The Power of Supervision: The European Parliament and the Accountability of the European Central Bank

Persistent URL of this record https://hdl.handle.net/1887/123287

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International Studies (BA)

Schlatmann, Tom T.F. (2020)

The Power of Supervision: The European Parliament and the Accountability of the European Central Bank

Bachelor thesis | International Studies (BA)

This thesis offers a qualitative approach to understanding the interactions between the European Parliament (EP) and the European Central Bank (ECB). The European Parliament supervises the ECB through the Banking Dialogue and the Monetary Dialogue. By doing this, the EP actively seeks to demand accountability from the ECB. The extent to which the EP does this is examined in this work. An interactionist qualitative model is used to analyse 10 hearings (1,5-3 hours) between April 2018 and June 2019. It is found that althought the European Parliament is restrained in its possibilities to demand accountability, members of the EP make effective use of the tools they have: they engage in informed and targeted dialogue, and demand accountability through scrutiny and justification requests.

European Union

European Parliament

European Central Bank