Paradoxical Obligations: An Inquiry into the Paradox of Self-Release and Duties to the Self

What do Les Misérables' Inspector Javert, The Princess Bride's Inigo Montoya, and Swan Lake's Prince Siegfried have in common? All of them find themselves within a problem that M. Singer has named The Paradox of Self-release. This paradox suggests that duties to the self cannot be coherent since one can release themselves from their own promises at any moment. Thus, this begs the question: Can we have duties to ourselves? I will attempt to argue that duties to the self are in fact coherent, by suggesting that they need not be unwaivable to be binding. After their coherency is proved, it is clear duties to the self are deserving of their own sphere within morality: the prudential sphere. In doing so I offer an alternative structure for understanding morality that moves away from the widely accepted Kantian perspective. I continue extending this structure by making a distinction between duties to the self and promises to the self based on their differing grounds of self-respect and...Show moreWhat do Les Misérables' Inspector Javert, The Princess Bride's Inigo Montoya, and Swan Lake's Prince Siegfried have in common? All of them find themselves within a problem that M. Singer has named The Paradox of Self-release. This paradox suggests that duties to the self cannot be coherent since one can release themselves from their own promises at any moment. Thus, this begs the question: Can we have duties to ourselves? I will attempt to argue that duties to the self are in fact coherent, by suggesting that they need not be unwaivable to be binding. After their coherency is proved, it is clear duties to the self are deserving of their own sphere within morality: the prudential sphere. In doing so I offer an alternative structure for understanding morality that moves away from the widely accepted Kantian perspective. I continue extending this structure by making a distinction between duties to the self and promises to the self based on their differing grounds of self-respect and self-interest. I conclude that, due to the differing grounds they are based on, that these duties to the self do create moral obligation, whereas promises to the self do not. Furthermore, I make a distinction between internal and external duties to the self, where the former originates from inside the self, and the latter appear from taking on duties from the external world. These external duties are then taken on willingly and as a result turn into what Paul Schofield describes as a 'practical identity'. The feelings of resentment that result from breaking a duty then appear to be equal to the failing of one's own character. I conclude that with this newly built structure of morality duties to the self, even if they are waivable, surely are coherent.Show less

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Paradoxical Obligations: An Inquiry into the Paradox of Self-Release and Duties to the Self