Selective attention poses a challenge to informed judgment among voters, potentially exacerbating political polarisation (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009). The relationship between ideological orientation...Show moreSelective attention poses a challenge to informed judgment among voters, potentially exacerbating political polarisation (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009). The relationship between ideological orientation and selective attention has been the subject of much debate in the scientific community. This thesis seeks to clarify this relationship by examining epistemic emotions within that context. Participants (N = 202) responded to headlines, differing on political orientation of statements and complexity, and were given the choice to further engage with the corresponding article. I find no ideological differences in selectivity of ideologically congruent information, but right-leaning individuals avoided incongruent information more than leftists. The data also points to an ideological asymmetry of the experience of epistemic emotions, which is surprisingly conditioned by the complexity of headlines. Rightists felt more confused than leftists only towards simple incongruent headlines. Further, leftists reported higher curiosity in incongruent complex headlines, which mediated the relationship of ideology and choosing to engage with those headlines. Implications of cognitive style differences reflected in differing experience of epistemic emotions are discussed. Further research is needed to clarify the role of the complexity of political messaging style information on information processing in ideologues.Show less
Political extremity has been widely researched, yet the emotions experienced by extremists remain underexplored. This study aims to address this gap by examining whether extremism influences the...Show morePolitical extremity has been widely researched, yet the emotions experienced by extremists remain underexplored. This study aims to address this gap by examining whether extremism influences the emotions of curiosity and confusion when reading an article, and whether this effect depends on the congruence between one’s ideology and that of the source. Based on research that highlights the importance of ideological congruence in influencing trust and acceptance of a source and its content, which can evoke emotional responses, I hypothesized that individuals would be more curious and less confused when reading information from a source congruent with their ideology. Additionally, I expected political extremity to condition this relationship, with extremists (vs. moderates) experiencing higher levels of curiosity and lower levels of confusion when reading ideologically congruent information. Contrary to these expectations, the hypothesized moderating effects of extremism on the relationship between source congruence and levels of curiosity and confusion were not observed. The findings suggest a more complex interplay between extremity, source congruency, curiosity and confusion. The insights from this study offer potential avenues for targeting polarization and misinformation in today’s media climate. However, further research is necessary to deepen our understanding of this interplay.Show less
Within the western democratic political system, political extremism is always present. This extremism is often triggered by emotions of fear and uncertainty. This study examines the connections of...Show moreWithin the western democratic political system, political extremism is always present. This extremism is often triggered by emotions of fear and uncertainty. This study examines the connections of the epistemic emotions curiosity and confusion, emotions derived from uncertainty, and political extremism, as well as source congruency (the alignment of article source with participants' political beliefs). By surveying 264 Dutch participants who voted in the last election, the research examined how matching article sources with participants' political beliefs influences their curiosity and confusion in contrary to mismatched sources. The hypothesis was that political extremists would show more curiosity and less confusion if an article had a congruent source. However, this study could not support that hypothesis. There has not been a significant interaction found between the chosen epistemic emotions and political extremism or source congruency. Nonetheless, other exploratory analyses showed a significant relation between related emotions and source congruency, like trustworthiness, perceived factuality and surprise. Extremists viewed incongruent sources as less trustworthy and factual and they were more surprised. These results suggest that while curiosity and confusion may not differ much between extremists and moderates, their perception of credibility and their reactions to source congruency do vary. This highlights the complex role of emotions in processing political information. More research is needed to understand these dynamics and the influence of how survey questions are worded on the findings.Show less
Disadvantaged groups can use collective action to improve their conditions. The present research targets the motivation to participate in collective action among individuals with a migration...Show moreDisadvantaged groups can use collective action to improve their conditions. The present research targets the motivation to participate in collective action among individuals with a migration background and how this is influenced by the presence of a social norm of equality and by an individualistic or collectivistic cultural background. This study had an experimental factorial 2x2 design and participants were Dutch residents with a migration background (N = 297). I predicted that the presence of an ingroup social norm of equality would increase the collective action intentions and that this effect would be stronger among people with a collectivistic cultural background than among those with an individualistic cultural background. I did not find evidence for the first hypothesis that an ingroup norm of equality (vs. control) increases the collective action intentions of people with a migration background. Furthermore, I did not find evidence that an individualistic or collectivistic culture of the country of origin of the parent would strengthen the collective action intentions. The findings, their implications and suggestions for further research are discussed.Show less
