This paper is motivated by the assumption that ‘terrorism’ is a loaded and politically significant term, the use of which exudes and produces power relations. It acknowledges this, and also argues...Show moreThis paper is motivated by the assumption that ‘terrorism’ is a loaded and politically significant term, the use of which exudes and produces power relations. It acknowledges this, and also argues that not everyone has an equal right to use the term. This leads to an examination into the kind of power that is manifested in the use of the term, by putting the social constructivist framework to work and placing the semantic field of terrorism within that framework. It identifies a kind of power attached to the enunciation of the term ‘terrorism’ and argues that it is unequally distributed between perceived potential victims of terrorism and perceived potential perpetrators of terrorism. Drawing on Nietzsche’s genealogical analysis of morality, I argue that it is counterproductive to deny potential perpetrators the power of enunciation around the term ‘terrorism’ on the basis that this leads to a kind of slave revolt in terrorism. Redistributing the power of enunciation around the term ‘terrorism’ might remove the line that separates potential victims from potential perpetrators of terrorism and work towards reducing the threat of terrorism itself by allowing those potential perpetrators to exercise this capability within mainstream society, as opposed to seeking alternative communities to do so outside of it.Show less
The main claim of this thesis is that Žižek's theory of violence is vulnerable to a reductio ad absurdum. On this point, I argue that meaning-making always involves violence against a thing 'x'...Show moreThe main claim of this thesis is that Žižek's theory of violence is vulnerable to a reductio ad absurdum. On this point, I argue that meaning-making always involves violence against a thing 'x' and its dissimilar. I name such exertion of violence as contempt. I will therefore conclude that so long as emancipation involves meaning-making, and meaning-making entails contempt, Žižek cannot claim violence can be overcome. He thus, falls prey of a contradiction that jeopardizes his potential to provide a viable theory of political change.Show less
Post-truth politics influences and challenges democracies around the world. Yet, influential political theories like Habermas’s seem unequipped to deal with it, as they are based on the premise...Show morePost-truth politics influences and challenges democracies around the world. Yet, influential political theories like Habermas’s seem unequipped to deal with it, as they are based on the premise that power is necessarily truth-sensitive. In this thesis I have confronted post-truth politics, defined as the phenomenon in which discourses that are unconcerned with truth still are power-bestowing, with Habermas' theory of communicative action. In doing so, I argue that that there is power beyond (reference to) truth. The everyday phenomenon of post-truth discourses is thus used to assess the implicit premises in our thinking, so that eventually better solutions to deal with the problems of post-truth politics can be found.Show less
In this paper I argue that the only way to eliminates cross-cultural conflicts is an hermeneutic dialogue based on the triad curiosty, dialogue and transformation. The cross/cultural dialogue is...Show moreIn this paper I argue that the only way to eliminates cross-cultural conflicts is an hermeneutic dialogue based on the triad curiosty, dialogue and transformation. The cross/cultural dialogue is initiated by the cosmopolitan irtue of curiosity, and does not aim at reaching an agreement between different cultures, but to be able to acknowledge each other's existence, a recognition that stems fro the acceptance of what is different from usShow less
The controversy surrounding the emergence of what some might call ‘immoral’ art ignites new discussions about the separation between art and life. Art seen as isolated from our normal moral lives...Show moreThe controversy surrounding the emergence of what some might call ‘immoral’ art ignites new discussions about the separation between art and life. Art seen as isolated from our normal moral lives does not seem to be the proper subject of moral evaluation. The autonomy we ascribe to art creates a gap between art and morality (or reality) that hinges respectively on purely aesthetic values and purely moral values. In return, this gap submits art to a distance from moral life where the production and enjoyment of art are radically a-moral or un-real. Moral considerations, then, cannot be properly invoked in aesthetic criticism. But how can we explain the phenomenon of immoral art without referring to moral values or disvalues? Moreover, the claim that a connection or continuity between art and life can result in immoral art corrupting our minds is highly debatable. The character of most healthy adults is resistant to moral debasement because of the level of absorption that plastic art can achieve. Consequently, it would seem that the formula “good art implies good morals, bad morals means bad art,” is outdated. For this thesis it will be taken for granted that morality can constitute the subject matter of art about which we can then make moral judgements. This paves the way for a potential intimate relation between moral and aesthetic values. It will be argued that the interdependency between the moral and the Aesthetic is one where a negative moral evaluation can translate into a positive Aesthetic evaluation; immorality can positively influence Aesthetic merit. Joel-Peter Witkin's photograph A Day in the Country (1993) will be used to make this claim credible.Show less
The conception of man as master and possessor of nature was introduced by Descartes and this view dominated ever since. Humanity has become extremely smug with his own intelligence and superiority...Show moreThe conception of man as master and possessor of nature was introduced by Descartes and this view dominated ever since. Humanity has become extremely smug with his own intelligence and superiority over nature. When we consider science and technology as parts of nature, they also subordinate to humanity. Heidegger believes that because man is so captured by this conception of himself as master and possessor, he is in fact enslaved by technology, and thereby disconnected from his own essence and from truth. These ideas are highly applicable to the case of artificial intelligence and they can explain the anxiety towards Artificial Intelligence and Robotics. This will be demonstrated through this paper. It is an attempt to show that the origin of the anxiety of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and robotics lies in man’s attachment to his self-image as master and possessor of nature.Show less
