Nietzsche’s Arguments Against Pity Reduced to the Interruption of Life as Becoming

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Filosofie (BA)

Buijssen, Ilana (2020)

Nietzsche’s Arguments Against Pity Reduced to the Interruption of Life as Becoming

Bachelor thesis | Wijsbegeerte (BA)

This thesis offers a systematic analysis of Nietzsche's critique of pity by demonstrating that for Nietzsche, pity leads to life-negation understood as the illegitimate and forcible interruption of becoming.

Author: Buijssen, Ilana

Faculty: Faculty of Humanities

Specialisation: Philosophy of Mind, Culture and Technology

Supervisors: Chouraqui, Frank

ECTS Credits: 10

Language: en

Leiden University Student Repository

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Nietzsche’s Arguments Against Pity Reduced to the Interruption of Life as Becoming