Previous studies established a link between social norms and collective action for social change. Collective action is used by disadvantaged groups as a path towards progressive social change....Show morePrevious studies established a link between social norms and collective action for social change. Collective action is used by disadvantaged groups as a path towards progressive social change. However, little is known about the influence of ideological extremity on the relation between social norms and collective action intentions. The present study focused on the disadvantaged group members’ perspective and examined the effect of an ingroup social norm of equality on collective action intentions of disadvantaged groups and influence of ideological extremity. We recruited participants among residents in the Netherlands with a migration background (N=300) and predicted that an ingroup social norm of equality affected collective action intentions and that ideological extremity interacted with this relationship. We successfully manipulated an ingroup social norm of equality (vs. control). I found no evidence for the prediction that an ingroup social norm of equality (vs. control) increased collective action intentions. I did find evidence that the manipulation affected higher-than-average ideologically-extreme people and it made them less prone for collective action. The findings and implications are discussed including interesting directions for future research.Show less
Despite rising economical inequalities it is still difficult to get Leftists and Rightists on the same page concerning taxes/economical redistribution. Trust and cooperation are factors that can...Show moreDespite rising economical inequalities it is still difficult to get Leftists and Rightists on the same page concerning taxes/economical redistribution. Trust and cooperation are factors that can play a big role in tax morale, could it be that Leftists and Rightists are just fundamentally different on these two elements? This study attempts to find that out. To be more specific this study explores whether Leftists and Rightists differ significantly in trust and cooperation, as measured in a context without political cues. With the use of a questionnaire, involving a Public Goods Game, Adjusted Trust Game, and ideology measure, data was gathered for the needed analyses. No significant differences were found between Leftists and Rightists on the factors trust and cooperation. What the results of this study would suggest is that there is no so called ideological asymmetry on trust and cooperation, which is in line with the proposed hypotheses.Show less
The current study focuses on the relationship between agreeableness and conflict tactics in intergroup conflict. Intergroup conflict arises when multiple groups have incompatible needs. Individuals...Show moreThe current study focuses on the relationship between agreeableness and conflict tactics in intergroup conflict. Intergroup conflict arises when multiple groups have incompatible needs. Individuals can invest in intergroup conflict at their own cost through conflict tactics such as ingroup bias or outgroup harm. The trait agreeableness may be an important predictor in the choice for conflict tactics. I hypothesized that agreeableness was positively associated with ingroup bias and negatively associated with outgroup harm. This study operationalized intergroup conflict with the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma Maximizing-Differences (IPD-MD) (N = 126). The results supported the first hypothesis that indeed, highly agreeable people show more ingroup bias in intergroup conflict than their less agreeable counterparts. However, the second hypothesis was not supported by our results, as no relationship was found between agreeableness and outgroup harm. Finally, this study includes several theories to explain these results, as well as directions for future research.Show less
In the study of political ideology, a debate has formed between two opposite sides, one side belief that there is a fundamental difference in the psychological process of rightist and leftists....Show moreIn the study of political ideology, a debate has formed between two opposite sides, one side belief that there is a fundamental difference in the psychological process of rightist and leftists. Those who oppose this, belief that there bias in research methods and there is not a difference for rightists and leftists. A study was conducted online, recruiting a sample of 388 participants from the United States United Kingdom, with the aim to find out if aggression differed between leftists and rightist in a context neutral situation. Using the game of Attack and Defense to provide a context neutral situation, the results showed that rightist were significantly more aggressive than leftists regardless of who they played against. However, when looking at aggression levels when playing against a member of an outgroup, the results contradicted what was hypothesized. Leftists were significantly more aggressive than rightists when playing against a member of their political outgroup.Show less
While initiating a conflict can sometimes lead to maximizing ingroup gains, it comes at high costs for the individual. Nevertheless, certain individuals are motivated to do so. The individual’s...Show moreWhile initiating a conflict can sometimes lead to maximizing ingroup gains, it comes at high costs for the individual. Nevertheless, certain individuals are motivated to do so. The individual’s need for affiliation might influence this because people high in the need for affiliation find good interpersonal relations important and want to benefit the ingroup (McClelland, 1961). This study hypothesizes that a high need for affiliation compared to a low need for affiliation increases the likelihood of investing in outgroup harm and thus initiating conflict. Participants (N = 126) engaged in the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma-Maximizing Difference (IPD-MD) game with modifications of efficiency (Halevy et al., 2008). They responded to the six-item Unified Motive Scale (UMS-6) measure of the need for affiliation (Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012). Opposite to the hypothesis, the findings showed that a low need for affiliation predicted inclinations for initiating conflict if initiating conflict maximized the gains for the ingroup. Surprisingly, thriving for maximum gains for the ingroup motivated people with a low need for affiliation to initiate conflict but not people with a high need for affiliation. Possibly, the increased need to be cooperative amongst people high in the need for affiliation also comprises the outgroup (Halevy et al., 2008), inhibiting people high in the need for affiliation to initiate conflict. This work suggests that alternative individual differences, like ingroup identification, should be studied to enhance understanding of why, when and by whom conflict gets initiated.Show less
