the international secretariates mandate and agenda, as seen by internal reports and the mandate, however they do maintain autonomy (Baehr, 1994). They call for supporters and activists, they run the campaigns, they do all the

hands-on work that the international secretariate does not do. Therefore, suggesting these members are minions of the international secretariate.

Lastly, AI has special consultative status with the UN, particularly with the Economic and Social Council of the UN which was gained in 1964 (United Nations, 2022). By doing this AI is able to encourage the UN to support and respect human rights. Furthermore, it works together with UN agencies such as international labour organization to further push AI's agenda. AI is one of the largest HRNGO operating within the UN and therefore are able to incorporate their agenda into the greater political sphere. This said, AI also works on behalf of the UN, this is seen by their strict adherence to the UDHR in their mandate (Amnesty International, 2021c; Morgan, 2013; Thakur, 1994). This suggest that AI works to promote UN's Human-Rights values (Thakur, 1994).

4.1.3. Amnesty International: Funding-Relations

On paper, AI does not seek or accept money from governments and political parties to conduct their tasks; instead, they receive funds from personal donations and fundraisers (Amnesty International, 2022a). According to AI this allows for ultimate independence and impartiality from all governments, political ideologies, and economic interests (NGO Monitor, 2012; Sanchez Salgado, 2013). A form of fundraising for AI constitutes as membership fees. Membership fees contributes to a proportion of the 75% of the organization's income in 2020 (Amnesty International, 2020). They provide even more independence as it allows for the organization to remain free from donor biases (Amnesty International, 2022a). However, at the same time limit the choices of advocacy strategies, as seen during the 2015 refugee crisis. Members are accountable to AI, this is because if they were to stop paying their membership fees, they would lose status of being a member; and if they were to stop following the mandate, the same thing would happen (Baehr, 1994; O'Dwyer & Unerman, 2008).

Donations are the second source of income for AI as seen by their regular citizen donations and their wealthier/ famous donors. In 2020, 1.5 million individuals donated to AI with an average of 13.31 euros per month (Amnesty International, 2020) and there have been number of famous people such as Yoko-Ono (Amnesty, 2011) who have donated money to the organization for the promotion of human rights. Here the accountability relationship is heavily reliant on AI sticking to its objectives and mandates to maintain these donations. Furthermore, although

AI says it is independent from the government, there has been an upward trend in the percentage of income received from governments (Chalmers, 2017). AI is accused of receiving donations from the Open Society Foundation which had a politically directed agenda (O’Loughlin, 2020). the UK department for international development has played a key role in financing AI, donating up to five million euros between the years of 2006 and 2011 (NGO Monitor, 2012). The European Commissions also had contributed to funding AI in 2007 (NGO Monitor, 2012). This said, EU funds do not directly contribute to the ongoing campaigns and or the autonomy of the organization but do help support the programmes of the HRNGO (Sanchez- Salgado, 2013). AI, however, strongly suggests that all donations from governments are not tied to Human-Rights campaigns or issues, these donations are solely for the organization to function properly (Chalmers, 2017; NGO Watch 2016). Therefore, the donor relationship does not necessarily aim at investigating Human-Rights violations but instead promote Human-Rights (Amnesty International, 2021j). However, since this is a statement from AI themselves, this should still be open to speculation.

4.2. Human-Rights Watch: 2015 European Refugee Crisis

Human-Rights Watch (HRW) also takes a leading role in defending refugee rights whether it be individuals, workers, children, or families (Long et al., 2022). Furthermore, HRW advocates for better protection of refugee rights and safe migration routes (Human-Rights Watch, 2015a). HRW believes that all people on the move must be “treated with dignity and respect for their basic Human-Rights” (Human-Rights Watch, 2014). HRWRM strongly believes that all people on the move must be “treated with dignity and respect for their basic human rights” (Human-Rights Watch, 2014). Furthermore, HRW strongly believes that refugee children are also to be considered. Namely the fact that they often end up in ‘jail-like’ facilities where the conditions are both inhumane and degrading (Long & Sawyer, 2022). HRW is a pursuant of the UDHR, therefore oppose violations that fall under basic human rights, however, maintain a Human-Rights focus to international humanitarian law⁹

HRW believes that a reform needs to appear, especially in the EU asylum systems and initiatives. They see that the responsibility sharing is not sufficient enough and because of this,

⁹ Law referring to preventing war crimes

serious Human-Rights violations are taking place (Human-Rights Watch, 2022d). HRW advocate the need for the EU needs to produce better Human-Rights orientated approaches to solving the refugee crisis, including the deadly routes the refugees are taking (Human-Rights Watch, 2022d; Human-Rights Watch, 2015c; Human-Rights Watch, 2015b)). HRW stated that the “Mediterranean is the world’s deadliest migration route” (Human-Rights Watch, 2015e) and that thousands of refugees who have taken this route have died, including children; with over three and a half thousand refugees dying in 2014 and almost two thousand in the first five months of 2015 (Human-Rights Watch, 2015i).

