Leiden University Student Repository

Rapeli, Sampsa (2018)

Practical Utilitarianism and the separateness of persons objection

Master thesis | Philosophy (MA) (60 EC)

In modern political philosophy, utilitarianism is often considered a road once tried and found wanting. A major reason for this is the eminence of John Rawls' Theory of Justice, which provides a number of arguments against it. One of them is the separateness of persons objection, which accuses utilitarianism of viewing separate persons as one, and thus considers the happiness of individuals freely aggregateable and interchangeable. This, it is thought, results in unacceptable consequences in matters of distribution. Similar criticisms are found in the works of Scanlon and Nozick. In this thesis I argue that the separateness of persons argument only works if interpreted as a weak argument against moral aggregation, and that a type of utilitarianism, restricted to political domain and informed by the practical limitations of human nature and the possibilities available to the utilitarian state, can deal with this objections.

Political Philosophy

Philosophy

Utilitarianism

Rawls

Author

Rapeli, Sampsa

Faculty

Faculty of Humanities

Specialisation

Philosophy, Politics and Economics

Supervisors

Verbeek, Bruno

ECTS Credits

20

Language

en