Intelligence under Democratic Rule: Formal Oversight  and Reform in Colombia’s Evolving Democracy

This thesis considers how the process of democratic consolidation in Colombia since the promulgation of the 1991 Constitution shaped formal mechanisms of intelligence oversight until the establishment of the DNI in 2011. Inspired by the paradox of secrecy and accountability in intelligence agencies, it asks the following question: "How has democratic consolidation in Colombia since the 1991 Constitution until the creation of the DNI affected formal intelligence oversight mechanisms?" This qualitative study used a case-study approach using Bühlmann et al.'s democracy matrix, which was adjusted for vertical accountability, horizontal accountability, and rule-of-law compliance. It also uses deductive and inductive thematic coding on constitutional provisions, statutory laws, court rulings, and institutional reforms during three key periods (post-1991, Uribe period, and transitional DNI). The findings show that the Constitution of 1991 gave provisions for moderate vertical and...Show moreThis thesis considers how the process of democratic consolidation in Colombia since the promulgation of the 1991 Constitution shaped formal mechanisms of intelligence oversight until the establishment of the DNI in 2011. Inspired by the paradox of secrecy and accountability in intelligence agencies, it asks the following question: "How has democratic consolidation in Colombia since the 1991 Constitution until the creation of the DNI affected formal intelligence oversight mechanisms?" This qualitative study used a case-study approach using Bühlmann et al.'s democracy matrix, which was adjusted for vertical accountability, horizontal accountability, and rule-of-law compliance. It also uses deductive and inductive thematic coding on constitutional provisions, statutory laws, court rulings, and institutional reforms during three key periods (post-1991, Uribe period, and transitional DNI). The findings show that the Constitution of 1991 gave provisions for moderate vertical and horizontal oversight through parliamentary control and judicial review, but enforcement fell short in operational terms. The Uribe administration witnessed a further decline in formal legislative oversight, even as judicial and prosecutorial bodies addressed the abuses at the highest levels, as repeated scandals showcased a disconnect between laws and practices. The abolishment of the DAS and creation of the DNI under Santos were thus reactive, scandaldriven reforms that strengthened internal controls but at the same time displayed the nonlinear paths of democratic consolidationShow less

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Intelligence under Democratic Rule: Formal Oversight and Reform in Colombia’s Evolving Democracy