Therefore, HRW Aims to bring to light current issues with governmental violations through exposing reported stories of individuals, children or families whose rights have been violated (Long et al, 2022). According to the HRW, they draw the attention of the international arena to issues of Human-Rights violations, act as the voice for the oppressed and hold governments and public actors accountable for their violations (Englehart, 2012). Here they can try to focus the media and government to the problem by investigating, exposing and thus trying to change the problems that are causing human-rights violations (Human-Rights Watch, 2022a).

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4.2.2. Human-Rights Watch: Advocacy Mechanisms

HRW draws its focus on both Human-Rights crisis and emergencies, but also an on-going focus of general protection of Human-Rights world-wide (Human-Rights Watch, 2022a). This allows them to draw the attention of the international arena to issues of Human-Rights violations, act as the voice for the oppressed and hold governments and public actors accountable for their violations (Englehart, 2012). Although HRW is also prone to using campaigns, they do not do so very prominently. This is because HRW is an HRNGO that advocates at times of crisis, such as the 2015 European Refugee Crisis. In 2015 HRW developed a campaign known as: Europe; Refugees and Migrant Rights (Human-Rights Watch, 2015f). However, instead of using their campaigns to mobilize citizens like with AI, HRW aims to generate extensive media coverage on Human-Rights violations thereby pressuring governments and perpetrators to change their practices due to the international public opinion (Brown, 2012). This is because they focus their work on crisis. On the other hand, HRW also strongly seeks to work alongside governments to persuade them to change their policies and processes. They do so often alongside the EU or the UN (Human-Rights Watch, 2022h;

Human-Rights Watch, 2021e). This said, because of HRW's limiting budget, they decide the strategy based on what is the cheapest (Human-Rights Watch, 2017b). However, in making this consideration, they have to weigh out the severity of the abuse and the impacts of the abuses (Johnson, 2015).

HRW sends fact-finding teams to areas where there have been allegations of Human-Rights abuses, experts and researchers of HRW go to these sites, conduct interviews with victims, witnesses, lawyers and politicians (Long & Sawyer, 2022; Lai, 2011), and then publishes it into books, reports and journal articles. HRW's research strategy changes based on whether it is indeed a Human-Rights crisis or long-lasting Human-Rights issues (Human-Rights Watch, 2022a). For long-lasting issues, researchers of HRW tend to extensively investigate for background information of the case and the country, therefore are familiarized with the context of the issue before conducting interviews with victims and witnesses (Human-Rights Watch, 2022a; Lai, 2011). On the other hand, during a crisis HRW tends to conduct research as quickly and extensively as possible, therefore deploy specialists in the country of question (Human-Rights Watch, 2022a). When HRW identifies acute crisis, they typically publish the situation of the social reality through press releases. In 2015, HRW documented the field-research and interviews of refugees that were faced with harsh conditions within the Mediterranean and published as a short clip on their YouTube channel¹¹. This gave forehand proof HRW researchers were present in the arena where the violations are taking place.

HRW often resorts to publishing reports as means to holding governments accountable (Lai, 2011). However, instead of being reports that aim at educating and recommending public actors to stop violating, HRW uses its reports as shadow reports, aiming at educating and pressuring governments with Human-Rights recommendations and feasible pathways to the solutions (Johnson, 2015). What is noticeable from HRW, which differs significantly to AI, is that their reports are much more extensive and lengthier, allowing a broad understanding of where the problem comes from, what problems are causing, who are causing the problems and possible solutions to the problems. For example, in 2015, HRW published "Europe's Refugee Crisis: An Agenda for Action" (Human-Rights Watch, 2015i). This report uncovers the problems with the Mediterranean routes, and addressing the crisis at the European borders, fix the European refugee system, ensure external cooperation improvement and puts emphasis on tackling the root causes and that the EU should be put in responsibility to protect this better

¹¹Human-Rights Watch- Desperate Journey: Europe Refugee Crisis: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uX-8emlxqgc&t=2s>

(Human-Rights Watch, 2015h). With each complaint, there are several of recommendations to how the EU can combat these problems following with a lengthy description of how this can be established.

For example, in fixing the EU's broken refugee system, the EU commissions "should pursue infringement proceedings, monitor progress in implementation of EU directives and legally sanction member-states that do not comply with asylum standards and procedures" (Human-Rights Watch, 2015i) or "replace the Dublin regulation with a permanent relocation mechanisms(Human-Rights Watch, 2015i) ' ; and in tackling the root problem HRW "encourages the EU and individual member-states to use their influence and resources more concretely to address the major drivers of migration" (Human-Rights Watch, 2015i).

