A Social Connection Model of Individual Responsibility to Face Climate Injustice

In a context of insufficient climate action on the part of governments, the question of whether individuals have any underlying moral responsibility concerning climate change has become increasingly relevant. However, despite various theoretical attempts to ground such responsibility, none of them has been completely satisfactory, resulting in a lack of consensus in the scholarly literature. In this thesis, I engage with this debate, guided by the following research question: what is the nature of individual responsibility for climate change? I build on Iris Marion Young’s Social Connection Model (SCM) of responsibility to respond to this question. I argue that using Young’s SCM to conceptualize individual responsibility to face climate injustice is appropriate because it captures the structural nature of the problem. The shared and forward-looking responsibility it entails and its focus on collective political action provide a framework to respond to climate injustice meaningfully....Show moreIn a context of insufficient climate action on the part of governments, the question of whether individuals have any underlying moral responsibility concerning climate change has become increasingly relevant. However, despite various theoretical attempts to ground such responsibility, none of them has been completely satisfactory, resulting in a lack of consensus in the scholarly literature. In this thesis, I engage with this debate, guided by the following research question: what is the nature of individual responsibility for climate change? I build on Iris Marion Young’s Social Connection Model (SCM) of responsibility to respond to this question. I argue that using Young’s SCM to conceptualize individual responsibility to face climate injustice is appropriate because it captures the structural nature of the problem. The shared and forward-looking responsibility it entails and its focus on collective political action provide a framework to respond to climate injustice meaningfully. However, while Young sees the nature of such responsibility as being strictly political, I engage critically with the author and argue that, instead, the responsibility we bear to face climate injustice is moral. Despite concerns about moral responsibility and the blameworthiness it entails, I explore how blame can be a mechanism of accountability and social enforceability, fundamental for ensuring effective collective climate action.Show less

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A Social Connection Model of Individual Responsibility to Face Climate Injustice