The normative status of unjust combatants: A critical reflection on liability within Just War Theory

Does a coerced, poorly armed soldier forfeit their right not to be killed - i.e. become liable - simply because they are on the “wrong” side of the war? This thesis explores this question within the framework of just war theory, focusing on the unexplored degrees of liability among unjust combatants and how this relates to voluntariness. While Walzer, McMahan, Bazargan, and Lazar have addressed the moral equivalence between just and unjust combatants, the specific issue of how voluntariness affects their differing moral status remains largely untouched. I will examine the implicit conceptions of voluntariness and intentionality present within the liability accounts of Walzer, McMahan, and Bazargan, providing a critique of these conceptions. Walzer has been selected because his work is foundational to modern just war theory, with an undifferentiated assessment of combatant liability; McMahan because he added differentiation to Walzer with an account of the liability of unjust...Show moreDoes a coerced, poorly armed soldier forfeit their right not to be killed - i.e. become liable - simply because they are on the “wrong” side of the war? This thesis explores this question within the framework of just war theory, focusing on the unexplored degrees of liability among unjust combatants and how this relates to voluntariness. While Walzer, McMahan, Bazargan, and Lazar have addressed the moral equivalence between just and unjust combatants, the specific issue of how voluntariness affects their differing moral status remains largely untouched. I will examine the implicit conceptions of voluntariness and intentionality present within the liability accounts of Walzer, McMahan, and Bazargan, providing a critique of these conceptions. Walzer has been selected because his work is foundational to modern just war theory, with an undifferentiated assessment of combatant liability; McMahan because he added differentiation to Walzer with an account of the liability of unjust combatants; and Bazargan for providing a contemporary collectivist critique of McMahan. This paper considers these authors alongside one another, with the following research question: Whose liability account and implicit conception of voluntariness and intentionality best accommodate the different moral statuses of unjust combatants? It concludes that whilst Bazargan’s account goes furthest, existing scholarship is yet to provide a satisfactory and differentiated account of liability within the bracket of unjust combatants.Show less

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The normative status of unjust combatants: A critical reflection on liability within Just War Theory