Another notable example of a report published in 2016 directed towards Greece and was based on the fact that refugee children were held in "deplorable conditions". In the report HRW suggests that the Greek police routinely lock up unaccompanied children in jail-like facilities. This report consisted of lengthy analysis of the background of the situation and the current violations that are taking place. Here HRW do not only recommend Human-Rights improvements to the Greek government, such as "stop using police stations as detention centres for children" (Human-Rights Watch, 2016b) or "ensure that all unaccompanied children are immediately appointed a guardian who has the capacity and expertise necessary to secure representation of the child's best interest" (Human-Rights Watch, 2016b) , but also has recommendations for the EU commissions (i.e.: allocate emergency funding to Greece and NGOS that provide service for children) (Human-Rights Watch, 2016b) , the EU member states (i.e.: making revisions to EU emergency relocation plan) (Human-Rights Watch, 2016b) and to the EU, council of Europe and the UN Human-Rights bodies and experts (i.e.: assessing and reporting Greece's reception of unaccompanied children through systematic visits) (Human-Rights Watch, 2016b). According to HRW, coincidentally, few days after publishing this report the EU commissions pledged 115 million euros to improve conditions for refugees including facilities for unaccompanied children (Riddell, 2020).

With these reports, the HRW is able to leverage its agenda into the EU policy sphere. Although this is not made very evident, within HRWs news articles, they establish that certain members are present during the discussions therefore enabling their sharing of opinion here they "bring the voices of refugees.... to policymakers in the EU" (Human-Rights Watch, 2017a). Furthermore, they work heavily alongside the UN, while the UN establishes the violations taken place HRW calls "the widespread abuses crimes against humanity" (Human-Rights Watch, 2017c). Within the UN there is a Human-Rights folder in their archive dedicated

to HRW reports ¹², this is not the same for AI. Suggesting the UN uses HRWs reports systematically.

Despite suggesting relations with EU ministers and the UN within its news articles, they are also used to stimulate media attention towards violations and problems that are seen within social reality. Most, if not all information that is present on these news articles can be relocated to different reports, but also acute-crisis and ‘happenings’. News releases were most commonly published during 2015, these also that present the most shocking figures such as “3,200 people” in 2014 died trying to cross the Mediterranean” (Human-Rights Watch, 2015fj, para 7). HRW use these online resources to name and shame the EU such as calling out the EU for shifting their responsibility; however also use these news articles as sources of complementing the EU (Human-Rights Watch, 2017a). This allows for the possibility of the EU to be more receptive in receiving the negative feedback as well. Furthermore, not only does HRW work alongside the UN, they also work in providing support in how the UN should conduct its work (Sjöholm, 2020). This is seen by the recommendations presented in the reports.

There was one notable fact sheet within the time frame referencing to the migrant crisis. The Fact sheet took the migration crisis to a global scope and developed ten possible steps to deal with the global refugee crisis. All these steps are in correspondence to adhering to international agreements and having pure decency over any human being, even if they obtain the refugee status (Human-Rights Watch, 2015a). These fact sheets are used to promote better policy initiatives that are rooted in protecting Human-Rights for refugees. They therefore again act as expertise in the process of advocating for changes.

HRW is very well known for its movie festivals. Film Festival events play a very important role of the campaign as it most notably draws the attention towards the campaign (Tascon, 2022). The HRWFF presents films and videos that allow for the ‘direct storytelling and expose form’ (Human-Rights Watch Film Festival, 2022). It therefore draws the attention of the public more directly about Human-Rights abuses (Lehrer, 1997). This is because there is a form of immediacy to this form of media that enables the viewers to relate or empathize more with the victim, therefore in the hopes of really ‘moving’ the viewer to take action on behalf of the victim and the problem (Lehrer, 1997). In this case, the film festival isn’t just used to show the suffering of the violated but instead are used to really move the audience into action

¹² United Nations Archive: <https://search.archives.un.org/drc-security-generals-investigative-team-human-rights-watches> .

(Tascon, 2022). These film festivals, which in an essence are spaces where activists can come together to fight for Human-Rights, also allow for post-film panel discussion, production of school education packages, community partnership that may also include sponsorship or promotion (Tascon, 2022).

During the 2014–2017-time frame, there were a significant number of films presented that were in relation to the refugee crisis in some shape or form. This said, 2015 significantly had the most submissions in regard to the topic, coincidentally the same year they started their European refugee crisis campaign. What they were therefore aiming to do is developed the ‘migrant gaze’, in that the viewers’ attention is heavily drawn to the topics of refugees and migrants (Ostrowska, 2019). In some cases, they are educational in presenting the ways in which refugees have died, for example in government custody (Houry, 2016)¹³. In other cases, these video act as educational videos in which UN and HRW figures are presented in visual form (Bouckaert & Zalmay, 2016)¹⁴.

