Why Algoenhancement Won’t Save the World: Raising three Challenges for Moral Enhancement in the Context of Major Moral Problems

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Philosophy (MA) (60 EC)

Buczek, Felix (2022)

Why Algoenhancement Won’t Save the World: Raising three Challenges for Moral Enhancement in the Context of Major Moral Problems

Master thesis | Philosophy (MA) (60 EC)

A central tenet of the standard account of moral enhancement qua algorithmic technology is that it has the potential to solve the mega-problems of our time, such as global poverty or the climate crisis. Thereby, it is simply assumed that the enhanced moral competence of individual agents will directly translate into solutions to our major moral problems. This paper sheds light on this key assumption and argues for a more sophisticated outlook on the potential effects of algorithmic moral enhancement. In particular, it is shown that our major moral problems are essentially political problems which are characterised by various kinds of dilemmas. The author shows that due to this peculiar nature of these problems, three distinct challenges arise when it comes to translating moral competence into political solutions. These challenges will have to be met by future proposals of algorithmic moral enhancement.

artificial intelligence

moral enhancement

algorithmic technology

world poverty

political philosophy