With the increase in polarization worldwide, the danger of democracies not working anymore and societies breaking apart has become an increasingly real prospect. Previous research concluded that,...Show moreWith the increase in polarization worldwide, the danger of democracies not working anymore and societies breaking apart has become an increasingly real prospect. Previous research concluded that, in general, Rightists tend to be more aggressive towards outgroup members than Leftists; recent studies, however, have challenged this by proposing affective responses are symmetrical in both groups. 200 Leftists and 200 Rightists were recruited from the United Kingdom and the United States with the aim of finding differences in aggression directed to ingroup and outgroup members. Using the Attacker-Defender Contest to assure context-neutrality and a mixed ANOVA to test for interactions between political ideology and aggression, results showed an increased rate of aggression towards outgroup members by Leftists only. Furthermore, a statistically significant interaction between political ideology and aggression was found.Show less
Political ideology has been at the center of social psychology research over the years. Researchers are trying to find out whether rightists and leftists have fundamental differences, or whether...Show morePolitical ideology has been at the center of social psychology research over the years. Researchers are trying to find out whether rightists and leftists have fundamental differences, or whether this can be attributed to context. I am researching if the relationship between ideology and anti-social behaviour towards the out-group is mediated by stereotypes about morality, warmth, competence, and aggression of that out-group. Research has confirmed higher support for aggressive measures by rightists over leftists. Therefore, I argued that there will be a difference in anti-social behaviour/tendencies between rightists and leftists. Furthermore, research regarding stereotypes also shows how these affect behaviour. Thus I hypothesised that both leftists and rightists will engage in anti-social behaviour when holding a negative stereotype about the target group. This was tested using an online-based experiment, where participants were asked to play two economic games (Joy of Destruction and Attacker-Defender game) and fill out a questionnaire. First, two logistic regression analyses were performed to test whether there are anti-social behaviour differences towards the out-group depending on ideology. This was significant. Second, several mediation analyses were performed to see whether the relationship between ideology and anti-social behaviour is mediated by stereotypes. Some of these mediation analyses were found to be significant, showing that anti-social behaviour can vary depending on ideology through stereotypes as a mediating variable.Show less
This paper seeks to investigate if childhood poverty has an effect on aggression towards outgroups in adulthood. While previous research has suggested that childhood poverty has a negative effect...Show moreThis paper seeks to investigate if childhood poverty has an effect on aggression towards outgroups in adulthood. While previous research has suggested that childhood poverty has a negative effect on behavior in teenage years and on physical health during adolescence and beyond, there has not been much literature on childhood poverty and its behavioral effects in adulthood. I looked specifically if childhood poverty would have negative behavioral effects, in this case aggression towards outgroups, in adulthood. Our sample consisted of 802 members from the United Kingdom and the United States of America, 362 of which reported having experienced poverty during their childhood. They played the Joy of Destruction game, which measured aggression towards an outgroup and then filled in an online questionnaire which include current socioeconomic information and experiences of childhood poverty. The results indicated that people who experienced childhood poverty displayed more aggression towards members of an outgroup. This result contributes to the existing literature that having adverse experiences during childhood will have a negative effect on one’s behavior in adulthood.Show less
Violent political events can be manifestations of anti-social preferences against outgroup members. Prior studies have already found differences between leftists and rightists in presenting anti...Show moreViolent political events can be manifestations of anti-social preferences against outgroup members. Prior studies have already found differences between leftists and rightists in presenting anti-social preferences. Political extremism was also found closely correlated with anti-social events. However, studies about the ideological difference in antisocial preferences against outgroups and the interactive effect of ideology and political extremism on anti-social preferences against outgroups are required for a better understanding of real-life violent political events. In a large experimental study (n = 769), I examined two hypotheses: (1) Rightists have higher anti-social preferences against outgroup members than leftists; (2) Levels of political extremity may moderate the relationship between ideology and anti-social preferences against outgroup members. Participants were asked to play the Joy of Destruction game with members of different ideology, same ideology, different nationality, and same nationality from them respectively. After the game, participants were asked about their political orientation and levels of political extremity. The results showed rightists have higher anti-social preferences against national outgroups than leftists; no significant difference in anti-social preferences against ideological outgroups was found between rightists and leftists. The level of political extremity was found not significant in moderating the relationship between ideology and anti-social behaviors against both ideological outgroups and national outgroups. These findings filled the gap for us to understand the ideological differences in anti-social preference against outgroups and they may stimulate future research.Show less
Can people be motivated to experience an emotion solely due to the belief that this emotion reinforces their ideology? This study investigated whether people would be motivated to experience...Show moreCan people be motivated to experience an emotion solely due to the belief that this emotion reinforces their ideology? This study investigated whether people would be motivated to experience ideology-congruent and -incongruent emotions, if they believed these would reinforce their (left or right) ideology. A repeated-measures design showed that across ideologies, people were more motivated to experience fear when they believed it was ideology-reinforcing than when they had no such belief. Contrary to the hypothesis, for hope, the data suggested motivation to be high regardless of people’s beliefs about its usefulness for their ideology. This study also investigated potential differences between leftists and rightists in their motivation to experience ideology congruent and incongruent emotions. Whilst the data suggested rightists to be generally more motivated to experience both hope and fear, these results had to be disregarded, due to a great gender and age difference between the samples of the leftist and rightist supporters, which influenced the results. The significance and implications of the current findings are discussed.Show less