4.2.3. Human- Rights Watch: Organizational Architecture

Human-Rights watch (HRW), originally known as “Helsinki Watch”, is a non-profit HRNGO founded in 1978. It was originally “investigating” countries that had signed the Helsinki Accords, most notably those behind the iron curtain (the soviet bloc) (Human-Rights Watch, 2022a; Gorvin, 2009). They then had the task to monitor the soviet-unions compliance to the accord (Human-Rights Watch, 2022a). Over the years, the HRNGO had expanded to five different continents and now investigate a large variety of Human-Rights abuses such as: government takeovers of media; political opposition figures; violations against people who face discrimination, and the rights of refugees and migrants.

Although HRW’s scope of Human-Rights violations is rather large, they (as mentioned on the website) do everything that brings them back to their commitment of justice, dignity, compassion and equality. This is seen back in the fact that HRW also is also a strong pursuant to the UDHR. Namely they use this legislation to either oppose violations of basic human rights, right to asylum; freedom to movement and residence; and, right to nationality (United

¹³ Houry, N. (2016). *If the Dead Could Speak*. Human-Rights Watch Film Festival. <https://ff.hrw.org/film/if-dead-could-speak>

¹⁴ Bouckaert, P., & Zalmay. (2016). *Desperate Journey*. Human-Rights Watch Film Festival. <https://ff.hrw.org/film/desperate-journey>

Nations, 1948; Human-Rights Watch, 2022a). HRW advocates freedoms of the fundamental Human-Rights such as the freedom from excessive bail and cruel and unusual punishment and the right to travel within and between states. Their main task is to investigate and report abuses that are happening all over the world; therefore, they direct their attention towards governments, armed groups, and businesses ‘pushing’ them to either change their policies, laws and practices.

HRW is a confederation, this is seen by the fact that although there is a centralized body of authority that oversees the work of its members, however there is less central coordination. This is because all of the work is spread out across both committees and individuals (Brown et al, 2012). The core work of the HRNGO is guided by the senior management, staff, board of directors, council leadership and advisory committees. The senior management as a leading role in running the various country committees. However, each role holds a Human-Rights task. The country committees fall under the regional divisions, for example Human-Rights Watch Netherlands would fall under the Europe and Central Asia Division (Human-Rights Watch, 2022j). There are also topic Human-Rights committees which conduct research based on their Human-Rights issues but using a general scope. Topics include Environment and Human-Rights Division; Children’s Right Division Women’s Rights Division; and LGBT Rights program (Human-Rights Watch, 2022j). Within each division there is a chair that overlooks the work of the sector and works as the middleman with the main overarching organization.

The country committees make the network of the Human-Rights Watch Council leadership. It currently has over 1,300 council volunteers in over 30 cities around the globe (Human-Rights Watch, 2022b; Gorvin, 2009). HRW suggests that the council is therefore made up of ‘dedicated Human-Rights supporters’ (Human-Rights Watch, 2022b). HRW also involves the Circle of Friends groups, these are countries or groups that are not necessarily a part of a committee but take pride and joy in promoting and supporting the work of HRW (Human-Rights Watch, 2022b). instead of promoting sportsmanship of the organization, they in fact promote becoming an ambassador for the organization. HRW ambassadors are active supporters of the organization who serve on a volunteer basis is as HRW representatives (Human-Rights Watch, 2020b).

The approximately 450 staff members include experts, lawyers, journalists, advocates of all different nationalities and backgrounds, therefore making their work network rather simple (Human-Rights Watch, 2022a). Their website presents all the different names of their

country experts and either linked-in contacts or twitter pages¹⁵. HRW member are chosen to work for the organization based on merit, namely background in law or expertise on the issue (Human-Rights Watch, 2022b). Citizens are only able to join the organization by signing up for their newsletters and through donations for supporting causes. However, citizens play a small role in the work of the HRNGO.

The UN and HRW work in consultative partnership with one another. HRW leverages the research they have conducted and issues which have been discussed at the UN as a way to call out member-states which are putting out policies (Human-Rights Watch, 2022h). Besides this, HRW is also in special consultative status with the UN's Economic and Social Council, (United Nations, 2022). They therefore frequently meet with the UN to discuss their research and possible solutions to the problem. In this sense, HRW sets the agenda for the UN which has more power on behalf of keeping account of government behaviours (Lai, 2011). HRW meets with the European Union regularly to call on these governments to take better precautions in protecting human right, this is done through the various committees that are located in various EU member states (Human-Rights Watch, 2021c). What is notable here is that HRW commits to only working with the EU in order for them to achieve their recognitions of Human-Rights obligations.

