Delegation without Enforcement: The African Union’s Kigali Financing Decision

Financing the African Union (AU) lies at the center of debates about autonomy, agenda-setting, and credibility. The 2016 Kigali Decision aimed to address external donor dependence by introducing a 0.2 percent levy on eligible imports; however, implementation has progressed unevenly, and the AU budget remains externally vulnerable. Existing research recognises these problems but rarely explains the reasons behind such situations. To address this gap, this study asks: Why has the Kigali financing reform stalled? The analysis examines variation in the implementation of the Kigali Decision by comparing three member states, Rwanda, Kenya, and Nigeria, using qualitative document analysis of AU-level decisions, national fiscal laws, audit reports, and budget statements for the period 2016-2023. A stalling index operationalises implementation through adoption, predictability, and timeliness, while enforcement expectations, domestic veto structures, and administrative compatibility serve as...Show moreFinancing the African Union (AU) lies at the center of debates about autonomy, agenda-setting, and credibility. The 2016 Kigali Decision aimed to address external donor dependence by introducing a 0.2 percent levy on eligible imports; however, implementation has progressed unevenly, and the AU budget remains externally vulnerable. Existing research recognises these problems but rarely explains the reasons behind such situations. To address this gap, this study asks: Why has the Kigali financing reform stalled? The analysis examines variation in the implementation of the Kigali Decision by comparing three member states, Rwanda, Kenya, and Nigeria, using qualitative document analysis of AU-level decisions, national fiscal laws, audit reports, and budget statements for the period 2016-2023. A stalling index operationalises implementation through adoption, predictability, and timeliness, while enforcement expectations, domestic veto structures, and administrative compatibility serve as explanatory indicators based on the theoretical framework that combines the Principal-Agent theory and Historical institutionalism. The comparison demonstrates that uniform agreement has produced divergent outcomes: integration, where the levy smoothly becomes a part of the financial system, substitution, where obligations are fulfilled through existing fee instruments, and stalling, where fragmented systems prevent the reform from adoption. These findings show that variation cannot be attributed to weak enforcement alone. Instead, implementation reflects the capacity of national fiscal systems to routinise the levy, as well as the administrative constraints and adaptation strategies, such as substitutions, that shape this process. In this way, the study contributes to debates on international organisation financing by explaining why continental reforms may stall or be redirected once they encounter domestic institutional structures.Show less

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Delegation without Enforcement: The African Union’s Kigali Financing Decision