4.2.4. Human-Rights Watch: Funding-Relations

As mentioned previously, HRWs choice of advocacy strategy is very dependent on its budget and thus its funding. HRW suggest they are an independent HRNGO which does not 'solicit or accept donations by governments, directly or indirectly' (Human-Rights Watch, 2022e) which includes governmental actors, governmental bodies or governmental foundations (Human-Rights Watch, 2017a). HRW defines indirect donations as: donations that are made on behalf of a government or government official through an immediate family member or other intermediary. HRW gets its financing from is through 'contributions from private individuals and foundations worldwide' (Human-Rights Watch, 2017a). HRW makes sure to not accept any donations from private donors who could possibly ruin the impartiality of the organization and remain neutral in the location of researching (Human-Rights Watch, 2017a). Any funds that are received with political affiliations will be transferred back (Emmons, 2020).

Fundraising funds are received through donations and makes up the majority of HRWs income. The majority of HRW donations are received with restrictions. This was also seen

¹⁵ Human-Rights Watch People: <https://www.hrw.org/about/people>

during the years of the 2015 European Crisis¹⁶ with 2016 having the least restricted donations (190,000,000 euros compared to 230,000,000 in 2015 (Human-Rights Watch, 2017d) . Because HRW was created with the funds of elites in the US, instead of smaller contributions such as in AI, the organization has developed a reliance to these contributions (Rodgers, 2009). Therefore, this system is deep-rooted within the organizational structure.

HRW overwhelmingly receives its restricted funds from large foundations, cooperation's and wealthy individuals in the form of endowments, grants or gifts. In 1988 HRW saw the need to campaign for the call of foundations who were willing to donate endowment funds which would be used as a general stream of revenue to maintain the organization and not used for fundraising efforts (Morgan, 2013). Endowment funds make up 10% of the organization's income (Morgan, 2013). In 2016 for example, endowment funds made up nearly half of HRW overarching funds (Human-Rights Watch, 2017d), this implies a sense of stability on behalf of HRW since these funds are on-going funds. Endowment funds are not affected by political changes (Human-Rights Watch, 2020a) and therefore maintains their income at times when individual donations may be lacking (Morgan, 2013).

Endowment funds are restricted HRW endowment funds are restricted: HRW is not allowed to spend more than five percent of the fund on operations each year and the assets would be held temporarily restricted until enough time has passed to open the assets. Organizations such as MacArthur Foundation, Oak Foundation and Ford Foundation are key actors in these endowment funds for HRW (Human-Rights Watch, 2022d; NGO Monitor, 2021). However, they all concern catalytic funds. For example, the MacArthur Foundation donated \$1,250,000 to be spread out across three years to support HRW in its evidence-based research, ensure the freedoms are considered in HRWs work and maximizes its effectiveness in the digital environment (McArthur Foundation, 2022). Hence why HRW has digitalized its means significantly. However, this is a common theme for endowment funds for HRW.

Although endowment funds do not influence the topic of advocacy, they jeopardize HRWs independence since it narrows down the options of fight for better considerations of Human-Rights (Einsiedel, 2020). Restricted donations as we know are much stricter. Therefore, the donor has much more control about how the organization is run and what its

¹⁶ See Financial Statements from HRW between the years 2014-2016
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2020/06/financial-statements-2015.pdf ;
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/financial-statements-2016.pdf ;
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/financial-statements-2014.pdf

chooses to focus on. This is often seen to be the case where HRW often directs their reporting strategies based on internal donor strategy (Einsiedel, 2020). Furthermore, because the endowment donors have Human-Rights request on where their money is needed to be spent on, HRW is required to follow these requests otherwise they might lose these funds.

Unrestricted donations on the other hand consist of donations often made by citizens, celebrities and wealthy individuals. Citizens are an example of unrestricted donations. Regular citizens who support the organization have the capability of donating money to the organization. HRW namely states that citizens donations, contributes to the protection of human rights worldwide (Human-Rights Watch, 2022c). They furthermore state that citizen donations will support research and researchers in investigating Human-Rights violations. On the HRW website, it gives you the option to choose the amount to donate which go from 50 euros to 1000 euros, or indeed choose your own amount to donate¹⁷. It is possible to donate once or donate monthly. Unrestricted donations, only require accountability on behalf of HRW in terms of having to stick to their objective and mandate (Human-Rights Watch, 2018), otherwise they will possibly lose this source of income. Implying some sense of control but not full control.

Lastly, Although HRW aims to only receive donations without any indirect or direct political affiliations, this has not always been the case. In fact, there have been several allegations towards HRW in that they have received government money indirectly and received donations that are both obtain a political agenda and have history of allowing or even endorsing Human-Rights violations (Morgan, 2013, Norton, 2022; Treanor, 2004; NGO Monitor, 2021; Global Times, 2021). The George Soros case is a notable one that is mentioned in most sources discussing the set up and financing of the organization (Morgan, 2013; Norton, 2022; Treanor, 2004; Lynch, 2010; Furtak, 2015, Gorvin, 2009). In 2010 Soros announced that his foundation, the Open Society Institute is going to grant 100 million USD over ten years to HRW, this would have ended in 2020. This is the largest donation HRW has ever received (Coleman, 2010; Treanor, 2004). Furthermore, it would also grant an additional 100 million in private contributions to match the gift (Open Society Foundation, 2010). His goal was to achieve better access to justice through these HRNGOS and was hoping to support the internationalization of

¹⁷ Human-Rights Watch Donation Weblink Page:
<https://donate.hrw.org/page/75691/donate/1?ea.tracking.id=geo>

HRW (Open Society Foundation, 2010). Although on paper this may seem like it wouldn't be problematic, in reality this donor is a highly political affiliated donor (Global Times, 2021).

Because of the size of the donation, he had the capability of changing HRW's congress and is involved in a network within the organization which allows him to share his own personal agenda (Einsiedel, 2020). Here we saw that because of the lack of independence on behalf of HRW, they indeed adhered to the desires of Soros instead of developing better strategies for Human-Rights advocacy (Einsiedel, 2020). This therefore implies that these types of donations influence the internal structure of the organization, again questioning the full impartiality.

5. A Comparison Between two HRNGO Watchdogs

It can be suggested that both AI and HRW opt for insider and outsider strategies, however with specialization towards one during the 2015 refugee crisis, therefore implying their roles as watchdogs being fulfilled: mediating between citizens and the EU, pressuring the EU directly and mobilizing the public and the media to call for indirect accountability, they still had a tendency to lean towards one strategy more than the other. This can be linked to their institutional features, HRW being a confederation who is heavily reliant on its endowment funds, opts for more insider-strategies focusing on political action, whilst AI who is a federation and is dependent on its member-ship fees opts for outside-strategies focusing on non-violent actions.

One of the more fundamental findings, which help highlight the main differences of advocacy mechanisms is that both HRNGOs set their problem and issue agenda in a similar manner as to which Carpenter (2007) and Keck & Sikkink (1998) have implied. Namely, the problem lies in the EU's restrictive and non-human-rights orientated policies and their lack of collective effort to solve the problem. Therefore, implying the necessity to raise awareness in some manner. Here both HRNGOs had a tendency to call out the conditions the refugees are facing, whether it be housing, education or travel routes which are not to basic Human-Rights standards; the cause of this are both the restrictive policies such as the EU-Turkey Deal the EU and its member-states have agreed, which constitute the underlying problem (Carpenter, 2007; Keck & Sikkink, 1998).

Furthermore, both HRNGO maintained their role as experts since they both interview, conduct participant observations and collect a number of secondary sources to retrieve first and second-hand information about violations, this corresponds with Dzwonkowska-Godula (2019), Tornquist-Chesnier, (2004), and Hilton et al (2013) framework of HRNGOs as watchdogs. Here their role of experts on Human-Rights violations and sources of, is very prominent. By conducting their own research, great autonomy is encouraged thereby giving the HRNGOs more ability to control the government and remain impartial and allows them to act as mediators between the violated and the violators (the citizens and the state), this falls in line with Richard (2009), Shea (2016), Convergne (2016); Davies (2019); Ackerman (2005), Marie-Clark (1995), Lai & Hamilton (2020), Dieng (2001) frameworks on HRNGOs as mediating bodies. This said, their roles as whistle-blowers, pressures and influencers differs, this is seen by the differences in uses of strategies, actions and logics.

While AI makes use of certain cooperative strategies, such as reports with recommendations to Human-Rights actors and its submissions to the UN These reports and submissions did not only outline the problems that were being monitored but also made broad suggestions on how the EU and its member-states and the UN (since it has consultative status) could consider Human-Rights better. Although influential, inside lobbying is not what AI is well known for, instead AI opts mostly for outside lobbying.

AI much more prominently uses adversarial strategies whereby non-violent actions are pursued. Including, protests, campaigns, mass-letter and petition writing and mobilization through the media which correspond to Dellmuth and Tallberg (2017), Junk (2016), Rietig (2011), Colli (2019), Hanegraaff et al. (2016) expectations on what outside lobbying is. While many HRNGOs use outside lobbying to also pursue legal and political actions, since this has more direct means of influence (Dzwonkowska-Godula, 2019), AI opts for advocacy actions where citizens have the responsibility to pressure the government and indirectly hold governments accountable, however, with notable focus to prisoners of arbitrary arrest or death-row prisoners. As seen by the UrgentAction campaigns produced by AI. These campaigns called for citizens to contribute to mass-letter writing, petition signing, and tweeting to public officials for the release and freedoms of Human-Rights refugees. However, since AI's normative dimension is based on the morale of 'prisoners of consciousness', their focus of the protection of refugee rights is limited as well.

Furthermore, because AI is heavily dependent on its membership fees as sources of finances, they are also obligated to maintain a mobilized member-base. This falls in line with Dellmuth & Tallberg (2017) conceptualization of the influence's membership style on

advocacy strategies. This was particularly seen with its long running campaign ‘I-Welcome’ campaign, which calls for citizens to join the movement and partake in taking action against the government but also in support of refugee rights. Furthermore, through its press-releases and exposing the EU, AI is able to put press on the violation or topic of concern, leading to an indirect pressure through news media and social media. This said, without the membership-fees being received, AI would substantially fail in holding governments accountable, not only because they decide what actions should be taken, for example, the protests that were held in the Netherlands and in Greece were mobilized by country sector members of AI and they decide what call for action citizens need to complete which are found in their short and longer term campaigns, but also put press on the issue through its press-releases.

Using outside lobbying, AI can send out warnings to citizens (Ackerman, 2005; Dzwonkowska-Godula, 2019; McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984), which in turn mobilizes them to send out their own governments, indirectly pressuring governments (Dzwonkowska-Godula, 2019). AI also in this way takes active participation in changing the state of social reality, however, does so vis-à-vis the citizens. In this sense, AI needs to maintain its reputation through mobilizing its membership base, in order make an influence in holding the EU accountable. Therefore, it can be argued that AI advocates for awareness of violated refugees, while at the same time advocate for short term changes vis-à-vis the citizens.

HRW likewise uses of a mixture of both adversarial and cooperative strategies (Inside/outside lobbying) using political actions to hold governments accountable. Through its press-releases and film-festivals HRW is able to gain immediate media and public attention to the violations against refugees. While HRW opts for outside lobbying to mobilize citizens and the media, they do not call for Human-Rights actions and instead provide general information about the violations against refugee and problems with the policies regarding the rights of refugees. This way HRW is able to mobilize public opinion against the EU.

This said, HRW is highly driven by the logic of influence and expertise, implying that they adopt strategies where HRW engages in a more direct approach of holding the EU accountable through providing and engaging in extensive research, Human-Rights and backed up recommendations; this is likewise in correspondence with Dellmuth and Tallberg (2017), Junk (2015), Rietig (2011), Colli (2019), Hanegraaff et al; (2016), Chalmers (2013a), and by the fact that HRW does not produce campaigns in the same way AI does. This was very prominent in HRW's reports and news articles and fact sheets. All of HRW's reports consist of very lengthy analysis of the problem and the issue at hand. Here instead of just mentioning the problem, they attempt to understand the problem and understand the underlying causes of the

problem. Because HRW draws Human-Rights attention to their role as impartial researchers (Long & Sawyer, 2022; Lai, 2011), their topic reports consist of lengthy analysis about the background of the topic, the violations taken place, they are able to develop Human-Rights recommendations and sanctions for other public actors to impose onto the violators. These reports do not only hold the EU accountable, but they call out Human-Rights sanctions EU member-states or the UN can conduct to further hold the EU accountable. Implying a call for a direct political action. This stems from the normative dimension of the founding of HRW, that they monitor the adherence to international law regarding the iron curtain. This was also seen by the role as experts HRW portrayed towards the Council of Europe and the UN, this is only possible because of the consultative status with the economic and social council of the UN (Martens, 2006).

Because HRW is closer to a single tier-membership style (Srinivas, 2022), that is reliant on merit-based recruitment, HRW has resources over the whole scope of the organization, allowing the workload to be dispersed more evenly. This allows HRW to conduct much more research and spend much more time at finding ways to influence the EU regarding its policies and practices towards refugees. This was seen by the very Human-Rights recommendations made to different bodies within the various reports, fact sheets and news articles. Furthermore, since HRW is not reliant on its membership fees (because they are simply not present), they do not have to work to maintain its membership, instead it is able to focus on holding the EU accountable for its violations in a more direct manner (Dallmuth & Tallberg, 2017). This said, HRW is limited by its endowment funds and donations, this is because they do not only decide what issue agenda the funds are being allocated to, but also influence the way in which HRW uses its advocacy mechanism. This

Overall, what we see from HRW is that they send out warnings to the EU and its member states in a more direct manner, here we see that the pressure comes from HRW directly and take active participation in influencing policies and sanctions against public actors. Taking a more traditional stance of a whistle-blower as stipulated by Dzwonkowska-Godula (2019), with occasional public mobilization to educate and warn citizens about the current state of social reality. Implying HRW advocates for awareness and longer-term changes to be made in a more systematic manner compared to AI who advocates for releases of refugees.

While a lot of research has looked at the role as HRNGOs as watchdogs, they few have been able to identify their mechanisms of holding governments accountable, especially regarding the confounding variables (organizational architecture and funding-relations). This research, through a QCA, build upon diverse literature that explains these factors individually,

and attempted to explain what role HRNGOs have as experts, whistle-blowers, pressures and influencers. While the role of experts in holding governments accountable does not differ; Dzwonkowska-Godula (2019) over-nuanced explanation of HRNGOs functions of whistle-blowers, pressures and influencers do not substantively align with the results presented in this paper. Here it is necessary to consider their forms of lobbying and accountability actions and the logics used behind the mechanisms as suggested by Brown et al (2012), Junk (2016) Weiler and Brandli (2015), de Bruycker and Beyers (2018), Dellmuth and Tallberg (2016), Rietig (2011), Hanegraaff et al (2016), Colli (2019), Maloney et al (1994), Chalmers (2013b).

Because as the results suggest, AI who opts for more outside lobbying, warns, pressures and influences government accountability vis-à-vis the citizens, while HRW who opts for more inside lobbying warns, pressures and influences the government in a more direct manner. This said, both AI and HRW aim to fill the mediating role to receive citizen complaints and mobilize citizens into democratic action. While both HRNGOs lean towards a mixture of both inside and outside lobbying to hold governments accountable since AI is a federation and HRW is a confederation as accordance to Brown et al. (2012) finding, the findings have shown that according to Dellmuth & Tallberg, 2017 HRNGOs tend to specialize in one strategy is influenced both by the membership style and authorities' power within the HRNGO, but also by the type of funding. This is conceptual link many authors have missed out. Furthermore, while it was expected that the regulative dimension would play a bigger role in the choices of advocacy mechanisms for HRNGOs since the diversity of literature was greater, the normative dimension seemed to play a bigger role since their culture is often formed in the organizations founding (Scott, 2008). This was more prominently so in AI than HRW.

Whilst the empirical findings were triangulated, especially regarding the general conceptualization of each advocacy mechanism, due to the lack of data on the 2015 Refugee crisis and the role of HRNGOs the research was limited to information sourced directly from the organization, therefore it should be considered that certain aspects of the results may be prone to publication bias. Furthermore, both HRNGOs had limiting information on real life interactions with public officials or the UN, this was also difficult to find on the public institution's webpages, therefore understanding the role as a consultant in the UN should be considered lightly and should not be strictly generalized; further extensive research would need to be done in order to thoroughly understand this relationship and the role HRNGOs alongside the UN. Lastly, AI did not make all of its funding or researching information available, this was also very difficult to locate back, this leads to questions of reliability of the method of QCA since the information compared is not identical in substance, this means the research is

to a small extent prone to analysis bias since the information on AI's funding was written closely in line with what was written for HRW. While HRW did have a lot of this documents public, it was lacking prior research from scholars in understanding the Human-Rights of their actions, therefore the results may be limiting in this sense. This said, the findings show consistency with theories, only really expanding the existing theories and this is because the research strongly adhered to the methodology.

6. Conclusions

Though a QCA, this research aimed to understand the role of HRNGOs as watchdogs and the influence of the confounding variables (organizational architecture and institutional funding), and how AI and HRW differ in this, allowing for a deeper understanding for the role of the confounding variables. Although the role of watchdogs in terms of expertise does not differ amongst HRNGOs, their roles in acting as whistle-blower, pressures and influencers differs significantly. This can be linked to the type of advocacy strategies the HRNGO opt for, namely insider and outsider strategies. While outside strategies tend to warn, pressure and influence governments vis-à-vis the citizens, inside lobbying tends to warn, pressure and influence governments directly. However, coincidingly with literature, the results presented that although HRNGOs tend to use a mixture of inside and outside lobbying, they often are specialized in on strategy. This is explained most notably by their membership style and their funding sources, external funding having the most significant impact. While it can be suggested that organizational architecture and funding-relations does have an immediate influence on the choice of advocacy strategy, it is dubious whether they have a influence in the topics of advocacy and the actors being held accountable; while it can be argued that HRNGOs that opt for a federation architecture and relies on membership-fees will often specialize more in adversarial strategies (outside-lobbying), confederations that rely heavily on endowment funds and donations have better capabilities of pursuing cooperative strategies (inside lobbying).

This said, corresponding to Brown et al. (2012), Dellmuth & Tallberg (2017), and Colli (2019) HRNGOs typically opt for a mixture of strategies, as seen during the 2015 European refugee crisis. This said, in order to certify these conclusions about these HRNGOs, it would be essential to conduct further research where AI for example is compared with an HRNGO with obtains a similar architecture and funding-relations and see whether advocacy mechanisms would be the same. Only once conclusions are drawn there, can we make final

conclusions about the overarching role of the confounding variables on the role of HRNGOs as watchdogs. In attempting to fill the gap of understanding the role of watchdogs and the role of its confounding variables, this paper put together a variety of sources that have focused on each variable independently and developed a framework of understanding this research problem. By bringing this framework into reality by analysing both AI and HRW, this paper has enabled a gateway to understand the overarching role of HRNGOs as watchdogs, and how this is limited by their organizational architecture and funding-relations in choices of advocacy to hold governments accountable. However, since this is a topic that is not examined in this way, it is necessary to conduct further research by analysing each strategy individually in relation to organizational architecture and funding relations more thoroughly, this would provide for more theoretical embedding in this framework for HRNGOs as watchdogs.

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